Swinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity

Snowdon, Paul

Swinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity

dc.contributor.author	Snowdon, Paul
dc.date.accessioned	2023-03-03T10:16:47Z
dc.date.available	2023-03-03T10:16:47Z
dc.date.issued	2021-03-19
dc.description.abstract	In chapter 2 Swinburne rejects physicalism for two reason. The first is that it is committed to entailments that do not exist. It is suggested that this reason is questionable both because there is no persuasive reason to deny there are such entailments, and also no reason to think that physicalism has such entailments. The second reason is that the mental involves privileged access by the subject and physical features do not allow privileged access. It is proposed that the physical does in fact permit privileged access. In chapter 3 Swinburne defends the Simple View of personal identity. The reasoning is very complex and rich, but it is proposed that Swinburne has not really shown that a reductionist account cannot be correct.	pl
dc.identifier.citation	"Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2021, Vol. 69, nr 1, s. 11-21	pl
dc.identifier.doi	10.18290/rf21691-2
dc.identifier.issn	0035-7685
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12153/4504
dc.language.iso	en	pl
dc.publisher	Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II	pl
dc.rights	Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/	*
dc.subject	Swinburne	pl
dc.subject	physicalism	pl
dc.subject	entailments	pl
dc.subject	privileged access	pl
dc.subject	personal identity	pl
dc.subject	Simple View	pl
dc.subject	Reductionist View	pl
dc.title	Swinburne on Physicalism and Personal Identity	pl
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	pl