

The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

Faculty of Philosophy

Chair of Metaphysics

**Kingsley Chidiebere Ekeocha**

Album Number: 139965

**THE CONCEPTION OF REALISTIC METAPHYSICS ACCORDING TO  
MIECZYŚLAW ALBERT KRĄPIEC**

A Doctoral Thesis written under the supervision of:  
Prof. dr. hab. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, SDB  
and Ks. dr. hab. Tomasz Duma  
Seminar: Metaphysics and Philosophical Anthropology

Lublin 2020

## Table of Contents

Abbreviations.....	vi
General Introduction.....	1
Formulating the Statement of the Problem and Thesis of the Dissertation.....	4
Aim of the Work and Choice of M. A. Krapiec.....	6
Literature .....	8
Method.....	9
Structure of the Work .....	9
Chapter One: The Realism of Metaphysics as base for the Realism of Philosophy .....	12
Introduction .....	12
1.1 Meaning of the term “Realism” .....	12
1.2 What is Metaphysics.....	13
1.2.1 Metaphysics as a Science .....	15
1.2.2 Metaphysics as Theoria .....	22
1.2.3 “Realistic Philosophy” and “Realistic Metaphysics” .....	29
1.3 The Determination of the Object of Metaphysics.....	32
1.3.1 Historical Considerations .....	32
1.3.1.1 The Object of Philosophy as a result of a generalization of Naïve Empiricism .....	32
1.3.1.2 The Object of Philosophy as a Construct of Intuitive Thought .....	34
1.3.1.2 The Object of Philosophy apprehended Abstractly .....	36
1.3.1.3 Determination of the Object of Philosophy through the Subject.....	39
1.3.1.4 The Real Object of Metaphysical Cognition .....	42
1.3.2 General and Particular Metaphysics .....	43
1.4 Determination of the Realism of Cognition.....	44
1.4.1 Types of Cognition .....	49
1.4.1.1 Existential Judgment.....	50
1.4.2 Being: The First Object of Cognition .....	53
1.4.3 The Subject-Object axis in Reflexive Cognition .....	56
1.4.4 The Problems with the Subjective and Objective axis of Cognition. ....	58
1.4.5 The Basic Characteristics of Spontaneous Cognition as necessary for Realistic Philosophy.....	60
1.4.6 Consequences for Realistic Cognition.....	61
Chapter Two: The Transcendental Properties and the Analogical Character of Being .....	64
Introduction .....	64
2.1 Historical Development and meaning of the Transcendentals .....	64
2.2 Method of Discovery of the Transcendentals .....	68
2.3 The absolute transcendental properties.....	72
2.3.1 Being as the First Transcendental.....	72
2.3.2 Being as a Thing .....	73

2.3.2.1 How to discover Transcendental Res .....	75
2.3.2.2 Transcendental Res and the Law of Identity .....	78
2.3.3 Transcendental Unity.....	79
2.3.3.1 The Ways of discovering Being as something One.....	82
2.3.3.2 The Discovery of the Law of Non-Contradiction as the Foundation for Ontological Unity ....	83
2.3.4 Being as a Second Something .....	85
2.3.4.1 How do we discover Being as Something Separate?.....	89
2.3.4.2 The Principle of Excluded Middle as the Epistemological Expression of Aliquid.....	90
2.4 The Relative Transcendental Properties .....	90
2.4.1 Being and Truth.....	91
2.4.1.1 How do we discover Transcendental True?.....	95
2.4.1.2 The Law of Intelligibility of Being as the Epistemological Expression of Transcendental True. .....	96
2.4.5 Transcendental Good.....	97
2.4.5.1 The principle of Finality .....	100
2.4.6 Transcendental Beauty .....	102
2.4.6.1 The Transcendental Status of Beauty .....	102
2.4.6.2 The Ways Being is Discovered as Beauty .....	106
2.4.6.3 Principle of the Law of Integrity (Perfection) as a Law of the Existence of Things .....	107
2.5 Analogy of Being: The mode of Existence, the Mode of Cognition and the mode of Predication .....	109
Introduction .....	109
2.5.1 Historical Excursus.....	109
2.5.1.1 Cajetan: The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being.....	113
2.5.1.2 Krapiec's Idea of Analogy.....	115
2.5.1.3 Analogy within Being as a Response to the Problem of Plurality .....	116
2.5.2 Analogy between Beings .....	119
2.5.3 Analogy in Connection with Cognition.....	125
2.5.4 The Sufficient Reason for the Analogical Existence of Being .....	129
2.6 Chapter Summary .....	132
Chapter Three: The Discovery of the Nature of Being.....	133
Introduction .....	133
3.1 Understanding the Fact of Ontic Structural Complexity .....	135
3.1.1. Structural Composition in Non-Metaphysical Disciplines .....	135
3.1.2 The Metaphysical Path towards the Discovery of the Constitutive Nature of Being .....	141
3.1.3 The Metaphysical Method for the discovery of the Constitutive Nature of Being.....	143
3.2 The Activity and the Dynamic Nature of Beings .....	144
3.2.1 Act and Potency: The search for the source of the dynamism of being.....	145
3.2.2 Explaining Dynamism and Change through Act and Potency.....	148

3.2.3 Arguments for the Composition of Being through Act and Potency .....	153
3.2.4 The Discovery of Act and Potency through Metaphysical Separation .....	157
3.2.5 The Inherent Relation between Act and Potency.....	158
3.2.7 The Real Difference between Act and Potency .....	161
3.3 Substance and Accidents as Explanation of the Identical Existence of Being .....	162
3.3.1 The Meaning of the term and the Historical Development of the Substance Debate .....	162
3.3.2 Substance as the Base of Identity .....	165
3.3.3. Nature and Person: An Instantiation of the Subsistent Unity of a Substance Being. ....	167
3.3.4 Accidents .....	168
3.3.5 Ways of discovering the Composition of Substance and Accidents in Beings .....	171
3.4 The Composition of matter and form as justification for the changeable nature of substantial beings .....	172
3.4.1 The Constitution of Material Beings .....	173
3.4.2 Metaphysical Separation and the discovery of the Matter-Form Composition in Being.....	177
3.4.3 Problems Connected with the Matter and Form Composition.....	177
3.5 The Composition of Existence and Essence as Justification for the Contingency of Being.....	180
3.5.1 The Meaning of Existence and the Historical Development of the Problem of Existence.....	180
3.5.2 Krapiec's Adoption of Aquinas' Conception of Being and the Demonstration of the Essence-Existence Distinction.....	185
3.5.3 Arguments for the Real Difference between Essence and Existence .....	187
3.6 The Composition of Being as Foundation for the Causal Cognition of Being .....	190
3.6.1 Historical Development and Etymological Considerations in the Causal Cognition of Being .	191
3.6.2 Material Causation:.....	195
3.6.3 The functionality of Formal causation.....	196
3.6.4 Efficient Causality .....	197
3.6.5 Final Causation .....	199
Cognitive Consequences .....	200
3.7 Conclusion .....	201
Chapter Four: Metaphysical and Methodological Considerations of Mieczysław Albert Krapiec's Metaphysics .....	202
Introduction .....	202
4.1 Metaphysical Considerations.....	203
4.1.3. Is Mieczysław Albert Krapiec a Realist or Thomist? .....	215
4.2 Methodological Considerations .....	221
4.2.1. Maximalism.....	224
4.2.2. Historicism .....	225
4.2.3. Reductive Thinking .....	226
4.3. Realistic Philosophy and Contra-Ideologisms .....	228
4.3.1 Contra-Nominalism .....	229

4.3.2 Contra-Idealism .....	234
4.3.3 Contra-Positivism .....	236
4.4 The End of Realistic Cognition .....	238
4.5 Some Disputed Questions .....	240
4.6 Summary .....	248
4.7 Evaluation and Conclusion .....	250
Bibliography .....	256

## Abbreviations

### Plato

<i>Crat</i>	<i>Cratylus</i>
<i>Rep</i>	<i>Republic</i>
<i>Tim</i>	<i>Timaeus</i>

### Aristotle

<i>Apost</i>	<i>Analytica Posteriora</i> [Posterior Analytics]
<i>Cat</i>	<i>Categoriae</i> [Categories]
<i>DA</i>	<i>De Anima</i> [On the Soul]
<i>EN</i>	<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i> [Nicomachean Ethics]
<i>Met</i>	<i>Metaphysica</i> [Metaphysics]
<i>Phys</i>	<i>Physica</i> [Physics]
<i>Top</i>	<i>Topica</i> [Topics]

### Thomas Aquinas

<i>De Ver</i>	<i>Quaestiones disputate de Veritate</i>
<i>Ente</i>	<i>De Ente et Essentia</i>
<i>In Boeth de Hebd</i>	<i>Expositio in librum Boethii De hebdomadibus</i>
<i>In Boeth de Trin</i>	<i>Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate</i>
<i>In De Caelo</i>	<i>Sententia de caelo et mundo</i>
<i>In Phys</i>	<i>Sententia super Physicam</i>
<i>Periherm</i>	<i>Sententia super Peri hermenias</i>
<i>Pot</i>	<i>De potentia</i>
<i>Q. de anima</i>	<i>Questiones disputate de anima</i>
<i>Quodlibet</i>	<i>Quaestiones de quodlibet</i>
<i>SCG</i>	<i>Summa Contra Gentiles</i>
<i>Sent</i>	<i>Scriptum super libros Sententiarum</i>
<i>Sent. Libri De Anima</i>	<i>Sententia super De anima</i>
<i>ST</i>	<i>Summa Theologiae</i>

## General Introduction

The possibility of metaphysics<sup>1</sup> has been a legitimate question since the time of Immanuel Kant, for he was the first philosopher to posit the question: “How is metaphysics possible?”<sup>2</sup> I will refer to this as the “possibility question” for the purpose of this work. This possibility question, however, was not out of Kant’s skepticism but rather as a challenge to traditional metaphysics.<sup>3</sup> The challenge which Kant termed his “Copernican revolution,” produced a metaphysics that was revolutionary, reformed and critical.”<sup>4</sup> Kant devoted his *Critique of Pure Reason* to formulating a metaphysics that was founded on synthetic *a priori* cognition.<sup>5</sup> The recommendations from Kant’s methodology and conclusions warrant a jettisoning of classical metaphysics due to its illusory results and inability to apprehend things-in-themselves.<sup>6</sup> Thus Kant “simply discredits all forms of metaphysical realism, or the traditional epistemological claims, which go back to ancient Greece, to know the mind-independent world as it is.”<sup>7</sup> In its place, a new body of objective knowledge emerged with the aim of taking humanity from an illusory foundation to the frontiers of pure reason without the repudiation of metaphysics as a science.

It is important to note that the possibility question for Kant refers to a specific kind of knowledge. Kant was investigating how synthetic *a priori* knowledge was possible.<sup>8</sup> Why did Kant start his analyses from judgments? He was convinced that rational and true knowledge are given only in judgments. Therefore he aimed at the discovery of the nature of judgments which enrich our knowledge. These are synthetic-a priori judgments. They make knowledge possible (synthesis of experiential data). But at the same time they exclude metaphysics, because it goes beyond experience (synthesis concerns only experiential data).

---

<sup>1</sup> Rohlf states that the focal point of Kant’s investigation in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is “the possibility of metaphysics.” Rohlf, Michael, “Immanuel Kant”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/kant/>>.

<sup>2</sup> Jonathan E. Lowe, *The Possibility of Metaphysics, Substance, Identity and Time* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 1. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), B 22.

<sup>3</sup> Frederick Copleston identifies different senses of the term ‘metaphysics’ as they appear in Kant’s works. In the first place, Kant uses it to refer to (a) “the whole body of philosophical knowledge attained or attainable by the power of pure reason;” (b) sometimes the term extends to what Kant calls ‘critical philosophy;’ (c) a natural disposition or tendency; (d) a science of the supersensible. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy, The Enlightenment: Voltaire to Kant*, vol. 6 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2003 Edition), 215-216.

<sup>4</sup> Graham Bird, Introduction to *A Companion to Kant* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010), 5.

<sup>5</sup> Rohlf, Michael, “Immanuel Kant”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/kant/>>.

<sup>6</sup> Copleston, *Voltaire to Kant*, 277.

<sup>7</sup> Tom Rockmore, “Remarks on the structure of twentieth century philosophy,” Paper presented at a conference at Utrecht University, The Netherlands, June 26th, 2003. *Ars Disputandi*, 3:1, 332-339, DOI: 10.1080/15665399.2003.10819801.

<sup>8</sup> Copleston, *Voltaire to Kant*, 218-219.

My work, however, directs the possibility question to classical philosophy<sup>9</sup>, following the Aristotelian-Thomistic model. Furthermore, I consider it necessary to state here that an important aspect of the possibility question is the consideration of the scientificity of metaphysics. This I refer to as the *scientificity* question. In setting the parameters of metaphysics, some of the philosophers who attempted to proffer solution to the possibility question, were not only establishing the limit of human reason or developing a novel model of metaphysics, they were also building a metaphysics that could qualify as *science*. By dividing the phenomenal world from the noumenal world and by arguing for the impossibility of grasping the noumenal world, Kant takes a big swipe on classical metaphysics.<sup>10</sup>

Although Kant is acknowledged as the first person to explicitly state the possibility question, he is not the first to be critical of metaphysics. If Kant's approach to the metaphysics question is termed 'critical' or 'revolutionary,' the approach of some other philosophers or group of philosophers are no less critical. Among them would be David Hume, whom Kant acknowledges had woken him up from his dogmatic slumber.<sup>11</sup>

David Hume is known for his famous statement against metaphysics that any book of metaphysics should be committed to the flames because they are not based on facts.<sup>12</sup> In fact, Hume's tenacious opposition to metaphysics necessitates his characterization by logical

---

<sup>9</sup> I use the term "classical philosophy" in a way similar to Stanisław Kamiński as "the philosophy shaped by Plato and Aristotle, developed by the Scholastics, and modified in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries to such an extent that it has been preserved essentially unchanged mainly in the form of the so called Christian Philosophy, and as a part of the philosophical currents continuing the Peripathetic tradition. It is the standalone kind of rational cognition of reality that explains it in an ultimate and necessary way." Stanisław Kamiński "The Theory of Being and other Philosophical Disciplines" in Wojciech Daszkiewicz, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics* (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2018), 15.

<sup>10</sup> Here, I do not suggest that Kant directly criticized Aristotelian Metaphysics. Kant was trained in the metaphysics of Wolf and Meier and he focused more on resolving the problem between the rationalists and empiricists. I am interested instead in the consequence of Kant's synthetic-*a priori* judgments for classical metaphysics. 'Critical' in the way I applied it above refer to the opposing path between Kantian Metaphysics and Classical metaphysics, particularly, Aristotelian metaphysics. These opposing paths can be seen in two instances: the first point is the relationship between the principles of knowledge and being. In Kant's Metaphysics, there is a dichotomy between the first principles of knowledge and being. Principles of knowledge perform conceptual functions unlike in Aristotle where they are principles of being. Secondly, Kant's conception of Metaphysics differs essentially and substantially from Aristotle's. The role and nature of experience in both philosophies is on opposite directions. Metaphysics, for Kant is an *a priori* discipline that deals with *a priori* concepts. For Aristotle, on the other hand, concepts like form, matter etc. are not developed *a priori*, they are formed within the realms of experience. Cf. Nathan Rotenstreich. "Kant's Concept of Metaphysics." *Revue Internationale De Philosophie* 8, no. 30 (1954): 393-394. Accessed August 3, 2020. [www.jstor.org/stable/23936829](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23936829). One could also consider that necessity and universality, which are two important elements of *a priori* judgments, cannot be in the results from experience.

<sup>11</sup> Copleston, *Voltaire to Kant*, 218.

<sup>12</sup> David Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" in *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge 3rd edn. rev. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 165.



positivists as “an implacable enemy of metaphysics.”<sup>13</sup> With regard to the scientificity question, Hume avers:

Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly a science; but arise either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness.<sup>14</sup>

Hume’s investigation will show that metaphysics, aligned to the Aristotelian-Thomistic trend, as the quest for understanding the ultimate nature of reality, is beyond reason’s scope. Hume doubted if “causal relations are objective and irreducible features of reality.”<sup>15</sup> With regard to substance, Hume is considered to be either a sceptic or a nihilists.<sup>16</sup> Instead of substance, he focuses on impressions and ideas.<sup>17</sup> These positions cast a great shade on these two important aspects of realistic metaphysics, namely, causality and substance.

The impact of Hume’s philosophy was quite enormous and is reflected in the philosophical inclinations of his successors, because “since the time of Hume, there have been philosophers who have proposed that metaphysics is “impossible”—either because its questions are meaningless or because they are impossible to answer.”<sup>18</sup> Among them are the logical positivists also known as the logical empiricists.<sup>19</sup>

The logical positivists carved out a new direction and task for philosophy in relation to science. They maintained that “philosophy does not sit in judgment of science; nor does it aim to provide science with “foundations.” Rather, philosophy must orient itself to the sciences and test its claims about science against the best science of the day. This regard for science urgently raises the question of the task of philosophy.”<sup>20</sup> Such task strips philosophy of its autonomy and makes philosophy a subservient to science. However, that is not all. The logical positivists orchestrated an intellectual-methodological campaign for eradicating metaphysics. In the first

---

<sup>13</sup> Don Garrett, “David Hume,” in *A Companion to Metaphysics*, Jaegwon Kim, Ernest S., Gary R. (Eds.), 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009), 306.

<sup>14</sup> David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, 11.

<sup>15</sup> Peter van Inwagen, and Meghan Sullivan, “Metaphysics”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/metaphysics/>>.

<sup>16</sup> Howard Robinson, “Substance,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/substance/>>.

<sup>17</sup> William Edward Morris and Charlotte R. Brown, “David Hume,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, forthcoming URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/hume/>>.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> For a detailed explanation of the origin and application of the nomenclature see: Thomas Uebel, “‘Logical Positivism’ ‘Logical Empiricism:’ What’s in a Name.” *Perspectives on Science* 21, 1 (Spring 2013): 58-99. [https://doi.org/10.1162/POSC\\_a\\_00086](https://doi.org/10.1162/POSC_a_00086).

<sup>20</sup> Thomas Ricketts, “Logical Positivism” in *A Companion to Metaphysics*, 382.

chapter of the work *Language, Truth and Logic*, A. J. Ayer devotes his attention to “the elimination of Metaphysics.” There he stipulates that his aim was to discredit metaphysical statements by showing that they lack “literal significance.”<sup>21</sup> The methodological tool for determining the value of a statement is the verifiability principle, which states that “a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express – that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.”<sup>22</sup> Metaphysical statements fail this criteria and should be regarded as nonsense since they do not express tautologies or empirical hypothesis.<sup>23</sup>

From the above historical excursus, three problems can be detected: firstly, is the disintegration of the philosophical disciplines through an exclusion of metaphysics; secondly is the subjugation of the whole of philosophy to the service of the natural sciences and thirdly, the annihilation of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline by a distortion of its object of investigation and the institution of varied (non-autonomous) methods for metaphysical investigations.

This brief exposition sets the stage for philosophers, particularly in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, to show and defend the possibility and scientificity of classical metaphysics. Several philosophers across different parts of Europe and America have undertaken this noble task of reinventing, re-instituting and re-establishing the scientificity of metaphysics in a unique way, different from the natural sciences yet maintaining its autonomy as a science. One of such philosophers who has given an affirmative proposal to the scientific and possibility questions, whose works have captivated my interest, is the Polish philosopher, Mieczysław Albert Krapiec.

### **Formulating the Statement of the Problem and Thesis of the Dissertation**

The wide-ranging methods and approaches in doing philosophy are not to be taken for granted. Indeed they have become “the primary issue for every philosopher.”<sup>24</sup> The Cartesian,<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Alfred Jules Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952), 34.

<sup>22</sup> Ayer A. J. *Language, Truth and Logic*, 34.

<sup>23</sup> Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, 41.

<sup>24</sup> Stanisław Kamiński, “The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being” in *On The Methodology of Metaphysics*” ed. Wojciech Daszkiewicz (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2018), 205.

<sup>25</sup> Although Descartes was not mentioned earlier, his contribution to this discussion is vital. The introduction of Descartes’ *cogito* is significant. Even prior to Kant, Descartes had already taken a more epistemological than metaphysical approach. In his time and in the years that would follow, Descartes’ radical dualism would create a rift between Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics and Cartesianism. See D. W. Hamlyn, “History of Metaphysics” in *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, ed. Ted Honderich, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 591.

Kantian, Humean and the Positivist way of philosophizing implies an annihilation of classical metaphysics, deprives philosophy of its autonomy, and reduces philosophy to a meta-science by making it a scientistic philosophy.<sup>26</sup> Andrzej Maryniarczyk's succinctly captures the problem when he writes:

No one could cast any doubt on the scientific character of metaphysics throughout Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Only in the modern era, beginning from the 17<sup>th</sup> century, and later on, in contemporary times, when substance – which had always been the proper object of metaphysics – began to be eliminated and replaced with the idea, consciousness data, language, etc., while methods from outside the field of philosophy (logic, mathematics, sociology, psychology, linguistics) began to be transmitted straight into it, voices have been raised proclaiming “the end” (death) of metaphysics as a science.<sup>27</sup>

These problems are the effects and consequences of aforementioned approaches to the possibility and scientificity questions. The need to respond to these questions differently becomes imperative as without it, classical metaphysics is lost, while philosophy remains at the subservience of the sciences.

My thesis is that Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec's *conception of realistic metaphysics* is an adequate and sufficient response to the possibility and scientificity questions. I do not defend the thesis that Krąpiec's metaphysical realism is a *perfect* response; neither do I defend that it is the *only* response. My claim is that it does enough to establish the parameters metaphysics operates as a science. Krąpiec's response asserts the scientificity of metaphysics by identifying the peculiar object of metaphysics in contradistinction from that of the natural sciences. The object of metaphysics is being, understood in the light of its ultimate principles, wherein existence plays a fundamental role.

It redefines the relationship between metaphysics and the natural sciences by pointing out how the results of the sciences inspire metaphysics instead of scientifying it or eliminating it entirely. In turn, metaphysics neither replaces nor imposes its method on any of the sciences.

The sufficiency of Krąpiec's realistic metaphysics is not limited to the identification of the object of metaphysical cognition, but is also seen in the method applied in the apprehension of this object. In his bid to respond to the annihilation of metaphysics by Hume, Kant and the rest,

---

<sup>26</sup> According to Stanisław Kamiński, the concept of scientistic philosophy is “connected in an essential way with the particular sciences, and takes the form of either a meta-science (epistemology and logic of science) or a knowledge which takes as the object of deeper explanations the commonly accepted scientific facts, or the most general scientific theses, or finally, a knowledge that includes scientific assertions in its own expositions.” Cf. Stanisław Kamiński, “The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being,” in *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, ed. Wojciech Daszkiewicz (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2018), 207.

<sup>27</sup> Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Introduction to *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, 7.

Krapiec discovered that although philosophy is considered to be one of the oldest disciplines, it still lacked a “satisfactorily developed methodology of its own.”<sup>28</sup> Metaphysical separation, which appeared as *separatio* in Thomas Aquinas’ works, occupies a central place in the metaphysics of M. A. Krapiec. Whereas Krapiec demonstrates this method only in the apprehension of the being as being, a reconstruction of his metaphysics which this dissertation engages in, would extend this method to the whole of Krapiec’s metaphysics (except for analogy of being). The argument I formulate for this extension is that since metaphysical cognition is characterized as separation-based cognition, metaphysical cognition cannot be limited to only to the discovery of the subject matter of metaphysics or to being as the first transcendental. The method stretches to the discovery of the undividedness of being, its separateness, its ordination to the human intellect and will and to the integrated, simultaneous act of the intellect and will. Metaphysical separation will further stretch to the discovery of the source of the dynamic nature of being, its contingency, and mutability.

The discussion between realism, idealism, and subjectivism forms a vital part of the problem which this thesis confronts. Krapiec chooses realism as *his adequate* response to the possibility and scientificity questions by demonstrating that metaphysics secures our connection with real beings, a feat which, in the Kantian model, would be impossible. Both metaphysical and epistemological realism form vital part of Krapiec’s defense. Krapiec endeavors to show the connection between how things exist and how we cognize them. He anchors the realism of his metaphysics, on this connection. In this way, there is an integration of both *how beings exist* and *how beings are known*. Krapiec’s realism therefore attempts to prevent the nihilism of classical metaphysics.

### **Aim of the Work and Choice of M. A. Krapiec**

This work aims at a deeper understanding of the world of persons, animals and things – the real world.<sup>29</sup> It seeks to unveil the truth of the world through the prism of Krapiec’s metaphysical realism. An affirmative response to the possibility and scientificity questions leads the cognizer to appreciate the sapiential character of metaphysics which leads the cognizer to the most

---

<sup>28</sup> Mieczysław Albert Krapiec, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, Trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2010), 20.

<sup>29</sup> The metaphysical understanding of the world of persons and things could be considered one of the central themes of Krapiec’s entire philosophy, so much that he devotes an entire work to this cause. See Krapiec, M. A. *O rozumienie swiata* [On the Understanding of the World], (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL), 2002.

fundamental elements which constitute our world. In a world that is saturated with metaphysical, anthropological and epistemic confusion, it is pertinent and imperative to return to the *plan* in order to *read* reality, which has always been an open book. The prevailing discussions on gender, transhumanism or post-humanism theories and the like, are evidence and fruits of reductionist approach to the world and human being. The substantial and accidental compositions of the human person, for instance, cannot be reduced to *feelings* and *emotions*. The essence and identity of our world is much more than emotion.

This work is also aimed at a demonstration of *how to do metaphysics*. Philosophy as metaphysics is a dialogue with reality. This work will undertake some demonstrative methods to achieve this aim. The emphasis is to show how to ensure an objective, realistic interpretation of reality, absent of any form of imposition or distortion.

While I acknowledge that M. A. Krapiec is not the first philosopher to call for a revival and return to classical philosophy, his unique ideas and style of writing have captivated my interest. Firstly, Krapiec's metaphysics orchestrates a firm affirmative response to the possibility question and a subsequent demonstration of this possibility. My choice of M. A. Krapiec was also inspired by his progress and immense contributions to the fount of metaphysical knowledge. The height of his progress is evident in his methodological precision and demonstration in the apprehension of being as being. This aspect of his philosophy – the three steps in metaphysical separation as well as the particular reason - brings a totally new dimension to the discussion, a dimension not found in Thomas Aquinas or Etienne Gilson, or Maritain. The results of this method shows that metaphysical cognition is not a product of mere presuppositions or dogmatic constants but rather proceed from systemic procedures which form the base of its scientificity.

The choice of M. A. Krapiec in proffering answers to the scientificity question is not arbitrary. It is consequent on his background as one of the founders of one of the greatest realistic intellectual centers of his time in Poland – the Lublin philosophical school. This school was instituted to confront Marxism which was the prevailing philosophy of the time in Poland. However, having chosen the path of realism as the tool to stand toe-to-toe with Marxism, the school also had to deal with idealism, subjectivism, and essentialism. Philosophical currents like phenomenology, existentialism and positivism were not left out of the discussion. The implication is that Mieczysław Albert Krapiec is not a neophyte in dealing with Marxism or in discussing with other philosophical schools. His metaphysics (and philosophy generally),

therefore, is an inspiration when it is applied to contemporary discussions on issues like trans-humanism, gender ideology, identity etc.

## Literature

This work is a product of a wide range of available literature written by M. A. Krapiec. As a prolific and voluminous writer, a lot of books and articles are accredited to him. In fact according to Chudy, “Krapiec’s literary legacy includes 30 books and over 400 articles.”<sup>30</sup> These works spread across a wide range of areas like: Metaphysics, Metaphysics of Man, Methodology of Metaphysics, metaphysics of cognition, philosophy of culture, law and politics, etc.<sup>31</sup> Whereas, most of these works are written and published in Polish, a significant portion of relevant texts for this work has been translated into English. This work dwells primarily on these translated texts without neglecting the original Polish texts.

The first set of materials are some specific texts from the 23 volumes of the set of works labelled “Dzieła.” Among these books, there are some translated related works used for this dissertation. Such translated books include: *Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being* (primary text), originally published as *Metafizyka* (Poznan: 1966); *I – Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology* (originally published as *Ja – człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej*, Lublin: TN KUL, 1974) Translated by M. Lescoe, et al. Connecticut: Mariel Publications, 1983; *The Lublin Philosophical School*, Trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2010); *Understanding Philosophy*, trans. Hugh McDonald, 2007. This work is a translated manuscript of the book, *O rozumienie filozofii* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1991). This work will be cited in this dissertation as a manuscript. Another important set of materials are the numerous translated articles of M. A. Krapiec in the *Powszechna Encyclopedia Filozofii* [*The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*]. There are over 90 articles already translated into English. For the purpose of citation, only the range of the entries as they appear in the encyclopedia will be cited. The English translations are unpublished and are available at the office of the chair of Metaphysics.

---

<sup>30</sup> Wojciech Chudy, “Mieczysław Albert Krapiec in the Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, no. 4 (October – December 2018):551. DOI: 10.26385/SG.070428.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

The secondary sources consulted are mainly works written in English by authors who are either collaborators with M. A. Krapiec, his students and many others who are inspired by his works. Notable among these are the Notebook on Metaphysics Series authored by Andrzej Maryniarczyk, the immediate successor to M. A. Krapiec as well as the current chair of Metaphysics at the Pope John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin: *The Monistic and Dualistic Interpretation of Reality* (2010); *Rationality and Finality of the World of Persons and Things* (2016); *On Causes, Participation and Analogy* (2017), *Discovery of The Internal Structure of Being* (2018). The works of Piotr Jaroszyński were also valuable. These include: *Science in Culture* (2007); “Beauty and being: Thomistic perspectives.” (2010); and *Metaphysics or Ontology?* (2018).

## **Method**

This research is based on an analysis of texts, which, however, are not just about extracting what and where has been said. The analysis of text enables one to grasp systematically, the problematique in the formulation of the possibility and scientificity questions. The determination of this problem evokes a response and a novel formulation of realistic metaphysics.

A second method that is employed in this work is metaphysical explanation. The metaphysical explanation has an intuitive-reductive character. It is aimed at discovering the ultimate reason of being, particularly in the inner structure of being.<sup>32</sup> This method manifests in the objectival, non-contradictable reasons for the being of things. Hence I will proceed from what is given in experience and investigate the “why” of such experience. The investigation leads to the discovery of ontic principles as the reason for what is given in experience. This method is very much in agreement with that adopted by M. A. Krapiec.

I will employ both systematic and historical methods in the various discussions in the work.

## **Structure of the Work**

This work is divided into four chapters. The first chapter, however, is preceded by a general introduction in which the problem is formulated and the thesis, questions and methods of this dissertation are stated.

The first chapter commences with explication of key concepts and terms applicable to this dissertation. These concepts include: realism, metaphysics, realistic metaphysics, and realistic

---

<sup>32</sup> Stanisław Kamiński, “The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being” in *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, 242-243.

philosophy. The first response to the possibility question is seen in the adoption of Aristotle's conception of metaphysics as a science. The discussion on realistic metaphysics brings metaphysics to the limelight as a specific kind of cognition. Hence, a shift from mere conceptual exposition to actual metaphysical demonstration is observable therein. The conceptual explication gives way for a cognitive demonstration on *how* to do metaphysics. With the scientificity and possibility questions in view, I will proceed to the discovery of the object of realistic metaphysics. But the search for this object requires a panoramic view of previous attempts. The culminating point of the first chapter is the discovery of being *qua* being as the object of metaphysical cognition. Another point which this first chapter highlights is the unification of all the philosophical disciplines under metaphysics. Instead of being a subservient of the sciences, Metaphysics becomes the bond that holds all philosophical disciplines, such that philosophy becomes a metaphysical philosophy.

The second chapter comprises of three important metaphysical issues: the transcendental properties of being, the first metaphysical principles and the analogical existence/predication of being. I will put emphasis on M. A. Krapiec's insistence that the transcendental properties are real properties of being, that is, they are not merely propositional statements about being. These properties are: being, thing, one, something, true, good and beauty. Special attention is given to the use of metaphysical separation in the grasping of each of the transcendental properties. I will place this method at the heart of Krapiec's metaphysics. These transcendental properties reveal the rational character of the world which are expressed through different metaphysical laws like the law of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, law of intelligibility, and the law of perfection of being.

Chapter three is divided into two parts: the first part discusses the structure of being while the second part discusses the *sapiential* character of metaphysical cognition through the causal apprehension of being. The first part consists of a structural dissection of being to reveal its composite character. The composition comprises sub-ontic elements that are ordered to one another. These are act and potency; substance and accidents, matter and form, essence and existence. These sub-ontic pairs lead to the knowledge of the dynamic, mutable, and existential characters of being. Furthermore the material, formal, efficient and final causes of being manifest both the ontic make-up and external factors that play essential roles in the emergence of a being. Despite the long range of disputes in these areas, I will endeavor to channel attention



to the cognitive path of the discovery of these sub-ontic elements. This does not prevent me from identifying which camp Krapiec belongs to in those metaphysical disputes.

Chapter four is devoted to metaphysical and methodological considerations. While the previous chapters were, more or less, exposition of Krapiec's ideas, this chapter is my personal assessment of his conception of realistic metaphysics. One of the most important points here is to determine if M. A. Krapiec's philosophy does justice to the possibility and scientificity questions. Also, I had to characterize Krapiec's metaphysics as a prototype of existential Thomism. Despite being an existential Thomist, it is likely that Krapiec would prefer to be addressed as a realist than a Thomist. There are textual evidences that support such claim. However being a realist does not exclude being a Thomist.

This final chapter consists of two parts: metaphysical and methodological. The metaphysical considerations address key metaphysical questions emerging from the previous chapters. There I will consider the place of Krapiec's metaphysics in contemporary discussions, highlighting its similarities and differences with other philosophers. The methodological considerations attempt to extract methodological tools employed by Krapiec for doing realistic metaphysics. I will discuss how his realistic metaphysics differs from nominalist, idealist and positivist ideas. Criticisms and appraisals of Krapiec's works form part of the evaluation while the work concludes with key discoveries of the dissertation. These key discoveries, together with the analysis carried out in the dissertation, would show the originality, depth and significance of Krapiec's conception of realistic metaphysics.

# Chapter One: The Realism of Metaphysics as base for the Realism of Philosophy

## Introduction

This section discusses the starting point of Metaphysics. It begins with the explication of terminologies like “realism,” “metaphysics,” and “realistic metaphysics.” It attempts to demonstrate the ‘scientific’ sense of metaphysics, pointing to its object and end, as well as its autonomous methods of demonstration which Mieczysław Krapiec considers to be ‘analogous’ to those employed by partial metaphysics. The subtitle *the realism of metaphysics as a base for the realism of philosophy*, indicates, as would be demonstrated, that the starting point of metaphysics is indeed the starting point for all philosophical disciplines, namely, existing things. Metaphysics, the study of being, is indispensable for the realistic understanding of man, of culture, human action and morality.

### 1.1 Meaning of the term “Realism”

The term *realism* is a noun from the Latin word *realis* which means something which exists, concrete, true. The term cuts across various disciplines, phenomena, and subject matters, for example: “ethics, aesthetics, causation, modality, science, mathematics, semantics, and the everyday world of macroscopic material objects and their properties.”<sup>33</sup> It is also used in literature and art. In philosophy, realism refers to the existence of things as “mind-independent.” This means that their existence or other properties do not depend on how we view, perceive or conceptualize them.<sup>34</sup> Three forms of realism can be identified in philosophy: epistemological realism, metaphysical (ontological) realism and semantic realism.<sup>35</sup>

According to John Haldane, Metaphysical realism is concerned with existence and answers questions referring to existence in a specific way. If asked, for instance, whether things of a certain sort exist; if they exist, how do they manifest their existence? To the first part of the question, some philosophers would answer in the affirmative while some others would answer negatively. The affirmation of the existence of things of a certain sort would require an attempt

---

<sup>33</sup> Alexander Miller, "Realism," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/>>.

<sup>34</sup> William P. Alston, introduction to *Realism and AntiRealism*, ed. William Alston (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 1.

<sup>35</sup> Here I am employing the division, classification and explanation employed by John Haldane in his lecture on “Aquinas and Realism” at the University of Chicago. Cf. John Haldane, “Aquinas and Realism” (YouTube video, 1:04:20, October 30, 2013), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8MnS6A7mzwE&list=WL&t=2107s&index=3>.

at the second part of the question, namely: in what way do they exist? A (moderate) realist would reply that they exist mind-independently while an anti-realist would reply that they exist dependently on the mind. The questions pertaining existence also apply to knowledge. To the question: “what can we know?” a realist would reply that we know things themselves while an anti-realist would opt for representations of things or rather ideas. A second question on the part of knowledge is: How are things known? To a realist, man can, and has the capacity to cognize things as they are in themselves; while for an anti-realist, we can only know representations.<sup>36</sup>

Realism is also prominent in philosophy with particular reference to the problem of universals. While some philosophers posit that properties such as redness, justice, goodness, beauty exist, others oppose such view. In this sense, realism is in opposition to nominalism and idealism.<sup>37</sup> In fact, the realism-antirealism debate is so complicated because while one may be a realist in one sense, he could be anti-realist in another sense. For example, one could accept that “this table” exists yet its existence is not independent of mind. In the first case, the person is a realist, while in the second, the person is anti-realist. It is obvious then that the term realism can apply to different philosophers in different senses. Plato, for instance, is referred to as a realist by some philosophers because he posits the existence of forms in the platonic heavens (*universalia ante res*) while Aristotle is also considered a realist, despite the fact that he differs in thought with Plato, insisting that the universals exists in things (*universalia in rebus*).<sup>38</sup> While Plato is an extreme realist, Aristotle is a moderate realist.<sup>39</sup>

## 1.2 What is Metaphysics

The origin of the word *metaphysics* has been a subject of considerable debate among philosophers. Although there is a current consensus that the term was not used by Aristotle himself, it remains a subject under contention regarding how the term came to be. This debate did not arise with the ancient commentators because they believed that the term *τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά* came from Aristotle.<sup>40</sup> On the contrary, studies show that the term *τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά*

<sup>36</sup> Haldane, “Aquinas and Realism” (YouTube video, 1:04:20, October 30, 2013).

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> See John Wild, Preface to *Introduction to Realistic Philosophy* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers), ix. Here Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas are all regarded as “the greatest thinkers of the realistic tradition.”

<sup>39</sup> Bob Hale, “Realism,” *Encyclopedia Britannica* (June, 2017). <https://www.britannica.com/topic/realism-philosophy>.

<sup>40</sup> Piotr Jaroszyński, *Metaphysics or Ontology?*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasz z Akwinu, 2011), 28.

emerged three centuries after the Aristotle's death<sup>41</sup> and was used to refer to "the collection of fourteen books to which Aristotle did not give a single name."<sup>42</sup> Since the name emerged three centuries later, Aristotle could not have used the term. Most authors trace its beginning to Andronicus of Rhodes who took up an editorial task of a systematic classification of Aristotle's works. Divergent accounts of the *modus* of Andronicus' approach exist. Notable among them is Johann Gottlieb Buhle's account. Buhle's account reads that when Andronicus came across some treatises which defied classification, he simply merged them with a collection under the title "*ta meta ta physica*" understood as a set of "treatises placed after the physical ones."<sup>43</sup> This merging, Buhle claims, is the reason for the lack of coherence among the fourteen books referred to as *Metaphysics*. Buhle's account has been rejected by some philosophers like J. Owens because it makes the term metaphysics to be "doctrinally meaningless as the heading 'appendices' over a nondescript group of documents unable to be absorbed into the regular sequence of a book."<sup>44</sup> Owens rather traces its historical usage to the Peripatetics who referred to some Aristotelian treatises as such. The treatises in question were discussions about immaterial things which Aristotle had considered to be divine and were the causes of our sensible world. One can only come to the knowledge of these immaterial beings through series of rational investigations which presuppose ready-made conclusions developed and derived in other writings which Aristotle referred to as the "physical treatises." Owens therefore, concludes that metaphysics, in its origin, meant the study of the supersensible beings.<sup>45</sup>

According to Krapiec, the term *τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά* was used by Andronicus of Rhodes largely but not exclusively for editorial reasons. The term itself had already been in usage at the Lyceum to refer to works which come after the "sciences of the universe, nature, plants, and animals (which) were called *peri physeos* or simply *ta physica*."<sup>46</sup> This implies that the term *metaphysics* obviously fulfills an editorial purpose which does not reveal its origin. The classification by Andronicus of Rhodes was in accord with the tradition of the school, and the term may not have been his brainchild. History remembers Andronicus for formally bringing the term to the spotlight in the classification process.

Various attempts have been made by philosophers to describe what metaphysics is: Aristotle defines it as the science that studies being; he also refers to it as wisdom (*sophía*), first

---

<sup>41</sup> Jaroszyński, *Metaphysics or Ontology*, 27.

<sup>42</sup> Jaroszyński, *Metaphysics or Ontology*, 28.

<sup>43</sup> Joseph Owens, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Bruce publishers, 1963), 3.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>46</sup> Mieczysław Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being*, Trans. Theresa Sandok (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 3.

philosophy (πρώτη φιλοσοφία; *prima philosophía*) and even theology (θεολογική; *theologia*).<sup>47</sup> For Plato, this science is called “dialectic.” Reality, in Plato’s view, lies beyond the sensible world, in the world of forms and it is only through dialectic that man can gain access to the truth.<sup>48</sup> The 14<sup>th</sup> Century marked a historic change in the description of the science that studies being through the nominalist trend of William Ockham. In the second quarter of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Christian Wolff’s book *Philosophia prima sive ontologia* replaced the word *metaphysics* with ontology. Ontology became the science of being.<sup>49</sup>

Cognizant of several attempts to replace or substitute the term, Mieczysław Albert Krapiec insists that the proper name for the body of knowledge which deals with reality and the fundamental problems concerning reality is “metaphysics.” He defines metaphysics as: “...knowledge obtained by naturally transcendent reason (reason insofar as it employs the general principles of being and thought) seeking the primary and unique non-contradictable factors of that which exists and is given to us embryonically in our empirical intuition of the material world.”<sup>50</sup> The definition needs proper analysis and explanation in the light of Krapiec’s philosophy. Hence the rest of the chapter will endeavor to show the different components that make up this definition - the first of which is to question whether metaphysics is a science since it is a body of knowledge.

### 1.2.1 *Metaphysics as a Science*

The birthplace of rational thinking has caused a lot of controversies in the past. Some authors point to ancient Egypt due to their mathematical prowess while others consider Babylonia, India, and the Middle East. Majority of authors, however, consider ancient Greece to be the locus of the beginning of rational, scientific thinking. Such debate is not the focal point of my discussion. It suffices to mention that in Europe, scientific cognition developed in the form of philosophy<sup>51</sup> and the Greeks were considered to be the champions of this scientific development in Europe.<sup>52</sup> Piotr Jaroszyński describes what it means for a body of knowledge

---

<sup>47</sup> Jaroszyński, *Metaphysics or Ontology*, 19.

<sup>48</sup> See Jakob L. Fink, *The Development of Dialectic From Plato to Aristotle* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.

<sup>49</sup> For a detailed account of the shift from metaphysics to ontology see Piotr Jaroszyński’s *Metaphysics or Ontology?*

<sup>50</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 36.

<sup>51</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, “Filozofia nauki,” [Philosophy of Science] w *Powszechna Encyclopedia Filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, t. 3 (Lublin, 2002), 481-490.

<sup>52</sup> Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome*, vol. 1 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2003), 16.

to be *science* at that time: “A science is systematized in some way and has a clearly defined goal and object (a material and a formal object), and it uses a fitting method. Science in this respect did not take shape until the pre-Socratics.”<sup>53</sup> In Krapiec’s opinion, there have been three different conception of science since its inception: the Platonic-Aristotelian conception, the Kantian conception and the scientific model of Auguste Comte.<sup>54</sup> The application of these various forms of science is central to grasping Krapiec’s description of metaphysics as a science.

Metaphysics, for Krapiec, undoubtedly is a *science*, a science that studies being or reality.<sup>55</sup> Without clarification, the above statement would attract refutation and rejection from all angles, especially from contemporary science which has no semblance of methods with metaphysics and differs with it in respect to its end. However, one sees an attempt in Krapiec’s works to qualify the *sense* in which one can justify this claim. There are three essential factors why an unguarded and unclarified sense of *science* cannot be applied to metaphysics in Krapiec’s view: the first is connected with a twist in the contemporary usage of the term; the second has to do with the end of scientific investigations while the third has to do with methodology (which I will discuss together with the end of science).

- a. Before its contemporary usage, Krapiec claims that *science* was associated with a general scientific question διὰ τί [*diá tí*], which means “why” or “on account of what something is.”<sup>56</sup> The essence of scientific knowledge then was to explain existing reality on the grounds of the factors responsible for why they are what they are as we experience them in our spontaneous and reflective cognition.<sup>57</sup> This corresponds to the Platonic-Aristotelian conception of science. For Plato, Philosophy is the child of wonder (Theaetetus, 155d). Sometimes the cognizer is puzzled, perplexed and bewildered by the nature of our world. And this prompts a deeper investigation to discover the true nature of our world. For

---

<sup>53</sup> Jaroszyński, *Metaphysics or Ontology*, 22.

<sup>54</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, “Filozofia nauki,” 481-490.

<sup>55</sup> In the application of the word *science* to metaphysics, all positivist understanding of the term do not apply. The positivists maintain that metaphysics cannot be scientific unless it adopts the methods of modern sciences especially logic and mathematics. At the time, there was emphasis on logic as the authentic method of doing philosophy. According to the positivists only scientific knowledge qualifies to be called knowledge. By scientific knowledge they imply “facts” derived through “observable, empirical, and measurable evidence,” which is known as the scientific method. They sought a replacement for metaphysics in mathematics and logic. Cf. Luke Mastin, “positivism” in *The Basics of Philosophy*, [http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch\\_positivism.html](http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_positivism.html).

<sup>56</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, “Diá Tí” w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczk, t. 2 (2001), 556-558.

<sup>57</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, “What is Philosophy For?” in *Understanding Philosophy* (Unpubl.), trans. Hugh McDonald, 2007, 4. This book is an unpublished translation of the Polish work, *O rozumienie filozofii* (Lublin:Redakcja Wydawnictw Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1991).

Aristotle these philosophical puzzles (*aporiai*) are not to be left unattended. In fact, Aristotle devoted book B of the *Metaphysics* listing these *aporiai* and he further presented arguments in a bid to resolve them. Whether the solutions he proffered were clear or not, is another question.<sup>58</sup> Most importantly is that for Aristotle, scientific cognition was open to the whole of reality. It was not restricted or limited in a systemic way based on a priori presuppositions, neither was it restricted to sensory or cognition. Aristotle, whose work is the first to be called metaphysics, stated clearly that it is a science that studies being. However it is not the only science that studies being since the physical sciences and mathematics study parts of being. But *Metaphysics* distinguishes itself from the others because it studies being *qua* being, from a holistic and general perspective (Met 1003<sup>a</sup>25). It deals “with the first causes (*αἰτίαι*; *aitia*) and the principles (*archai*) of things” (Met 981<sup>b</sup>28). Not simply that it is a science, it is the queen of the sciences, it leads and the others follow.<sup>59</sup> Krapiec’s conception of metaphysics as a science corresponds to this Aristotelian sense of the word.

- b. If *scire* means knowledge, the basic question should be, for what end? Why does being exist? What is the essence of being? What is the end of the cognition of being? Jaroszyński gives an interesting insight regarding the various conceptions of science and the ends which they pursue. In philosophical history, we can identify different conceptions of science in connection with ends: the first is science as *theoria*; the second is science as praxis; the third is science as *threskéia*; and the fourth is science as *póiesis*.<sup>60</sup> Jaroszyński demonstrates that the change from one conception of science to the other is consequent on the change observable in the purpose and goal of scientific cognition as well as in the civilization of the time. Also the conception of science was dependent on whether science was treated as an autonomous domain of culture or whether it was only a part of other domains like morality, art and religion. Science that enjoys autonomy is called *theoria* (θεωρία); science

---

<sup>58</sup> Marc S. Cohen, "Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, forthcoming URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/>>.

<sup>59</sup> “We suppose first, then, that the wise man knows all things, as far as possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them individually; secondly, that he who can learn things that are difficult, and not easy for man to know, is wise...again, he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge; and of the sciences, also, that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey *him*.” Aristotle, *Met* 982<sup>a</sup>5-982<sup>a</sup>15.

<sup>60</sup> Piotr Jaroszyński, “Nauka w perspektywie celu poznania” [Science in the Perspective of the end-purpose of Cognition], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, t. 3 (2002), 490-494; See also *Metaphysics or Ontology*, 58.

that is a part of morality is called *praxis* (πράξις); as a part of religion, *threskéia* (θρησκεία); as part of art or production, *poesis* (ποίησις).<sup>61</sup>

Among these ends, only science as *theoria* identifies with the specific kind of metaphysics which Krapiec intends to build on. Science as *theoria* indicates the pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge. The internal force that drives this type of knowledge is truth. It is truth-oriented kind of cognition. A Science that operates as *theoria* (derived from the Greek θεᾶσθαι [theásthai], meaning, to behold), “is a cognitive beholding with respect to the truth – ‘*scire propter ipsum scire*’ (“to know in order to know with understanding.”)<sup>62</sup> Aristotle highlights this characteristic and end of such science in his *Protrepticus* and in the first book of his *Metaphysics*. Making reference to earlier text, James Collins writes:

the philosopher “possesses an ambition for a certain science (ἐπιστήμης τινός) that is honored for itself and not on account of anything else resulting from it” (71.2–4). He does not pursue mathematics and other theoretical sciences because they are useful, but because in these pursuits he is related to the truth (οἰκεῖον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας, 72.21–22). Because he is “in love with contemplation” (φιλοθεάμονα, 72.25), he pursues sciences full of amazing observations (θαυμασιωτάτων θεαμάτων οὔσαι πλήρεις, 72.25–73.1).<sup>63</sup>

There are also textual evidences of Aristotle extolling such end of science. In the *Metaphysics*, for instance, Aristotle writes: “...understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable; for he who chooses to know for the sake of knowing will choose most readily that which is most truly knowledge.” (*Met* I, 982<sup>a</sup>30–982<sup>b</sup>1).

Krapiec interprets *theoria* in a specific way that expresses the connection between the nature or essence of the cognizer and the end of science itself. The pursuit of science as *theoria* becomes a manifestation of the rational ability of the cognizer to contemplate reality and thus attain fulfilment for being true to one’s nature. Krapiec observes that the ancient times saw the acquisition of knowledge as a means to actualize man’s potentialities as rational human beings. Emphasis was not on what one could produce from the knowledge acquired, but the “delight” in the activation of what belongs to man as *homo sapiens* – a being capable of rational discourses and deliberations. Knowledge was more or less the banishment of mythological sentiments for preponderant, valuable thoughts which later shaped human civilization and

---

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Jaroszyński, “Nauka w perspektywie celu poznania,” *ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> James Henderson Collins II, *Exhortations to Philosophy: The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 254.



culture. Knowledge humanizes humanity by aiding man to attain the highest potentiality he possesses:

If the maximal actualization of man's potentialities – optimum potentiae - was synonymous with human virtue and perfection, then the actualization of man's highest faculties, the rational and cognitive faculty, that which is specific to the human being, is the crowning achievement of human potentialities for activity. It was rightly observed that each thing exists for the sake of an activity (esse propter agere), whereas in the case of man, he is "to be for the sake of himself, as for one who acts" (esse propter seipsum ut agentem).<sup>64</sup>

The pursuance of knowledge in the ancient time was primarily for this purpose – to be human, to take delight in my humanity as a being capable of knowledge. That is the meaning of the slogan "*scire propter ipsum scire*" which means knowledge for the sake of knowledge.<sup>65</sup>

Later there was a twist in this end from "*scire propter ipsum scire*" to "*scire propter uti*."<sup>66</sup> *Scire propter uti* is characteristic of science as part of art or production, *póesis* (ποίησις).<sup>67</sup> This occurred in the Middle Ages, at a time when industrialization was the trend. Utility became the hallmark of science. The effect of such approach was enormous for science and philosophy as Jaroszyński observed:

the utilitarian approach to science caused the particular sciences to be transformed into technology, while philosophy became ideology...The utilitarian conception of science entails many conventions. A reductionistic vision of reality and a reductionistic conception of science are connected with it. The human science, and also metaphysics, are treated as pseudo-sciences because they do not meet the new methodological requirements for scientific cognition and are regarded as objectless.<sup>68</sup>

Metaphysics loses its central place as it was in the concept of science as *theoria*. In its place, mathematics becomes the dominant discipline that determines the scientificity of every other discipline.<sup>69</sup> According to Krapiec, one of the reasons for this twist was the progress and successes recorded by the natural sciences, particularly, physics and technology. Some

---

<sup>64</sup> M. A. Krapiec, "What is Philosophy For?" in *Understanding Philosophy* (Unpubl.), trans. Hugh McDonald, 2007, 3.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. In his work *Understanding Philosophy*, Krapiec was particularly interested in the shift from *scire propter ipsum scire* to *scire propter uti*, so much that attention was not paid to the other ends of science. However, according to Jaroszyński, science as praxis refers to the end – *scire propter agere* – to know in order to act. This was the end of science adopted by the stoics. Here, ethics takes the center stage. Knowledge of the world is necessary to enable one act rightly. Metaphysics loses its place to physics, while nature is transformed into a deity. On the other hand, science with a religious end *threskéia* (θρησκεία) was adopted and practiced by Plotinus. The One is the placed both above being and cognition. Philosophy is reduced to a way of contact with the One. Iamblichus proposed Theurgy as the shortcut to the One. These contributions laid strong foundation for determining and defining neo-Platonism. In Christianity, there is also a discussion with faith and reason. Philosophy is defined as *ancilla theologiae*. Philosophy is both autonomous and complementary to Theology. Cf. Piotr Jaroszyński, "Nauka w Perspektywie celu Poznania," 490-494.

<sup>67</sup> Piotr Jaroszyński, "Nauka w Perspektywie celu Poznania," 490-494.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

philosophers and scientists, as Krapiec claims, championed the change of the sense in which science could be understood with reference to philosophy. Notable among them were Immanuel Kant, Auguste Comte and Karl Popper.<sup>70</sup> Each of them contributed either by aligning the basic question of philosophy to pragmatic ends or by adopting a methodology which supports this end.

Krapiec criticises Kant for changing the basic question of philosophy. Instead of asking “why?” or what it means to be real? Kant was concerned about the “*a priori* subjective conditions of valid cognition.”<sup>71</sup> In Krapiec’s view, one cannot engage in metaphysics as a scientific philosophy by setting out conditions for cognition. These conditions include: man himself, his cognitive apparatus and the space-time measure of cognition.<sup>72</sup> For Krapiec, metaphysical cognition begins on a spontaneous platform. It is rather through reflection that one comes to the knowledge of the nature of cognition itself. Auguste Comte was criticized by Krapiec along this same direction. Having rejected theology and metaphysics,<sup>73</sup> Comte replaced the question *dia ti* with a practical form of investigation. For Comte, scientific knowledge has to deal with something measurable, descriptive and classifiable. In this sense, scientific cognition shifts from merely “knowing” to “knowing how.” Science ceases to be knowledge for the sake of knowledge but rather directs itself towards a new purpose, “knowing how.” It becomes more or less the instrumentalization of cognition.<sup>74</sup> In such a cognition science utilizes mathematical methods for intended practical goals. This new understanding of science gave rise to the

---

<sup>70</sup> For works of Kant in this regard see: the *Critique of Pure Reason*; For Comte, 1830–1842: *Cours de philosophie positive, Paris translated by Harriet Martineau as: The positive philosophy of Auguste Comte The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, vol. 1. (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000); For Karl Popper see *Conjectures and refutations. The growth of scientific knowledge*.

<sup>71</sup> Krapiec, “What is Philosophy For?” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 4.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Auguste Comte coined the word “positivism” and founded the movement. It was a philosophical and political movement of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Comte claimed that the development of the human mind in history has gone through three different “theoretical conditions: the theological (fictitious), the metaphysical (abstract) and the scientific (positive). He claimed that the theological is necessary, the metaphysical transitory and the positive, normal. Comte explained that the metaphysical is no more different from the theological save for the substitution of supernatural agents with abstract entities as explanation for phenomena in the universe. The positive stage consists of a search for laws which govern phenomena instead of a search for causes (which the theological and the metaphysical stages are concerned with). This third stage is largely characterised by relativism: “it comes close to truth without reaching it.” Comte accused scholastic philosophy of obscuring the true meaning of science; he is considered to be the first philosopher of science because he aimed at developing a philosophy of mathematics, a philosophy of physics, a philosophy of chemistry and a philosophy of biology. In line with this aim he was able to develop methods for different sciences ranging from observation, experimentation, comparison and classification. Cf. Michael Bourdeau, “Auguste Comte”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, forthcoming URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/comte/>>; Auguste Comte, *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, Trans. Harriet Martineau, vol. 1. (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000), 28-32.

<sup>74</sup> Krapiec, “What is Philosophy For?” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 4.

development of the hypothetical deductive method, a method which “consists in choosing the correct mathematical functions to direct experiments and to obtain intended practical results.”<sup>75</sup> The hypothetical-deductive method gained further accent in Karl Popper’s method of falsification.<sup>76</sup> Krapiec is of the view that whereas the hypothetical method in Auguste Comte’s system was more theoretical, Popper extended it to the realm of experience.<sup>77</sup> These developments of the term *science* had serious consequences and implications which Krapiec sums up in these words:

The development of tools became a synonym for the “scientific nature” of science, for men began to treat the most various domains of human knowledge as instruments or sets of instruments to make human life possible or comfortable. The economic, medical and agricultural sciences, the sciences of geology and astronomy came to be treated as the development of “tools” in the concrete technological domination of their respective areas in the material world. “Know-how” – a domain of knowledge if properly cultivated can be used for human needs: this is a concrete verification of the success of scientific knowledge. In this sense science itself become [*sic*] a basic and powerful instrument for the social and economic development of the state, which organizes science and carries out an effective science policy. In such a situation the so-called philosophical sciences cannot take glory in any temporary success, and so they must depart to the margins of society’s scientific interest.<sup>78</sup>

This reflects very much the thought of Karl Popper who considers science to be a problem-solving enterprise, such that to do science would mean to be a problem solver. Such conception of science is obviously a total exclusion of metaphysics from the realm of science. It will imply that the question which metaphysics asks has no practical nor productive relevance; neither does it hold any meaning, it is utter ‘nonsense.’ This is indeed a total rejection of metaphysics as well as a total exclusion of metaphysics from the fold of scientific cognition. Krapiec is of the opinion that such idea is influenced by Descartes’ distinction between the world of matter (*res extensa*) and the world of the spirit (*res cogitans*), which led to this crave for what is measurable and verifiable through mathematical methods. Having established what sense science is used in relation to metaphysics, it remains for Krapiec to highlight the specific character of metaphysical cognition.

---

<sup>75</sup> Krapiec, “What is Philosophy For?” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 5.

<sup>76</sup> Karl Popper, a philosopher/scientist of the 20<sup>th</sup> century claimed that “if a theory is incompatible with possible empirical observations it is scientific; conversely, a theory which is compatible with all such observations...is unscientific.” This gave rise to his principle of falsification wherein he destabilizes the traditional view that science can be distinguished from non-science on the basis of its inductive methodology. He also said that the essence of science is “problem solving.” Attempts at solving problems yield to growth in human knowledge. Cf. Thornton, Stephen, “Karl Popper”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/popper/>>. Furthermore Popper rejected all forms of inductive method or “inductive logic” and attempted to develop what he described as “the theory of the deductive method of testing.” Cf. Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Routledge, 2002), 6-7.

<sup>77</sup> Krapiec, “What is Philosophy For?” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 5.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

### 1.2.2 Metaphysics as Theoria

In the previous discussion on metaphysics as a science, I made mention of a twist from *scire propter ipsum scire* to *scire propter uti*. The twist suggests a change in status quo. It suggests that there was a time when it would have been absurd to deliberate whether metaphysics was a science in any manner. “Originally,” Krapiec writes, “scientific cognition was identified with philosophical cognition.”<sup>79</sup> At that time theoretical disciplines were regarded as ‘philosophy,’ as Kamiński shows:

In the past, all theoretical sciences were just philosophy. The second level of abstraction introduced the “second philosophy,” that is, physics. If we take a closer look at the contents of the theses of that “philosophical physics” and the way that most important concepts were formulated (such as “motion,” “extension,” “time,” “location,” etc.), sometimes we will come across purely philosophical analyses, not different in any detail from metaphysical ones, while on other occasions, we will see some naïve and pre-scientific generalizations or imprecise “data” concerning that which is now the subject-matter of contemporary physics. Such has been the fate of science. It emancipates in a slow process, and slowly does it arrive at constructing its own object and its own method of research, and in the early stage, it is rather bound together with other sciences. Such was the case with natural sciences (including physics) which were all tied to philosophy and constituted a naïve “physical philosophy.” As the years went by, and physics, together with all natural sciences, became independent, and there was no longer any reason to reserve the first degree of abstraction for philosophy. The first degree (or level) of abstraction has been changed and converted into the so-called “real sciences” (that is, the “empirical” ones) which were all disciplines using empirical data for the construction of their basic concepts.<sup>80</sup>

This would mean that to be philosophical is to be scientific, in the first place. Krapiec therefore aimed at a return to the “original moment.” The original moment being referred to was the moment of the classification of the sciences initiated by Aristotle and classically interpreted by Aquinas. Krapiec refers to the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> questions of Thomas Aquinas’s commentary on *De Trinitate* of Boethius and Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. In his Commentary on the *De Trinitate* of Boethius,<sup>81</sup> Thomas distinguishes the theoretical/speculative intellect from the practical intellect according to ends. While the speculative intellect is directed towards truth as its end, the practical intellect orders truth to action as its end. The above distinction leads to another between speculative science and practical science. The speculative science pursues knowledge for its sake while the practical sciences have human

---

<sup>79</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 4.

<sup>80</sup> S. Kamiński, M. A. Krapiec, “The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition” in *On The Metaphysical Cognition*, Trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2020), 16-17.

<sup>81</sup> Here Thomas was answering a question on the adequacy of the division of the theoretical sciences into three parts, viz. natural science, mathematics and divine science. This division dates back to Aristotle. See *Met* 1026<sup>a</sup>18-19.

action as their end.<sup>82</sup> Within the speculative sciences, a further distinction is made based on different objects of theoretical considerations known as *speculabilia*<sup>83</sup> and these objects (*speculabilia*) are three in number. The first two are reliant on matter for their being (*secundum esse*) because they only exist in matter. These two are physics (natural sciences) and mathematics. The distinguishing factor between the two is that physics and the natural sciences depend on matter for their being and intelligibility while mathematics depends on matter for its being but not for its intelligibility. The third group are those that do not depend on matter for their being. They are divided into two: those that are never found in matter (for example, God and angels) and those that exist in matter in certain cases although not in others (e.g. Substance, quality, being, potency, act, etc.). The science that studies this third group (namely, those that do not depend on matter for their being) Thomas calls “Metaphysics,” “Theology,” and “First Philosophy” respectively.<sup>84</sup>

Some issues can be identified from the above divisions. If metaphysics is an autonomous discipline, why does it bear the title “theology” which is a different discipline? If God is its subject matter does it not imply that metaphysics is no different from theology? Secondly, if it is the case that a single science bears these three appellations, it would seem that the science does not have a single object (formal object) like other disciplines (e.g. Physics – motion, mathematics – numbers, biology – living organisms). What is this science and what exactly does it study? Krapiec refers to the Aristotelian-Thomistic explanations in throwing more light on these terms, he writes:

---

<sup>82</sup> *In Boeth de Trin*, q. 5, a. 1: “Dicendum quod theoricus sive speculativus intellectus in hoc proprie ab operativo sive practico distinguitur quod speculativus habet pro fine veritatem quam considerat, practicus vero veritatem consideratam ordinat in operationem tamquam in finem. Et ideo dicit philosophus in III de anima quod differunt ad invicem fine, et in II metaphysicae dicitur quod finis speculativae est veritas, sed finis operativae scientiae est actio.”

<sup>83</sup> *In Boeth de Trin*, q. 5, a. 1: “Sciendum tamen quod, quando habitus vel potentiae penes obiecta distinguuntur, non distinguuntur penes quaslibet differentias obiectorum, sed penes illas quae sunt per se obiectorum in quantum sunt obiecta. Esse enim animal vel plantam accidit sensibili in quantum est sensibile, et ideo penes hoc non sumitur distinctio sensuum, sed magis penes differentiam coloris et soni. Et ideo oportet scientias speculativas dividi per differentias speculabilium, in quantum speculabilia sunt.”

<sup>84</sup> *In Boeth de Trin*, q. 5, a. 1: “Quaedam ergo speculabilia sunt, quae dependent a materia secundum esse, quia non nisi in materia esse possunt. Et haec distinguuntur, quia quaedam dependent a materia secundum esse et intellectum, sicut illa, in quorum diffinitione ponitur materia sensibilis; unde sine materia sensibili intelligi non possunt, ut in diffinitione hominis oportet accipere carnem et ossa. Et de his est physica sive scientia naturalis. Quaedam vero sunt, quae quamvis dependeant a materia secundum esse, non tamen secundum intellectum, quia in eorum diffinitionibus non ponitur materia sensibilis, sicut linea et numerus. Et de his est mathematica. Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt, quae non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt, sive numquam sint in materia, sicut Deus et Angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa et huiusmodi. De quibus omnibus est theologia, id est scientia divina, quia praecipuum in ea cognitorum est Deus, quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id est trans physicam, quia post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia devenire. Dicitur etiam philosophia prima, in quantum aliae omnes scientiae ab ea sua principia accipientes eam consequuntur.”

The term “metaphysics” appears in Thomas’ work as a synonym for the terms “theology,” “divine science,” and “first philosophy,” since it investigates the ultimate reasons and reaches to the first cause, the Absolute – hence the term “theology” (theologia). It is also the most noble body of knowledge pertaining to God, and man should be concerned for such a body of knowledge, hence the term “divine science” (Scientia divina). It also concerns everything that exists, and for this reason all the sciences receive principles from it, hence the term “first philosophy (philosophia prima).”<sup>85</sup>

There is no doubt that this issue has been under the spotlight in the philosophical world to decipher what this science is all about really. Some misconceptions about what metaphysics is have led some philosophers to presuppose that metaphysics is simply a science that studies God and the supra-sensible realities. It becomes even more difficult when the works of philosophers like the Neo-Platonists are cited as evidence. Simplicius, for example, described metaphysics as “a science concerning divine things...found above the world of nature.”<sup>86</sup> In this sense, metaphysics becomes ὑπερ φυσικά (hyher-physiká). The Neo-Platonists took metaphysics out of the sphere of being to a world above being, the abode of the One. As Jaroszyński shows, within the Neo-platonic system, mythology, astrology and magic converged (in the works of Iamblichus and Proclus). Theology became a dominant discipline while philosophy became a means to attain contact with the One.<sup>87</sup> Still more some philosophers cite Thomas Aquinas himself especially in his definition of metaphysics as *trans physicam*. They interpret it to mean that metaphysics is concerned about the otherworldly. Krąpiec opposes such views. The world which metaphysics studies is not different from the world which physics and the natural sciences study. The difference comes to light when one is aware that metaphysics studies every existing thing as such while the physical and natural sciences engage themselves in some aspective study of reality. *Trans physicam* in the way Thomas Aquinas uses it implies that metaphysics is a science that proceeds “from what is knowable by the senses to what cannot be known by the senses.”<sup>88</sup> It is obvious that the natural sciences and physics focus primarily on movable, changeable reality but metaphysics investigates things as long as they exist. However, the material object of both metaphysics and physics are the same, but they differ in formal objects. While physics studies nature from the perspective of motion, metaphysics studies the same nature but from the perspective of existence.

---

<sup>85</sup> Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2010), 80-81.

<sup>86</sup> Mieczysław A. Krąpiec (wspólnie z A. Maryniarczykiem), “Metafizyka” w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 7 (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2006): 102-116.

<sup>87</sup> Jaroszyński, *Metaphysics or Ontology*, 45.

<sup>88</sup> Krąpiec and Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 80.

Apart from the explanations rendered by Thomas Aquinas, Krapiec also relishes the explanation of Aristotle on metaphysics as a science. The first point Krapiec picks from Aristotle is that metaphysics is an empirical science. Not only is metaphysics an empirical science, “it is the most empirical of the empirical sciences, since its object is real reality.”<sup>89</sup> This means, as has been said already, that metaphysics is not a *trans physicam* in the sense of a study of things outside of our empirical world. Rather, metaphysics begins from the experience of concretely existing things and investigates the causes of their existence and beingness. The physical and natural sciences investigate the aspect of this same reality which metaphysics investigates, mathematics concerns itself with its quantitative aspect but metaphysics goes deeper to discover the essence of the thing and its ultimate cause.<sup>90</sup>

A second point from Aristotle and very importantly (since it forms our subheading) is that metaphysics is *theoria* (θεωρία). The understanding of reality as that which is not separate from our material world helps Aristotle to develop a method of cognition as well as an understanding of philosophy (or metaphysics) as a science. Aristotle’s observations in the world of nature helps him to conclude that the purpose of human nature is the attainment of wisdom. The existence of man is therefore connected to this end. Philosophy as a science, therefore, is distinct from the physical sciences and mathematical sciences; it is a theoretical science which leads to the highest form of knowledge, namely, knowledge of the ultimate causes. Philosophy as a science is *theoria* – knowledge for the sake of knowledge (*scire propter ipsum scire*). *Theoria* is a kind of free thought which serves no other purpose but is an end in itself – it is “looking at things with the addition of understanding.”<sup>91</sup> It is the actualization of the highest human potentialities as Krapiec observes: “The highest moment of cognition is the achievement of accord with the known reality – being, i.e. the attainment of truth. To know reality and to be in accord with it in the act of veridical cognition should be the essential moment wherein man is fulfilled as a contingent being, knowing his own contingency and seeking an understanding of being.”<sup>92</sup> The actualization of the potentialities in man leads to further curiosity. The knowledge of one thing leads to further enquiry into the nature of another. Like a child man continues to pose questions about reality: “what is this?,” “why is that?” The answer to those questions may lead to deeper more fundamental questions formulated like the famous *dia ti?*– “why?” Man begins to ask fundamental questions about reality: “why are there

---

<sup>89</sup> Krapiec and Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 83.

<sup>90</sup> Krapiec and Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 82.

<sup>91</sup> Piotr Jaroszyński, *Science in Culture*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 2007), 15.

<sup>92</sup> Krapiec, “What is Philosophy For?” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 3.

things rather than nothing?” or “why do things exist at all?” The investigation of these problems leads to an understanding of reality, of human cognition, of man and the meaning of life and leads to the formation of culture. When one acquires knowledge of the causes and gives justification for the way things are or why things are, the person is said to have acquired wisdom. Therein lies the link between philosophy and wisdom: a philosopher is a lover of wisdom (Gk. *philo*, *Sophia*). Yet, this wisdom is not something infused from above, it proceeds instead from an ordering between man and his world, specifically the concretely existing world.

The development of philosophy (metaphysics) as *theoria* has its foundation in the pre-Aristotelian era. It goes back to the predecessors of Aristotle and is, in fact, the trend in Greek civilization at that time. Certain philosophers had already committed themselves to the search of the truth of reality by providing answers to the question *dia ti?* by focusing on the fundamental urstuff (*arche*) which accounts for the existence of things. Thales proposes water, Anaximanes says it is air, while Heraclitus argues it is fire. Obviously, these answers are naïve.<sup>93</sup> However, Krapiec adds that the fact that these fundamental questions were asked and that answers were sought in the structure of things themselves reveal two things: firstly, the rationality of man as not something accidental but something essential to the human nature and secondly “a recognition of the existence of a rational order in things...(whereby) the rational order manifests itself not as some “a priori,” as a purely human prejudgment, a postulate which is an extrapolation or condition of our thought.”<sup>94</sup> Therefore there is a co-relation between the human being as a rational being and existing things. The reason for the nature of things are not sought in the intellect of the bewildered person who poses the question *dia ti?*, rather it is sought in the things themselves because it is the thing itself that has prompted the question in the first place. This leads Krapiec to conclude that metaphysics is not a science in the modern sense of the word. It is rather, “a theoretical-contemplative science” or *theoria* because it aims at the truth which reality presents to us and which we can cognize through intuition and contemplation.<sup>95</sup>

One final defense which Krapiec offers as grounds on which metaphysics is a science is the method of justification operative in metaphysics. What differentiates scientific cognition from non-scientific or pre-scientific cognition is that it is methodic, organized, consciously directed and it offers proportional justification for its conclusions. For Krapiec, Metaphysics fulfils

---

<sup>93</sup> Krapiec, Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Krapiec, Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Krapiec and Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 83.



these basic criteria. Metaphysics has basic tools for its investigations, some of which are employed by other sciences *analogically*. The first is historicism.<sup>96</sup> Metaphysics addresses problems by first examining the historical contexts that led to their emergence. Metaphysics is not a science cut-off from socio-political and economic realities. Metaphysics admits that these factors play tremendous roles in the emergence of these problems and a proper understanding of the context provides better standpoint for proffering solution. This also proves that metaphysics is very concrete irrespective of how abstract these problems are formulated. About this, Krapiec avers: “all philosophical problems, even if they were formulated abstractly, are a manifestation of concrete human life and as connected with this life they explain something, rationally justify something or are an expression of protest against the way things are.”<sup>97</sup> This is why Krapiec thinks that history of philosophy is indispensable for doing realistic metaphysics. Without the history of philosophy, one lacks the tools to justify or reject any system of philosophy whether realism, idealism, subjectivism, etc. history thus has an indicating character, pointing to the proper path for cultivating metaphysics.<sup>98</sup> I will deliberate more on this topic in the fourth chapter of this dissertation.

Secondly, metaphysics employs systems of demonstration and justification, some of which are analogously employed by contemporary science. Metaphysics makes use of three negative proofs, namely, the *probatio per absurdum*, the negation of a thesis not conformable with ontic states and finally *reductio ad absurdum*.<sup>99</sup> The first, of these three proofs, involves proving the truth of a thesis by showing that its opposing view is false, that is, its negation leads to a contradiction. The second is based on demonstrating that the negation of a thesis does not conform to observable reality or metaphysical facts. The *reductio ad absurdum* applies reductive thinking to the negation of a proposition to absurdity, proving that a negation of the thesis leads to absurdity. These constitute the “principal methods of justification in the realm of the philosophy of being.”<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>96</sup> Historicism is the claim that every philosophical problem has a historical setting or context of its own. Krapiec’s works are always saturated with historical developments of philosophical problems. One can claim that Krapiec believes that history is a part of the solution to problems in metaphysics because it traces the problem to its foundation, examining its cause and the arguments of opposing sides over the years. History of philosophy in Krapiec’s view is not something about the dead past, nor is it a “cemetery of human thought;” rather, it is something living, something alive. Cf. Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 42.

<sup>97</sup> Krapiec and Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 115; see also, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 41.

<sup>98</sup> Krapiec and Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 116.

<sup>99</sup> Stanisław Kamiński, Mieczysław A. Krapiec, “The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition,” in *On [the] Metaphysical Cognition*, 57-73.

<sup>100</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 45.

If to be science in its contemporary sense means having a hypothesis, Krapiec argues that metaphysics has its kind of hypothesis involving propositions that are non-contradictory in themselves and yet to be demonstrated by already established metaphysical truths. Similarly, if science claims to be special because it uses deductive kind of reasoning, metaphysics also uses deductive reasoning, except that its deductive method is in alignment with the first metaphysical principles which we can intuitively obtain through cognition of real beings without which both philosophy and science are impossible. And finally if being science means to have reductive and demonstrative reasoning, metaphysics is not left out since it reasons from cause to effect and builds on previously established truths about existing realities. Krapiec shows that there is hardly any tool the sciences possess which is lacking in metaphysics. However, each has its tool in a peculiar manner and it applies to each analogously. Hence he concludes that “metaphysics...given an appropriately understood conception of science – can be regarded as scientific cognition, but in an analogical sense.”<sup>101</sup> Despite the pressures from formal disciplines like logic and mathematics, Krapiec makes it clear that the results of metaphysical enquiries cannot be formalized because metaphysics deals with real ontic states. Metaphysics cannot be a science in the same sense as these disciplines. The object of metaphysics cannot be formalized, neither can the language of metaphysics be formalized.<sup>102</sup> Metaphysics has the methods proper to its investigations. It employs transcendental cognition and concepts. It is connected with individual being and grasps the whole of the being.

