Swinburne’s Hyper-Cartesian Dualism

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dc.contributor.authorCottingham, John
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-03T10:27:13Z
dc.date.available2023-03-03T10:27:13Z
dc.date.issued2021-03-19
dc.description.abstractThis paper maintains that Swinburne’s argument that the body is not essential to who I am is vulnerable to a similar objection to that put forward by Arnauld against Descartes: how do I know that my self-identification furnishes a complete and adequate account of the essential “me,” sufficient to show I could really continue to exist even were the body to be destroyed? The paper goes on to criticize Swinburne’s “hyper-Cartesian” position, that we are simply “souls who control bodies,” and thus only contingently human. This denial of our essential humanity compares unfavourably with Descartes’s own more intuitively attractive view that the human being is a genuine entity in its own right.pl
dc.identifier.citation"Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2021, Vol. 69, nr 1, s. 23-31pl
dc.identifier.doi10.18290/rf21691-3
dc.identifier.issn0035-7685
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12153/4505
dc.language.isoenpl
dc.publisherTowarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła IIpl
dc.rightsUznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/*
dc.subjectdualismpl
dc.subjectDescartespl
dc.subjecthuman beingpl
dc.subjectsoulpl
dc.subjecthyper-Cartesianpl
dc.subjectembodimentpl
dc.titleSwinburne’s Hyper-Cartesian Dualismpl
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlepl
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Roczniki Filozoficzne, 2021, Tom 69, Nr 1