Kubiak, Adam PawełKawalec, PawełKiersztyn, Adam2021-06-232021-06-232021-03-18Axiomathes, 2021, January.http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12153/1763We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.enAttribution 4.0 International (CC-BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Pragmatic valuesContextReliabilityStatistical testPredictive valueFrequentisminfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-021-09541-y