We conclude this section by stating that the investigation which metaphysics undertakes is connected with the question “why?” The search for answers for the nature of existing things leads to a causal explanation in accounting for reality. This formulation of the scientific question for metaphysics was substituted in contemporary times to “how?” Such alteration of the question shifted the nature of metaphysics from *theoria* to praxis, substituting the meaning of science, adopting methods which correspond to the new model of science, ousting out the methods specific to metaphysics as *theoria*, the result of which is a new science – a scientific metaphysics or the “new metaphysics.”<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>101</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 47.

<sup>102</sup> Krapiec, M. A. *Język i świat realny*, [Language and the Real World] (Lublin: RW KUL 1985).

<sup>103</sup> The concept “new metaphysics” was employed by Peter van Inwagen and Meghan Sullivan to refer to metaphysics as ontology. They highlighted the difficulty associated with defining metaphysics today as it was understood and as it applied to ancient and medieval philosophy. Contemporary philosophy has added a lot of things to “metaphysics” so much that it is no longer the study of being as being or first causes. Problem of free will, modality, space and time causation etc. has warranted the name *ontology*. Also those who reject the ancient-medieval sense of the subject matter of metaphysics are considered to be metaphysical in current day use of the term. Cf. Peter van Inwagen and Meghan Sullivan, “Metaphysics”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of*

### 1.2.3 “Realistic Philosophy” and “Realistic Metaphysics”

It was Aristotle who wrote that “All men by nature desire to know.”<sup>104</sup> To add to the above philosophical aphorism, M. A. Krapiec asks: “Know what?” what is it that every man would desire to know? And he replies himself saying that in every man there is a natural drive to know, a desire to understand reality. In every man, there is a cognitive endowment and an appetite to apply such cognitive powers to a profound understanding of our world. Men “want to know the world itself and know themselves in this world,”<sup>105</sup> he writes. The discussions above regarding the meaning of the term metaphysics, its status as a scientific discipline and its status as *theoria* have been directed toward the idea of a great philosopher – Aristotle.

The history of philosophy has shown a variegated and conflicting spectrum of ideas in the philosophical world which seem to undermine this great philosophical optimism of Krapiec. As earlier stated, there is the opinion appearing in different forms, that we cannot know things in themselves, we cannot know the world itself. Such view, together with others, create some complexities in the philosophical world, regarding the nature of reality. To rid the philosophical world of such complexities and to open a clear path toward a comprehensive philosophical understanding of our world, Krapiec demonstrates a profound path for cognizing reality through realistic philosophy.

While the term *realism* refers to a system of philosophy which admits that the external world exists irrespective of my knowing them, *realistic* is an adjective that can be used to qualify a given set of knowledge in contradistinction to others like idealistic, subjectivist. These terms apply to Mieczysław A. Krapiec’s philosophy in two ways: in a descriptive way and also a prescriptive way. From a descriptive perspective, realism or realistic categorizes Mieczysław A. Krapiec philosophy with that of philosophers like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson and the like. Alongside the above, Mieczysław A. Krapiec’s philosophy is also prescriptive. It tells us what philosophy should be, the questions philosophy should ask, the methods philosophy should adopt and the end and goal of philosophical investigations. In fact, his philosophy indicates the elements one must consider before labelling a body of knowledge to be philosophical at all. There is often a tendency in his works to label any other philosophy idealistic and probably, unrealistic.

---

*Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/metaphysics/>.

<sup>104</sup> Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται πύσει. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 980<sup>a</sup>22 in Jonathan Barnes. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. The Revised Oxford Translation, vol II. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984, 1552.

<sup>105</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, “Knowledge and Reality,” *Forum Philosophicum* 11, (2006): 29.

From a descriptive perspective and a historical context, realistic philosophy is recognized as classical philosophy.<sup>106</sup> Classical philosophy must be understood in a narrow sense as that philosophy that was “shaped by Plato and Aristotle, developed by the Schoolmen and modified in 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries in such a way that in an essentially unchanged shape it has been preserved as the so-called Christian philosophy and in these trends which continue the Peripatetic tradition.”<sup>107</sup> In the philosophy of M. A. Krapiec, the concept “realistic philosophy” is synonymous with “realistic metaphysics.”<sup>108</sup> The realistic metaphysics in question is one that is based on an existential conception of being. For this work, therefore, realistic philosophy is interchangeable with realistic metaphysics.

Realistic metaphysics is a specific type of cognition that has a *sapiential* character, that is, it flows from man’s natural desire to cognize being. This cognition of being is not about mental conjectures but real beings. This is why common-sense cognition is vital to metaphysical cognition.<sup>109</sup> Understanding Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics as a science warrants a knowledge of what “science” consists of during the early Greek investigation into the nature of reality. For the Greeks, the essence of human life is a rational explanation and understanding of our world. And the highest form of explanation then was seeking the causes of things, through which one can discover that our world is intelligible and rational. Therefore scientific knowledge consisted in “a desire to understand the facts and the way they are ordered by appealing to their causes, including their ultimate causes. And this was the conception, understood in a basic, very general way, of the philosophical, purely scientific cognition of reality.”<sup>110</sup> Krapiec defends this historical development of this realistic kind of understanding reality against the positivists and enemies of metaphysics who, during the modern period and even down to his time, tried to dismiss the basic questions asked by metaphysics. Questions like: “what is the reason, cause, or justification of the inner structure of the thing? What is the source or cause of the existence of the thing itself?...what is the purpose of the thing?”<sup>111</sup> Hence,

---

<sup>106</sup> Peter Fotta, “Pri Pramieni Filozofie,” (PhD Diss., The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, 2005), 429. Some authors accept two senses of the term “classical philosophy: a. a temporal sense as the philosophy of the Greek and Roman antiquity b. Objective sense as a philosophy that is determined in its reasoning and explanation by the object, by the nature of human cognition, natural language. I have employed the terms “descriptive” and “prescriptive” for this same division.

<sup>107</sup> Stanisław Kamiński. “The Theory of Being and Its Domains,” in *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, 49.

<sup>108</sup> To say that realistic philosophy is synonymous with realistic metaphysics means that both are interchangeable and this may not warrant any justification. However arguments could be made from Krapiec’s explanation regarding the relationship between general and particular metaphysics.

<sup>109</sup> Krapiec, “Filozoficzny realizm” [Philosophical Realism] w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 3 (2002), 541-546.

<sup>110</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 32-33.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, 33.

against the logical positivists who claim that the questions of metaphysics are nonsensible and meaningless, Krapiec claims that, in the light of these questions, metaphysics is meaningful.<sup>112</sup> The discussion on the descriptive sense of realistic metaphysics defends the thesis of a type of metaphysics, which like Aristotle's and Aquinas,' seeks to offer rational justification for the being of things through their causes, discovering the intelligibility and rationality of our world through intuitive grasping of the non-contradictable factors responsible for the being of existing things. Therefore three elements are integral to realistic metaphysics:<sup>113</sup>

- a. Realistic metaphysics concerns itself with the cognition of concretely existing things. It does not deal with trans-physical or hyperphysical realities. No abstract content or concept command the attention of realistic metaphysics because they are empty. The results of this cognition are expressed in existential judgments – which are existential affirmations that fully manifest the existence of the cognized thing.
- b. In the act of cognition, metaphysics seeks to grasp the necessary aspects of the concretely existing thing. The necessary aspects of being referred here are the universal and transcendental aspects. For example in cognizing John as a man, I may seek the material and formal elements which account for his being as a man. These constitute the universal aspect of his being. The transcendental aspects come to light when in discovering certain transcendental properties like truth, good, beauty, I can discover what John shares with every existing thing.
- c. Every scientific discipline requires justification for its findings. The ultimate justification provided by metaphysics as a science is not a logical justification but real ontological justification. This ultimate justification attains its apex in the real causes of being. There is no doubt that there could be another sort of justifications pursued by other sciences but if metaphysics is to account for the existence of beings, it must and should justify the existence of beings through their ultimate causes. Only in this sense can it be truly realistic. Also, realistic metaphysics in its justification must provide “the ultimate explanation of the structure of reality.”<sup>114</sup> The explanation of the structure of being should be negative in the sense that realistic metaphysics provides the non-contradictory factors in the structure of being, without which the being cannot exist.<sup>115</sup> These non-contradictory factors include the

---

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, 34.

<sup>114</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 36.

<sup>115</sup> Although Krapiec admits that a positive explanation is possible but the negative explanation is preferable.

first principles of being and thought – the principle of identity, the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason.

I conclude this section by stating that the base for the *realness* in “realistic metaphysics” is not the Platonic *Idea*, neither is it the sensible being of the pre-Socratics. It is rather the act of existence. This act of existence is a principle of reality. Therefore realistic metaphysics studies being, understood as concretely existing things. From the three criteria and from our earlier discussions, all the constitutive parts of Krapiec’s definition of metaphysics become obvious. Metaphysics is the cognition of being through an intuitive process by which we discover non-contradictable factors within the structure of the being and the principles which operate within the being. What remains at this point is to demonstrate how we can obtain the object of metaphysics.

### *1.3 The Determination of the Object of Metaphysics*

The legitimacy of every science is largely determined by its object of study. There is no scientific discipline that lacks an object. The lack of an object implies the non-existence of a discipline. What makes biology or physics a science is that they have proper objects which they investigate. The same holds true for metaphysics. Krapiec has made it clear that history of philosophy remains an indispensable tool for the formulation of a metaphysical problem as well as the discovery of its solution. Therefore it will be absurd to simply state that the object of metaphysics is being as being, without going into history to investigate various contributions of philosophers to juxtapose their stands and determine the proper object for metaphysics.

#### *1.3.1 Historical Considerations*

Krapiec classifies the different attempts by philosophers to determine the proper object of metaphysics into five. These are the object of philosophy as a result of hasty generalization of naïve empiricism, the object of philosophy as a construct of intuitive thought, the object of philosophy apprehended abstractly, the subjectivization of the object of philosophy and finally the real object of metaphysical cognition. I will succinctly discuss these points.

##### *1.3.1.1 The Object of Philosophy as a result of a generalization of Naïve Empiricism*

*Naïve empiricism* is the term Krapiec uses in designating the philosophy of the pre-Socratics, particularly the Ionians, who depended on the most natural ability of man (namely, sensory cognition) and attempted to reduce all existing things to a single material element in their search

for the *arche*. Aristotle gives an insight into the thoughts of the pre-Socratics in his *Metaphysics*.<sup>116</sup> These philosophers sought the factor responsible for the being of things: for Thales, the fundamental urstuff or principle is water<sup>117</sup>; Anaximander, a disciple of Thales, argued that it was the boundless (the *apeiron*) that accounts for the generation, destruction, and preservation of things in the world;<sup>118</sup> Anaximanes argued for air<sup>119</sup> while Heraclitus said it was fire.<sup>120</sup> Empedocles unified all the elements of his predecessors and added a fourth, earth. He claimed that the interaction (made possible by love and hate) between fire, water, earth, and air are responsible for the existence of things.<sup>121</sup> Anaxagoras is known for his statement: “in everything there is a portion of everything,”<sup>122</sup> except the *nous*, which he claims to be “the motive cause of the cosmos.”<sup>123</sup> Krapiec, without undermining the great contributions of these early philosophers, accuses them of falling into the fallacy of hasty generalization because of their inability to investigate their findings methodologically.<sup>124</sup> These philosophers were quick, in Krapiec’s view, to generalize the result of their perception; their line of thought, which fails to see beyond the material content of reality, condemns their philosophical thinking to “hylozoism and materialistic monism.”<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>116</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 983<sup>b</sup>6 - 984<sup>a</sup>18.

<sup>117</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 983<sup>b</sup>18-27: “Thales, the founder of this school of philosophy, says the principle is water (for which reason he declared that the earth rests on water), getting the notion perhaps from seeing that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat itself is generated from the moist and kept alive by it (and that from which they come to be is a principle of all things). He got his notion from this fact, and from the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and that water is the origin of the nature of moist things.”

<sup>118</sup> Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics*, 24. “Of those who declared that the *arkhē* is one, moving and *apeiron*, Anaximander...said that the *apeiron* was the *arkhē* and element of things that are, and he was the first to introduce this name for the *arkhē* [that is, he was the first to call the *arkhē* *apeiron*]. (In addition he said that motion is eternal, in which it occurs that the heavens come to be.) He says that the *arkhē* is neither water nor any of the other things called elements, but some other nature which is *apeiron*, out of which come to all the heavens and the worlds in them. This is eternal and ageless and surrounds all the worlds.” Quoted in Richard D. Mckirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2010), 33-34.

<sup>119</sup> On Anaximenes, Theophrastus writes: “Anaximenes...like Anaximander, declares that the underlying nature is one and unlimited [*apeiron*] but not indeterminate, as Anaximander held, but definite, saying that it is air. It differs in rarity and density according to the substances <it becomes>. Becoming finer it comes to be fire; being condensed it becomes water, then earth, then stones, and the rest come to be from theses. He too makes motion eternal and says that change comes to be through it.” See Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics*, 24.26-25.1 in Richard D. Mckirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates*, 48.

<sup>120</sup> “This world neither any god nor man made, but it always was and is and will be, an ever-living fire, kindling in measures and being extinguished in measures...Everything is an exchange for fire, and fire for everything—as goods for gold, and gold for goods.” Quoted in Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, revised ed., (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), 45.

<sup>121</sup> Richard D. Mckirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates*, 257.

<sup>122</sup> Richard D. Mckirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates*, 195.

<sup>123</sup> Patricia Curd, “Anaxagoras”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/anaxagoras/>>.

<sup>124</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 57.

<sup>125</sup> *Hylozoism* obviously is from the Greek *hyle* meaning matter. This categorization excludes Anaximander whose *apeiron* is a boundless immaterial, indeterminate and eternal entity.

The dangers of monistic interpretations are enormous. Maryniarczyk emphasizes the consequences in his work *The Monistic and Dualistic Interpretation of Reality*. Such consequences include: the loss of the foundation of the differentiation of plants, animals, and all forms of beings are lost. There would be no qualitative difference between a man and a horse, since they are made of the same stuff. There would be only quantitative and phenomenal differences between beings. The consequences also extend to the laws governing our world. The only valid law would be the law of nature since there will be no base for moral laws guiding human beings. Also, plurality which is given in experience, becomes a mirage – simply put, all things are the same.<sup>126</sup>

### *1.3.1.2 The Object of Philosophy as a Construct of Intuitive Thought*

The ultimate factor responsible for the empirical formulations propounded by the hylozoists was an unflinching trust in sense cognition. Their knowledge was largely based on observable phenomena devoid of intellectual processing of what the senses have apprehended. But this trust in sense cognition would be challenged by the fleeting nature of things which are uncharacteristic of a body of knowledge. This challenge provoked mistrust against sensory cognition and marked the rise of intellectualism in the 6<sup>th</sup> century BC.<sup>127</sup> Intellectualism should not be understood here as some reliance on the intellect; rather it is a total radical form of trust in the intellect. Krapiec claims that the rationale for such trust is that the philosophers who fall under this category held that *only* the intellect “is capable of perceiving permanent, necessary, universal structures. Only pure thought, unencumbered by the material impediment of the senses, can lead the human being to a cognition of truth.”<sup>128</sup> One cannot avoid noticing the total repudiation of sense cognition in the above quotation. The senses are incapable of attaining the truth because the truth can neither be sought nor apprehended in changing phenomena. The truth is permanent, necessary and universal. This position had been championed by three philosophers whom Krapiec refers to as “the first fathers of ontology,” namely: Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Plato. It may be confusing that Heraclitus appears in different categories in this discussion. Krapiec mentions him as a hylozoist because he reduces all existing things to fire. However, another aspect of his philosophy links him directly to this second group namely, his proposition of *phronetic* cognition as the means through which humanity can know and

---

<sup>126</sup> Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Monistic and Dualistic Interpretation of Reality* (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2010), 66-70.

<sup>127</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 66

<sup>128</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 60.



understand the world. *Phronein* is “a deeper, inner insight into changeable reality, for the sake of uncovering and getting a glimpse of the fundamental law governing the changeable world of mutually opposing forces and tensions.”<sup>129</sup>

Plato, on the other hand, developed a kind of cognition called “noetic cognition.” The explanation of this kind of cognition is demonstrated in Plato’s theory of ideas (εἶδος, ἰδέα).<sup>130</sup> By this theory, Plato tries to explain that “what we call universals are not simply concepts in the mind, but objective realities displaying their character to perfection and eternally, invisible to the senses but grasped after intensive preparation by a sort of intellectual vision, with an existence independent of their mutable and imperfect instances or copies which are all that we experience in this life.”<sup>131</sup> In his philosophy, Plato divides the world into two: the sensory world, characterized by concreteness and impermanence and constituted by non-necessary elements. The world of ideas, on the other hand, is comprised of universal, permanent and necessary elements. While sensitive cognition apprehends the former, the latter is apprehended through intellectual-intellective cognition. The former, Plato called “*doxa*,” meaning opinion while the later he called “*noesis*” which indicate real knowledge – a distinction almost similar to the Parmenidian way of truth and way of falsity. What is real belongs to *noesis* implying that being or reality must be something necessary, permanent and universal. Only ideas possess these basic characteristics. Philosophy, therefore, is a soteriological means, which frees one from the shackles of the darkness of this material world as he ascends to the world of ideas, the dwelling place of the sun, where the mind is illumined as it beholds the true nature of things. Plato’s philosophy, therefore, has both anthropological, epistemological and metaphysical consequences for Krapiec. Anthropologically, man is a spirit who existed in the world of ideas before his birth. Man is in need of salvation which comes through philosophical reflection. Epistemologically, nothing is new as such in the realm of knowledge, since whatever the human being knows is simply anamnesis. All knowledge was acquired in the world of ideas prior to the human descent. Noetic cognition is purely intellectual and occurs through anamnesis. It is distinguished from *dianoetic* cognition which concerns mathematical beings and *doxal* cognition which deals with the changeable world. The metaphysical dimension

---

<sup>129</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, *I-Man. An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, translated by M. Lescoe (New Britain (Conn.): Mariel Publications 1983), 187.

<sup>130</sup> See Republic VII in *Plato: Complete works*, eds. John M. Cooper, D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).

<sup>131</sup> W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy, The Later Plato and the Academy*, vol. 5 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1978), 378.

consists of ideas, defined by Krapiec as “the objectified meanings of the general terms of language.”<sup>132</sup> The first among the ideas is the One, which is equalled with the Good.

This section fails to capture the proper object of metaphysical cognition because of its inadequacy in the determination of what is real. Reality for these philosophers, is beyond this world.

#### *1.3.1.2 The Object of Philosophy apprehended Abstractly*

The first philosopher Krapiec considers within this group is Aristotle, the philosopher. Notable for his method of abstraction, there is hardly any misgiving in this classification. Aristotle was once a disciple of Plato who later left Plato’s Academy and established his school, the Lyceum. The peripatetic tradition founded by Aristotle is famously known for the aphorism: “*nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu*”<sup>133</sup> – there is nothing in the intellect that is not first in the senses. Hence, Krapiec makes it clear that in Aristotelian philosophy there is a merging of both empiricism and rationalism. Krapiec acknowledges that Aristotle’s theory of cognition was the first in the history of philosophy to emphasize the necessary relation between the intellect and the senses in cognition. Aristotle argued that it is the senses that relate directly to the empirical world and as such provide data for the intellect, which is divided into active and passive parts.

In relation to the previously investigated groups in history, Krapiec claims that Aristotle’s philosophy connotes a partial acceptance and rejection of both. Plato would be wrong in his total distrust of the sensible world while the hylozoists would be wrong in their total trust of the senses alone. Krapiec concludes that Aristotle adopted a position of “genetic empiricism” and “methodological rationalism.”<sup>134</sup> This combination will become clearer in Krapiec’s interpretation of his three levels of abstraction. The object of philosophy in this sense is not in the world of ideas rather, it is in sensible reality which is the direct object of apprehension by the senses. Krapiec states that Aristotle does not argue for the non-existence of ideas. These ideas exist in things themselves and can be sought in things.

Despite the discrepancies between Aristotle and Plato, Krapiec is aware of the arguments that have persisted concerning the identity between Aristotle’s form or essence and Plato’s ideas.

---

<sup>132</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 66.

<sup>133</sup> This was also accepted by Thomas Aquinas. See *De Ver* q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19: “Praeterea, nihil est in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu. Sed in Deo non est ponere sensitivam cognitionem, quia materialis est. Ergo ipse non intelligit res creatas, cum non sint prius in sensu.” See also the response to arg. 19: “Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod verbum illud est intelligendum de intellectu nostro, qui a rebus scientiam accipit; gradatim enim res a sua materialitate ad immaterialitatem intellectus deducitur, scilicet mediante immaterialitate sensus; et ideo oportet ut quod est in intellectu nostro, prius in sensu fuerit; quod in intellectu divino locum non habet.”

<sup>134</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 69.

Aristotle pitched his genetic empiricism against Plato's forms, yet "he did not completely resolve the problem because he treated the abstract and general state of a concept as a general form on the pattern of Platonic idea."<sup>135</sup> Aristotle argues that sensible material things are composed of matter and form. The matter is the sensible stuff a thing is made of; form is the principle which organizes matter and actualizes it. The discussion surrounding this similarity provokes a criticism from Krapiec against Aristotle's form which he labelled as "the concretized counterpart of the Platonic idea."<sup>136</sup>

I stated earlier in this discussion that Krapiec demonstrates the interconnectedness of genetic empiricism and methodological rationalism through his three levels of abstraction. Krapiec shows that the three levels of abstraction are means through which Aristotle attaches values to the empiricists claim as well as the rationalists claim.<sup>137</sup> The physical sciences which belong to *doxal* cognition gained recognition in Aristotelian system, since "the (Ionian) philosophizing physicists strived to answer the question about the fundamental *urstuff* through sensory experience. Plato's philosophy, which was greatly influenced by the Pythagorean mathematical system, also gets approved on this second level. However, not without reference to the material world as its foundation. The third level is the level of metaphysics which is not so detached from sensible reality but deals with sensible reality as being. But being is studied as a substance which is determined through form.

That Aristotle is one of the greatest philosophers of all time is hardly disputable. However the essentialization of the object of metaphysics in the medieval times has its origin within the context of the interpretation of his philosophy. It will be recalled that Aristotle had enumerated four possible candidates that could qualify for what determines the substance of being: first is an individual independently existing thing - τὸδε τί (tode ti); second is that which is known by the intellect, the universal - τὰ καθόλου (ta katholou); third is the definitional object - τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (to ti en einai) and the fourth, substance as a subject or substratum – ὑποκείμενον (hupokeimenon).<sup>138</sup> Avicenna made a distinction between first nature, second nature and third nature. While the first nature refers to "this individual" man existing concretely, second nature refers to man as he exists in my mind (universal man); third nature refers to man that exists

<sup>135</sup> Krapiec, "Metafizyczne poznanie" [Metaphysical Cognition] w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 7 (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2006): 90-101.

<sup>136</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 69.

<sup>137</sup> I think that Krapiec interprets the three levels of abstraction in two ways: firstly, to resolve the rationalist and empiricists claims and secondly to link the levels of knowledge in Plato's epistemology.

<sup>138</sup> Cohen, S. Marc, "Aristotle's Metaphysics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/>>.

neither in my mind nor exemplified in an individual man. And this third nature is what constitutes substance for Avicenna. But the third nature has some basic characteristics which have serious consequences for realistic cognition: i. third natures are pure possibilities ii. They become concrete individual beings through an act of infusion of existence by God, the necessary being; iii. Existence, therefore, does not belong to things *per se*, they are accidental.<sup>139</sup> Avicenna provided Duns Scotus with materials to engage in what could be considered a stratification of being. He drew a pyramid of natures gathered from genera and species, beginning from the most general to the most particular. For example, “this John” has different strata of genus and difference within him. In John there is a rational part, lower to this rational part, there is an animal level, followed by a vegetative level, a body, a substance or perhaps a substratum which bears all these levels and finally being. To be ‘this John’ means to be an aggregate of all these levels. What differentiates John from Eve is on the level of *haecceitas*. Scotus’ concept of being has some properties and implications: firstly, actual being emerges when it possesses all the various stages of the hierarchy. Therefore we can argue for the existence of a multiplicity of essences in an individual being. Secondly, since being applies to each of these stages, in the same way, it implies that being is univocal. Thirdly, even though Scotus’ conception of being is not an accident like Avicenna’s, his concept of being is purely intelligible. This means that if we want to arrive at being which is common to all things, we only need to de-stratify each existing thing.<sup>140</sup>

Hegel began his philosophy by considering such possibility. If it were possible to strip a thing of all its determinations, then what will be left? Nothing. This means only one thing – being is equal to nothing. He rather advocates an evolutionary trend: instead of being, we should be concerned with becoming which operates in a dialectic movement from thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

Having observed the difficulties associated with Aristotle’s method of abstraction, Krapiec offers two reasons why abstraction is unsustainable for apprehending the object of metaphysics: firstly, one of the objects which will be established later in consideration of the real object of philosophy is that the object of philosophy extends to all existing things. Abstraction as a method of cognition will make metaphysics comatose in its effort to attain this goal because it scales off certain basic necessary elements of being and lays emphasis on form. We cannot reduce being to form or to essences, neglecting individual and material aspects of

---

<sup>139</sup> M. A. Krapiec, “Major Periods and Movements of Philosophy,” in *Understanding Philosophy* [Unpubl.], Trans. Hugh McDonald (2007), 70.

<sup>140</sup> See M. A. Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 74-75.

existing beings. Any method that disregards real ontic elements in a being cannot be adequate for determining the object of metaphysics. Secondly, concepts generated through abstraction are obviously abstract and face the real challenge of “bearing” the real thing they were abstracted from. Realistic metaphysics seeks and uses concepts which bear both essential and existential aspects of being. Krapiec concludes that Aristotle’s method does not connect being with our concrete world but is simply a “reification of the conceptual mode of human cognition itself.”<sup>141</sup>

### *1.3.1.3 Determination of the Object of Philosophy through the Subject*

The various interpretations of Aristotelian philosophy together with its Thomistic counterpart may have triggered some discontent with the status quo in the minds of subsequent philosophers who became critical of traditional metaphysics and sought a revolutionary trend in the understanding of the world. Although, Kant was not reacting directly to Aristotle, his philosophy was all the same revolutionary and he also attracted a lot of followers in this regard. This revolutionary trend, not only took a different path but also questioned the possibility of metaphysics. The revolution was initiated by Immanuel Kant and his revolution is so significant that it has been termed “Kant’s Copernican revolution.”<sup>142</sup> For Kant, the heart of this revolution is the change from the object to the subject. He says: “Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts (for instance, to account for the possibility of objective knowledge) have, on this assumption ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects conform to our knowledge.”<sup>143</sup>

Even though Mieczysław Krapiec hails Kant as “one of the greatest geniuses of the German spirit,”<sup>144</sup> he acknowledges that Kant would not assent to the possibility question. He traces Kant’s problem to his desire to make metaphysics scientific. Kant thinks that what we gain through experience in the traditional understanding of experience cannot make metaphysics scientific. While in the Aristotelian conception of experience the object is active, while the faculties are ‘passive,’ For Kant, it is the faculties that assume the active role of organizing what is received in experience. What makes Kant more revolutionary from a traditional standpoint is his insistence that we cannot have access to things in themselves. We rather need

---

<sup>141</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 77.

<sup>142</sup> Rohlf, Michael, “Immanuel Kant”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/kant/>>.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. Bell, D., “Kant” in *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, ed. Nicholas Bunnin and Tsui-James E. P., (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.,) 589-606; Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 16.

<sup>144</sup> Krapiec “Major Periods and Movements of Philosophy” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 87.

to focus on the subject who possesses *a priori* categories that make cognition possible. Krapiec believes that for Kant rationality does not come from the object but the subject.<sup>145</sup> The human being possesses *a priori* knowledge, for instance, about basic laws of science, like cause and effect, etc. Therefore sensible experience is only a conformity of phenomena with the constructions which the mind imposes on them through basic scientific laws. This unification of the necessary and empirical produces the synthetic *a priori* cognition which Kant recognizes as the valid kind of human cognition. The human mind is limited only to phenomena; being or things in themselves are beyond its grasp.<sup>146</sup> What we have access to are the foundations of our actions, duties or obligations (sollen).<sup>147</sup>

The implication for realistic cognition is obvious: traditional metaphysics is impossible since it allows the object to be the bearer of law, an active initiator of the cognitive process, and the actualizer of the human faculties which are always in potentiality to it.

The Kantian spirit was inherited by several other philosophers who sought to take a critical standpoint against traditional philosophy or sought to fill the gap in traditional philosophy with Kantian metaphysics. Philosophers such as Joseph Maréchal, Johannes B. Lotz, Karl Rahner, Emerich Coreth, etc. form part of this group.

Karl Rahner operated within the ambience of subjective philosophy. He is considered to be one of the leading transcendental Thomists in history.<sup>148</sup> In the work *Geist im Welt – Spirit in the World* – Rahner argues that the fact of questioning is connected and vital for the possibility of metaphysics. He writes:

Man questions necessarily....However, the metaphysical question is not any question at all about any object at all within the implicitly presupposed horizon of the question about being itself. The metaphysical question is rather the surmounting of this naïveté. It is the reflexive articulation of that question which pervades the ground of human existence itself, the question about being. For in fact, to put it first of all quite formally, the metaphysical question is that question which in a final and radical sharpening of man's questioning turns upon itself as such and thereby turns upon the presuppositions which are operative in itself; it is the question turned consciously upon itself, the transcendental question, which does not merely place something

---

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> The thesis that human beings cannot experience things in themselves but are limited only to appearance is referred to as "transcendental idealism." Cf. Rohlf, Michael, "Immanuel Kant", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/kant/>>..

<sup>147</sup> Kant refers to this as the metaphysics of morals wherein he declared autonomy for man as one who gives the law to himself. The law of morality manifests itself through the categorical imperative which state that "one should act in such a way that the rule of one's conduct may be a generally valid rule." The knowledge of this law is also a priori and belongs to the domain of reason. Cf. Krapiec, "Major Periods and Movements of Philosophy," in *Understanding Philosophy*, 89.

<sup>148</sup> Christopher M. Cullen, "Transcendental Thomism: Realism Rejected." *The Failure of Modernism: The Cartesian Legacy and Contemporary Pluralism* (1999): 72-86.

asked about in question, but the one questioning and his question itself, and thereby absolutely everything.<sup>149</sup>

Questioning is the very foundation of metaphysical investigations. Questioning, as Rahner understands it, is not to be confused with *dia ti* which gave rise to scientific cognition. Rahner's idea philosophy presupposes a knowledge of what is questioned, such that what is questioned, forms part of the question:

Being is questionability. Now one cannot ask about being in its totality without affirming the fundamental knowability, in fact a certain a priori knownness of being as such. What is absolutely unknowable cannot be asked about, in fact what is absolutely unknown cannot be asked about. Every question is evoked by an antecedent summons from what is questioned, which as conscious (although not reflexively known, or although not even knowable reflexively) and as known (although not explicitly known, or although not even knowable explicitly) is present in the question itself. Thus in view of the reality of the question about being, the concept of a being unknowable in principle, in fact of a being even only factually (totally) unknown, is rejected as a contradiction.<sup>150</sup>

Krapiec puts it this way: "questioning is a necessary mode of human fulfilment, and it also reveals the human being as that creature who must question. All the necessary conditions for understanding the fact of questioning are also conditions for understanding the human being."<sup>151</sup> The question of being follows from the human being's natural capacity as a being who questions. The question of being in general is questionable, but the questioning of this question is not formulated as it were something outside or beyond the question because "the being that is questioned is at once the being of the question and of the one questioning."<sup>152</sup> But Rahner insists that one cannot ask: "what is being?" unless one already knows being or possesses being. Therefore the question concerning a concrete being cannot arise unless we already possess a consciousness of being. This consciousness of being is what makes the knowableness of being and the possibility of questioning them possible. This consciousness of being takes place simultaneously with our sensory experience of things in space and time.<sup>153</sup> This implies that the knowledge of being is *a priori*. Krapiec criticizes Karl Rahner in the same fashion he criticizes Kant, but even more, he regards his philosophy as a "metaphysics of human cognition"<sup>154</sup> and not a metaphysics of being. If we question what is already known in our consciousness, it means that metaphysics does not produce any new knowledge.

---

<sup>149</sup> Karl Rahner, *Spirit in the World*, translated by William Dych, S.J. (New York: Continuum, 1968), 58.

<sup>150</sup> Rahner, *Spirit in the World*, 68.

<sup>151</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 81-82.

<sup>152</sup> Rahner, *Spirit in the World*, 59.

<sup>153</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 82.

<sup>154</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 81.

The metaphysics of all philosophers within this group have this trend of adopting a transcendental method of doing metaphysics which consists of starting from the cognizing subject, formulation of *a priori* conditions for metaphysical cognition and various understanding of being which do not conform to the realistic way of cognition. Hence the subjectivist way for determining the object of metaphysics cannot guarantee a realistic cognition which we seek in this work.

#### *1.3.1.4 The Real Object of Metaphysical Cognition*

The investigations into the previous formulations of philosophy (vis: as a result of generalization, as a construct of intuitive thought, as abstract apprehension, as *a priori* subjective thought) place us on a vantage point to determine the proper object for philosophy. Based on the flaws of the above systems of philosophy, Krąpiec sets out three important elements which must be considered for this determination:<sup>155</sup>

- i. The object of realistic cognition cannot fall short of “realness.” Philosophy deals with real beings in an objective sense, not simply as they appear to us but as they are in themselves. If we want to engage in realistic philosophy, we have to deal with real beings. Possibility is obviously outside the scope of realistic metaphysics.
- ii. The second determinant concerns scope and extension. Realistic cognition extends to all reality. It is not about a particular thing or category of being; rather it considers every real being as its object of study. Therefore realistic metaphysics is universal cognition. Universalism differentiates metaphysics from other sciences and discipline that take only a part of reality for investigation.
- iii. The proper object of metaphysics ought to be grasped neutrally. Neutrality prevents realistic cognition from derailment into subjectivism or idealism. It emphasizes a cognition that does not proceed from *a priori* formulation or preconception, neither does it permit a focus on an idea detached from reality. Such preconceived cognition shuts out reality and focuses instead on products of our thinking.

In seeking to establish the object of philosophy, we have to search for what is real, analogically extensive to every concrete individual thing, and neutral as well. Krąpiec argues that it is only the act of existence that determines the realness of a thing; secondly, it is only existence (and all that are consequent upon it) that extends to every real individual thing, and finally, existence is neutral and does not depend on the cognizer. While the first two factors connect the object

---

<sup>155</sup> Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, “Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School” in *Ad Fontes: Metaphysics Today*, 6 (2009): 146-147.



of philosophy to the real world the third guarantees cognitive objectivity.<sup>156</sup> This third factor, neutrality, is considered the most difficult by Krapiec because all the previous considerations in this section failed to maintain neutrality in cognition. I will expound this problem in the discussion on the subject-object axis of cognition. We conclude here that “the (real) object of philosophy is being, that is, everything that exists, and metaphysics provides an ultimate explanation of the structure of reality.”<sup>157</sup>

### *1.3.2 General and Particular Metaphysics*

The demonstration of the object of realistic metaphysics in Krapiec’s metaphysics gives room to consider how realistic metaphysics affects the whole of philosophy. I have indicated that the object of metaphysics is being; the same applies to the whole of philosophy. It is therefore important to investigate the relationship between metaphysics and other philosophical disciplines. Aristotle differentiated metaphysics from other sciences on the grounds that metaphysics studies the ultimate causes and principles whereas other disciplines undertake only aspective study of reality. First philosophy or Wisdom as Aristotle calls it, leads the other sciences, providing them with principles necessary for their operations. While many philosophers have taken similar steps in demonstrating the relation between metaphysics and other sciences, Mieczysław Krapiec, together with Kamiński, constructed a web of relations between metaphysics and other philosophical disciplines, dividing them into General metaphysics and particular metaphysics. General metaphysics refers metaphysics which takes a central role in directing other disciplines like philosophy of man, philosophy of nature, philosophy of culture, art, the philosophy of morality (individual ethics, economic ethics, and political ethics).<sup>158</sup> The theory of cognition is submerged in general metaphysics while logic and methodology are tools employed during metaphysical investigations. Important also is that each discipline has its starting point but the unifying factor is that they all investigate existing things. General metaphysics studies existing things as much as they exist, as being; anthropology studies a real existing man; morality considers real human actions, etc. the determination of their objects and the methods for their investigation are analogously the same. Of course, such view can be viewed as reductionistic, that is, reducing the whole of philosophy

---

<sup>156</sup> M. A. Krapiec and A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 100.

<sup>157</sup> M. A. Krapiec and A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 95.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid*, 127.

to metaphysics, but the analogical application of object and method to both general and particular metaphysics preserves the integrity of each discipline.

Summarily, the integrated nature of philosophy and metaphysics comes to light when one considers the object of philosophy itself. Philosophy is not simply the love of wisdom but more so the study of being. This implies that all the disciplines in philosophy have a unified object analogically, namely being. In this way, it could be said that metaphysics and philosophy have the same scope.<sup>159</sup> What makes metaphysics special within this system of cognition is that it seeks for the ultimate causes of being and bases its explanation on the structure of being. The end of philosophy, therefore, is an understanding of being, whether it is being as being, or a moral being or a human being or etc. in each of these beings we need to discover the elements without which the being cannot be – these are necessary elements for existence, for action or identity of being. This idea of building the whole of philosophy on the solid foundation of metaphysics concurs with Jacques Maritain's statement: "A philosopher is not a philosopher if he not a metaphysician."<sup>160</sup>

#### **1.4 Determination of the Realism of Cognition**

The previous discussion focused on metaphysics as a science. I used Krapiec's philosophy to establish that the realism of philosophy in general is connected with the realism of metaphysics. It is realistic metaphysics that provides philosophy with object and methods for investigating reality. However, the object and methods apply to particular metaphysics in an analogous way. In this section, I will fix my focus on metaphysics as a kind of cognition. If the first section deals with *reading* or *studying* metaphysics, this section deals with *doing* metaphysics, by laying emphasis on the process in the cognition of being. The focus here is to demonstrate how we use the data of experience to ascend to metaphysical cognition. Hence the question here is how do we cognize?

There is no doubt that man shares a lot in common with lower animals and even with plants. But what distinguishes man among the products of nature is his cognition.<sup>161</sup> If metaphysics is understood as a cognitive activity, how, then, should one proceed? A simpler way of formulating the question is: how must one do metaphysics? We have established that being is

---

<sup>159</sup> Kaminski, "Contemporary Methods of Metaphysics" in *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, 17.

<sup>160</sup> Jacques Maritain, *Existence and the Existent*, Trans. Lewis Galantieri, Gerald Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), 215.

<sup>161</sup> Krapiec, "Who is man" in *Understanding Philosophy* [Unpubl.], Trans. Hugh McDonald (2007), 264. For more investigation into the nature of cognition and the problems associated with it, see Krapiec, M. A. *Poznawać czy myśleć. Problemy epistemologii tomistycznej*, jako *Dzieła*, t. 8, (Lublin: RW KUL 1994); *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* [Realism of Human Cognition] (Poznań: Pallottinum 1959).

the real object for metaphysical investigation, not only for metaphysics, but for the entire philosophy in an analogous manner. But how can someone come to grasp this being? For Krapiec we can grasp being through an experience with existing things in an intellectual encounter called, cognition. Krapiec defines cognition as “a conscious apprehension of the composite structure of being, which is made up of really non-identical ‘parts’ of one whole.”<sup>162</sup> Mieczysław Krapiec divides the structure of cognition into two parts: the material (*corporeal*) part and the spiritual (formal) part.<sup>163</sup> The material part of cognition refers to those physical organs and systems in man without which cognition is impossible. For example, if the central nervous system is not in order, cognition and its consequences are often impaired. In the case of someone whose brain is dysfunctional, reasoning is often problematic.<sup>164</sup> For Krapiec, cognition cannot be reduced to biological processes.

Krapiec expresses the difficulty associated in narrowing down the specifics of cognition. Even if one attempts to meticulously describe the functionality of the cognitive organs from the eyes and ears to the nervous system, one is still not able to grasp holistically what cognition is. These organs and processes do not constitute cognition itself, “they are its origin, its necessary material aspect; they constitute a necessary reason of being of cognition, but not a sufficient one.”<sup>165</sup> The eyes and ears, the nervous system, etc. are necessary cognitive organs, but they do not define what cognition entails.

Cognition is something one experiences “in a living way ‘in consciousness,’”<sup>166</sup> and founded on the sensory-intellective organic composition of being. Krapiec observes that in the history of philosophy there have been different philosophers who championed either sensory cognition or intellectual cognition. The senses and the intellect are two sources of cognition. Rationalists and empiricists claim that each of these sources is the ultimate avenue for knowledge. For the Rationalists “there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience,”<sup>167</sup> while for the Empiricists all concepts and knowledge

---

<sup>162</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 5.

<sup>163</sup> Krapiec, “Who is man” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 262-263.

<sup>164</sup> Here I am making reference to the ontological character of cognition. This aspect of cognition cannot be studied by other disciplines because they lack the adequate method to undertake such analysis and it falls outside the scope of their investigations. It belongs only to the domain of metaphysics. The consequence of the inclusion of cognition as cognition into metaphysical investigation is quite interesting. If metaphysics studies being, and cognition is included within the scope of its investigation, it follows that cognition is a being. Thus in the act of identifying a dog as a being, both the dog and the cognitive act of apprehending the dog as being form part of metaphysical studies.

<sup>165</sup> Krapiec, “Who is man” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 263.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> Peter Markie, “Rationalism vs. Empiricism”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/rationalism-empiricism/>>.

owe its source to our senses. This discussion had serious consequences for science. The senses enable us to apprehend individual, measurable and concrete data; for example, the solidness of my table or the greenness of the leaf of a tree. I can sense these qualities with my hands and eyes. An acceptance of the senses as the ultimate source of knowledge would imply that “the reality of the existing world is individual, measurable and concrete.”<sup>168</sup> But the criticisms leveled against sensory cognition seems to outweigh its scientific value. The most damaging critic against empiricism is what I consider to be the “distrust of the senses.” Heraclitus was the philosopher who observed the ever-flowing nature of our world: “You cannot step twice into the same river,” he wrote.<sup>169</sup> The data the senses give us are susceptible to change: my solid table can be burnt into ashes and the greenness of the leaf can vanish under high temperatures. If knowledge and science generally demand something that is rational, permanent, necessary and general then sensory cognition is less likely to fulfil that demand. Little wonder sense-knowledge was disregarded by most ancient philosophers as Mieczysław Krapiec observes: “It is not at all surprising, therefore, that the first thinkers, reflecting on the value of cognition, especially cognition organized into science, basically accepted a type of rational cognition and, perceiving its conflicting nature with sensory cognition, rejected the value of sensory cognition as inadequate with respect to reality, which (in consequence) appeared to them as only seemingly changing, for in its deepest core it was identical.”<sup>170</sup> Plato’s attempt to resolve this issue gives rise to a gradation of cognition as well as of reality. Plato realizes that sensory cognition is not totally futile. He notices that without sensory cognition man will be devoid of contact with sensible reality. Thus he attaches some value to the senses as necessary means to attain the highest form of cognition. This he refers to as *doxal* cognition.

---

<sup>168</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 6.

<sup>169</sup> The actual wordings and meaning of this maxim by Heraclitus are highly disputed. Guthrie presents different versions of this saying in *A History of Greek Philosophy*. “(a) Plato, *Crat.* 402 A: I believe Heraclitus says that everything moves on and nothing is at rest, and comparing existing things to the flow of a river he says that you cannot step into the same river twice (b) Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1010a 13: Cratylus criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step into the same river twice: in his opinion you could not do so even once.’ (c) Plutarch, *De E*, 392 B: ‘According to Heraclitus it is not possible to step into the same river twice, nor to lay hold twice of any mortal substance in one permanent state.’ *Qu. Nat.* 912 A: ‘You cannot step twice into the same rivers, as Heraclitus says, for fresh waters are flowing on’ (e) *Ser. Num. Vind.* 559 C: ‘Before we know where we are, we shall have thrown everything into Heraclitus’s river, into which he says one does not step twice, because nature in its changes moves and alters everything.’ Simplicius, *Phys.* 77.31 ‘the continuous flow which interchanges all things, which Heraclitus described in riddling terms in the sentence “You could not step twice into the same river”, comparing becoming to the continuous flow of a river, as having more of not-being than of being’. (g) *Ibid.* 1313 .8: ‘The natural philosophers who follow Heraclitus, concentrating on the continuous flow of becoming, . . . say naturally enough that everything is always in flux and you cannot step twice into the same river.’ There are even more differing formulations of this saying but Guthrie concludes that verbal accuracy was the least of the interests of ancient writers as is the case in contemporary authorship.” Cf. W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 450; 488-492.

<sup>170</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 6.

Aristotle takes a different step from Plato. From the peripatetic maxim he says that the intellect and the senses cooperate in making knowledge possible.<sup>171</sup> In the metaphysics he describes the senses as the source of the most authoritative knowledge of individual things. The senses grasp sensible forms through which the intellect is able to make rational universal judgments from particular things.<sup>172</sup>

The positions of the empiricists and rationalists on the sources of cognition are on a plane of disagreement with that of Mieczysław Krąpiec. Also the solutions rendered by Plato and Aristotle are inadequate. In Krąpiec's realistic philosophy, it is the whole person who cognizes. Man does not cognize as an intellect, neither does man cognize as the senses. Rather, man cognizes. This does not imply that there is an identity of sensory and intellectual activities. These cognitive organs are distinct in their own rights but they are only parts which contribute to a wholeness of an activity, namely, cognition. Mieczysław Krąpiec says: "...but it is important that we perceive the functional unity of cognition in man. It is man who cognizes through his various cognitive organs. And although sight is not the same as hearing, imagining or the understanding of the object, here we are constantly dealing with a single human process whereby some being is known."<sup>173</sup> Walking, for instance, does not count which leg takes a person to a destination. The person considers himself/herself as moving toward a desired goal. The person acts within a framework of consciousness; there is an "I" involved in the act of walking. The same applies to cognition:

...in our sensory cognition there is no such thing as a merely sensory cognitive experience; in the sensory experience there is at the same time an understanding of the cognized thing; there is, therefore, a rational, that is, intellectual cognition of the thing that I see, hear, touch, feel, taste etc. Nonetheless, we cannot identify cognitive sensory structures with intellectual ones, for between various sensory and intellectual acts of cognition there are essential differences on account of the different functions of matter in sensory and in intellectual cognition.<sup>174</sup>

This discussion is much similar to what E. Gilson describes as "the unity of the knowing subject." Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, in his forward to the *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance*, opines that Gilson grounds the foundation of metaphysical realism in this integration of sense and intellect; "...sense and intellect are not distinct entities at war with

---

<sup>171</sup> *De veritate*, q. 2 a. 3 arg. 19: "Nihil est in intellectu quod non sit prius in sensu."

<sup>172</sup> Aristotle, *Met* Bk I.

<sup>173</sup> Krąpiec, "Who is Man" in *Understanding Philosophy*, 264.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*

each other. They are powers of a single knowing subject, and through their mutual interpenetration the intellect “sees” the universal in the singular.”<sup>175</sup>

What, then, is responsible for this functional unity of the senses and the intellect? It is the *vis cogitativa*, the particular reason. The origin of this is traced to Thomas Aquinas. In his *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas distinguishes between internal senses and external senses. The internal senses include common sense, imagination, estimative sense, and memory. In animals, the estimative sense is known as instinct. Thomas argues that this power enables the animal to estimate or perceive the useful or harmful nature of the object encountered and subsequently provokes an action toward the object if deemed useful or an immediate withdrawal from the object if deemed harmful. The movement toward the useful or withdrawal from the harmful can be very spontaneous and may not even depend on a previous experience of the animal with the apprehended object. Therefore Aquinas concludes that the estimative sense perceives intensions which other senses do not perceive.<sup>176</sup> But this same power is operative in humans and it is called the cogitative power or particular reason. Aquinas specifies the function of particular reason thus:

Now what is not perceived by any special sense is known by the intellect, if it be a universal; yet not anything knowable by intellect in sensible matter should be called a sense-object incidentally, but only what is at once intellectually apprehended as soon as a sense-experience occurs. Thus, as soon as I see anyone talking or moving himself my intellect tells me that he is alive; and I can say that I see him live. But if this apprehension is of something individual, as when, seeing this particular coloured thing, I perceive this particular man or beast, then the cogitative faculty (in the case of man at least) is at work, the power which is also called the ‘particular reason’ because it correlates individualised notions, just as the ‘universal reason’ correlates universal ideas.<sup>177</sup>

Krąpiec draws out some consequences for realistic cognition. First among them is the debate between singularists and generalists, concerning what we first know intellectually. Do we know individuals first or do we know generalities? Krąpiec opines that the generalists are right in a sense while the singularists are right in a way too. If I come in contact with my mother, for example, I do not cognize her only with my senses neither do I appeal to a phantasm of her which I had in my previous encounter with her. Rather I am able to assert her presence as “this

---

<sup>175</sup> Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, foreword to *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge*, trans. Mark A. Wauck (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 18-19.

<sup>176</sup> Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 78, a. 4.

<sup>177</sup> Aquinas, *Sent. Libri De Anima II*, c. XI, Lect. 13: “Quod ergo sensu proprio non cognoscitur, si sit aliquid universale, apprehenditur intellectu; non tamen omne quod intellectu apprehendi potest in re sensibili, potest dici sensibile per accidens, sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensatae apprehenditur intellectu. Sicut statim cum video aliquem loquentem, vel movere seipsum, apprehendo per intellectum vitam eius, unde possum dicere quod video eum vivere. Si vero apprehendatur in singulari, ut puta cum video coloratum, percipio hunc hominem vel hoc animal, huiusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam, quae dicitur etiam ratio particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis est collativa rationum universalium.”

here” mother which I express in existential judgment: “this mother exists.” So from the sight and apprehension to the expression in existential judgment. I can grasp the concreteness, individualness of my mother as well as the generalities and abstractions that guarantee her as a subject capable of existing in itself.<sup>178</sup> Therefore the functionality of the particular reason is both sensible and intellective since it grasps the concrete individual element through the senses, while the intellect can understand the materials grasped by the senses through an identification of the relations of the elements constituting the apprehended object and finally expressing them intellectually.

The most important point here is that cognition is an apprehension of being which the human being as cognizing agent engages in. I will give a deeper consideration of the *cogitativa* in the fourth chapter.

#### 1.4.1 Types of Cognition

Krapiec divides cognition into two types: a. Spontaneous cognition/reflected separation and b. Reflexive/critical cognition.<sup>179</sup> Spontaneous cognition refers to the first unreflexive cognitive acts in which we affirm the existence of something through existential judgments. Tomasz Duma describes it as “the fundamental act in which the intellect apprehends the existence of a thing.”<sup>180</sup> Spontaneous cognition connects the cognizer with the individual concrete thing and ensures the grasping of the existence of the whole being. It is the cognizer’s first response to reality. Through this type of cognition, one grasps the existential aspect of being. Spontaneous cognition commences with the experience of being. Krapiec uses the word experience (Lat. *experientia*; Gk. *ἐμπειρία* [empeiria]) in the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense to denote the point of departure for the cognitive process by way of affirming the reality of the being that confronts the cognizer.<sup>181</sup> Hence it is a natural occurrence.<sup>182</sup> However, Krapiec uses it in a different sense from the Aristotelian sense. For Aristotle, natural cognition is connected with conception or essence. But for Krapiec, natural cognition is connected with affirmation of existence, with judgment. The human being’s first cognitive act is not ‘conceptualization’ but ‘judgment.’ The realism of cognition begins from this point – experience. In spontaneous cognition, the moment

<sup>178</sup> Krapiec, “Cogitativa vis,” w *Powszechna Encyclopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 2 (2001): 231-236.

<sup>179</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, “Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School” in *Ad Fontes: Metaphysics Today*, 6 (2009): 151.

<sup>180</sup> Tomasz Duma, “The role of Existential Judgments in Knowing the Existence of Beings,” 318.

<sup>181</sup> Krapiec, “Doświadczenie” [Experience] w *Powszechna Encyclopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 2 (2001): 673-676. See Aristotle, *Apost* 100<sup>a</sup>4 – 100<sup>b</sup>5; Thomas Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 76, art. 1.

<sup>182</sup> Krapiec, “Filozoficzny Realizm” [Philosophical Realism] w *Powszechna Encyclopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 3 (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2002): 541-546.

of experience and the moment of cognition take place simultaneously. This spontaneous cognition occurs at the pre-scientific stage and it does not really grasp the identity of what is cognized. The cognizer can only express the outcome of this cognition in the formula of expression: “something exists.”<sup>183</sup>

According to Krapiec, the spontaneous cognition makes possible a more complex process called metaphysical separation. This is the specific method for the determination of the object of metaphysical cognition. I will explain the process in more details within this dissertation. This method would be at the heart of Krapiec’s metaphysics in his attempt to respond to the possibility and scientificity questions. Important here, is the understanding that through existential judgment, we assert the realness of what is given or perceived through sensory-intellective cognition.<sup>184</sup> Spontaneous cognition has to do with things as we experience them. Krapiec refers to it as an “original experience,” meaning that it is an experience whose data is untainted by any act of subjectivism. It is simply basic. We experience things as such. It is the outcome of that experience that is expressed in the form of existential judgment.

#### *1.4.1.1 Existential Judgment*

There has been a lot of attention in recent times (especially since Etienne Gilson’s work on *Being and Some Philosophers*) regarding the process through which one can grasp being, namely, judgment.<sup>185</sup> While commenting on the thoughts of Aristotle in *De Anima* (III 6, 430<sup>a</sup>26 – b6), Thomas Aquinas makes mention of two operations of the intellect which are attuned to two factors in a thing: the first is what Aristotle refers to as the understanding of the indivisibles or simple apprehension, while the second is judgment, which consists of composing and dividing.<sup>186</sup> The first operation is directed and ordered to the thing’s nature,

---

<sup>183</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, “Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School” in *Ad Fontes: Metaphysics Today*, 6 (2009): 151.

<sup>184</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 85

<sup>185</sup> Some philosophers who have discussed elaborately on this include: E Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Toronto: 1949), 190-215; J. Owens, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985), 45-56; J. Owens, “Aquinas on Knowing Existence,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 29 (1976), 670-690; J. F. Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, D.C., 1984), 69-104. J. F. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 23-62.

<sup>186</sup> *In Boeth de Trin* q. 5, a. 3: “Sciendum est igitur quod secundum philosophum in III de anima duplex est operatio intellectus. Una, quae dicitur intelligentia indivisibilium, qua cognoscit de unoquoque, quid est. Alia vero, qua componit et dividit, scilicet enuntiationem affirmativam vel negativam formando. Et hae quidem duae operationes duobus, quae sunt in rebus, respondent. Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, sive sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, sive res incompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda vero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei, quod quidem resultat ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus.”



while the second is ordered to the thing's being (*esse*). These two-fold operations of the intellect are re-iterated again by Thomas Aquinas in the *Commentary on I Sentences*.<sup>187</sup>

The second operation forms the core of Krapiec's philosophy. It consists of the affirmation of the existence of a concretely existing thing, hence the name existential judgment (EJ). Krapiec acknowledges that he is inspired by the work of Etienne Gilson in this regard.<sup>188</sup> Gilson is known to have argued that *esse* cannot be conceptualized; it can only be grasped in judgment.<sup>189</sup> Existential judgment helps the cognizer to understand what intellectual or cognitional experience of being is. Through existential judgement, a direct grasp of being is guaranteed. For some philosophers, a direct grasp of being is impossible. They opine that there is always a need for mediation in the form of concepts through which being can be grasped. Krapiec points out rather that in existential judgements we grasp directly being in our experience or cognition without representation. This grasping of being is an act of the intellect. The existence of being is not received as sensible forms which we receive through sense perception, for even animals are capable of sense perception. Existence is not something like the hotness of fire, neither is it like the color of a butterfly. Instead, existence is apprehended by the intellect as the "reason" of contents that appear and can be perceived by the senses. This brings our minds back to the discussion on metaphysics as a science. The basic question for metaphysics is "why?" Being understood as an act of existence is the first answer to the question. In the case of John, for instance, it is because there is an act of existence proportional to an essence of a human being with certain physical and psychological features. The realization of this fact is spontaneous, and its expression is such that it carries the weight of existence, thus: "John exists," or "Eve exists," or "this tree exists." Existential judgments are therefore non-predicative affirmation of the existence of a being. The existential judgments could be regarded as the first expressions of the process of cognition. In the statement "John exists," "Eve exists," "this tree exists," the initial point of emphasis is not on the content of John or Eve or on this tree, the emphasis is

---

<sup>187</sup> Aquinas, *I Sent* d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7: "Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum sit duplex operatio intellectus: una quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio intellectus, quam philosophus nominat intelligentiam indivisibilem, quae consistit in apprehensione quidditatis simplicis, quae alio etiam nomine formatio dicitur; alia est quam dicunt fides, quae consistit in compositione vel divisione propositionis: prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius."

<sup>188</sup> See Krapiec, "Cognition or Being" in *Understanding Philosophy* [Unpubl.], Trans. Hugh McDonald (2007), 143: "And it was not until after the Second World War that for the first time the eminent philosopher E. Gilson in his work *L'être et L'essence* formulated the concept of an original cognition of existence in the form of judgments which do not have predicates, that is, "existential judgments," in which we cognitively affirm the existence of a thing as existence."

<sup>189</sup> Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 200-201.

rather on their various acts of existence because the act makes John or Eve or the tree real. More still, existence in John is different from existence in Eve and this tree respectively.

Another important characteristic which Krapiec highlights is that EJ is a non-predicative judgment (PJ). What this implies is that EJ is on the ontological level in contrast with the predicative judgment which is on a different cognitive order.<sup>190</sup> This leads Krapiec to highlight sets of differentiation between EJ and PJ from two main senses: a. structurally and b. functionally. From a structural perspective, EJ reads: “John exists,” “Eve exists,” “this tree exists;” PJ on the other hand reads: “John is a man,” “Eve is a woman,” “this tree is a plant.” It can also be structured based on activities: “John is running,” “Eve is dancing,” “the tree is growing.” Both forms of expression can be represented thus: “A exists,” (EJ) where “A” is any concretely thing possessing existence; and “S is P,” where ‘S’ and ‘P’ form a subject-predicate relationship. Functionally, EJ simply affirms the existence of an individual (either John, Eve, or this tree). It bears the totality of the beingness of each of these subjects. PJ, on the other hand, is a knowledge-generating statement which tells me about the subject.

These structural and functional differences make it impossible to reduce EJ to PJ as Krapiec observes: “all attempts to change existential judgments into predicative judgments are futile since either they do not express the content of our cognition contained in the predicative judgments or they are simple pleonasms, constructed in an artificial way on the model of predicative judgments.”<sup>191</sup> For example, I cannot change the judgment from “John exists” into “John is existing;” such can lead to a total distraught of the intending meaning, or it could simply lead to an obnoxious way of saying the same thing. This does not mean that the use of existential judgment excludes the use of predicative judgment. As we shall see in the method for the discovery of the transcendental properties, only the first stage of metaphysical separation uses EJ.

Summarily, one could deduce four important characteristics of existential judgments from Krapiec’s works: immediacy, individuality, pre-reflexivity and super-verity.<sup>192</sup> Immediacy implies that there is no mediator between being and the cognizer, individuality denotes the exclusive unrepeatable character of the judgment that is specific to each being, pre-reflexivity means that existential judgement precludes the “I” in cognition,<sup>193</sup> super-verity conveys the

---

<sup>190</sup> Krapiec, “Cognition or Being” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 32; *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 86.

<sup>191</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 88.

<sup>192</sup> A. Maryniarczyk, *Metoda metafizyki realistycznej*, 49.

<sup>193</sup> Mieczysław. A. Krapiec, *I-Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology* (Connecticut: Mariel Publications 1983), 135.

indubitable foundation of existential judgment.<sup>194</sup> In addition to these, existential judgments can be direct (Eve exists); or indirect (God, the soul exists).<sup>195</sup> It cannot be general, it has to be “this existing individual thing.” General statements are constructs of the intellect which associate similar properties to a group of objects

Having explained these means of grasping being, there is need to explain how existence should be understood. What does it mean for something to be a being?

#### 1.4.2 Being: The First Object of Cognition

The philosopher, acknowledged to be the first, that identified being as the first object of cognition was Avicenna. This view was reiterated and given more systematic attention by Thomas Aquinas.<sup>196</sup> However, there are lots of discussions on how *ens ut primum cognitum* should be understood.<sup>197</sup> The discussion is centered on whether there is a divide between *ens reale* and *ens rationis*, where *ens reale* refers to things existing *extra mentis* while *ens rationis* concerns beings as they exist in the mind of the cognizer.<sup>198</sup>

More importantly here is that Krapiec agrees with Aquinas that being is the first object of cognition, referring to it as *ens ut primum cognitum*.<sup>199</sup> The point of departure is the existential judgment which flows from our experience with concretely existing things. It is at this point that the object of metaphysics becomes fully actualized, as Krapiec says:

After consciously affirming the existence of the world in existential judgments, we cognitively identify that which determines the real be-ing of the world; that is to say, in the world of real beings we identify the object of realistic metaphysics. What we are seeking here is the sort of cognitive apprehension of the world that could be predicted of every real being and every real ontic element. In a word, at issue here is the so-called construction of the concept of being, a concept that would be the analogically most general apprehension and, at the same time, an apprehension of every concrete, individual be-ing.<sup>200</sup>

I think that this quotation tries to show how we move from the cognition of the concrete individual being to the concept of being which is the subject of metaphysics. Krapiec is trying to show that they are not distinct things. They only vary based on the angle of cognition. In our cognition what comes to us first is the fact that a thing is. Our experience of the world is

---

<sup>194</sup> Tomasz Duma, “The role of Existential Judgments in Knowing the Existence of Beings,” 318. It must be noted that there are some instances where Krapiec refers to existential judgment as simply “veridical.”

<sup>195</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 89.

<sup>196</sup> *ST Ia-IIae*, q. 94, a. 2, c.

<sup>197</sup> For a detailed discussion see Brian A. Kemple, *Ens Primum Cognitum in Thomas Aquinas and the Tradition: The Philosophy of Being as First Known* (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

<sup>198</sup> Kemple, *Ens Primum Cognitum*, 3.

<sup>199</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 90.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*

something that is originally given to us, and it is always first of all our cognitive experiences. Reality attacks us, “striking us with the edge of its existence,”<sup>201</sup> drawing our attention to itself. It is only within this context that we seek to know what it is that has won our attention. It is this experience Krapiec refers to as the “facticity” of the thing.<sup>202</sup> We are therefore moved towards that which has struck us to discover what it is. Notice that I do not choose what strikes me even though cognition is a conscious act. That which strikes me with the edge of existence is being, understood as a determinate content with a proportional existence.

Krapiec likens the response to being to the experience of a child and the mother. He claims that a child is able to decipher that “someone is here” before narrowing it down to “mother is here.”<sup>203</sup> The formulation of this response is the existential judgment. Moreover, in the above quote, Krapiec identifies being as that which prompts our response. And it is this being that is the object of metaphysics. However, it does not emerge so obviously, we have to determine it by looking at John or Eve or this tree to discover that each of them is in act, thanks to the act of existence which is unique in each of them, on account of which each is a being. Therefore in formulation of the concept being, I am referring both to fact that John/Eve/tree exists and to the act of existence which makes John, Eve, and the tree, real things in a real world. Hence, I can refer to any concretely existing thing as being. It means that being is the most general concept or rather transcendental yet it is concrete and individual. This ambiguity in the generality and concreteness of the word, warrants an important consideration from Krapiec as he asks: “what is the meaning of ‘to be’? And, in consequence: what is the meaning of ‘being’ in its chief and primary sense, presented to us in the cognition brought about by existential judgments?”<sup>204</sup> The ambiguity is even made clearer when one considers that in most of the translated works being appears as “*be-ing*”, “*being*”, “*to be*.” I think one of the ways of reformulating this question is: what is being as being? Krapiec’s reply is very straightforward on this issue: to be being refers, in one sense, to this individual existing thing. In this sense being is a noun which refers to substantial, subsisting things or a property common to all individual things.

The second part of being as being (*ens qua ens*) refers to an aspect under which *ens* must be understood. Krapiec states that *as being* must be understood existentially. John, Eve or the tree

---

<sup>201</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 86.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid. The formulation “someone is here” and “mother is here” are mine. Krapiec stated rather that the child responds first to the existence manifested in its mothers presence, even before it cognizes any of the contents of things.

<sup>204</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 91.

are beings in their own right. Each of them is concrete, individual, determinate, in fact they are *this here* content. Having affirmed that John exists, Eve exists, the tree exists, I investigate whether “John” is the same as existence, or Eve or this tree. The answer is obviously negative. John cannot be an identity of John with existence; there cannot be an identity of essence with existence. This is because existence cannot be exhausted in John and more still the existence of Eve and the tree are evidences to this fact. Krapiec therefore concludes:

In order to be, that is to be something real, it is not necessary to be “precisely this” being, since other beings also exist. In order to be a being, it is not necessary to be a being of some one particular species, since other species also exist; it is not necessary to be a material being, since immaterial beings also exist; it is not necessary to be an independent being, since non-independent beings also exist; it is not necessary to be a necessary being, since non-necessary beings also exist; it is not necessary to be this here individual, since other individuals also exist. *In order to be a real being, it is necessary to be any determinate concrete content whatsoever as existing.*<sup>205</sup>

If one tries to consider whether being is a noun or verb or infinitive or participle in Krapiec’s metaphysics, I think that the quotation resolves the whole question. Being is the participial form of “to be” which signifies an act – the act of existence. While being in the first sense (as a noun, eg. John, Eve, this tree) is conceivable, being, in this second sense is not conceivable. That is why it is that which we grasp when we know anything. The grasping of being in this second sense is an act of the intellect. The existence of a thing is not received as sensible forms which we get through sense perception. “Existence is apprehensible only by the intellect as the ‘reason’ of contents that appear and can be perceived by the senses.”<sup>206</sup>

This brings our mind to our discussion on metaphysics as a science. The basic question is “why?” In the case of John, it is because there is an act of existence proportional to an essence of a human being with determinate physical and psychological features. This act of existence can extend to all kinds of being whether, substantial or accidental or material or immaterial, contingent or necessary. What matters most is that it is in act. This means that being lacks any form of determination whereas the things that are in act are determinate and concrete things. The statement that being lacks determination is not a presupposition that it is abstract. Being is always a living force, operative in concrete things. The fact that being applies to myriad of all existing things is an evidence of the plurality in our real world. The application of this single concept to all existing reality reveals the transcendental character of metaphysical cognition. However, it applies to each of them in a peculiar, specific manner. This specific manner is due

---

<sup>205</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 92.

<sup>206</sup> Krapiec, “Cognition or Being” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 147.

to the fact that the act of existence is unique in each singular case. This specific application of the term being to each of these reveals the analogical character of metaphysics. Therefore realistic metaphysics is an analogical-transcendental cognition of reality.

Despite the fact that being is the most general of concepts and the most common in experience, yet it is the most neglected. Most discussions in the physical and natural sciences and sometimes in philosophy hardly concern themselves with the problem of existence. Focus has always been in the essential part of concretely existing things. Most of the sciences operate on the presupposition that things exist without acknowledging it. Biologists, for instance, do not ask whether living cells exist. They presuppose the existence of living cells and begin their investigation from the nature of living cells. For Krapiec, the point of departure for realistic metaphysics is the affirmation of existence.

#### *1.4.3 The Subject-Object axis in Reflexive Cognition*

Having discussed one aspect of the kinds of cognition, namely, spontaneous cognition, I consider it important to shift attention to the second kind of cognition: reflexive or critical cognition. Krapiec refers to reflexive cognition as “a ‘turning upside down’ of the process of cognition.”<sup>207</sup> It is often the starting point for subjectivist and idealistic philosophies and also for those who practice ontology in the name of metaphysics. Such cognition is characterized by an analysis of cognition instead of being. The priority for reflexive cognition is usually *a priori* conditions which make cognition possible or the study of the reified mode of the products of cognition. This cognition is devoid of affirming the existence of being.<sup>208</sup>

In every act of cognition, there are three important elements: the subject who cognizes, the object that is cognized and the space between the subject and the object which Mieczysław Krapiec refers to as “the field of cognition” or “the field of consciousness.”<sup>209</sup> The subject and object form the poles of cognition. The relation between these elements goes a long way to determine the realism of philosophy. The major question is: does the subject condition or determine the object in cognition or is the object the conditioning and determining element in cognition? An affirmative answer to any of these two options undermine the realism of philosophy: such cognition separates itself from the proper understanding of reality and clings instead to “thinking” or “fantasizing” on issues concerning reality; secondly, such cognition

---

<sup>207</sup> Krapiec, “Cognition or Being” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 148.

<sup>208</sup> Krapiec, “Cognition or Being” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 113-117.

<sup>209</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 4.

leads to the formation of a philosophy that is founded on the cognition of reality, instead of a spontaneous contact with real beings.<sup>210</sup>

Mieczysław Krapiec identifies three different responses corresponding to three different phases in the history of philosophy regarding the axis of subject-object. The first phase is represented by classical philosophy. Classical philosophy places the accent “upon the objective, ontological aspect of the axis.”<sup>211</sup> This attitude stretches through Christian antiquity to the Middle Ages. The second stage witnessed both cultural and philosophical changes. There was a shift in emphasis from the object, characteristic of the classical and Christian thought, to the subject. This change was initiated by René Descartes who, according to Mieczysław Krapiec, subjectivized the whole of philosophy. Descartes influence was not only revolutionary but was so strong that “since that time, philosophy has remained condemned to subjectivity.”<sup>212</sup> Descartes sought clear and distinct ideas reminiscent of the Platonic ideas, but his concept differs significantly from Plato’s. Whereas Plato considered his ideas to be real ideas, so real that they guarantee the properties inherent in things in the world of senses, Descartes’ ideas “were only a subjective idea, the realism of which is guaranteed by God and the principle of causality, this principle being given to us as one of the *a priori* ideas.”<sup>213</sup> There was a shift from the real world to concepts which are formulated by the cognizing subject. Obviously, the subject becomes the arbiter of what exists while God is the guarantor. Philosophy relapsed from being the cognition of real beings to *a priori* constructive conceptualization. Soon after, more sophisticated *a priori* constructive philosophical systems emerged in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, Krapiec insists that even though these philosophical systems shed some light about things in the world they remain inadequate to serve as foundation for proper explanation of reality.<sup>214</sup> The third stage was very much subjective in nature. But the shift was more or less “from thought itself to its external expression in language.”<sup>215</sup> This was connected to the British analytic philosophers who insisted that the function of philosophy is the clarity of concepts and analysis of language.

---

<sup>210</sup> Krapiec, “Major Periods and Movements of Philosophy” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 53.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Krapiec “The Object of Philosophical Investigations” in *Understanding Philosophy*, [Unpubl.], Trans. Hugh McDonald (2007), 40. The influence of Descartes and Kant seem to overlap in Krapiec’s writings. One can argue that in Krapiec’s philosophy while Descartes laid the foundation for subjectivism Kant radicalized it.

<sup>213</sup> Krapiec, “The Object of Philosophical Investigations,” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 40-41.

<sup>214</sup> Krapiec, “Major Periods and Movements of Philosophy,” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 54.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

Mieczysław Krąpiec observes that from the cradle of philosophy until now philosophy has been a “balancing” venture on the subject-object axis. There has been a total disconnect with reality and a philosophical obsession with the ‘world’ as we see it, the ‘world’ as we think it or the ‘world’ as we express and understand it through concepts. In other words these philosophical thoughts are reflective and uncharacteristic of realistic philosophy. The starting point of their philosophical inquiry is data in man’s reflexive cognition. These reflexive thoughts are responsible for the multiplicity of philosophical systems, the incorrectness in the solutions of these systems and the unending tendency toward idealism.<sup>216</sup>

#### *1.4.4 The Problems with the Subjective and Objective axis of Cognition.*

A discussion on the subjective axis of cognition demands a proper understanding of how Mieczysław Krąpiec interprets Descartes. Krąpiec, as with several other authors, agree that Descartes was highly influenced by the philosophy of the Scholastics. Prior to Descartes the Scholastics tried to explain existence as a modality of the content of a being. This means that a concept bears the existence of that which it signifies with it. Beginning from Duns Scotus, philosophy shifted its focus from “being” to the “concept of being” - *conceptus entis*. The concept of being became the object of human cognition and it could be attained through a simple act of the intellect. Such thought reached its apex in the philosophy of Francisco Suarez. According to Suarez, concepts have an objective side as well as a subjective side.<sup>217</sup> The objective concept of being, which Mieczysław Krąpiec also refers to as “the objective content of being” refers to “that which we grasp with a simple act of the intellect.”<sup>218</sup> It is the first object of cognition and it aids in cases of intellectual analysis to understand what is being referred to. The subjective concept, on the other hand, refers to “our personal ‘image’ which is formed by our intellect and through which we ‘see’ – as through spectacles- the objective content of being.”<sup>219</sup> For example, when I come in contact with a dog, I am able to grasp the

---

<sup>216</sup> Mieczysław Krąpiec, “On the Realism of Metaphysics,” *Ad Fontes*, 6 (2009), 116.

<sup>217</sup> M. A. Krąpiec, “Knowledge and Reality,” *Forum Philosophicum* 11, (2006): 32. Also mention must be made that in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* Suarez distinguishes between ‘formal’ concepts’ and ‘objective concepts:’ “Conceptis formalis, et obiectivus quid sint, et in quo differant.—Supponenda imprimis est vulgaris distinctio conceptus formalis et obiectivi; conceptus formalis dicitur actus ipse, seu (quod idem est) verbum quo intellectus rem aliquam seu communem rationem concipit; qui dicitur conceptus, quia est veluti proles mentis; formalis autem appellatur, vel quia est ultima forma mentis, vel quia formaliter repræsentat menti rem cognitam, vel quia revera est intrinsecus et formalis terminus conceptionis mentalis, in quo differt a conceptu obiectivo, ut ita dicam.” However most authors refer to the “formal” concepts as “subjective” concepts. For example see Victor Salas and Robert Fastiggi, “Francisco Suárez, the Man and his Work.” In *A Companion to Francisco Suárez*, (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 25.

<sup>218</sup> Krąpiec, “Cognition or Being” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 113.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*



existential and essential aspects of the dog in my intellect. This content which is in my intellect is objective in the sense that it comes directly from the concretely existing thing. Also, this “image” helps me whenever I wish to discuss or talk about “dog;” I make reference to this image as grasped from the concretely existing thing. The subjective content of the dog comes up in the course of my effort to understand and demonstrate fully what I grasped and experienced from the objective image which I have already. I do not need to have a contact with a dog again in order to talk about a dog. Rather, I call up the objective content or concept in order to intellectually understand what it is. Yet, the dog existing in itself is quite different from the same dog which I have in my head. Here we see both ontic and epistemological differences. But particularly in the epistemological realm Mieczysław Krąpiec tries to emphasize is that realistic philosophy respects this dichotomy in every ‘concept,’ namely, the subjective and the objective. But this dichotomy does not imply a disagreement between the subjective and the objective; instead, in the actual sense,

there was no difference between the “objective concept” and the “subjective concept.” There was only as much objective content contained in “objective concepts” as the “subjective concept,” which is the apex of a given man’s efforts at knowledge, allowed. Thus from the point of view of the “apprehended cognitive content” there was no difference between the subjective concept and the objective concept. However, there was a fundamental difference as regards the very mode of existence of the content being cognized, for in the objective concept this content existed as objectively cognized, dependent on the thing itself. This is because the objective concept is a thing as cognized, whereas the subjective concept is my psychic construct existing within myself which allows me to discern as much in the thing itself as I have personally cognized and to the extent that “I have formed an idea about it.”<sup>220</sup>

In the above quotation we see very important points: firstly, the (absolute) identity of the subjective and the objective contents of being and secondly the difference in the mode of existence between the objective side of being and the being as existing outside of the cognizer. The relation between the objective concept or content of being with the concrete thing seems to be clear. It is the concretely existing thing that makes it possible for an apprehension to take place at all. Without the dog existing, for instance, I could never have constructed an objective image of it. But the other part of the quotation, namely, the almost absolute identity between the objective side and the subjective side of the content provokes basic epistemological questions and problems. Firstly, it would obviously imply that since the power of discernment is different for each person, there is certainty that we cannot understand one object in the same way. Therefore, there are as many subjective sides as there are many cognizers. But the above problem is not the key to a proper understanding to the quotation. Rather, Mieczysław Krąpiec

---

<sup>220</sup> Krąpiec, “Cognition or Being” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 114.

draws our attention to the first statement of the quotation which means that the subjective content can only draw from and be as big as the objective content but not without it or more than it. The subjective content can only be as much as the objective content. Without the objective content, the subjective content is non-existent. This distinction for Mieczysław Krąpiec is the guarantee of the realism of philosophical cognition, meaning that for a philosophy to be realistic, it must recognize the distinction between the mode of cognition and the mode of being and secondly, within the mode of cognition, the subtle distinction between the objective and the subjective content of being. Descartes did not.

