Roczniki Filozoficzne, 2021, Tom 69, Nr 1
Permanent URI for this collection
Browse
Browsing Roczniki Filozoficzne, 2021, Tom 69, Nr 1 by Subject "imaginary cases"
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Results Per Page
Sort Options
- ItemNo Work for a Theory of Personal Identity(Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II, 2021-03-19) Schwenkler, JohnA main element in Richard Swinburne’s (2019) argument for substance dualism concerns the conditions of a person’s continued existence over time. In this commentary I aim to question two things: first, whether the kind of imaginary cases that Swinburne relies on to make his case should be accorded the kind of weight he supposes; and second, whether philosophers should be concerned to give any substantial theory, of the sort that dualism and its competitors are apparently meant to provide, to explain the conditions of personal identity after all. My suggestion, instead, will be that the concept of a person’s continued existence is better taken as philosophically unanalysable.