Olson, Eric T.2023-03-032023-03-032021-03-10"Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2021, Vol. 69, nr 1, s. 89-1010035-7685http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12153/4511Substance dualism says that all thinking beings are immaterial. This sits awkwardly with the fact that thinking requires an intact brain. Many dualists say that bodily activity is causally necessary for thinking. But if a material thing can cause thinking, why can’t it think? No argument for dualism, however convincing, answers this question, leaving dualists with more to explain than their opponents.enUznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polskahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/Swinburnepersonal identityimmortalityinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article10.18290/rf21691-9