Mieczysław Krąpiec states that Descartes rejected the objective content of reality and stuck to the subjective side. His reason for this rejection was that the distinction was “an unnecessary duplication of reality.”<sup>221</sup>

The consequences for following the path of reflexive cognition include: the formation and an entrapment in a field of consciousness wherein the cognizer deals with the mode of cognition, with signs and symbols far-removed from reality; the formation of concepts prior to cognition indicates that reflexive cognition is indeed an upside down movement in cognition; reflective cognition is no more than a critical analysis of my cognition and as such is on a meta-level – being critical of spontaneous cognition

#### *1.4.5 The Basic Characteristics of Spontaneous Cognition as necessary for Realistic Philosophy*

In our discussion of metaphysics as a way of cognition, we have seen two ways or two kinds of cognition: spontaneous cognition and reflexive cognition. The flaws of reflexive cognition are overtly based on the formation of a field which distances cognizer from the object. This distancing can be as a result of essentialization of the object or the objectivization of the conditions for cognition. However, the real nature of cognition warrants a unity of the subject with the object, whereby that which is known becomes one with the person who knows. This statement does not imply that reality is reality because it is knowable. On the contrary, it is knowable because it exists, because it is a reality.<sup>222</sup> This peculiarity is found in spontaneous cognition. Spontaneous cognition guarantees sensible contact with objective reality. Its starting

---

<sup>221</sup> Krąpiec, “Cognition or Being” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 114.

<sup>222</sup> Krąpiec, “Knowledge and Reality,” 31.

point is a “thisness” – “this John,” “this Eve,” “this tree.” There is some sensible touch in its nature which makes it imperative for realistic cognition. In realistic metaphysics, one needs to have experience with concretely existing things. We begin from experience, not from analysis of statements or thought. Realistic metaphysics is a philosophy which has real things as its object.

If reductiveness in thinking is one of the properties and characteristics of realistic cognition, then the point of departure must be put into consideration. If philosophy begins from the subjective axis, we cannot reduce the conditions for cognition beyond the conditions. Thinking cannot be reduced to anything further. The result of such cognition cannot go beyond the thinking subject. However, when there is a cognition devoid of the subject-object axis, we can engage being in an investigative way by a reductive thinking, seeking those non-contradictory factors in being without which it cannot exist. A reflective type of cognition cannot guarantee such. Realistic cognition begins from experience and moves down to determine the causes of the existence of concretely existing reality.

#### *1.4.6 Consequences for Realistic Cognition*

The discussions in this first chapter have revealed the origin, nature, methods, and characteristics of doing a realistic metaphysics. These points are summarized below:

- Differentiation has been made between metaphysics from a descriptive perspective as “meta-metaphysics” and metaphysics from a prescriptive point of view as a demonstrative way of cognition. This demonstrative way is vital to proffering solution to the possibility and scientificity questions. The object of the science has been identified as being as being while autonomous, authentic methods have been used to demonstrate how this object is grasped. As a science metaphysics is a discipline with its formal and material objects, with adequate methods suitable for the pursuit of its object and a veridical end, gained through contemplation. As a way of cognition, realistic metaphysics is an objective type of cognition that employs a reductive type of thinking in seeking the ultimate causes of things in things themselves, which are real by their acts of existence.
- Realistic cognition is practically impossible if there are no real objects. Realistic cognition is determined by reality (real things) which is in turn determined by the act of existence. The real, existing world is the world of persons, animals, plants, and things. Possibility is logically and ontologically incompatible with actuality in realistic cognition. Realistic metaphysics, in this sense, does not seek to formulate theories to

explain the real world but seek the real factors in things as justification for the existence of the real world.

- *Dia ti* was the first question to produce scientific knowledge. Therefore it is absurd that it is considered to be anachronistic by contemporary science which obviously does not and cannot answer the questions posed by veridical cognition. Realistic metaphysics cannot succumb to the pressure of contemporary science to give up its object and methods of investigation in order to be scientific.
- The object for realistic cognition is being, understood as that which has an act of existence. Transcendental-analogical language guarantees the universality of realistic cognition and prevents it from reductionism by preserving the individuality of all that is called being.
- Realistic cognition demonstrates that objective knowledge and objective form of cognition is possible. We cannot build knowledge on hypothesis and presuppositions which do not establish a relation between the subject and the object. Therefore there is a correlation between object and method in metaphysics.
- The impossibility of reducing metaphysical cognition to the theory of cognition must be affirmed. The connection between general metaphysics and particular metaphysics indicates that all philosophical disciplines are committed to a study of being understood analogically and the theory of cognition cannot be a pre-condition for doing metaphysics because human cognition is a being in itself.
- The act of existence remains important even for epistemological reasons for only being which is actualized can actualize our intellect.
- Knowledge of our world is a consequence of the operations of our intellect. There is no infused knowledge of any sort in the human mind nor is knowledge merely reminiscence of previously known truths lost due to separation from the eternal forms. The cognizer discovers the existence of things through the functioning power of the intellect.
- Realistic philosophy is a cognitive enterprise that is made feasible through cognitive apparatus of intellect and senses, together with physiological and psychological interactions within the human system. However, realistic philosophy does not concern itself with these processes and interactions since it focuses on the totality of the outcome of the cognitive act and not on the partitioned functionality of each of these organs. The *cogitativa vis* preserves and guarantees cognitive realism by obliterating functional

separativism of the senses and intellect in cognition. Particular reason, while acknowledging the distinct operative nature of the senses and intellect, emphasizes the intrinsic relation between both as potency to act, thereby making man the cognizer (in this case it is the sense cognition that is in potency to the intellectual cognition because while the sense cognition provides material content, the intellectual cognition provides the realization of the content through the affirmation of its existence.<sup>223</sup>

---

<sup>223</sup> M. A. Krąpiec, "Cogitativa vis" w *Powszechna Encyclopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 2 (2001): 231-236.

## Chapter Two: The Transcendental Properties and the Analogical Character of Being

### Introduction

This chapter treats three important metaphysical themes, namely, the transcendental properties of being, the first metaphysical laws and the analogy of being. We have firmly established that metaphysics is a way of cognition and what is cognized is being. However, at that level of cognition, being is indistinct and is in dire need of clarification. Krapiec argues for the indistinctiveness of being apprehended cognitively by focusing on its insufficiency to explain and represent the nature of the particular concrete thing.<sup>224</sup> The first point of clarification is the existential aspect of a composed being. The pursuit of this end leads to the discovery of the richness of the concrete thing which the concept ‘being’ cannot denote. This richness of being is what is referred to as the transcendental properties of being. Krapiec mentions two modes of clarification: universal mode and transcendental mode. The universal mode leads to the formation of universal concepts while the transcendental mode leads to transcendental properties. Also, the transcendentals show the properties belonging to each being, while the universals belong to some category of being. The difference between these modes and concepts is based on differences in the cognitive process, content, the range of predication and the relation of their range of predication to their content. In this transcendental knowledge, Krapiec seeks to answer the question on why being is. His answer is simple: being is because it has an act of existence; being is because it has content; being is true, being is something, being is good and being is beauty.

### 2.1 *Historical Development and meaning of the Transcendentals*

When transcendental properties are mentioned one of the prominent names that come to mind is Thomas Aquinas. This does in no way imply that this theory owes its origin to Thomas Aquinas, rather it has been attested by a good number of philosophers that Thomas Aquinas systematized and built on the foundation of his predecessors.<sup>225</sup> Discussions surrounding being, good, true, unity etc. pre-date Thomas Aquinas and was the focus of Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales and Albert the Great at the Parisian school. The question of being, for instance, has been there since the pre-Socratic philosophers in a veiled form. Therefore the

---

<sup>224</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 101.

<sup>225</sup> Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 24.

development of these properties can be remotely traced to the Ionians, who though took the act of existence for granted but sought the primordial element to which everything is reducible. Their naïveté evoked the famous metaphysical Parmenidian statement: “Being is.”<sup>226</sup> Thence the discussion on being took skyrocketing dimension in Plato and Aristotle. Plato had opined that the Good is above being (*Rep* 508a-e). The convertibility of being (τὸ ὄν) and unity (τὸ ἓν) is also seen in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*.<sup>227</sup> These proximate thoughts are not totally unconnected with the discussions which ensued at the University of Paris where the ‘first development of the doctrine of the transcendentals is to be found.’<sup>228</sup> Even though the medieval philosophers were deeply concerned on how these properties are related with God, there is no doubt that their discourses on the transcendentals had great philosophical significance.

The overemphasis on how these properties are related to God really truncated the standard of medieval philosophy in contemporary terms. However, in Krapiec’s philosophy we see a commitment to metaphysical analysis focused on being as being, far removed from theological concerns. The properties we shall discuss in this chapter are not focused on God rather Krapiec draws our minds to all existing things, the Absolute inclusive. Mention ought to be made of Krapiec’s main source, namely, the *de Veritate* of Thomas Aquinas. However references to Aquinas’ Commentary on the *Metaphysics* and on the *Physics* were also made.

The transcendentals are properties of being. They are trans-categorical, meaning that they transcend the limitations and contractions of the Aristotelian categories. Whereas the categories are simply modes of predication and cannot apply to all existing things in the same way, the transcendentals are real properties without which any being cannot exist. For instance, we can predicate “redness,” which belongs to the category of quality, to a red apple. But this redness applies to this apple and not to all things. This shows a limitation in the Aristotelian categories. Also the category of quality, quantity signify different ways of predicating things, for example, to be red (quality) cannot mean to be big (quantity). The transcendentals, on the other hand, are not simply predicates (words). They are rather properties without which a being cannot exist. Each existing thing must have an essence and should possess unity, intelligibility,

---

<sup>226</sup> It could also be translated “what is, is.” See McKirahan, *Philosophy Before Socrates*, 154-155.

<sup>227</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 1003<sup>b</sup>23-24.

<sup>228</sup> Aertsen, J. *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 25. Philip the Chancellor discussed the transcendentals in his *Summa de bono*; Alexander of Hales discussed the theme in his *Summa theologica*, a work that is claimed to have been written by many other contributors, see Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 40-41; Albert the Great dealt on the transcendentals in several treatises, but importantly in *De bono*, *Commentary on the Sentences* and his commentary on Dionysius’ *De divinis nominibus*. See Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 25-70.

affability, and perfection. These properties are convertible in that they are not ‘demarcation’ or exclusive in nature like the categories. This means that to be being is to be true; to be being is to be one etc. – a demonstration of an extensive character. They refer to the same thing. This does not imply that the transcendentals are synonyms. Each transcendental is unique in itself. It brings up an aspect of being which is not captured by ‘being.’ The important preliminary points for Krapiec regarding the transcendentals are as follows:

- a. The transcendentals are seven in number *ens, res, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum* and *pulchrum*.<sup>229</sup>
- b. There is an obvious effort to show that the transcendentals are properties of being and not mere concepts or ways of predication. These properties are the “existential aspects” of being that are directly inexpressible by the concept ‘being.’<sup>230</sup>
- c. The method for the discovery of these properties is a complex process called metaphysical separation, in place of spontaneous abstraction.<sup>231</sup>
- d. The understanding of the transcendental properties is progressive. The understanding of being as being is pivotal to the understanding of the subsequent transcendental.
- e. In this progression, each new transcendental adds new content to being. This content is not something from outside of the thing. The addition is not something positive either as the number one is added to the number two. The progression also indicates that the transcendentals are both extensive and inclusive.
- f. The primacy and firstness of being is emphasized. All the other transcendental properties stand in an inclusive but progressive relation to being. Their derivation is not haphazard or arbitrary but in an order corresponding to the structure of being.<sup>232</sup> Not only are they in such relation, their intelligibility is absolutely tied to being as being.
- g. There is always a movement back to being to avoid *a priori* derivation of these properties. The transcendentals are not derived in the sense of logical deduction, whereby the properties are simply concepts that are constructed from an already

---

<sup>229</sup> There are many works which show fewer number of transcendentals or different kinds of transcendentals varied from the Thomistic trend. For example, Oliva Blanchette mentions five transcendentals in his work, namely, Being as one, being as true being as good, being as active, being as universe. Cf. *Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 147-236.

<sup>230</sup> *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 102.

<sup>231</sup> *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 107.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*



constructed concept of being.<sup>233</sup> Rather we go back to the point of existential judgment, as will be demonstrated in this work.

The discussion on the number of transcendentals cannot be overlooked. Some authors give varied numbers of the transcendentals. But Krapiec mentions seven of them without even mentioning the discussion regarding number. The only transcendental he argues for its status is beauty.

In *De Veritate* we see a classic Thomistic enumeration of the transcendentals.<sup>234</sup> In *Veritate* 1, 1, Thomas divides the transcendentals into two groups: the first is that which pertains to every being considered absolutely (*uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se*). In this work we shall refer to them as the absolute transcendentals. The second group of transcendentals are divided into two. Aquinas was specific that this second group of transcendentals are relational in character – (*Si autem modus entis accipiat secundum modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum*). Within this group, he mentions *aliquid*, which is derived when being is considered negatively as division (*divisio*) of one being from another. In the correspondence of being to the soul, Thomas makes mention of truth and good, the objects for the human intellect and will.<sup>235</sup> This connection to the soul is seen in Aristotle's work on the soul, wherein he says the soul is in a sense all things.<sup>236</sup> Beauty is obviously not included in the text. Krapiec will justify the inclusion of beauty by citing texts from the *Summa Theologiae*<sup>237</sup> and through an analysis of the nature of the psychic life of man. This second group of transcendentals will be referred to as relative transcendentals.

It is worth noting that in his works, especially in his *Metaphysics*, he does not directly dispute this categorization or division of the transcendentals. However, in his explanation of *aliquid*, especially in his justification of the plurality of beings, he seems to pursue an argument which

---

<sup>233</sup> Ibid.

<sup>234</sup> *De Ver* q. 1, a. 1 “Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae metaphysicae...Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi essentia eius, secundum quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur hoc nomen res, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio *Metaphys.*, quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam entis. Negatio autem consequens omne ens absolute, est indivisio; et hanc exprimit hoc nomen unum: nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens indivisum...exprimit hoc nomen aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid;... Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, ut in principio *Ethic.* dicitur quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis...”

<sup>235</sup> *De Ver* q. 1, a. 1 “Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiat aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente: hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia, ut dicitur in III de anima.”

<sup>236</sup> Aristotle, *DA* 431<sup>b</sup>21.

<sup>237</sup> *ST* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad. 1; I-II, q. 27, a. 1 ad 3.

places *aliquid* as an absolute transcendental. Therefore in our discussion, we shall include *aliquid* as an absolute transcendental property of being. These points having been made, our attention will focus on the method for the derivation of the transcendental properties, namely, metaphysical separation.

## 2.2 *Method of Discovery of the Transcendentals*

In the history of philosophy, it is clear that each system of philosophy has a method akin to it. Different kinds of cognitions have different methods suitable for deriving their objects in philosophical inquiries. The Ionians were naturalists who focused on the material aspect of being and hence clung to sense cognition as a reliable method for discerning the urstuff. Plato and Parmenides were more intellectual as they sought for some something permanent to form the basis for science. For Aristotle, the object of philosophical inquiry is the form (*to ti en einai*), which can be grasped by a co-operative act of the senses and intellect through a method called abstraction. The Aristotelian method of abstraction corresponds with his idea of the structure of being which is made up of matter and form. It was not until Thomas Aquinas that a revolutionary stance on both structure and method within Aristotelianism emerged. Abstraction focuses strictly on grasping the conceptual and essential aspect of being.<sup>238</sup> In his work *De Ente et Essentia*, Thomas argued that matter and form which are the basic structure of being in Aristotle belong to the essence of being while existence is a vital part that is lacking in Aristotle's metaphysics. Hence composed beings are made up of essence (*essentia*) and existence (*esse*).<sup>239</sup> The change in the structure of being necessitates a change in the method for the apprehension of being. Hence Thomas Aquinas introduces the method of separation.<sup>240</sup>

The term separation is not original to Thomas Aquinas. The word appeared in different forms in Aristotle's philosophy: He uses the word separation in relation to the Platonic forms existing outside of the material world. He also talks of material entities as separate and also uses the

---

<sup>238</sup> Thomasz Duma, "The Role of Existential Judgments in knowing the Existence of Beings," *Espíritu*, (July-December, 2014): 318, <https://www.revistaespiritu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Dialnet-TheRoleOfExistentialJudgmentsInKnowingTheExistence-4885199.pdf>.

<sup>239</sup> *Ente*, 3, 77-78: "Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quiditate, nisi forte sit aliqua res, cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse; et haec res non potest esse nisi una et prima."

<sup>240</sup> *In Boeth de Trin* q. 5, a. 3, "Sic ergo intellectus distinguit unum ab altero aliter et aliter secundum diversas operationes; quia secundum operationem, qua componit et dividit, distinguit unum ab alio per hoc quod intelligit unum alii non inesse. In operatione vero qua intelligit, quid est unumquodque, distinguit unum ab alio, dum intelligit, quid est hoc, nihil intelligendo de alio, neque quod sit cum eo, neque quod sit ab eo separatum. Unde ista distinctio non proprie habet nomen separationis, sed prima tantum. Haec autem distinctio recte dicitur abstractio, sed tunc tantum quando ea, quorum unum sine altero intelligitur, sunt simul secundum rem."

term ontological separation in relation to substance.<sup>241</sup> Also, separation in being and in notion was a yardstick in his division of the sciences.<sup>242</sup> In Thomas Aquinas, even though the *separatio* is not disconnected with the division of the sciences, the term was also used to refer to a specific operation of the intellect, or more precisely, the second operation of the intellect through which we can arrive at the understanding of being as existing. Despite identifying separation as the method for the discovery of being as existing, “Thomas did not devote an article or define the specificity of *separatio*” in any of his works.<sup>243</sup> Hence, some philosophers have gone into the very specifics of *separatio* or offered demonstrations on how it grasps being as existing. Etienne Gilson, for example, explains the operations of the intellect in these words: “First, the knowing subject apprehends *what* the given object is, next it judges *that* the object is, and this instantaneous re-composition of the existence of given objects with their essences merely acknowledges the actual structure of these objects. The only difference is that, instead of being simply experienced, such objects now are intellectually known.”<sup>244</sup> Hence, I will expose Krapiec’s idea on how metaphysical separation as a method works.

I have explained already the process of spontaneous cognition. Although not a method in the strict sense of the word, Krapiec, uses it as a stepping stone towards metaphysical separation. Krapiec describes metaphysical separation as a “complicated cognitive process.”<sup>245</sup> He applies this method specifically to the discovery of being as the subject for metaphysical cognition and also to the discovery of the transcendental properties of being. On the use of this method in determining the object of metaphysics, Krapiec says: “hence, we should appeal to the type of cognition that, being an expression of natural human language, does not presuppose in its point of departure any “intermediaries” modifying the understanding of reality. Such cognition consists in a process of “separation,” which determines the real object of metaphysics.”<sup>246</sup> Since being is a transcendental, it follows then that the method used in the discovery of being as being is applicable to all the transcendental properties. This method consists of three stages:

(a) at the first stage, we begin with the data given to us through spontaneous cognition, namely, existential judgment. Without existential judgment, metaphysical separation is impossible. Existential judgment is the foundation and starting point for separation, as Krapiec says: “...the

---

<sup>241</sup> Emily Katz, “Ontological Separation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” *Phronesis* 62 (2017): 26-27. See *Met* 987<sup>a</sup>30 – 988<sup>a</sup>15; 990<sup>b</sup>1 – 993<sup>a</sup>10; 1041<sup>a</sup>6-1040<sup>b</sup>30; 1078<sup>b</sup>5-1080<sup>a</sup>10.

<sup>242</sup> *Met* 1025<sup>a</sup>15-30.

<sup>243</sup> Wippel, *Metaphysical Themes*, 78.

<sup>244</sup> Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 204.

<sup>245</sup> Krapiec, “The Object of Philosophical Investigations,” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 33.

<sup>246</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 85.

existential judgment is the direct object of analysis in the process of separation.”<sup>247</sup> This is because the existential judgment is the nucleus or DNA of our metaphysical experience, containing information on the basic laws of being. The fundamental laws of being are anchored on those necessary elements without which nothing is real, the first of which is existence. Hence we say “this Peter exists,” “this red rose exists,” “Mary exists.” Any example from these divisions can qualify for existential judgment. It does not matter whether such being is material or not as Krapiec says:

In order to be, that is, to be something real, it is not necessary to be «precisely this» being, since other beings also exist. In order to be a being, it is not necessary to be a being of some one particular species, since other species also exist; it is not necessary to be a material being; since immaterial beings also exist; it is not necessary to be an independent being, since non-independent beings also exist; it is not necessary to be a necessary being, since non-necessary beings also exist; it is not necessary to be this here individual, since other individuals also exist. In order to be a real thing, it is necessary to be any determinate concrete content whatsoever as existing.<sup>248</sup>

The implication of the statement is that “existence is the basis of realness, of being.”<sup>249</sup> A being that is not concretely existing cannot count as real. One cannot say a contradictory being like a squared-circle exists. All contradictory entities cannot form a genuine existential judgment. Also, Krapiec mentions different forms of being in the above quotation, viz. material vs immaterial, necessary vs non-necessary, independent vs non-independent. However, the general classification of being in Krapiec’s metaphysics are four: substantial, accidental, relational and necessary beings.

(b) the second stage consists of separation in the real sense of the word. The existential judgment provides us with elements, which during the course of analysis, highlights the non-identity of the content and the existence in the concretely existing being (in the case of *ens*). He writes: “The next act, after we have affirmed the existence of various subjects (eg. the existence of John, Mary, this horse, this oak, etc.) is our perception of their heterogeneity, their non-identity. We perceive the primordial pluralism of being. In a subsequent act, we perceive that reality...is joined more with “that something is” that [*sic*] with “what the being is.”<sup>250</sup> The analysis of the existential judgement (John exists) shows that we are dealing with more than one element. When we analyze further, we are able to cognize two important points at this stage: firstly, the relation and connection between essence and existence and secondly, the

<sup>247</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 109.

<sup>248</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 92.

<sup>249</sup> Kingsley Ekeocha, “The Method of the discovery of the Absolute Transcendental Properties of Being in Mieczysław Albert Krapiec’s Metaphysics,” *Rocznik Tomistyczny*, 6 (2017): 212-213.

<sup>250</sup> Krapiec, “The Object of Philosophical Investigations,” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 32.

limitation of existence and content in a being,<sup>251</sup> thirdly and most importantly, existence is the reason for being.<sup>252</sup> The connection between essence and existence is a relation of act and potency. The existence factor makes the essence to be real. There is a non-identity between both essence and existence however there is no presupposition that both essence and existence were separate beings before a relation is established. Being determined implies that Eve/John as a human being is not an indeterminate essence and cannot become a tree or a bird over time. Also, there is a specific content which goes into relation with a specific existence. Eve's height, color, weight etc. go into relation with her specific individual existence. There is no point in time Eve would become John. This second stage is on a categorical level.

(c.) the third and final stage is the transcendental level. What has been discovered in the second stage is extended to all real beings. Since Eve is composed of essence and existence and the relation of these factors determine the realness of Eve, it follows that "to be a being as being means *to be any determinate concrete content (concrete essence) whatsoever as existing.*"<sup>253</sup> Being applies not only to Eve or John but to every existing thing. It is in this sense that Krapiec refers to the concept of being as transcendental and analogical at the same time.<sup>254</sup>

These three stages are quite important for the derivation of being and the transcendental properties. However, it should be noted that Krapiec applied this method only for *ens* although he mentions these methods in his discussion on beauty. The application and extension of this method to the other transcendentals was achieved by Andrzej Maryniarczyk.<sup>255</sup> We shall adopt his application of this method for the rest of the transcendentals. Having discussed being to an extent in the previous chapter, I wish to present some other important points on being and draw out cognitive consequences. Subsequently, I will discuss the other transcendental properties, demonstrating how we can apply metaphysical separation in their derivation. We shall stick with the division between the absolute and the relative transcendentals as well.

---

<sup>251</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 111.

<sup>252</sup> Krapiec, "The Object of Philosophical Investigations," in *Understanding Philosophy*, 33.

<sup>253</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 93.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid.

<sup>255</sup> In his work *Rationality and Finality of the World of Persons and Things*, A. Maryniarczyk makes an elaborate application of Krapiec's spontaneous and reflective (separation) methods for the discovery of other transcendentals. See *Rationality and Finality of the World of Persons and Things*. Notebooks on Metaphysics, vol. 4, translated by Hugh McDonald (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2016).

## 2.3 The absolute transcendental properties

### 2.3.1 Being as the First Transcendental

In the previous chapter, we discussed being as the subject of metaphysics as well as the first object of cognition. In this chapter, we have demonstrated how metaphysical separation can be used to arrive at the notion of being. The demonstration shows that being is a transcendental property. In fact, being is the first transcendental, the *primum transcendental*. Aertsen identifies three important texts where Thomas Aquinas argued for the firstness of being: In I Sentences, 8, 1, 3, he stated that “without being, nothing can be apprehended by the intellect.”<sup>256</sup> In his commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, he shows that the intellect proceeds from more general knowledge to more specific knowledge: “Yet it must be said that those things which are more universal according to simple apprehension are known first; for being is the first thing that comes into the intellect, as Avicenna says...”<sup>257</sup> Thomas Aquinas also reiterates this point in his commentary on Boethius’ *De Trinitate* where he challenges the idea that God is the first object known by the mind.<sup>258</sup>

In the order of cognition, the firstness of being is very significant. Regarding this, Krapiec says: “A man radically cognizes a really existing being before he cognizes that he cognizes anything at all. Without an object, there is no activity. Without a being, there is no cognition.”<sup>259</sup> This means that being is necessary for cognition to take place. It is the primary foundation for every cognitive activity. The intellect hinges on it even for its own activity. Metaphysics, as a way of cognition, would be impossible without being, for being is the starting point of all metaphysical inquiries. This is confirmed in Aquinas’ statement where he says: “that which the intellect first conceives, as best known, and into which it resolves all its conceptions, is being (*ens*), as Avicenna says in the beginning of his metaphysics.”<sup>260</sup>

---

<sup>256</sup> Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy*, 160.

<sup>257</sup> *In I Met* lect. 2, 46. “Ibi enim dicitur quod magis universalia sunt nobis primo nota. Illa autem quae sunt primo nota, sunt magis facilia. Sed dicendum, quod magis universalia secundum simplicem apprehensionem sunt primo nota, nam primo in intellectu cadit ens, ut Avicenna dicit, et prius in intellectu cadit animal quam homo. Sicut enim in esse naturae quod de potentia in actum procedit prius est animal quam homo, ita in generatione scientiae prius in intellectu concipitur animal quam homo.” Some Philosophers point to this quotation as a justification that being is grasped only through simple apprehension.

<sup>258</sup> *In Boeth. De Trin* 1.3: “Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod primum, quod a mente humana cognoscitur etiam in hac vita, est ipse Deus qui est veritas prima, et per hoc omnia alia cognoscuntur. Sed hoc apparet esse falsum, quia cognoscere Deum per essentiam est hominis beatitudo, unde sequeretur omnem hominem beatum esse.”

<sup>259</sup> Krapiec, “The Object of Philosophical Investigations,” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 42.

<sup>260</sup> *De Ver* 1.1, “Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est *ens*, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae metaphysicae.”

Another significance regarding *ens* is that it is the distinguishing element between what is real and unreal. From its etymology, *ens* denotes that which is (*id quod est*)<sup>261</sup> or that which possesses an act of being (*id quod habet esse*).<sup>262</sup> From the structure of being, one already sees *esse* or the *actus essendi* as a vital part of being (*ens*).<sup>263</sup> For something to be real, it must be in act. Metaphysical cognition, therefore, concerns cognition of the real world. *Ens* guarantees the realism of our cognition and enables us to “set it apart from the contents of illusions, or abstractions or mere mental constructions.”<sup>264</sup> I can distinguish my computer from an imaginary smart phone, or this tree beside my window from the tree in my mind, thanks to *ens* (*esse*) which signifies realness. Following this argument above we see the differentiation between a real being and a being of reason. A being of reason is intra-mental, it depends on a human intellect for its existence. General forms like man, animal etc. fall within such category. There is no ‘man’ *per se*; there is rather this John or this Eve – beings with determinate content and existence proportional to this content.

Another important significance of *ens*, in relation to existential judgment, is its cognitive inerrancy. It is a starting point that is free from any kind of error.<sup>265</sup> According to Krapiec, one cannot be mistaken at this point in the act of cognition. I cannot be mistaken when I affirm the existence of an object after contact with such an object. There is an infallibility of the cognitive act on the basis that the existence of something, expressed in existential judgment, is the proper object of the senses and the intellect. And just as the faculty for hearing, touch, sight etc. cannot be in error when it affirms its proper object – a sound, feeling, light/color, the intellect is not mistaken when it is involved in the most fundamental and original experience in human cognition.<sup>266</sup> This point already places realistic cognition on the right path in its search for the truth of reality.

### 2.3.2 Being as a Thing

Can anyone really imagine an existence without a base that possesses it? If there is such an existence it will not be in this real contingent world. Krapiec describes reality as having two

<sup>261</sup> Cf. *In I Phys* lect. 3, n. 21; *In Boeth. De Hebdomadibus* lect. 2, n. 24: “id quod est, sive *ens*...”

<sup>262</sup> Cf. *In I Sent* d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, sol.

<sup>263</sup> One should be mindful of the fact that there is an Aristotelian interpretation as well as a Thomistic interpretation of Boethius’ conception of being as *id quod est*. The context here suggests a Thomistic interpretation. For an Aristotelian interpretation see, Andrew Lazella, “Creation, “Esse,” and “Id Quod Est” in Boethius’s ‘Opuscula Sacra,’” *Carmina Philosophiae*, 17 (2008), 35-56. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44078593>.

<sup>264</sup> Krapiec, “The Object of Philosophical Investigations,” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 43.

<sup>265</sup> Krapiec, Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 25.

<sup>266</sup> Krapiec, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 11.

sides. I interpret this to mean that it could be likened to a coin with two sides or like the Greek god, Janus – with two faces - reality presents itself with two sides. When it strikes our consciousness with the fact of existence, we discover at the same time that there is a base or *concretum* which is in act. This implies that the act of existence must be in relation with an essence. One could question how possible it is to arrive at the discovery of essence in separation from the existence of the thing. According to Krapiec, the discovery of *res* is not done in separation from the fact of existence. Rather, there is a cognitive shift in emphasis from the act of existence to the kind or nature of the thing.<sup>267</sup> What is discovered through this cognitive shift is what Krapiec refers to as, a “functional difference”<sup>268</sup> between essence and existence. The functional difference is obtainable, thanks to the functional duality of being.<sup>269</sup> Krapiec argues that we see this functional duality clearly in our definition of being as “that which exists.” While the “thatness” in the definition refers to the essential aspect of a being, the “exists” refers to the existential aspects.<sup>270</sup> These two are in a necessary relation to form a being in act.

There are three terms that play a significant role in the discussion on *res*, namely: being, thing, and essence. The interconnectedness of these terms is made clearer in the Aristotelian statement: “...each thing then and its essence are one and the same in no merely accidental way, as is evident...because to know each thing, at least is to know its essence”<sup>271</sup> According to Krapiec, being as being and being as thing are coextensive but point to different aspects of the same entity. “A concrete is called a ‘being’ insofar as it exists, whereas it is given the name ‘thing’ insofar as it is constituted in content, insofar as it is inwardly ‘organized,’ such that it presents one, undivided, self-identical content, which goes by the name “essence” when it becomes the object of conceptual cognition and is definable.”<sup>272</sup> This John, for instance, is called ‘being’ because he exists. When I consider John from the point of view of his humanity and rationality, I am making John an object of definition by pointing out the specific nature operative in John that makes him a particular kind of being. Thus the essence of John is highlighted. By thing, I indicate that John is not the whole of humanity but a particular individuated kind of the human species.

---

<sup>267</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 109.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid.

<sup>269</sup> Functional duality refers to the fact that being is both the act of existence as well as the determinate content possessing that proportional existence. Cf. *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 110.

<sup>270</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 109.

<sup>271</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 1031<sup>a</sup>15-18.

<sup>272</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 117.



Since being and thing are coextensive, what does thing add to being? This question would definitely follow if we accept that it is *res* that adds something to *ens*. Philosophers, like Avicenna, think otherwise. In fact, Krapiec was critical of certain conceptions of *res* by some philosophers, he said: “In connection with this topic, we should also note that in the history of philosophy of being there were different notions of ‘thing.’ Particularly from the time of Avicenna and the reception of his views by Duns Scotus, and later by Suárez and Wolff.”<sup>273</sup> At the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned that each of the transcendentals adds something conceptual to being but Avicenna is of the view that the reverse is the case. For Avicenna *res* is the *primum transcendental*, the *esse proprium*, *ens* and other common notions are added to it.<sup>274</sup> Krapiec dismisses such views of *res* since they are simply “reification of the modes of human thought,”<sup>275</sup> focusing simply on the cognitive aspect of *res* while disregarding the ontological side. Against the view of Avicenna, Krapiec insists that *res* expresses the determinateness of being, an aspect which we cannot grasp from the concept *being*.

### 2.3.2.1 How to discover Transcendental Res

How do we discover being as thing? Krapiec highlights two ways for the discovery of any of the transcendental as already discussed earlier: the first is spontaneous cognition and the second is metaphysical separation. (a). Every discovery of the transcendental properties begins with contact with reality, with a real being. At such a moment, we discover that each being has an essential aspect and an existential aspect. When we place the cognitive accent on the essential aspect, we discover each being as a “bearer of definite laws, as the subject of experiences and as the object of activities.”<sup>276</sup> Therefore the real world is a world of essences that have proportional existences. Our world cannot be a world of existences without essences through which the concept of thing is formulated; for without the concept ‘thing’ we could experience the incommunicability of being. As Krapiec puts it:

existence can be experienced, it can be perceived, but the experience of existence cannot be communicated to anyone else. Every transmittal of an intellectual experience – every communication – takes place by means of conventional signs, and these symbolize concepts and are connected with concepts. Metaphysics would have to completely abandon all communication if it did not make use of the concept of *thing*.<sup>277</sup>

---

<sup>273</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 117.

<sup>274</sup> Cf. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 194.

<sup>275</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 118.

<sup>276</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 109.

<sup>277</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 110.

When we say *something exists*, for instance, something represents a definite determinate subject. There necessarily must be a subject of existence. If one says “*I think of existence*,” the natural reaction would be: “the *existence of what?*” This shows the indispensability of thing as a transcendental property as well as a concept for metaphysical investigation. Krapiec is even of the view that the concept *thing* is used often in metaphysics than the concept *being*.<sup>278</sup> Hence the cognitive shift from existence to essence is practically unavoidable because “no human cognition can detach itself from the essential aspect, the content aspect.”<sup>279</sup> The result of such cognition would lead to an “impossibility of formulating any judgment whatsoever about reality.”<sup>280</sup> From an ontic perspective, we discover that our world is a world of real essences with proportional existences. This does not mean that all existing beings possess the same content. “Each being has its own separate content.”<sup>281</sup> Metaphysics, however, does not commit itself to the study of determining each individual thing in its peculiarity. Rather metaphysics aims at making judgments concerning all existing things with particular reference to what makes them being:

The reality that is revealed in the framework of metaphysical cognition (philosophical cognition- reality viewed in the framework of transcendental concepts) is too rich in relation to our cognitive apprehension. We basically apprehend reality only in a negative way, apprehending or indicating the limits within which it is contained. We do not, however, in a positive way univocally delimit the content of this reality. This would, in any case, be impossible, because individual concrete beings possess their own separate content, proper only to themselves. In apprehending them in certain proportions of essence and existence, we do not know the character of the positive content of a particular essence and existence. We, therefore do not know the exact character of the ontic content of a particular being, which is de facto contained actu confuse in a general, proportional, cognitive apprehension.<sup>282</sup>

The above statement reveals the delimitation of metaphysical investigations with reference to the relation between essence and existence. In the above statement, Krapiec tries to clarify the fact that there are certain questions metaphysics cannot answer not because of a conscious limitation of metaphysics to certain aspects of being but rather to the fact of the richness of being. If we establish that each essence and existence is unique in its own right, metaphysics does not study each one as the biological sciences determine the genetic separability of all humans. However, metaphysics is concerned with making general judgments as it pertains to all concretely existing beings. One of such judgments is the composition of essence and existence in every contingent being. A second point from the ontic side is that the real world is

---

<sup>278</sup> Ibid.

<sup>279</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 110.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid.

<sup>281</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 115.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid.

not made of general essences because “a real being, “has its own individual essence that is strictly determined in content.”<sup>283</sup> General essences like man, animal, tree, plant regarded by Aristotle as secondary substances, cannot be regarded as real because they are only modes of classification and they do not have proportional existence. These secondary substances can only be instantiated through the primary substances. Realistic metaphysics rather deals with ‘this Adam,’ ‘this Eve,’ ‘this dog,’ ‘this rose flower’ etc. Krapiec warns against the trend of Duns Scotus and Suárez who conceived being as thing in an abstract way.<sup>284</sup>

(b) We can also arrive at the discovery of being as thing through the more complex process of metaphysical separation which is comprised of three stages: (I) the specificity of metaphysical separation begins with the affirmation of the existence of something. We state categorically that “this George exists,” this apple exists etc. It is important to notice that these are individual concretely existing things. We do not begin from general essences like ‘man exists.’

Stage II. We engage in an analysis of the existential judgment in (I). We discover that both George and the apple exist and they have natures and are determinate in themselves. These elements (essence and existence) are necessary factors without which George and the apple cannot be. A cognitive shift on the essential aspect reveals that John and the apple are determinate. For if they were not determinate they would be nothing or mere general essences which exist only in the mind. It is based on this determinateness that they are called *thing*. As Aquinas says: “we can, however, find nothing that can be predicated of every being affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely, with the exception of its essence by which the being is said to be. To express this, the term thing is used; for, according to Avicenna, ‘thing differs from being because being gets its name from to-be, but thing expresses the quiddity or essence of the being.’”<sup>285</sup>

(III). The third stage involves an analogical transcendental application of the discovery made on John and the apple to all existing things. We arrive at the conclusion that George is a *thing*, the apple is a *thing*, Eve is a *thing*, the table is a *thing* etc. This judgment is not arbitrary. It is rather made on the basis that without this transcendental property, nothing will exist. Every being must be determinate. There are no indeterminate beings existing anywhere in the real world.

---

<sup>283</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 35.

<sup>284</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 117.

<sup>285</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *De Ver* q. 1, a. 1.

### 2.3.2.2 *Transcendental Res and the Law of Identity*

The metaphysical principles are accentuated in the different transcendental properties. Krapiec refers to them as laws of thought and being. They are a “clarification of being” and “the cognitive expression of being itself.”<sup>286</sup> Each transcendental property manifests these principles operative within each being. These laws flow from being. They are

not *a priori* laws produced by the reason. They were not supplied to the reason before the reason began to acquire knowledge, but they are the result of reading nature. They are not so much law-principles that serve the cognition of being as they are law-principles which govern the existence of being and make it possible to know being.<sup>287</sup>

This reiterates Krapiec’s position that these laws are laws of being and thought. When we reflect on transcendental *res* and cognitively express the results of our discovery we arrive at the principle of relative identity.<sup>288</sup> The formulation of this principle reflects and is based upon the “two-sidedness” and “functional duality” of being as it appears in our cognition.<sup>289</sup> They flow from being and not vice-versa. Krapiec traces its earliest formulation to be: “Being is being” Krapiec insists on avoiding such tautology while retaining what the principle is intended to convey. The most appropriate formulation in his opinion is: “every being is what it is.”<sup>290</sup> This means that every existing thing has a determinate nature: George is George; Eve is Eve. George cannot have two natures: George cannot be a man and a horse. George cannot also be indeterminate in any manner whatsoever. The formulation also reveals: a. the non-identity of essence and existence in each contingent being. In every contingent being, essence is always different from existence. If the essence of one being is its existence then such being is a necessary being, but the forfeitability of existence is a fact for contingent beings. Therefore it is only in the Absolute that essence and existence are the same. b. the relation of essence and existence in each being. The fact that both essence and existence find themselves entangled in each being means that they are in a relation. This relation can be of two kinds: there can be a case of relative identity, where existence and essence are not absorbed into each other. Such is the case with beings like plants, human beings, inanimate objects, even immaterial spirits. The second kind of relation occurs when the essence of the being is absorbed in the existence of the being; when essence is existence and existence is essence. This is called absolute identity,

---

<sup>286</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 138.

<sup>287</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and finality*, 41.

<sup>288</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 110.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid.

<sup>290</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 111.

exemplified in one being. Such a being “is accepted in metaphysics as the chief, necessary, and sufficient reason for all reality. It is a self-intelligible being, a subsistent being – the Absolute, called God in religion.”<sup>291</sup>

### 2.3.3 *Transcendental Unity*

If we understand being as a determinate essence which has existence, next to being in the order of the transcendentals is one (*unum*) or transcendental unity. Krapiec demonstrates this knowledge by discussing transcendental unity immediately after *res*. This is in line with Thomas Aquinas’ idea that one is the closest to being.<sup>292</sup> The Parmenidian statement that “being is and non-being is not” demonstrates that being cannot be non-being or within being there is no place for non-being. The contrary will be an ontological and logical contradiction. The property which is the base for this law of being and thought is what Krapiec refers to as transcendental one.

The discovery of the property called unity signifies non-division as well as non-contradiction in being. Hence, whatever has a concretely determinate content with an existence proportional to it cannot have a negation of content and existence. Krapiec claims that being cannot be identical with non-being. Being and non-being cannot co-exist simultaneously both in thought and in the ontic sphere. The real world, though is made up of individually composed concretes, is not composed by antagonistic parts. For instance, John and Eve and the apple are composed of individual essence and existence. But John, Eve and the apple are not composed of being and non-being. The elements involved in the ontological composition of beings do not contain elements which annihilate or cancel out each other. This is in agreement with Thomas Aquinas’ statement that existence and non-existence stand on two opposing sides of the isles and are therefore incompatible.<sup>293</sup> There cannot be the existence of John and the non-existence of John existing simultaneously in John. Beings are also composed from the physical level. Eve has hands, legs, and parts that are organized to form a whole. They are organized in such a way that they form a unity. Therefore all composed beings, irrespective of the parts they possess, form a unity. Our world too is composed of different things yet it is one world.<sup>294</sup>

The problem of unity is as old as philosophy itself. The Ionians were monists who sought to reduce the whole of the changing world to a single, eternal, unchanging element. However in

---

<sup>291</sup> Ibid, 112.

<sup>292</sup> *I sent* 8. 1. 3.

<sup>293</sup> *De Quattuor oppositis*, C1, C4.

<sup>294</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 47.

Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas we see two major interpretations of unity namely, non-composition based (Neoplatonism) and composition based (Aristotelian-Thomistic).<sup>295</sup> The Neoplatonic idea of unity depicts non-convertibility between being and one, the priority of one over being, a ‘one’ that is simple, undivided, closed, unchanging and finally a one that is divinity.<sup>296</sup> The Aristotle-Thomistic interpretation, on the other hand, is understood in an analogical sense and is interpreted either essentially (Aristotle or his commentators) or existentially (Thomas Aquinas). Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* argues that one is not prior to being, rather both of them are convertible. He says that “one man,” “being man,” and “man” are not different, they are the same. The difference is simply conceptual, since they all refer to the same reality, man.<sup>297</sup> In Book X, Aristotle offers different ways of understanding unity: a continuum, a whole, an individual and a universal. These four signify indivisibility in number and in species. Hence the meaning of *unum* as ‘indivisibility.’<sup>298</sup> Thomas Aquinas builds on this Aristotelian foundation by arguing for the convertibility of the being and one and the non-identity between the transcendental one and mathematical one.<sup>299</sup> Regarding the non-identity between transcendental one and mathematical one, Aquinas says:

Some philosophers failed to distinguish between unity which is convertible with being, and unity which is the principle of number... The above options, then, were based on the supposition that the one which is convertible with being is the same with that which is the principle of number, and that there is no plurality but number that is a species of quantity. Now this is clearly false.<sup>300</sup>

One of such ‘philosophers’ in the above quotation refers first to Avicenna who identified the transcendental one with the mathematical one. The implication would be that one adds something positive to being. Aquinas obviously opposes such view.

Krapiec’s idea of *unum* reflects both indivision between being and non-being as well as unity in composed being. Krapiec’s interest was more in discovering the determinant of the lack of division in being. What is responsible for the undividedness of being? What is it that holds the

---

<sup>295</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 48.

<sup>296</sup> See Plotinus, *Enneads* V. 6; VI, 9.1-2; The evidence of the priority of the One over being is also found in the famous fourth proposition of the *Liber de Causis* which states: “prima rerum creatarum est esse (the first of created things is being). This is treated extensively by Aertsen J in *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 161-166. For the divinity of the one see Thomas Aquinas, *De Substantiis separatis*, c.1: “Id autem quod primo est in intellectu, est unum et bonum: nihil enim intelligit qui non intelligit unum; unum autem et bonum se consequuntur: unde ipsam primam ideam unius, quod nominabat secundum se unum et secundum se bonum, primum rerum principium esse ponebat, et hunc summum Deum esse dicebat.”

<sup>297</sup> Aristotle, *Met* IV, 1003<sup>b</sup>26-32.

<sup>298</sup> Aristotle, *Met* X, 1052<sup>a</sup>15-35; Aquinas, *In X Met.*, lect. 1, See Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 49; Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 207.

<sup>299</sup> *ST*, 1. 11. 1, *Pot* q. 9, a. 11.

<sup>300</sup> Aquinas, *Pot* q. 9, a. 7.

different elements and parts in being together to constitute an ontic unity? Aristotle had attempted to answer this question by resorting to the forms as the determining factor for ontic unity. Krapiec offers one reason why Aristotle's view falls short: if the form does not determine being, neither can it determine the undividedness of being.<sup>301</sup> Aristotle, in Krapiec's view, was unable to come to terms with the importance of existence in a concretely existing being. What determines the undividedness of being is the single act of existence. Form, however, plays an active role as a co-determinant with existence, with the priority of place given to existence, without which nothing is. He says:

“A being exists when one content is organized by form, which is real only “under” one actual existence. The unity of being is a result of existential undividedness (just one act of existence), the co-factor of which is essential undividedness (one form). The realness, however, of formal undividedness (content) is dependent upon existence.”<sup>302</sup>

The keyword is ‘realness.’ This shows the transcendental character of *unum* even more. It is on par with being – to be, is to be one. The indivisible act of existence integrates and unites the various elements in the existing being, thereby constituting the most profound characteristic of being.

Krapiec warns against a particular interpretation of undividedness of being as ‘lack,’ particularly as lack of division.<sup>303</sup> The ‘division’ in the ‘lack of division’ is not something positive which is lacking in being. Such an understanding would entail an incompleteness in being. As Krapiec puts it:

if we were to regard unity as a lack of division, then by reason of this lack there would be a certain imperfection in being. If, on the other hand, unity is a transcendental property of being and also something ontically positive, because (it is) identical with being, then unity understood in this sense equally signifies another aspect of some ontic perfection or ontic act.<sup>304</sup>

As a transcendental, *unum* signifies being and its undividedness, not a lack in being. It is a perfection of its own. An interpretation of *unum* as ‘lack,’ or as privation would make it a being of reason and disqualify it as a transcendental property. It will be interpreted as blindness is considered a lack of sight.

Krapiec also highlights the fact that unity applies differently to composed beings and simple beings differently. He developed this thought in his discussion on ontic uniqueness. Ontic uniqueness is both possible and necessary only in the Absolute, a being in which there is

---

<sup>301</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 130.

<sup>302</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 130-131.

<sup>303</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 131.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid.

absolutely no composition, a being that is pure existence. Since the Absolute is non-composite, there is no basis for a possibility of ontic division. Krapiec, however, states that the ontic uniqueness is applicable, in a derivative sense, to those ontic instances that are composite in their structure, but whose acts of existence and the essence proportional to their existence are “unrepeatable.” Hence “the ontic uniqueness of the Absolute is justified in a way and the uniqueness of composite beings in another: in the former, the cause of uniqueness is the absolute absence of composition; in the latter, the negation of repeatability.”<sup>305</sup>

### 2.3.3.1 *The Ways of discovering Being as something One*

In the light of the discussion on *unum*, how can we discover this property in metaphysical cognition? Bearing in mind that every metaphysical cognition begins from experience, we can discover transcendental unity through the following steps:

- a. by spontaneous cognition
  - b. by metaphysical separation
- a. During our original experience, our intellect comes into contact with being. We perceive that most beings are composed of parts. Human beings, for instance, have ears, eyes, mouths, nose etc. Trees have roots, branches, stems, leaves etc. Yet we do not experience them as different beings. We experience them as unities composed of different parts. I do not distinguish John’s hand from John or John’s leg from John. I simply know John. The same applies to the tree. If there are branches at all they belong to the tree and form a whole with it. This would also imply that we do not reduce beings into aggregates of parts. The identity and unity of beings are preserved in realistic cognition, hence we affirm that this tree exists, this John exists, Eve exists, the red rose exists. But within their existence is included this uniqueness, undividedness and non-contradictory elements that characterize their being.
  2. The second step involves an application of metaphysical separation to cognition. This involves three stages: 1st Stage: the first stage consists of an affirmation of the existence of what is given in experience. For example, when I encounter Paul, I affirm that “this Paul exists.” The same applies to the orange tree, or fish or the dog, Fido. All these are individual beings. This stage is nothing other than the “joining” of our cognition with the world of really existing things. We should always bear in mind that existential judgments are not merely flatus

---

<sup>305</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 131-132.



vocis – empty words without content. They are not cognitive constructs but begin from “this here Paul.”

2nd Stage: Here, we take a look at the results of existential judgment and examine them closely. The examination reveals that in Paul or Fido or in the fish, there is no non-being. We grasp this reality when we perform an act of intellectual negation on being as being or being as thing. In the words of Krapiec:

If we perform an act of intellectual negation on being as being or being as thing, then we perceive the internal undividedness of being; we perceive that being does not have anything in itself that is not being – that being is only being. Through negation, we affirm the identity of being. In performing an act of intellectual negation on being, we perceive that “whatever has a concretely determinate content and is proportionally existing is not something that does not have a concretely determinate content and is not proportionally existing.”<sup>306</sup>

This affirms the impossibility of a simultaneous co-existence of Fido and non-Fido. It is not possible for Fido to be and not be at the same time. The same applies to Paul and to the Fish. We can only think of ‘non-Fido’ only in relation to Fido. ‘Non-Fido’ equals nothing or non-existence. Thus, nothing exists beyond being. Between being and nothing, there is no “both-and;” there is only an “either-or” position. It is either being (accompanied with the modifications that are associated with being) or nothing.

3rd Stage: The third stage is a transcendental extension of the necessary elements in the second stage to all existing things. Here we affirm analogically that every being is one because all that exists, exists as undivided into being and non-being.

#### *2.3.3.2 The Discovery of the Law of Non-Contradiction as the Foundation for Ontological Unity*

Transcendental unity which expresses the non-division within being reveals that being is guided by another principle, namely, the principle of non-contradiction. Krapiec traces the earliest formulation of this principle to Aristotle who said: “a thing cannot at the same time be and not be.”<sup>307</sup> The above ontological formulation has an epistemological equivalent: “it is impossible to affirm and at the same time deny the same predicate of the same subject.”<sup>308</sup> If the reverse is the case, then we are faced with a contradiction. A contradiction is the identification of being and nonbeing in the same aspect. There can be no tree and non-tree,

---

<sup>306</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 119.

<sup>307</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 996<sup>b</sup>30; *Met* 1005<sup>b</sup>19–20.

<sup>308</sup> Viglino, U. “Principle of Contradiction” in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 4, (New York 1967), 277 – 278; See also <https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/contradiction-principle>.

John and non-John existing at the same time. Such a situation is absurd for Krapiec since the content of the predicate completely destroys the content of the subject. Thus, the principle of non-contradiction expresses that being cannot be reduced to non-being<sup>309</sup> He says:

The principle of non-contradiction expresses the impossibility of connecting in one judgment as assertion and a denial concerning the same object...For indeed a contradiction is the identification under the same aspect of being and non-being, e.g., in the form of the assertion “being is non-being” or “non-being is being”...The principle of contradiction basically expresses the impossibility of connecting in one sentence at the same time as assertion and a negation concerning the same object, while preserving any sort of meaning.<sup>310</sup>

For Krapiec, because reality is ontologically justified by the act of existence, this irreducibility of being to non-being basically rests on the existential aspect of being. From this existential point of view, Krapiec arrives at an important metaphysical conclusion namely, the nullification of the idea of an absolute non-being. Non-being has no existence. Non-being equals nothing or nothingness and therefore cannot assume an existential status as something. Non-being cannot be united with any essence in any sphere of the real world. The apprehension of non-being can only be achieved in relation to being through negation. If we recall, being has a definite content but non-being has no content whatsoever.

What then, is the connection between transcendental unity and the principle of non-contradiction and how does it differ from the principle of identity? According to Krapiec in the principle of identity, we cognitively clarify being and thing, whereas in the principle of non-contradiction we clarify transcendental unity, marking being off from non-being and affirming that being is not composed in itself of being and non-being. With regard to the connection between transcendental unity and the principle of non-contradiction, Krapiec says:

In the principle of non-contradiction, we affirm that whatever is a being is not in itself divided into being and nonbeing at the same time. Since existence determines that something is being, something cannot exist and not be a being, nor can something be really ontologically determinate in itself and not exist. There is no nonexistence. If, therefore, something is a being, i.e., has existence, then there is nothing in it that would really not be being; in other words, being is not in itself divided into being and nonbeing. This inner undividedness of being into being and nonbeing constitutes transcendental unity, the epistemological expression of which is the principle of non-contradiction.<sup>311</sup>

These two principles (the principle of identity and non-contradiction) constitute “the first and fundamental laws of both being and human thought.”<sup>312</sup> However, the principle of non-contradiction enjoys priority over all other axioms and principles as Aquinas says: “For that

---

<sup>309</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 119.

<sup>310</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 144-145.

<sup>311</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 121.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid.

which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is *being*, the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore, the first indemonstrable principle is that *the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time*, which is based on the notions of *being* and *not-being*: and on this is the principle all others are based.”<sup>313</sup>

#### 2.3.4 *Being as a Second Something*

Our world is not a monistic world, where everything coalesces into one identity. It is rather a pluralistic world whereby whatever exists determinately is formally distinct from other things. Each existing thing is sovereign and possesses existential individual integrity that is unrepeatable. Hence “whatever is one, is something determinate in itself, existing, and, at the same time, not identical with any other being and unity.”<sup>314</sup> *Aliquid* expresses the sovereignty of individual beings in the light of the pluralism of persons, animals, plants and things in our world. Oliver Blanchette refers to it as “the flip side of speaking of being as one.”<sup>315</sup> Whereas transcendental one expresses the undividedness within being, something expresses the dividedness between one being and the other. In this sense, they are like two sides of the same coin.

A lot of discussions has been going on regarding the transcendental status of *aliquid*. While some philosophers dismiss its transcendental status<sup>316</sup>, others have identified it as a similitude of *multitudo* which Thomas Aquinas mentions on few occasions to be a transcendental. Krapiec on the other hand does not hesitate to identify the transcendental character of *aliquid*:

Therefore, separateness comes to light in the process of reflecting on the ontic structure of our acts of reflection on the structure of being-thing-unity, accompanied by a simultaneous insight with regard to the multiple, pluralistic nature of reality, make us aware that the concept of being is “composed” of basically different and only proportionally identical cognitive apprehensions of content and existence. For to be a being means, for example, to be “this here” concrete human being existing precisely in “this here” way, or to be “this here” tree existing in “this here” way. We can, therefore, in reflection, accentuate the separateness of the affirmed concrete contents along with the existence proportional to them<sup>317</sup>

---

<sup>313</sup> ST I-II, q. 94, a. 2: “Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit. Et ideo primum principium indemonstrabile est quod non est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis, et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur;” cf. Aristotle, *Met* 1005<sup>b</sup>32-34.

<sup>314</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 133.

<sup>315</sup> Oliva Blanchette, “Analogy and the Transcendental Properties of Being as the Key to Metaphysical Science.” *The Saint Anselm Journal* 2 (2005): 15. [https://www.anselm.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Institute%20of%20SA%20Studies/4.5.3.2h\\_22Blanchette.pdf](https://www.anselm.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Institute%20of%20SA%20Studies/4.5.3.2h_22Blanchette.pdf).

<sup>316</sup> Aertsen mentions that its transcendental status was not widely recognized even in the Middle Ages, cf. *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 109.

<sup>317</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 134

One point worth stressing here is that Krapiec does not state that *aliquid* is the cause of plurality. *Aliquid* does not *primarily* express that our world is pluralistic. Rather it is brought to light more within the consideration of the pluralistic nature of our world to emphasize the distinctness of every existing thing, for “as things have being, so they have unity and plurality.”<sup>318</sup> This is important given the fact that it is only within the context of plurality that *aliquid* can be understood more profoundly. Regarding this Krapiec says: “transcendental separateness comes *clearly* into view when we accentuate the alternateness of the judgments entering into the composition of the so-called “concept” of being.”<sup>319</sup> When we place the different sets of elements which come into the composition of a being, we perceive that these sets of elements are unique, sovereign and autonomous with reference to other sets of elements which make up other beings. For example,

the proportional act of existence of John – the determinate essence of John – this existing John  
the proportional act of existence of Eve – the determinate essence of Eve – this existing Eve  
the proportional act of existence of the pear tree – the determinate essence of the pear tree – this pear tree

In the light of these arrangements, we see clearly that John’s act of existence differs from Eve’s act of existence. John’s essence is not the same as the essence of the pear tree. Therefore John is not Eve and Eve is not the pear tree. Each of them is autonomous, sovereign and individual; “each of them is a being to the extent that it is separate from other beings.”<sup>320</sup>

According to Krapiec, two positions radically differ from *aliquid*, namely, ontic isolation and monism. *Aliquid* cannot denote “ontic isolation.” Ontic isolation could mean a situation of absolute disconnect between all beings that will result to radical pluralism. Krapiec feels that radical pluralism is an absurdity for two reasons: firstly, it denies the substantial unity of essence and existence in a being and it denies that there is a reason for being (the Absolute). This leads to a contradiction. The contradiction is seen in the implication that a being is without reason either from within or from without. Secondly, ontic isolationism would make knowledge or cognition impossible. Being would be unintelligible. However, this is not the case. Krapiec argues that experience shows that being is intelligible. Experience shows a

---

<sup>318</sup> Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 228.

<sup>319</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 133. I placed emphasis on “*clearly*.”

<sup>320</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 135-136.

connection, a relation between beings. One can also argue that the fact that we desire things point to some connection and relation between beings. In the light of this relation we can formulate the concept of being as applying to every existing thing; in the light of this relation, metaphysics is possible. Krapiec avers that this relation is more profound in a bond referred to as ‘participation.’<sup>321</sup> This theory of participation “preserves ontic separateness, the necessity of the existence of the Absolute, and the ontic bond between the Absolute and other beings.”<sup>322</sup> Yet, this bond does not destroy ontic separateness.

A second position which is unidentifiable with separateness is monism. Various philosophers are well-known for their monistic purview: Heraclitus ever-changing reality and Parmenides’ notion of being; the emanating activity of the Plotinian One, Spinoza’s idea of substance, Hegel’s absolute idea – all fall within this monistic range. These positions regard plurality of being as merely an illusion and are contrary to experience.<sup>323</sup>

But one question remains to be understood, namely, why would Krapiec claim that *aliquid* is not a relative transcendental property? Although there is no textual evidence for such claim, there are suggestions that Krapiec treated *aliquid* as an absolute transcendental property. It does seem to me that, in the light of this connection between *aliquid* and plurality, the argument for the relative character of *aliquid* should be maintained. From the writings of Thomas Aquinas himself, *aliquid* is considered based on its relational character (*aliud quid*).<sup>324</sup> Let us also consider the division by Aquinas as represented by Aertsen:<sup>325</sup>

---


<sup>321</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 136.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid, 137.

<sup>323</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 136-137.

<sup>324</sup> *De Ver* q. 1, a. 1: “Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid; unde sicut ens dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur aliquid, in quantum est ab aliis divisum.”

<sup>325</sup> Aertsen, *Mediaeval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 100.



A look at the table shows an obvious classification of *Aliquid* as a relative transcendental property. Also while explaining Thomas Aquinas' introduction of the transcendentals in *de Veritate*, Aertsen writes:

With respect (to the second group of transcendentals, the relational ones, Thomas again introduces a subdivision. The relation of one being to another can be regarded first of all according to their division (*secundum divisionem*). This aspect is expressed by the transcendental "something" (*aliquid*), a name that means literally "another what (*quasi aliud quid*)).

There are certain statements by Krapiec which could lead one to argue that he accepts a classification of *aliquid* as a relative transcendental. Consider this statement: "separateness 'endows' unity with a new relation, namely, division from other beings. Other beings in relation to a being-unity (a concretely existing thing) are "not-this-being;" hence, in a derivative sense – with respect to the originally apprehended be-ing – they are "not-being."<sup>326</sup> In my opinion, Krapiec's interpretation of *aliquid* maintains reveals its relational character and he does not give any justification for the derivation of being when considered in itself. This becomes clearer when the cognizer considers that the flip side of this coin, that is, when being is considered absolutely we grasp indivision – *unum*. Transcendental *aliquid* expresses the separateness of beings as a result of their individuality. And the basis for this individuality and separateness is their individual acts of existence.<sup>327</sup>

<sup>326</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 134.

<sup>327</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 70.

#### 2.3.4.1 How do we discover Being as Something Separate?

We can discover transcendental separateness through the methods already described at the beginning of this chapter: (1) through spontaneous cognition (2) through metaphysical separation.<sup>328</sup>

1. As rational beings, we clearly delineate one being from another. We spontaneously decipher the individual nature of each being. We perceive the autonomy and sovereignty of each being as we differentiate them and identify them individually. This spontaneous action is a natural ability. Hence a child is able to cognize its father as separate from its mother; a student is able to decipher that the metaphysics professor is not the anthropology professor. A farmer knows that the apple tree is different from the orange tree.
2. Metaphysical separation as already demonstrated begins with an existential judgment and leads to the discovery of the transcendental (*aliquid* in this case). This procedure comprises of three stages:

Stage 1: In the first stage, we affirm the existence of concretely existing being. Krapiec gives particular examples:<sup>329</sup>

- “a concrete human being                      insofar as he or she exists
- a concrete horse                                      insofar as it exists
- a concrete tree                                      insofar as it exists
- a concrete atom                                      insofar as it exists”

At this level, we have only affirmed the existence of Peter (as an instance of a human being), the apple tree (as an instance of a tree), Traveller (as an instance of a horse), hydrogen (as an instance of an atom).

II. The second state involves an intellectual analysis of these existential judgments. We discover that the existence of Peter is different from the existence of the apple tree, as well as the existence of the horse. But the base for this difference is due to the individual, unrepeatable act of existence which is unique to each of them. In this sense, Peter is an *aliud quid* (something else) to the apple tree.

III. the third stage consists of a transcendental extension which applies to all existing things. We state that all beings are individual in their existence, essence, and unity. Being is not like

---

<sup>328</sup> Ibid, 68-69.

<sup>329</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 133.

the Parmenidian generalized construct in which all beings are one in exactly the same unchanging way. Instead, there is a transcendental sense in which we exist as beings and there is also a transcendental sense in which we are unique.

#### 2.3.4.2 *The Principle of Excluded Middle as the Epistemological Expression of Aliquid*

It was Aristotle who said: "...there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate...To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and what is not that it is not, is true."<sup>330</sup> It should be noticed that Aristotle makes mention of contradictories (in this case, being and non-being). One could argue that there is no becoming or transitional state outside of being. If there is becoming, such phenomena occur within being or it is not at all. This does not deny the fact of change. Rather it emphasizes change as a reality only for existing things. On the ontological level, there are no mid-points between being and non-being, "...man is always a man, a tree is always a tree, a red rose is always a red rose."<sup>331</sup> The law of excluded middle is not unconnected with the principle of identity and non-contraction. It follows both ontologically and logically from them. Logically the law implies that one does himself/herself no favor in taking a middle stance because, in reality, there is no middle stance. It is a fallacy to hold onto such a position between contradictions. Therefore it is either a being is or it is not.

### 2.4 The Relative Transcendental Properties

In *De veritate*, Thomas Aquinas makes reference to some properties when being is considered *in ordine ad aliud*, that is, in relation to something else.<sup>332</sup> But at the heart of this relation is the human being, the human soul. In the human soul we see a network of connection and relations with all existing things (*totum ens*). Why Man? Why the human soul? Thomas Aquinas traces this idea to Aristotle. In *De Anima* Aristotle says that "the soul is in a sense all things," (*hoc autem est anima, quae quodam modo est omnia*).<sup>333</sup> The human soul possesses two important powers/faculties – the intellect and the will. The functioning of these powers connects them to all existing things. In the act of knowing, the human soul is able to grasp all sensible and intellectual forms; in the act of willing the soul makes an existing thing its object. While the relation between being and the intellect (the knowing faculty) is expressed by true, the relation

---

<sup>330</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1011<sup>b</sup>24-25.

<sup>331</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 71.

<sup>332</sup> *De Ver* q. 1, a. 1: "alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad aliud."

<sup>333</sup> Aristotle, *DA* 431<sup>b</sup>21.



between being and the will (the appetitive faculty) is expressed by *good*.<sup>334</sup> This connection between the human soul and being shows that the soul has some sort of infinite character.

In the light of these connections, Krapiec shows that there is a unity between man and the real world. A rational soul makes a 'rational' world, where each being fulfils the design and purpose of the maker. Hence, rationality and finality are intrinsic qualities of the real world, expressed through transcendental true and good. A cognitive collaboration of both faculties gives birth to transcendental beauty which expresses the perfection of all existing things.

#### 2.4.1 *Being and Truth*

What is truth? This question has occupied the thoughts of some philosophers, theologians, through many centuries. The question appears even in the Scriptures and was met with great silence. This biblical silence does not indicate that there has not been attempts to answer this question. In *De Veritate*, which deals primarily on truth, Thomas Aquinas helps us with several definitions from his predecessors in the philosophical arena. He makes reference to three definitions of truth: the first definition is connected with the basis for truth, namely, being. Two specified philosophers have their definitions in this respect. Augustine defines truth as "that which is" (*id quod est*)<sup>335</sup>; for Avicenna, "the truth of each thing is a property of the act of being which has been established for it."<sup>336</sup> Though other definitions abound in this respect, Thomas Aquinas goes ahead to mention the second set of definitions of truth. This definition of truth is connected with that according to "which its intelligible determination is formally completed." Here he presents the definition of Isaac Israeli as "the conformity of thing and intellect (*veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*)."<sup>337</sup> He also makes mention of the definition of Anselm of Canterbury. The third set of definition presented by Aquinas is based on the effects following upon truth. Here he presents the definition of Hilary of Poitiers: "the true is that which manifests and proclaims existence (*verum est declarativum et manifestativum esse*)."<sup>338</sup>

Truth for Krapiec has to do with the ordination or conformity of being to the intellect. Hence whatever has a concrete essence and an existence proportional to it, and is undivided in itself

---

<sup>334</sup> Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 258-260.

<sup>335</sup> Aquinas, *De Ver* q. 1, a. 1: "Augustinus in Lib. Solil. dicit, quod verum est id quod est. Sed id quod est, nihil est nisi ens. Ergo verum significat omnino idem quod ens."

<sup>336</sup> Aquinas, *De Ver* q. 1, a. 1: "...et Avicenna in sua Metaphysicae veritas cuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei."

<sup>337</sup> Ibid.

<sup>338</sup> Ibid.

and divided from others is also connected with the intellect.<sup>339</sup> I would present Krapiec's discussion on truth under three questions which he presents in his *Metaphysics*:

- a. How is being conformed to the intellect?
- b. What kind of intellect is it in conformity with?
- c. What is the nature of this conformity?

a. Krapiec argues for the conformity of being to the intellect by stating that our world is a rational world. This rationality is made evident in the laws which govern being. Some of these laws have already been discussed in this work, namely, the principle of identity and non-contradiction. These laws govern cognition so much that without them cognition is impossible. They are indispensable for every cognitive act. The judgment that there cannot be John and non-john for instance flows from being and my intellect is guided by this principle of non-contradiction to cognize it as such. My ability to distinguish Eve from John or an apple tree from an orange tree is also guided by the principle of identity and flows from being itself. These kind of judgments, in accordance with the first principles, are rational. Hence Krapiec says: "If, therefore, the first principles are merely an epistemological expression of being itself, and if these principles form the ultimate basis of rational cognition, such that thanks to them cognition is possible at all (for whatever we cognize is a being), *then being in itself is rational.*"<sup>340</sup> This follows that we have rationality on two sides: both on the side of being, and on the side of cognition. From this point, Krapiec proceeds to demonstrate the conformity of being to the intellect by stating that the intellect has being as its object. Just as light is object of the eye, so is being the object of the intellect. Krapiec uses a similitude of the Aristotelian maxim: *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu*, by saying: "there is nothing in thought that was not somehow derived from being."<sup>341</sup> This shows some dependence, conformity and relation between the intellect and being. This relation manifests one important characteristic of being, its intelligibility. Intelligibility implies that being is cognizable, understandable and knowable. If a being lacks intelligibility it cannot be known in the first place. It is on the basis of this relation between being and the intellect that truth is apprehended.

---

<sup>339</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 138.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid, 138-139.

<sup>341</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 139.

From the statement that there is rationality on the side of being and on the part of cognition, Krapiec arrives at three kinds of truth: transcendental truth, ontic truth and logical truth. With the aid of some propositions, he highlights the specifics of these kinds of truth:

Ontic truth	Transcendental/Metaphysical Truth	Logical truth
“Every being as being is cognized by the Absolute. If, as has been shown, reality is composite/pluralistic, then the principle of non-contradiction is operative in it.”	“Every being is knowable in the sense that in every being as being there is nothing that would prevent its cognition.”	“Every being as being is knowable by the human intellect – within the limits of its powers – if the object of the object of the human intellect is precisely being.”
“Every being is in conformity with the mind of the Absolute if every being is entirely derived from this Absolute, which has also been shown.”	“Every being is a necessary condition of any cognition since the object of cognition is precisely being. Hence, whatever we cognize, we cognize as a being.”	“Every being as a being is knowable by the human intellect if being is expressed in the principles of identity and non-contradiction.”
“Every being derived from the human intellect is connected with it in that which constitutes the being as intellectually derived.”	“Every being as a being possesses that due to which it is explained as a being and this is simply an expression of the previously analyzed and justified principle of the reason of being.”	

These propositions, according to Krapiec, clearly show that a relation exists between being and cognition and point to a relation between two kinds of intellect: the human intellect and the divine intellect.<sup>342</sup>

b. what kind of intellect is being in conformity with?

Based on the table above, we can decipher two intellects as already indicated. The human being finds himself in a world with already existing things. These things, according to Krapiec, are in their natural state. Man has the ability to deconstruct and reconstruct these natural raw material according to whatever model he desires. The outcome of such reconstruction is known as culture. Culture hence is what man makes out of nature. Regarding this Krapiec says:


This being so, all cultural products as such bear the stamp of their relation to the human intellect (a rather obvious fact) and this is true to such an extent that we can sometimes unequivocally determine that a particular cultural work owes its derivation or causation to a certain producer, e.g. in the case of musical compositions, literary works, paintings, and sculptures.<sup>343</sup>

The quotation clearly shows the relation between being and the intellect of a producer. Krapiec opines that we can apply *true* to these cultural products to the extent that they are in conformity to the plan of the producer. For instance, one can immediately identify the trademarks of an

<sup>342</sup> Ibid, 146.

<sup>343</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 147.

apple watch as distinct from other watches. These products can also be called false inasmuch as they are at variance with the demand of the creative intellect, or fake if it does not derive from a particular intellect which it claims as its origin.<sup>344</sup> However, the human being is contingent and as such is also a “product of the intellect” like any other contingent being. This makes it possible for us to argue for “the truth of contingent being as a whole in relation to the intellect of the Absolute.”<sup>345</sup> I hereby represent Krapiec’s ideas in the diagram below:



Being and truth are co-extensive and have only a conceptual difference. Hence they are represented in a way that shows their convertibility. In that sense, the truth in question is transcendental truth. The arrows indicate a relation of dependence on the one hand and relation of conformity on the other. The arrow from ontic truth reveals the source of being, from the intellect of the creator or the human producer. The being is true to the extent it actualizes the plan of the creator. However, this being also is intelligible and has an effect on a human being during cognition. Regarding this division, Maryniarczyk avers: “the intellect of a maker (in relation to his products), and of the Creator – are those which establish truth, while the things that are produced and created are what realize the truth in themselves; the knowing intellect is what discovers the truth and makes it its own.”<sup>346</sup> Hence Metaphysical truth is defined as *adequatio rei et intellectus* while Logical truth is the agreement of the intellect (judgment) with the state of affairs (*adequatio intellectus et rei*). It is a conceptual kind of truth because it is a property of cognition, not of being and it is peculiar only to the human intellect.<sup>347</sup> These

<sup>344</sup> Ibid.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid.

<sup>346</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 82.

<sup>347</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 150.

divisions are what Krapiec refers to as the fundamental, formal and causal aspects of ontic truth.<sup>348</sup>

One must not conclude that Krapiec presupposes an equal foothold of rationality between the Absolute and human beings. The level and modus of rationality differ essentially: He writes:

Every changeable being with a forfeitable existence possesses rationality (intelligibility) in itself insofar as it is a being, that is, insofar as it possesses existence in itself. If changeable beings with a forfeitable existence, viz., contingent beings, are rational in accordance with their ontic structure, then beings situated higher in the ontic hierarchy, i.e., beings constituted in a superior way, possess more be-ing in themselves and, consequently, also more intelligibility...It follows, then, that the absolutely non-composite being, Absolute Being, which appears as the source of all contingent, multiple, and, hence, composite beings, is the most intelligible in itself; it is a being in which there is no division into a cognitive power (a cognizing subject) and a cognized object, since such an ontic case would already be a composite and an ontic relatedness. The Absolute is, therefore, a pure intellect that in itself is the object of its own cognition and in itself cognizes itself and all that is derived from it as contingent, multiple and composite.<sup>349</sup>

Krapiec avers that the Absolute at this level is the reason for contingent beings and does not appear here as the God of religion.<sup>350</sup>

#### C. What is the nature of this relation?

According to Krapiec, the relation between being and the intellect is not something accidental. There rather exists a necessary relation between being and the intellect. The removal of this relation means the annihilation of the being. This is understandable given the fact that a being does not emerge from nowhere. Based on the contingency and plurality of being, a being owes the explanation of its existence to a being outside of it. Hence this relation of dependence and conformity is a necessary one.

##### *2.4.1.1 How do we discover Transcendental True?*

The discovery of the property which expresses the intelligibility and rationality of the world of persons, animal and things can be done through two means:<sup>351</sup> (1) spontaneous cognition, and (2) by metaphysical separation

---

<sup>348</sup> Ibid.

<sup>349</sup> Ibid, 149.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid.

<sup>351</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 83-84.

1. Through spontaneous cognition, we affirm the intelligibility and rationality of being. We affirm that not only does a man, an apple tree or this art work exist, but that each of them is *rational*. Their rationality is based on the fact that they are vehicles of various pieces of information.<sup>352</sup> By discovering and understanding this information which they convey, our intellect is perfected and at the same time connected with the intellect of the Creator or maker. In such a state, we can talk of true man, true artwork or true apple tree when each of these realizes in itself the plan of the Creator or maker. We can also talk of falsity when there is a non-conformity of the thing and the intellect from which the thing is ontically derived.<sup>353</sup> But such falsity is peculiar only in the relation to the intellect of a contingent creator and not to that of the absolute.
2. In metaphysical separation, we undertake a more rigorous path towards the discovery of the connection between being and the intellect. This path comprises of three stages:

First Stage. The first stage of metaphysical separation consists of the affirmation of what is given in experience through existential judgment. Hence, we can say: “this X exists,” “this child exists,” “this pear exist.”

