Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks

Kubiak, Adam Paweł; Kawalec, Paweł; Kiersztyn, Adam

Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks

dc.contributor.author	Kubiak, Adam Paweł
dc.contributor.author	Kawalec, Paweł
dc.contributor.author	Kiersztyn, Adam
dc.date.accessioned	2021-06-23T06:45:29Z
dc.date.available	2021-06-23T06:45:29Z
dc.date.issued	2021-03-18
dc.description.abstract	We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.	pl
dc.identifier.citation	Axiomathes, 2021, January.	pl
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09541-y
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12153/1763
dc.language.iso	en	pl
dc.publisher	Springer	pl
dc.rights	Attribution 4.0 International (CC-BY 4.0)	*
dc.rights.uri	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Pragmatic values	pl
dc.subject	Context	pl
dc.subject	Reliability	pl
dc.subject	Statistical test	pl
dc.subject	Predictive value	pl
dc.subject	Frequentism	pl
dc.title	Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks	pl
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	pl