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Title: Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks
Authors: Kubiak, Adam
Kawalec, Paweł
Kiersztyn, Adam
Keywords: Pragmatic values; Context; Reliability; Statistical test; Predictive value; Frequentism
Issue Date: 18-Mar-2021
Publisher: Springer
Citation: Axiomathes, 2021, January.
Abstract: We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.
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