Second Stage. From the existential judgment, we discover that we could affirm the existence of Peter, Eve or the apple tree on the basis that there is a connection between them and our intellect. Without the connection, we could not establish the fact of their existence. Also because there are cognitive data which these beings present to us, we can say that each of them is a bearer or harbinger of truth, which is not present in them by accident but by conscious design.

From the foregoing we make a transcendental assertion that every being fulfills the design of the Absolute; every being is ordered to the intellect; every being is intelligible and every being is true.<sup>354</sup>

#### *2.4.1.2 The Law of Intelligibility of Being as the Epistemological Expression of Transcendental True.*

In the course of clarifying being as truth, we discover a new principle of being known in the philosophical tradition as “the principle of the reason of being”<sup>355</sup> otherwise known as that principle of the intelligibility of being. The justification of the ordination of being to the intellect leads to this discovery. The principle states that “whatever is has that, due to which it

---

<sup>352</sup> Ibid.

<sup>353</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 151.

<sup>354</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 84.

<sup>355</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 139.

is (exists) and is what it is.”<sup>356</sup> It could also be expressed formally: “For every fact *F*, there must be an explanation why *F* is the case.”<sup>357</sup> In other words, everything that exists has its reason of being, as a necessary condition.

Its earliest formulation is traced to Leibniz who says that everything that exists has a sufficient reason for its existence. It means that everything that is existent either exists of its nature or has been brought into being by something else that is the reason of its existence.<sup>358</sup> Krapiec divides this principle into two parts: internal reason of being and external reason of being.

- a. The internal reason of being flows from the principle of identity. It states that whatever is has its reason of being “in itself” with respect to its constitutive factors.<sup>359</sup> It highlights the fact that every being has a determinate nature through its constitutive factors. A human being, for instance, through his or her constitutive factors is a human being. A square also is what it is due to its structure. Therefore, a denial of the internal reason of being would be a denial of the identity of the thing and the basis of human cognition. He identifies the form as the basis for the internal organization of being because it is the form that determines what a thing is.
- b. The External reason of being, on the other hand, refers to non-constitutive factors that determine a being. Krapiec would refer to them as “that without which a given being is not what it is.”<sup>360</sup> Krapiec gives credence to Aristotle and Aquinas in this regard especially in their discussions on causes.<sup>361</sup> Thus, while form serves as the internal cause of being, final cause, efficient cause, exemplary cause, and material cause serve as the external cause of being.

#### 2.4.5 Transcendental Good

The discussion so far has led us to discover that our world is made up of real beings that exist and are undivided in themselves, divided from others and also are intelligible. In addition to

---

<sup>356</sup> Ibid, 140.

<sup>357</sup> Melamed, Yitzhak Y. and Martin Lin, "Principle of Sufficient Reason", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/sufficient-reason/>>.

<sup>358</sup> Hawkins, D. J. B. “Principle of Sufficient Reason” in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 13, 777-778.

<sup>359</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 140.

<sup>360</sup> Ibid, 141.

<sup>361</sup> SCG Aquinas expresses the principle of the reason of being thus: “whatever belongs to a being not by virtue of what it itself is, belongs to it as a result of the action of some other cause...for that which has no cause is absolutely first.”

these properties, we have transcendental good which expresses desirability. Transcendental true activates the functionality of the will, awakening its appetitive powers. If transcendental true is an inward movement, involving the intellect's ability to draw substantial forms of things into the cognizing agent, transcendental good is an outward movement, through which the will seeks that which the intellect has shown to it. As Krapiec puts it, being is "ordered to the will, to desire."<sup>362</sup> Desire is a necessary consequence of cognition.

Krapiec offers three important arguments to explain the nature of transcendental good. The first is the correlation between the intellect or cognition and the will/desire; second is the forfeitability of existence in contingent beings; thirdly, the end of human actions. On the first point, Krapiec appeals to the operations of the form in a being, to show the correlation between cognition and desire, as well as being and good. Every being, he says, is derived from the intellect; during cognition, the intelligibility of the said being is made explicit. But the principle that organizes this being from within is the form. The form, not only organizes being from within but possesses an innate inclination which he refers to as the "cosmic love of being."<sup>363</sup> This cosmic love of being is a desire to be sustained in being, an act which denotes that being constantly moves towards perfection. This shows that the activity of every will is a movement towards an end. This *end* is what Krapiec identifies as the good.<sup>364</sup> Krapiec further argues that an intellect that creates, is an intellect that desires. Since every being is created from Pure Intellect, there is no doubt that they exist only because the Pure Intellect, the Absolute, willed it.<sup>365</sup> From this perspective, we can say, that which the will pursues, which is also the end of action, is the good.

The forfeitability of existence argument states that the fragility of the existence of contingent beings demands an investigation into the source of contingent existence which results in a connection between all contingent beings with the will of the Absolute. We can see that human beings die, plants wither and perish, lots of animals are decimated within the food chain. Things exist and after a while they go out of existence. For Krapiec this proves that we are not necessary beings. The ontological explanation is that our essence is not *to be*. The reason for our being is not within us; it lies outside of all contingent beings. We can only trace the origin of our being to the Absolute, Necessary being. This absolute being, in Krapiec thought, must be a being with an intellect, for it can only create what it knows. But one important question

---

<sup>362</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 152.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid.

<sup>364</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 153.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid.



which Krapiec tries to answer is: must the Absolute create something? The response is negative. If it is the case that the Absolute must create things, then contingent things would be necessary since they cannot but be. However, this is not the case given the demonstration of the forfeitability of existence of contingent beings. Based on this Krapiec concludes that the Absolute wills things into being. Moved by “non-necessary love” the Absolute creates non-necessary beings.<sup>366</sup> The operation of this love flows from the will of the Absolute, a desire to bring things into existence. Having used the contingency argument to show that there is a connection between contingent beings and the will of the Absolute, Krapiec proceeds to develop a second meaning of the good. He says: “We are through our being connected with the will of the Absolute. The effect of this ontic bond with the will of the Absolute is called goodness.”<sup>367</sup>

The third argument is a psychological argument connected with human action. Krapiec shows that in each human being there is a propensity to love. This propensity is seen more clearly when one analyses human acts. Human acts are not empty actions, they are rather “extensions of my being.”<sup>368</sup> The implication of this extension is the love of my being. I desire my existence; I seem to objectify my existence and seek means to pursue, to preserve and to improve it. In this sense, my existence is a good which I desire. In my pursuits in life, whether religion, education, jobs, marriage, friendship etc., I seek things that help me to improve my existence. These ends that I seek are the things that enable me to achieve fulfillment as a person. My inclination towards them is also evidence of the love or desire in me. These pursuits are also goods – they are objects of my desire. With these expositions, Krapiec avers: “If, therefore, an *object of desire* is called a *good*, then whatever is being, is also a good...in a word, beings are goods.”<sup>369</sup> One might easily argue that such a conception of good is subjective, anthropocentric, and not metaphysical. One can also claim that actions which tend to harm the human being cannot be *good*. Such criticisms are justifiable since Krapiec himself does not consider this to be a concept of good to be primary in metaphysical cognition. According to him, goodness is not in the desire, the goodness is in being; something is desired because it is good. It is the goodness in being that awakens the desire in us.<sup>370</sup>

---

<sup>366</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 154.

<sup>367</sup> Ibid.

<sup>368</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 155.

<sup>369</sup> Ibid.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid.

The question would be what would constitute transcendental good in Krapiec's view. The first two arguments suffice in this regard. As in transcendental true, the contingency argument shows a connection between being and the will of the Absolute. This connection is not specific only to the absolute; the human will is also involved. As the principal agent of culture, the human being, connected with nature is able to transform it according to his/her will. Every being proceeds from the will and is meant for the will. The good is indeed the object of the will. The finality argument opens up our discussion on the law of finality of being. If the internal mechanism that organizes a being desires be-ing, and this be-ing is a good on the grounds that whatever is desired is considered as such, then it follows that to be and to be good are one and the same thing. This supports Thomas Aquinas' saying: "All that is, in so far as it is, is good."<sup>371</sup> Therefore being and good are convertible and co-extensive.

There are, in Krapiec's view, different aspects of goods depending on where the emphasis is laid between being itself, the desire or inclination and purpose. When I desire an object for the sake of the object itself, that is, if one desires the good for its own sake by reason of the object itself – such desire is called honorable good (*bonum honestum*). Only persons can be sought as objects in themselves. When the emphasis shifts to the very act of desiring, then we are dealing with pleasurable good (*bonum delectabile*). For example, one who eats because he/she likes eating. The pleasure of desiring is a result of placing the emphasis on the function of desiring some good. Finally, if the good is desired for the sake of another good, to which we subordinate our acts of desire, then we are dealing with a useful good (*bonum utile*).<sup>372</sup> An example here could be playing soccer in order to win a scholarship.

#### 2.4.5.1 *The principle of Finality*

Each of the principles is an epistemological expression of one of the transcendentals. While the transcendental is ontic in nature, laws represent insight one gains into the natural coding of being itself. The principle of finality of one of such coding. Krapiec presents three formulations of this principle, as follows:

- Potency is essentially ordered to act
- Whatever acts, acts for an end
- Everything exists for itself as acting

---

<sup>371</sup> Aquinas, SCG III, 7: "Omne igitur quod est, quocumque modo sit, in quantum est ens, bonum est."

<sup>372</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 97-98.

Krapiec rejects the first formulation on the grounds that it presupposes the absence of purposiveness in the Absolute. This would be correct if we consider the fact that there is no potentiality in the Absolute. The Absolute is Pure Act (*Actus Purus*). Secondly, such principle already excludes any possibility to seek for the reason of being in the Absolute. Only the second formulation wins approval as an authentic epistemological expression of transcendental good for Krapiec. He makes an appeal to human psychology in the face of pain in failure. The pain emerges as a result of the person's realization of the futility of the action. The expectation that accompanies each action denotes the purposiveness attached to all actions. Krapiec also avers that purposiveness is not limited only to living beings; non-living beings are also involved in the web of purposefulness of being.

As in transcendental good, one already sees a connection between the Absolute and the human being. At the beginning of the relative transcendental properties, we pointed out the soul (intellect and the will) as the loci for the connection with all things. This connection with the will also reveal a lot about the human being, as a being that desires, a being that loves, and a being that is amiable.

#### 2.4.5.2 How do we discover Transcendental Good?

We come to the realization that our world originates from a will and is ordered to the will through spontaneous cognition and through metaphysical separation<sup>373</sup>

- I. We begin from a realistic foundation by affirming the existence of a being. John exists, this computer exists, this pen exists, this Eve exists.
- II. We cognize that as human beings we feel an outward trajectory towards beings outside of us. I want a computer in order to do my work, I desire a pen in order to write an exam, Adam loves Eve in order that they might get married. In each instance, the subject of action is drawn by the object that is desired for a purpose. That purpose is the end for which the subject is moved towards the object and as such is the good sought by the subject. When I need to write, I am drawn to a pen because the pen is a good meant for writing. We feel this connection between us and the beings around us. As principal agents of culture too we see the products that emerge from us. We envisage something in our intellect and execute it to be real. It is not only that we know what we wanted to

---

<sup>373</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 94-96.

do but we desire to make it a reality, thereby making the real object a visible expression of the plan of the maker, born not out of necessity.

- III. We move from the universal level to a transcendental level and affirm that all beings are connected with the will – the will of the Absolute as well as the will of the human cognizer. This connection is known as transcendental good. The implication is that there is no being that is ‘unwanted.’ Every being is desirable, it would not have being if it was not desired.

#### 2.4.6 *Transcendental Beauty*

The human being is not a creature who receives impressions from objects of cognition (through the intellect) without responding to it (through the will) in a spontaneous simultaneous act of cognition; for we do not just passively undergo cognitive experiences but we simultaneously express our attitude toward the cognized content. This inward-outward movement which is holistic in nature is the basic expression of transcendental beauty. The world of persons and of things are, therefore, not only objects that are ordered to the intellect (as in transcendental truth) or ordered to the will (as in transcendental good) but they are ordered to the intellect and will simultaneously in one act of cognition in such a manner that we are enchanted by their nature. A search for the reason of this enchantment leads to a discovery that existing beings are vehicles of beauty. Being, when considered in relation to a simultaneous act of the intellect and will, is perfect. Perfection does not connote physical, psychological and functional flawlessness. It is rather substantial flawlessness and ‘defectlessness’ located in the form. There are four important aspects of this discussion I will undertake: firstly, the transcendental status of beauty; secondly, the nature of transcendental beauty; thirdly, the objective-subjective axis of beauty and finally the discovery of beauty and the law of perfection of being.

##### 2.4.6.1 *The Transcendental Status of Beauty*

The transcendental status of beauty has been called into question based on the criticisms leveled against Thomas Aquinas who is considered to be the main point of reference in the discussions on the transcendentals as recent studies have shown. De Veritate 1.1 and 21.1 which are considered the primary literary evidence for Thomas’ argument on the transcendentals do not make a mention of beauty. The same could be said for the commentary on the first book on the *Sentences*, so much that Etienne Gilson refers to it as the *forgotten transcendental*.<sup>374</sup> But as

---

<sup>374</sup> Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 335.

Aertsen observes, despite this “omission” or “forgotteness” beauty remains the most discussed among the transcendentals.<sup>375</sup>

Also, in separate texts where Thomas mentions beauty, his description and definition of beauty have sparked controversies if such definition of beauty portrays it as a transcendental value or an aesthetic value.<sup>376</sup> On another note, some philosophers are of the view that *pulchrum* has a derivative value. As a derivative value, the discovery of transcendental beauty would be dependent on transcendental truth and good. Philosophers like Elders maintain this ‘synthesis’ stance. Elders avers: “The beautiful is accordingly that property of being which arises from a combination of the true and the good. This explains why it is not mentioned by Aquinas as a special transcendental.”<sup>377</sup> Maritain also had proposed that beauty is a synthesis of all the transcendental properties.<sup>378</sup> It would seem for Krapiec that if beauty is a mere synthesis or derivative of truth and good there could be some consequences in interpreting it as a transcendental property. However such argument may be problematic because since all transcendentals have the exact characteristics, any possible synthesis of these properties will necessarily give rise to another transcendental. However, even if one succeeds in synthesizing and carving out a new transcendental, an important feature is left, namely, what would beauty add to being since it is a mere synthesis of all the other properties?

Krapiec claims that beauty is a real, ‘substantive’ transcendental.<sup>379</sup> As a substantive transcendental, it is not dependent on any other transcendental for its apprehension or discovery. Krapiec defends the “real value” stance by describing the nature of the intellectual-emotional life of man. In his description, he reaches the conclusion that beauty is cognitively prior to truth and good. In this sense, it cannot be a mere synthesis. It is a transcendental in its own right. This also serves as a response to those who deny the transcendental reality of *pulchrum*.

---

<sup>375</sup> Ibid.

<sup>376</sup> For a discussion on “the identification of beauty with aesthetic value” see c. 7 and c. 13 of *Beauty and Being: Thomistic Perspectives* (2011) by Piotr Jaroszyński.

<sup>377</sup> Elders, *The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 142.

<sup>378</sup> See Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, 335; J. Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism*, 172, n.63b; G. B. Phelan, “The Concept of Beauty in St Thomas Aquinas,” in *Selected Papers* (1967), 155-180.

<sup>379</sup> The term substantive was not used by Krapiec. I employed this term to make a juxtaposition with “derivative” transcendental. It is meant to express a property of being that does not proceed from another.

### *Nature of transcendental beauty*

The discussions on transcendental good and true reveal distinctive features of the intellect and will. In their actions, we seem to see a picture of two forces operating towards opposite directions in one man. According to Krapiec, this level of seeming opposition is preceded by a moment of cognitive-intellective unity. This could be likened to the case of the *cogitativa vis*, where we perceive a unity of the intellect and the senses in the act of cognition despite their specialization in sensation and intellection.<sup>380</sup> Krapiec is of the view that the rational-appetitive faculties are simultaneously awakened by being before a “specialization” of the rational (intellect) or appetitive (will) faculties take place. As a being possessing inner unity, all the physical, emotional, intellectual, psychological aspects of man – irrespective of their specific functionality- work in *tandem* with the unity of man. This co-operative integration happens at the embryonic stage in man’s contact with being. In Krapiec’s view, this embryonic level is the base for the deepening of experience of being. This holistic experience of the world of persons and things is what Krapiec refers to as beauty. This interpretation of beauty by Krapiec as “simultaneous” instead of “synthetic” is also seen in the work of Piotr Jaroszyński where he writes: “if we express a thing’s relation to the intellect we call it truth, and if we express its relation to the will we call it good. If we express a simultaneous relation of the thing to the will and the intellect we call it beauty.”<sup>381</sup>

Krapiec also shows that at the level of specialization, this unity is not lost. Knowledge and love are not totally neutral to each other. The cognitive and appetitive have a basic connection. This connection is seen when we discover through experience that it is love (desire) that draws us towards knowledge; he says: “intensive acts of cognition are not possible in the absence of love, that is, without an attraction to the object of our contemplation.”<sup>382</sup> This can be related with the Aristotelian maxim that men by nature desire to know.

### *The Objective-Subjective axis of beauty*

In the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas defines beauty as “*pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent*,” meaning, “that which when beheld awakens the state of being pleased.”<sup>383</sup> This classical definition of beauty has been subject to controversial interpretations. Firstly, it is

---

<sup>380</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 180.

<sup>381</sup> Piotr Jaroszyński, *Beauty and Being: Thomistic Perspectives*, Trans. Hugh McDonald (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2011), 27-28.

<sup>382</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 184.

<sup>383</sup> *ST I*, q. 5, a. 4 ad 1; I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3, “*Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent.*”

claimed to deal with physical appearance, since “beholding” an object involves sight; secondly, beauty is a subjective experience that is determined by the “I.” If these two assertions are true, it implies that beauty cannot be a transcendental property. We shall, therefore, proceed from Krapiec’s defense of this classical definition to his metaphysical stance on beauty.

According to Krapiec *visa* and *placent* represent the appetitive and cognitive parts of man. *Visa* is not about the eyes which have its object as light. Rather it is something purely intellective, a sort of contemplative delight devoid of reason. Since the human being is a certain psychophysical unity, the acts proper to the being are intimately connected. Therefore, metaphysical-transcendental cognition is intellective-appetitive in nature.<sup>384</sup> Through intellectual cognition, we are able to unite ourselves intentionally with all that exists. In the act of apprehending being, an appetitive response of a purely intellectual nature is evoked. Since our will is connected with intellectual cognition, our initial intellectual acts have corresponding initial emotional responses. We are therefore involved in two movements: inward, by virtue of being intentionally united within us with the world, and outward, by which we tend toward a union with the desired object. For Krapiec, it is in this sense that we can demonstrate that the experience of beauty is prior to truth and good. It is only when we have this integral experience that one can “specialize” either in rational-cognitive experience or emotional-appetitive experience. In this sense, we can interpret Krapiec in this way: man’s experience of the world of persons and things is a response from within to whatever enters our cognition from without. With regard to this, Krapiec says: “If we only had cognitive experiences and did not also express ourselves (embryonically) with respect to the experienced content, we would then be in a state of a handicapped person or creature who, although receiving impressions of various content, is incapable of personally responding to them.”<sup>385</sup> The basis for this reaction is the beauty in the object of cognition. It is beauty that awakens our intellect and will and draws us into a union with the object through an act of love. For Krapiec, love is “the first expression of the will,”<sup>386</sup> This love ensures a unification with the object that is cognized.

Krapiec interprets “visa” not as “physical sight” but as “contemplation.” Contemplation here refers to a disinterested fascination that is devoid of reason; it is “looking at” which evokes a special kind of delight by reason of the looking itself.<sup>387</sup> Hence we affirm that the things that surround us exist as objects of contemplation and reality itself is connected with our intellect

---

<sup>384</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 180.

<sup>385</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 181.

<sup>386</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 184.

<sup>387</sup> Ibid, 185.

and will. This connection implies that the cognizer is perfected in this act of cognition. Being, therefore, perfects the intellect and will of the cognizer. Being is able to perfect the intellect and the will because it is perfect in itself. This perfection is also connected with that of the Absolute, since the Absolute accounts for the existence of being. We can say, therefore, that everything that exists is beautiful because it is rationally and volitionally derived from pure Existence, God, who is self-subsistent Beauty. Since being is derived by means of intellect and love of the Absolute, it is also true and good.<sup>388</sup> To be beautiful, in a word, means “to be a being (to exist) as simultaneously ordered to the intellect and will of the Absolute in the transcendental sense and to the human person in the sense of an object acting upon the person.”<sup>389</sup>

Finally, defending the definition of Aquinas, Krapiec insists that Aquinas is protected by his system of philosophy.<sup>390</sup> This is what could be referred to as “argument by system.” Since Thomas Aquinas is devoted to realism, his definition is protected and should be considered in the light of his kind of philosophy. Beauty is therefore not a construct of the individual. Beauty is being as it perfects the individual.

#### *2.4.6.2 The Ways Being is Discovered as Beauty*

We arrive at the transcendental beauty of being through (1) an analysis of our spontaneous but simultaneous intellectual-cognitive experience (2) through metaphysical separation.<sup>391</sup>

1. The enchantment which ensues during our contact with being is a confirmation of the reality of transcendental beauty. This experience is natural and original. A being is able to have the enchantment-effect only by virtue of its perfection. It is this perfection that awakens the intellect and will of the cognizer, and in turn perfects them. In addition to rationality and finality, we perceive the perfection of being, which is the basic expression of transcendental beauty.

2. As already indicated in the previous discussions, metaphysical separation involves three important stages:

---

<sup>388</sup> Ibid, 187.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid, 188.

<sup>390</sup> Ibid, 185.

<sup>391</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 126-130.



Stage I. the first stage is the base for the realism of metaphysics, namely, existential judgments. Here we express the fundamental result of cognition by stating: “Peter exists,” “the apple tree exists,” “the table exists” etc.

Stage II. In the second stage, we discern the ordering of Peter, the apple tree and the table to my intellect and will simultaneously such that they constitute the object of my contemplation. Hence, “peter is the object of my contemplation;” “the apple tree is the object of my contemplation;” “the table is an object of my contemplation.” This is also possible because of the connection of being to the Absolute who is “self-subsistent beauty.”<sup>392</sup> But beauty and being are co-extensive, hence, thanks to existence without which beauty is in-cognoscible. To be beautiful, in this sense “means to be a being (to exist) as simultaneously ordered to the intellect and will of the Absolute in the transcendental sense and to the human person in the sense of an object acting upon the person.”<sup>393</sup>

Stage III. We move from the categorical to the transcendental level and affirm that all beings are beautiful by virtue of their existence, connection to the Absolute as well as a simultaneous connection to the intellect and will of the cognizer.

#### 2.4.6.3 Principle of the Law of Integrity (Perfection) as a Law of the Existence of Things

As we apprehend in cognition the content of the transcendental beauty, we discover the principle of perfection of existing things.<sup>394</sup> Of course this law is not connected with aesthetic perfection which Władysław Tatarkiewicz wrote about.<sup>395</sup> In Book Delta of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle distinguishes three meanings of the term or three ways it could be applied. These are considered the oldest definitions of the word.<sup>396</sup> ‘Perfect’ refers to that:

- which is complete — which contains all the requisite parts;
- which is so good that nothing of the kind could be better;
- which has attained its purpose.<sup>397</sup>

Tatarkiewicz observes that the first and the second are linked while the third is quite different, hence creating a duality in the understanding of *perfection*.<sup>398</sup> This duality was expressed by

---

<sup>392</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 187.

<sup>393</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 188.

<sup>394</sup> Maryniarczyk, *Rationality and Finality*, 134.

<sup>395</sup> Władysław Tatarkiewicz, “Aesthetic Perfection,” in *Dialectics and Humanism: The Polish Philosophical Quarterly* VII, 4 (1980): 145-53.

<sup>396</sup> Władysław Tatarkiewicz, “Perfection: the Term and the Concept,” *Dialectics and Humanism* 4, (1979), 7.

<sup>397</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 1021<sup>b</sup>12-1022<sup>a</sup>3.

<sup>398</sup> Władysław Tatarkiewicz, “Perfection: the Term and the Concept,” 7.

Thomas Aquinas, in the *Summa Theologiae*, when he gave two forms of perfection of a being: “The ‘first’ perfection is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole having its parts complete. But the ‘second’ perfection is the end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building.”<sup>399</sup> Applying it to transcendental beauty, we discover that each being is perfect in the sense that it is ordered to the intellect and will. The Absolute or a maker tries to create or make something by putting both the essential (comprising of matter and form) as well as the existential elements together to constitute a being. Hence, every being is determined in one way or another on account of its origin from the Absolute. In the being, we discover that the Absolute “wants” this being to exist and makes us enchanted by what we “see.”

So far, we have investigated the transcendental properties and principles belonging to each being. Our attention now is drawn to the sense in which being, thing or good is said of, or applies to every existing being. How does being apply to John and Eve at the same time? When we say all beings are good, is my dog good in the same sense as God? It is clear that John is not Eve and God and dog are not essentially the same. Despite these dissimilarities we perceive some sense of similarity on the grounds of which ‘being’ and ‘true’ applies to them. Therefore philosophical curiosity pushes us to discover the foundation of unity in being and between beings. Krapiec identifies it as analogy. Since clarification of terms is vital for research purposes I will begin from an etymological stand point and later a historical purview before highlighting the thoughts of our author.

---

<sup>399</sup> Aquinas, *ST I*, q. 73, a. 1. “Prima quidem perfectio est, secundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius, quae ex integritate partium consurgit. Perfectio autem secunda est finis. Finis autem vel est operatio, sicut finis citharistae est citharizare, vel est aliquid ad quod per operationem pervenitur, sicut finis aedificatoris est domus, quam aedificando facit.”

## 2.5 Analogy of Being: The mode of Existence, the Mode of Cognition and the mode of Predication

### Introduction

In the first part of this chapter I have tried to demonstrate the convertibility of the transcendental properties with being, the first transcendental. I have also demonstrated how we can discover these properties through metaphysical separation. However, it remains to show why and how these various properties apply to different things. How do we show that being applies to the Absolute, Eve and Peter? How do we show that ‘man’ or ‘human being’ applies to Eve and Peter? How do words signify one thing? How does this signification extend to other things that share the same perfection? How is it that we can see one word, term or property refer to many things? Is the meaning of the word or term responsible for binding the things that share in it together? Or should we seek answers in the things themselves and how they exist? These are some of the concerns that one finds in whenever the discussion on analogy is initiated.

#### 2.5.1 Historical Excursus

Analogy is arguably one of the most important aspects of metaphysics. It could be described as the hub of all metaphysical investigations. Cajetan de Vio attests to this fact when he writes: “An understanding of this doctrine is so necessary that without it no one can study metaphysics, and ignorance of it gives rise to many errors in other sciences.”<sup>400</sup> This importance, however, has been undermined by several philosophers and logicians who tend to emphasize the semantic aspect of language and see analogy as an ambiguity that does more harm than good in philosophical investigations.<sup>401</sup>

What is at stake for Krapiec in this investigation is the plurality and unity of being. This makes analogy indispensable for realistic cognition. In a monistic world, like the world of Parmenides, analogy may be irrelevant, since being is understood in a monistic way. However, in a pluralistic world, analogy is important for the defence of ontic plurality in the face of reductionist cognition. Each being is marked by compositional wholeness, whereby they are composed of different parts yet exist as an ontological unity. Also, the realistic vision of the world affirms the individuality and separateness of each being, thereby protecting reality from

---

<sup>400</sup> Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, Trans. Edward A. Bushinnski, (Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2009), 9.

<sup>401</sup> This is with particular reference to the logical positivists.

univocal interpretations. This individuality flows from the single act of existence of each being, an act that is not shared and cannot be reduced to a general existence.

From its Greek etymology ἀναλογία, analogy has to deal with comparison of two things on the basis of some proportion or relation between them.<sup>402</sup> ‘Ball’ for instance could be an analogous term when it refers to football, basketball or volleyball. Though this same word could be used in an equivocal sense when it refers to a rounded shaped leather for sports and an official occasion where people dance. A clearer example of analogy is the word ‘being’. Just as Peter is a being, so is this apple tree a being. This type of analogy is known as analogy of proportionality because there exists certain proportion of elements in these things which qualify them as ball or as being. A second type of analogy is the analogy of attribution. This analogy occurs when a perfection exists primarily in one being and secondarily in other beings. The most common example is health. Health exists primarily in Peter but secondarily in an apple or in urine. If the word ‘health’ applies in exactly the same sense to Peter, urine and an apple, it means that ‘health’ is a univocal term. An appropriate example of univocity is the term ‘man’ as it applies to Peter and John or Eve. Based on its relation with univocity and equivocity, analogy is considered to be a middle point. It is a mid-point because an analogous term “expresses differences, as they affect the very sameness expressed by the notion, so that its meaning becomes somehow *totally* different and yet remains *totally* the same.”<sup>403</sup>

The fact that the original meaning of the word analogy is Greek naturally draws our minds to context of early Greek philosophy to this perennial problem. Aristotle makes clear that the term ἀναλογία, prior to its philosophical usage was a mathematical term which signifies an “equality of two proportions, i.e. a proportionality.”<sup>404</sup> However, as Lyttkens argued, it was Plato, not Aristotle, who first used the term in philosophical writings.<sup>405</sup> Plato uses the philosophical conception of analogy in the *Timaeus* and in the *Republic* (particularly in the “analogy of the sun” and “analogy of gold” respectively). He employs it to demonstrate the relation between various classes of knowledge and domains of reality; (b) to show the structural order in the universe through mathematical relations between the cosmic elements; (c) to

---

<sup>402</sup> Jennifer E. Ashworth, "Medieval Theories of Analogy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/analogy-medieval/>>.

<sup>403</sup> Oliva Blanchette, *Philosophy of Being*, 123.

<sup>404</sup> Hampus Lyttkens, *The Analogy Between God and the World. An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, 1952), 15. See Aristotle, *EN* 1131<sup>a</sup>31f.

<sup>405</sup> Lyttkens, *The Analogy Between God and the World*, 16.

demonstrate functional similarities in two things. In the analogy of the sun,<sup>406</sup> for instance, Plato uses an analogy to describe the Good. He says that what the sun is in relation to sight in the visible world, the good is in the intelligible realm and to our objects of thought or the things we know. Yet, goodness, truth, and knowledge cannot be on the same level, for as the sun cannot be identified with light, the good, in turn, cannot be identified with truth and knowledge. Here we perceive a cause-effect relation typical of the analogy of attribution – a kind of analogy later adopted to describe the relationship between God and creatures. In *Timaeus*, Plato shows a proportional relation between cosmic elements. Such relation, bonded by an act of the Demiurge, ensures a harmonious cosmos.<sup>407</sup>

Aristotle's contribution to the discussion cuts across different works. However, some philosophers claim that his contribution is mainly logical.<sup>408</sup> Analogy was a tool for Aristotle in the classification of animals. In this usage analogy means "similarity of function."<sup>409</sup> We also see analogy as similarity of functions in the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle states that all things share the same causes analogously. In this sense we can talk of formal cause or material cause as they apply to all things in a general sense but differing in each individual being.<sup>410</sup> Hence just as the flesh is the material cause for a human being so is a scale the material cause of a fish. Both have material causes in an analogical sense which differs when considered individually. In his *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle describes friendship and justice in an analogical way.<sup>411</sup> The *Topics* reveals a different use of analogy by Aristotle. Here analogy is seen as "likeness of relations."<sup>412</sup> The relations are between four different things and could be expressed in the formula:  $A:B = C:D$ . In the *Categories*, the earliest of his writings, Aristotle distinguishes univocal, equivocal and analogical terms. In his distinction he shows how names signify things. Signification means the art of attaching meaning to a thing, an act formally known as imposition.<sup>413</sup> In the first chapter of the *Categories*, Aristotle shows that "animal" is a univocal term when it is predicated of a man and an ox. "Animal" can also be predicated equivocally when it is said of a man and a picture of a man.<sup>414</sup> Later in his

---

<sup>406</sup> Cf. *The Republic*, Book 507<sup>b</sup>-509<sup>c</sup> in *Plato: Complete Works*, Cooper, J. (ed.), (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997) 1127-1130.

<sup>407</sup> Plato, *Tim* 31<sup>bff</sup>; *Tim* 53<sup>eff</sup>.

<sup>408</sup> Lyttkens makes such a claim. See *The Analogy Between God and the World*, 29.

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid*, 29.

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid*, 41-47; cf. Aristotle, *Met* 1071<sup>a</sup>3-29.

<sup>411</sup> Aristotle, *EN* 1159<sup>b</sup>25 f.

<sup>412</sup> Lyttkens, *The Analogy Between God and the World*, 39.

<sup>413</sup> Domenic D'Ettore, *Analogy after Aquinas. Logical Problems, Thomistic Answers* (Washington: The Catholic University Press of America, 2019), 2.

<sup>414</sup> Aristotle, *Cat* 1<sup>a</sup>1-3.

metaphysics, Aristotle writes that *being* is said of in many ways (λέγεται πολλακῶς)<sup>415</sup>, thereby revealing the analogical character of *being*. While this last statement may seem to be an oversimplification of Aristotle's statement,<sup>416</sup> it does not remove the nexus of that passage, namely, that being, for Aristotle, applies both to substance and accidents.<sup>417</sup> It applies to substance primarily because they exist on their own and applies to accidents in a qualified sense because they inhere in substances. Mention ought to be made of the *pros hen* example, specifically 'healthy' as it refers to 'health' and 'medical' in relation to the art of medicine.<sup>418</sup>

Put within a historical context, Aristotle's idea of analogy stands in contradistinction with Parmenides' idea of being. We have come across Parmenides on few occasions in this work. However, his idea of being remains important in the discussion on analogy. John Wippel presents two levels of criticism against Parmenides by Thomas Aquinas: firstly on the ontological level and secondly on the conceptual level.<sup>419</sup> On the ontological level, Parmenides argues for the indivisibility of being either by being or non-being. Since divisibility presupposes multiplicity, it implies that Parmenides denies any form of plurality. Being is absolutely one. On the level of concept, the Parmenidian being is univocal because it treats being as a genus that is incapable of any differentiation whatsoever.<sup>420</sup> The inference that could be drawn from the discussions is that multiplicity or divisibility of being is directly connected with the discussions on analogy.

Even though a lot of attention has been given to Thomas Aquinas's notion on analogy, different philosophers differ on the depth of his contribution to the subject. Cajetan, for instance, accuses Thomas of not having a real grasp of Aristotle's teaching on analogy. Ralph McInerny is of the view that Cajetan did not properly understand Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle by claiming that the Latin usage of the word is an aberration since it has no equivalent of the Aristotelian Greek usage.<sup>421</sup> McInerny insists that one cannot find any ground in the works of Thomas Aquinas from which Cajetan mapped out the analogous names.<sup>422</sup> Etienne Gilson, argues that there are not so many references to analogy in the works of Thomas Aquinas. Klubertanz agrees with

---

<sup>415</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 1003<sup>b</sup>5-10.

<sup>416</sup> Lyttkens, for instance, argues that the statement is not determined analogically. Rather Aristotle was referring to a logical determination, namely, *pros hen*.

<sup>417</sup> *Met* 1028<sup>a</sup>29.

<sup>418</sup> *Met* 1003<sup>a</sup>35ff; 1061<sup>a</sup>1 ff.

<sup>419</sup> For fuller understanding of Wippel's thought see "Parmenides and Analogy of Being" in *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 65-93.

<sup>420</sup> Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 68-69.

<sup>421</sup> Ralph McInerny, *Aquinas and Analogy* (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 47.

<sup>422</sup> *Ibid*, 52.

him but enlisted over four hundred instances where Aquinas uses analogy either explicitly or indirectly. However it is generally accepted that Thomas Aquinas did not treat analogy as an independent treatise.<sup>423</sup>

The lack of a formal tract dedicated to the discussion on analogy by St. Thomas Aquinas, however, did not prevent his commentators from expanding the discussion so much to the bewilderment of other philosophers.<sup>424</sup> Some of the scholars who have done significant research on Thomas Aquinas on this topic include: Hampus Lyttkens, L. Geiger, C. Fabro, Robert J. Henle, Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara and Suarez.<sup>425</sup> Among these philosophers, Cajetan has been undeniably influential and controversially so. He is well-known and probably the most debated philosopher on this topic.<sup>426</sup> For this reason I will briefly discuss Cajetan's view briefly before delving into Krapiec's idea on analogy.

#### 2.5.1.1 Cajetan: *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*<sup>427</sup>

An impression one gets from reading the text by Cajetan is that it is a candid effort to be faithful to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. While the effort and intention are obvious, the outcome has been a dissatisfaction on the part of most Thomistic philosophers who claim that Cajetan did not properly represent the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas on this matter. What was analogy for Thomas Aquinas?

The beginning paragraph of the *Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being* contains an assessment of obscurity and indispensability of analogy. Cajetan traces the word analogy to its Greek origin wherein it means "proportion" or "proportionality." He reduces all forms of analogy into three types, following a hierarchical structure, from terms that are less properly analogous to real analogous terms. These three modes are: analogy of inequality, analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality.<sup>428</sup> Cajetan argues that these forms of analogy were

---

<sup>423</sup> Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 74.

<sup>424</sup> Gilson shows this bewilderment in his statement: "His (Thomas Aquinas') texts on the notion of analogy are relatively few, and in each case they are so restrained that we cannot but wonder why the notion has taken on such an importance in the eyes of his commentators." Cf. Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas*, translated by L. K. Shook, C. S. B. (New York: Random House, 1956), 105.

<sup>425</sup> See Hampus Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino*. Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksells, 1952; Robert J Henle, S. J., *Saint Thomas and Platonism* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956); L. B. Geiger, O.P., *La Participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris: Vrin, 1953; C. Fabro, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino*, second edition. Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1950.

<sup>426</sup> Domenic D'Ettore, *Analogy after Aquinas. Logical Problems, Thomistic Answers* (Washington: The Catholic University Press of America, 2019), 16.

<sup>427</sup> For this review, I am using a translation by Edward A. Bushinski and Henry J. Koren.

<sup>428</sup> Thomas De Vio Cardinalis Caietanus, *De Nominum Analogia. De conceptu entis*, ed. P. N. Zammit, O.P., and P. H. Hering, O.P. Rome: Angelicum, 1952. n. 3: "Ad tres ergo modos analogiae omnia analogia reducuntur:

used by Aristotle. However he adds that only analogy of proportionality constitutes analogy in the real sense of the word.<sup>429</sup> Analogy of inequality deals with an unequal participation in the perfection signified by the name. An example cited by Cajetan is based on ancient physics namely, ‘body’ as it applies both to celestial bodies and terrestrial bodies. The celestial bodies are considered to be far superior to terrestrial bodies.<sup>430</sup> Cajetan then claims that Thomas Aquinas refers to this type of analogy as “analogy according to ‘to be’ only (*secundum esse et non secundum intentionem*). In this type of analogy, things are equal in name but not in perfection.<sup>431</sup> Cajetan concludes that referring to analogy of inequality as analogy is a misuse of language because it is essentially univocal. In the second chapter, Cajetan discusses analogy of attribution. He uses a familiar Aristotelian example showing a higher mode of analogy namely, health. This kind of analogy can come about in different ways, in accordance with the different kinds of causes: material (subject), formal (exemplar), efficient and final cause. Cajetan lists four conditions to be met by such analogy, the first of which is that only the primary analogate has the perfection primarily while others have the perfection by extrinsic denomination.<sup>432</sup> He claims that Thomas Aquinas calls this analogy according to intention and not according to ‘to be’ (*secundum intentionem et non secundum esse*).<sup>433</sup> The third division is analogy of proportionality. Cajetan refers to this as the proper sense of analogy. This form of analogy occurs when a word is said of two things in such a way that they share the meaning of the term in a proportional way. Cajetan demonstrates this with the word ‘see’ just as it means ‘sight’ which is a corporeal form of vision, so it means understanding which an intellectual kind of vision is.<sup>434</sup> He claims that Thomas Aquinas refers to this as analogy according to be and according to intention (*secundum esse et secundum intentionem*).<sup>435</sup> This form of analogy is the most important for metaphysics because we could arrive at concepts like goodness and

---

scilicet ad analogiam inaequalitatis, et analogiam attributionis, et analogiam proportionalitatis. Quamvis secundum veram vocabuli proprietatem et usum Aristotelis, ultimus modus tantum analogiam constituat, primus autem alienus ab analogia omnino sit.”

<sup>429</sup> Bushinski argues that save for nomenclatural differences, these three modes of analogy correspond to three modes of analogy mentioned in Aristotle’s works. Bushinski points to Aristotle’s *Physics* 249<sup>a</sup>22ff for analogy of inequality, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1096<sup>b</sup>26ff for analogy of attribution and *Topics*, 108<sup>a</sup>6ff for analogy of proportionality. See footnote n.7, p. 10 in *The Analogy of Names*.

<sup>430</sup> Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names*, n.4.

<sup>431</sup> Cajetan, *The Analogy of Names*, n. 6. A denomination is considered intrinsic when the perfection is in that which is denominated while it is extrinsic when the perfection is not in the thing. Using ‘health’ Cajetan argues that animal is healthy formally, but urine and medicine do not possess this perfection intrinsically though they are related to it.

<sup>432</sup> Ibid. 10.

<sup>433</sup> Ibid. 21.

<sup>434</sup> Ibid. 23.

<sup>435</sup> Ibid. 30.



truth which are impossible in the former types of analogy.<sup>436</sup> He further divides it into metaphorical and proper analogy.

Cajetan has been heavily criticized for his views primarily from the perspective of his status as a commentator of Thomas Aquinas. George Klubertanz, for instance, criticizes Cajetan on two grounds: firstly for identifying analogy of proportionality with the analogy discussed in *de Veritate* q2, a. 11; secondly, for reduction of all forms of analogy of proportion to analogy of attribution and his claim that the secondary analogate in analogy of attribution is by extrinsic denomination.<sup>437</sup>

### 2.5.1.2 Krapiec's Idea of Analogy

It is interesting to note that the earliest philosophical works of Albert Krapiec were dedicated to the analogy of being.<sup>438</sup> It shows the importance of analogy to the discussion on realistic philosophy. One can claim that this shows his support for priority of analogy in metaphysics. An important point should be noted here: Krapiec was not commentator of Thomas Aquinas like Cajetan. Krapiec aimed at a deeper understanding of analogy in metaphysics. At the background of Krapiec's understanding of analogy are three important issues: first is the problem of plurality. Do we live in an absolutely monistic world, where each being is totally unconnected with the other? Is the real world a world of monads? Secondly, if we do not live in a monistic world, what language do we need to characterize our world? Obviously it cannot be monistic. Since there is a connection between our world and our language, we ought to determine what kind of language would adequately characterize our world. Thirdly is the problem of the knowledge of the Absolute. How do we arrive at a knowledge of the Absolute and in what way can we establish a relation between the Absolute and creatures?

Before going into these problems in details, I would state categorically here, that for Krapiec the starting point of analogy is the affirmation of the existence of real beings and followed by

---

<sup>436</sup> "Scimus quidem secundum hanc analogiam, rerum intrinsecas entitates, bonitates, veritates etc., quod ex priori analogia non scitur. Unde sine huius analogiae notitia, processus metaphysicales absque arte dicuntur. Acciditque huiusmodi ignorantibus, quod antiquis nescientibus logicam." C. 3, n. 29.

<sup>437</sup> George Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, 10.

<sup>438</sup> These works include: "Egzystencjalne podstawy transcendentalnej analogii bytu." *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych oraz Kronika Towarzystwa Naukowego Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego* 6 (1954), 69–72; "Analysis formationis conceptus entis existentialiter consideranti." *Divus Thomas* (Placentiae), series III, LIX (1956); "O rehabilitację analogii bytowej" *Roczniki filozoficzne*, V, no 4 (1957): 103–119; *Teoria analogii bytu* (Lublin: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski), 1959.

the affirmation of plurality of being.<sup>439</sup> However on a general level, Krapiec discusses analogy on two levels: firstly, analogy in connection with being and secondly, analogy in connection with cognition. Analogy in connection with being could be divided into two: analogy within being and analogy between beings. Analogy between beings is extended to the relation between God and creatures. Analogical cognition is more extensive because it deals with words and terms and language generally. However for the purpose of this work, I will discuss Krapiec's view within the framework of addressing the problem of plurality and the relationship between God and creatures.

### *2.5.1.3 Analogy within Being as a Response to the Problem of Plurality*

Earlier in this work I have shown that there exists a connection between analogy and the problem of plurality. In line with that, Krapiec treats analogy as a rebuke of Parmenides' monism. The radically closed circle of being drawn by Parmenides had suggested an absolute identity of being expressed in the phrase: "being is."

Krapiec offers two sets of arguments against monism: firstly, spontaneity of plurality and the composition of being. The spontaneity argument states that the plurality of being is a spontaneous assertion cognizable by a single act of perception. We experience plurality the same way we experience being. Krapiec argues that if we place our experience on a hierarchical scale, the experience of plurality comes immediately after the experience of the fact of existence.<sup>440</sup> This is observable when we perceive the sustenance of other beings in the face of the annihilation of a single being. It is also observable in the dissimilarities in human beings, psychologically, biologically, physically etc. In our decisions as persons, we also see how our thoughts differ and even conflict. There are disagreements over almost everything.<sup>441</sup> This is indisputable experience of plurality.

In the composition based argument, Krapiec shows that beings are so composed that any thought of monism is defenceless. In Krapiec's view, Parmenides would be correct if being were to be simple and non-composite but on the contrary experience suggests that being is a multi-partitioned whole. From a simple observation of the human body, we perceive a "multi-faceted composition"<sup>442</sup> in material beings – a composition which goes well beyond the somatic

---

<sup>439</sup> Krapiec, "The Theory of Analogy of Being," in *Theory of Being to Understand Reality*, eds. Stanisław Kamiński, Marian Kurdziałek, Zofia Zdybicka (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1980), 46.

<sup>440</sup> Krapiec, "The Theory of Analogy of Being," 46.

<sup>441</sup> Ibid, 46-47.

<sup>442</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 449.

level to the very essence of man. Krapiec identifies three levels of composition: material and formal composition, substantial and accidental composition and existential and essential composition. Prior to his arguments on the three levels of composition, Krapiec uses the part-whole argument to show that tissues, hands and legs are integrating parts which form a whole, such that the whole is not reducible to any one part. This is what I refer to as the structural argument or the “whole-part” argument for analogy. If analogy is about proportion or relation between things, can we really formulate a proportion or relation based on the body parts? The answer is obvious. There is a relation between the parts of the body and the whole. For Krapiec there is an ordering of these parts to the whole.<sup>443</sup> Ordering means that the parts work in *tandem*, a cooperation that merits them to be called “this being”. The integration is already the identity. The human being is typical example. This example extends to lower animals as well as trees. Apart from being ordered to one another, these integrative parts are quantitative, and this implies that they are measurable. Hence they have mathematical value.<sup>444</sup> This outcome is that we can represent them in some form of proportions. The body can be considered symmetrically or on the basis of some ratios etc. These are verifiable facts that show proportions and plurality in being. However, Krapiec warns that our ability to express some existing things in mathematical formats does not confer on mathematics the prerogative of absolute science. This is because mathematics does not exhaust the whole of reality.

The next argument Krapiec formulates for the plurality of being is the functionality of form. On the formal level, Krapiec argues that each concrete being has internal organizing principle. It is on the basis of the form that we identify both ‘Adam’ and ‘Eve’ as human beings or ‘the apple’ and ‘orange’ as fruits. Both form and matter combine to make the thing what it is. The functional difference and constitutional differences between matter and form only show their non-identity. This already is plurality. In his use of form as “principle,” one can argue that it echoes the Aristotelian-Thomistic critique against Parmenides in which ‘principle’ is seen as an indication of plurality.<sup>445</sup>

Taking his argument further, Krapiec shows a correlation between matter and form on the one hand and substance and accidents on the other. It is the form that determines the substance, yet it relies on the dispositions that are made available only by matter. These dispositions are accidental to substance. Hence Krapiec points out a relation of interdependence between the

---

<sup>443</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 449.

<sup>444</sup> Ibid.

<sup>445</sup> *In I Phys* lect. 2, nn.13, 15; Aristotle, *Phys* 184<sup>b</sup>25-185<sup>a</sup>3.

pairs of matter and form as well as substance and accidents.<sup>446</sup> These elements also relate as act and potency. This goes a long way to buttress Krapiec's point that plurality is real contrary to the position of Parmenides. Matter and form, substance and accidents, act and potency are elements and principles which interact in every concrete existing being.

On the substantial and accidental level, Krapiec argues that we cannot arrive at a univocal understanding of being simply on our ability to define things based on the genera and difference. What this implies is that univocity, which the Parmenidian monism suggests, does not capture the individuality of the concrete being. He criticized the philosophers who tried to give up on the individual being while clinging to the constancy of definitions, which are basically abstract. His best response to this was a higher form of composition, namely, the essential and existential composition of being.<sup>447</sup> He shows that within these levels of composition the individuality of each being is not compromised. Based on the above analysis, Krapiec claims that the only term that can simultaneously express "ontic pluralism, the inner 'composition' of a being from non-independent ontic elements, ontic determination, and the relationism that characterizes a 'composite' being," is analogy.<sup>448</sup>

These three compositions: matter and form, substantial and accidental and essence and existence are not distanced from each other. Krapiec opines that there is a 'stratification' and 'intermeshing' of these levels of composition. This makes an individual being, like a human being as already demonstrated, an embodiment of a web of relations.<sup>449</sup>

#### Brief analysis:

A brief analysis of the above elements covered by 'analogy' might be necessary. The first is the question of ontic pluralism. Already we have seen some idea of what plurality consists of for Krapiec. However there is also another sense of pluralism which has been stated already in our discussion on transcendental aliquid, namely, the relative identity of being. The uniqueness of essence and existence in a composite being. Even though there is a substantial unity in, for instance, a concrete human being, there is also ontic plurality by virtue of the non-identity between essence and existence in the concrete human being.

---

<sup>446</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 449.

<sup>447</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 450.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid, 451.

<sup>449</sup> Krapiec, "The Theory of Analogy of Being," 51.

Why is pluralism important for Krapiec as a background to his idea of analogy? Klubertanz states that the problem of multiplicity/plurality is one of the reasons for analogy.<sup>450</sup> For Krapiec, there is a correlation between beings as they exist and beings as they are said of, in other words, between being and the language of being. If beings exist as monads, the appropriate language for a metaphysics of monistic beings would be univocal. Krapiec tries to show that the base for analogical cognition is in the mode of being which is analogical in itself. Hence it would be a mischaracterization of being to employ univocal terms for metaphysical purposes. This does not imply that we cannot formulate or abstract universal concepts from being. However such universal concepts would be a vague characterization of reality. Arguing for multiplicity provides a base for drawing similarities between beings which are somewhat different as well.

The next factor worth considering so far is the composition within being. Composition does not undermine the unity of the being, the ontic elements are integral to the very existence of the being and as such can be substantial or accidental. That they are composed does not imply that they existed prior to some sort of assemblage.<sup>451</sup> This unity is also seen in the nature of beings that are composed and yet identified as wholes. Hence “man does not exist as an eye or as an ear, although those are elements of his being, nor does man exist as an aggregate of various elements that have not been ordered to a whole.”<sup>452</sup>

All these factors put together constitute what Krapiec refers to as “analogy within being” or “ontic analogy.”<sup>453</sup> Ontic analogy means that being exists analogically. In comparison with other works on analogy, one notices an emphasis on this ontic analogy, either within being or between beings. The reason Krapiec offers for this emphasis is his claim that philosophers have shown less attention to this part of the discussion, focussing more instead on analogical cognition.<sup>454</sup>

### 2.5.2 *Analogy between Beings*

We have established that we live in a pluralistic world by demonstrating that there is a stratification of compositions, together with a web of relation constituting individual beings. However, pluralism is a fact that goes beyond individual beings. It is a reality that stares at us

---

<sup>450</sup>Klubertanz, *St Thomas on Analogy*, 2.

<sup>451</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 451.

<sup>452</sup> Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation and Analogy*, 104.

<sup>453</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 452.

<sup>454</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 452.

as existence itself does. We consider John and Eve to be individual beings, separate entities. The foundation laid by Krapiec in his demonstration on analogy within being provides a basis for a consideration of analogy between beings. The types of analogy between beings have to do with various elements operational in being. A brief exposition of the elements of analogy is important. Krapiec identifies three elements that form constitutive parts in the structure of every analogy: analogon, analogate and relation.<sup>455</sup>

- a. Analogon: the analogon is the basis for an analogy. It is an element which is “common” or the bond that links two different objects – the analogical content. Krapiec gives a specific example:

Human being:soul = animal:soul - living beings (a kind of analogy within being).

we can also observe another analogy by Krapiec,

airplane:wing = butterfly: wing – flying beings (a kind of analogy between beings).

Both soul and wing are thus the analogon which is the basis for making an analogy between a human being and an animal; an airplane and a butterfly. The analogon is simply the proportionally common or shared perfection. Krapiec emphasizes that being a shared perfection does not imply “pre-existence” and a subsequent distribution of the analogon to the analogates. Rather, in each instant of analogy, the analogon is realized in a new and distinct way, creating a novel analogical perfection. In this sense analogy is referred to as proportional perfection.<sup>456</sup>

- b. Analogate: The analogical contents inhere in subjects which are “the bearers of the analogical perfection.”<sup>457</sup> They are the entities in which the analogon is realized. These subjects enter into analogy showing their similarities and as well indicating what differentiates them from each other. Following the examples above the airplane in relation to its wings and the butterfly in relation to its wings are analogates. The same applies to the human being and the animal in relation to their souls.
- c. Relation: this refers to the ordering of the different parts that constitute a being to one another. It is on account of the ordering that the parts are not isolated but form a whole, a unity. Analogy involves the apprehension of relations between and within beings. Such

---

<sup>455</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 457.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid, 458.

<sup>457</sup> Ibid, 457.

relations can be non-composite/composite, non-essential/essential, one-sided/many-sided, but all these forms are contained in a larger classification between necessary and non-necessary relations.<sup>458</sup>

Analogy Based on Necessary and non-necessary Relations: The necessary relation is an ontic chain that binds the whole part into a unity. It refers to the ordering of all parts in a being, both substantial unity and accidental unity. These relations are not “extra” in the sense of outside a being. For instance when there is an analogy between Peter and Eve on the basis of their existence, the relation is not a visible or imaginary line linking Peter’s existence with Eve’s. The relation is found within Peter and within Eve simultaneously. If there is no necessary relation within Peter, he would not exist and there would be no basis for analogy. Using the words of Krapiec: “these relations therefore, do not constitute a special category of real being, since they are not simply “pure” relations designating a new type of being, but are rooted in the different beings and different ontic elements that by their composition “constitute” the being as a whole.”<sup>459</sup>

The term ‘necessary’ also suggests indispensability. As it applies to our discussion, necessary relation is a form of relation that is essential to the very existence of the being. In this sense Krapiec refers to a connection between ontic elements both substantial and accidental. In his words: “it is the being (or a constitutive element of the being) connected with another being to such an extent that the understanding of the nature of one being without a correlative understanding of the other is a contradiction.”<sup>460</sup>

Non-necessary relation, on its part, refers to the connection between elements that may or may not exist in a given being.<sup>461</sup> Krapiec gives specific examples such as relations in qualities, like dissimilarities and dissimilarities (which is found in metaphors, for instance).<sup>462</sup> These non-necessary relations are not metaphysical and hence are found in non-philosophical uses of analogy.

From the necessary relations we can decipher two types of analogy: analogy of general proportionality and transcendental analogy.<sup>463</sup>

---

<sup>458</sup> Ibid, 458.

<sup>459</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 452-453.

<sup>460</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 453.

<sup>461</sup> Ibid.

<sup>462</sup> Ibid.

<sup>463</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 456.

- a. Analogy of General (proper) proportionality: here we decipher relational similarities of necessary elements between two beings. Example: when human, plant, and animal are referred to as living things because of the ‘soul’ which is realized in each of them. Unlike the transcendental analogy, the analogy of general proportions deals with general concepts which are apprehended in particular individual things or a group of things, not in relation to their existence (as being) but to other philosophical considerations that are not transcendental such as substance, accident, matter, form, man, etc. For example:

just as  $\frac{\text{a human being is to his or her}}{\text{soul}}$  so is  $\frac{\text{an animal to its}}{\text{soul}} = \text{alive/living things}$

“Soul” in this sense is an analogical concept which refers to a relation between a particular human being (perhaps John) and a particular animal (dog), and as such could be extended to plants since they possess a principle of life, a vegetative soul.

just as  $\frac{\text{a tree is to its}}{\text{soul}}$  so is  $\frac{\text{an animal to its}}{\text{soul}} = \text{alive/a living thing.}$

Since the soul is not a basis for forming a transcendental concept, Krapiec categorizes it as an analogy of general proportionality. A necessary relation exists in both cases. The ‘necessity’ of the relations is considered from the fact that there is a necessary connection between an animal and a soul. An animal without a soul is unimaginable, as it will lack a life-giving force. The same applies to the human being and to plants. However, there is limitation in scope since not all beings possess souls.

#### b. Transcendental analogy

Transcendental analogy refers to a necessary relation between transcendental elements like res, unum, aliquid, verum, bonum and pulchrum.<sup>464</sup> We decipher this kind of relation when we consider a being from the aspect of existence. If a transcendental applies to every existing thing, it means that such relation operates in every existing thing as well. For Example:

Just as  $\frac{\text{John is to his}}{\text{existence}}$  so is  $\frac{\text{this horse to}}{\text{its existence}} = \text{a being}$

Here we apprehend a necessary relation between John and his existence, and the horse and its existence. This makes them beings from an ontological perspective. Just as John cannot be without an act of existence, so the horse cannot be without an act of existence. Thus being is transcendentially analogical since it expresses concrete contents insofar as they are existing. And this kind of analogy applies to the whole of existing things: plants, animals, living and

<sup>464</sup>Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 456.



non-living things. This is important since Krapiec's primary criterion for distinguishing the two types of analogy based on necessary relations is scope or extension. We can further our investigation by making use of another transcendental property:

Just as  $\frac{\text{the orange fruit}}{\text{is object of my desire}}$  so is  $\frac{\text{the banana}}{\text{object of my desire}} = \text{good}$

Here we discover that relation to will and to love forms a base for analogy. All beings have a connection with the will. The will is moved into action in response to this connection.

For transcendental true, we discover ontological analogical connection by virtue of intelligibility of being. There is an ordering of all things to an intellect. Similar arguments can be made for all the transcendentals. We can predicate 'one' of every existing thing on the basis of the internally non-contradictory nature of being. We can also indicate the autonomy of being, each of which is separate. In considering the ordering of things to the intellect and will of the Creator or human maker, we can make out an analogy of transcendental beauty.

What is most important for Krapiec at this point is the distinction he makes between necessary and non-necessary relations in the overall discussion on analogy. According to Krapiec, the formulation of a univocal concept is not possible in necessary relations but this is possible with non-necessary categorical relations.<sup>465</sup>

Andrzej Maryniarczyk differs from Krapiec in his division of the types of analogy. He mentions three types of analogy based on difference in relation as well: analogy of general proportion, analogy of metaphysical proportion and analogy of transcendental proportion.<sup>466</sup> According to him, in the analogy of general proportionality, we see a relation between non-necessary elements. For example, a relation between hair and body or relation based on the number of legs a being has:

just as  $\frac{\text{John is a being}}{\text{with two legs}}$  so is  $\frac{\text{Eve a being}}{\text{with two legs}} = \text{a being with two legs.}$

- b. Metaphysical analogy: here we decipher relational similarities of necessary but non-transcendental elements between two beings. But these elements have metaphysical value. Example: when human, plant, and animal are referred to as living things because of the 'soul' which is realized in each of them. For example:

just as  $\frac{\text{a human being is to his or her}}{\text{soul}}$  so is  $\frac{\text{an animal to its}}{\text{soul}} = \text{alive/living things}$

<sup>465</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 454.

<sup>466</sup> Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation, and Analogy*, 113-116.

c. Transcendental analogy

Transcendental analogy refers to proportion between transcendental elements.<sup>467</sup> We decipher this kind of relation when we consider a being from the aspect of existence. If a transcendental applies to every existing thing, it means that such relation operates in every existing thing as well. For Example:

Just as  $\frac{\text{John is to his}}{\text{existence}}$  so is  $\frac{\text{this horse to}}{\text{its existence}}$  = a being

Maryniarczyk's concern in this division is quite obvious: how do we exclude the "soul," for instance, from the metaphysical realm? If we consider that for Krapiec to be metaphysical is to be transcendental (a fact which is shown in his diagram) discussions on soul and things within the same category are not metaphysical.

Krapiec gives his answer in his *Metaphysics* he explained that the soul belongs to analogy of general proportionality because in cognizing the function of the soul in a human being, as an internal principle which organizes matter and as a principle of life, one could also do the same by observing the role of the soul in an animal. Hence this creates a situation whereby "the definition of one pair of proportions is also the proportional definition of another pair of proportions not cognized by us."<sup>468</sup> This means that we can gain knowledge of another being simply by transferring a knowledge of one being to another. Krapiec argues that such analogy cannot be obtainable between creatures and God. He states:

In transcendental analogy, although existence is the actualizing element (in the case of a being as such) and there is nothing in a real being that does not depend on existence, yet existence does not belong to the elements constituting the nature (essence) of the being. Existence, since it is not a constitutive element of (nor an element derived from) the nature of a given analogate, does not constitute a basis for the cognition of some other analogate. It can only be a basis for the cognition of the existence of another analogate if this analogate is the primary analogate – the Absolute, and it makes possible the cognition of other contingent analogates only as beings, and nothing more. If I know what a human being as a human being means, then I know what a mineral as a being and a horse as a being mean, and I know that the Absolute as a being – pure being – exists. But in knowing what a human as a being or horse as a being, I still do not thereby know what a horse is as a horse, a mineral as a mineral, or God as God.

The transcendental analogy of being, therefore, enables us to know other objects connected by analogy only in their most general ontic aspect, yielding no more specific knowledge of these things as such. To know a thing in the ontic aspect means only to know that this thing, which is concrete and determinate in itself (identical with itself), is somehow in its own way connected with existence.<sup>469</sup>

<sup>467</sup> Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation, and Analogy*, 114.

<sup>468</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 475.

<sup>469</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 475-476.

The essence of this quotation is to show that there is a limitation to what we can know about the Absolute, therefore we must adopt a kind of analogy that corresponds to this reality. When, for instance, we say God is Good, Beauty, All-Knowing, Wisdom etc. we are simply drawing properties which flow from the fact of existence and we are not adding anything new to the essence of God, for neither goodness, beauty, or wisdom “has any meaning apart from being.”<sup>470</sup>

This explanation helps to distance Krapiec’s idea from Cajetan’s. We see these distinctions in the following areas:

1. In Cajetan’s work *The Analogy of Names* there is no distinction between analogy that employs transcendental concepts from the analogy that employs universal concepts.<sup>471</sup>
2. Analogy of being was treated “patronizingly” by Cajetan while focus was primarily on analogical perception or concepts.
3. Krapiec demonstrates that most examples employed by Cajetan are essentially isomorphism or identical proportions or univocity and not analogical proportionality.<sup>472</sup>
4. This reduction by Cajetan is a consequence of abstraction from concrete beings whereas in realistic cognition, we cannot abstract from existence. Hence Krapiec concludes that Cajetan’s idea of analogy is simply based on categorical relations.<sup>473</sup>
5. Cajetan’s understanding of analogy anchors on his understanding of being – essential being. Since the essence of being is the end of philosophical pursuit and the determinant of being, reference to the absolute as sufficient reason for being would be meaningless. Krapiec opposes such view.<sup>474</sup>

### 2.5.3 Analogy in Connection with Cognition

The understanding of “cognition” here for Krapiec deals with the act of knowing, from the point of experience to the processing of the data of experience until it assumes the nature of knowledge in the cognizer. Krapiec shows that analogical cognition has its foundation on analogical existence of being. This means that analogical cognition is a cognitive expression of the necessary relations or non-necessary relations that exist within beings and between

---

<sup>470</sup> Ibid, 476.

<sup>471</sup> Krapiec, “The Theory of Analogy of Being,” 58.

<sup>472</sup> Krapiec, “The Theory of Analogy of Being,” 58-59.

<sup>473</sup> Ibid, 63.

<sup>474</sup> Ibid, 72-73. Krapiec states that this particular point was at the heart of the dispute between Cajetan and Sylvester of Ferrara.

beings.<sup>475</sup> Analogy within being and between being lead to the development of analogical concepts. These concepts, however, are not necessarily metaphysical. They could be suited both for philosophical use and use in other scientific disciplines. According to Krapiec, this is at the heart of all the disputes in metaphysics.<sup>476</sup> The possibility of having analogy of cognition or metaphorical analogy or analogy in different sciences is based on the analogy of being. In analogy based on cognition, our focus shifts from the consideration of being in the aspect of existence, to the formation of concepts, whether transcendental, or categorical or metaphorical.

Krapiec bases his division of analogical cognition on necessary and non-necessary relations also. Analogical cognition are of three types based on the kind of relation:

- a. Metaphorical analogy: From the Greek μετά φέρειν [meta pherein] meaning “to transfer” or “carry beyond,”<sup>477</sup> a metaphor can be described as transferring a meaning that is proper to one thing to another where it applies improperly. In the sentence ‘the hills grew like an iroko tree’ we are simply transferring the quality which belongs primarily to a tree to the hills. This kind of analogy for Krapiec is based on a non-necessary relation and is used to express our feelings for reality but not reality itself. For instance, if I call a human being a dog, it is simply an expression of my feeling which represents reality in a different way. Hence Krapiec regards it as ‘symbolic cognition.’<sup>478</sup> This kind of analogy is used frequently in literature, poetry and theology. Using more extensive examples in theology, Krapiec shows that such analogy is used when we talk about a reality that is beyond our grasp. However, if these realities are beyond our understanding, they may not be beyond our love. Our projection of the term ‘Father’ to God is a concrete example of this love. When we call God ‘Father’ we transfer properties from humans to God. Therefore the language of the Bible is full of metaphorical analogy. In the process of philosophical cognition we do not use metaphorical analogy to explain the essence of God.
- b. Analogy of Attribution: Analogy of attribution occurs when we perceive causal relations between a principal analogatum and the objects ordered to it. It is often referred to as “*pros hen*” or analogy of ordination.<sup>479</sup> This type of analogy emerges from a necessary relation. A classical example is the word ‘healthy,’ “John is healthy,” “this

---

<sup>475</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 455.

<sup>476</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 454.

<sup>477</sup> Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation and Analogy*, 116.

<sup>478</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 485.

<sup>479</sup> *Ibid*, 464.

food is healthy,” “this medicine is healthy,” “this fruit is healthy.” Looking at these examples one notices that the characteristics of being healthy is proper only to John. Food, medicine, and fruit are considered healthy only in reference to the health of John, who primarily is the subject of the predicate “health” in the proper sense. For this reason, John is called the *summum analogatum* or *primum analogatum* while the others are called *analogata inferiora*.<sup>480</sup> Whereas in the primary analogate (John), health is realized in a proper sense based on John’s constitutive attributes, in the secondary analogate health is not found formally but in simple relation to John. For instance, a food is healthy because it leads to the nourishment of John, the medicine is healthy when it restores health to a sick John or makes a healthy John healthier. In this sense we perceive a causal relation between the primary analogate with the secondary analogate:

- Sometimes the secondary analogates are effects of the primary analogates as their efficient cause. For example, medical procedures in relation to a doctor.
- The analogates, at other times, can be considered from the perspective of exemplar causality. This is what is referred to as *ab uno* or *et henos*. Such analogy is seen in art works, for instance. Three different works of art could be traced to a particular artist due to some peculiarity of the artist. For example, the works of Leonardo Da Vinci.

Krapiec has some reservations for the analogy of attribution. According to him, from a cognitive perspective, the analogy of attribution basically does not belong to metaphysical cognition. When applied to the relation between the Absolute and creatures, analogy of attribution presupposes a prior understanding of God and based on this understanding we can understand other beings only by a relation or ordering to God. But this is problematic because we do not have access to God directly. Rather “God is cognized through other beings, and so God is cognized indirectly. God is the point of destination, not some ‘a priori’ in our cognition of beings.”<sup>481</sup>

---

<sup>480</sup> Alberto Strumia “Analogy” in *Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science*, [www.inters.org/analogy](http://www.inters.org/analogy).

<sup>481</sup> Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation and Analogy*, 113.

## Analogy of proportionality

The base of proportion, for Krapiec, are relations between elements in being or between beings. This proportion that exists in being can be expressed mathematically:

$$\frac{2}{6} = \frac{3}{9}$$

In the above equation we see a proportion between both fractions. In the real sense, this is not analogical, it is rather identical because both of them are equal. This is what Krapiec refers to as Isomorphism. Using this argument, Krapiec criticises philosophers who try to mathematicise analogy of proportionality. In philosophy, Krapiec identifies two types of analogy of proportionality similar to what was explained in analogy within being:

### a. Analogy of General Proportionality

Here we deal with analogical concepts which flow from necessary but non-transcendental relations. For example, in our experience we can affirm that Paul, Fido and the apple tree are ‘alive’ or ‘living beings’. We can represent this thus:

Just as  $\frac{\text{Paul is to his}}{\text{soul}}$  so is  $\frac{\text{Fido is to his}}{\text{soul}}$  so is  $\frac{\text{an apple tree is to its}}{\text{soul}} = \text{a living being.}^{482}$

The element common to such beings is that they possess a soul. Therefore that which they share in common (soul) and what they are called on the basis of this shared perfection (‘living beings’) are analogical terms or concepts.

### b. Transcendental analogy:

On transcendental analogy, we arrive at a conception of being when we observe that sets of determinate essences and proportional existences are shared perfection for all beings. Krapiec demonstrates this with an example:


Just as  $\frac{\text{John is to his}}{\text{existence}}$  so is  $\frac{\text{this horse to its}}{\text{existence}} = \text{a being.}$

We can extend the discovery of other transcendental concepts like truth, good and beauty. From the demonstration above we can confirm that ‘being,’ ‘true,’ and ‘good’ are analogical concepts.

Krapiec represents his divisions in a diagram thus:

---

<sup>482</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 456.



The major difference between analogy of transcendental analogy and analogy of attribution is that we do not need to understand the “concept” before arriving at an analogical knowledge. Rather we start from the categorical and arrive at the conception. The individual being remains the starting point for the construction of concepts.

#### 2.5.4 The Sufficient Reason for the Analogical Existence of Being

In the first chapter of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle states that the highest Science is one that seeks the ultimate causes of things. In his bi-structural division of being as essence and existence, Aquinas shows that investigation into the being of contingent being would be incomplete without the sufficient reason of being. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles* he explains that there are certain elements in being that have the reason of their being internally within being itself while there are others whose explanations are sought outside of being.<sup>483</sup> This is seen clearly in definitions. Definitions are usually formal expressions of the elements of a being. They reveal the elements which make up the being and as such do not need something external for explanation because the nature of the being is already understood. However there are elements which are not captured by such definitions, for instance, existence, and these need a sufficient explanation outside of the being. To make this clearer, in defining a man as a rational animal, we capture the constitutive elements of rationality and animality (using the Aristotelian model). It is a formal definition which captures the ‘nature’ of every man. It offers sufficient reason why John, Paul, Eve can be classified under the species “man.” But “man” does not capture

<sup>483</sup> SCG, II, 15: Krąpiec, “The theory of Analogy of Being,” 81.

the fact that John is taller than Paul, or has one leg whereas Eve has two or more importantly, that John or Paul or Eve exists. The point here is that there is always a reason why a thing or element is in a being. This reason can be sought within being or outside the being. Since in the analogical cognition of being we see a composition of analogon and analogate (and on this transcendental level, essence and existence), both of which cannot mutually explain each other (especially given the fact that an act of existence does not come into the definition of any content), it follows therefore that there is a “primary analogate” which is the ultimate and sufficient reason of the existence of all analogical perfections – a being in which analogon and analogate form an absolute unity.

Using this explanation, Krapiec argues that realistic analogical cognition would be incomplete without affirmation of the sufficient reason of being. It must be stated that this affirmation is not a logical expression of the sufficient reason of being, rather it is an ontological affirmation of a being that explains the existence of contingent beings. This adequately explains the maxim: “*magis et minus dicuntur per respectum ad maximum*,” which means, that the great and the lesser is said in respect of the greatest. Hence, we can say that the analogy of being is another way of arriving at the sufficient reason of being. Let us consider this reasoning by Krapiec:<sup>484</sup>

Just as  $\frac{\text{quantity}}{\text{is a being in a substrate}}$  so  $\frac{\text{a substance}}{\text{is a being in itself}}$

Just as  $\frac{\text{contingent being}}{\text{exists}}$  so  $\frac{\text{Necessary Being}}{\text{exists}}$

An analysis of the structure of being reveals that a substrate is always referred to in every discussion on quantity and since it is a being to which it does not belong to exist, there is a being to which it belongs to exist – a substance. The same argument applies to contingent beings and Necessary Being: since there are beings whose essence and acts of existence are not identical, so there is a being that has an Absolute identity of essence and existence.

If we must seek answers for contingent beings externally, it means that Krapiec rejects intrinsic causes (formal and material) as sufficient reasons. Instead he favors extrinsic causes (final and efficient cause).

This discovery of the Absolute as the sufficient reason of contingent being is of paramount importance because metaphysical analogy cannot be properly understood without capturing the

---

<sup>484</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 461.



sufficient and ultimate reason for the ontic unity of analogon and analogate in a contingent being. About this Krapiec says:

When in metaphysics, therefore, we attempt to cognize being, we cannot avoid responding to the question concerning the existence of an ultimate ontic reason. And just as we cannot really cognize properties-accidents without referring them to a substance, we cannot really cognize an existing being without referring it to existence, and in turn, without referring this to Pure Existence as the ultimate sufficient reason of the analogical perfection that, in the first order, is existence itself. Thus, the analogical cognition of real being cannot abstract from the cognition of the primary analogate of transcendental analogy.<sup>485</sup>

Here, we see the big difference between transcendental analogy and analogy of attribution. The argument of the former assumes a levitational plane while the latter is gravitational. The existence of contingent beings leads to the existence of a necessary being, while the non-identity of essence and existence in contingent beings leads to the knowledge of the First Being, in whom essence and existence are identical. It is only the Absolute as the “primary analogate,” as Krapiec uses the term, that is the ultimate justification of the fact of analogy from the ontic point of view.

In the light of the relation between the Absolute and creatures, we can differentiate transcendental proportionality from proper proportionality thus:

- a. Non-constitutive vs constitutive: the analogical transcendental concepts are not found nor contained in the definition of anything. Analogical concepts from proper proportionality are constitutive of the thing and is apprehended in the definition of the thing.
- b. Extrinsic cause vs intrinsic cause: if the ‘why’ of a thing cannot be captured in definitional terms, it implies that its reason is extrinsic (efficient cause) to it. Therefore a primary analogate is resorted to. In proper proportionality, the reason for a thing is already contained intrinsically (formal and material causes) and expressed in the definition of the thing. Hence there is no primary analogate involved here.
- c. Separation vs abstraction: analogical transcendental concepts cannot be abstracted. Only separation guarantees a successful operation of the intellect. Non-transcendental concepts can be abstracted.
- d. Analogical vs univocal: because we cannot abstract transcendental concepts, it is not possible to reduce them to univocal terms. Proper proportionality, when performed through abstraction could be reduced to univocal terms.

---

<sup>485</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 461.

## 2.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter captures the heart of Krapiec's existential metaphysics. It puts Krapiec's philosophy in direct opposition to any form of essentialist philosophy. The primary narrative of this chapter is that the understanding of being in a philosophical system dictates the nature and results of the philosophical investigations. From the beginning of this chapter, Krapiec has advocated for a philosophical anchor, namely, being. The nature of being reveals a relative identity founded on a relation between two elements: essence and existence. Emphasis on the existential part reveals the basic properties that are convertible and coextensive with being. These transcendental properties reveal the first metaphysical principles guiding the world of persons and things.

