The Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objection

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dc.contributor.authorOlson, Eric T.
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-03T11:19:23Z
dc.date.available2023-03-03T11:19:23Z
dc.date.issued2021-03-10
dc.description.abstractSubstance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.pl
dc.identifier.citation"Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2021, Vol. 69, nr 1, s. 89-101pl
dc.identifier.doi10.18290/rf21691-9
dc.identifier.issn0035-7685
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12153/4511
dc.language.isoenpl
dc.publisherTowarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła IIpl
dc.rightsUznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/*
dc.subjectSwinburnepl
dc.subjectpersonal identitypl
dc.subjectimmortalitypl
dc.titleThe Dualist Project and the Remote-Control Objectionpl
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlepl
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Roczniki Filozoficzne, 2021, Tom 69, Nr 1