Robinson, Howard2023-03-032023-03-032021-03-19"Roczniki Filozoficzne", 2021, Vol. 69, nr 1, s. 33-430035-7685http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12153/4506I argue in this essay that Richard Swinburne’s revised version of Descartes’ argument in chapter 5 of his Are We Bodies or Souls? does not quite get him to the conclusion that he requires, but that a modified version of his treatment of personal identity will do the trick. I will also look critically at his argument against epiphenomenalism, where, once again, I share his conclusion but have reservations about the argument.enUznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polskahttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/Swinburnedualismpersonal identityepiphenomenalisminfo:eu-repo/semantics/article10.18290/rf21691-4