Through spontaneous cognition and metaphysical separation Krapiec has painstakingly demonstrated how we can grasp being. The flaws of abstraction, especially its inability to grasp the existence of being, necessitates a rejection and a consequent adoption of a judgment-based cognition characteristic of metaphysical separation. This form of methodology guarantees the realism, objectivity and neutrality of cognition.

The nature of the existence of beings controls the nature of the cognition of being. There is no disconnect between being and cognition. The structure of our cognition aligns with the structure of being. The structure of the existence of beings shows the relational character of beings that are multi-partitioned and are composed of stratified layers. This stratification and 'intermeshing' of composed layers in being is a demonstration of necessary internal relations. This structure of being, known as ontic analogy, defines our world as a pluralistic world, an analogical world.

Since it is being that makes cognition possible the analogical nature of being demands an analogical cognition. Cognition is not logical, instead it is analogical. In the analogical cognition, we affirm, among other sorts of relations, proportional relation between beings. The rationale for these proportional relations can be intrinsic or extrinsic. While the intrinsic cause does not demand for an answer outside of the being itself, the extrinsic cause, which Krapiec refers to as the primary analogate, does. This leads to the cognition of the Absolute, a cognition without which metaphysics as a science would be incomplete.

## Chapter Three: The Discovery of the Nature of Being

### Introduction

In the previous chapter, the emphasis was on the use of metaphysical separation to discover the properties of being. I also emphasized the analogical existence and predication of being in the way M. A. Krąpiec applies it. In this chapter, focus will be on the structural complexity of being and the discovery of the nature of being therein. I will structurally dissect being, as found in the *Metaphysics* of M. A. Krąpiec, to reveal its composite nature and its importance in dealing with some metaphysical problems.

Ordinarily, we do not really need to go into a science laboratory to discover that being is composed of different parts. This data is given to us through experience. On the basest level of prescientific intuition,<sup>486</sup> we experience that our bodies are made up of different parts which perform different functions. When we lose some of these parts tragically, we still find ourselves in a continuity of existence as if we could have even lived without that lost part from the beginning. We also notice something similar in an orange tree or apple tree. When a part of an orange tree is cut off from the stem of the tree, we observe that the separate part is a different being. How do we explain such phenomena, that a being that is essentially one has multiple parts? How do we explain the essential unity of a human being that is composed of many material parts? How do we explain why things come into being and go out of existence? This brings to mind the age-long philosophical question: “why are there things rather than nothing?” Since its inception, philosophers have grappled with the problem of generation, change, identity and persistence. How do things come into being? Why do things change? What is responsible for their change and why do we still cognize continuity through change?

History provides a plethora of answers to this inquisitiveness evoked by wonder which confirms the *sapiential* nature of the human species. For Krąpiec, a look at the structure of being holds answers to these questions. But even more, it plunges the cognizer into a deeper understanding of being than anything else. The structural complexity of being is an initiation of a different angle of cognizing being. What this means is that being is not cognized only through the determination of the object of metaphysics, i.e., being as being. The cognition of being can be made from another angle which he calls particularization (*partykularyzacja*). The

---

<sup>486</sup> Krąpiec says the discovery of the composition of being is attained through pre-scientific intuition and ordinary experience. Cf. *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 195.

particularization could be done in two ways: firstly we can understand it as a kind of division. As a result of this division we have:

- existence as absolute – *esse in se et per se*, which represents the highest point of metaphysical cognition, exemplified in the Absolute, the necessary Being, that exists “in itself and through itself.”<sup>487</sup>
- existence in substance – *esse in se*, material or immaterial beings that have existence as individual substances, exemplified in man, dog, cat, tree.
- existence as an accident – *esse in alio*, non-substantial beings whose mode of existence depends on the individual substances, which are exemplified in the color *blue* as in a blue ball or the property *hot* as in hot water.
- existence as a relation – *esse ad aliud*.<sup>488</sup>

Secondly, particularization could be seen as a natural way of the existence of being. As a result of this we discern the dynamic existence of being, identical existence of being, changeable existence of being and contingent existence of being. In seeking to offer rational explanation that goes beyond ordinary experience and prescientific intuition, we discover different layers of composition as well. In our investigation of the dynamic existence of being and the source of this dynamism, we discover the composition from act and potency. In an effort to understand why being is persistent even through change, we discover the composition of substance and accidents. In our effort to explain the changes on the substantial and accidental levels, we discover the composition of matter and form in being. And finally, when we ask why being is contingent, we discover the composition of essence and existence. Our investigation dwells more on this second aspect of particularization.

At the end of our investigation, we shall discover in Krapiec’s metaphysics that matter and form, act and potency, substance and accidents, and essence and existence are not separate problems. They are all connected with the nature of being. While the transcendentals help us to discover being and the properties that are on par with being, the composition of being helps us to go deeper in our understanding of being and provides us with adequate tools for a proper understanding of being.

---

<sup>487</sup> Maryniarczyk, A. *Discovery of the internal Structure of being*, Notebooks on Metaphysics, Translated by Hugh McDonald, vol. 5 (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2018), 17.

<sup>488</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 309.

### 3.1 Understanding the Fact of Ontic Structural Complexity<sup>489</sup>

There is no doubt that ontic structural complexity is considered by some philosophers to be a cognitive impairment. Mereological nihilists, for instance, claim that our senses deceive us into thinking that objects, which are composed of parts, exist.<sup>490</sup> There are also others who accept the composition of beings but accentuate the importance and priority of parts over the whole and vice versa. In realistic cognition, on the other hand,

we discover that things are not aggregates of particles or accidental component elements, but they form organic wholes, each of which is something more than the sum of its parts. Moreover, the whole of the world or the unity of composite things has a different nature than do the elements from which they are built.<sup>491</sup>

A branch of a tree cannot be said to be greater than the whole tree, neither can we say that a tree is a mereological sum of all the parts that are joined together. This means that beings are organic wholes even though they are made up of parts. It also suggests that each has its own nature and when a part ceases to be a part of the whole, it is considered a different being. In realistic cognition what we seek are internal compositions of being. These internal parts, as Krapiec demonstrates, cannot be dislodged from being as a branch is cut-off from a tree. They are rather explained as correlates which are in a necessary relation and explain the dynamism, identity, mutability and contingency in being. These constitutive elements in question are called “the sub-ontic elements of being.”<sup>492</sup>

As characteristic of Krapiec’s method, we shall consider the concept of composition and method applied in different sciences to determine their adequacy for metaphysical cognition.

#### 3.1.1. Structural Composition in Non-Metaphysical Disciplines

The non-metaphysical explanations reviewed by Krapiec are represented by the physical sciences, the positivists, the phenomenologists and the conceptual abstractionists. The inadequacies in these systems of explanation lead Krapiec to propose the metaphysical explanation as the adequate method of explanation for the constitutive nature of being. Krapiec

---

<sup>489</sup> Important Polish texts of M. A. Krapiec for this chapter include: Krapiec, *Struktura bytu. Charakterystyczne elementy systemu Arystotelesa i Tomasza z Akwinu* (Lublin: TN KUL 1963) [jako Dzieła, t. 5, wyd. 2 (popr.), Lublin: RW KUL 1995]; *Arystoteles koncepcja substancji*. [Aristotelian Conception of Substance], Lublin: TN KUL, 1966; Krapiec, M. A. *Byt i istota. Św. Tomasza “De ente et essentia”* [Being and Essence. St. Thomas’ De ente et essentia]. vol. 11. (KUL, Lublin, 1981). Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1994.

<sup>490</sup> Peter Van Inwagen and Peter Unger hold such claims. Cf. Wasserman, Ryan, “Material Constitution”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/material-constitution/>.

<sup>491</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 11-12.

<sup>492</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 17.

does not intend to give detailed explanation of each of these modes of understanding composition of being. He wants his reader to grasp the basic cognitive elements which these disciplines adhere to.<sup>493</sup>

a. The Physical Interpretation of the Ontic Structural Composition

If the Pre-Socratics explained the material world through elements like earth, water, fire and air etc., the physical sciences today explain the material world to be composed of atoms. Atoms, in turn, are constituted by electrons, protons and neutrons. Modern studies in physics also show that protons and neutrons are made of a more basic element called quark. These elements are often measured through their mass, or electric charge or magnetic power. Hence mathematical calculations are integral to the physical interpretation of reality.

Krapiec sees the inadequacy of the physical interpretation of the composition of being in the following points: firstly, the ‘mathematisation’ of reality is reductionist since “we can see that many aspects of being and its properties are quantitatively immeasurable.”<sup>494</sup> Here Krapiec is proposing that if existence is given to the mathematician or physicist as a data, the physicist cannot effectively measure the existence of a being. Hence, physical and mathematical explanations cannot lead us into the deepest non-quantifiable depth of being. Secondly, if the essence of the physical sciences is mathematical and quantified matter, the language for expressing this result would also be mathematical. How then do we express a particular mode of the existence of being mathematically? For Krapiec, this is practically impossible. He says:

With quantitative language we can express only quantitatively organized matter insofar as it can be apprehended with the help of a corresponding instrument of measurement without any concern about greater distortion (for indeed, there is the problem of the limit of measurement, and this is both from the measuring device and from the quantitative measured matter). If, then, quantitative language expresses such a narrow scope of this knowability of being, and if many elements of being are not apprehended in that language, then on that account it can be excluded from metaphysics, which has the task of apprehending cognitively being as being.<sup>495</sup>

There is no place for mathematical language as employed by the physical sciences in our investigation. Krapiec tries to tell his readers that the language of any science, must have the capacity to apprehend and represent its object of investigation. Since the mathematico-physical method cannot apprehend being as being, it is totally unsuitable for our current operation. Thirdly, Krapiec claims that in the mathematical and physical sciences, the relation between

---

<sup>493</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 196.

<sup>494</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 197.

<sup>495</sup> Ibid, see also, Maryniarczyk, *The Internal Structure of Being*, 32.

parts and wholes could be lumped together. It would be difficult to discern when a part is treated as an independent part or as still a constitutive part of a whole.<sup>496</sup> Fourthly, Krapiec states that the mathematico-physical interpretation can lead to idealism for two reasons: (a) since the instrument of measurement has significant impact on the value of what is apprehended, the identity of what is apprehended and the real world cannot be guaranteed; (b) the attempt to identify the reading from the instrument and the real world would reduce the real world to mere symbols which is the unit given to us by the instruments.<sup>497</sup>

#### b. The Scientific Interpretation of the Ontic Composition of Being

Karl Pearson's book *The Grammar of Science* contains ideas that suggest that metaphysics ought to abandon its methods in favour of scientific method. Pearson writes:

It must not be supposed that science for a moment denies the existence of some of the problems which have hitherto been classed as philosophical or metaphysical. On the contrary, it recognises that a great variety of physical and biological phenomena lead directly to these problems. But it asserts that the methods hitherto applied to these problems have been futile, because they have been unscientific.<sup>498</sup>

Science, for Pearson, covers every realm of human experience and existence. There is nothing that is beyond the scope of science. In fact, everything should be viewed through the binoculars of science to qualify as knowledge.<sup>499</sup> Such conception of science is generally known as scientism. Tomas Burnett in an article writes: "once you accept that science is the only source of human knowledge, you have adopted a philosophical position (scientism) that cannot be verified, or falsified, by science itself. It is, in a word, unscientific."<sup>500</sup> The implication is that scientism is an ideology that claims to have the monopoly of knowledge – what Raymond Tallis refers to as "the *omnicompetence* of science."<sup>501</sup> This ideology of the methodological superiority of science has some consequences for the composition of being.

Krapiec's criticizes Karl Pearson and all who championed the cause of scientism for the following reasons: firstly, because scientism is entangled with positivist and empiricist positions, it cannot escape their monistic flaws whereby the whole of reality is cognized as a single nature. A. Maryniarczyk warns against falling into the traps of monism because it fails

---

<sup>496</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 197.

<sup>497</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 198.

<sup>498</sup> Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, third edition (New York: Dover Publications, 2004), 19.

<sup>499</sup> Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, 12.

<sup>500</sup> Thomas Burnett, "What is Scientism?," *American Association for the Advancement of Science*, accessed April 15, 2020. <https://www.aaas.org/programs/dialogue-science-ethics-and-religion/what-scientism>.

<sup>501</sup> Raymond Tallis, *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides* (New York: Continuum, 2007), xiii.

to give a true picture of the world of persons, animals and things.<sup>502</sup> Falling into such trap means that the philosopher is confined to dogmatism and reductionism. Secondly, because the whole of reality is reduced to one nature, cognition, in turn, is reduced to sensory cognition. The complexity in the structure of being goes beyond the frontiers of sense impression which is found in empiricism.<sup>503</sup>

These reasons disqualify the scientistic conception of composition from being adopted as a suitable metaphysical way of cognizing being.

### c. The Phenomenological attempt to Grasp the Composite Nature of Being

The consideration of the scientistic system of investigating the composition of being has revealed inadequacies that compel Krapiec to seek answers in another, namely, phenomenology. David Smith defines phenomenology as “the study of structures of experience, or consciousness.”<sup>504</sup> These experiences include “perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, desire, and volition to bodily awareness, embodied action, and social activity, including linguistic activity.”<sup>505</sup> An important aspect in the phenomenological method is what Husserl and Brentano refer to as ‘Intentionality.’ Intentionality is a property of consciousness which denotes that experiences are not empty or directionless, they are rather experiences of something.<sup>506</sup>

In his examination of this method, Krapiec chose to analyse an article of Roman Ingarden, whom he describes as “the most famous contemporary representative” of the method.<sup>507</sup> The article in question was “the Aims of phenomenologists.” The following are the basic tenets of this method:

- Phenomenology focuses on an analysis of what is given in immediate experience;
- ‘experience’ extends both to “individual facts and immediate a priori cognition;”
- immediate a priori cognition is the most important aspect of this ‘experience;’
- through the application of *epoche* the real object is bracketed.

---

<sup>502</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Monistic and Dualistic Interpretation of Reality*, 69-70.

<sup>503</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 199.

<sup>504</sup> Smith, David Woodruff, "Phenomenology", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/phenomenology/>>.

<sup>505</sup> Ibid.

<sup>506</sup> Smith, *ibid.* See also Siewert, Charles, "Consciousness and Intentionality", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/consciousness-intentionality/>>.

<sup>507</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 199.



Krapiec carefully brings to limelight the flaws of the phenomenological conception of beings complexity: firstly, there is a discrepancy on the understanding of what is given in experience. In realistic cognition, we cognize beings through our experience, whereas in phenomenology there is a separation between intentionality and the real world. Secondly, even though it begins from data given in experience, phenomenology side-lines spontaneous cognition which highlights the realness of being, focusing instead on the reflective analysis of cognition which are later stages of the cognitive act. Therefore, the priority of the *a priori* is a misplaced priority, for what is given first in experience is ‘realness’ not cognitive states which the phenomenologist emphasizes. The realization of the cognizer as a self-conscious cognizing agent comes to light only in the act of reflecting on cognition itself. Based on these points, Krapiec claims that phenomenology is no different from Cartesianism, for it is all about the agent of cognition as against the reality of being.<sup>508</sup>

The second reason for the rejection of this method is its proximity to Plato’s *a priorism*. The indubitable foundation of knowledge for Plato was in the world of ideas. Such a world would not only be accessible through pure intuition that is abstractive in nature. Phenomenology falls into such idealism in Krapiec’s view because it takes up these experiential data and analyse them as independent beings whereas the constitutive elements of being which we seek to study are not independent beings by themselves.

#### d. Understanding Composition through Abstraction

The flaws of the phenomenological method leave a lacuna as we continue to investigate the proper understanding of the composite nature of being. Conceptual abstractionism refers to the process of arriving at concepts through the method of abstraction. Maryniarczyk explains the method thus:

Abstractionism states that every act of knowing a concrete object or an element of such an object can be performed in the framework of a constructed abstract concept. Thus, all known objects and the elements of those objects have the status of abstractions. According to this interpretation, in order to know the concrete John, we must construct the abstraction “man.” In order to know the concrete apple tree, we construct the abstraction “tree.” In order to know a concrete compositional element of being, e.g., form, matter, essence, existence, soul, or body, we must construct an abstraction corresponding to those elements. For indeed, the whole of intellectual cognition is expressed in conceptual, i.e. abstract, cognition.<sup>509</sup>

---

<sup>508</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 202-203.

<sup>509</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 38.

Krapiec holds that it would be wrong to presuppose that every act of the intellect would end in conceptualization. There are moments in intellectual cognition that do not end in conceptualization, particularly the moment of spontaneous cognition, which uses judgment to affirm the existence of a being. Also, if existence cannot be conceptualized, the sub-ontic elements of being would be beyond the scope of the abstractionists since these elements are not mere concepts but real ontic states.

The rejection of the conceptualists seem to pose some problems, namely, how can we express our thoughts or communicate the results of our metaphysical investigations without concepts? Krapiec argues that the problem is not simply about using concepts. Concepts are obviously indispensable for every science. The problem is the conceptualization of metaphysics such that the aim of metaphysical cognition is simply the formation of concepts.<sup>510</sup> Secondly, there would hardly be any place for existence since “no one has ever formed an actual concept of existence.”<sup>511</sup> Existence, thus, would be non-existent. Krapiec states:

That which is not in conceptual cognition or that whose concept cannot be constructed, does not exist at all. Also in this light we can and must preclude many controversial questions, e.g., whether there is a difference between essence and existence in being, as pseudo-problems, since no one ever constructed a proper concept of existence. Thus there is no existence at all as some sort of “thing different” from essence.<sup>512</sup>

The consequence of the abstractionist position is a total nullification of the foundation of metaphysics itself. If existence is the foundation on which Krapiec’s metaphysical realism rests upon, then any system that attacks the fact of existence, attacks the whole of metaphysics. Since we cannot conceptualize existence, abstractionism is unlikely to give an adequate understanding of the fact of composition in realistic metaphysics. Secondly, abstractionism creates a divide between the real world and concepts which explain reality. There is no connection between the real world and the world of abstracted concepts. Thirdly the operations of the intellect cannot be reduced to conceptualization. Judgment is another kind of operation of the intellect which involves the affirmation of the existence of being; predicative judgment which is connected with truth is also another operation. Conceptualization would therefore imply the abrogation of judgment-based cognition on the one hand and of the truth of being on the other.<sup>513</sup>

---

<sup>510</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 205.

<sup>511</sup> *Ibid*, 205.

<sup>512</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 39.

<sup>513</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 205-206.

### 3.1.2 The Metaphysical Path towards the Discovery of the Constitutive Nature of Being

As we have done in the preceding methods and system under consideration, we shall re-iterate the basic features of metaphysical cognition as stated by Krapiec and consider its adequacy for cognizing the constitutive elements in being and the relation existing between them.

The basis for deciding what is real is the fact of existence. This fact is not conceptualized but affirmed. Metaphysical cognition proceeds from this point of departure by affirming the existence of being. Contrary to the preceding systems that emphasize consciousness, or concepts or the subject of consciousness, metaphysical cognition emphasizes being. To escape the flaws of the preceding considerations and achieve objectivity in cognition, the fact of existence is apprehended spontaneously, untainted by the intrusion of the cognizing subject and focused on the fact given in immediate experience. Through this method we are able to affirm the following:

- a. The specificity of the understanding of the composition of being. Composition of being in realistic metaphysics refers to those “elements (factors) without which a being would not exist at all. Also without those elements, a being could not properly act, be actualized, or be perfected.”<sup>514</sup> Krapiec refers to them as “the real non-contradictable reasons for ontic pluralism.”<sup>515</sup> In the case of a human being, this is not about hands or legs or parts of the body. Instead we have substantial and accidental features, essential and existential factors, material and formal aspects etc. These are the sub-ontic elements and metaphysical principles which govern being.
- b. Just as the existence of a being is a fact<sup>516</sup> so is the constitutive nature of being a fact. The cognition of both the fact of existence and the fact of the composition of being occur in spontaneous cognition. These elements that constitute the fact of a being are necessary, non-contradictable, and non-independent. They are necessary because a being cannot exist without them. A human being, for instance, cannot exist without its formal element, the soul.<sup>517</sup> The denial of this formal element in man is equal to the denial of the entire being. The elements are non-contradictable. This means that they are in line with the principles of non-contradiction. Their source cannot be traced to non-being even if the ultimate reason

---

<sup>514</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 39-40.

<sup>515</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 207.

<sup>516</sup> Krapiec warns against understanding fact as the phenomenologists do. To affirm a fact in realistic context occurs when one affirms any of these ontic elements (like matter and form) or states (ontic plurality) or processes (ontic mutability). Facts are discerned in objective and neutral manner. cf. *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 207-208.

<sup>517</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 208; Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 40.

for the individual being is located outside the being itself.<sup>518</sup> The elements are non-independent because they do not exist on their own in isolation from the being. In realistic cognition, the treatment of essence and existence or matter and form as ‘beings’ presupposes their non-independence. In cognition, these elements are presented to us as if they are autonomous beings existing on their own. In Krapiec words they are presented in “ontic language,” in a “reified” manner,<sup>519</sup> whereas in the real sense they are obviously parts of being and not being themselves for they cannot exist apart from being.

- c. The elements that are discussed as part of being should be understood analogically. About this Krapiec says:

[...] the acquired cognitive results will bear names such as those we use in the case of universal and univocal concepts, e.g., “matter,” “form,” “essence,” “nature,” “person,” “substance,” and “accident.” However, all the names that occur in metaphysics have analogical meanings, and so they are connected with the concept of being and are judgements in our cognition rather than univocal concepts. They “indicate” each concrete thing in which its content – universally named, e.g., “form” – is realized in an analogical, that is, unique and unrepeatable, way; for in reality, “form” is one and unrepeatable, although it performs proportionally the same function in different beings.<sup>520</sup>

The above quotation is to re-emphasize what we have already discussed in the previous chapter. All concepts in realistic cognition are analogical for Krapiec.

- d. Through metaphysical cognition in relation to the structure of being, we discover the concept of real difference and conceptual difference.<sup>521</sup> Krapiec defines the concept of difference as “a negation of identity between anything whatsoever.”<sup>522</sup> Difference can be real or conceptual. A conceptual difference refers to the definitional distinctness found in concepts which are produced through our sensitive-intellective processes. Conceptual difference can be two kinds: it can either be cognitive or creative. It is cognitive when its origin is a really existing thing; it is creative when it is not ‘thing-inspired.’ A real difference, on the other hand, obtains “when one being is not another.”<sup>523</sup> This occurs when there is a variance between a thing and its negation (being and non-being) or a variance between two things (act and potency), or a variance of a thing in its different accidental modes of existence (a bottle lying on the table and a bottle sitting on a table). The constitutive elements or the sub-ontic elements are considered ‘things’ in the realistic

<sup>518</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 208.

<sup>519</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 210.

<sup>520</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 41.

<sup>521</sup> Krapiec defines difference as “a negation of identity between anything whatsoever.” Cf. Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 211.

<sup>522</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 211.

<sup>523</sup> Ibid, 213.

cognition. Essence and existence are two things in this sense, hence there is a real distinction between them.

This distinction is important for Krąpiec because of the tendency of some philosophers to consider difference only on the conceptual level, boycotting the real being which is the basis for such difference. In realistic cognition, we emphasize that there is no identity between the sub-ontic elements that make up being.

### *3.1.3 The Metaphysical Method for the discovery of the Constitutive Nature of Being*

Here, M. A. Krąpiec shows the uniqueness of the metaphysical method vis-à-vis physical, the scientific or phenomenological methods. The uniqueness of the separation-based cognition in Mieczysław Krąpiec's philosophy consist in our application of metaphysical separation to the discovery and demonstration of the various features that occur in being from a metaphysical perspective. Just as we applied metaphysical separation to the discovery of the transcendental properties of being, we can apply similar method in the discovery of the constitutive nature of being, to the mutability of being, to the analogical existence of being and the causal state of being. Andrzej Maryniarczyk has done an enormous work in building up this method and this work follows suit.<sup>524</sup>

As characteristic of the separation-based cognition, the discovery of the constitutive mode of being follows three stages:

Stage I. Every step in metaphysical cognition must proceed from the affirmation of the existing thing. As already said we can only guarantee the objectivity and realism of our cognition when we proceed from the existing thing. The *indubitandum* of metaphysical cognition distinguishes itself from the Cartesian model by its fidelity to being, not to the subject of cognition. Therefore, depending on the state or mode of being we would like to emphasize (for instance, the dynamism, mutability of being, identity, or the contingency of being, we can commence thus: This John exists as acting, this John exists and acts; this Eve exists as acting, this Eve exists and acts; this apple tree exists, this apple tree exists and changes.<sup>525</sup>

There seems to be a difference in this first stage in comparison to what we have in the discovery of the transcendentals. Here we affirm the existence of a being as well as the mode of the

---

<sup>524</sup> Ibid, 43-44; 70-71.

<sup>525</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 43.

existence of that being. The function of the mode is to reveal a phenomena or a specific character or property which the existing being exhibits or possesses.

Stage II: in the second stage, we have separation in the proper sense of the word. We separate the subject from the mode of existence and affirm the non-identity between them. Hence: Eve and Eve's acts are not the same; the apple tree and its actions are not the same, etc. The propensity of John or Eve or the apple tree to act in certain ways confirm potential elements in John/Eve/Apple tree. It follows that while John/Eve/the apple tree is in act, it has the potency to act in certain ways or be acted upon.

Stage III: The third stage is characterized by an analogical extension of our discovery to the whole of reality, proceeding from "this John," "this Eve," and "this apple tree" to all existing things. Hence we conclude that all existing beings are composed of act and potency. The demonstration above introduces us to the first particular of the constitutive elements: act and potency.

### *3.2 The Activity and the Dynamic Nature of Beings*

The cognition of the composite nature of being, particularly of act and potency, is aided a great deal by our comprehension of the terms 'activity' and 'dynamism' as they relate to being of beings. If to be in act refers in part to what has been already expressed as 'existing,' what is the dynamism of being? Charles Dubray describes dynamism as

a general name for a group of philosophical views concerning the nature of matter. However different they may be in other respects, all these views agree in making matter consist essentially of simple and indivisible units, substances, or forces. Dynamism is sometimes used to denote systems that admit not only matter and extension, but also determinations, tendencies, and forces intrinsic and essential to matter. More properly, however, it means exclusive systems that do away with the dualism of matter and force by reducing the former to the latter.<sup>526</sup>

Dubray's description from the general point of view places dynamism as a property of matter. It means that matter is responsible for the being of things. A second meaning alludes that it is rather force that is the principle of things. For Maryniarczyk, in its earliest usage, dynamism was related to 'force' and 'power' which are found in places like the mountains or rivers or in objects, human beings, in plants and in some actions of human beings that are related to healing practices.<sup>527</sup> On its philosophical usage, Krapiec traces it back to Greek mythologists whose influence possibly inspired the Ionians search for the *arche* in matter. This discussion is

---

<sup>526</sup> Charles Dubray, "Dynamism." *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. Vol. 5. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909.

<sup>527</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 47.

ultimately linked with the discovery of act and potency as the first correlates in the composition of being to be investigated.

### **3.2.1 Act and Potency: The search for the source of the dynamism of being**

The first set of correlates which M. A. Krapiec presents in the structure of being is act and potency. Act, because it is the very basic status of every existing thing; potency, because it is engraved in the nature of being to be dynamic. In our everyday experience, we see seeds sprout and develop from a two-leaf plant into an uncountable-leaf giant tree. Yet it is still the same. How do we explain the continuum from seed to plant and to tree? We see a child that is born today grow before our eyes into a full-blown man or woman. Was the full-blown man or woman in the child from the outset? How do we explain the capacity to develop from a small thing to a big one in a rational philosophical way? The pre-Socratic philosophers were not simply concerned about the element from which the whole of existing things emerged, they also sought to render an explanation on the dynamism of the world in relation to their identity. Since then, various attempts have been made offer rational justification for the phenomena of change and identity through change. Both philosophical, scientific and logical explanations have been offered. However, we shall briefly explain few of these positions. Krapiec identified three sets of systems in philosophy that offered such justifications: the extreme evolutionary systems, the extreme static systems and the centrist conciliatory/revolutionary systems.

#### **A. The Extreme Evolutionary Systems**

The basic characteristic of this system is that it acknowledges matter to be the primordial element responsible from which everything comes from. The material responsible for the being of things is also responsible for the change in things. Secondly, the nature of matter in this system is characterized by extreme potentiality. Here, matter is always in motion such that motion is the identity of being. The various interpretations that fall within this system are:<sup>528</sup>

1. The hylozoistic interpretation: we already explained the hylozoists in the first chapter of this work. From *hyle* which means matter, these philosophers sought the answer for dynamism in matter. Matter is the material element from which all things emerge and the reason for the changeable nature of things. Explaining the basic tenets of this interpretation, Krapiec says:

---

<sup>528</sup> It should be noted that most of these divisions are inspired by Aristotle. See also, Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of being*, 52-58.

[Those philosophers] held that the archaic principle that explained everything ontically was “something” potential, some form of potential matter that by way of evolution or by way of radical change passes into all things, that therefore the deep reality in itself is a radically potential element that as it passes into everything becomes everything.<sup>529</sup>

This means that matter is everything and everything is matter. Since matter in the way it is understood here is pure potentiality, it follows that everything is in potency. There is no actuality. Nothing really is. Thales, Anaximander, Diogenes and Anaxagoras fall within this group.

2. The Atomistic interpretation: Leucippus and Democritus were known as atomist. Change in their view was consequent upon the motion of atoms which were constantly moving.
3. The absolute dynamic interpretation: absolute or extreme dynamism is seen in the philosophy of Heraclitus. In saying that “everything flows and nothing endures,” Heraclitus identified being with dynamism. Hence to be, is to be changeable. According to Maryniarczyk, such interpretation connotes the priority of change over being. Hence “change is the essence and principle of being. Change is outside of the concrete being, and precedes it as it were.”<sup>530</sup> Absolute dynamism would make cognition impossible since the being changes so much that it lacks identity.

#### B. The Extreme Static Systems:

If the extremely evolutionary system is characterized by a never-ending, absolute potency, the extreme static system is characterized by a rigidity against dynamism, total and absolute denial of change and a radical characterization of change as ‘unreal.’ This position Krapiec refers to as immobilism.<sup>531</sup> This is some sort of cognitive defect whereby the cognizer separates the act of the sense and the act of the intellect in cognition, upholds that of the intellect as genuine and real cognition while rejecting the act of the senses as unreal. This is interesting for Krapiec because we have to recall at this stage the importance of the *vis cogitativa* in cognition. The *vis cogitativa* ensures the inseparable bond of the senses and the intellect in the act of cognition. Even though we can detect what each of these faculties contribute, we cannot separate them in the act of cognition. The extremely static systems fail in this regard.

---

<sup>529</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of being*, 52.

<sup>530</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of being*, 54.

<sup>531</sup> Krapiec refers to it as immobilism. But since it is a defect in the interpretation in the mode of existence or cognition of being, it could be called cognitive or ontological immobilism. See *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 220 - 221.



The first philosopher who falls into this category is Parmenides. Parmenides sees dynamism as something connected with the senses. His view is that what is real is in the intellect, where real things remain unchanging, where being is real. Hence his famous statement: Being is. The consequences of this statement for Krapiec is significant. It means that

...the only reality is unchangeable being-unity. And what is being? It is that which is. This “formal” Parmenidian definition, if can be so designated, is applicable to this day in ontology. Being, therefore, as understood by Parmenides, is the inner content of all that is. Beyond being there is nothing. Being is neither generated nor destroyed; it merely is. It is unchangeable and identical with itself. It is the one and only universal reality. It neither arises nor perishes. It has no inner structure. It is simple, non-composite, homogeneous, the same throughout, since everything has the same ontic definition. Being is the one, being-unity, everything is being identical with itself.<sup>532</sup>

The summary of the above long citation is that the simplicity of being rules out any chance or possibility of conceiving any composition within being. We cannot have constitutive elements in being since being is simple. Being cannot also change because the only option left is non-being. If change must occur, it would be from being to non-being or from non-being to being. Such a situation is inconceivable for Parmenides. In the light of this some philosophers feel Parmenides fell into the trap of static monism.

This had great influence on Plato. All the qualities of being enumerated by Parmenides were vested on the Idea in Plato’s system.<sup>533</sup> We also see the division of the senses and the intellect in cognition in the philosophy of Plato. While the world of ideas is known for its realness and reach by the intellect, the sensible world is characterized by change and its reach by the senses.

Krapiec rejects both extreme evolutionary and extreme static systems because of their monistic view and one-sidedness in cognition.

### C. The Centrist Conciliatory/Revolutionary Systems

These are middle-stance positions on the change and permanence debate and the source of dynamism. The two major philosophers in this trend are Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

#### i. The Hylemorphic Interpretation:

On Aristotle’s conciliatory stance, M. A. Krapiec wrote: “Aristotle, synthesizing extreme mobilism with extreme immobilism through the theory of act and potency, provided the basis for a real as well as a rational explanation of reality.”<sup>534</sup> The first realistic stance, in Krapiec’s

---

<sup>532</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 220.

<sup>533</sup> Ibid, 221.

<sup>534</sup> Ibid, 222.

view was spear-headed by Aristotle. The hylemorphic interpretation admits that dynamism is real and an inherent property of being. The source of this dynamism is located in being itself, which is complex by nature. The relation and the interaction of these various elements in the complex structure of being explains the dynamism of being. This is seen in the theory of act and potency.

ii. The existential interpretation: The existential interpretation is a brain child of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas tried to fill in some blank spaces for Aristotle, who did not see existence as a problem in his time due to the nature of matter which was thought to be eternal. For Aquinas, the source of dynamism and change is the act of existence. The act of existence “organizes, actualizes, and dynamizes being. The act of existence of each being is the internal reason for the dynamism of being. This position is indeed revolutionary because it gave an entirely new interpretation to the discussion on being.

Among these different stances on the nature and source of dynamism, M. A. Krapiec demonstrates that the Aristotelian centrist approach and Thomas’ revolutionary existential approach are key to adequately understand being in its structural complexity and different manifestations.

### *3.2.2 Explaining Dynamism and Change through Act and Potency*

The theory of act and potency originated from the ingenuity of Aristotle. Hence the explanation Krapiec gives are from Aristotle’s works. A rundown of the meaning of these terms are vital for their application to realistic cognition.

#### *3.2.2.1 Act*

Chung-Hwan Chen<sup>535</sup> systematized the concept of act in Aristotle’s metaphysics. He explains several senses of act in Aristotle. The first is act understood as actuality. This signifies a thing as it actually exists.<sup>536</sup> The second is act in the sense of being actualized or perfected.<sup>537</sup> The third is act as it refers to form (εἶδος) instantiated in the relationship between soul and body.

---

<sup>535</sup> Chung-Hwan Chen, “Different Meanings of the Term *Energeia* in the Philosophy of Aristotle.” In *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1956), 56-65.

<sup>536</sup> *Met* 1048<sup>a</sup>30-32: “Actuality means the existence of the thing, not in the way which we express by ‘potentially’; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out...”

<sup>537</sup> *Met* 1049<sup>b</sup>25: “For from the potential the actual is always produced by an actual thing, e.g. man by man, musician by musician; there is always a first mover, and the mover already exists actually. We have said in our account of substance that everything that is produced is something produced from something and by something...”

And fourthly, act as actualization. This differs from the other senses because it refers to what a being can potentially be. A log of wood exists (first sense) as a log of wood but has the potential to be a table. This sense of act is found in Aristotle's definition of motion.<sup>538</sup> The further senses of act in Aristotle include, act as it applies to the act of sensation (characterized by an ability to receive sense impressions, called suffering, and the actualization of such potential by external existing things proper to this faculty).<sup>539</sup> Similar to sensation is intellectual knowledge (which comes about through a faculty in potency that is actualized by an external object proper to it)<sup>540</sup>, the act of contemplation by the intellect,<sup>541</sup> and Pure Act.<sup>542</sup>

Although lacking textual evidence, Krapiec also captured these meanings of act in Aristotle. But first, he emphasizes that *definition* is insufficient to capture the very nitty gritty of concepts like act and potency. We can understand such terms more through some sort of quasi-induction, which consists of citing particular examples.<sup>543</sup> Typical examples are the statue of Hermes and the building of a house. Since we cannot capture the concept through definitions, the following points should be noted:

- From an etymological perspective, act corresponds to *energeia* or *entelecheia*.<sup>544</sup>
- Act is any activity which “brings about a work that is in any way aimed at.”<sup>545</sup> (1050a22-23). This applies both to activities in nature as well as human operations.
- The term act applies to that which is completed or perfected.<sup>546</sup>

<sup>538</sup> *Met* 1065<sup>b</sup>16: “I call the actuality of the potential as such, movement.” *Phy* 201a28-29: “It is the fulfilment of what is potential when it is already fulfilled and operates not as itself but as movable, that is motion.”

<sup>539</sup> *DA* 418<sup>a</sup>3-4: “...what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually.”

<sup>540</sup> *Met* 1048<sup>b</sup>33-34: “it is a different thing that is being moved and that has been moved, and that is moving and that has moved; but it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinking and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement.”

<sup>541</sup> *EN* 1177<sup>b</sup>18-20: “but the activity of intellect, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in worth and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself.”

<sup>542</sup> *DA* 430<sup>a</sup>18: “Thought in this sense is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essential nature activity.”

<sup>543</sup> “Our meaning can be seen in the particular cases by induction, and we must not seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the analogy.” Aristotle, *Met* 1048<sup>a</sup>35.

<sup>544</sup> Two texts where Aristotle distinguishes act from potency are *Met* 1017<sup>a</sup>30 – b<sup>9</sup> and *Met* 1048<sup>a</sup>31 – b<sup>6</sup>. While in *Met* V he uses *entelecheia* in *Met* IX he uses *energeia*. Mark Senteny argues that some authors have defended that Aristotle used these terms interchangeably. See the similarities between *Met* XI, 9 and *Phy* III, 1 for the definition of movement. See also *Met* 1047<sup>a</sup>30 and *Phys* 202<sup>a</sup>2-4. Cf. Mark Senteny: *Aristotle: Movement and the Structure of Being*, 219-220; G.A. Blair, *Energeia and Entelecheia: ‘Act’ in Aristotle* (Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1992). Krapiec shows this interchangeability when he writes: “In all these cases, the meaning of act (*energeia-entelecheia*) is, at the same time, connected with the meaning of the end-aim. *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 224. See also, Krapiec, “Entelécheia,” w *Powszechna Encyclopedia Filozofii*, 3 (2002), 171-172. JiYuan Yu shows an exception to this stance by citing G. Blair who interprets *energeia* as internal activity and *entelecheia* as something “having its end within it” cf. *The Structure of Being*, 15.

<sup>545</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 224.

<sup>546</sup> *Ibid*, 222.

- In relation to potency, act is its realization. It is that which potency moves towards.<sup>547</sup>
- In differentiation from potency act is “the existence of the thing, (but) not in the way which we express by ‘potentially’”<sup>548</sup>
- In relation of the movement of a potential being to actuality, act is conceived as the perfection of potency.
- The possibility of this movement from potency to act is founded on the ordination of act and potency.
- The discernment of act is made evident through motion. Hence the primary understanding of act refers to motion even though motion is not the same as act.<sup>549</sup>
- This primary understanding of act as motion does not exclude non-movable things and unchangeable beings from beings-in-act, neither does it relegate them to the category of non-being.
- Act is a certain mode of existence of a being, it is a state of being differentiated from potency. In fact Aristotle argues that *energeia* is the thing itself, it is substance.<sup>550</sup>
- The various meanings or understandings of act reveal the analogical character of *act*. Act cannot be understood univocally but analogically. The reason for the analogical existence and understanding of act lies in its instantiation in concrete beings. Hence there are as many acts as many beings and there are as many acts as many potency.<sup>551</sup>
- Summarily the term act extends to the following: “to *activity* (in matter) that aims at the production of a new being; to *immanent activity* that does not produce a new product-work beyond itself; to life itself, which is the aim of vital processes; and to the ultimate end of the whole universe, Pure Act, which as such is completely immutable.”<sup>552</sup>

It is worth noting that Krapiec does not engage in semantic arguments whether act (*Energeia*) should be understood as actuality or activity, or whether *entelecheia* should be understood as completeness or being in its end. He also did not discuss if *energeia* and *entelecheia* are used

---

<sup>547</sup> Ibid, 223-224.

<sup>548</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 1048<sup>a</sup>30-31; Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 223.

<sup>549</sup> Aristotle defines motion in connection with *energeia/entelekheia*. He writes: “the fulfilment of what is potentially, as such, is motion.” (*Phy* 201<sup>a</sup>11; *Met* 1065<sup>b</sup>17). Krapiec’s primary concern was to debunk the claim that act is identical with motion. He notes that act and motion are not identical however we come to terms with the idea of act “against the background of an intuition of motion.” *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 222.

<sup>550</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 1049<sup>b</sup>3-1051<sup>a</sup>1.

<sup>551</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 224.

<sup>552</sup> Ibid.

interchangeably or not. It suffices to capture the basic meanings of these terms for metaphysical cognition.

### 3.2.2.2 Potency

Some philosophers have interpreted Potency (*dunamis*) in the sense of *possibility*. Mark Sentesy, for instance, shows that Menn avers that the minimal meaning of *dunamis*, *possibility*, takes precedence over *dunamis* understood as potency or potentiality.<sup>553</sup> Krapiec would warn even more vehemently against understand *dunamis* as *logical possibility* since potency refers to being in the real order. Following Aristotle's statement that potency is not definable as such, I will enumerate basic characteristics of this correlate of act in accordance with Krapiec's understanding of the term. The point of departure is the most significant sense of the word potency in Aristotle:

- "all potentialities that conform to the same type are starting points, and are called potentialities in reference to one primary kind, which is a starting point of change in another thing or in the thing itself *qua* another."<sup>554</sup> Here potency means *capacity* not *possibility*. It is a capacity to initiate and make change happen.
- in realistic metaphysics, potency must be distinguished from potencies in logic. It must be distinguished from logical possibility and impossibility which are connected with necessarily true or false propositions. These belong to conceptual and intentional beings and not the concern of metaphysical being.
- Potency should be seen not in opposition to act, but rather as a co-relate of act.<sup>555</sup>
- In relation to act, the cognoscibility of potency depends on the cognoscibility of act. It is only in the light of act that we can understand potency. This implies that potency is not an independent element in being.
- Potency, like act is connected with motion. It is not possible to explain motion without knowledge of potency. As act is discernible through the process of change, so is potency.

---

<sup>553</sup> Stephen Menn, "The Origins of Aristotle's Concept of 'Ενέργεια: 'Ενέργεια and Δύναμις" *Ancient Philosophy* 14 (1994), 73-114 in Mark Sentesy, "On the many senses of Potency according to Aristotle." [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330910779\\_On\\_The\\_Many\\_Senses\\_of\\_Potency\\_According\\_to\\_Aristotle](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330910779_On_The_Many_Senses_of_Potency_According_to_Aristotle)

<sup>554</sup> *Met* 1046<sup>a</sup>9-11.

<sup>555</sup> The faulty interpretation of act and potency to be in opposition in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* has been treated extensively by Mark Sentesy in his article "Are Potency and Actuality Compatible in Aristotle?" *Epoche* 22, no. 2 (2018).

- If change is defined as the assimilation of new forms by a subject, potency within the process of motion, is identified as the disposition in a subject to assimilate or acquire such form.
- As disposition in a subject to acquire new form, potency is considered to be the source or principle of motion.<sup>556</sup>

Summarily potency is understood as disposition, as the bases of change, and the subject of motion.<sup>557</sup>

Krapiec identifies two types of potency in accordance with Aristotle's metaphysics: active and passive potency.

- Active potency: According to Aristotle, active potency is fundamentally understood as: "the source of change in another being, and even in the same being but as another."<sup>558</sup> This means that "it is the source of motion." This means that within being there is a distinction between the parts that are movers and the parts that are moved. Examples of active potency include: A doctor who has the capacity to heal a patient.
- Passive potency: this is described as "that which in the thing being acted upon is the principle of being changed by another as another (*principium patiendi ab alio*)."<sup>559</sup> If the active potency is the subject that changes, passive potency is the subject that is the recipient of change. eg. a sick patient is receptive to the activity of the doctor.

Krapiec breaks down this definition by analysing two important words: *Principium* and *Patiendi*. Passive potency as principle is characterized by two elements: (a) a lack of act; (b) a disposition toward the act that is to be realized.

- As a lack of act, potency is yet-to-be. It is not yet. In relation to being, it is non-being. A seed has the potency to grow into a tree. But in relation to the tree, it is non-being. It is non-being because there is a lack. This lack however does not mean that potency is nothing. It is something real. Its reality is deeply connected with the act of the being in which it inheres.
- The second element is that there is an ordination and disposition towards act. Every potency moves in a direction towards an act. There is an ordination towards act because if it were not the case, a potency cannot be actualized. Krapiec refers to this

---

<sup>556</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 225.

<sup>557</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Internal Structure of Being*, 63.

<sup>558</sup> *Met* 1046<sup>a</sup>10-11.

<sup>559</sup> *Met* 1046<sup>a</sup>11-13.

phenomenon as “disposition of act.” Wood, for instance, has the disposition to become a table when a carpenter imposes the form of a table on it. Such disposition cannot be said of air. However prior to its assemblage as table, Krapiec explains that such disposition is latent in the wood.

*Patiendi* on the other hand, means “being changed” or “undergoing change” internally. This change results in a new form as a new element comes into act. “being changed” is passive and suggests that the subject is being acted upon. The source of this action is external to the subject. Krapiec affirms that this is in line with the Aristotelian maxim: “*omne quod movetur ab alio movetur.*”<sup>560</sup> The effect of this action from outside leads the subject to: (i) attain perfection (ii) acquire a better form and (iii) to lose its former form in line with the maxim *corruptio unius fit generatio alterius*.

Further points on active and passive potency are thematised thus:

1. Active potency is the subject which changes while passive potency is the subject that is changed. This follows from the definition of active potency as “the source of change in another being” and passive potency as “the principle of being changed in another.”<sup>561</sup>
2. Passive potency undergoes change through active potency even though active potency could be acted upon by an external agent.
3. When active potency is acted upon by an external agent, it is passive potency in relation to the external agent.

### 3.2.3 Arguments for the Composition of Being through Act and Potency

Justification is an integral part of realistic philosophy and as such Krapiec, following Aristotle, tries to justify and argue for the composition of being through the correlates, act and potency. He presents three arguments by Aristotle in this regard: the first is the analysis of motion, the second is the analysis of the principle of non-contradiction and the third is Aristotle’s criticism against the Megarians. Krapiec argues that logically the analysis of the principle of contradiction comes first, however since motion is given to us in experience, its consideration would precede the logical.<sup>562</sup> Here again we see the priority of the metaphysical over the logical.

---

<sup>560</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 229.

<sup>561</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 226-227.

<sup>562</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 231.

### 3.2.3.1 Justification of Ontic Composition through an Analysis of Motion<sup>563</sup>

In our daily experiences we observe the birth of a child or an animal, we also observe the death of humans or animals young and old alike; cities have disappeared and new ones built upon them; we have witnessed the change of seasons -the heat in the summer, the shredding of leaves in the autumn, the cold in the winter, the rebirth and warmth in the spring. All these are evidence of the fact of motion. We experience motion in the most common phenomena in our daily existence. This makes Krapiec refer to motion as “the most basic and obvious phenomenon in the world,”<sup>564</sup> a phenomenon that extends to every existing contingent being.<sup>565</sup> It is a phenomenon observable in all facets of human existence: in science, technology, nature, art etc. For Aristotle, motion is the actuality (*entelecheia*) of a potentiality as such.<sup>566</sup> To talk of motion means to talk of change and becoming. Oliva Blanchette helps us to understand clearly the concept of change and becoming. The Greeks understood becoming from a positive perspective as *genesthai* which means “going forth from one thing to another...without ceasing to look back on what was negated.”<sup>567</sup> When we reverse this positive view of becoming we have a negative view of “ceasing to be.” Change, in relation to both positive and negative views of becoming is “either coming to be or ceasing to be or both simultaneously.”<sup>568</sup> He argues that if becoming is understood as proceeding (from the positive understanding) or receding (from the negative understanding), then change is “a kind of *ceding* either way or a *con-ceding* that may be viewed positively in terms of what comes to be or negatively in terms of what ceases to be. In this sense every coming to be of something is at the same time a ceasing to be of something else.”<sup>569</sup> If a kettle of water is on the fire a process of becoming is initiated. From a positive understanding it proceeds from being cold to being hot, it gains a new quality of hotness; from a negative perspective however, it loses its coldness. Change has occurred in either of these instances either when considered separately or simultaneously. Krapiec’s view

---

<sup>563</sup> See Krapiec, “Akt i możność” [Act and Potency], w *Powszechna Encyclopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 1 (2000), 145-150.

<sup>564</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 231.

<sup>565</sup> Krapiec, “Ruch” [Motion], w *Powszechna Encyclopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 8 (2007), 841-842.

<sup>566</sup> Aristotle, *Phy* 201<sup>a</sup>10-11, 201<sup>a</sup>27-29, 201<sup>b</sup>4-5. *Met* Book VII.

<sup>567</sup> Oliva Blanchette, *Philosophy of Being. A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003). 251.

<sup>568</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>569</sup> *Ibid.* 252.



would not differ essentially from Oliva Blanchette's. For Krapiec change would mean the acquisition of a state or quality that was previously lacking in a being. He writes:

[...] that which changes, that which is in motion in some aspect, already possesses within it something from the term of its change. For indeed, that which is in the course of change and of motion is partially found in the stage of acquiring the term of its motion, and it is partially found in the stage of leaving its starting point. Therefore in a being that is undergoing change there is already something from the term, at least by the fact that it is demarcated univocally by co-elements of the subject at which the change aims. For as long as change occurs, the being has not left its previous stage in which the new stage is "lacking;" the rejection of the previous stage is equivalent to the acquisition of the new stage or "new" mode of being. This all means that by change a being acquires something from the term at which it aims.<sup>570</sup>

What this implies is that if we are to account for why it is possible for a substance or subject to lose a quality or gain a quality, we cannot look for answers outside of the being, as Aristotle says: "...there is no movement apart from things; for change is always according to the categories of being."<sup>571</sup> The newly acquired property is within being and is only possible because in the being that is changing there is a disposition for that change to occur. Using the building of a house as an example when the materials for building are assembled, the final form of the house is still lacking. But when the act of building is imposed on the materials, they attain a new form and the house is completed. This example leads Krapiec to conclude, following Aristotle, that there are three elements that make motion possible and intelligible: (a) an imperfect initial act, (b) the subject of motion and, (c) the final perfecting act. The act of building is the initial act. Its imperfection is due to the fact that it is connected with the building materials and is not identical with the act that is connected with the unity of being. Its function is to perfect those materials by imposing a form on them. The subject of motion refers to the building materials themselves, that is, wood, stones, nails etc. These materials are in potency to become a house. There is always an ordering and disposition that connects the initial act with the subject of motion. It is this ordering that makes the combination of both a possibility. The last element is the final act represented by a finished perfect house. This last element makes motion intelligible. We would be unable to understand the direction of the initial act and the subject motion without the final act.

The rationale for this analysis of building is to demonstrate how these three moments constitutes motion and how their relation show the act and potency relation in a being. Without these three moments, motion is unintelligible.<sup>572</sup> Hence in realistic cognition we conclude that

---

<sup>570</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 72.

<sup>571</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 1065<sup>b</sup>5.

<sup>572</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 73.

an analysis of motion can serve as a justification for the composition of act and potency. It would be practically impossible to explain the fact of motion without the principle of act and potency. A rejection of act and potency is a rejection of motion itself.<sup>573</sup>

### 3.2.3.2 An analysis of the principle of non-contradiction

If we consider the principle of non-contradiction from its first formulator, it would be surprising how we can use it to argue for change and the composition of being, given that its formulator concludes that change is an absurdity. Parmenides tries to show the incompatibility between this principle and the phenomenon of change. It is either the principle is true or the phenomenon is true. Obviously, for Parmenides, truth lies on the side of the principle. Change, for him, is an absurdity. Therefore being is absolutely one.

Aristotle agrees with Parmenides that nothing can come from nothing. He accepts the principle of non-contradiction but rejects the conclusion of Parmenides.<sup>574</sup> The problem here is: if we accept that the principle of non-contradiction is a valid logical assertion how can we use the same principle to argue for change which Parmenides himself rejected? Krapiec says that the only way we could use this principle to demonstrate act and potency is to show how this principle has its roots in real being. Aristotle successfully debunked Parmenides' monistic system by arguing that "only real potentiality allows us to escape the "Parmenidian" dilemma."<sup>575</sup> Hence between being and non-being there is being-in-potency. Krapiec argues that the principle of non-contradiction cannot hold without an understanding of being-in-potency. Without it, we cannot explain generation, change, evolution, growth, which are real phenomena that form part of real experience.

Krapiec also shows that our ability to come to terms with this law in the first place, shows that even though it is a logical assertion, it has its base in being. At birth we do not know anything. The law of non-contradiction is oblivious at that stage. However as we grow up we come to cognize this law and see its exemplification in things. It means two things: firstly, the realm of cognition and the realm of being are not unconnected; secondly, the composition of act and

---

<sup>573</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 236.

<sup>574</sup> "We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said without qualification to come from what is not. But nevertheless we maintain that a thing may come to be from what is not in a qualified sense, i.e. accidentally. For a thing comes to be from the privation, which in its own nature is something which is not..." *Phys* 191<sup>b</sup>8-16, 191<sup>b</sup>17 ff; John A. Vella, *Aristotle, A guide for the Perplexed*, 71. Aquinas also agreed with Aristotle on this point, see *In Phys* I, 14, 5.

<sup>575</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 239.

potency is real since at one point we were actually ignorant of this principle, although with the potentiality to arriving at such knowledge.<sup>576</sup>

### 3.2.3.3. Common sense argument against the Megarians<sup>577</sup>

The Megarians rejected the idea of potentiality, founding their argument on an absolute conception of being, in line with the Parmenidian model. Under such model being is absolute and simple, motion is impossible because it is identical with rest.<sup>578</sup> If we follow the argument of the Megarians, the potency and act of painting are manifest in the act of painting. There is no being-in-potency. Aristotle argued:<sup>579</sup>

- i. If it were the case it would be impossible for one to have a skill or proficiency to do something
- ii. It would also be impossible to lose certain abilities and skills
- iii. When one stops acting, one loses the ability to repeat that same action

Aristotle concludes that act is not identical with potency. He also argues that change cannot be an illusion.

### 3.2.4 The Discovery of Act and Potency through Metaphysical Separation

The discovery of being as the subject of metaphysics, the discovery of the transcendentals and the composition of being are attained by a specific methodology in the reinterpretation of Krapiec's metaphysics. The method in question is metaphysical separation. The essential character of this method is to help us "perceive through an operation of thought (and so not a physical operation), which consists of separation of the elements that are necessary for a given mode of being."<sup>580</sup>

As already demonstrated in the beginning of this chapter, metaphysical separation consists of three stages:

Stage I. we proceed from existential judgement by affirming the existence of a being and the mode of the existence of the being. Since the focal point of cognition is the dynamism of being,

---

<sup>576</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 236.

<sup>577</sup> According to Diogenes Laertius the followers of Euclides were called Megarians after him. The name later metamorphosed to the *Eristics*, and much later they were labelled *Dialecticians*, by Dionysius of Chalkedon because their arguments came in the form of question and answer. Prominent members of this school include Euclides (Eukleides), Stilpo of Megara, cf. Matthias Haake, "Megara and the 'Megarians': a city and its philosophical school,"

[https://www.academia.edu/37389287/Megara\\_and\\_the\\_Megarians\\_a\\_City\\_and\\_its\\_Philosophical\\_School](https://www.academia.edu/37389287/Megara_and_the_Megarians_a_City_and_its_Philosophical_School)

<sup>578</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 241-242.

<sup>579</sup> *Met* 1046<sup>b</sup>34-47<sup>a</sup>3.

<sup>580</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Internal Structure of Being*, 70.

our cognitive apparatus accentuates this mode of being concomitantly with the existence of beings. Hence we say: “ ‘John exists as one who acts and as one who receives action,’ ‘The rose exists as developing, and as being the subject of maturation,’ ‘The bird exists as flying and being in potency to flying,’ ‘The apple tree exists as developing and as being a subject that is developing.’”<sup>581</sup> The realism of this level is guaranteed on the basis that this affirmation is not made *a priori*. This is what is given to us in experience. It is so basic that in we are not in need of other facts to prove them. They are self-evident truths.

Stage II: this second stage comprises an analysis of what is given in experience. Here we make a separation between the being and the mode of the being. The result shows a composition within the being. Hence, using Maryniarczyk’s example, we separate the existent John from his action, the existing rose and the existing apple tree from their act of development, the existing bird from its act of flying. We discover that “[the] existent John is a source and subject of action, but John’s action is not identical with John; the existing rose is a source and subject of development, but the development of the rose is not identical with the rose; the existing bird flutters and it is the subject of fluttering, but the bird’s fluttering is not identical with the bird.”<sup>582</sup> What we discover here is that the reason for dynamism is that each of these beings is composed of act and potency. The fluttering cannot exist on its own without the bird. The bird could also do some other thing apart from fluttering. The same argument applies to the John and the rose.

Stage III: On this level we make an analogical generalization of the results in (II) we affirm that in every being we can distinguish activities from the subject of action in a relation of act and potency.

### 3.2.5 *The Inherent Relation between Act and Potency*

The consideration of the relation between act and potency has great significance for metaphysics. It leads to deeper understanding and awareness of the composite nature of being and the essential character of each of these elements. These considerations will be made from the point of view of priority, ontic limitation and ontic multiplicity, interdependence and real difference of act and potency.

#### 3.2.5.1 The priority of Act over Potency

---

<sup>581</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Internal Structure of Being*, 71.

<sup>582</sup> Ibid.

Krapiec identifies three ways in which act is prior to potency: first is cognitive priority, second is temporal priority and third is substantial priority. This analysis is based on Aristotle's *Metaphysics IX*.

- a. *Act is cognitively prior to potency.* We cannot cognize potency without act, since act is itself included in the understanding of potency. This idea that the understanding of one thing requires the prior understanding of another is what Krapiec refers to as "cognitive primacy."<sup>583</sup> Potency is cognized through act but act is not cognized through potency. An example would be the act of sitting. The capacity to sit is known from the act of sitting. Learning is also another good example. When John or Paul learns a new language, we understand that he has this capacity to learn languages. When he is not sleeping, even though he is not speaking, he has the capacity to speak. Hence there was a time when he was unable to speak Polish and a time when he could. Krapiec is arguing that we would not be able to understand his "not being able to speak Polish" if he did not speak Polish. But whenever he speaks Polish, we see this capacity without the aid of his potency to speak.
- b. *Both act and potency precede each other temporally in a given instant but act ultimately is temporally prior to potency.*<sup>584</sup> When a distinction is made between the concrete individual level and the level of species, act and potency share the spoil of priority. When we consider John as this concrete human being, we realize that he was born in 1984. This means that he was not existent in the years before 1984 (1983, 1982...). However, his grandparents and parents already existed. We can argue that he existed in his parents who are considered causes of his actual existence. In this sense, "potency, in the order of actualization, in the order of coming into existence, is prior to act in concrete individuals."<sup>585</sup> On the level of species, however, as this individual, the actual John is prior to the potential John (existing in his causes), because the potential John is in need of *act* for his realness.
- c. *Act is ontically (substantially) prior to potency.* The justification of the ultimate primacy of act over potency is attained through an analysis of the formal and final causes of being to reveal substantial primacy. Krapiec argues that since the form is identified with the essence of the being, and without essence, matter is undetermined and imperfect, then act is prior ultimately to potency because it is also identified with act. Secondly, finality has a

---

<sup>583</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 251.

<sup>584</sup> This follows from Aristotle's statement "...To all such potentiality, then, actuality is prior both in formula and in substance; and in time it is prior in one sense, and in another not..." *Met* 1049<sup>b</sup>10ff.

<sup>585</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 252.

sense of end and perfection. Between act and potency, act denotes perfection since it is what potency aims at. It is in the light of act that we can understand potency.<sup>586</sup> This leads to the gradation of beings because the more a being is in act, the more perfect the being is, hence we have beings that are mixed with form (act) and matter (potency), beings whose forms are not mixed with matter but are mixed with potency still and finally the most perfect being in whom there is no potency (*actus purus est omniperfectus, actus in aliquo ordine purus in eo est totaliter perfectus*).<sup>587</sup>

### 3.2.6.2 Ontic Limitation and Ontic Multiplicity

Potency is the constitutive element that limits act. The notion of limitation does not presuppose act that is limited by potency before an individual being is formed. Far from such conception we are considering an already existing being and seek the internal reason for the limitation

Since form is source of perfection in being, it follows that it cannot be the source of limitation, because limitation goes with imperfection. Also, since the correlate of form is matter, and form is the source of perfection, it follows that matter is the source of imperfection. Matter is hence, the potential element in being and limits act in a being. If we deny ontic multiplicity, we would have only one absolute perfect being. Such a scenario is different from what is given in experience.

### 3.2.6.3 Interdependence of Act and Potency

Apart from being related prior to posterior ontologically, temporally and cognitively, there is also a play of interdependence between act and potency. Firstly, potency is necessarily ordered to act; secondly, potency has a cognitive dependence on act. It leans on act for its cognition; thirdly, an act that is actualizing a potency necessarily belongs to the same category as that potency either substantially or accidentally; fourthly, act and potency are co-relates which form a being. Two acts or two potencies are incapable of forming a being. Only in the case of Pure Act that we have a being devoid of potency.

---

<sup>586</sup> Ibid, 252-253.

<sup>587</sup> Ibid, 253.

### 3.2.7 The Real Difference between Act and Potency

In order to cognize the real difference between act and potency, our conception of “non-being” is vital. Non-being could be understood as:<sup>588</sup>

- “the *complete negation of being*, where “being” is taken metaphysically, i.e., being as being;
- as *the negation of a particular being*, e.g., in relation to a human, taken as a being, a goose as a non-human is a non-being;
- as *the negation of an act* through which a being is constituted in a certain aspect.”

Krapiec explains that the real difference between act and potency is based on this third sense of non-being. Even though the necessary conditions for the actualization of potency already exists, temporally it is still ‘not-yet.’ Hence in relation to act that is temporally present, potency is ‘non-being.’ This explanation serves as a response to the Megarians as well. Act and potency cannot be identical. A real difference exists between them.

We conclude this section by stating that in the theory of act and potency we find very useful tools for confronting the problem of the dynamism of being, the problem of motion, the question of plurality and multiplicity of being. Krapiec writes:

Without potency and act, apprehended in a special way in each case, changes as such would be absurd. Thus if changes and motion are real, then the existence of act and potency in changing categorical beings is also real. Of course this is not the autonomous existence of potency and act, but their “co-existence” through the existence of a concrete being...

The analysis of motion leads to showing the internal composition from act and potency. Only act and potency explain the phenomenon of motion. All other explanations of motion, those that do not refer to act and potency, fail to describe what the motion that is really given to us in experience is. If we were to reject the conception of act and potency as real elements of being, we would have to reject the fact of motion.<sup>589</sup>

The discussion on motion, change and dynamism is not left only for the physical sciences to explain. Realistic cognition does not accept evolutionary explanations as justifications for the dynamism of being. This theory has given metaphysics a tool to explain these phenomena in a metaphysical way.

---

<sup>588</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 265.

<sup>589</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 79.

### 3.3 Substance and Accidents as Explanation of the Identical Existence of Being

In our previous discussion, Krapiec has demonstrated that dynamism or change is a fact. He has traced the source of this dynamism to the principles of act and potency. These are sub-ontic elements that constitute being and explain motion, generation, corruption and ontic plurality. However, the bewilderment in the world of persons and things transcends the horizon of dynamism. Identity is also a phenomenon which we encounter in our everyday experience. The understanding of ‘identity’ helps not only to clarify what is meant by an objective or ontological difference between beings and but even more so, the internal or ontic difference between kinds of change which a given being, as a subject of change, can undergo – the extremes of which are the substantial and the accidental changes. In this last sense, a genuinely metaphysical enquiry cannot circumvent the question: What is it that accounts for the identity of being as it undergoes the process of change?

In our everyday experience we see an orange lose its green color and becomes yellow, yet it is the same orange tree; we experience the growth of a child into a man or woman without loss of identity. In search for answers regarding this we come to discover that at the base of each being there are structural elements that keep the identity of each being intact throughout the process of change – they are called substances. The mutable qualities that appear and disappear during the process of change are called accidents.

#### 3.3.1 *The Meaning of the term and the Historical Development of the Substance Debate*

In everyday language, we come across the word substance in various expressions. For instance, an individual could be described as “a man of substance” or “a woman of substance” to designate the worth of the individual. Similarly the adjective ‘substantial’ signifies the worth or value of something, whether quantitatively or qualitatively. If substance denotes something of value in ordinary language, this value attains concentrated attention in philosophy, especially in metaphysics which has been described by “the philosopher” to be the study of substance.<sup>590</sup>

Explaining the concept substance, Robinson Howard writes:

The philosophical term ‘substance’ corresponds to the Greek *ousia*, which means ‘being’, transmitted via the Latin *substantia*, which means ‘something that stands under or grounds things’. According to the generic sense, therefore, the substances in a given philosophical

---

<sup>590</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 1028<sup>b</sup>2-4; Aquinas, In VII *Met* 1.2, n 1270.



system are those things which, according to that system, are the foundational or fundamental entities of reality.<sup>591</sup>

Leo Elders states that the term substance (*substantia*) was used by Seneca to translate the word ὑπόστασις which means reality. The word later reappeared in the works of Marius Victorius and St. Augustine as the translation of οὐσία to denote the first category of being. This use of *substantia* as translation of οὐσία was also seen in the work of Boethius, who in another text uses *substantia* to translate ὑπόστασις instead of οὐσία. But prior to the use of *substantia*, Elders states that the word *essentia* designated what we understand today as substance.<sup>592</sup>

As characteristic of every investigation in Krapiec's metaphysics, we shall undertake a brief excursus of the historical development of the substance-accident composition in being beginning with the pre-Socratics through its peak in Aristotle and some subsequent divergent views in modern times. Various philosophers interpret the pre-Socratic search for the fundamental urstuff as the search for substance.<sup>593</sup> Because certain explanations of these positions have been offered in this work already, I will state the positions of these philosophers. For Thales, all reality is reducible to a single substance, namely, water. For Anaximander, the fundamental substance is indeterminate, Anaximanes proposed air; Democritus and Empedocles talked of atoms. In his works Plato uses *ousia* in various senses: "a) property or wealth; b) a thing which is real and exists independently of the perceiver; c) the essence, the formal aspect of things; d) the being of the world of Ideas; e) the actual existence and reality as expressed by the copula 'to be'; f) the three levels of being (the unchangeable Ideas, intermediate realities such as the soul, sensible things such as the celestial bodies)."<sup>594</sup>

Aristotle took the discussion to another level in two of his works, namely, the *Categories* and the *Metaphysics*. In the *Categories* Aristotle describes substances as that which "are neither in a subject nor said of a subject."<sup>595</sup> Example of substance includes an individual man or an individual horse.<sup>596</sup> Hence, John, Eve, the red rose are individual substances. This idea of substance as the individual is the first, primary sense of substance. The secondary sense of substance refers to the genera which John, Eve and the red rose belong to. In this sense, man, tree or plants are secondary substances. These secondary substances are called universals. Most

---

<sup>591</sup> Robinson Howard, "Substance", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/substance/>>.

<sup>592</sup> Leo Elders, *The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective*, 1993, 239-240.

<sup>593</sup> Robinson Howard, "Substance", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/substance/>>.

<sup>594</sup> Elders, *The Metaphysics of Being*, 240.

<sup>595</sup> *Cat* 1<sup>b</sup>1-5.

<sup>596</sup> *Cat* 2<sup>a</sup>13.

authors see Aristotle's identification of universals as substances to be an influence from Plato. Aristotle's account of substance here has been considered by some authors to be more descriptive and logical than definitive and metaphysical.<sup>597</sup> Krapiec, on the other hand, would defend the thesis that the categories do not represent mere linguistic modes of expression. They are rather "real properties" because of their relation to substance which is the first in the hierarchy of the categories.<sup>598</sup>

In the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle offers more detailed and perhaps conflicting accounts of substance. The conflicting accounts created some ambiguity relating to the meaning of substance. I have captured the ambiguity in the quotation thus: "for Aristotle being is substance but in his explanation of substance we have first substance - τὸδε τί (tode ti, the individual subject), second substance - τὰ καθόλου (ta katholou, the universal) and third substance - τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι (to ti en einai, the definitional object) and possibly a fourth one – ὑποκείμενον (hupokeimenon, a subject or substratum)."<sup>599</sup>

Several philosophers either took a swipe at Aristotle's conception of substance or carved out completely different understanding of substance: Descartes, famous for his *cogito*, defines substance as "an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist" (M. 6, VII). Copleston argues that only God fits into such definition.<sup>600</sup> For Descartes also, the *res extensa* and *res cogitans* are two substances in the human being and do not form a single substance. This marks an obvious shift from Aristotle's conception of substance. Spinoza, through the theory of *natura naturans* (the infinite substance or God) and *natura naturata* (modes of God), gave a unitary idea of substance (God) that has infinite attributes, namely, thought and extension. Substance, for Spinoza, is "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself."<sup>601</sup> His idea of substance has raised controversies if he is pantheist or an atheist.<sup>602</sup> In his *Discourse on Metaphysics*, Leibniz offers a different view of substance. Reacting against the Aristotelian

---

<sup>597</sup> See Robinson, Howard, "Substance", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/substance/>>. John Cottingham writes: "Aristotle approached the concept of substance from a logical point of view." (The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, 76).

<sup>598</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 277.

<sup>599</sup> Kingsley Ekeocha, "The Method for the Discovery of the Absolute Transcendental Properties in Mieczysław Albert Krapiec's *Metaphysics*," 219. See Aristotle, *Met* 1028<sup>b</sup>33-36. For a concise explanation of Aristotle's idea of substance, see Cohen, S. Marc, "Aristotle's *Metaphysics*", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/>>.

<sup>600</sup> Copleston, *A History of Philosophy, vol. 4 The Rationalists: Descartes to Leibniz*, (London: Bloomsbury, 1958), 118.

<sup>601</sup> Ibid, 214.

<sup>602</sup> Robinson Howard, "Substance", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/substance/>>.

logical view of substance as the subject of predication, Leibniz defends the view that an individual substance does not comprise of single predicates but should be the totality of all qualities (past, present and future) put together. From an ontic perspective, only a being that is one can possess the totality of these qualities. In addition to unity, a substance is the source of activity. Leibniz's conception of substance would find its maturity in his monadology.<sup>603</sup> The monads are simple substances that are indivisible and lack parts. They are figureless and shapeless. And are qualitatively differentiable to the extent of perception and appetite inherent in them.<sup>604</sup>

### *Revisiting the Aristotelian Conception of Substance*

The first point Krapiec highlights here is the value of Aristotle's conception of substance for scientific cognition. Krapiec observes that prior to Aristotle, Plato had formulated a conception of science that fulfils basic criteria like being necessary, universal and immutable. The 'Idea' fulfils these criteria. For Aristotle, scientific cognition should also fulfil these basic criteria. However, instead of idea, it is substance that fulfils these. The substance is a locus of necessary relations between factors like form, matter, finality and efficacy. The intertwining of these necessary relations makes intellectual cognition a reality. Without these factors, cognition is impossible. On the grounds of these characteristics, Krapiec describes substance in the Aristotelian sense as:

...the thing in itself that is organized by form, that is determinate in itself, and that has a permanent content, necessary for it, a content capable of being grasped cognitively. This thing in itself, organized by form, having an unchangeable content that is capable of becoming an object of intellectual cognition is what Aristotle calls *ousia*, substance.<sup>605</sup>

If, substance is the font from which metaphysical knowledge flows, it is not surprising then, that Aristotle placed it at the centre of his investigation when he declared metaphysics as the science that studies substance.

### *3.3.2 Substance as the Base of Identity*

At the start of this section, I stated that in ordinary day experience we realize that things have identities even though they undergo change. Krapiec attempts to provide answers with regard

---

<sup>603</sup> Look, Brandon C., "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/leibniz/>>

<sup>604</sup> Copleston, *The Rationalists*, 296-297.

<sup>605</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 274.

to the source of this identity. Following the Aristotelian model, substance accounts for the identity of beings. Krapiec writes:

if we perceive a changing world, then there are changing non-necessary elements in being itself, and these elements are simply the properties of being-substance. At the same time, however there exists ontic identity, thanks to the same substance. Consequently, thanks to substance we can act both really and cognitively with respect to the same being, despite the changeableness characterizing the concrete being with which we are dealing. If there were no substance, as the element guaranteeing the identity of the being, then the scientific cognition of reality would not be possible.<sup>606</sup>

From various Aristotelian texts, Krapiec deduces certain characteristics of substance: (a) a substance refers primarily to an individually concrete, separate thing. Separateness and individuality are the basic determinants in identifying a substance. Hence we can say Peter or this horse is a substance. These are individually existing beings. (b) a substance exists with and is cognized through its properties (accidents). Hence it is regarded as the “subject of accidents.”<sup>607</sup> (c) a substance enjoys primacy over its properties: it can exist without certain properties (as a cup can be either white or black); it enjoys definitional priority (since an attempt to define an accident presupposes a substance); and it makes accidents more intelligible (it acts as a mode that enables us to grasp properties, eg. we understand ‘roundness’ when it is considered in a subsistent mode. (d.) Substance persists through change. In the interplay between substance and accidents, it is substance that remains while the accidents are either lost or gained. Substance ensures the stability in the identity of the being. (e.) There is a non-identity between substance and accidents. Krapiec argues that if there was no real difference between substance and accidents “then each change of a property would be equivalent to the loss of the thing’s identity, which is contrary to common sense.”<sup>608</sup> This appeal to common sense is quite demonstrable since it is given to us in everyday experience. A book that is in the shelf or on the floor, with a part of its front cover burnt does not lose its identity because of its position or loss of front page. There is also a relation of dependence on substance. An accident does not exist on its own – it is either an accident in a substance, a substance of its own when separated from its parent substance or an aggregate of a substance.<sup>609</sup> (f.) finally, cognition would be impossible if substance is rejected.<sup>610</sup> This is connected with the importance of substance for scientific cognition.

---

<sup>606</sup> Ibid, 280.

<sup>607</sup> Ibid, 280.

<sup>608</sup> Ibid, 293.

<sup>609</sup> Ibid.

<sup>610</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 292.

The discussion on substance as the base of identity is also connected with its structure. Krapiec argues that substance is not uni-structural, that is, it is not one complete whole without parts. Having demonstrated the pluralism of being in different sections of this work, it would be contradictory to conceive of one whole un-composed structure of substance. Multiplicity or plurality in a being emerges due to multifaceted operations that exist in the being. The idea of a composite structure of substance brings to life the phenomenon of changes in spite of the identity of a substance. Such changes are realized through the principles of act and potency which we had discussed in the previous sections. Hence the changes which occur within the structure of substance are justified due to the principles of act and potency. The substance of a human being, for instance, is composed of body and soul, where body is the receptive principle (hence akin to a potential element) and soul being the principle of life plays the role of organizing the body as well as actualizing life-functions – i.e. acts of vegetative, sensory, intellectual life (hence the soul serves as the actualizing element). Each of these two principles – body and soul - are non-independent in the sense that they come together to form a being with an ontological unity.

### 3.3.3. *Nature and Person: An Instantiation of the Subsistent Unity of a Substance Being.*

Krapiec avers that most philosophers would agree that the person is “the most perfect form of being.”<sup>611</sup> Hence it has its foundation within the discussion on substance. This is even made clearer when we consider that one of the examples of primary substance for Aristotle was “an individual man.” However, the substance-accident composition of being gained massive attention within the context of the Christological debates, particularly with regard to the relation of divinity and humanity in Christ. For Krapiec that was purely a theological discussion. It goes a long way to show the influence of Aristotle’s idea of substance in the formulation of Christian doctrines. One of the important highlights of the Aristotelian influence in the Christological debates was the definition of person by Boethius as “an indivisible (individual) substance of a rational nature” (*rationalis naturae individua substantia*). The definition is obviously Aristotelian since its understanding of substance is connected to matter which is the principle of individuation in Aristotle.

