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dc.contributor.authorKubiak, Adam P.-
dc.contributor.authorKawalec, Paweł-
dc.identifier.citation"European Journal for Philosophy of Science", 2021, 11,
dc.descriptionThis article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
dc.description.abstractIn this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses (N-P) by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the replicability of experiments in terms of the indirect aspect and the replicability of outcomes in terms of the direct aspect. We argue that the influence of pragmatic values is beneficial to N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability indirectly. We show that while the direct influence of pragmatic values can be beneficial, its negative effects on reliability and replicability are also unavoidable in some cases, with the direct and indirect aspects possibly being
dc.rightsUznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska*
dc.subjectstatistical testpl
dc.subjectepistemic reliabilitypl
dc.titleThe epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inferencepl
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