No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity

dc.contributor.author	Schwenkler, John
dc.date.accessioned	2023-03-03T10:50:50Z
dc.date.available	2023-03-03T10:50:50Z
dc.date.issued	2021-03-19
dc.description.abstract	A main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to explain the conditions of personal identity after all. My suggestion, instead, will be that the concept of a person’s continued existence is better taken as philosophically unanalysable.	pl
dc.identifier.citation	"Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2021, Vol. 69, nr 1, s. 57-65	pl
dc.identifier.doi	10.18290/rf21691-6
dc.identifier.issn	0035-7685
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12153/4508
dc.language.iso	en	pl
dc.publisher	Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II	pl
dc.rights	Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/	*
dc.subject	Swinburne	pl
dc.subject	dualism	pl
dc.subject	personal identity	pl
dc.subject	imaginary cases	pl
dc.title	No Work for a Theory of Personal Identity	pl
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	pl