While acknowledging the strides of the *Boethian* definition, it still does not escape the peculiar problem of the Aristotelian metaphysics. Matter which is the principle of individuation is incapable of being the factor of uniqueness in a human being. Form is incapable of achieving

---

<sup>611</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 299.

such feat since it is general. To resolve this *aporia*, latter philosophers like Richard of St Victor and Thomas Aquinas employed two important notions to complement and complete the *Boethian* definition, namely the notions of ‘subsistence’ and ‘existence’. These notions are not simply concepts but they are realities which form the bases for characterizing a human being as a person.<sup>612</sup> Understood as a person, man is not simply a substance (in any of the four Aristotelian senses: individual being, general nature, definitional concept, or subject of accidents) but much more than these –the human being is dynamically oriented towards the realization of the highest perfection of his rational nature – which is the attainment of cognitive truth and desirable good. To be a person is neither exhausted in the categories of a substance nor that of accidents. It is thus the subsistence of a drive towards the perfection of nature – and when this nature is rational nature, it follows that its perfection, being that of rational ends of truth and good, is both an actually/really existing state (personhood) and a dynamic process (personalization). In other words, the existing human being *subsists* both in act (as an individual personal *being*) and in potency (as a rational *acting* person). Krapiec writes: “Consequently, the person must be constituted through the existence proper to a given concrete rational nature. A concretely existing nature, insofar as it is ‘under’ an existence proper to itself, is a subsistent being and a concrete rational nature is a person.”<sup>613</sup> When asked: what is it that indicates that the human person is rational, or subsistent, individual or distinct? Krapiec moves further than Boethius and Aquinas. He argues that when we analyse the actions of man, we can discern individualness and rationality. These acts consists of: (a) act of cognition (b) free action (c) act of love.<sup>614</sup> These three acts are in relation to nature. But there are other factors that determine the uniqueness of man these are found in relation to society. They are: (a) subjectivity to the law, (b) dignity and (c) wholeness. In the light of the relation between man and society, Krapiec develops his theory of human transcendence.

### 3.3.4 Accidents

In relation to identity and change, Krapiec distinguishes substance from accidents in these words: “all that which in an individually existing concrete being is the basis (reason) of the identity of the being and its relative constancy can be called *substance*. On the other hand, all that which, in the presence of the continuance of the identity of the given being, is changing

---

<sup>612</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 298.

<sup>613</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 301.

<sup>614</sup> See Krapiec, “Osoba,” [person] w *Poszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 7 (2006): 873-887.

transient, and undergoing transformations is a property, an *accident*, of substance. The word *accident* is connected with the Latin *accidere* and derived from the Greek τό συμβηκός.<sup>615</sup>

In realistic cognition, accidents are not treated as abstract properties. They are real properties characterized by their “inherence in a constituted being-substance.”<sup>616</sup> As inherent properties they contribute to the modification of substance.

Following Aristotle’s division and explanation in the categories, we can identify substance with its nine modifiers:<sup>617</sup>

- a. Quantity (Gk. πόσον, Lat. *quantum*): This is the property that manifests the extension of a substance.<sup>618</sup> According to Aristotle, a quantity can be discrete or continuous depending on whether it is separate or it is joined with other parts. Examples of discrete quantity are number and language; examples of continuous quantity are lines, surface, bodies, time and place. A line is joined by points but the syllabus of a language lacks such character. Similarly, a surface has its connecting points through lines, while both lines and surfaces connect to form a body. Present time is joined by past and future. Place is continuous since it is joined by the body occupying it.<sup>619</sup> Furthermore, while some quantities are made up of parts positioned relative to the others (eg. a line), other quantities do not have parts positioned in similar manner (eg. a number).<sup>620</sup> In addition to the above, we cannot find contraries in a quantity. Finally, quantities can be equal or unequal.<sup>621</sup> Krapiec observes that quantity modifies a substance from the material aspect.
- b. Quality (Gk. ποιόν, Lat. *qualitas*): As a substance is modified through its matter, so it is modified in its formal aspect, in its nature. Quality is “the property perfecting a being in the aspect of its form, manifesting itself in the concrete ordination of the being towards purposive action.”<sup>622</sup> Aristotle identifies four kinds of quality, grouped in pairs. The first pair is state and condition. These are differentiated by their level of stability and duration. For example, knowledge of one’s name or one’s sense of justice is stable

---

<sup>615</sup> Elders, *The Metaphysics of Being*, 255.

<sup>616</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 295.

<sup>617</sup> Aristotle, *Cat* 1<sup>b</sup>25-2<sup>a</sup>4. Here Aristotle first gives a list of the accidents. He writes: “Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected.”

<sup>618</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 295.

<sup>619</sup> Aristotle, *Cat* 4<sup>b</sup>20-5<sup>a</sup>14.

<sup>620</sup> Aristotle, *Cat* 5<sup>b</sup>10.

<sup>621</sup> Aristotle, *Cat* 6<sup>a</sup>26-35.

<sup>622</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 295.

and enduring when compared to the hotness of the weather. While knowledge and Justice are states, hotness or coldness are conditions. The second pair are natural capacity (the ability to stay healthy, run or box without enhancements) and incapacity (lack of ability to stay healthy, inability to engage in activities like running or singing due to nature). A third pair are affective qualities and affections. The affective qualities are of two kinds: there are those that modify a subject and determine it only by virtue of being possessed by the subject, for example, sugar is called sweet because it possesses the quality of sweetness or a leaf is called bitter because it possesses bitterness. There are also qualities that modify a subject and determine it, not simply by virtue of being possessed by the subject, rather, these qualities are generated by circumstances (affections) that act on the subject. For example, anger makes a person become red; fear makes a person become pale. However only those circumstances that endure (either from birth or developed over time) are called qualities; those that fade away are simply affections.<sup>623</sup> The fourth quality is shape or form; eg. a line is called straight if it has the quality of straightness. Similarly, a figure is called a triangle, if it is made of three lines with three sides.

- c. Relation (Gk. πρὸς τι; Lat. *relatio*): relation is “the ordination of one being to another.”<sup>624</sup> For example, a jug is big in relation to a small cup.
- d. Where (Gk. ποῦ; Lat. *ubi*) also known as place, modifies the subject with respect to the locus occupied by the subject. According to Krapiec, we could understand a subject more when the context of place and time are considered.<sup>625</sup> Examples: an individual buying in the market-place, debating in the Lyceum or a fish swimming in the river.
- e. When or Time (Gk. πότε; Lat. *quando*): Aristotle had already treated time as some kind of quantity, a continuous quantity precisely because both past, present and future are joined together. We can consider a substance based on what occurred yesterday or last year.
- f. Being-in-position (Gk. κεῖσθαι): Krapiec interprets this as “the property that arises in a being as a result of the arrangement of its different integral parts in relation to one another.”<sup>626</sup> But the example given by Aristotle (lying, sitting) seem to suggest the modification of being at a point of rest. One could conclude that there is a correlation

---

<sup>623</sup> Cat 9<sup>a</sup>29-10<sup>a</sup>10.

<sup>624</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 296.

<sup>625</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 172.

<sup>626</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 296.



between the internal disposition of substance and the external relation of the parts of the substance.

- g. Having (ἔχειν): a substance can possess material things like shoes, armour and these possessed items can determine the substance as such.
- h. Doing or Action (ποιεῖν): The examples given by Aristotle (cutting and burning) reveal the character of substance as an efficient cause. A substance can bring about change in another being or in itself through its activities.
- i. Being-affected or passion (πάσχειν): while substance is a source of change in itself or in another. It can also be on the receiving end of the action of others. Hence a man could be cut or slapped.

These determinations of being are not only modes of predication (drawing from the Greek κατηγορεῖν), they are rather “actual modes of being in the extra-mental world.”<sup>627</sup>

### 3.3.5 Ways of discovering the Composition of Substance and Accidents in Beings

The question which the composition of substance and accident seeks to explain is the reason for the identity and persistence of being through change. This discovery is made through metaphysical separation. The separation-based cognition as understood and applied by Krapiec helps us to gain an insight into being to discover the intrinsic relationship between substance and accidents and their relationship through the process of change. As already demonstrated this method comprises of three stages:

Stage I: the first involves an affirmation of what experience gives us. We simply affirm what is given to us in experience: namely, the fact that something exists and the fact that we still identify it as the same being despite all the changes it undergoes. Using the example of Maryniarczyk we state: “John exists as identical with himself, even though he changes and undergoes various modifications.”<sup>628</sup> We can extend the same method to ‘this Eve,’ ‘this red Rose,’ ‘this apple tree.’ As indicated in the previous sections, the affirmation contains two parts: the fact of existence of the being and the mode of existence which is given to us in experience. This is the level of existential judgment.

Stage II: The second stage consists of separation proper, whereby we examine and analyse the outcome of the operation in the stage one. Maryniarczyk explains what happens here thus:

---

<sup>627</sup> Copleston, *Greece and Rome*, vol. 1, 279.

<sup>628</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Internal Structure of Being*, 159.

In the process of analysis, we discover that the existing apple, despite constant changes and modifications, is identical with itself, and this is manifested in the fact that it is the subject of various actions and passions; the existent rose, despite changes and modifications, is identical with itself, and this is manifested in the fact that it is the subject of various actions and passions; existent John, despite constant changes and modifications, retains his identity and this is manifested in the fact that he is the subject of various actions and passions.<sup>629</sup>

What this reveals is that there is a base which serves as bearer of all the accidents that survives the process of change. The modifications which John or the red rose or Eve undergo do not alter this base to the point that it loses its identity. Hence we discover the distinction between the subject and the properties which modify the subject.

Stage III: The third stage is the conclusion of this procedure whereby we cognize that the rational explanation for the identity of a being, irrespective of the changes that occur within it, is its composition of substance and accidents.

### **3.4 The Composition of matter and form as justification for the changeable nature of substantial beings**

In the preceding sections we have shown that change is not an absurdity; it is real. However change comes in different forms. Experience shows us that things come into being and things perish. The birth of a new child, for instance, marks the ‘beginning’ of a new life, a new being. An old woman dies and forfeits her existence. These are known as substantial change. We also see that throughout a being’s existence the being goes through quantitative and qualitative changes. The growing child can be sometimes pale or red. The child gains a new knowledge or can be forgetful. Such change is called accidental. If we are to ask why things come into existence or go out of existence (substantial change), the realistic model states that change is possible because a substance is composed of matter (Gk. ὕλη, hule) and form (μορφή, morphe). This theory is generally known as the hylomorphic theory.<sup>630</sup> Without delving into the historical development of this theory, I wish to point out important aspects of this discussion from Krapiec’s realistic perspective.

---

<sup>629</sup> Ibid.

<sup>630</sup> Ainsworth, Thomas, "Form vs. Matter", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/form-matter/>>.

### 3.4.1 The Constitution of Material Beings

Krapiec demonstrates first that discussions on matter is not unique to philosophy. Other disciplines have their peculiar understanding of matter. Aligned with the division of the three levels of the sciences, Krapiec gives three levels of understanding of matter. The first is the physical and natural science conception of matter. Here matter is explained as chemical and atomic properties which make up things. Material reality consists of a relation of molecules, atoms, electrons, protons, neutrons and quarks. The combination and arrangement of these entities generate reactions that govern our world.<sup>631</sup> According to Krapiec, such conception of matter does not suit our investigation of matter-form composition. We can deduce the following inadequacies in their interpretation: “(i) it presents a reductionist conception of matter, i.e., the variety of compositional elements in a being is reduced to uniform particles; (ii) there is a tendency to reduce the entirety of a thing to the sum of its compositional parts; (iii) matter is treated as an independent being.”<sup>632</sup> Such understanding for Krapiec cannot be suitable for realistic cognition.

The second understanding is the mathematical. Having dealt with this in other parts of this work, we can state here that mathematics is quantitative and there is more to reality than quantity. We demonstrated already in the substance-accidents composition of being that quantity is only one of the many ways being is modified.<sup>633</sup>

The metaphysical understanding of being holds that beings are made of two constitutive elements: matter and form. Matter and form are correlates. They are understood properly within the context of substantial change.<sup>634</sup> They are principles of becoming. In the process of change, matter is that which makes change possible. It serves as a link between two beings: the first prior to change and the second that emerges after the change. as Krapiec describes it,

“the material element of things is the sufficient reason for the change, potentiality, and evolution of the world of matter. Without the existence of matter justifying the evolution in nature, it would be necessary to accept two “miracles” at once, namely, the annihilation of one thing, which loses its form of be-ing, and the simultaneous creation out of nothing of a new thing, which has come into existence. In addition, it would be necessary to deny the basic experience that testifies to the “passage” of one thing into another.”<sup>635</sup>

---

<sup>631</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 314-317.

<sup>632</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 107.

<sup>633</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 322-325.

<sup>634</sup> Aristotle, *Phys* 1, 7.

<sup>635</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 331.

The change implied that matter “assumed a new shape, a new substantial form.” In the process of change, matter loses form or shape and gains another. This does not mean that Krapiec limits his understanding of form to ‘shape.’ Krapiec argues that every being is made up of various elements that constitute its nature and essence. These beings, as Krapiec demonstrates, are also endowed with unity because all the elements operating within each of these beings work for the good of the being. There is something responsible for holding all these elements together, giving them a definitional identity. Hence, form (*morphe*) is defined as that “which constitutes the content, the basis of the conceptualizability, of a material thing.”<sup>636</sup> I am able to distinguish John from a goat because John has the form of a human being. John exhibits rational character, whereas a goat has a form peculiar to it. Form can be substantial or accidental.

What reasons can we offer to justify the claim that being is composed of matter and form? Krapiec offers several arguments. Most of these arguments, however, have their bases in the philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

- a. *Evidence from common sense*: A stance against matter as a constitutive element in being is counter-intuitive and counter-experiential. It goes against what we experience daily. It renders our day-to-day experiences inexplicable. However, what matters most here is that the process of substantial change enables the cognizer to establish the composition of matter and form in beings.
- b. *The differentiation of matter and form in conceptual cognition*. This argument shows that the cognizer is able to grasp the concept of matter and the concept of form differently. However the possibility of grasping these concepts is consequent upon the fact that they exist really in being even though they are united within a being. For such an argument to hold, cognitive realism must be accepted; cognitive realism must be established. Cognitive realism stipulates that “the content of conceptual cognition...is identical with the content of the thing in precisely those elements presented by the concept.”<sup>637</sup>
- c. *Matter and form as the reason and base of substantial change*. Krapiec opines that substantial change cannot be explained save for the composition of matter and form. Unfortunately no scientific apparatus can detect this connection. The demonstration of the matter and form composition comes at the backdrop of the reality of the substantial change phenomena. Krapiec shows the reality of substantial change using three common examples,

---

<sup>636</sup> Ibid, 330

<sup>637</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 333.

namely: the changing of food (a non-living substance) into life-giving nutrients after consumption, death – which involves a transformation from a living being to a lifeless being and thirdly, a wood that is thrown into a fire is transformed into ashes. These three examples manifest that substantial change is indubitable.<sup>638</sup>

- d. *Argument from divisibility and indivisibility (pre-scientific intuition).* Here we observe physically that beings exist in an undivided manner in their nature. This entails that the internal make-up of each being is arranged in a way that there is an ontic and functional unity towards the good of the being. However, this indivisibility does not remove the fact that one cannot argue for the divisibility of the same undivided being: a hand of a human being could be severed, a leg from a chair or table could be removed etc. Here Krapiec tries to argue that divisibility and indivisibility could apply to a being in a specific sense. On a metaphysical plane, therefore, we must seek for the base of divisibility and indivisibility in the structure of being. He concludes that form is the ontic reason for indivisibility while matter is the reason for divisibility.
- e. *Matter and form as explanation for the unity of genus and multiplicity of individuals.* Why does ‘human being’ apply to Eve and John? And why is John different from Eve even though they are the same on the level of human beingness? They share the same human beingness because they share the same form; they are distinct individuals within the same species because they have different material compositions. We observe that John is a human being, Mary is a human being and Socrates is a human being. The common factor between these beings is “human being.” So there is something that binds these beings together as belonging to the same species. In a similar way, we observe that an oak is a tree; the same could be said of a pine. The common factor between both oak and pine is “tree.” With these examples we see unity of species. On the other hand, we perceive individuality and plurality. Mary is not John and John is not Socrates. In the same vein, the oak tree differs from the pine. When we consider the rationale for the multiplication of individuals within the same species, we discover that form is the reason for unity, while matter is the reason for multiplicity. Krapiec draws inspiration from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics VII* for this argument.
- f. *Arguments from cognitive realism.* Krapiec argues for the composition of matter and form in beings by making reference to cognitive realism in the case of different opposite and

---

<sup>638</sup> Ibid, 328.

exclusive attributes. Krapiec observes that the intellect is able to formulate objective concepts and attributes even if they are different and mutually exclusive. However, these mutually exclusive and different concepts have their base in being, wherein lies their real composition. Concepts like unity and multiplicity, composition and undividedness, intelligibility and unintelligibility, the ability to act and being acted upon - are different, mutually exclusive, yet are a part of the same being.<sup>639</sup> So when we ask the question, why is a being one, that is, undivided and yet is composed of many parts (multiplicity)? We look at the structure of being to discover that these mutually exclusive and different ontic states really exist in a being as a result of elements which differ from each other. Hence while form is the rationale for unity and undividedness, matter is responsible for the multiplicity and divisibility in being.<sup>640</sup>

- g. *Argument from potentiality and actuality.* The composition of matter and form corresponds to the composition of act and potency. Matter is to form what act is to potency. A being changes because it has the potentiality to change or be acted upon by another. Activity and passivity are real properties; while form is responsible for activity, matter, the potential element, is responsible for the passivity in being.
- h. *The distinct objects of the intellect and the sense in the act of cognition.* In the analysis of the operations of both intellect and senses we discover that the objects of the intellect and the senses are different, thanks to the composition of matter and form in being. While the senses are able to grasp sensible data from matter, the intellect is directed towards the form. Finally, when we analyse the activities of our intellect and senses, the composition from matter and form become obvious. The intellect and the sense are dual-directional in cognition. The intellect concerns itself with necessary relations in being which cannot be captured by matter. Yet this material part is what makes the being knowable potentially. Hence we decipher that there are two parts of the being that are apprehended, the formal side and the material side which the senses detect.

Having argued for the composition of matter and form in material beings, it remains to explain how it is attained through metaphysical separation.

---

<sup>639</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 332.

<sup>640</sup> Ibid.

### 3.4.2 *Metaphysical Separation and the discovery of the Matter-Form Composition in Being*

One of the specific character of this work is the application of metaphysical separation to ascertain and determine the subject of metaphysical investigation, the properties of being as well as the various sub-ontic elements and compositions in being. With regard to the discovery of the composition of matter and form, metaphysical separation, as already demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter, consists of three steps:

Stage I. In the first stage, we affirm the existence of a being and mode of the existence of the being. We affirm through existential judgment that a being exists and also stress “how,” that is, in what sense it exists. Using specific examples found in Krapiec’s work, Maryniarczyk writes: For example, “the existing apple undergoes a change when it is eaten,” the existing wood undergoes a change when it is transformed into other objects,’ ‘the existing substance radium undergoes a change into radon in the process of chemical change.”<sup>641</sup> We can also add examples like: an existing human body decomposes when it loses life.

Stage II: According to Maryniarczyk, here, we analyse what we have affirmed in existential judgement to find out why these beings undergo such process of change. We discover that there is something that remains despite the change that has occurred. The analysis helps us to separate sub-ontic elements that account for such substantial change. We then discover that the wood, or the apple or the human body is made up of matter and form.

Stage III: Here we make an analogical extension to all beings that all beings are made up of matter and form. Matter is that which remains and takes up another form after the process of change; while form is lost or disintegrated during the process of change. In this way, all beings are susceptible to change.

### 3.4.3 *Problems Connected with the Matter and Form Composition*

Krapiec discusses three main problems connected with the matter-form composition. The first is the problem of prime matter and substantial form; the second is the problem of generation and corruption of forms, followed by substantial unity, the unity of substantial form and the individuation of beings. I do not intend to discuss all these problems. I will briefly discuss two of these problems, stating Krapiec’s important stances therein.

---

<sup>641</sup> Maryniarczyk, *The Structure of Being*, 119.

a. The problem of prime matter and substantial form in material beings:

In her book, *Form, Matter, Substance*, Kathrin Koslicki observed that there are some controversies regarding the stance of Aristotle on prime matter. While some authors or commentators interpret Aristotle to have committed to prime matter, some others have challenged such view.<sup>642</sup> For M. A. Krapiec, “the Aristotelian analysis of substantial change leads not only to an affirmation of the existence of prime matter, but also to the discovery of the ‘nature’ of this matter as pure potentiality.”<sup>643</sup> Undeniably Krapiec follows this interpretation of Aristotle and commits to it. He wrote: “a denial of the existence (the nonindependent existence!) of prime matter leads to the absurdity of an absolutely static monism, contrary to what is most evident and to our own self-knowledge. It makes it to explain any kind of change at all and raises many new, unresolvable difficulties, since they usually contain implicit contradictions.”<sup>644</sup>

This strong conviction of Krapiec flows from his understanding of prime matter: it does not have an independent existence since it is not *ousia*; it is undefinable on its own when it is in separation from form; it is the first subject of change in a being.<sup>645</sup> He went on to add: “Prime matter, as the ultimate and primary substrate of change in an independently existing being is not a co-element in the generation of accidents, for there secondary matter, ... performs this role. Prime matter is what accounts for the possibility of ontic pluralism and for substantial change in general, for the evolution that takes place in the whole of nature.”<sup>646</sup>

An important question which Krapiec attempted here is: Is prime matter real? Or is it merely conceptual? Krapiec argues that the reality of change is obvious. It is a real phenomena which we experience daily. If it is real, the elements which aid in our explanation cannot be merely conceptual since we are making appeal to co-constituting factors in being. More still “a conceptual being does not constitute a ‘justification’ of a real being.”<sup>647</sup>

The correlate of prime matter is substantial form. Substantial form is “the first act (the fundamental and most basic act constituting a real content, under actual existence) of prime matter.” The label “first act” presupposes a “second act.” Krapiec demonstrates that while substantial form is the “first act,” existence is the second act. The Substantial form is the first

---

<sup>642</sup> Kathrin Koslicki, *Form, Matter, Substance*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 33.

<sup>643</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 338.

<sup>644</sup> Ibid, 339.

<sup>645</sup> Ibid, 338.

<sup>646</sup> Ibid.

<sup>647</sup> Ibid, 339.



act because it “does not presuppose any other acts.”<sup>648</sup> Existence, on the other hand, is the second act because it merges with essence which is constituted of matter and form.

Neither prime matter nor substantial form has independent existence. They are discovered through rational analysis and are ordered to one another.<sup>649</sup>

b. Generation and corruption of forms

This addresses the question whether there are accumulation of various forms which are concealed in substantial form such that substantial change is merely an emergence of a form that has been concealed all the while within the substantial form. In Krapiec’s view, such explanation of substantial change is erroneous. He draws the attention of the cognizer to the fact that “only beings exist and beings arise and perish. Form arises together with a being and perishes together with it.”<sup>650</sup> Hence in our discussion on the generation and corruption of forms, one must not lose sight of being because one could run the risk of “reifying or hypostatizing form.”<sup>651</sup> Justification for substantial change must be sought in the nature of being that is causally conditioned. And this conditioning hinges on material causality and efficient causality. Material causality is explained as a proportion between prime matter and substantial forms. Prime matter, because it is pure potentiality, has the capacity of bringing forth new forms. This is due to the dispositions and form which are connected with it, for “prime matter has never existed and can never exist without form and dispositions.”<sup>652</sup> Substantial change occurs when there is an alteration in the dispositions. The alteration leads to a rearrangement and displacement of the previous form; what Krapiec refers to as “a decay” or “conversion” of the form. It simply goes back into the potentiality of matter. The effect of this decay is an emergence of a new form.

---

<sup>648</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 348.

<sup>649</sup> Ibid, 349.

<sup>650</sup> Ibid, 350.

<sup>651</sup> Ibid, 350.

<sup>652</sup> Ibid, 351.

### 3.5 The Composition of Existence and Essence as Justification for the Contingency of Being

The explanations given in the previous sections have accounted for the dynamism of being, the persistence of being in the face of its changeable nature, and the mutability of being. However, a question persists: do we live in a world that is eternal wherein the coming into being and going out of being are explained simply as motion or as mere changes from one form to another? Experience seem to show otherwise. As humans we are aware that we have not always existed. The elements of our biological make-ups have not always been in existence. Even science supports the fact that humans, trees, animals, earth, the planets etc. have not always existed. What it means is that necessity is not one of the properties we possess. We are contingent beings. In a bid to offer rational philosophical justification for our contingent reality, M. A. Krapiec directs our minds to one final component in the structure of being, namely, the essence and existence composition.

#### 3.5.1 The Meaning of Existence and the Historical Development of the Problem of Existence

In the concluding part of the work *Aquinas on Being*, Anthony Kenny stated that in Aquinas' works, it is problematic that there was no clear-cut, satisfactory distinction between being and existence.<sup>653</sup> In fact, the aim of his work was to show how confused Aquinas' project of being was, based on the terminological ambiguities therein. I do not intend to argue whether Kenny's claim is accurate or not. I would rather show briefly, the clarity of terminological usage of these terms as they appear in the works of M. A. Krapiec as a stepping stone in the discussion of the development of the problem of existence.

According to M. A. Krapiec, being (Greek: τὸ ὄν, οὐσία; Latin: *ens*) refers to "the concrete, existing individual thing."<sup>654</sup> "This John" or "this Eve" is a being because each of them is an individual, a concrete reality and in addition, they possess the act of existence. Krapiec shows that at a time, τὸ ὄν and οὐσία appeared synonymously for the word being.<sup>655</sup> In Plato's work, τὸ ὄν referred to "that which is real," "that which is stable, eternal and unchanging in the world (a substratum)," "an essence," and also "a cause."<sup>656</sup> In Aristotle, οὐσία was at the centre of metaphysical investigation and was used as equivalent to τὸ ὄν. In its common-sense understanding, being is that which we encounter in our world to be real. Philosophically, it is

---

<sup>653</sup> Anthony Kenny, *Aquinas on Being* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 192.

<sup>654</sup> M. A. Krapiec (wspólnie z A. Maryniarczykiem), "Byt," [being], w *Powszechna Encyclopedia Filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, t. 1 (Lublin, 2000): 746-785.

<sup>655</sup> Ibid.

<sup>656</sup> Plato, *Crat* 401C.

a determined content which actually exists and is grasped spontaneously or through the method of metaphysical separation as the object of metaphysics.

Existence, on the other hand, is traced to the Greek τό εἶναι and Latin *esse*, *existere* or *existentia*. The word *existence*, as presented by M. A. Krapiec, has several meanings in relation to being:

...in ordinary language: life, as opposed to death; that which is real as distinct from what is illusory; that which is, as distinct from that which is not; in philosophy: facticity, reality, the coming-into-existence of something that becomes independent in being after “going out beyond its cause” (*sistere ex*); the most original object of spontaneous cognition; the act (*principium*) of being, that is, that whereby something is; the Absolute conceived as the source of existence (Pure existence – *Ipsium esse*); in the grammar of natural language, a synonym for the word “is” that can perform a fourfold function in a sentence: affirmation, or the factual statement of a thing’s existence (Jan is – exists); assertion, or the predication of certain qualities of a thing (it is beautiful); cohesion, or the connection of names with oneself (John is a teacher); also location, or the affirmation of the fact of presence (John is right here).<sup>657</sup>

Facticity and act are two important words that would be discussed later in this work. In the light of these terminological precisions, we perceive an overlap in the meaning of both being and existence. To be being means to be real and to exist means to be real as well. Therefore Kenny’s concern for a clear-cut distinction appears to be unfeasible. As Joseph Owens rightly points out, “...being for Aquinas was existence and existence was being.”<sup>658</sup> Thomas Aquinas himself makes it clear when he states: “existence is that in virtue of which a substance is called a being.”<sup>659</sup>

Krapiec demonstrates that the word existence has pre-philosophical usage, appearing in the works of Hesiod, Herodotus and Homer. The inception of philosophy was marked with the search of the *arche* – the underlying principle from which all things are made of. Despite the wide range of propositions from different Pre-Socratic philosophers, the word *existence* never emerged. The reason for this omission could be explained thus:

while philosophers saw the features of things, they did not see the existence of things (as existence), since existence contains no features to which they could point as to the determining factors in a thing. Existence as existence contains no sign, no feature for recognition, so on the path of cognition by impressions and mental images, it is something cognitively “empty,” and therefore it is something inaccessible to sign-based apprehension. While they spoke of the “being” (εἶναι [*éinai*]) of a thing, they did not understand this [act of] being as the presence of features that by necessity or in a variable way determined the thing itself. Existence as existence, not experienced in cognition through features or signs, thus remained imperceptible,

---

<sup>657</sup> M. A. Krapiec, “Istnienie” [Existence], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 5, (Lublin 2004): 44-58, 68-69.

<sup>658</sup> Joseph Owens, *An Interpretation of Existence* (Houston: Center For Thomistic Studies, 1985), 133.

<sup>659</sup> Aquinas, *SCG* 2, 54.

although they distinguished between being and non-being (as its negation), but only in the aspect of recognized features, which constitute or mark an existing thing.<sup>660</sup>

The rationale for the imperceptibility of existence expressed in the above quotation is made clearer in the works of Aristotle. Although Krapiec borrows the concept of metaphysics as a science from Aristotle, he highlights certain deficiencies therein:<sup>661</sup>

- the intelligibility of being is only in connection to substance since substance is the base through which anything is cognoscible;
- the analyses of substantial form and prime matter reveal that they belong to the essential part of being, whereas there is more to being than essence.
- The eternity of the world made it impossible to conceive of existence as a counterpart of essence in the composition of being.

These deficiencies spurred Krapiec in labelling the Aristotelian conception of being “incomplete” and “inadequate.”<sup>662</sup> The incompleteness is found in the inability to distinguish the fact that a being is from the essence of the thing in the Aristotelian system – in the words of Michael Nelson, “...Aristotle seems to have seen nothing more to existence than essence; there is not a space between an articulation of what a thing is and that thing’s existing.”<sup>663</sup> These deficiencies grew further in the philosophy of the philosopher Abū ‘Alī b. Sīnā also known as Avicenna. In contrast to Aristotle, Avicenna distinguished essence from existence, however, this separation raised some metaphysical disputes. The problem associated with Avicenna’s thought was that:

He conceived the Aristotelian substance-nature, understood as the object of definition, that is τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι [to ti en einai] as so-called third nature, as distinct from first substance or the concrete thing (e.g., Socrates) and “second substance,” or the abstract conception (e.g., man). Only the “third nature” can be an object of metaphysics, since the first nature (Socrates) is an individual and changing being, and as such it cannot impose necessity on cognition. The second nature, or the abstract concept, is not a real object. Neither universality nor individual existence belong to a nature, for if concrete existence belonged to a nature in itself, its universal state, such as we have when we think, e.g., of a horse, would be impossible; its universality does not belong to a nature, since this would make its concreteness impossible. Therefore, the concrete existence of a nature is something external to it, something that “arrives” at a nature that is constituted in itself and is, according to Aristotelian terminology, an accident of that nature.<sup>664</sup>

---

<sup>660</sup> M. A. Krapiec, M. A. Krapiec, “Istnienie” [Existence], 44-58, 68-69.

<sup>661</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 377-378.

<sup>662</sup> Ibid, 377.

<sup>663</sup> Nelson, Michael, “Existence”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/existence/>>.

<sup>664</sup> Krapiec, “Istnienie” [Existence], 44-58, 68-69.

Avicenna's claims imply that there are essences that are devoid of existence. A horse, for instance, is an essence, just as 'man' or 'tree.' A horse, a man and a tree are differentiated from "this horse," "this man," and "this tree" – these are individuals. Metaphysical cognition, for Avicenna, focuses on the essences and not on the individual beings. Existence has to be added to these essences for the individual beings to emerge. "The philosophical intuition underlying the distinction is that what some-thing is (man, horse etc.) is different from the fact that it exists."<sup>665</sup> Therefore existence is something that happens to essence – it is an accident.

It was at this point that Thomas Aquinas, the angelic doctor, entered into the discussion. While acknowledging that Avicenna rightly cognized that essence is different from existence, he disagrees on the mode of relation between essence and existence as posited by Avicenna. Aquinas argues that Avicenna got it wrong in making it appear as if existence is something added to a thing's essence.<sup>666</sup> In his Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,<sup>667</sup> Aquinas writes "But in regard to the first point he (Avicenna) does not seem to be right; for even though a thing's existence is other than its essence, it should not be understood to be something added to its essence after the manner of an accident, but something established, as it were, by the principles of the essence. Hence the term being, which is applied to a thing by reason of the very existence, designates the same thing as the term which is applied to it by reason of its essence."<sup>668</sup> The main conclusion of the quotation is that being is not accidental to a substance.

However, the most definitive treatment of Aquinas' essence-existence distinction was in the treatise *De ente et essentia*.<sup>669</sup> In this treatise (*De ente*), which is one of his earliest works (1256), Thomas Aquinas discusses the problem of being in relation to its composition of essence and existence, both in composite beings and in the separate substances. In chapter three, Thomas Aquinas explains how essence exists in separate substances, that is, the soul, the

---

<sup>665</sup> Fedor Benevich. "The Essence-Existence Distinction: Four Elements of the Post-Avicennian Metaphysical Dispute (11–13th Centuries)" *Oriens* 45 (2017): 204. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18778372-04503004>. For the English translation in this work, see Thomas (de Aquino.), and George G. Leckie. *Concerning Being and Essence*. Appleton-Century, 1937; for the Latin translation see <https://www.corpusthomicum.org/oe.html>.

<sup>666</sup> *In IV Metaph, lect 2, n. 9*: "Sciendum est autem quod circa hoc Avicenna aliud sensit. Dixit enim quod unum et ens non significant substantiam rei, sed significant aliquid additum. Et de ente quidem hoc dicebat, quia in qualibet re quae habet esse ab alio, aliud est esse rei, et substantia sive essentia eius: hoc autem nomen ens, significat ipsum esse. Significat igitur (ut videtur) aliquid additum essentiae."

<sup>667</sup> For the English translation, see *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*. Trans. John P. Rowan. (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1961).

<sup>668</sup> *In IV Metaph, lect 2, n. 11*: "Sed in primo quidem non videtur dixisse recte. Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia."

<sup>669</sup> Jeffery C. Witt. "Essence and Existence" In *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Lagerlund H. (2011). Springer, Dordrecht. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9729-4\\_157](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9729-4_157).

intelligences (angels) and in the First Cause (causa prima). There Aquinas explained that the composition of form and matter does not obtain in the soul and intelligences. They are rather composed of form and being (esse).<sup>670</sup> That they are devoid of matter however does not make them absolutely simple since they have potency in them.<sup>671</sup> He further tries to show that the essence of simple substances differ from the essence of composite substances: while the essence of simple substances is form alone, that of composite substances is made up of form and matter.<sup>672</sup> At the heart of this distinction was this statement by Thomas Aquinas:

...for whatsoever does not belong to the concept of essence or quiddity is something accruing from without and effecting a composition with the essence, since no essence can be conceived without those things which are parts of essence. But every essence or quiddity can be conceived aside from the condition that something be known concerning its existence, for I can conceive what a man or phoenix is and still not know whether it has existence in the nature of things. Therefore it is clear that existence is something other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there be something the quiddity of which is its very existence.<sup>673</sup>

This chapter, by virtue of this passage, has been labelled “the most famous, and to a certain degree the most controversial, instance”<sup>674</sup> of the essence-existence distinction. While most authors agree that Aquinas distinguished essence from existence, they argue if the distinction is real, conceptual or even intentional. This discussion had a reasonable space in the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> century debates, and has sustained its presence in contemporary discussions. While Giles of Rome, particularly in his *Theoremata de esse et essentia* and the *Quaestiones disputatae de esse et essentia* argued for a real distinction, Siger de Brabant, Godfrey of Fontaines and John Buridan argued for conceptual distinction. Henry of Ghent said it was an intentional distinction. In contemporary times, Joseph Owens argues for a logical/conceptual distinction of essence and existence.

<sup>670</sup> Aquinas, *Ente* c. 3, 70-71: “Unde in anima vel in intelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex materia et forma, ut hoc modo accipiatur essentia in eis sicut in substantiis corporalibus, sed est ibi compositio formae et esse. Unde in commento IX propositionis libri de causis dicitur quod intelligentia est habens formam et esse, et accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa quidditate vel natura simplici.”

<sup>671</sup> Aquinas, *Ente* c. 3, 76-77: “Huiusmodi ergo substantiae quamvis sint formae tantum sine materia, non tamen in eis est omnimoda simplicitas nec sunt actus purus, sed habent permixtionem potentiae. Et hoc sic patet. Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quidditatis, hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his, quae sunt partes essentiae, intelligi potest.”

<sup>672</sup> Aquinas, *Ente* c. 3, 73: “In hoc ergo differt essentia substantiae compositae et substantiae simplicis quod essentia substantiae compositae non est tantum forma, sed complectitur formam et materiam, essentia autem substantiae simplicis est forma tantum.”

<sup>673</sup> Aquinas, *Ente* c. 3, 77: “Quicquid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quidditatis, hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia nulla essentia sine his, quae sunt partes essentiae, intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia vel quidditas potest intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo; possum enim intelligere quid est homo vel Phoenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura. Ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia vel quidditate, nisi forte sit aliqua res, cuius quidditas sit ipsum suum esse.”

<sup>674</sup> Gaven Kerr, “Aquinas: Metaphysics” in *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Accessed May 12, 2020. <https://iep.utm.edu/aq-meta/>.

The essence and existence debate is quite extensive so much that there is yet a comprehensive work on the theme as Wippel observed: “A complete history of this controversy concerning the relationship between essence and existence remains to be written”<sup>675</sup> It is not my intention to engage in a full investigation of the problem.

### 3.5.2 Krapiec’s Adoption of Aquinas’ Conception of Being and the Demonstration of the Essence-Existence Distinction

Krapiec refers to Aquinas’ version of the essence-existence composition as “true.” In fact, he regards the *Aquinean* moment as a revolutionary moment, the *summum punctum* (highest point), since the inception of philosophy. Little wonder Krapiec wrote that in Aquinas the development of the theory of being reached its summit, its maturity.<sup>676</sup> Krapiec highlighted the uniqueness of Aquinas’ doctrine in the following areas: firstly, he rejected the Avicennian understanding of existence as an accident, and so applied the Aristotelian principle of act and potency to the relationship between essence and existence, such that “what act is to potency, existence is to substance.” He argues that whereas substance accounts for the intelligibility of being, it is insufficient to account for the realness of being. On this issue, he writes:

What distinguishes a being from nothingness is not just the possession of some determinate content but the fact of real concrete existence...The mere fact of possessing content, however, does not yet qualify a being for real subsistence. A being is something real, and not merely something “conceptual,” only when it really exists subjectively in itself. The subjective existence of beings is, therefore, something fundamental in reality. Existence is the ultimate justification of the fact that a certain being really is, that it constitutes a reality; existence is, therefore the reason of ontic realism.”<sup>677</sup>

Hence being manifests itself as an act. Krapiec stresses the importance of realness as a property symbolized by act. Thinking in such manner, there is a shift in the Aristotelian conception of being which is based on substance. Krapiec supports Thomas Aquinas’ idea that matter and form (Aristotelian) substance belong to the essential aspect of being. This, however, does not account for the realness of being. Contingent beings are composed of essence and existence. And existence is the factor, the act, which accounts for the realness of being – ultimately, existence is “the reason of ontic realism.”<sup>678</sup>

---

<sup>675</sup> Wippel, “Essence and existence” In *The Cambridge history of later medieval philosophy*, eds. Kretzmann N, Kenny A, Pinborg J (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 392.

<sup>676</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 378.

<sup>677</sup> Ibid, 379.

<sup>678</sup> Ibid.

If a being is composed of essence and existence, it follows that the essence of the being does not emerge before the existence. There is a mutual dependence since they are ordered to each other as potency is to act. For “neither essence nor existence is any kind of “thing” whatsoever; they in no way existed prior to their mutual union...That which arises is not some sort of “compound” of essence and existence, but a normal being...Essence and existence, as the potential and actual factors in beings, are only conditions of the emergence, change, and intelligibility of beings.”<sup>679</sup>

The quotation seems to warn against drifting from the main focus of metaphysical investigation, namely, being. Krapiec has a peculiar way of drawing the attention of his readers to this central theme of metaphysics. He is simply placing the essence-existence discussion in its proper place in the whole. We can summarize the focal points of this discussion thus:

- a. *The priority of existence over essence:* if realness is determined by existence, then existence is prior to essence. It would also be wrong to begin realistic cognition from an essential point of view since no essence can be without existence.
- b. *Addition to essence:* Existence adds nothing extra to essence, hence it does not make essence to become something more than it already is. While essence accounts for the identity of being, it is unintelligible, unreal without existence.
- c. *The non-autonomous relation of essence and existence:* There are no essences and existences existing in isolation of each other. Instead there is a “mutual dependence between essence and existence.
- d. *The co-temporality of essence and existence:* in the emergence of a being, an essence is not formed in isolation from existence. An essence always emerges co-temporally with existence. Existence is not added separately to an already formed essence. None exists prior to the other.
- e. *A posteriori cognition of essence and existence:* The necessary connection between essence and existence implies that we cannot separate them from the real being or study them as constitutive elements absent from the concrete being – a practice Krapiec refers to as ‘hypostatization.’

---

<sup>679</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 381.



- f. *The ordination of essence and existence*: Essence and existence are ordered to one another since they relate as act is to potency.

### 3.5.3 Arguments for the Real Difference between Essence and Existence

As stated earlier, the discussion on the real difference spans through centuries into our own time. It would be proper to present M. A. Krapiec's stance on this highly controversial discussion as affirming a real difference between essence and existence. Krapiec highlights two forms of cognitive justifications for discovering the real difference and composition of essence and existence in contingent beings. These cognitive justifications can either be direct or indirect. The direct justifications are arguments that flow from the interaction between essence and existence in concrete beings while the indirect justifications are arguments that flow from the consequences of rejecting the real distinction.

For direct justifications, Krapiec offers seven arguments as follows:

- a. *Analysis of what is cognized as essence*: the apprehension of an essence of a being implies apprehending the features or nature of that being. For example, in apprehending *man* we apprehend both *rationality* and *animality* as important characteristics of *man*. And even if we enumerate all the features which inhere in a man, we will never mention existence. Hence existence is conceptually different from essence and both of them form a single being. If the reverse were the case, if existence is part of the essence of a being, then there would be only one being who would be absolute. Ontic multiplicity would be inconceivable. But the distinction does not only occur on the conceptual order. If there is no identity of essence and existence in the conceptual order, then they cannot have an identity in the real order.
- b. *Analysis of what is cognized as existence in contingent beings*: in our cognition of the functionality of existence, we discover that to exist is to be in act. Part of the functionality of act is that it is the perfection of being. This perfection consists in the reception of new forms which propels the being towards its *telos*. When we consider the source of these new forms we will discover that they do not proceed from the substantial form, since the possession of a new substantial form relinquishes the previous one. These new forms can only be accidental forms which are proper to potency. And since the potential sub-ontic element in being is essence, we can conclude that a contingent being is made up of essence and existence.

- c. *Contingency and imperfection as justifications for composition*: An absolute being is considered, using the terms of Thomas Aquinas, to be *Ipsium Esse Subsistens*. The being of the absolute is defined by simplicity and identity of essence and existence. Having established in (a) and (b) that contingent beings are composed and lack simplicity, we can argue from the point of view of contingency that essence and existence are the elements of this composition. Sequel to this, the simplicity of the absolute springs from the fact that there is no potency in it, it is pure act (*actus purus*). Since change and decay are real cognitive experiences, Krapiec argues that contingent beings are composed, obviously of essence and existence.
- d. *The retrogressive effect of a denial of the essence-existence composition*:<sup>680</sup> According to Krapiec, a denial of the essence-existence composition destroys several centuries of development made, taking philosophy back to Parmenides, to the very heart of monistic interpretation. Being would become a closed circle where nothing comes in or goes out. But experience teaches us that when one being forfeits its existence, for example, through death, other beings are not destroyed due to that single loss of existence. Hence there is plurality, multiplicity and composition in being.
- e. *The nature of the relation between essence and existence*: Krapiec appeals to the distinction between relative and absolute identity, insisting that the relation between essence and existence in contingent beings produces relative identity as against absolute identity which is found only in the Absolute. In that case there is a real ontological difference in the order of being. This differentiation also occurs on the conceptual level.
- f. *Conceptual consideration of matter and form as constitutive elements of being*: matter and form constitute the essence of a being. Neither prime matter nor substantial form nor a combination of both is identical with existence. Hence ‘existence’ is ‘another’ in comparison to them and hence forms an integral part of being.
- g. *Ontic consideration on the basis of the principle of act and potency*: since matter and form are related on the basis of act and potency and since we already established the real difference between act and potency, then essence and existence are different and real on the basis of this same principle. But here we deal with essence as “real ontic

---

<sup>680</sup> This looks like an indirect argument since it proceeds from an “effect” perspective.

potency” and existence as “real ontic act” in differentiation from the conceptual justification in (f).

For indirect justifications, we notice that as indicated above, they spring from arguments which proceed from the consequences of the denial of a real distinction. M. A. Krapiec presents two of such arguments:

*a. Monistic and pantheistic consequences of the denial of the essence-existence composition:* the point in (c) shows that the identity of essence and existence can only occur in the Absolute, who alone is simple, necessary, perfect and without any cause. In the Absolute we see a uniqueness of identity that is not found in any other being. A denial of the composition of essence and existence in contingent beings would transform them into necessary beings. Hence there would not be only one Absolute since every being would become simple, perfect and absolute. All beings would have the same nature (monism). That would be absurd and contradictory.

*b. The finitude and causation of contingent beings as justification for composition of essence and existence:*<sup>681</sup> infinity as one of the qualities of a perfect being is reserved only for the Absolute. Since there can be only one Absolute being, it follows that there can be only one infinite being. Therefore contingent beings are finite. Being finite, contingent beings are caused and participate in existence. Hence Krapiec concludes that “whatever is not existence by its own essence, has in itself something that participates (the subject) and something in which it participates (existence), and so real participation presupposes real composition.”

I consider these arguments to be formidable with respect to the series of attacks on the real distinction of essence and existence. Although some of these arguments are similar, in my opinion, there is no doubt that they form an agglomeration of defences for the real distinction of the essence-existence constitution in contingent beings. The demonstration of the discovery of the essence-existence composition through spontaneous cognition and metaphysical separation has already been done in the earlier chapters. Hence it would be superfluous to undertake such task.

I conclude by stating that the constitution of essence and existence answers the question on the contingency of being. The real world is not made up of pre-existing essences to which existences are added. Rather being, as a concretely existing thing, is composed of essence and

---

<sup>681</sup> It is clear that this is a direct argument since it does not proceed from the consequence of non-acceptance of the essence-existence distinction.

existence. Hence there is a differentiation of beings: finite being as different from the infinite being; contingent being as different from the Necessary Being. And since we live in a world that is made up of non-necessary beings, it is logical to argue we live in a caused world in which whatever exists owes its being to the *Actus Purus*, the *Ipsum Esse Subsistens*.

### 3.6 The Composition of Being as Foundation for the Causal Cognition of Being

The central theme of this chapter remains the composition of being. I have exposed Krapiec's ideas on act and potency, substance and accidents, matter and form, essence and existence as sub-ontic elements which account for the dynamism, identity, mutability and contingency of being within the ambience of the composite character of being. According to Krapiec, there is another way we could cognize the composite nature of being, namely, causal cognition. Borrowing from Aristotle, He writes:

If there were no multiplicity of elements (things, attributes, etc.) but only one element, if the thing or system of things were noncomposite, then the question “due to what” – i.e., “due to what element is something what it is in a given aspect” – would be devoid of all meaning, since every noncomposite thing is evident *per se*. Aristotle gave a detailed justification of the necessity of the existence of elements in a thing or system of beings in order for the question “due to what” to be asked at all...If ontic pluralism is possible only where there is ontic composition from a multiplicity of elements, then it is meaningful to ask about causes in different aspects, with regard to both a group of beings, as well as an individual being, and it is even meaningful to ask which element among the many justifies a thing in a given aspect.<sup>682</sup>

Following Aristotle, Krapiec argues that *dia ti*, a question which is at the heart of philosophical cognition, finds its voice within the context of ontic composition. If contingent being were simple, non-composite, the question “why” would not only be unnecessary, but it will be meaningless. The implication of composition, as evident from the above quotation, is that simple beings do not need sub-ontic elements to be explained. Secondly, contingent beings are in need of explanation on the grounds of their composition. These composite elements could be explained as causal elements. In this sense, a cause should not be understood as mere verbal explanations but “something (or someone) concrete that makes it possible to provide a noncontradictory explanation of mutable reality.”<sup>683</sup> And thirdly, although indirectly implied in the quotation, a composite being does not have all its explanations within. There must be a cause outside of it to explain it.

---

<sup>682</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics, An Outline*, 409-410; cf. Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation and Analogy*, 49.

<sup>683</sup> Mieczysław A. Krapiec, “Przyczyny bytu” [Causes of Being], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 8 (2007): 527-545.

### 3.6.1 Historical Development and Etymological Considerations in the Causal Cognition of Being

In the second chapter of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle mentions four factors which should be sought for a valid scientific consideration: (a) *that* a thing (X) is; (b) *why* X is; (c) *if* X is; (d) and *what* X is.”<sup>684</sup> Later, he argues that seeking *what* a thing is and *why* a thing is are the same (*Apost* 90<sup>a</sup>14). Hence Aristotle proceeds to make his case for the four causes. It should be recalled that the importance of the causes for Aristotle should be considered from the perspective of its importance for scientific cognition, as Krapiec puts it: “the cognition of causes was, for Aristotle, an attribute of scientific cognition.”<sup>685</sup> According to Aristotle one cannot claim to have an in-depth knowledge of being if one has no knowledge of the cause of the being.<sup>686</sup> He even identified the subject matter of metaphysics to be the first causes.<sup>687</sup>

Aristotle admits that he was not the first philosopher to consider reality from the point of view of causal cognition. He shows the extensive achievements of his predecessors and systematized and completed their viewpoints. Andrea Falcon shows that causal cognition emerged at the very beginning of philosophy. And Although Aristotle is known to have developed an extensive and more systematic version of the discussion, he was simply following a tradition that was prior to him.<sup>688</sup> Before I expose this foundation on which Aristotle built on, I wish to delve into the meaning of the term cause.

#### *Arche – pricipium – aitia*

In his etymological presentation of the word cause, Krapiec connects the word αἰτία [aitía], which means *cause* with the Greek ἀρχή [arche] (beginning, origin) and its Latin equivalent *principium* (principle).<sup>689</sup> But this connection does not swallow up the distinctness of each of these terms. The distinction is found in Aristotle’s Metaphysics.

We call an origin<sup>690</sup> (1) that part of a thing from which one would start first, e.g. a line or a road has an origin either of the contrary directions. (2) That from which each thing would best be originated, e.g. we must sometimes begin to learn not from the first point and the origin of the thing, but from the point from which we should learn most easily. (3) That from which (as an

---

<sup>684</sup> *APost* 89<sup>b</sup>24.

<sup>685</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 407. In *Met* 982<sup>a</sup>1, Aristotle writes: “Clearly then wisdom is knowledge about certain causes and principles.”

<sup>686</sup> *Phys* 194<sup>b</sup>17-20.

<sup>687</sup> *Met* 982<sup>a</sup>1.

<sup>688</sup> Falcon, Andrea, “Aristotle on Causality”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/aristotle-causality/>>.

<sup>689</sup> “A cause, in this conception, is close to the very ancient concept of the ἀρχή (*principium*), which in Polish is called “początek-zasada” [beginning-principle], See Mieczysław A. Krapiec, “Przyczyny bytu,” 527-545.

<sup>690</sup> The word translated here is ‘ἀρχή’.

immanent part) a thing first arises, e.g. as the keel of a ship and the foundation of a house, while in animals some suppose the heart, others the brain, others some other part, to be of this nature. (4) That from which (*not* as an immanent part) a thing first arises, and from which the movement or the change naturally first proceeds, as a child comes from the father and the mother, and a fight from abusive language. (5) That by whose choice that which is moved is moved and that which changes changes, e.g. the magistracies in cities, and oligarchies and monarchies and tyrannies, are called origins, and so are the arts, and of these especially the architectonic arts. (6) That from which a thing can first be known; for this is also called the origin of the thing, e.g. the hypotheses are origins of demonstrations. (Causes are spoken of in an equal number of senses; for all causes are origins...

We call a cause (1) that from which (as immanent material) a thing comes into being, e.g. the bronze of the statue and the silver of the saucer, and the classes which include these. (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the formula of the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g. the ratio 2:1 and number in general are causes of the octave) and the parts of the formula. (3) That from which the change or the freedom from change first begins, e.g. the man who has deliberated is a cause and the father a cause of the child, and in general the maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing. (4) The end, i.e. that for the sake of which a thing is, e.g. health is the cause of walking. For why does one walk? We say 'in order that one may be healthy', and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause.<sup>691</sup>

For Aristotle to be an *aitia* is to be a form of *arche*, a principle of some sort. Krapiec deduces two conclusions from this fragment of the metaphysics: principle and cause have a point of convergence but they do not convey exactly the same thing. While all causes are principles (origins) not all principles have positive impact in the emergence of a being as causes do. Hence Krapiec divides all principles into two main parts: in the order of thought and in the ontic order. The principles in the order of thought do not lead to the generation and corruption of beings. But the principles in the ontic sphere that are positive (since some can be negative), and yield to generation and corruption can rightly be called causes.

The second point from this excerpt is that in realistic cognition, the complexity in being and the processes in nature could be explained through four causes. Using the first instance (the bronze of a statue and other examples cited by Aristotle), the causes are thematised thus:

- The material cause: "that from which," e.g., the bronze of the statue.
- The formal cause: "the form" or "pattern" e.g., the shape of the statue.
- The efficient cause: "the agent that initiates the change" e.g., the father of a child, the artisan that makes the statue.
- The final cause: "the end, i.e., that for the sake of which a thing is," for example, walking in order to be healthy.

As stated earlier, the discoveries of these four causes by Aristotle were built upon the foundation laid by his predecessors. The first philosophers who sought to answer this question,

---

<sup>691</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 1012<sup>b</sup>32- 1013<sup>a</sup>23.

resorted to some elements and principles as the factors responsible for generation or change in the natural world. In the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle discusses his predecessors, his aim was to review their claims to discover if they were accurate in their discoveries or if there are important details left out from their discoveries.<sup>692</sup>

Aristotle begins with the Ionian school which is known for their adherence to material causality as the factor responsible for change and permanence in being. Aristotle acknowledges that while they agree on this specific function of matter, they differ on the *whatness* of this matter. Aristotle writes:

Thales, the founder of this school of philosophy, says the principle is water (for which reason he declared that the earth rests on water)...He got his notion from this fact, and is from the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and that water is the origin of the nature of moist things.

...Anaximenes and Diogenes make air prior to water, and the most primary of the simple bodies, while Hippiasus of Metapontium and Heraclitus of Ephesus say this is fire, and Empedocles says it is of the four elements, adding a fourth – earth to those which have been named;

...Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who, though older than Empedocles, was later in his philosophical activity, says the principles are infinite in number; for he says almost all the things that are homogeneous and are generated and destroyed.<sup>693</sup>

These philosophers held to the traditional elements of water, air, fire and earth. Aristotle, however, indicates that material causality is not sufficient to explain generation, change and corruption. He states: “from these facts one might think that the only cause is the so-called material cause.”<sup>694</sup> As time went on, philosophers discovered that changeable things do not experience change just on their own accord; there is “that from which comes the beginning of movement.”<sup>695</sup> The philosophers reasoned that wood does not transform into a bed on its own, neither does a bronze change into a statue unaided. This led to the search for the efficient cause. The efficient cause would elude the grasp of those who held onto a monistic conception of the world. But those who held onto two elements or more were more likely to discover this second cause. Hence Anaxagoras was credited for his idea that *nous* was responsible for things and order in the world. Aristotle also credits Empedocles for viewing love and hate as principles of motion. For Aristotle, although these philosophers had an idea of this second cause, they did not fully comprehend it and were unable to fully explain them. Aristotle criticises Anaxagoras

---

<sup>692</sup> *Met* I, 983<sup>b</sup>5, “For obviously they too speak of certain principles and causes; to go over their views, then, will be of profit to the present inquiry, for we shall either find another kind of cause, or be more convinced of the correctness of those which we now maintain.”

<sup>693</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 983<sup>b</sup>20-984<sup>a</sup>15; Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation and Analogy*, 19-20.

<sup>694</sup> *Met* 984<sup>a</sup>15.

<sup>695</sup> *Met* 984<sup>a</sup>25.

for using his idea of efficient cause as a *deus ex machina*, using it only when it suits him. For Empedocles, there is less criticism, since he explains reality using efficient causality but only insufficiently.<sup>696</sup> Another set of philosophers who cognized efficient causality were Leucippus and Democritus. In their explanation, our world comprises of the elements “full and empty.” These are material causes. While full is being, empty is non-being. Shape, order and position account for the differences in beings. These three differences are regarded as causes.<sup>697</sup> These philosophers obviously expressed some improved form of understanding than the Ionians, yet their understanding was shallow.

The next step was made by the Pythagoreans who committed themselves to mathematical studies. They held that number is the principle of nature and reality. Number is prior to all things and all things are expressible through numbers. The Pythagoreans also made a great contribution that influenced the thought of Plato. They held that “things exist by imitation of numbers.”<sup>698</sup> This imitation was renamed by Plato to be participation. However Plato added that things did not participate in numbers, rather, they participated in the Forms or Ideas (influenced by Socrates’ definitional ingenuity). The Ideas or Forms, in turn, are products of the One. Hence Plato subscribes to material and formal causality.

The discovery of material, efficient and formal causes for Aristotle are insufficient to explain *dia ti* – “due to what.” This leads to the discovery of the fourth cause: the final cause. In different texts both in the *Metaphysics*, *Physics* and *Parts of Animal*, Aristotle argues for and defends final causality. For instance, in the *Metaphysics*, I 7, 988b6-15, Aristotle argues that his predecessors had a glimpse of teleology, of the end of activity, but they could not grasp it as a distinct cause in its nature. He writes:

That for the sake of which actions and changes and movements take place, they assert to be a cause in a way, but not in this way, i.e. not in the way in which it is its nature to be a cause. For those who speak of reason or friendship class these causes as goods; they do not speak, however, as if anything that exists either existed or came into being for the sake of these, but as if movements started from these. In the same way those who say the One or the existent is the good, say that it is the cause of substance, but not that substance either is or comes to be for the sake of this. Therefore it turns out that in a sense they both say and do not say the good is a cause; for they do not call it a cause qua good but only incidentally.<sup>699</sup>

Although some authors have questioned if Aristotle distinguished finality as a cause in its own right, Krapiec however, follows the distinction of the four causes above. While the material

---

<sup>696</sup> *Met* 985<sup>a</sup>20.

<sup>697</sup> *Met* 985<sup>b</sup>1-20.

<sup>698</sup> *Met* 987<sup>b</sup>5-10.

<sup>699</sup> *Met* 988<sup>b</sup>6-15; cf. 984<sup>b</sup>8-22. See also, *GA* 789<sup>b</sup>1-15; 778<sup>b</sup>7-19.



cause and formal cause constitute the internal causes of a material being, the efficient and final cause are the external causes. A brief explanation of these causes would show the functionality of these causes and how they fit into the realistic scheme of Krapiec's realistic metaphysics.

### 3.6.2 Material Causation

Krapiec reiterates the Aristotelian definition of matter as “that from which something arises and endures.”<sup>700</sup> Matter is important for the generation of material beings, for the existence and endurance of material beings and for the alteration and modification in material beings. The reason behind this importance is that matter is the basic stuff (*urstuff*) from which things are made. The determining factor which account for the inclusion of matter as a cause is its passive receptivity. This confirms the nature of matter as pure potentiality. Krapiec identifies various instances where the causality of matter is manifested: firstly, and in a primary sense, it is manifested “in prime matter in relation to substantial form.”<sup>701</sup> Commenting on the centrality of prime matter to the understanding of material causality, Krapiec opines that prime matter is vital for a comprehension of material cause.<sup>702</sup> While material causality applies to prime matter and substantial form in a primary sense, it applies to these bunch of relations in an analogical sense: “matter and form (or form alone) in relation to existence; a material whole in relation to accidents; one accident in relation to another (e.g., quantity, in relation to place), and real dispositions in relation to new forms of being (whether substantial or accidental forms).”<sup>703</sup>

Material causation has effects: “the reception of form, the constitution together with form of a whole material being, and functioning as the subject of generation.”<sup>704</sup> These effects apply to material causation analogically. Based on these effects, Krapiec extracts important traits of material causation: firstly, material causation leads to the “emergence” of form which is a correlate of matter and which cannot exist without matter. Secondly, material causation leads to limitation and individuation of forms; thirdly, material causation renders form to be non-transferable and accounts for substantial unity in being.<sup>705</sup>

---

<sup>700</sup> *Met* 1042<sup>a</sup> ff.

<sup>701</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 415.

<sup>702</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>703</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>704</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>705</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 415; Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation and Analogy*, 54.

### 3.6.3 The functionality of Formal causation

Formal causation depends on material causation for its intelligibility. Hence the explanation of formal causation is done in relation to material causation. Krapiec distinguishes internal and external formal causes:

Internal causation: internal formal cause refers to the function of the form in its act from within. Two emphasis for Krapiec in the explanation of internal formal causation is: a. the immediate actualization of matter and b. the lack of intermediary between matter and form. If the actualization of matter by form is not immediate, it presupposes the pre-existence of matter and form before they are co-joined in a being. Such explanation is contradictory to basic understanding of being as upheld in realistic cognition. The consequence of such pre-existence is: we cannot argue for substantial unity since each of these correlates would have existed independently of each other.

Form is not why a being exists; it is what organizes a being and determines nature of activity in a being. Therefore when Krapiec defines being as that which exists and has a determinate content, we see this separation of the act of existence and the form. In the relationship between existence and form, existence is prior to form because it is the “ultimate act of a being,”<sup>706</sup> while form, “presupposing the existence of a being...organizes matter into a definite way of acting.”<sup>707</sup> The above explanation is the primary function of formal causality.

Formal causality has a secondary function. This applies not to the relationship between substantial form and prime matter, instead, it applies to form and matter after generation. Change entails that a new form is acquired thanks to the potentiality of matter which is able to absorb old forms. The relation of *oppositio privationis* existing between the old and new forms makes it impossible for both forms to exist concurrently in one being. The emergence of one form necessitates the loss of the former form.

#### *External formal causation*

External formal causation is connected with the Aristotelian twist in the Platonic theory of Ideas. While Plato claimed that the ideas existed ‘substantively,’ Aristotle claimed that the ideas exist in the intellect. Krapiec distinguishes two ways of understanding ideas or concepts existing in the intellect: a. concepts that are apprehended spontaneously. They are objective

---

<sup>706</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 417.

<sup>707</sup> Ibid.

and are traditionally referred to as *quo*. The second sense of concepts as existing in the intellect is *quod*. This occurs when the object of cognition is what we know already; a concept that is the object of my reflection. Krapiec identifies this with the exemplar. For Krapiec, an exemplar is a concept, a specific kind of concept. When a concept is reconstructed and replicated in a different form, that concept serves as the exemplar. For instance, an architect reflects on the concept of a house and draws it. The concept existing in his mind is the exemplar. The way the idea exists in the intellect of the human applies analogically to the way it exists in the mind of the God. The major concern for Krapiec was to show the existentiality of the idea as it exists in the Absolute's mind. Realistic cognition cannot regard an idea as abstract since its starting point is from the concretely existing thing. The existence and knowability of the idea is guaranteed by First Being as source of the idea. Secondly, Krapiec insists that the ideas exist individually in God and these individual existences do not compromise the simplicity of God. The individuality of the ideas in God counteracts universal ideas championed by Plato.

Following Thomas Aquinas, Krapiec shows the connection between exemplary cause, efficient cause and final cause: "As a result of spontaneous cognition, there arises an initial desire...a "first love" for an object. This original inclination is the aspect of *final causation*. That love is then more precisely "determined" by reflection upon, by constructing, the cognitive content. This is the aspect of the appearance of the idea-exemplar, or *exemplary causation*. Next, the final cause, which has been more precisely determined by the exemplar, in turn, determines the direction and the nature of activity. The "summoning" of this activity into real being is the aspect constituting efficacy itself, or *efficient causality*."<sup>708</sup>

### 3.6.4 *Efficient Causality*

Krapiec shows the progression of the development of the idea of efficient causality from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas. The background of Aristotle's worldview provides answer to his view on efficient causality. In Aristotle's purview, one could not pinpoint a beginning for the world because the world was necessary and eternal. But this necessity does not mean that the world was free from change. Only the divine sphere, by virtue of *ether*, are unchanging in their substance. However they undergo accidental changes by way of motion. The Aristotelian God was the unmoved mover who, although did not create the world, exerts profound influence on it through its act of contemplation. This contemplative act sets the whole heavenly bodies and

---

<sup>708</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 419.

our world in motion. In this way the Aristotelian God is an efficient cause. Efficient causality became associated with and traceable to the source of motion. Aristotle therefore defines efficient causality as “that from which motion originally emanates.” (*Met* 983<sup>a</sup>3) and “the original and subsistent source from which motion is originally emanated outward (*Met* 1033<sup>a</sup> 25).

Only specific beings are able to be the source of motion. These are basically substantial beings which are internally organized by form. Form is the nexus of all inclinations in substantial beings and these inclinations come to light through motion. But what form does as an internal cause is different from what the substantial being does as a source of motion. While form is inward, efficient causality is outward.

Thomas Aquinas operated with a different template and world view. Although there were not so many changes in astronomy at the time, the world was seen from its contingent perspective, as something that was not necessary and has a beginning in time. The definition of efficient causality, as the first source of motion, remained unchanged. However since motion in Aristotle’s sense applies only to matter which is eternal, Thomas Aquinas’ sense of motion applied differently to the generation of a new being. Hence God, in Thomistic sense is an efficient cause because he creates being anew and does not simply add form to pre-existing matter. Hence God as efficient cause, makes things to exist. From this perspective efficient causality acquires the meaning of bringing things into existence.

Efficient causality leads to a hierarchy of being based on the ability to ‘produce’ beings. First in line is the absolute who creates and second are secondary or instrumental efficient causes. Melina G. Mouzala states that “according to what is stated in *De Generatione et Corruptione* I 7, 324<sup>a</sup>24–b14, the term to *kinoun* (the mover) and the corresponding term to *poioun* (the producer) have a double significance and application. They apply to that which contains the originative source of the movement, i.e. the first in the series of causes of a movement, and also to “that which is last” (to *eschaton*) in the series of causes; namely to the cause next to the body which is being moved and to that which is coming to be. The mover in the sense of *eschaton* (“that which is last”), while moving and acting upon a subject, is always moved by that which it moves or is always altered by that on which it acts.<sup>33</sup> So the proximate efficient

cause in Aristotle's causal theory is that which by directly acting upon a subject brings about its motion, change, generation or destruction."<sup>709</sup>

### 3.6.5 Final Causation

Krapiec connects final causality with transcendental good. As already discussed in transcendental good, that which an act tends towards (the end) is the good. So the end plays an important role both in our understanding of being from the point of view of the transcendental properties as well as in our understanding of causation. Krapiec mentions different meanings associated with end: (a) *finis terminus, or finis qui*, the point of fulfilment or last stop of motion; (b) *finis quo*, the action which leads to the acquisition of the end; (c) *finis cui*, "the person to whom the desiring agent subordinates the desired good;" (d) *finis cuius gratia*, the motive which prompts an action that is directed towards a target. This last sense of end is the one connected to causality in Krapiec's opinion. Hence the end as a cause is defined as "a reason of being for the fact of emanation of activity in an efficient agent."<sup>710</sup> It corresponds to Aristotle's statement in the *Metaphysics*: "In yet another way we call a cause as the end; this is that for the sake of which – e.g. of walking, health. For why does one walk? We say, "in order to be healthy," and speaking so we think we have given the cause."<sup>711</sup>

The modality of final causality

- a. Cognition and desire play vital roles in the initiation, pursuit and realization of an end through purposeful activities. However, cognition is not ultimate determinant in the realization of an end. In realistic cognition, as Krapiec shows, cognition and desire operate in opposite directions; while cognition goes inward, desires goes outward to capture the object that is desired.
- b. We cannot explain efficient causality in human beings without the aid of finality and end which the conscious efficient being pursues. This is possible, all thanks to the faculty of the will, which seeks unification with the good it perceives. This driving force for unification is called the first act of love.<sup>712</sup>
- c. The end operates differently in conscious beings on two grounds: in the exercise of moral actions and in the exercise of productive actions. Non-rational beings also have

---

<sup>709</sup> Melina G. Mouzala "Aristotle's Criticism of the Platonic Forms as Causes in *De Generatione et Corruptione* II 9. A Reading Based on Philoponus' Exegesis" in *Peitho/Examina Antiqua* 1, 7 (2016): 131-132. [http://peitho.home.amu.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Peitho-7-2016-06\\_Mouzala.pdf](http://peitho.home.amu.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Peitho-7-2016-06_Mouzala.pdf).

<sup>710</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 438-439.

<sup>711</sup> Aristotle, *Met* 194<sup>b</sup>24; 194<sup>b</sup>32-35.

<sup>712</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 440.

ends peculiar to them. The discovery of movement towards ends in non-rational beings proceeds from an analysis of the activities of rational beings.

- d. Since things do not occur arbitrarily in non-rational beings, purposeful activities occur only when certain conditions are met. We cannot explain why these activities occur without reference to an inclination that leads to the action. This inclination is the final cause.
- e. In realistic cognition we emphasize the analogous application of the function of finality in rational and non-rational creatures. Just as desire and cognition are indispensable conditions for realization of an end, so are various conditions for action in non-rational beings, conditions for an end. An example could be heat as a condition for expansion. Just as the will movement of the will is called “the first act of love,” so the inclination towards the end in non-rational beings is called “cosmic love.” In both rational and non-rational beings, the final cause is analogously “the reason of being for the very emergence of the fact of activity.”

#### *Cognitive Consequences*

- 1. Realistic cognition is committed to a holistic explanation of the nature of reality. Any attempt to offer only material explanations, formal explanations, efficient explanations or final explanations fail to capture this completeness which realistic cognition aims at. Here, the insufficiency of only one or less than four cause(s) is emphasized. The diversity of the roles of these causes in being shows the composite nature of being, which is made up of various element with different operational principles to account for various observable phenomena in nature.
- 2. The question *dia ti* is not simply any kind of redundant question, but a valid scientific question which leads to real valid explanation of generation, change and the like. The causal explanation initiated by Aristotle in this regard, and developed over time, remains valid metaphysical explanations
- 3. The causes are called principles because they contribute positively to the emergence of being. They are not principles from the logical sense of the word since they have real impact in the real, ontic order.
- 4. Explanation of phenomena as chance or luck runs contrary to causal explanation of reality since whatever is moved is moved by another. We also see the world of persons, animals, plants and things as a purposeful world, an object of love and desire.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

The previous chapters established that being as being is central to metaphysics. They also reveal the inalienable properties belonging to every being. This chapter sought to offer a deeper insight into the nature of being, directing our cognitive prowess to particular aspects which cannot be grasped in our consideration of being as being or the transcendental properties of being. The phenomena of dynamism, identity, change and contingency are also real and demand rational explanations.

Krapiec exposed various attempts to offer such rational explanation. However, he insisted that when confronted with the problem of dynamism, identity, change and contingency realistic cognition does not succumb to the pressures of the sciences in search of a method for explanation. Through metaphysical separation, we have demonstrated how one can offer metaphysical justifications for the act-potency composition, the matter-form composition, the substance-accident composition as well as the essence-existence composition. These compositions provide sufficient reasons for identity, change and contingency which form part of our daily experiences. Causal explanations are also alternative explanations of how the elements and principles operating in every being justify the phenomena that occur in nature.

One important factor we have seen in this chapter is the systematic organization of Krapiec's work which denotes that matter and form, act and potency, essence and existence and the casual explanation of being are deeply connected and are not separate problems.

## Chapter Four: Metaphysical and Methodological Considerations of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec's Metaphysics

### Introduction

The preceding chapters have responded affirmatively to the possibility and the scientificity questions following Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec's philosophical template. I have demonstrated, using M. A. Krąpiec's specific method of metaphysical separation, how metaphysical knowledge is attained. In this chapter, I will undertake an analysis of the central elements of M. A. Krąpiec's ideas. Based on these elements I will attempt to identify or categorize Albert Krąpiec, pointing out what he shares in common with other philosophers as well as where he differs from them. Secondly, I will discuss certain methodological tools which could be extracted from his metaphysics. Thirdly, I will consider the methodological incompatibility of other methods in juxtaposition with M. A. Krąpiec's realistic thought. And finally, an attempt on some disputed questions will be made.

Some parts of this chapter would witness a rise in reference to the works of Stanisław Kamiński especially in the methodological considerations. I read these works as a framework bearing the metaphysical and methodological imprint of Krąpiec's thoughts. Kamiński's works, in a large part, retain Krąpiec's essential principles of operation and concepts in an unsullied and unmodified manner.<sup>713</sup> The rise in frequency of these texts should not be seen as a replacement or comparative analysis of both philosophers.

The division of this chapter into metaphysical and methodological considerations serve both structural, systemic and didactic purposes. It is clear that metaphysical and methodological elements overlap. However, the division may counter any suggestion that Krąpiec was committed to "metaphysics only" or "methodology only." Since one of the basic questions of this thesis focuses on how to do realistic metaphysics, one could presume that Krąpiec simply developed a methodology for metaphysics. But this distinction tries to show that he could not have developed a methodology without addressing important metaphysical questions or taking significant metaphysical positions. In my opinion, these two do not exclude each other. I agree with the thoughts of Kamiński in this regard: "...one should not forget that considering metaphysics is also metaphysics, which means that even methodological remarks and considerations of such a subject-matter are conditioned, to a greater or lesser extent, by some

---

<sup>713</sup> Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics," in *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics* (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2019), 299-300.



metaphysics, and they take place in an atmosphere of a certain kind of metaphysics.”<sup>714</sup> As in my assessment of Kamiński’s work, the same holds for Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec: “to be philosophical is to be inclusively metaphysical, realistic and methodic.”<sup>715</sup>

#### 4.1 Metaphysical Considerations

Under this heading, I will discuss the focal place of existence in the philosophy of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec. The centrality of existence leads to a connection of Albert Krąpiec’s philosophy with that of Thomas Aquinas, Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain.

##### 4.1.1 The centrality of existence in M. A. Krąpiec’s Metaphysics

Existence, here must not be understood from the existentialist perspective,<sup>716</sup> which is less concerned about objective knowledge and is permeated with individual and subjective truths.<sup>717</sup>

In addition, existence should not be understood as something general (in the sense of indeterminateness). Existence in the way Krąpiec understands it is connected with being. Being (*ens*) as existing is at the heart of Krąpiec’s philosophy. But more precisely, existence is connected with act as a principle in *ens*. Krąpiec refers to it as “the factor determining the reality, the be-ing, of being itself.”<sup>718</sup> It is likely that the word *being* appears sometimes in a hyphenated form (be-ing) in Krąpiec’s *Metaphysics* to emphasize its meaning as act.

We also witness a consistent accentuation of the dual-faceted nature of being in Krąpiec’s works. The substantial and existential aspects characterize being (*ens*) as *habens esse*.<sup>719</sup>

---

<sup>714</sup> “The Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics” 71.

<sup>715</sup> Kingsley Ekeocha, Book review, On the Methodology of Metaphysics/ Z metodologii metafizyki, in *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, 3 (July – September 2018): 521-528. DOI:10.26385/SG.070325.

<sup>716</sup> Existence, for the existentialists, is focused on human existence. See Douglas Burnham, George Papandreopoulos, “Existentialism,” in *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/existent/#SH1e>.

<sup>717</sup> Steven Earnshaw, *Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006), 1.

<sup>718</sup> Krąpiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 96.

