The Revival of Substance Dualism
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Date
2021-03-19
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Abstract
I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.
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Keywords
Swinburne, dualism, personal identity, epiphenomenalism
Citation
"Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2021, Vol. 69, nr 1, s. 33-43