<sup>719</sup> Considerable studies on *esse* have been done by philosophers over the years. Some of which include: R. J. Henle, “Existentialism and the Judgment,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 21 (1946): 40-52; H. Renard, “The Metaphysics of the Existential Judgment,” *The New Scholasticism*, 23 (1949): 387-394; H. J. John, “The Emergence of the Act of Existing in Recent Thomism,” *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 2 (1962): 595-620; C. Fabro, “The Transcendentality of “Ens-Esse” and the Ground of Metaphysics,” *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 6 (1966): 389-487; F. D. Wilhelmsen, “The Triplex Via and the Transcendence of Esse,” *The New Scholasticism*, 44 (1970), 223-235; J. Owens, “Aquinas on Knowing Existence,” *Review of Metaphysics*, 29 (1976): 670-690; F. D. Wilhelmsen, “The Concept of Existence and the Structure of Judgment: A Thomistic Paradox,” *The Thomist*, 41 (1977): 317-349; F. D. Wilhelmsen, “Existence and Esse,” *The New Scholasticism*, 50 (1976): 20-45; J. C. Maloney, “Esse in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas,” *The New Scholasticism*, 55 (1981): 159-177; J. Nijenhuis, “‘To Be’ or ‘To Exist’: That is the Question,” *The Thomist*, 50 (1986): 353-394; O. J. Gonzalez, “The Apprehension of the Act of Being in Aquinas,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 68, 4 (1995): 475-500; L. Dewan, “St. Thomas and the Distinction Between Form and Esse in Caused Things,” *Gregorianum* 80, 2 (1999), 353-370; S. L. Brock, “On Whether Aquinas’s

Realistic cognition demands that the cognizer cannot lose sight of both angles. However, priority goes to the act of existence since it is the first thing that comes to the cognizer in the act of cognition. Existence “grabs us by the throat.” Justifications abound for the centrality of existence in Krapiec’s works. These are seen in his own expressions already:

- a. Existence has an ontic primacy: realistic metaphysics is impossible without existence. If by realistic metaphysics, a philosopher is committed to the cognition of real beings, then this cognition would be impracticable if nothing exists.<sup>720</sup> Existence determines being. Krapiec argues that the essential aspect of being would be reduced to mere abstractions without the act of existence.<sup>721</sup>
- b. Existence has an epistemic primacy.<sup>722</sup> This brings us to the question of *a priori* and *a posteriori*. If nothing exists outside of the mind, what exactly can man know? Krapiec argues: “being is the object of cognition...cognition cannot be ‘emancipated’ by depriving it of an object, since without an object cognition does not exist.”<sup>723</sup>
- c. Existence as foundation for the logical order: In many instances Krapiec shows that existence provides the base for the logical order. The law of non-contradiction, for example, would be impossible if there was no being. Existence provides the property that is distinguished from non-being.
- d. Primacy of existence as a shift from Aristotelianism: the primacy of existence means that realistic cognition is an upgrade of Aristotelian philosophy, which is hylomorphic in character but fails to account for the act of existence due to the nature of matter in the hylomorphic composition. By following the Thomistic line of argument in the constitution of being, Krapiec shows that existence and not form is the basic constitutive element in being.
- e. Existence as the basis for metaphysics as a science: commenting on Krapiec’s thought on the indispensability of existence to metaphysics as a science, Chudy writes: “according to Krapiec, without an appeal to existence as the fundamental reason for being, metaphysics

---

Ipsam Esse is Platonism,” *Review of Metaphysics*, 60 (2006): 723-757 ; J. F. X. Knasas, “Haldane’s Analytic Thomism and Aquinas’s actus essendi,” in *Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue*, ed. C. Paterson and M. S. Pugh, Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington (Routledge, 2006): 233-251; S. L. Brock, “Harmonizing Plato and Aristotle on Esse: Thomas Aquinas and the De hebdomadibus,” *Nova et Vetera*, English Edition 5, 3 (2007), 465-494; J. Mitchell, *Being and Participation: The Method and Structure of Metaphysical Reflection According to Cornelio Fabro*, 2 vols, (Rome: Pontifical Athenaeum Regina Apostolorum, 2012).

<sup>720</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 96.

<sup>721</sup> Ibid, 96 -97.

<sup>722</sup> Ibid, 96.

<sup>723</sup> Krapiec, “The Object of Philosophical Investigations,” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 44.

cannot be cultivated, and philosophy becomes at most mythology or ideology.”<sup>724</sup> Existence determines principles of being. These principles are not rules of our thinking. They are rather from being. When one is confronted with a question like: “what is the last justification of principles?” For Krapiec it is the act of existence. In this way principles belong to being. Therefore metaphysical knowledge is rational knowledge. The metaphysical principles guarantee scientificity of being.

The ontic, epistemic and logical priority of existence is pivotal in the characterization of realistic cognition. The possibility question and scientificity question of classical realistic metaphysics are demonstrable, thanks to *being qua being*, the subject matter of metaphysics and to *actus essendi*, the operative principle in being that guarantees its realism. Krapiec’s recognition of the *esse* priority differentiates him from other philosophers, who, for instance see the Aristotelian form as the basic element in being.<sup>725</sup> Taking a glance at Krapiec’s philosophy there is no doubt that his philosophy has similar characteristics with that of Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, philosophers who are known today as existential Thomists.<sup>726</sup>

#### 4.1.2 Krapiec’s Existential Metaphysics: an instantiation of Realistic Philosophy

A recent publication by Juan Manuel Burgos on personalism has differentiated three strands of Thomism which synergized into what came to be known as the Lublin School of Philosophy. According to Burgos, “this school united several tendencies with important differences amongst them: a traditional Thomism led by the professor of metaphysics Stanisław Adamczyk; existential Thomism, that is, Thomism renewed by the contributions of Maritain and Etienne Gilson and with openness to phenomenology, whose principal representative was Stefan Swieżawski; a Polish version of the transcendental Thomism of Louvain led by

<sup>724</sup> Chudy, “Mieczysław Albert Krapiec in The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, 4 (2018): 553. Doi:10.26385/sg.070428.

<sup>725</sup> Philosophers regarded as Aristotelian Thomists include: James Weisheipl, William Wallace, Vincent Smith, and Benedict Ashley. Cf. John Knasas, *Being and some Twentieth-Century Philosophers* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 9.

<sup>726</sup> Some of the Existential Thomists and their works include: Jacques Maritain, *Existence and the Existent*, trans. Lewis Galan- tierie and Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Vintage Books, 1966); For Etienne Gilson, see his *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952), chaps. 2, 5, 6; and *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. L. K. Shook (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), chap 1. For Joseph Owens, see *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985); *An Interpretation of Existence* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985); *Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1992). Other noteworthy Existential Thomist authors include John F. X. Knasas, *The Preface to Thomistic Metaphysics: A Contribution to the Neo-Thomist Debate on the Start of Metaphysics* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990); *Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003); Leo Sweeney, *Authentic Metaphysics in an Age of Unreality* (Oregon: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2007); Robert Henle, *Method in Metaphysics* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1950); Yves R. Simon, *An Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge*, trans. Vukan Kuic and Richard J. Thompson (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999).

Mieczysław Krąpiec”<sup>727</sup> While I agree with Burgos on the merger of a several strands of Thomistic orientations in the Lublin school, I wish to point out that he has misplaced the particular strand of Thomism into which Mieczysław Krąpiec adequately fits. I argue in what follows that Mieczysław Krąpiec’s appropriation of Thomism follows the Thomistic trajectory of the likes of Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson who are undoubtedly categorized as existential Thomists.

It is possible that Burgos could have been misled to consider Krąpiec as a transcendental Thomist, given the fact that the seminal foundations of transcendental Thomism is present in the works of the Prussian philosopher, Immanuel Kant and in this regard, the Lublin school of philosophy through the works of Karol Wojtyła equally engages the works of Kant in its philosophical discourse, particularly in the philosophy of human action or moral philosophy.<sup>728</sup> If this is the case, then there is a mis-reading of influences since Wojtyła’s appropriation of Thomism for his ethical project does not completely coincide with that of M. A. Krąpiec, even if both of them were closest associates at the Lublin school of philosophy. But even so, Burgos himself does not categorize Karol Wojtyła – (who was more outright than Krąpiec in engaging Kantianism as well as phenomenological traditions) - as a transcendental Thomist, hence it becomes even more surprising that he will indicate that M. A. Krąpiec is a transcendental Thomist.

Another possibility of this mis-reading could be from the fact that transcendental Thomism is widely popularized at the Catholic University of Louvain where the main figures were Desiré Cardinal Joseph Mercier and at the Jesuit house of studies, through Joseph Marechal. Given that there has been a longstanding co-operation of the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium with the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland and in fact most of the professors and students of the Catholic University of Lublin had undertaken at some stage academic exchange programmes and scholarships grants at the Catholic University of Louvain, it can be surmised too hastily that M. A. Krąpiec, who was at the Chair of Metaphysics at the philosophical department of KUL for one quarter of a century (1957-1983), perhaps was also a transcendental Thomist. No doubt, it could be the case that perhaps these academic exchanges impact on the way of philosophizing at the Catholic University of Lublin and Fr Krąpiec could not have been buffered from picking up some elements of such ‘Kantianization’ of Thomism

---

<sup>727</sup> Juan Manuel Burgos, *An Introduction to Personalism* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2018), 103.

<sup>728</sup> See Karol Wojtyła, *The Lublin Lectures [Wykłady Lubelskie]*, (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2020).

from his colleagues, yet it remains too far stretched to categorize him as a transcendental Thomist, a category into which it is not even appropriate to suggest for Karol Wojtyła.<sup>729</sup>

A third factor could also be wrongly deducible from the title of his 1957 habilitation thesis *Egzystencjalne podstawy transcendentalnej analogii bytu*. Again, we note his emphasis on the centrality of existence in the interpretation of metaphysical analogy rather than the nuance of transcendentality which is derived from metaphysical cognition of the transcendental properties of being rather than from the Kantian notion of transcendental apperception in reference to the unity of the contents of consciousness.

Thus, in all sides of the considerations, Krapiec is not a transcendental Thomist in the way it is understood as a Kantian-inspired or critical tradition of Thomism. Therefore, the claim of Juan Burgos is mistaken as it can neither be arguably corroborated from a consideration of M. A. Krapiec's works nor by any appeal to his training in Krakow and Lublin given that his doctoral in philosophy<sup>730</sup> and in theology<sup>731</sup> as well as his habilitation thesis were all supervised and

---

<sup>729</sup> Amongst Mieczysław Krapiec's associates in the Lublin School of Philosophy, the closest exposure to transcendental Thomism would have been Karol Wojtyła. This is so because Wojtyła is said to have undergone a 'Copernican Revolution' in his encounter with Thomistic metaphysics into which he had been first introduced in 1942 by his director of studies, Kazimierz Kansak who asked him to read the book *Ontologia czyli Metafizyka* (*Ontology, That is to say Metaphysics*) written by Rev. Kazimierz Weis of Lwow. Weis himself was under the influence of the transcendental Thomism of Desire Cardinal Mercier from Louvain, and he had tried to rethink Thomism in relationship to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Cf. Andre Frossard, *"Be Not Afraid!": Pope John Paul II Speaks Out On his Life, his Beliefs, and his Inspiring Vision for Humanity* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1984), 17.

<sup>730</sup> Between 1939, through the period of the World War II, up till 1946, Mieczysław Albert Krapiec studied both philosophy and theology at the Dominican Colleges in Krakow and Warsaw, at the end of which he obtained a doctorate degree in philosophy on the basis of the work *O miłości przyrodzonej nade wszystko względem Boga* (*On the Inherent love of God for all things*). This work was supervised by Dominican priest professor of both theology and philosophy, Jacek Adam Woroniecki. Woroniecki had trained at the Catholic University of Fribourg in Switzerland where in 1909 he had obtained a doctorate degree in theology on the basis of the thesis: *Główne podstawy socjologii tomistycznej*. In 1916, he was offered a teaching position at the Angelicum in Rome but due to the outbreak of the first world war, he could not assume this post and so in 1919, just one year into the historical beginning of the Catholic University of Lublin, Fr Idziego Radziszewskiego asked him to become the director of the priests' hostel, *-Księży Konwikt Studentów*, as well as a teaching position at the theology department where he taught moral theology until 1929, when he was eventually able to assume his teaching position as a professor of moral theology and pedagogy at Angelicum in Rome. Fr Woroniecki's sojourn in Rome will only last for four years as he had to return to Poland in 1933 taking up a teaching position in Warsaw and eventually in Krakow in 1939 at the beginning of the World War II. It was during this war-time period that M. A. Krapiec became his student until the latter's doctoral defence in 1946. Woroniecki died in Krakow in 1949, three years after M. A. Krapiec's doctoral defence. Significantly, it could not be said that Woroniecki is drawn towards transcendental Thomism and he could not have influenced Krapiec in this direction.

<sup>731</sup> M. A. Krapiec's affiliation to the Catholic University of Lublin stretches back to the post-World War II. Notable in 1948, he defended his second doctorate degree in theology on the basis of the thesis - *De amore hipostatico in Sanctissima Trinitate secundum St. Thomam Aquinatem* [*On the hypostatic love in the Holy Trinity according to St. Thomas Aquinas*]. This work was supervised by the first post-World War II Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, Fr Antoni Słomkowski, who was trained in dogmatic theology at the Catholic University of Strasbourg, France. Thomism in France is influenced to a greater extent by Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson both of whom are identified with existential Thomism. Hence in both his philosophical and theological trainings, M. A. Krapiec was exposed to the tradition of existential Thomism and when he began to publish his independent works, it could be noticed that he continues in this tradition. It is thus surprising that he is sometimes

reviewed by professors who are inclined more towards existential Thomism than transcendental Thomism. But even if this factor is put into consideration, we do not still find such associates of Krapiec as Karol Wojtyła (who outrightly undertakes engaging scholarly discourse with critical and phenomenological tracts from Kant and Scheler), adopting transcendental Thomism.

Perhaps a more direct corroboration of the claim I make here that M. A. Krapiec's realistic metaphysics is an instantiation of existential Thomism can be better adduced from a consideration of the features of existential Thomistic tradition. In the work, *Being and some Twentieth-Century Thomists*, John Knasas identifies important characteristics of Existential Thomism.<sup>732</sup> The first characteristic is an emphasis on the *actus essendi* as the basic principle of being. This distances existential Thomism from Aristotelian Thomism and Transcendental Thomism. The discussion here is "what is it that makes this Eve or this John an existent? Krapiec, as an existential Thomist, would declare that 'this Eve' or 'this John' is an existent because he/she possesses an act of existence (*actus essendi*). Krapiec's metaphysics, therefore distances itself from the idea that form or essence is the basic element that determines being – a hallmark of Aristotelian Thomism. It also distances itself from Transcendental Thomism which, according to Christopher Cullen, is replete with idealistic and subjectivist elements.<sup>733</sup> Realistic cognition cannot be limited to the substance-accident composition of being since matter which was an eternal component of that structure cannot account for the realness of being.

A significant element of Krapiec's existentialist strand of Thomism is its feature of realistic cognition, as characterised by *a posteriori* cognition. Experience is an important theme in Krapiec's metaphysical realism. This experience demands contact with reality. Our world is viewed as a world that exists independently of the cognizer, as an "extra-subjective object."<sup>734</sup> As *a posteriori* cognition, realistic metaphysics is opposed to *a priori* cognition. This kind of

---

misrepresented, I could add -mistakenly, as patronizing the Kantian-influenced transcendental Thomism, which in actual fact, he tends to criticize as incapable of arriving at a realistic metaphysics of being.

<sup>732</sup> Knasas, *Being and some Twentieth-Century Philosophers*, 14-16.

<sup>733</sup> Christopher Cullen mentions six areas which justifies the characterization of Transcendental Thomism as such. They include: "(1) Man as questioning is the certain point for metaphysics; (2) man is already with being in its totality; (3) being is subjectivity; (4) the intellect pre-apprehends Infinite Esse; (5) the agent intellect is the power of forming the first principles of transcendental validity; (6) the first principles function as a priori conditions for knowledge. These positions constitute a rejection of realism." Cf. Christopher M. Cullen, "Transcendental Thomism: Realism Rejected" in Brendan Sweetman (ed.) *The Failure of Modernism: The Cartesian Legacy and Contemporary Pluralism* (Washington D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 73.

<sup>734</sup> M. A. Krapiec, "A priori" [A priori in Philosophy] w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 1 (Lublin, 2000): 303-304.

cognition is regarded as “pre-judgment”<sup>735</sup> because it occurs prior to contact with real being or is made in the absence of real being. For Krapiec, *a priori* cognition occurs at different levels: it occurs in reflective cognition whereby metaphysical cognition is built on previously formulated concepts that are not products of spontaneous cognition.<sup>736</sup> A typical example of this are Plato’s Ideas. A second example of *a priori* is found in the method of philosophical explanation. Yet another example is found in the segmented use of natural language, that is, by disintegrating the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic relations of language.<sup>737</sup> In order to be a posteriori, the metaphysical process is initiated by an activation of the human faculties which are in potency in relation to the world of persons, animals, plants and things.

A third factor is immediate realism. This entails an affirmation that what the senses give us are real. They are neither representations nor imaginary features of the ungraspable real. For M. A. Krapiec, we cannot discard the data of common sense cognition because it has value not only for metaphysics or philosophy but indeed for all the sciences. It is from the data of common sense that “we affirm the existence of the world, that is, an extra-subjective cosmos, together with the human being, his life, his cognition, desires, and activity. If such a world exists, then metaphysics, like every other science, proceeding from the premises of common sense, has as its end a distinctive ultimate cognition of this already really existing world.”<sup>738</sup> But realistic cognition goes beyond the level of common sense cognition to seek the non-contradictable factors in being on account of which a being is considered real.

The points marshalled out do not entail that there is absolute agreement of thought between M. A. Krapiec and all existential Thomists. There are some areas of agreements and divergences that are worth considering. *There is no doubt that Krapiec came in contact with the works of Jacques Maritain and the effect of this contact is evident in the similarities in their works.* The first of which is that Metaphysics is the science that studies *ens in quantum ens*. The *ens* that metaphysics studies should not be treated as “logical being” or “scientific being” of the natural sciences.<sup>739</sup> Maritain emphasized the distinction of essence and existence in being. He argues

---

<sup>735</sup> Ibid.

<sup>736</sup> Ibid.

<sup>737</sup> Ibid.

<sup>738</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 36.

<sup>739</sup> Maritain states: “We must beware of a fatal error, confusing metaphysics with logic. This mistake has, in fact, been made by the moderns, many of whom maintain that this being as such is a mere word, a linguistic residuum, or else that it is a universal frame whose value is purely logical, not ontological. According to them the metaphysician has fallen victim to human language whereas in fact he passes through and beyond language to attain its intellectual source, superior to any uttered word. We must, therefore, understand clearly that the metaphysical intuition of being is *sui generis* and of powerful efficacy and therefore distinguish carefully being which is the object of metaphysics from being as it is grasped by common sense and studied by the natural sciences

that the fact *that* a thing is and the essence or *what* the being is are not one and the same thing.<sup>740</sup>

Secondly, Maritain talks of the extra-mental world, as one that exists independently of the human mind. The extra-mental world, as Maritain argues, is intelligible and is knowable and stands in relation to the human intellect that is able to grasp being. On this Maritain writes:

...the being with which we are here concerned is indeed the actual being of things, which exists in them *independently* of the knowing mind. To maintain, on the contrary, that the object of our intellect is not the being of things but the *idea* of being which it forms in itself, or more generally bound hand and foot to scepticism. For if that were the case, it would be impossible for our mind under any circumstances to conform itself to that which really is, and truth would therefore be unattainable. Moreover, the intellect would stand convicted of falsehood, for what the intellect professes to know is what things are, not what its ideas are. In reality ideas, as the consciousness of every man witnesses immediately, are our *instruments* of knowledge. If, therefore, knowledge did not apprehend the things themselves, knowing would be an operation or activity without end or object, which is absurd...The formal object of the intellect is being. What it apprehends of the very nature is what things are independently of us.<sup>741</sup>

The similarity between Maritain and Krapiec is unprecedented specifically with the reference to the existence of the external world, the intelligibility of being and the act of being. However, regarding the mode of apprehension of being, Krapiec takes a different path from Maritain. Maritain upholds that intuition is the mode by which being is grasped for “it is intuition that makes the metaphysician.”<sup>742</sup> On this point, Krapiec disagrees.

While it is obvious that Krapiec came in contact with the works of Maritain, it is Etienne Gilson that would hold a greater influence on his thoughts. M. A. Krapiec’s thoughts conforms with Etienne Gilson in the rejection of the Cartesian *cogito* as the starting point of philosophical

---

and from being as studied by logic.” Cf. Jacques Maritain, *Preface to Metaphysics* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1945), 17.

<sup>740</sup> Sweet, William, "Jacques Maritain", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/maritain/>>.

<sup>741</sup> Jacques Maritain, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (London: Continuum, 2005), 116-117.

<sup>742</sup> Maritain, *Preface to Metaphysics*, 26.



cognition,<sup>743</sup> the rejection of the use of mathematical method for doing metaphysics,<sup>744</sup> in addition to the basic elements of existential Thomism as indicated by Knasas.

Despite the influences these two great thinkers (Maritain and Gilson) have on him, M. A. Krapiec has some reservations about their philosophy. In his book, *Teoria analogii bytu* and the article *Analysis Formationis Conceptus Entis Existentialiter Considerati*, Krapiec makes his case against Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. The first, is against Maritain's idea of intuition. Krapiec argues that Maritain's proposal is incomplete – "*theoria Maritain nihilominus incompleta apparet.*"<sup>745</sup> Krapiec observed that although Maritain claims that the intellect is able to grasp the existence of a being through 'intuition,' he does not explain how the intellect does this. Hence, his theory lacks substantial justification.<sup>746</sup> Secondly, Krapiec shows that there is a separation of the sense and intellect in the grasping of existence in Maritain's philosophy.<sup>747</sup> Turning his attention to Gilson, Krapiec compliments Gilson for identifying the role of existential judgment in the grasping of the being of things, he however notices two problems associated with Gilson's theory. The first is that Gilson does not identify whether judgement takes place before or after conceptualization. The moment of judgment in the process of cognition has epistemological implications for Krapiec. If before conceptualization, then Gilson did not explain how the intellect grasps existence; if after, then there is some form of idealism in Gilson's epistemology. The second problem is how do we connect the individualness of the concrete material being to the generality which the intellect grasps in cognition? If existential judgment affirms the existence of this John or this Paul, and

---

<sup>743</sup> In the work *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge*, an English translation of the text *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance*, Gilson writes: "...a whole series of unavoidable consequences will follow, the first of which is that if we do not take the immediately self-evident existence of external beings as our starting point, it will be necessary to start with the existence of thought alone. To proceed from thought to being in any sense whatsoever is to follow an idealist methodology. And so immediate realism is condemned to fall into either idealism or self-contradiction. In point of fact, immediate realism spontaneously becomes self-contradictory. In order to justify its pretensions to the title "critical" it became necessary to find an "incontestable starting point" upon which realism could be based. This starting point had to be distinct from realism itself because the whole problem was to base realism upon something that would justify it. It is hardly surprising, then that Descartes should have furnished such a starting point and that the *cogito* should have been called to the aid of immediate realism as the incontestable starting point which this doctrine needed. Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Thomist Realism and The Critique of Knowledge*, Trans. Mark A. Wauck (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), 61.

<sup>744</sup> Cf. Etienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999), 99-120. Here Gilson confronts the mathematization of philosophical cognition attempted by Descartes. For Krapiec, we see similar arguments in his attempt to justify the autonomy of metaphysics. Neither mathematical method nor methods of the physical sciences can help metaphysics achieve its desired goal of autonomy and scientificity.

<sup>745</sup> "Słabą jednak stroną Maritainowskiej teorii jest jej niekompletność." *Teoria Analogii bytu*, (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1993), 108; see also "Analysis Formationis Conceptus Entis Existentialiter Considerati," *Divus Thomas*, 1956, 330.

<sup>746</sup> "Maritain mówi wprawdzie o poznaniu istnienia przez intelekt, nazywając to poznanie "intuicją", nie uzasadnia jednak swego twierdzenia i nic bliżej nie mówi o sposobie tego poznania." Krapiec, *Teoria Analogii bytu*, 108.

<sup>747</sup> "Poza tym - jak się wydaje - zbyt oddziela w ślad za tradycyjną koncepcją teorii poznawczą w tomizmie funkcję poznania zmysłowego od funkcji poznania intelektualnego." *ibid.*

the formal object of the intellect is not material, what guarantees then that the existence which the intellect grasps belongs to this John or this Paul?<sup>748</sup> If the separation of the intellect and senses are upheld, Krąpiec claims that “it would imply epistemological idealism, given that the intellect was not in direct contact with existence of a being prior to the phase of creating concepts. The second difficulty would be one belonging to the ontic level, namely there would occur identification of essence and existence.”<sup>749</sup>

At the heart of Krąpiec’s solution to this problem is his consideration of man as a psychophysical unity (“człowiek bowiem stanowi psychofizyczną jedność”). This unity is reflected in the act of cognition too. Hence the sense and intellect are united in the act of cognition (“to jest jasne, że dokonuje się tutaj synteza poznania intelektualnego i zmysłowego”).<sup>750</sup> The locus of this unity is what Krąpiec refers to as the particular reason.<sup>751</sup> Krąpiec owes the origin of this power to Aquinas. He writes (I am quoting St Thomas Aquinas as it appears in the work of Krąpiec for obvious reasons):

Quod ergo sensu proprio non cognoscitur, si sit aliquid universale, apprehenditur intellectu; non tamen omne quod intellectu apprehendi potest in re sensibili, potest dici sensibile per accidens, sed statim quod ad occursum rei sensate apprehenditur intellectu. Sicut statim cum video aliquem loquentem, vel movere seipsum, apprehendo per intellectum vitam eius, unde possum dicere quod video eum vivere. Si vero apprehenditur in singulari, utputa cum video coloratum, percipio hunc hominem, vel hoc animal; huiusmodi quidem apprehensio in homine fit pervim cogitativam, quae dicitur etiam ratio particularis, eo quod est collectiva intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis est collectiva rationum universalium...Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet cogitativa apprehendit individuum ut existens sub natura communii; quod contingit ei inquantum unitur intellectivae in eodem subiecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem, prout est hic homo, et hoc lignum prout est hoc lignum.<sup>752</sup>

The context of this text is the discussion of the *sensibile per se* and *sensibile per accidens*. Focusing on the line *cogitativa apprehendit individuum ut existens sub natura communii*, Krąpiec states that Aquinas was assigning a special function to the particular reason (*vis*

<sup>748</sup> “Jeśli bowiem intelekt stwierdza, że coś, jakieś "x" istnieje, to wówczas istnienie (rzeczywiste) wiąże się z "x" - jakimś konkretnym bytem. Tymczasem zaś czysto intelektualne pojęcie, reprezentujące treść tego "x" jest zawsze ogólne. będąc zaś ogólnym - nie istnieje w rzeczywistości, tak jak w intelekcie. Nie istnieje bowiem człowiek jako taki, lecz istnieje tylko jakiś człowiek: Jan, Paweł itd. Jeśliby więc sądy egzystencjalne, dotyczące rzeczywistości materialnej, istniały tylko w łonie funkcji czysto intelektualnych (bez związku z poznaniem konkretno-zmysłowym), to wówczas 1. byłyby one po prostu niemożliwe, albo też 2. z miejsca postawiłyby nas w jakimś platońskim świecie idei. Istnienie byłoby związane z ideą ogólną, taką, jaka jest w poznającym intelekcie.” Krąpiec, *Teoria Analogii bytu*, 108-109.

<sup>749</sup> Kamiński, “The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition,” 67.

<sup>750</sup> Krąpiec, *Teoria analogii bytu*, 113.

<sup>751</sup> For a detailed historical development of particular reason, see: George Klubertanz, *The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa according to St. Thomas Aquinas* (St. Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1952).

<sup>752</sup> Krąpiec, *Teoria analogii bytu*, 110-111; see also “Analysis Formationis Conceptus Entis Existentialiter Considerati,” 332.

*cogitativa*), as a power that grasp being as existing (*siła kogitatywna bowiem ujmuje jednostkę jako istniejącą pod wspólną naturą*). *Ut existens sub natura communii* means that is affirming the existence of the individual from the point of view of its nature. He also describes the power as a co-operative power where sense and intellect participate in the cognitive act.<sup>753</sup> Elsewhere, Krapiec defends this same stance by writing: “it (particular reason) directs our cognitive attention to reality, and so to the fact of the existence of what is given sensibly and is understood in the process of conceptual cognition.”<sup>754</sup> Before I proceed to reactions against Krapiec’s interpretation, I wish to briefly examine other instances where Thomas Aquinas discusses the particular reason.

In Thomas Aquinas’ psychology there are five external senses and four internal senses. These internal senses include: common sense (*sensus communis*), memory (*memoria*), imagination (*imaginatio*), and cogitative reason (*vis cogitativa*) also known as particular reason (*ratio particularis*). The specification of these senses is found in *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 78, a. 4. Here Thomas writes:

Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum. Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestimativa. Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memorativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum. Cuius signum est, quod principium memorandi fit in animalibus ex aliqua huiusmodi intentione, puta quod est nocivum vel conveniens. Et ipsa ratio praeteriti, quam attendit memoria, inter huiusmodi intentiones computatur.

Here Aquinas explains that the task of the common sense is to receive sensible forms. The phantasy or imagination is described as a “storehouse” because its duty consists of retaining the forms that were received by the external senses. But at this point, Aquinas makes us understand that there are intentions (*intentiones*) which are not received through the external senses. The estimative power is able to grasp these forms. Memory stores such forms from the estimative power.<sup>755</sup>

Furthermore, Aquinas explains that this estimative power is found both in animals and in humans. It helps the animals to detect what is beneficial or what is harmful to them. For example, a calf instinctually flees from a lion because it senses danger. Therefore *intentiones*

<sup>753</sup> Krapiec, *Teoria analogii bytu*, 111-120.

<sup>754</sup> Krapiec, “Poznanie (istniejących rzeczy)” [Cognition of Existing Things], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 8 (2007): 396-404.

<sup>755</sup> *ST* I, q. 78, a. 4.

is understood as “individual or sensory intentions or else as instinctive references.”<sup>756</sup> In humans, however, it is called cogitative power or particular reason and operates in a more advanced form. The human being discovers these *intentiones* through some sort of “coalition of ideas”<sup>757</sup> and enables the human person to “compare individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions.”<sup>758</sup>

Krapiec’s description of the role of particular reason has not gone unnoticed by philosophers, particularly John F. Wippel. Wippel notices that whereas the particular reason appeared in the work of Maritain, Krapiec “makes it the center-piece of his description of judgments of existence.”<sup>759</sup> Wippel claims that *cogitativa apprehendit individuum ut existens sub natura communii* does not refer to the cogitativa’s ability to apprehend existence, it refers instead to its “recognition of an individual as individual insofar as it falls under some common nature.”<sup>760</sup> Citing different instances in the works of Thomas Aquinas, Wippel proposes that it is through *reflexio*,<sup>761</sup> that the intellect becomes aware that this John or this Eve exists. This is made possible by the intellect’s cooperation with the common sense. He concludes that instead of particular reason or the *cogitativa*, it is “the contribution of the common sense [that] should be emphasized in accounting for our original judgments of existence, that is, the kind required for us to discover being.”<sup>762</sup>

The discussions so far show real discrepancies between Krapiec and some other philosophers on what accounts for the grasping of the individuality of the existence of beings. However, it remains to be shown if Krapiec is actually trying to use the *vis cogitativa* in the same sense as it appears in the works of Thomas Aquinas or whether he was using the same term in a totally new meaning different from Aquinas. Since this is not the primary aim of this dissertation, I recommend it for further research.

---

<sup>756</sup> Piotr Lichacz, *Did Aquinas Justify the Transition from ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’?* (Warsaw: Institute Tomistyczny, 2010), 262.

<sup>757</sup> *ST I*, q. 78, a. 4.

<sup>758</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>759</sup> Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 39.

<sup>760</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>761</sup> Some texts cited for the justification of this claim include: *ST I*, q. 85, a. 1 “Cognoscere vero id quod est in materia individuali, non prout est in tali materia, est abstrahere formam a materia individuali, quam representant phantasmata. Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus.” See also *Quodlibet* 8, q. 2, a. 1; *De Spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 9; *Questiones disputate de anima*, q. 4; *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas*, c. 4; c. 17; *SCG II*, c. 73; c. 76; c. 77; Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 38.

<sup>762</sup> Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 40.

#### 4.1.3. Is Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec a Realist or Thomist?

The sub-heading is somewhat provocative since some philosophers may argue that to be realist is to be Thomist. However, there are instances where Thomas Aquinas has been considered “anti-realist.” John Haldane, for instance, argues that the term *realist* was not associated with Thomas Aquinas before the twentieth century. The term was ascribed to Thomas more emphatically, seven and half centuries after his death, specifically in the 1920s and 1930s. Even More, Haldane argues that although Aquinas is a moderate realist with respect to universals and to knowledge of things in themselves, he could be an anti-realist with regard to ‘constitution,’ that is whether what is known is known “in accordance with the nature of the thing or in the mode of the knower.”<sup>763</sup> My point here is that the characterization of any philosopher as Thomist or realist is not irrelevant and it deserves some consideration.

The publication of *Aeterni Patris* has led to a boom of interest in Thomism.<sup>764</sup> Some philosophers, for example Knasas, views M. A. Krąpiec’s philosophy as a part of this “Thomistic boom.”<sup>765</sup> As such it is understandable why he is basically referred to as a Thomist. However, I wish to state that an unguarded qualification of M. A. Krąpiec as a Thomist might lead to some misinterpretation. John Haldane, an analytic Thomist, rightly points out the possibility of misapplication of the term “thomist” and “thomistic,” when he writes as follows:

Where it is clear that the work of Aquinas himself is at issue the use of “thomist” and “thomistic” is unproblematic; but their application is often extended to cover a multitude of thinkers influenced by and ideas deriving from Aquinas, and in this there is potential for confusion. First there is the issue of how close to the original the intended faithful interpretations of Aquinas may be. Second, is the fact that some who have been inspired by Aquinas have knowingly developed his thoughts along lines different to those which most disinterested commentators would take to be authentically Aquinean.<sup>766</sup>

---

<sup>763</sup> John Haldane, “Aquinas and Realism” (YouTube video, 1:04:20, October 30, 2013), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8MnS6A7mzwE&list=WL&t=2107s&index=3>.

<sup>764</sup> Philosophers listed as part of the “tidal wave” based on the influence of *Aeterni Patris* include: “A sampling of names from Europe includes: Emerich Coreth, Peter Coffey, Frederick Copleston, Leo Elders, Aime’ Forest, Cornelio Fabro, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Joseph Geiger, Etienne Gilson, Joseph Gredt, Andre’ Hayen, Peter Hoenen, Charles Journet, Albert Krąpiec, Joseph Mare’chal, Pierre Mandonnet, Eric Mascall, Jacques Maritain, Desire’ Mercier, Le’on Noe’l, Pierre Rousselot, Antonin Sertillanges, Joseph de Tonque’déc, and Fernand Van Steenberghen. In the U.S. and Canada, names include: James Anderson, Benedict Ashley, Celestine Bittle, William Norris Clarke, Joseph Donceel, Maurice Holloway, George Klubertanz, Charles de Koninck, Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Ralph McInerny, Joseph Owens, Anton Pegis, Gerald Phelan, Louis-Marie Re’gis, Henri Renard, James Reichmann, Yves R. Simon, Gerard Smith, Vincent Smith, Robert Schmidt, Henry Veatch, Frederick Wilhelmsen, William Wallace, James Weisheipl, and John Wippel.” Cf. Knasas, *Being and some Twentieth-Century Philosophers*, 3.

<sup>765</sup> Knasas, *ibid.*, 3.

<sup>766</sup> John J. Haldane, “A Thomist Metaphysics,” in *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics*, Richard M. Gale (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2002), 88.

Such “potential for confusion” warrants clarification on my part to address the sense in which one can identify Krapiec as a Thomist. In the first place, the name “Thomist” has been in use since the fourteenth century.<sup>767</sup> This applies both to philosophers and theologians alike. John Haldane identifies different sets of philosophers who enjoy different senses of this appellation since its inception. Particular interest here is narrow application of the term to the sixteenth and seventeenth commentators and interpreters like: Cajetan, Sylvester of Ferrara, Domingo Bañez and John of St Thomas.<sup>768</sup> Furthermore, Haldane identifies philosophers who, using Thomas Aquinas’ principles, have arrived at conclusions which deviate from Thomas Aquinas’ own teachings. This broad sense of the term also include philosophers who mix up Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy with thoughts from other philosophers and philosophies. These philosophers include: Francisco Suárez, who was greatly influenced by the philosophy of Duns Scotus and, Joseph Marechal (1878–1944) who is an ardent follower of Transcendental Thomism. The divergences of thoughts between these philosophers and realistic cognition, as demonstrated in this dissertation, evokes hesitation on the part of Krapiec to be identified as ‘Thomist.’

The hesitation to be identified as ‘Thomist’ on the part of M. A. Krapiec flows from the specific character of the Lublin Philosophical School (also known as the Lublin School of Philosophy) itself which made frantic efforts to distinguish itself from the “traditional Thomists.” Stefan Swieżawski, one of the prominent founders of the Lublin School of Philosophy, listed several general reasons for aversion against Thomism – one of which is the lack of fidelity to the central tenets of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.<sup>769</sup> This confirms the statement of Haldane that it was confusing to attach the name *Thomist* even to those whose ideas are on a different philosophical terrain from that of Aquinas. Ivan Zelić, while commenting on the identity-specification and identity-distancing of the LSP recognizes this specific character in these words: “it (the LSP) came into being as against the conviction of the old school of so-called traditional Thomism, which taught that all the answers had already been given and that they only had to be learned...”<sup>770</sup> This identity-distancing does not obliterate the fact that the Lublin Philosophical school is Thomist, in its own way.<sup>771</sup>

---

<sup>767</sup> Romanus Cessario, O. P., *A Short History of Thomism* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 11.

<sup>768</sup> John J Haldane, “Thomism,” in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Accessed June 15, 2020. Doi:10.4324/9780415249126-N067-1.

<sup>769</sup> Stefan Swieżawski, *St. Thomas Revisited*, Trans. Theresa Sandok (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 12.

<sup>770</sup> Ivan Zelić, “The Lublin School of Philosophy” *Disputatio Philosophica: International Journal on Philosophy and Religion* 5, 1 (2003): 6.

<sup>771</sup> Ivan Zelić writes “...the Lublin School has always been considered markedly Thomist” Cf. “Lublin School of Philosophy,” 16.

Drawing my attention back to M. A. Krapiec and his works, I must state that the discussion on the identification of M. A. Krapiec as an instantiation of existential Thomism or his identity as an existential Thomist should not lead to a presumption that Krapiec is a Thomist in the sense of a philosopher who devotes his life's work to running commentaries on the works of Thomas Aquinas, or as one of the philosophers that have sought only to discover the authentic interpretation of Thomas' Aquinas philosophy. Such presumption may actually be flawed. Thomas Aquinas, like Aristotle, did not write a book titled *Metaphysics*. Neither did he write a *Summa Philosophie* or *Summa Metaphysicae*.<sup>772</sup> His notable treatises on metaphysics are *On the Principles of Nature (De Principiis naturae)* and *On Being and Essence (De Ente et Essentia)*.<sup>773</sup> Krapiec's *Metaphysics* is neither a commentary on the treatises of Thomas Aquinas, nor is it simply an attempt to rediscover the "authentic" Thomas Aquinas. Reasons for this position are obvious:

Firstly, in his *Metaphysics*, Krapiec's primary concern was to respond to the scientificity question on how we can build a classical metaphysics that is autonomous and untainted by positivism. Hence, in most parts of the work, there is an obvious effort not to engage deeply with other Thomists on key discussions that have saturated current discussions among Thomists, for example, whether immateriality of being must be ascertained for the commencement of metaphysics, or the number of transcendentals, etc. I do not claim that these issues were not raised at all in his *Metaphysics*, instead I claim that there were not his primary concern. Krapiec's *metaphysics* was overtly prescriptive and descriptive, marshalling out steps in the metaphysical process from the knowledge of contingent being to the highest point – the knowledge of the Absolute, Necessary Being.

Secondly, Thomism has been criticized for being an unproductive repetition of the words of Thomas Aquinas on a new piece of paper. However, I agree with Robert Brennan there is more to being a Thomist than engaging in a mere repetitive, redundant, unprogressive, literal transcription of his works.<sup>774</sup> In line with Brennan's argument, creativity is a necessary ingredient of authentic Thomism. Krapiec's creativity is undeniable in this regard. In a review of Krapiec's *Metaphysics*, Knasas remarks that Krapiec's metaphysics is "unrelentingly *Krapiec*."<sup>775</sup> What this means is that inasmuch the Aristotelian-Thomistic influence is

---

<sup>772</sup> Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, xvii.

<sup>773</sup> Hadane, J. *A Thomist Metaphysics*, 88.

<sup>774</sup> R. E. Brennan, "Troubadour of Truth" in *Essays in Thomism*, (Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 1942), 20.

<sup>775</sup> Knasas, Knasas, John F. X. Review of *Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being*, by Mieczysław Albert Krapiec, *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review* 59, 1(1995):152.

unquestionable, Krapiec's personal insights and contributions which correspond to the basic teachings and conclusions of Thomas Aquinas, to the reservoir of metaphysical knowledge, is significant. One cannot underestimate the impact of the three stages of metaphysical separation, however imperfect, in the derivation of the subject matter of metaphysics as well as in other aspects of metaphysical cognition. Also, an important contribution from Krapiec was his habilitation on "*Egzystencjalne podstawy transcendentalnej analogii bytu*" (The Existential Foundations of the Transcendental Analogy of Being),<sup>776</sup> where he argued for the correlation between analogical existence of being and analogical predication of being as well as the foundational character of analogical existence of being for analogical predication. Therefore, Krapiec's metaphysics is not a *restatement* of Thomas Aquinas' views. He rather developed a unique way of metaphysics by drawing on Aristotle's conception of philosophy and Thomas Aquinas' notion of existence.

But if *creativity* is about discussing topics associated with what is referred as "the new Metaphysics,"<sup>777</sup> would it imply, then, that Krapiec's thought has no value in contemporary discussions? An affirmative answer to the above question would represent another flawed argument. Weisheipl's definition of Thomism as "a theological and philosophical movement that begins in the thirteenth century, and embodies a systematic attempt to understand and develop the basic principles and conclusions of St. Thomas Aquinas in order to relate them to the problems and needs of each generation,"<sup>778</sup> highlights the importance of application as it relates to different epochs and generations. Some of the prevalent problems confronting Krapiec in his time were Marxism, positivism and scientism – problems which Thomas Aquinas himself did not experience in his time. Today, the discussion is quite different. Contemporary issues like gender identity, transhumanism are in need of answers. There is a clarion call for Thomists to apply Thomistic principles in these discussions to ensure continuity and viability in our time. Michael Konye, for instance, shows how Krapiec's realistic philosophy engages contemporary issues like transhumanism. Applying the metaphysical

---

<sup>776</sup> Chudy, "Mieczysław Albert Krapiec in The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy." *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, 4(2018). doi:10.26385/sg.070428.

<sup>777</sup> In their discussion of the problems of metaphysics, Peter and Meghan distinguished between the old metaphysics and the new metaphysics. The problems of the old metaphysics include: being as such, first causes, unchanging things, categories of being, universals and substance. The problems of the new metaphysics include: modality, space and time, persistence and constitution. Cf. van Inwagen, Peter and Sullivan, Meghan, "Metaphysics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/metaphysics/>>. Krapiec's realism emphasizes that the discussion on modality, space and time, persistence and constitution cannot be discussed in a way that displaces being. Identifying with problems related with "old metaphysics" does not distance realistic metaphysics from contemporary discussions

<sup>778</sup> "Thomism," in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 14 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), 126.



principles operative in the structure of being to the metaphysics of man, Konye demonstrates that technologically modified humans are products of reductionist materialist trend that deny the human person access to human transcendence. Such practice is classified by Krapiec to be an anthropological mistake.<sup>779</sup> This confirms the words of Stanisław Kamiński that the theory of being follows “an appropriate and increasingly precise rereading of the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas to match today’s updated scientific methodology.”<sup>780</sup> Andrej Maryniarczyk, an erudite professor and faithful student to M. A. Krapiec, has used the same Thomistic principles to investigate if souls are identified as male and female.<sup>781</sup> In a world that is besieged by gender identity, such application of Thomistic principles are absolute manifestations of the creative ingenuity - all thanks to the Krapiec-Thomistic influence on these scholars.

Another reason for aversion for Thomism according to Stefan Swieżawski was the charge of anachronism against Thomism. Thomism is seen as backward but also closed. Krapiec’s realistic metaphysics applied an approach that was open. He achieved this by reaching out to the physical sciences in search for the object or meaning of terms like “matter.” This approach, for Krapiec helps the cognizer to widen the field of experience. This gives Krapiec’s realism a universal character. Krapiec presents physical meaning of matter not as a basis for metaphysical cognition but as a reference, hence, making wider the field of experience. The scientific view of matter helps up to understand a wider sense of metaphysical experience. Hence it makes sense to refer to scientific data not as a base of analysis but to enrich metaphysical experience and considerations in metaphysics. In this way, realistic cognition gains inspiration from other scientific disciplines.

If by *Thomist* we understand “a philosopher or theologian who believes that his seminal or core ideas agree with those of the thirteenth-century Dominican theologian St. Thomas Aquinas, as that philosopher or theologian reads the Thomistic texts,”<sup>782</sup> then we can be certain that Krapiec is a Thomist in this sense. Realistic cognition proposed by Krapiec adopts Thomistic principles, like essence and existence, the real distinction between essence and existence etc. to advance realistic classical philosophy. Krapiec’s use of Thomistic principles was not simply redundant and repetitive but creative and open to engage new problems and challenges in the world.

---

<sup>779</sup> Konye Michael, “The Basis of Human Transcendence According to Mieczysław Albert Krapiec” (PhD Diss. The Pope John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, 2008), 238-246.

<sup>780</sup> Kamiński, “Explanation in Metaphysics” in *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, 161-163.

<sup>781</sup> Andrzej Maryniarczyk, “Is the Human Soul Sexed? In Search for the Truth on Human Sexuality,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 9, 1(2020): 87-142.

<sup>782</sup> Knasas, *Being and some Twentieth-Century Thomists*, 1.

Krapiec's proposal demonstrates the possibility of a metaphysics that is not dependent on positivistic and scientistic methods. This proposal should be viewed from a positive outlook as a suggestion that metaphysics or philosophy is not a closed system as positivism tries to suggest. Contrasting the Thomistic from the positivist and scientistic outlook of philosophy, Brennan writes:

It is easy to discern the advantages which the Thomistic outlook has over the modern ideologies: its stability of principles; the clearness, depth, and expanse of its statement of problems; the confidence it manifests in its ability to reach solutions; the sublimity of its mission, which serves to keep alive the faculties of comprehension and to turn to account the speculative truths that lie at the roots of all obligation. The positivist creed, the most vicious of all the modern heresies, has laid its trust in the mechanical methods of science to free the world of the incubus of philosophic thinking. But the fruits of mechanism can be only temporarily fascinating to men who, after they have made themselves comfortable, are likely to discover that they have minds. The science we have to repudiate and the machinery we must fear is the kind that would make a closed experiment out of human thinking or a smooth-running clock out of the human mind.<sup>783</sup>

Since positivism constitutes an intricate part of the problems which M. A. Krapiec confronted during his days, there is glaring evidence, that he sought refuge in the robust intellectual capacity in the realistic thought of Thomas Aquinas, in his proposition of a new way of doing metaphysics.

The final point I wish to make here is a consideration of how Krapiec judges Thomas Aquinas. Fidelity to being or to reality is the yardstick that determines the dependence of Krapiec's metaphysics with that of Thomas Aquinas. In the way fidelity to Thomas Aquinas is established as the measure for being authentically *Thomist*, so does M. A. Krapiec emphasize fidelity to reality as measure of being *realist* or *realistic*. Little wonder in one of his articles on the metaphysics of man, Krapiec writes: "Saint Thomas was a realist in his consideration of man."<sup>784</sup> This quotation specifies and is consistent with the direction of Krapiec's philosophy. It is all about reality and realism. Being is the ultimate point of reference. Realistic cognition, as evident in the works of Krapiec, is faithful primarily to reality. I conclude this section with the words of Kamiński, "...the conception of the theory of being cares not for the faithfulness either to the Thomist tradition or to some likings of contemporary thinkers. Instead it seeks to be faithful primarily to its natural object – the existing reality."<sup>785</sup> This existing reality is "life-giving" and a digression from this path, throws the whole of humanity: our being, our culture, and cognition into oblivion.<sup>786</sup> Therefore, Krapiec's realism is a universal kind of realism that

---

<sup>783</sup> R. E. Brennan, "Troubadour of Truth," 23.

<sup>784</sup> Krapiec, "Towards and Integral Anthropology," *Angelicum* 77, (2000): 52.

<sup>785</sup> Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," 211.

<sup>786</sup> M. A. Krapiec, "Foundations of a Civilization of Life and a Civilization of Death," Translated by Marek Kowalczyk. *Ethos* 2 (1996), 204.

embraces certain elements from Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Etienne Gilson. This is in totally different from a “confessional realism” which characterizes some strands of Thomism. Hence, I am of the opinion that Krąpiec is a Thomist but even more, a realist.

#### 4.2 Methodological Considerations

At the beginning of this work I posited two questions: the possibility question and the scientificity question. The possibility question warranted a three-chapter demonstration of the *how* of metaphysics. While the scientificity question is obviously linked with the possibility question, a deeper step demands an abstraction of the methodological tools applied in the execution of the *how*. Profoundly connected to Krąpiec’s Metaphysics in this regard are Stanisław Kamiński’s thoughts. The collaboration of these Polish philosophers led to the publication of the work *Z teorii i Metodologii Metafizyki* (On the Theory and methodology of Metaphysics).<sup>787</sup> A compendium of some other texts of Kamiński published by the Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu<sup>788</sup> gives detailed insight into Krąpiec’s Methodological tools for doing metaphysics. Although committed both to the classical and analytic trends,<sup>789</sup> the realistic nature of Kamiński’s methodological constructions for doing metaphysics reflects significantly in Krąpiec’s metaphysics. This impact is seen in the following discussions:

##### a. The Methodological Determination for the Scientificity of Metaphysics

Kamiński observes that the scientificity of metaphysics has been undermined so much that metaphysics has lost its value as queen of the sciences and is regarded as ‘sheer nonsense’, ‘mysterious’, ‘vague’ and ‘unreal.’<sup>790</sup> However the undermining of the scientificity of metaphysics was not championed by scholars outside the philosophical field but rather by

---

<sup>787</sup> “The article *The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition* has been originally published in *Znak* [The Sign] vol. 13 (1961), 602-637, written together with Mieczysław A. Krąpiec as the co-author.” Cf. Editor’s note in Stanisław Kamiński, “On Metaphysical Cognition,” 231. See also, Bronk, A. “Stanisław Kamiński – A Philosopher and Historian of Science,” in *Polish Philosophers of Science and Nature in the 20th Century*, (2001): 141-151. <https://brill.com/view/title/30518?language=en>; <http://www.kul.pl/files/32/Kamiński1.pdf>.

<sup>788</sup> The texts include: *On the Methodology of Metaphysics* [*Z Metodologii Metafizyki*], Trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin: PTTA, 2018); *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics* [*Metody Współczesnej Metafizyki*] (Lublin: PTTA, 2019); *On [the] Metaphysical Cognition* [*O Poznaniu Metafizycznym*], Trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin: PTTA, 2020).

<sup>789</sup> Marek Rembierz, “How to Understand and Practice Philosophy? On the Concept of Philosophy Developed by Stanisław Kamiński” in *The Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century: Stanisław Kamiński*, Kazimierz Marek Wolsza (ed.), (Kraków: Akademia Ignatianum, 2019), 29; Bronk, *ibid.*

<sup>790</sup> Stanisław Kamiński, “The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition” in *On Metaphysical Cognition*, Trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin: PTTA, 2020), 9-10.

philosophers themselves. Different philosophers formulated different objects of cognition, breaking away from the peripatetic and Thomistic trends, focusing instead on more rational, and overtly *a priori* objects for cognition. Apart from these divergent objects, another way of undermining metaphysics are the various modes of cognizing the different objects that have appeared through history. This undermining takes an intensive turn when there was a clamor for the use of scientific method in doing philosophy and a total rejection of metaphysics. How, then, can the scientificity of metaphysics be established?

Kamiński proposes that the first step towards restoring the integrity of metaphysics as a science is the realization of the integral nature of philosophical disciplines. This demands a unification of all philosophical disciplines in a way that they constitute “one cognitive discipline,” understood as metaphysics. In this way, all forms of philosophical cognition are categorized as either general metaphysics or particular metaphysics.<sup>791</sup> The base of this unity is found in the “one analogical object (this object is everything that exists), apprehended generally (transcendentally and analogically), and explained in metaphysics. For this reason...metaphysics is the fundamental philosophical discipline, which performs a role in the whole cultivation of philosophy.”<sup>792</sup>

The unity of the philosophical disciplines still leaves a big question unanswered – the scientificity question. In what sense can metaphysics be said to be a science? Is there an equiparation or an equalization between metaphysics, physics, chemistry, mathematics and other disciplines with regard to the term ‘science?’ Kamiński resolves the problem of the scientificity question by distinguishing the “narrow” sense of the word science from the broad sense. This is in alignment with the thoughts of Leo Sweeney as he reflects on whether science should apply to metaphysics and the empirical sciences in the same sense. He wrote: “at the very outset one thing is also clear: to answer affirmatively we cannot grant their equation of “science” with “empiriological science.” We cannot accept their restriction of science to knowledge based solely on the quantitative and the measurable. Rather we must attempt to elaborate a description of “science” which is broad enough to fit metaphysics as well as mathematical and empiriological fields of knowledge.”<sup>793</sup>

According to Kamiński, the narrow sense of *science* applies to disciplines that adopt methods of inductive generalization obtained through observation and experimentation, like physics,

---

<sup>791</sup> Kamiński, “The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition,” 10.

<sup>792</sup> M. A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, “Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School,” *Studia Gilsoniana* 5, 2(2016), 422-423.

<sup>793</sup> Leo Sweeney, *Authentic Metaphysics in an Age of Unreality* (Oregon: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2007), 7.

biology and other natural sciences. The broad sense of *science*, on the other hand, provides shelter for humanistic disciplines, including metaphysics.<sup>794</sup> The prerequisite for this broad sense is that a science is established, determined and distinguished firstly and primarily by its object.<sup>795</sup> The object determines the autonomy of the discipline or its subordination to another. In Kamiński's thought, for a subordination of one science to another to occur, its object must belong to the scope or ambience of that science.<sup>796</sup> When an object does not fall within the scope of a scientific discipline, it implies that it belongs to another.

Krapiec agrees with Kamiński on the indispensability of the object as the first determinant of any discipline and of metaphysics particularly. He writes: "For scientific knowledge to arise, the first and fundamental task is to determine the object of a given field of knowledge or science. Unless the object of scientific cognition is designated, no organized cognition will come about at all."<sup>797</sup> In validating the scientificity of metaphysics, Krapiec first tries to determine the object of metaphysical cognition, a step which Kamiński refers to as "the first and fundamental moment for every science."<sup>798</sup> Krapiec achieves this prerequisite for scientificity by appealing to what is given in experience. In this way, realistic cognition acquires an *a posteriori* status. The object in question is being.

While the object of the discipline is the first determinant of its scientificity, its method is key in its peculiarity. Here the discussion with positivism continues. Kamiński argues that "...one cannot transmit the methodological tools of mathematical-natural sciences, or mathematical logical ones, for that matter, to metaphysics. Instead, one should rather invent such methodological tools which will be able to safeguard the autonomy of metaphysics, its maximalist cognitive character, and cognitive realism."<sup>799</sup> Having demonstrated metaphysical separation through most part of this thesis, I will briefly explain some other methodological features that are evident in M. A. Krapiec's realistic metaphysics. These include: maximalism, historicism and reductive thinking.

---

<sup>794</sup> Andrzej Bronk, "Stanisław Kamiński — Philosopher of Science and Science Historian." Cf. <http://www.kul.pl/files/32/Kamiński1.pdf>

<sup>795</sup> Kamiński, "The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition," 20.

<sup>796</sup> Kamiński, "The Theory of Being and Other Philosophical disciplines." 42.

<sup>797</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 410.

<sup>798</sup> Kamiński, *ibid.*

<sup>799</sup> Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Introduction to *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, 11.

#### 4.2.1. *Maximalism*

The down-play of the importance of philosophy is not only demonstrated in the attempt to limit it to the methods of the sciences. This trend is also evident in the dictation of the kind of questions philosophy should ask. Since existence forms the bedrock of M. A. Krapiec's philosophy, it is only logical to conclude that he supports a maximalist goal for philosophy. Maximalism means that philosophy should address "all existentially important questions,"<sup>800</sup> as well as seeking the last cause of the whole of reality. Thus Krapiec's realistic metaphysics sought "knowledge of the highest quality, concerning all of the most fundamental issues of sense and meaning of life and the world."<sup>801</sup> In Krapiec's explanation, the birth of realistic cognition is tied with the curiosity of humanity that manifests itself from childhood. The child begins by asking 'what' questions and at some point transcends to the 'why' questions. Such questions like, "why do things exist rather than nothing?" or "why do evil exist?" "Why do we come into existence and pass out of existence?" Such questions are inevitable and perennial. These questions in turn generate maximalist responses, like making reference to the *actus essendi* as the factor that determines the realness of being or to the contingent nature of created reality in relation to the Absolute – the Necessary Being. Reference could also be made to transcendental good and the problem of evil and finally to the forfeitability of existence in contingent beings.

The maximalist way of philosophising is distinguished from the minimalist way of doing philosophy. The minimalist method is more or less "fragmentary" and is limited to particular domains.<sup>802</sup> The methods are divided based on the results they produce.<sup>803</sup>

Despite the recurrence of the maximalist questions, some scientists and philosophers are of the view that the affirmation of the existence of a being does not add any meaningful knowledge. However, in the scientific world, questions like: "do UFOs exist?" or "did dinosaurs exist?" seem to be valuable for some scientists. If the affirmation or the proof of the existence of these beings seem to be valuable, it means the affirmation of existence of persons and things in our world, and indeed all maximalist questions should not be taken for granted.

---

<sup>800</sup> Mieczysław Albert Krapiec, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 9.

<sup>801</sup> Kamiński, "Contemporary Methods of Metaphysics," 27.

<sup>802</sup> Kamiński, "Contemporary Methods of Metaphysics," 26.

<sup>803</sup> Kamiński, "Contemporary Methods of Metaphysics," 29.

#### 4.2.2. *Historicism*

Stressing the link between history and philosophy, Kenny writes “Historians who study the history of thought without being themselves involved in the philosophical problems that exercised past philosophers are likely to sin by superficiality. Philosophers who read ancient, medieval, or early modern texts without a knowledge of the historical context in which they were written are likely to sin by anachronism.”<sup>804</sup> The bottom line of his argument is that the context of every philosophical problem demands adequate attention. This is what could be described as historicism. We must distinguish historicism proper to philosophy from *history* which is proper to historians. Z. J. Zdybicka makes a succinct distinction of these terms. She states that historicism is not simply “a question of a return to the past, proper to historians, but of resolving contemporary problems by the continuation of a methodologically defined type of philosophy and by drawing on the experience of the best thinkers of the past and present in order to understand and explain reality as quickly and as profoundly as possible.”<sup>805</sup>

According to M. A. Krapiec, “all philosophical assertions about reality have a history of their own.”<sup>806</sup> These problems developed within particular socio-economic, religious and political circumstances. These circumstances constitute the “context.” Philosophical problems emerge in a bid to “explain something, vindicate something, or challenge the present state of affairs.”<sup>807</sup> Ignorance of the problem-context relation would hamper a holistic assessment of the status-quo and affect the quality of proffered solutions.

In addition to understanding the context within which a philosophical problem emerged, historicism fosters a deeper understanding of the development of the problem over time. The development shows the different systems and approaches to the problem and how the problem mutated or whether seemingly different problems are simply the same problem with different names.<sup>808</sup> A demonstration of method is seen in the discussion of the structure of being, where Krapiec shows that the problem of act and potency, matter and form, substance and accidents and essence and existence are not distinct problems. They are all connected with the structure of being and their historical contexts are quite similar with minimal twists.

---

<sup>804</sup> Anthony Kenny, *Introduction to A New History of Western Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), xv.

<sup>805</sup> M. A. Krapiec, A. Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 15-16.

<sup>806</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 41.

<sup>807</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>808</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

History of philosophy plays three important roles in realistic cognition: the first is an introductory role which consists of tracing the inception of a philosophical problem and giving considerations to the solutions that have been proffered over time. The second is an *evaluatory* role which enables the cognizer to assess the various solutions earlier provided. Finally there is a resolution which consists of choosing adequate type of metaphysics and a corresponding method that effectively addresses the philosophical problem.<sup>809</sup> Historicism does not only enable the cognizer to identify the factors that led to particular problems in history, it ensures that those problems are circumvented.<sup>810</sup> Summarily historicism (a) shows progress of metaphysical solution; (b) enables the cognizer choose a proper method of explanation of metaphysical solution; and finally (c) avoid or evade the mistakes of the past.

M. A. Krapiec shows a persistent use of this method in determination of the object of metaphysics, in the derivation of the transcendental properties, in the discussion on the structure of being and the causal explanation of being. He demonstrated that philosophical problems always develop within a historical context. This context cannot be overlooked. Krapiec re-engages his reader with the same history written in a new light in order for the reader to understand where things went wrong. Therefore, in doing realistic philosophy we cannot take the history of the problem for granted. History gives us a wide spectrum of the problem at hand and helps us to see the flaws of whatever step we take in resolving philosophical dilemmas.

Apart from bringing the context of a problem to the fore, Krapiec uses historicism to show that history is a part of the solution to problems in metaphysics because it traces the problem to its foundation, examining its cause and the arguments of opposing sides over the years. History of philosophy in Krapiec's view is not something about the dead past, nor is it a "cemetery of human thought;" rather, it is something living, something alive.<sup>811</sup>

#### 4.2.3. Reductive Thinking

Reductive thinking is one of the important methods we find in the works of M. A. Krapiec. Kamiński includes it as one of the methods of explanation in metaphysics, employed by existential Thomists, particularly Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson and championed in Poland by M. A. Krapiec.<sup>812</sup> Reductive thinking is an objective kind of method. Its end is to

---

<sup>809</sup> Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Introduction" to *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, 10.

<sup>810</sup> Ibid, 12.

<sup>811</sup> Cf. Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 42.

<sup>812</sup> "Explanations in Metaphysics," 191.



discover “the ultimate – and, if feasible, the only – ontic reasons on the basis of ontic consequences (effective states).”<sup>813</sup> The emphasis on the word *only* suggests that reductive thinking primarily seeks to identify ontic factors that a being cannot do without. This emphasis is also found in other articles by Kamiński.<sup>814</sup> Reductive explanation is connected with causal cognition and explanation of reality.

The primary instance of this method is the determination of being as being as the subject matter of metaphysics. While perusing through different approaches, Krapiec sought an approach that would capture the “existential aspect of all reality.”<sup>815</sup> Existence is the first ontic reason for being. I already emphasized this at the beginning of this chapter. The transcendental character of existence means that it extends to all beings in a proportional way, making it the prime rationale for being. Its transcendental character connects it with the essential aspect (*res*), undividedness (*unum*), something (*aliquid*), and the relational properties of truth (*verum*), good (*bonum*) and beauty (*pulchrum*). The reductive thinking also manifests itself in the analogical existence of being. This gives metaphysical cognition a transcendental-analogical character.<sup>816</sup> This demonstration is found in the first two chapters of this work.

Since reductive thinking seeks ontic reasons one cannot turn a blind eye to the sub-ontic elements in being, because without these elements contingent being would be non-existent. Matter and form, for instance, are necessary elements in contingent beings. The indispensability of these elements have been shown in the previous chapter. A peculiar phrase is that the negation of any of act and potency, substance and accidents, matter and form, essence and existence, would mean the annihilation of being. This serves as an evidence of reductive thinking in the metaphysics of M. A. Krapiec.

Finally, reductive thinking is contradistinguished from the intuitive deductive method of Aristotle, the hypothetical deductive method of contemporary sciences and the critical or analytical intuitive method of scientific philosophers.<sup>817</sup>

---

<sup>813</sup> “Explanations in Metaphysics,” 191.

<sup>814</sup> See the statement: “The reductive reasoning in the theory of being is most often based not on implication but on factual relationship between really existing things. Thus, in most cases, it is not a passing in thought from effect to cause, but a passing in thought from the effect to its *only* cause, i.e, from a definite existential state to the only cause which contradicifies it in the determined existential aspect, in other words, by demonstrating that a certain state would not have existed, if the ontic reason for it had not existed in the first place.” Kamiński, “The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being,” 214.

<sup>815</sup> Kamiński, “Explanations in Metaphysics,” 193.

<sup>816</sup> Krapiec, Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 124.

<sup>817</sup> *Ibid*, 191-192.

I conclude this section by stating that the scientificity of realistic metaphysics is not and cannot be equated with that of contemporary natural sciences, if the term *science* is reserved only for knowledge obtained through observation and experimentation. By systematizing the elements through which science is constructed, Kamiński provides an anchor for Krapiec's realistic metaphysics.

### 4.3. Realistic Philosophy and Contra-Ideologisms

One of the ways to understand M. A. Krapiec's philosophy is to consider it from an engaging perspective, as a philosophy that "enters into dialogue with modern and contemporary philosophy, making special effort to develop methodological reflection concerning adequate cognitive tools used in the process of metaphysical cognition."<sup>818</sup> While such interaction may foster inspiration, co-operation and collaboration, others may end up in cognitive and methodological distancing. Juxtaposing Krapiec's realistic methodology with other forms of cognitive methods is another important way of ascertaining the uniqueness of his philosophy. It was H. E. Allison who wrote that: "The best way to understand a philosophical doctrine is to see what it denies."<sup>819</sup> Hence in this section I intend to juxtapose realistic cognition from what M. A. Krapiec sometimes refers to as *ideologies*. I will achieve this by stating the rationale for the term ideologies. Then I will juxtapose Krapiec's realism with nominalism and idealism.

There is no doubt the word 'ideology' is used in certain respect to refer to some philosophical systems in M. A. Krapiec's works. A typical example is found in his work *Understanding Philosophy*. He states:

...in the nineteenth century, after Marx, ideology became an outlook on the world and a program of action for the working class, especially for its leaders in the party, who declared that their ideology was the "scientific world-view." A very ironical examination of the history of philosophy reveals a series of philosophical systems which are basically ideologies. They are ideologies for two reasons: (a) because they originate in a theory of knowledge, as in a "first philosophy," and so they hold, at least implicitly, that the first object of our cognition consists in impressions, perceptions, conceptions – that is, in "ideas" taken in a very broad sense; (b) in philosophical investigations they try to apply terms and methods drawn from the leading sciences. Some directions of philosophy directly state that they are scientific because they basically "generalize" the results of the specific sciences (especially the natural sciences), as if a non-verifiable generalization could by itself be anything more than a wishful thinking proceeding according to pre-established aims.<sup>820</sup>

---

<sup>818</sup> Krapiec, Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 6.

<sup>819</sup> Henry E. Allison, "Kant's Transcendental Idealism," in *A Companion to Kant*, ed. Graham Bird (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 113.

<sup>820</sup> Krapiec, "What is Philosophy for?" in *Understanding Philosophy*, 7.

This means that ideology characterizes those who uphold one essential part of the Cartesian tradition and also to scientism. The essential part of the Cartesian tradition being referred to here is the placing of the theory of knowledge or the theory of cognition over the theory of being or put differently, upholding the theory that “epistemology is *philosophia prima*.”<sup>821</sup> The second is scientism which has already being discussed briefly in the last chapter. My aim in this section is not to defend or rebut the claim that such systems are ideologies. I would rather engage these systems on a methodological ground, pointing out their compatibility or incompatibility with Krapiec’s realistic philosophy. Generally realism is said to be opposed to nominalism and idealism. Therefore I will focus on these two aspects for this discussion.

#### 4.3.1 *Contra-Nominalism*

Contemporary analytic philosophy is the inheritor of medieval nominalism. This claim is consistent with several works published at the beginning of this 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>822</sup> Noteworthy is the self-acknowledgement of this connection of the analytic tradition to nominalist tradition, most evidently conspicuous in the philosophy of at least two of the most renowned 20<sup>th</sup> century popular analytic philosophers: Willard Van Orman Quine and Nelson Goodman. In an article co-authored by Quine and Goodman after the Second World War, they had marshalled out ten steps<sup>823</sup> towards a constructive nominalism. Of these ten steps, the very first step is most significant for our considerations here: “We do not believe in abstract entities. No one supposes that abstract entities – classes, relations, properties, etc. – exist in space-time; but we mean more than this. We renounce them altogether”<sup>824</sup>

It is obvious from the above the nominalist tradition is conspicuously marked by an outright reject of abstract realities and an unflinching commitment to its opposite: concrete objects, understood in terms of empiricism. For Quine, philosophy is the abstract flip-side of empirical

---

<sup>821</sup> Frederick C. Beiser, *German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism 1781-1801* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 1.

<sup>822</sup> See, Maria Gosselin, *Nominalism and Contemporary Nominalism: Ontological and Epistemological Implications of the work of W.V.O. Quine and N. Goodman*, (Dordrecht: Springer, 1990); Mateusz W. Oleksy *Realism and Individualism: Charles S. Pierce and the Threat of Modern Nominalism* (Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2015); Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, *Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002); Jody Azzouni, *Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Dena Shottenkirk, *Nominalism and Its Aftermath: The Philosophy of Nelson Goodman* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009) to mention but a few.

<sup>823</sup> The ten steps so-referred include the following: renunciation of abstract entities, renunciation of infinity, the nominalist’s problems, some nominalistic reductions, elements of nominalistic syntax, some auxiliary definitions, variables and quantification, formulas, axioms and rules, and finally – proofs and theorems. See, Nelson Goodman, W.V. O. Quine, “Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism”, *Journal of Symbolic Logic* 12, 4 (1947), 105-122.

<sup>824</sup> Nelson Goodman, W.V. O. Quine, “Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism,” 105.

sciences. Such an understanding of philosophy can be mistaken as suggesting that philosophy is a ‘science of abstractions’ but Quine’s emphasis lies rather in the vision of philosophy as a commitment to empiricism from the vantage point of formal aspects of logic and language.

This interpretation is corroborated in his well-known 1951 paper at the University of Sydney – titled “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”<sup>825</sup> Professor Peter Godfrey-Smith had described the popularity of this paper by noting that it is being “regarded as the most important in all of twentieth century philosophy.”<sup>826</sup> Of course, such a description holds water within the analytic tradition of philosophy, which undoubtedly had an overwhelming influence at the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and continues to hold sway in the intellectual landscape of British and American philosophical traditions. If it is the case, as we have noted, that analytic philosophy has its roots in medieval nominalism and is marked in contemporary times by its renunciation of abstract entities in favour of concrete empirical objects, it then follows that we have is an ideological strand of the philosophical tradition of empiricism.

Our task however is to give reasons why Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec is justified in not considering nominalism (and its contemporary forms in analytic philosophy) as a realistic philosophy but would rather classify them as one of many ideologisms that he finds methodological deficient for the realistic cognition of being. In this section, I shall argue for this justification by way of demonstrating the historical connection of analytic tradition to nominalism: At first, I shall try to consider whether the understanding of the so-called ‘abstract entities’ by analytic philosophy of W.V.O. Quine and Nelson Goodman is consistent with the varied senses of ‘universals’ in medieval scholasticism within the context of the debates between the nominalists and the realists. Then I shall try to show to what extent we can compare the renunciation of ‘abstract entities’ by contemporary analytic philosophers and the rejection of ‘universals’ by medieval nominalists. Ancillary questions which follow these will include: What were the reasons for these renunciations and rejections? How consistent are these rejections and renunciations with the nominalist commitment to exploring the relations between logic and language? With these questions at the background of our enquiry, let us begin with a consideration of the medieval arguments of nominalists on the question of universals, as popularized by William of Ockham.

It is important to note that the distinction between nominalists and realists in the medieval arose out of their debate about the status of universals and the associated problem of individuation.

---

<sup>825</sup> See, Willard Van Orman Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, *Philosophical Review* 60, 1 (1951), 20-43.

<sup>826</sup> See, Peter Godfrey-Smith, *Theory and Reality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 30-33.

There were at the time three positions: the Platonists' *universale ante rem*, the Neoplatonists' *universal in re*, and the Aristotelians' *universal post rem*. George Gracia reports that this division is thanks to the classification of St Albert, who "following Avicenna argues that the universal can be considered in three ways: (1) as a simple essence in itself (a *natura simplex*), (2) as existing in things, (3) as the abstracted universal in the mind."<sup>827</sup> Given that the senses in which the status of universal are varied, it is little wonder that on both sides of the arguments (nominalists and realists), no settled resolution can be envisioned unless the sense of universal on the basis of which the debate proceeds is settled.

But that is only the initial methodological decision, and when made, there is still the need to clarify whether what is referred to by 'universal' in any of the three senses is determined. For instance, suppose we take the first sense of universals – i.e. extreme universalism, as the essence "in itself" (i.e. *universale ante rem*), we come to realize that "the universal *ante rem* can mean either the universal in the mind of God or the universal that arises in time with the thing. Albert calls the latter the form or the nature. One notices here the close connection between "form" and "nature". But again note the ambiguity. Nature may mean (1) matter insofar as it is in *inchoatio formae*, or (2) more properly speaking, it is 'the nature of existing things and the substance, which is the form of things and the quiddity'. This close connection between matter, form, and nature shows that the form is not a self-standing independent Platonic essence. It is the nature as the basis of both matter and form in the composite and of the composite itself"<sup>828</sup>.

If we decide for the second sense of universal – 'moderate or communicated universalism' as the essence "in things" (i.e. *universale in re*), we are also confronted with another ambiguity regarding the way in which such a universal can exist in more than one thing since "the universal *in re* is the universal as particularized and individuated, multiplied and incorporated. Thus, it is [understood as] the subject of an infinite number of characteristics on account of matter"<sup>829</sup>

Finally, we meet another question of the objective reality of the third sense of universal, - abstracted universalism, that is, essence as an abstracted concept given that. "the universal *post rem* is the universal as it exists in the intellect. It is the product of abstraction. However, Albert is concerned to argue that the universal in the mind does not cause the universal nature. It

---

<sup>827</sup> Jorge J. E. Gracia (ed.), *Individualism in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter Reformation, 1150-1650* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 102.

<sup>828</sup> Jorge Gracia, *Individualism in Scholasticism*, *ibid.*, 102.

<sup>829</sup> *Ibid.*

knows it abstractly. The universal *ante rem et in re* is the basis of the objectivity of abstract cognition”<sup>830</sup>.

Clearly, if we take the final sense of universals as “abstracted entities”, then it becomes evident that contemporary analytic philosophy is the inheritor of the tradition of medieval nominalists, given that analytic philosophy as we have noted vehemently renounces all abstract entities which echoes the rejection of universals (understood as abstract entities) by medieval nominalists. But in Ockham, the most popular of the medieval nominalists, we find not just a rejection of universals only in the third sense as ‘abstractions’ but equally an outright rejection of universals irrespective of which of all three senses by which their opponents, the realists- had defended the doctrine of universals.

Meyrick Carre testifies to this absolute denial of reality to universals: “The pervading note of Ockham’s philosophical discussions is the rejection of all facets of Realism. Universals have no existence in reality. They are convenient mental fictions, signs standing for many particulars at once...[Against both extreme and moderate universalism], Ockham would rely on Peter Abelard’s argument against William of Champeaux to protests that there is no single identical and simple entity which is present in each of a number of particular things at the same time. On this view the particular thing and the universal are two distinct existences; and a single thing cannot exist in several other things. But some philosophers offered another interpretation ... that the universal was capable of being communicated to many things at the same time. What is the nature of this communication? If it means that the universal is imparted to many things at once without causing any alteration in itself or multiplying itself in the things, it remains a single identity or an individual; and our former difficulty remains.”<sup>831</sup>

For our purposes here, a more interesting attack on the realism of universals was the one directed against the position of Duns Scotus whose position was slightly closer to the generally held position of scholasticism at the time. Scotus had held that there are several essences which arise from several “forms” discovered by the mind (i.e. *formalitates*). He also held that universals belong to one of these essences but not the whole of the essence of an individual thing. To this Ockham “replies that even to say that the universals or *formalitates* are part of the essence of an individual implies that in any individual there would be as many distinct objects as there are universals which would be predicated of it”<sup>832</sup>

---

<sup>830</sup> Ibid.

<sup>831</sup> Meyrick Carre, *Realists and Nominalists* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 107-108.

<sup>832</sup> Ibid., 108.

Having shown from the above considerations that the nominalists outright rejection of universals extends to any of the three senses in which realists in medieval scholasticism had understood it, the claim we made that contemporary analytic tradition, as represented by W.V.O. Quine and Nelson Goodman, is the inheritor of the tradition of medieval nominalists, represented by William of Ockham is thus justified.

Another point to be clarified is the common ground between the philosophical project of the analytic tradition and that of nominalism. In this regard, it is to be noted already from our considerations above that Ockham had relied on Peter Abelard's arguments against William of Champeaux for the formulations of his own arguments against universals. This is significant because in the twelfth century, Peter Abelard "founded a school of logicians who had directed their attention to the relation between thought and language."<sup>833</sup> This logical project had laid the foundations for the methodological trajectories characterizing virtually the philosophical positions of all nominalists, most of whom were nurtured in the Oxford school, hence the continued influence of this trajectory in English philosophy which plays host till today to the analytic tradition, as testified by Meyrick: "English philosophy has been dominated by Nominalist theories. Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hamilton, and Mill express views on the nature of general ideas which are parallel to those of Ockham...In contemporary discussion there is wide concentration on the relation of thought to language, and the work of these schools has brought about the revival of Nominalism."<sup>834</sup>

If this project is thus focused from the beginning on the relation between thought and language, it is little wonder that its methodological route fails to grasp the metaphysical nature of really existing things as composed from essence and existence. Focused then on thoughts and their expressions, it is by default prone to the confusion of the "content" of thoughts (i.e. ideas, concepts) and the "content" of real beings as such as can be noted in their stance on the debates with realists on the question of universals. Hence, nominalism can only tell us something about the "term" (concept, notion, idea) with which we speak or think of being but it is not equipped to lead us to the discovery of the priority of "being" over the words with which it can be expressed in language. This explains the reason why Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec will group nominalism as one of the strands of methodological ideologisms. "Nominalism negating the possibility of an intellectual grasp of the nature-structure of things in the sphere of notional cognizance(,) reduces notional extertions to linguistic processes (names) which take place on

---

<sup>833</sup> Meyrick Carre, *Realists and Nominalists*, 106.

<sup>834</sup> *Ibid.*, 123.

the basis of schematized images. This helped as far as the development of logic and dialectic was concerned. It was done, however, at the cost of the cognizance of reality itself.”<sup>835</sup>

#### 4.3.2 *Contra-Idealism*

Krapiec presents idealism as a consequence of subjectivism. This stance is the philosophical trademark of both Gilson and Jacques Maritain.<sup>836</sup> Idealism is a philosophical position that upholds that “(a) something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and (b) although the existence of something independent of the mind is conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of self-knowledge.”<sup>837</sup> While (a) is referred to as metaphysical idealism, (b) is referred to as epistemological idealism.<sup>838</sup> George Berkeley is acclaimed to be an exemplification<sup>839</sup> of (a), while Immanuel Kant is considered an idealist in sense (b). Immanuel Kant’s form of idealism, known as transcendental idealism, has basic characteristics worth considering in the light of realistic cognition:<sup>840</sup>

- a. Space and time are pre-experiential necessary conditions for cognition. This means that we know them *a priori*.
- b. The features of the external world which are known to us are basically impositions from our mind.
- c. We cannot know the *noumenal* – things in themselves.

Krapiec’s metaphysical realism takes a different curvature. (a) metaphysical cognition does not begin with presuppositions and conditions for cognition. Cognition itself is a being, an act.

---

<sup>835</sup> M. A. Krapiec, “Christianity – The Common Good of Europe,” 479; See also “Nominalizm (i jego skutki w filozofii) [“Nominalism and its Effects Within Philosophy], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, 7 (2006): 696-697.

<sup>836</sup> Brian J. Shanley, *The Thomist Tradition* (Springer-Science + Business Media, 2002), 12.

<sup>837</sup> Paul Guyer and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, “Idealism”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/idealism/>>.

<sup>838</sup> Ibid.

<sup>839</sup> George Berkeley is known for his famous statement *esse est percipi* – to be is to be perceived. He objects to materialism (particularly regarding whether immaterial things exist), insisting that only ideas and minds exist. He also rejects the position that there are mind-independent substances. For more details, see: Lisa Downing, “George Berkeley”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/berkeley/>>.

<sup>840</sup> T. L. S. Sprigge, “Idealism,” in Richard M. Gale, *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2002), 219-241.



Experience is not a pre-supposition in metaphysical cognition, rather it is the action that initiates a metaphysical process that yields metaphysical knowledge. Space (locus) and time (tempus) are accidental features of substance which help to us to explain different ways in which substance is modified; (b) metaphysical cognition is *a posteriori*, since there has to be a sensitive-intellective contact with being. The discovery of being as the subject of metaphysical cognition cannot be determined prior to the experience of being. This point is supported by Knasas who stated that it would be difficult for the Kantian to demonstrate how reality which is structured by the human mind cannot conform to what is in the mind;<sup>841</sup> (c) if the features of the external world are impositions from our minds, it implies that the external world lacks properties. It would also lead to relativism since every existing human being do not cognize with one mind. Such imposition cannot explain why we perceive things in a similar way. Realistic cognition, on the other hand, emphasizes the substantial and accidental attributes of being. (c) the division of reality into noumenal and phenomenal is already some form of dualism. It presupposes that there is a cognoscible nature and incognoscible nature in being. Such agnostic outlook already questions what we claim to know about being.

One important point to note here is Krapiec's method for grouping philosophers. Krapiec's interpretation of philosophers like Descartes, Hume and Kant could be considered 'strict' or 'direct.' By 'direct' I mean that some of these philosophers are interpreted to be wide-ranged in their thoughts that they cannot be classified simplistically. Citing an example with David Hume might be beneficial at this point. Janet Broughton<sup>842</sup> tries to show that incompatible views seem to co-exist in Hume's philosophy. The first is a radically negative and destructive skeptic stance which is found in the interpretation of Thomas Reid<sup>843</sup> while the second is a "positive and constructive naturalist" stance which is found in the interpretation of Norman Kemp Smith.<sup>844</sup> On the part of Kant, some philosophers interpret him to be realist in part and subjectivist in part. Steven Hicks, for instance, states that "Kant was still enough of a realist to posit a noumenal reality that was the source of the content that our minds shape and structure."

---

<sup>841</sup> John F.X. Knasas, *The Preface to Thomistic Metaphysics: A Contribution to the Neo-Thomist Debate on the Start of Metaphysics* (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 52.

<sup>842</sup> Janet Broughton, "Hume's Naturalism and His Skepticism" in Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (ed.) *A Companion to Hume* (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2008), 425-426.

<sup>843</sup> Thomas Reid, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the principles of Common Sense*, ed. Derek Brookes. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).

<sup>844</sup> Norman Kemp Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its Origins and Central Doctrines* (1941).

Yet Kant is subjectivist to the extent he insists on the priority of the subject in the creation of the forms for cognition.<sup>845</sup>

I admit that in Krapiec's *Metaphysics* we do not find this complexity of classification of both 'negative' and 'positive' as in Hume or realist and subjectivist as in Kant. In Krapiec's metaphysics, one could argue that there is this overt simplification of either being a realist or a part of the contra-ideologisms. They are either subjectivist, or idealist, skeptists, nominalists or relativist. However, the main question in the current discussion is: Can we find any justification for the inclusion of any of these philosophers along these lines? And secondly, how does Krapiec's realistic metaphysics differ methodologically from these other propositions? These questions are answered as this analysis progresses. "Idealism" in Krapiec's works also covers a wide range of philosophical systems like positivism, subjectivism, phenomenology etc. Due to its connection with the scientificity and possibility questions, I will briefly explain positivism here.

#### 4.3.3 *Contra-Positivism*

In the introductory part of this dissertation I stated that one of the effects of positivism is that it strips philosophy of its autonomy and makes philosophy a subservient to science. This stance offers a negative response to the possibility question. The divorce between philosophy and science and philosophy and the scientists, ferociously pursued by the positivists, threatened the scientificity of metaphysics. While several responses to positivism could be drawn from the previous chapters. I will highlight only three of them:

##### a. The validity of the question *dia ti*.

In the introduction to the book *The Ultimate Why Question*, Wippel observes that while the ultimate why question is considered irrelevant and redundant for some philosophers, "for many other philosophers, however, the question is legitimate, interesting, and worth pursuing."<sup>846</sup> Krapiec obviously considers *dia ti* (due to what) to be a legitimate question which metaphysics as a science answers. About this he writes:

the context of metaphysical investigations is inseparably connected with the originally posed science-generating question "due to what," which continues to possess its own fundamental

---

<sup>845</sup> Stephen R. C. Hicks, *Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault*, (Milwaukee: Scholargy Publishing, 2004), 55; See also, "Metaphysical Solutions to Kant" in <http://www.stephenhicks.org/2009/12/16/metaphysical-solutions-to-kant-ep/>.

<sup>846</sup> John Wippel (ed.), "Introduction" to *The Ultimate Why Question: Why is There Anything at all Rather than Nothing.* (Washington D.C: The Catholic University Press of America), 1.

value, notwithstanding the propriety and science-generating value of the question “how” (although this latter question has value only for particular sciences). Only on the grounds of the question “due to what” can we seek the ultimate philosophical answers that explain changeable reality, i.e., the generation, change, and corruption of beings...<sup>847</sup>

A challenge to the question which metaphysics answers is a challenge to the foundation of metaphysics as a discipline. Krapiec successfully shows that a divorce of the natural sciences from philosophy does not invalidate the question which philosophy attempts to answer. Kamiński supports Krapiec in this regard. According to Kamiński, it is the cognitive task of metaphysics to pose the question “why.” More still, none of the scientific disciplines “can even pose this question using its own language and make it have any sense.”<sup>848</sup> Secondly, Krapiec shows that the validity of this question takes its rooting in a natural character of the human being, namely, curiosity. This means that common sense cognition is some sort of stepping stone towards metaphysical cognition. However, metaphysical knowledge is not limited to common sense knowledge because it investigates metaphysical problems using adequate methods and offers reasons for its results.

b. The autonomy and efficiency of metaphysical methods.

An ardent positivist, Abel Rey, states emphatically that “there is no legitimate method apart from the methods of science.”<sup>849</sup> The demonstration that I have embarked on in the previous chapters suggests otherwise. Krapiec was insistent on the autonomy of philosophy from the grasp of those who clamor for a submission of philosophy to the methods of natural sciences. Some of these philosophers, like Abel Rey, see the emancipation of science from philosophy as key to the growth of science since the Modern Age. If the growth of the natural sciences was due to their emancipation from philosophy, then philosophy is left with redundancy and archaic methods that are unproductive.

In response to such purview, Krapiec shows that the scientific methods do not cover the maximalist goal of metaphysics. This means that not only is philosophy important, philosophical methods must differ from scientific methods in order to achieve its maximalist goal. Through metaphysical separation, reductive thinking, historicism, Krapiec demonstrates that autonomous philosophical and metaphysical methods are efficient and productive. This

---

<sup>847</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 413.

<sup>848</sup> Kamiński, “The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being,” 217.

<sup>849</sup> Armand Maurer, “Etienne Gilson, Critic of Positivism” in *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review* 71, 2 (2007), 209. <https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.2007.0025>.

legitimacy of metaphysical method does not downplay the importance of the natural sciences in any way. Krapiec recognizes the immense contribution of the natural sciences but insists that they serve specific ends which are goals set out by scientific disciplines. Metaphysical methods, in the same vein, serve different ends for philosophy.

#### 4.4 *The End of Realistic Cognition*

In several parts of this work, I have stated that the basis for the demarcation for the scientificity of metaphysical cognition are its object, method and end. Having expounded the object and method, a brief consideration of the end at the final part of this dissertation becomes imperative. If M. A. Krapiec is posed with the question: “what is the end of metaphysical realistic cognition? There is no doubt that only one thing comes to his mind, namely, truth. Krapiec’s metaphysical realism is committed to the truth; little wonder he identifies realistic cognition as veridical cognition. Commenting on this Krapiec writes:

the highest moment of cognition is the achievement of accord with the known reality-being, i.e. the attainment of truth. To know reality and to be in accord with it in the act of veridical cognition should be the essential moment wherein man is fulfilled as a contingent being, knowing his own contingency and seeking an understanding of being. The veridical cognition of reality is to put man in accord with reality, lead him into harmony with reality, especially by showing the ultimate sense of what it is to be.<sup>850</sup>

The achievement of “accord with reality” sounds very similar to the Stoic aphorism: “living in agreement with nature.”<sup>851</sup> But one must be careful to draw any similarity between Krapiec’s philosophy with stoicism, since the latter is characterized by nominalism, materialism and corporealism.<sup>852</sup> However the point which I wish to emphasize here is that the natural desire for knowledge is a search for the truth of being. For Krapiec, cognition has to bear “the mark of truth.”<sup>853</sup> The correspondence of Krapiec’s thought with Aristotle and Aquinas is remarkable. Commenting on the end of philosophy, Thomas Aquinas avers: “The study of philosophy does not aim at knowing what people thought but what the truth of things is.”<sup>854</sup> Realistic metaphysical cognition is truth-oriented cognition.<sup>855</sup> At the beginning of this dissertation, I made mention of the Aristotelian maxim: “All man by nature desires to know.”

---

<sup>850</sup> Krapiec, “What is Philosophy For?” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 3.

<sup>851</sup> Dirk Baltzly, “Stoicism”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/stoicism/>>.

<sup>852</sup> Ibid.

<sup>853</sup> Krapiec, “The Object of Philosophical Investigations” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 31.

<sup>854</sup> In *De Caelo*, I, 22, n 28. “Studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum.”

<sup>855</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 35.

Following this last quotation by M. A. Krapiec, one could argue that only truth quells this natural desire in man for knowledge. Truth, he writes, is “the essential task of metaphysics.”<sup>856</sup> The attainment of truth is the pinnacle and ultimate goal of metaphysical cognition. Without truth, philosophy loses its purpose and fails to achieve its aim. Regarding this, Krapiec says:

The essential task of metaphysics, flowing from the character of its judgments, which apprehend be-ing in its necessary and transcendental aspects, is the attainment of *truth-oriented cognition*. If in metaphysics we are to make cognitive contact with being, then we accomplish this through judgments, which are the full human cognitive act. These judgments, which affirm be-ing in its necessary and transcendental aspects, have truth as their basic trait. Consequently, the truth of ultimate cognition is the intrinsic end of metaphysics.<sup>857</sup>

This end of metaphysical cognition converges with the very essence of philosophy itself, namely – the love of truth. Plato asked in the *Republic*: “...is there anything more closely connected with wisdom than truth?”<sup>858</sup> Kamiński noted that “the term ‘philosophy’ etymologically denotes a love of wisdom. However, the ways in which this love is consummated varied greatly.”<sup>859</sup> The consummation of this love in realistic cognition is not through the pursuit of scientistic ideologies or the pursuit of science in a way that enslaves and destroys human being and culture. Krapiec acknowledges that this is the proper end of metaphysics and indeed realistic philosophy generally.

Within the parameters of the end of metaphysical cognition, one can also argue that for M. A. Krapiec, metaphysical cognition is therapeutic cognition. Jaroszyński shows that in addition to its theoretical end, philosophy also possess moral, political and eschatological ends.<sup>860</sup> I interpret “knowing his own contingency” in the last quotation to entail that for Krapiec humanity should know its place in the world, humanity should know its limits. Realistic cognition, therefore, aims at curbing the maladies of scientific, technological, cultural maladies. In our time we have seen the rise of different forms of manipulations of the human person through: genetic engineering, cloning, manipulation of sexual identity etc. Hence realistic cognition has an awakening effect. It helps us to see how much we have drifted from reality, little wonder Krapiec writes:

We are witnesses of a threat to man coming from the immense development of the technical sciences on the one hand and the intensive socialization of life on the other. We need only to become aware of a few of the symptoms of man’s new situation: the alarming pollution of rivers and oceans; the pollution of the atmosphere; the disturbance of natural homeostasis, due to the

---

<sup>856</sup> Ibid.

<sup>857</sup> Ibid.

<sup>858</sup> Plato, *Rep* 475e. See also, 476b.

<sup>859</sup> Kamiński, “Science and Philosophy Vis-À-Vis Wisdom” in *On [the] Metaphysical Cognition*, 218-219.

<sup>860</sup> Jaroszyński, *Metaphysics or Ontology*, 23.

uncontrolled depletion of oxygen; the threat of nuclear destruction of human life; the intrusion of science into genetic structures, which has unforeseen circumstances, as well as the overpowering pressure on the individual and on the cultural institutions and relations. Man, the conqueror of nature, has become its dangerous destroyer.<sup>861</sup>

The threat to the environment, the human being, nature and the political world are not simply socio-political problems. Rather, “the source of the threat has its origin in philosophy.”<sup>862</sup> Such thinking is a consequence of viewing man as “the ultimate evolutionary end-product of the forces of nature and society.”<sup>863</sup>

#### 4.5 Some Disputed Questions

In his review of Krapiec’s *Metaphysics*, John F. X. Knasas made striking observations in the *Metaphysics* of M. A. Krapiec. I would focus on two of them. Knasas showed that Krapiec was ‘cavalier’ or lackadaisical in his movement from the facticity sense of existential judgement to the act sense of existential judgment.<sup>864</sup> Knasas adds that although Krapiec’s metaphysics is some sort of Gilsonian existentialism, Krapiec did not take notice of Gilson’s concern regarding the arguments among Thomists on the status of existence either as act or fact.<sup>865</sup> Knasas explains that whereas the fact sense of existence is peculiar to the activities of the senses, the act sense is peculiar to the intellect. He concludes by stating that Krapiec must have confused sense judgment with intellectual judgement. He also argues that Krapiec neglected intellectual judgement, focusing instead on judgement in the form of existential propositions.<sup>866</sup>

Here, the first problem is the problem of moving from fact to act; while the second is the problem of sense judgement versus intellectual judgment. I will briefly discuss these problems.

#### I

This debate on *esse* as ‘act’ or ‘fact’ appeared in 1974 in the work of Cornelio Fabro.<sup>867</sup> Fabro<sup>868</sup> argued that Thomas Aquinas differentiated between *esse* as act and existence understood as fact of a being. Fabro writes: “thus the authentic notion of Thomistic participation calls for

---

<sup>861</sup> Krapiec, “The Person and Society,” *Angelicum* 62 (1985): 609.

<sup>862</sup> *Ibid.*, 610.

<sup>863</sup> *Ibid.*, 618.

<sup>864</sup> John F. X. Knasas, Review of *Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being*, by Mieczysław Albert Krapiec, *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review* 59, 1(1995): 155.

<sup>865</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>866</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>867</sup> Kevin White, “Act and Fact: On a Disputed Question in Recent Thomistic Metaphysics,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 68, no. 2 (2014): 287-312. [www.jstor.org/stable/24636345](http://www.jstor.org/stable/24636345).

<sup>868</sup> Cornelio Fabro, “The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation,” trans. B. M. Bonanses, *The Review of Metaphysics* 27 (1974): 470.

distinguishing *esse* as act not only from essence which is its potency, but also from existence which is the *fact* of being and hence a “result” rather than a metaphysical principle.”<sup>869</sup>

Drawing on the criticism of Knasas, the first point of response is to consider Gilson’s argument in this regard. In his work *The Elements of Christian Philosophy*, Etienne Gilson writes:

Existence may mean either a state or an act. In the first sense, it means that state in which a thing is posited by the efficacy of an efficient or of a creative cause, and this is the meaning the word receives in practically all the Christian theologies outside Thomism, particularly those of Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, Scotus, and Suarez. In a second sense, existence (*esse*, to be) points out the interior act, included in the composition of substance, in virtue of which the essence is a “being,” and this is properly Thomistic meaning of the word. The problem under discussion now is: how did Thomas Aquinas achieve the awareness of the very possibility of this notion?...The majority of philosophers will concede that it is a far cry from a possible thing to an actual thing...This will be conceded by all, but if an actually existing being has been produced by its cause, why should one attribute to it an “existence” distinct from the fact that it exists?...What has divided the Thomist school from the other schools of theology, ever since the thirteenth century, is a general reluctance to conceive the act of being (*esse*) as a distinct object of understanding. To tell the whole truth, even the so-called “Thomists” have been and still are divided on this point.<sup>870</sup>

I have observed that some of the philosophers listed here by Gilson are those whom Krapiec consider to be essentialist in their thinking. A testament to this is found in one of Krapiec’s works where he writes: “He (Duns Scotus) was an advocate of the joining of philosophy with theology and faith, and in keeping with the spirit of the Franciscan School he held that “Christian philosophy’ was necessary. He sharply criticized the thought of St. Thomas’s conception of being, and in this respect it was Scotus’s conception of being that found acceptance in the writings of Suarez and other above mentioned thinkers, all of which after all was a wrong understanding of the thought of St. Thomas.”<sup>871</sup> This statement shows that Krapiec and Gilson are largely on the same pedestal in their interpretation of these philosophers. Krapiec also talks about the “Anselmian error.” And this discussion is made even interesting by the fact that Knasas himself acknowledges that Krapiec’s metaphysics is a “*tour de force* of Gilsonian Thomism.”<sup>872</sup> And as such he affirms an alignment between the main components of Krapiec’s Metaphysics with that of Gilson. Two points are important for me here. Firstly, I will state the extent to which I agree with Knasas statement on the fact and act sense and secondly, I will try to fix this microcosmic view within the entirety of Krapiec’s Metaphysics.

---

<sup>869</sup> Ibid.

<sup>870</sup> Knasas, “Introduction” to *Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists*, xvi. See also Etienne Gilson, *The Elements of Christian Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 142-143.

<sup>871</sup> Krapiec, “Major Periods and Movements of Philosophy,” in *Understanding Philosophy*, 74.

<sup>872</sup> Knasas, “Review of *Metaphysics*,” 152.

I agree with Knasas' assessment of Krapiec's *Metaphysics* on this movement from fact sense to act sense. However this is due to a particular reason. *The Metaphysics: An Outline of the Theory of Being* which Knasas reviewed lacks etymological explication of the word *being*. Also, it lacks important Latin equivalents that could help demarcate when being refers to being as *ens* or being as *esse*. Also, the words 'fact' and 'facticity' were not extensively delineated since Krapiec did not focus so much on *meaning* of terms.<sup>873</sup> As such it is difficult to grasp the exact meanings of the words "fact" or "facticity" as they appear in the *Metaphysics*. In most usages, fact or facticity were used as terminological points of emphasis to suggest "real" or "reality." But going by the distinction pointed out by Wippel, facts are like "judgments of existence." They are those judgments "whereby we recognize things as actually existing, whether or not we have yet concluded to distinction and composition of essence and *esse* (act of being) with such beings."<sup>874</sup>

A significant observation worth noting here is that Knasas comments refer specifically to one work of M. A. Krapiec. Here I am distinguishing between the book *Metaphysics* and the *Metaphysics* of Krapiec as an encompassing totality. When we consider other texts and works of Krapiec, we see a different approach altogether. In the *Teoria analogii bytu*, at the beginning of his discussion on being, Krapiec writes: "Wyraz "byt" (*ens*) tak w języku polskim, jak i łacińskim, pochodzi od słowa "być" (*esse*), czyli "istnieć" (*existere*) - *nomen ens imponitur ab actu essendi* ("nazwę bytu przydziela się od akty istnienia")"<sup>875</sup> meaning, "the word "being" (*ens*) in both Polish and Latin comes from the word "be" (*esse*), meaning "existere." So here, the emphasis is on act (*akty istnienia*) not fact. Hence, I state that the primary meaning of existence for Krapiec is act or actuality. There are certain sentences in Krapiec's metaphysics which could make it appear that "fact" precedes "act." Consider this statement: "similarly, in each of our cognitive acts concerning the real world, we respond first to the facticity of a thing, to the fact that something is, before we cognize what the thing is."<sup>876</sup> Also within the same context, he affirms: "In affirming the existence of an oak tree, I am focused primarily on its facticity, its reality..."<sup>877</sup> However this does not imply that Krapiec sees the fact sense to be prior. In the two quotations above, Krapiec tries to show that existence is where the focus lies

---

<sup>873</sup> Although Krapiec warns against understanding fact as the phenomenologists do. 'Fact,' in the way he uses it, includes the affirmation of ontic elements (like matter and form) or states (ontic plurality) or processes (ontic mutability). Facts are discerned in objective and neutral manner. cf. *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 207-208.

<sup>874</sup> Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought*, 32.

<sup>875</sup> Krapiec, *Teoria Analogii bytu*, 49.

<sup>876</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 86.

<sup>877</sup> *Ibid.*, 89.



and not on essence. The justification for Krapiec's position is that to be being is to be in act, to possess *esse*. However, from the cognitive perspective, we acknowledge this act as a fact because reality "imposes itself in cognition as a fact."<sup>878</sup> In one of his articles, Krapiec writes; "That which constitutes the fact of being in a being is real existence."<sup>879</sup>

Also in Krapiec's *Metaphysics*, there is always an emphasis on ontic primacy over the cognitive. We can see this movement also in his discussion on existence. He writes:

In the apprehension of real being, however, one cannot disregard existence, which has an ontic and epistemic primacy (it is the reason of reality and the reason of cognition). Due to existence, being is real and different from nonbeing (nothingness). Consequently, existence performs the role of what is known as "act," the factor determining the reality, the be-ing, of being itself. Without existence there is no real content; any eventual contents, in turn, are only "conceived," abstracted, from really existing, individual, essential content. The primacy of existence comes into play in the cognitive order as well, for real being is knowable insofar as it exists....<sup>880</sup>

Another possible explanation is that there seems to be some vocabulary inter-switch where what is meant is "act" not "fact." And then this led to some sort of inter-changing of both words. We see such interchange in the work *Understanding Philosophy*. There Krapiec writes: "we formally affirm the very act of the existence of being, as we have already said in the existential judgment, when eg. we affirm: "this here- exists" – "Alpha – exists," that is, I affirm "John – exists,"...In the cognitive act of the existential judgment I affirm the fact of the existence of a thing denoted as the subject "Alpha." However, on the level of explanation, what is sought is the internal principle, the non-contradictable factor responsible for beingness of a being and not just fact. This could be a translational issue.

The final explanation which I tend to agree with is that Krapiec is consistent in his focus on the 'act' of being in his realistic metaphysics. In his book *Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being*, he was speaking with reference to the cognition of being rather than with respect to the existence of being. The point is that with regard to cognition, fact of existence is prior to the act of cognition but with regard to realism of being, act of existence is causally prior to fact which is the result of the act of coming into being. Of course, a real being is already actualized in existence and we can speak of the simultaneity of its act of existence (*extra mentis*) and the fact that it exists (as verified by cognitive powers). Even more, Thomas Aquinas uses this form of argumentation from fact to act as demonstrated by Wippel.<sup>881</sup>

---

<sup>878</sup> Krapiec, "The Object of Philosophical Investigations," in *Understanding Philosophy*, 9.

<sup>879</sup> Krapiec, "Towards an integral anthropology," 45.

<sup>880</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 96-97.

<sup>881</sup> *Ente*, ch. V; *The Metaphysical Thought*, 32-33.

Therefore, I have no doubts, then, that Krapiec takes seriously this concern expressed by Gilson and no matter how imperfectly formulated his thoughts were translated into paper, the existential and realistic character of his metaphysics cannot be taken from him. It is interesting to note that barely five years after this review, Knasas published his *Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists*. I will conclude this argument by quoting a section of that work: “In sum, it is not so much that Aquinas disagrees with the fact-sense of the thing’s existence, but rather that Aquinas insists that the fact-sense be deepened to include the act in virtue of which the thing is a fact. A thing is a fact in virtue of its *actus essendi*.”<sup>882</sup>

The second criticism of Knasas concerns the vagueness of sense judgement and intellectual judgment in Krapiec’s *Metaphysics*. I agree with Knasas that the *Metaphysics* of M. A. Krapiec lacks certain specifics on the sensitive-intellective processes in the grasping of the existence of a being. In Krapiec’s *Metaphysics*, emphasis was not laid on the operations of the intellect and the senses in the apprehension of being. However within a paragraph Krapiec spells out his idea on the relationship between the sense and intellect at our initial contact with reality. He writes:

Such existential judgments are our absolutely first cognitive acts, bearing in mind that acts of sensory experience do not exist in separation from intellectual cognition. We do not have the experience of color or sound, or still less the perception of some material object, as simply the perception of sound, color, or a purely material object. It is true that our cognition begins from sensory perception, but this perception remains in cognition in communication with the intellect, constituting a single function that involves the activity of both the intellect and the senses. The belief that sensory perception is the initial cognitive act, and that intellectual cognition is then constructed upon it, arose as a result of the description and analysis of cognition and the isolation of the sensory and intellectual cognitive structures. In reality, however, we are dealing here with a single indivisible cognitive human function, in which we can later, through analytical description, isolate different cognitive structures according to the different immediate sources of cognition, namely, our intellect and individual senses.<sup>883</sup>

In my consideration of Krapiec as an existential Thomist, I explained briefly how significant the co-operation of the intellect and senses functions in the metaphysical system of Krapiec’s philosophy. There I made reference to the article, “Analysis formationis conceptus entis existentialiter considerati.” This argument is also found in *Teoria analogii bytu*. There Krapiec argued that the apprehension of being as being is neither exclusively sensitive nor exclusively intellective. Rather, it involves a co-operation of both senses and intellect. We see traces of this in his *Metaphysics* wherein he writes: “the affirmation of the existence of beings ...takes place immediately in the context of an apprehension by my sensory-intellectual cognitive

---

<sup>882</sup> Knasas, *Being and Some Twentieth Century Thomists*, 16.

<sup>883</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 85.

apparatus.”<sup>884</sup> Kamiński, who worked closely with Krapiec at the Lublin philosophical school, also agrees with Krapiec when he wrote: “Therefore in the existential judgement there is a special synthesis of the action of the senses and the intellect.”<sup>885</sup>

## II

### *The Theory of Participation*

If each of the themes treated in the previous chapters, like transcendentals, analogy of being, causes and structure of being are considered ‘tools’ for understanding reality, it would seem that Krapiec omitted the theory of participation in the discussion. This ‘lack’ would be the motivating factor for the publication of *Participacja bytu* by Zofia J. Zdybicka.<sup>886</sup> I argue here that although there is no separate treatment of participation in Krapiec’s metaphysics, there are possible suggestions which account for the place of this theory in his metaphysics. Although treated sparsely, these instances do not reveal a rejection of the theory on Krapiec’s part. One of the suggestions would offer reasons why he may not have considered it necessary to undertake the task of elaborating on the theory.

The discussion of participation has been discussed by many authors.<sup>887</sup> The word has an everyday sense as well as specific philosophical understanding. In her work, *Partycypacja bytu*, Zofia Zdybicka expresses the meaning of participation in these words:

...a relation that occurs between two realities, where one of the members of the relation, which usually contains a series of elements, is to the other as a part to the whole, as many to one, as the imperfect to the perfect, the non-identical to the self-identical, the limited to the unlimited, the similar to the identical, that which possesses to that which is, the composite to the simple, the derivative to the original, the caused to the uncaused. Thus participation means a share in a certain whole, which implies the existence of some whole (a unity or community), and kinship, a community between parts and a whole (plurality and unity) and between particular parts.

We should make a clear distinction between the term “participation” used in everyday language and the technical term, the philosophical or theological term. In everyday language the term “participation” means a share or membership. It may refer to various realms: the material, mental-moral, social or cultural realm. It implies the existence of some sort of whole, unity, or fullness (an absolute one or a relative one): a material one – a given estate; moral one – fullness

---

<sup>884</sup> Ibid, 89.

<sup>885</sup> Kamiński, “The Methodological Peculiarity,” 14.

<sup>886</sup> Zofia J. Zdybicka, *Participacja bytu*, (Lublin: TN KUL, 1972).

<sup>887</sup> Several Scholars who have treated the theory of participation include: C. Fabro, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino* (Turin: 1950); L. B. Geiger, *La participation dans la Philosophie de s. Thomas d’Aquino* (Paris: 1942); R. J. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the “Plato” and “Platonici” Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas* (The Hague, Nijhoff, 1956); 167-194; Rudi A. Te Velde, *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, 94-131.

of suffering or joy; a cultural one – some sort of cultural creativity or receptivity. This constitutes the participated reality (a whole, a fullness, a unity, a relative perfection).<sup>888</sup>

The word *participation* appears severally in Krapiec's work. For instance, in the metaphysics, he writes: "metaphysical cognition of the nature of things extends, therefore, to the problem of divine ideas, divine cognition, and consequently, to the theory of participation."<sup>889</sup> Still in the same light, Krapiec states:

this theory is based on an analogy with human products, products of art, in which a leading role is played both by the idea produced by the human being in the process of cognition, as well as by the work itself, which is a reflection of this idea and produced by means of the will... In a similar way, God in creating these causes Himself to be participated in as an exemplar, agent and end. Things, in turn, *participate in God*, being limited in their inner structure, limited by their potential element, matter. In light of the above, a knowledge of the theory of ideas and *participation* is necessary in the metaphysical cognition of nature<sup>890</sup> (italics mine).

Although Krapiec sees this importance of participation, no-where does he devote a separate chapter or article to the subject. This has been interpreted to mean that there is a significant omission in his metaphysics. From systematic point of view, it is difficult to present an exact reason why participation is not given a special attention. However, I present four possible answers to this problem:

1. There is a possibility that Krapiec has some concerns that participation takes the scope of realistic metaphysics beyond the empirical world which is the scope of our investigation. If participation connotes the "*descending road* in the cognition of being,"<sup>891</sup> that is, if it is to explain *creatio ex nihilo*, it could be interpreted as a cognition that has its starting point from the Absolute, then, such knowledge would be beyond human experience. For Krapiec, metaphysical cognition is an *ascending road* which proceeds from sensible reality to knowledge of the Absolute. The knowledge of the Absolute is the highest point in the cognitive process. It is possible that Krapiec connected the problem of participation with the philosophy of God with particular reference to the problem of creation. As evidenced in the manual of the Lublin School of Philosophy, "neither God nor the experience of God is accessible in the starting point of metaphysical enquiries...the problematic of God appears as the ultimate reason of metaphysical explanation."<sup>892</sup>

---

<sup>888</sup> Zofia J. Zdybicka, *Participacja bytu*, (Lublin: TN KUL, 1972), 19-20, in Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation and Analogy*, 89; See also, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Participation: A Descending Road of the Metaphysical Cognition of Being," *Studia Gilsoniana* 5, 4 (2016): 674-675.

<sup>889</sup> Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline*, 421.

<sup>890</sup> Krapiec, *ibid.*

<sup>891</sup> Andrzej Maryniarczyk uses the term "descending road" to describe participation in a specific sense (as a causal explanation of *creatio ex nihilo*). I am applying it in a sense that it signifies cognition from above. See *On Causes, Participation and Analogy*, 87.

<sup>892</sup> Krapiec, Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 126-127.

2. Another possibility is that one can argue that there is enough evidence that shows an acceptance of the theory of participation by Krapiec, even if they appear sparsely in his works. For such position, the statement quoted above – that things participate in God since He is their exemplar, agent and end – would suffice for a concrete defence of M. A. Krapiec. For such argument, it does not necessarily follow that each metaphysical ‘tool’ for understanding reality should be given a separate treatment. It is important to consider also that most of the great ideas of Thomas Aquinas like the transcendentals or analogy of being did not have a whole book or chapter devoted to them, yet it has not prevented philosophers from formulating and re-formulating Thomistic ideas on these themes based on the statements and examples of analogy and the transcendentals scattered in Aquinas’ works.
3. A third possibility is to argue that Krapiec understands analogy and causal cognition in a way that it includes participation and is therefore not in need of further explication. It is possible that he sees sameness in analogy of existence and participation in existence. This view is consistent with the words of Stanisław Kamiński where he wrote: “...the analogy of existence and the participation in existence are both the same, although differently conceived, system of ontic relationship.”<sup>893</sup> A similar idea appears elsewhere in Kamiński’s work, where he avers: “the principle of the transcendental analogousness (or participation) of being turns out to be just another formulation of the principle of the (sufficient) reason of being.”<sup>894</sup> Here we notice that analogy and participation are used interchangeably. This view is consistent with the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas in *Commentary on Boethius’ De Hebdomadibus*, from which Klubertanz succinctly captures different kinds of participation, thus: “A species participates in its genus; an individual participates in its species (logical participation); substance participates its accident; matter participates in its form (limitation of act by potency); effects participate in the perfections of their causes (analogous participation).”<sup>895</sup> There are also other instances where Aquinas refers to the analogy of participation.<sup>896</sup>

Andrej Maryniarczyk is of the view that the theory of participation has an augmentary character in relation to analogy and causal explanation. He writes:

we treat participation...as a completion of cause-oriented explanation and primarily as a completion of analogical explanation. For indeed if analogy allows us to see in plurality the fact of ‘unity’ that the analogically single act of existence gives to a being, then participation

---

<sup>893</sup> Stanisław Kamiński, “The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being,” 235.

<sup>894</sup> Kamiński, *ibid.* 236.

<sup>895</sup> Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, 56.

<sup>896</sup> See *SCG* 15, 16; 15, 21; *Quodlibet* 28, 2; *Pot* 14, 21-22. For more on analogy of participation, see Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy*, 55-64.

shows us the fact of the unity in which the concrete individual being ‘participates’ and whereby it exists. Thus by participation we learn about the fact of ‘imparted’ and ‘given’ existence, remembering also that it is a question of the whole of a being, and so, it is a question of the fact that a being exists and how it exists.<sup>897</sup>

This implies that there is a unique aspect of reality which cannot be fully grasped by analogical existence or analogical predication of being. This aspect is connected to the *creatio ex nihilo*.<sup>898</sup> In this sense, Krapiec, fails to use analogy as an explanation of creation ex nihilo.

4. The mention of *creatio ex nihilo* brings me to this final point and this is connected with the scientificity and possibility questions. Since Krapiec was trying to demonstrate the scientificity of metaphysics, it is possible that he tried to avoid being apologetic or confessional in his thinking. It is not unusual in the past for philosophers to make recourse to God or the Absolute as solution to philosophical problems. Krapiec concentrated more on what is given in experience as the object of investigation. We are not given the Absolute directly, the Absolute is only a reason for the being of things.

In all, I tend to lean towards the idea that Krapiec does not see the under-developed thesis of participation in his work as a lack. There is no outright rejection of participation in his work and there is no claim of incompatibility between an ‘existentialist’ way of interpreting being and a ‘participationist’ way of interpreting being. These two varied ways of understanding seem to converge in the analogy of being.

#### 4.6 Summary

This chapter represents my personal assessment of Mieczysław Albert Krapiec’s Metaphysical realism. Hence it takes a totally different appearance from the previous chapters which were expository in nature. Important in this chapter is to bring the characterization of M. A. Krapiec as an existential Thomist, a realist, a metaphysician and a methodologist of metaphysics. These different characterizations manifest the uniqueness of Krapiec’s realistic Metaphysics, showing where it converges and diverges with philosophers both from the metaphysical point of view and the methodological perspective. While Krapiec’s thought converges with Jacques Maritain and Gilson on key aspects of the elements of existential Thomism, they diverge on the importance of particular reason in the grasping of individual existences.

---

<sup>897</sup> Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation and Analogy*, 92.

<sup>898</sup> Here Maryniarczyk refers to the “creative cause” of the Absolute, *Ibid*, 93.

On a different note, I argued that between Thomist and realist, Krapiec is akin to be called the latter on grounds that the former applies to philosophers who have different ways of thinking from him. Fidelity to reality is the hallmark of realistic metaphysics.

The methodological discussions show the difference between realistic metaphysics from nominalism and idealism. Idealism is described as an encompassing term for subjectivism, idealism, positivism and the like. Realistic metaphysics does not begin from consciousness, ideas and other subjective or idealistic starting points. Being remains the central point of investigation. The disputed questions on act or fact sense of being and the discussion on participation are on-going and give room for further research.

## 4.7 Evaluation and Conclusion

Having extensively discussed the conception of realistic metaphysics, as a model of contemporary realistic philosophy, in the light of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec's thoughts and ideas, I wish to recap the properties of realistic cognition established as a result of this investigation:

Being as being (*ens qua ens* or *ens in quantum ens*) is the formal object of Metaphysics. The determination and specification of this object forges a path towards the scientificity of Metaphysics. The autonomy of its object, in addition to the particularization of its method and end, are manifestations of an attempt to respond to the scientificity and possibility questions. Realistic metaphysics in this sense is a specific way of understanding the world of persons, animals, plants and things.

*Ens qua ens*, the object of metaphysics, is distinguished from *ens* which is defined as a concretely determinate content, with an existence proportional to the content. In this sense, we can refer to John or Eve, or a rose flower as being (*ens*). The definition reveals the dual-faceted nature of being, namely – the existential and essential sides. Realistic cognition emphasizes priority of the existential aspect over the essential aspect of being without any sense of devaluation of the essential aspect. However, *Ens* refers to John, Eve and the red rose as existing being by virtue of an inherent principle which each of these beings possesses, namely, *the actus essendi* or *esse*. This factor determines the reality of individual things.

Realistic cognition recognizes that the world of persons, animals, plants and things – our world is the real world. The reality of this world is independent of our conceptual schemes, and mental constructs. The world is an open book; it is intelligible and stands in relation to cognitive faculties as act is to potency. This suggests an ordering between being and the faculties of the cognizer. The grasping of being occurs at the most original stage of cognition where the differentiation of subject and object are yet to be discerned. This means that realistic cognition is direct and is in no need of an intermediary – whether a concept or the reflexive activity of the subject of cognition.

The starting point of metaphysical cognition is experience, which gives it an *a posteriori* status. Here, common sense plays an important role although metaphysical cognition is not limited to the activities of common sense. Realistic metaphysics offers rational justification for its claims and results. The apprehension of the being takes place through spontaneous cognition or metaphysical separation and is expressed in existential judgments. The preference of separation



over abstraction guarantees a holistic grasping of being. Metaphysical separation is a complex operation that has three stages: the affirmation of the existence of the concrete being, the separation of the essential and existential aspects of being and finally, the analogical extension of the result of separation to every being. This final stage characterizes realistic metaphysics as transcendental-analogical cognition.

Since being is apprehended in an indistinct, vague manner (*in actu confuse*), it is in need of clarification. This clarification was embarked upon in the second chapter of this work. The transcendental mode of clarification is favored over universal mode of clarification – thanks to its convertibility and co-extensivity with being. The transcendental properties are trans-categorical properties of being. They are convertible with being, they add something conceptual to being, that is, they accentuate a mode of being that the concept fails to express. There is an order in the derivation of these transcendentals, each including the features of the previous ones. Krapiec does not dispute that these transcendentals are seven namely, *ens*, *res*, *unum*, *aliquid*, *verum*, *bonum* and *pulchrum*. Realistic cognition uses the transcendentals as tools to differentiate between the real things from mental conjectures.

Closely connected with the transcendental properties are the first metaphysical principles. Realistic metaphysics interpret these principles as principles of being and thought. They are not merely logical constructs, they are rather epistemological expressions founded on being. The unity of essence and existence, understood as transcendental *ens* and *res*, creates a relative identity in being and is logically formulated as the principle of identity. Transcendental *unum* which denotes the undividedness of being leads to the discovery of the principle of non-contradiction. *Aliquid* leads the cognizer to the realization of the principle of excluded middle, while *verum*, *bonum* and *pulchrum* lead to the principles of intelligibility, finality and perfection of being.

The second part of the second chapter focused on the analogical existence and predication of being. The duality of existence and predication manifest a relation of dependence of the latter on the former. Hence there is a co-relation between analogy on the ontic level and analogy on the cognitive level. Realistic metaphysics emphasizes this relation. The point of departure is the analogical existence of being which manifests itself in two ways: analogy within beings and analogy between beings. Both forms of analogy are consequent on the plurality and multiplicity of beings. While the analogy within being is based on the physical as well as the ontic constitutive elements of being, the analogy between beings shows the connection between

individual existing beings on the basis of necessary and non-necessary relations. Within the fold of necessary relations, we distinguish different kinds of analogy, the most adequate of which is transcendental analogy.

The conclusion of this second chapter reiterates that the basic character of realistic cognition is transcendental and analogical. It is a progression from a particular being, in relation to the necessary elements without which a being cannot be, to a transcendental level which applies to every contingent being. Yet, this transcendental level does not obliterate the uniqueness of the elements of each being, such that the forfeitability of these elements in one being does not imply the annihilation of the entire contingent order. The discovery of the first metaphysical principles of being has some philosophical implications. It means that in things (real things) we have the foundation for the rational order. It means that things have value in themselves, reality is simply an open book to be read and interpreted; it acts on the cognizing person and is also acted upon. It is not “nothing” to be imposed some meaning or an indeterminate substance to be determined by the cognizing subject. Our world is a communicating world; we know because it communicates and it engages us in a never-ending communication. The discovery of the Absolute is a justification of Metaphysics as a science that seeks the ultimate causes. This knowledge is not a product of theological discourse. It proceeds from an experience of composed beings to the knowledge of the simple, from the finite to the infinite, from the created to the uncreated, each existing in a way proper to its mode of existence.

The next phase of our investigation directs our cognitive apparatus to the structure of being in chapter three. There, the inter-relatedness and inter-connectivity between the correlates of act and potency, substance and accidents, matter and form as well as essence and existence are emphasized. In an attempt to explain the phenomenon of dynamism, identity, change dynamic existence of being, identical existence of being, changeable existence of being and contingent existence of being, we go deeper into the structure of being where we find ordering of different sub-ontic elements. Krapiec’s metaphysical realism delves deeper into the structure of being to discover the essence and existence composition. This composition deepens realistic cognition as a merger between Aristotelian and Thomistic modes of philosophising.

The fourth chapter focused on varied metaphysical and methodological features of M. A. Krapiec’s metaphysics. The centrality of place given to act of existence makes obvious a tending towards existential Thomism. This tending becomes glaring when comparison with

Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson are made. However this does not remove the fact of divergences within the works of these three philosophers. Krapiec's interpretation of particular reason emerged to account for the singularity of individual existences, a problem he considers unresolved in the philosophy of Maritain and Gilson alike.

The identity of Mieczslaw Krapiec as an existential Thomist does not warrant a simplistic attachment of the appellation "Thomist" to his personality. The variegated manner in which the name applies even to philosophers who champion a different course from Thomas Aquinas himself, evoked a desire to be distanced from it. Commitment to being and fidelity to being are placed at the pinnacle of the goals of realistic metaphysics. Therefore the conception of metaphysics, which is Thomistic by its alignment to the essence-existence composition in being, is deepened by its fidelity to reality.

The methodological questions addressed here bring to lime-light different methodological tools necessary for realistic cognition. Metaphysical separation remains at the center of all the methods. Not only is it important for grasping *ens qua ens* which is the subject of metaphysics, it is also important in the grasping of the transcendental properties as well as in the sub-ontic elements in the structure of being. Additionally, there are methods like historicism, reductive thinking and maximalism which direct the focus of the cognizer towards realistic end. The end in question is the truth of being.

The disputed questions addressed in this dissertation clarify M. A. Krapiec's stance on the act and fact debate as well as the issue of participation which has little attention in his metaphysics. In my opinion, the movement from fact sense to act sense in the *Metaphysics* does not represent the holistic thought in Krapiec's Metaphysics. There are textual evidences in other works that show a progression from the act sense. Most importantly, Krapiec did not exclude any of the senses in his approach. However, it is more probable that priority goes to the act sense, since what is sought are non-contradictory principles of being.

Finally, the problem of participation shows that it is not a 'lack' in Krapiec's metaphysics, since there are textual instances that shows its importance in metaphysics. Not giving it a separate treatment is explained by the fact that it is probable that the analogical existence and predication of being, takes care of participation.

Does Krapiec's proposal do justice to the possibility and scientificity questions? The results of my dissertation show that the metaphysical proposal of Mieczysław Albert Krapiec has successfully demonstrated that metaphysics, in the classical sense, intrinsically possesses all necessary requirements to be an established discipline. Krapiec squashes the intellectual skepticism concerning the possibility of metaphysics by identifying the object, method and end

of metaphysics. These three requirements necessary for the founding of a scientific discipline was a result of a collaboration within the Lublin philosophical school, particularly with the effort of Stanislaw Kamiński. The implication is that Metaphysics is a discipline that is not methodologically bereft. The introduction and use of separation-based cognition, transcendental-analogical cognition, historicism, reductive thinking have validated the methodological and systemic autonomy of metaphysics. This autonomy emasculates the positivists attempt to scienticize metaphysics under the ideological influence of scientism. The Kantian illegitimization of the scientificity of classical metaphysics crumbles as Krapiec's proposal demonstrates the validity and authenticity of classical metaphysical knowledge. This knowledge is possible, thanks to being, which is the subject of metaphysical cognition. Metaphysical separation, a demonstrative method for the grasping of being and the extraction of metaphysical data from existential judgment also ensures that metaphysical knowledge is not a presupposition or a dogmatic data emerging from a non-rational faculty. If part of the aim of this work is to successfully re-instate, re-legitimize and re-establish metaphysics as a science (which is understood as a body of knowledge with its object, method and end), it does not, however, place metaphysics with physics, chemistry and all natural sciences in the same category of science (as understood in contemporary terms). However, metaphysical knowledge gained from Krapiec's proposal places at humanity's feet a unique way of understanding our world. I validate this claim with the words of Stanisław Kamiński, "the theory of being is indispensable and sufficient for full establishment of the rational basis of a worldview (and as a platform for debating worldviews), and for validating strictly philosophical implications of scientific cognition."<sup>899</sup>

Krapiec's metaphysical realism metamorphoses the positivist conclusion that the expulsion of metaphysics from philosophy was a necessary panacea to all mind-boggling questions and confusions in philosophy. Instead, metaphysics is re-instated as the queen of the philosophical disciplines, providing them with their autonomous objects of investigation as well as important principles of investigation. Such co-operation between metaphysics and the other philosophical disciplines characterizes philosophy as metaphysical philosophy. Krapiec's metaphysics, therefore, is a proposition that contemporary realistic philosophy should be metaphysical philosophy.

The measure of the success of Albert Krapiec's Metaphysics is not restricted to his ability to construct a method or establish the scientificity of metaphysics, rather it is intrinsically

---

<sup>899</sup> "The Theory of Being and other Philosophical Disciplines" in *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, 34.

connected with the proximity of his proposal to reality. It is on this ground that I refer to him, not just as a philosopher, but specifically, a realistic philosopher. This fact is accentuated by the words of Chudy: “For more than half a century of philosophical work that was consistent with and faithful to realism, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec created a coherent system that, by a metaphysical explanation, encompassed the whole of reality that is accessible to human cognition. Both with respect to its comprehensive scope and its meritorious importance, Krąpiec’s philosophy is the greatest achievement in classical philosophy in Poland.”<sup>900</sup>

---

<sup>900</sup> Chudy, “Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec in the Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy,” 564.

## Bibliography

### Primary Sources

#### A. [Books]

Krapiec, M. A. *Arystotelesa koncepcja substancji* [Aristotelian Conception of Substance]. Lublin: TN KUL, 1966.

Krapiec, M. A. *Byt i istota. Św. Tomasza "De ente et essentia"* [Being and Essence. St. Thomas' De ente et essentia], vol 11 (KUL, Lublin, 1981). Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1994.

Krapiec, M. A. *Ja - Człowiek, jako Dzieła*, t. 9, wyd. 5 (popr.), Lublin: RW KUL 1991, Lublin: Wydaw. KUL 2005 (translated into English by M. Lescoe, *I-Man. An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, Connecticut: Mariel Publications 1983).

Krapiec, M. A. *Język i świat realny*, [Language and the Real World]. Lublin: RW KUL 1985; jako *Dzieła*, t. 13, wyd. 2 (popr.), Lublin: RW KUL 1995; wyd. 2 popr. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu 2015.

Krapiec, M. A. *Metafizyka. Zarys podstawowych zagadnień*, Poznań: Pallottinum 1966; pod zmienionym tytułem: *Metafizyka. Zarys teorii bytu*, wyd. 2, przejrz. i popr., Lublin: TN KUL 1978, wyd. 3, Lublin: RW KUL 1984, wyd. 4, Lublin: RW KUL 1985, wyd. 5, Lublin: TN KUL 1988; jako *Dzieła*, t. 7, wyd. 3, Lublin: RW KUL 1995 (translated into English by Theresa Sandok, *Metaphysics. An Outline of the Theory of Being*, New York: Mariel Publications 1991).

Krapiec, M. A. *O rozumienie filozofii* [On Understanding Philosophy], jako *Dzieła*, t. 14. Lublin: RW KUL 1991, Lublin: Wydawn. KUL 2000.

Krapiec, M. A. *O rozumienie swiat*. [On the Understanding of the World]. vol. 22. Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 2002.

Krapiec, M. A. *Poznawać czy myśleć. Problemy epistemologii tomistycznej*, jako *Dzieła*, t. 8, Lublin: RW KUL 1994.

Krapiec, M. A. *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* [Realism of Human Cognition], Poznań: Pallottinum 1959; jako *Dzieła*, t. 2, wyd. 2 (popr.), Lublin: RW KUL 1995.

Krapiec, M. A. *Struktura bytu. Charakterystyczne elementy systemu Arystotelesa i Tomasza z Akwinu*, Lublin: TN KUL 1963; jako *Dzieła*, t. 5, wyd. 2 (popr.), Lublin: RW KUL 1995.

Krapiec, M. A. *Teoria analogii bytu* [Theory of Analogy of Being], Lublin: TN KUL 1959; jako *Dzieła*, t. 1, wyd. 2 (popr.), Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1993.

Krapiec, M. A. Kamiński S., *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, Lublin: TN KUL 1962; jako *Dzieła*, t. 4, wyd. 3 (popr.), Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1994.

Krapiec, M. A., Maryniarczyk, A. *The Lublin Philosophical School* [Unpubl.], translated by Hugh McDonald. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2010.

**B. [Translated Entries in the Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy]** *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, edited by A. Maryniarczyk (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu).

Krapiec, M. A. “Akt i możność” [Act and Potency], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 1 (2000): 145-150.

Krapiec, M. A. “A Priori” [A Priori in Philosophy], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 1 (2000): 303-304.

Krapiec, M. A. (wspólnie z A. Maryniarczykiem), “Byt” [Being], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 1 (2000): 746-785.

Krapiec, M. A. “Cogitativa vis” w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 2 (2001): 231-236.

Krapiec, M. A. “Diá Tí” w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 2, (2001): 556-558.

Krapiec, M. A. “Doświadczenie” [Experience] w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 2 (2001): 673-676.

Krapiec, M. A. “Entelécheia” w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 3 (2002): 171-172.

Krapiec, M. A. “Filozofia nauki” [Philosophy of Science], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 3 (2002): 481-490.

Krapiec, M. A. “Filozoficzny realizm” [Philosophical Realism], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 3 (2002): 541-546.

Krapiec, M. A. “Istnienie” [Existence], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 5 (2004): 44-58; 68-69.

Krapiec, M. A. (wspólnie z A. Maryniarczykiem), “Metafizyka” w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 7 (2006): 102-116.

- Krapiec, M. A. "Metafizyczne poznanie" [Metaphysical Cognition] w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 7 (2006): 90-101.
- Krapiec, M. A. "Nominalizm (i jego skutki w filozofii) [Nominalism and its effects within Philosophy], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 7 (2006): 696-697.
- Krapiec, M. A. "Osoba," [person] w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 7 (2006): 873-887.
- Krapiec, M. A. "Poznanie (istniejących rzeczy) [Cognition of Existing Things], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 8 (2007): 396-404.
- Mieczysław A. Krapiec, "Przyczyny bytu" [Causes of Being], w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. A. Maryniarczyk, t. 8 (2007): 527-545.
- Krapiec, M. A. "Ruch" [Motion] w *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, t. 8 (2007): 841-842.

#### [Other Selected Articles]

- Krapiec, M. A. "Analysis formationis conceptus entis existentialiter considerati," *Divus Thomas* 59 (1956): 320-350.
- Krapiec, M. A. "Christianity - the Common Good of Europe," w *The Common Christian Roots of the European Nations*, vol. 1, Florence 1983, s. 77-92 (oraz w: *Angelicum*, 68 (1991), s. 469-487).
- Krapiec, M. A. "Culture and Value" In *The Human Person and Philosophy in the Contemporary World*, vol. 1, ed. J. M. Życiński, Kraków (1980), 29-45 (oraz w: *Theory of Being. To Understand Reality*, ed. S. Kamiński, M. Kurdziałek, Z. J. Zdybicka, Lublin 1980, 257-267).
- Krapiec, M. A. "Egzystencjalne podstawy transcendentalnej analogii bytu" *Sprawozdania z Czynności Wydawniczej i Posiedzeń Naukowych oraz Kronika Towarzystwa Naukowego Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego*, 6 (1954): 69-72.
- Krapiec, M. A. "Foundations of a Civilization of Life and a Civilization of Death." Translated by Marek Kowalczyk. *Ethos* 2 (1996): 201-204.
- Krapiec, M. A. "Knowledge and Reality," *Forum Philosophicum* 11, (2006): 29-35.
- Krapiec, M. A. and Maryniarczyk, A. "Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School" in *Ad Fontes: Metaphysics Today* 6, (2009): 133-165.



- Krapiec, M. A. and Maryniarczyk, A. "Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School," *Studia Gilsoniana* 5, no. 2 (2016): 391-427.  
[https://www.academia.edu/36093559/Studia\\_Gilsoniana\\_5\\_2\\_2016\\_](https://www.academia.edu/36093559/Studia_Gilsoniana_5_2_2016_).
- Krapiec, M. A. "O rehabilitację analogii bytowej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5, 4 (1955-1957): 103-119.
- Krapiec, M. A. "On the Realism of Metaphysics," *Ad Fontes* 6, (2009): 101-117.
- Krapiec, M. A. "The Person and Society," *Angelicum* 62, (1985): 609-623.
- Krapiec, M. A. Kamiński S., "The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition" in *On The Metaphysical Cognition*, Trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2020), 9 -94.
- Krapiec, M. A. "The Theory of Analogy of Being," in *Theory of Being to Understand Reality*, (Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1980): 31-106.
- Krapiec, M. A. "Towards and Integral Anthropology," *Angelicum* 77, (2000): 43-64.

## Secondary Sources

- Aertsen, J. *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996.
- Ainsworth, T. "Form vs. Matter," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/form-matter/>.
- Allison, H. E. "Kant's Transcendental Idealism" In *A Companion to Kant*, edited by Graham Bird, 111-124. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006.
- Alston, W. P. *Realism and AntiRealism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- Alvira, T. Clavell, L. Melendo, T. *Metaphysics*. Manila: Sinag-Tala, 1991.
- Andrew L. "Creation, 'Esse,' and 'Id Quod Est' in Boethius's 'Opuscula Sacra,'" *Carmina Philosophiae* 17, (2008):35-56. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/44078593>.
- Aquinas, T. *Commentary On Aristotle's Metaphysics*, translated by John P. Rowan. Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1995.

- Aquinas, T. and Leckie, G. G. *Concerning Being and Essence*. Appleton-Century, 1937.
- Aquinas, T. *Summa Theologia*, translated by Laurence Shapcote, edited by John Mortensen and Enrique Alarcón. Lander: Aquinas Institute, 2012.
- Ashworth, E. J. "Medieval Theories of Analogy," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/analogy-medieval/>.
- Ayer, A. J. *Language, Truth and Logic*. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1952.
- Azzouni, J. *Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Baltzly, D. "Stoicism," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 Edition), Zalta, E. N. (ed.), URL = [<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/stoicism/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/stoicism/).
- Barnes, J. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*. The Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vols. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Barnes, J. *The Presocratic Philosophers*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982.
- Beiser, F. C. *German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism 1781-1801*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.
- Bell, D. "Kant" in *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, edited by Nicholas Bunnin and Tsui-James E. P., 725-740. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2003.
- Benevich, F. "The Essence-Existence Distinction: Four Elements of the Post-Avicennian Metaphysical Dispute (11–13th Centuries)" *Oriens* 45, (2017): 203-258. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18778372-04503004>.
- Blair, G. A. *Energeia and Entelekheia: 'Act' in Aristotle*. Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 1992.
- Blanchette, O. "Analogy and the Transcendental Properties of Being as the Key to Metaphysical Science" in *The Saint Anselm Journal* 2, no. 2 (2005). [http://journaldatabase.info/articles/analogy\\_transcendental\\_properties.html](http://journaldatabase.info/articles/analogy_transcendental_properties.html).

- Blanchette, O. *Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics*. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003.
- Bourdeau, M. "Auguste Comte," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, forthcoming URL = [<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/comte/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/comte/).
- Brennan, R. E. "Troubadour of Truth." In *Essays in Thomism*, Edited by Robert E. Brennan, 3-24. Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 1942.
- Brock, S. L. "On Whether Aquinas's *Ipsium Esse* is Platonism," *The Review of Metaphysics* 60, no. 2 (2006): 269-303. [www.jstor.org/stable/20130777](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130777).
- Brock, S. L. "Harmonizing Plato and Aristotle on *Esse*: Thomas Aquinas and the *De hebdomadibus*," *Nova et Vetera* 5, no. 3(2007): 465-494.
- Bronk, A. "Stanisław Kamiński – A Philosopher and Historian of Science," *Polish Philosophers of Science and Nature in the 20th Century*. (2001):141-151.
- Broughton, J. "Hume's naturalism and His Skepticism." In *A Companion to Hume*, Edited by Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, 425-440. West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 2011.
- Burgos, J. M. *An Introduction to Personalism*. Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2018.
- Burnett, T. "What is Scientism?" American Association for the Advancement of Science. April 15, 2020. [www.aaas.org/programs/dialogue-science-ethics-and-religion/what-scientism](http://www.aaas.org/programs/dialogue-science-ethics-and-religion/what-scientism)
- Burnham, D. and Papandreopoulos, G. "Existentialism," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. <https://www.iep.utm.edu/existent/#SH1e>.
- Carre, M. *Realists and Nominalists*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.
- Cessario, R. *A Short History of Thomism*. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2005.
- Chen, Chung-Hwan. "Different Meanings of the Term *Energeia* in the Philosophy of Aristotle," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 17, 1(1956): 56-65.

- Cohen, S. M. "Aristotle's Metaphysics," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/>.
- Henderson, C. J. *Exhortations to Philosophy: The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle*. Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Comte, A. *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte*, translated by Harriet Martineau. vol. 1. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000.
- Cooper, J. M. and Hutchinson, D. S. *Plato: Complete Works*. Hackett Publishing, 1997.
- Copleston, F. *A History of Philosophy: The Enlightenment*, vol. 6. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2003.
- Copleston, F. *A History of Philosophy: Greece and Rome*, vol. 1. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2003.
- Copleston, F. *A History of Philosophy: The Rationalists, Vol 4*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2003.
- Cornelio, F. *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino*, Second edition. Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1950.
- Cornelio, F. "The Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation," *The Review of Metaphysics* 27, (1974): 449-491.
- Cornelio, F. "The Transcendentality of "Ens-Esse" and the Ground of Metaphysics," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 6, (1966): 389-427.  
<https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq1966634>
- Cottingham, J. *The Rationalists. A History of Western Philosophy* (vol. 4). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Cullen, C. M. "Transcendental Thomism: Realism Rejected." In *The Failure of Modernism: The Cartesian Legacy and Contemporary Pluralism*, edited by Brendan Sweetman, Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1999, 72-86.
- Curd, P. "Anaxagoras", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/anaxagoras/>.
- D'Ettore, D. *Analogy after Aquinas. Logical Problems, Thomistic Answers*. Washington DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 2019.

- Dewan, L. "St. Thomas and the Distinction between Form and Esse in Caused Things," *Gregorianum* 80, no. 2 (1999), 353-370. [www.jstor.org/stable/23580267](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23580267).
- Downing, L., "George Berkeley" *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2013 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  
<<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/berkeley/>>.
- Dubray, C. "Dynamism." *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. Vol. 5. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909. <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05222a.htm>.
- Duma, T. "The Role of Existential Judgments in knowing the Existence of Beings," *Espíritu*, no. 148 (2014):317-331.  
<https://www.revistaespiritu.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Dialnet-TheRoleOfExistentialJudgmentsInKnowingTheExistence-4885199.pdf>.
- Earnshaw, S. *Existentialism: A Guide for the Perplexed*. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006.
- Ekeocha, K. "The Method of the discovery of the Absolute Transcendental Properties of Being in Mieczysław Albert Krapiec's Metaphysics," *Rocznik Tomistyczny*, 6 (2017): 207-229.
- Ekeocha, K. Book review, On the Methodology of Metaphysics/ Z metodologii metafizyki, *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, no. 3 (2018): 521-528. DOI:10.26385/SG.070325.
- Elders, L. *The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Historical Perspective*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993.
- Falcon, A. "Aristotle on Causality," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  
<<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/aristotle-causality/>>.
- Fink, J. L. *The development of dialectic from Plato to Aristotle*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Fotta, P. "Pri Pramieni Filozofie." PhD Diss., The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, 2005.
- Frossard, A. "Be Not Afraid!": *Pope John Paul II Speaks Out On his Life, his Beliefs, and his Inspiring Vision for Humanity*. New York: St. Martins Press, 1984.

- Garrett, D. "David Hume." In *A Companion to Metaphysics* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition), edited by Jaegwon Kim, Ernest S., Gary R., 306-310. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009.
- Gaven K. "Aquinas: Metaphysics," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Accessed May 12, 2020. <https://iep.utm.edu/aq-meta/>.
- Geiger, L. B. *La Participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris: Vrin, 1953.
- Gilson, E. *Being and Some Philosophers*. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952.
- Gilson, E. *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, translated by L. K. Shook. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994.
- Gilson, E. *The Elements of Christian Philosophy*, New York: Doubleday, 1960.
- Gilson, E. *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999.
- Gilson, E. *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012.
- Godfrey-Smith, P. *Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
- Gonzalez, O. J. "The Apprehension of the Act of Being in Aquinas," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 68, no. 4 (1994): 475-500.  
<https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq19946843>.
- Goodman, N. and Quine, W. V. "Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism," *The Journal of Symbolic Logic* 12, no. 4 (1947): 105-122. DOI: 10.2307/2266485.
- Gosselin, M. *Nominalism and Contemporary Nominalism: Ontological and Epistemological Implications of the work of W.V.O. Quine and N. Goodman*. Springer Science & Business Media, 1990.
- Gracia, J. J. E. *Individualism in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter Reformation, 1150-1650*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
- Graham, B. Introduction to *A Companion to Kant*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010.

- Guthrie, W.K.C. *A History of Greek Philosophy: The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.
- Guthrie, W. K. C. *A History of Greek Philosophy, The Later Plato and the Academy*, vol. 5. Cambridge: The University Press, 1978.
- Guyer, P. and Horstmann, R. "Idealism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.).  
<<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/idealism/>>.
- Haake, M. "Megara and the 'Megarians:' a city and its philosophical school,"  
[https://www.academia.edu/37389287/Megara\\_and\\_the\\_Megarians\\_a\\_City\\_and\\_its\\_Philosophical\\_School](https://www.academia.edu/37389287/Megara_and_the_Megarians_a_City_and_its_Philosophical_School)
- Haldane, J. J. "A Thomist Metaphysics." In *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics*, edited by Richard M. Gale, 87-109. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2002.
- Haldane, J. J. "Thomism," *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, accessed on June 15, 2020.  
<https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/thomism/v-1>.
- Hale, B. "Realism," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, accessed on June 2, 2017).  
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/realism-philosophy>.
- Hamlyn, D. W. "History of Metaphysics." In *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, edited by Ted Honderich, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 590-593. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Hawkins, D. J. B. "Principle of Sufficient Reason" in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 13, 777-778.
- Henle, R. J. "Existentialism and the Judgment," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 21, (1946): 40-52.  
<https://doi.org/10.5840/acpapro19462121>.
- Henle, R. J. *Method in Metaphysics*. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1950.
- Henle, R. J. *Saint Thomas and Platonism: A Study of the "Plato" and "Platonici" Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956.
- Hicks, S. R. C. *Explaining Postmodernism: Skepticism and Socialism from Rousseau to Foucault*. Milwaukee: Scholargy Publishing, 2004.

- Hume, D. *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Jaroszyński, P. *Beauty and Being: Thomistic Perspectives*, translated by Hugh McDonald. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2011.
- Jaroszyński, P. *Metaphysics or Ontology?*, translated by Hugh McDonald. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2011.
- Jaroszyński, P. *Science in Culture*, translated by Hugh McDonald. Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 2007.
- John, H. J. "The Emergence of the Act of Existing in Recent Thomism," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 2, (1962), 595-620.  
<https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq19622444>.
- Kamiński, S. "Explanation in Metaphysics." In *On the Methodology of Metaphysics [Z Metodologii Metafizyki]*, translated by Maciej B. Stępień, 135-203. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2018.
- Kamiński, S. "Contemporary Methods of Metaphysics." In *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics [Metody Współczesnej Metafizyki]*, 13-36. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2019.
- Kamiński, S. "Science and Philosophy Vis-À-Vis Wisdom." In *On the Metaphysical Cognition [O Poznaniu Metafizycznym]*, translated by Maciej B. Stępień, 211-230. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2020.
- Kamiński, S. "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being." In *On the Methodology of Metaphysics [Z Metodologii Metafizyki]*, translated by Maciej B. Stępień, 205-248. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2018.
- Kamiński, S. "The Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics." In *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics [Metody Współczesnej Metafizyki]*, 69-304. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2019.
- Kamiński, S. "The Theory of Being and Its Domains." In *On the Methodology of Metaphysics [Z Metodologii Metafizyki]*, translated by Maciej B. Stępień, 49-98. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2018.



- Kamiński, S. "The Theory of Being and Other Philosophical disciplines." In *On the Methodology of Metaphysics [Z Metodologii Metafizyki]*, translated by Maciej B. Stępień, 15-46. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2018.
- Kant, I. *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc. 2018.
- Kant, I. *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by N. Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan, 1929.
- Katz, E. "Ontological Separation in Aristotle's Metaphysics," *Phronesis* 62, (2017): 26-68. doi 10.1163/15685284-12341318.
- Kemple, B. *Ens Primum Cognitum in Thomas Aquinas and the Tradition: The Philosophy of Being as First Known*. Leiden: Brill, 2017.
- Kemp S. N. *The Philosophy of David Hume*. London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005.
- Kenny, A. *Aquinas on Being*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002.
- Kenny, A. "Introduction" to *A New History of Western Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010, ix-xvii.
- Klubertanz, G. *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: a textual analysis and systematic synthesis*. Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2009.
- Klubertanz, G. *The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa according to St. Thomas Aquinas*. St. Louis: The Modern Schoolman, 1952.
- Knasas, John F. X. "Haldane's Analytic Thomism and Aquinas's *actus essendi*." In *Analytical Thomism: Traditions in Dialogue*, edited by C. Paterson and M. S. Pugh, 233-251. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Knasas, John F. X. Review of *Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being*, by Mieczysław Albert Krapiec, *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review* 59, 1(1995): 152-156.
- Knasas, J. F. X. *Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2003.
- Knasas, John F. X. *The Preface to Thomistic Metaphysics: A Contribution to the Neo-Thomist Debate on the Start of Metaphysics*. New York: Peter Lang, 1990.

- Konye, M. "The Basis of Human Transcendence According to Mieczysław Albert Krapiec." *PhD Diss.* The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, 2019.
- Koslicki, K. *Form, Matter, Substance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Lichacz, P. *Did Aquinas Justify the Transition from 'Is' to 'Ought'?*. Warsaw: Institute Tomistyczny, 2010.
- Look, B. C. "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/leibniz/>.
- Lowe, E. J. *The Possibility of Metaphysics, Substance, Identity and Time*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
- Lumen Christi Institute, "Aquinas and Realism" by John Haldane. YouTube video, 1:04:20. Posted by "Lumen Christi Institute," 14 November, 2013.  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8MnS6A7mzwE&list=WL&t=2107s&index=3>.
- Lyttkens, H. *The Analogy Between God and the World. An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino*. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, 1952.
- Maloney, C. J. "Esse in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas," *The New Scholasticism* 55, (1981): 159-177. <https://doi.org/10.5840/newscholas198155222>.
- Maritain, J. *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. London: Continuum, 2005.
- Maritain, J. *Existence and the Existent*. Lewis Galantiere, Gerald Phelan (trans.) New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959.
- Maritain, J. *A preface to metaphysics: Seven lectures on being*. London: Sheed & Ward, 1945.
- Markie, P. "Rationalism vs. Empiricism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =  
 <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/rationalism-empiricism/>>.

- Maryniarczyk, A. *Discovery of the Internal Structure of Being*. Notebooks on Metaphysics, Vol. 5. translated by Hugh McDonald. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2018.
- Maryniarczyk, A. "Introduction" to *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza Z Akwinu, 2018.
- Maryniarczyk, A. "Is the Human Soul Sexed? In Search for the Truth on Human Sexuality," *Studia Gilsoniana* 9, 1(2020): 87-142.
- Maryniarczyk, A. *On Causes, Participation and Analogy*. Notebooks on Metaphysics, vol. 6, translated by Hugh McDonald. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2017.
- Maryniarczyk, A. "Participation: A Descending Road of the Metaphysical Cognition of Being," *Studia Gilsoniana* 5, 4(2016): 673-688.
- Maryniarczyk, A. *Rationality and Finality of the World of Persons and Things*. Notebooks on Metaphysics, vol. 4, translated by Hugh McDonald. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2016.
- Maryniarczyk, A. *The Monistic and Dualistic Interpretation of Reality*. Notebooks on Metaphysics, vol. 1, translated by Hugh McDonald. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2010.
- Maurer, A. "Etienne Gilson, Critic of Positivism." *The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review* 71, no. 2 (2007): 199-220. <https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.2007.0025>.
- McInerny, R. *Aquinas and Analogy*. Washington DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 2019.
- Mckirahan, R. D. *Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, 2010.
- Melamed, Y. Y. and Lin, M. "Principle of Sufficient Reason," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/sufficient-reason/>>.
- Menn, S. "The Origins of Aristotle's Concept of 'Ενέργεια: 'Ενέργεια and Δύναμις" *Ancient Philosophy* 14, (1994): 73-114.

- Miller, A. "Realism", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/realism/>.
- Mitchell, J. *Being and Participation: The Method and Structure of Metaphysical Reflection According to Cornelio Fabro*. 2 vols, Pontifical Athenaeum Regina Apostolorum, Rome, 2012.  
[https://www.academia.edu/2307203/Being\\_and\\_Participation\\_The\\_Method\\_and\\_Structure\\_of\\_Metaphysical\\_Reflection\\_according\\_to\\_Cornelio\\_Fabro](https://www.academia.edu/2307203/Being_and_Participation_The_Method_and_Structure_of_Metaphysical_Reflection_according_to_Cornelio_Fabro)
- Morris, W. E. and Brown, C. R. "David Hume," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/hume/>.
- Mouzala, M. G. "Aristotle's Criticism of the Platonic Forms as Causes in *De Generatione et Corruptione* II 9. A Reading Based on Philoponus' Exegesis" in *Peitho / Examina Antiqua* 1, no. 7 (2016): 123-147.  
[http://peitho.home.amu.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Peitho-7-2016-06\\_Mouzala.pdf](http://peitho.home.amu.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Peitho-7-2016-06_Mouzala.pdf).
- Nelson, M. "Existence," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/existence/>.
- Nijenhuis, J. "'To Be' or 'To Exist:' That is the Question," *The Thomist*, 50 (1986), 353-394.  
[10.1353/tho.1986.0018](https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1353/tho.1986.0018).
- Oleksy, M. W. *Realism and Individualism: Charles S. Pierce and the Threat of Modern Nominalism*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2005.
- Owens, J. *An Interpretation of Existence*. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985.
- Owens, J. "Aquinas on Knowing Existence," *Review of Metaphysics*, 29 (1976): 670-690.  
[www.jstor.org/stable/20126849](http://www.jstor.org/stable/20126849)
- Owens, J. *Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry*. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1992.
- Owens, J. *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics*. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985.
- Pearson, K. *The Grammar of Science*. Third Edition. New York: Dover Publications, 2004.

- Popper, K. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. London: Routledge, 2002.
- Quine, W. V. O. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" *The Philosophical Review* 60, (1951): 20-43.
- Rahner, K. *Spirit in the World*, translated by William Dych. New York: Continuum 1994.
- Reid, T. *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the principles of Common Sense*. Edited by Derek Brookes. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997.
- Rembierz, M. "How to Understand and Practice Philosophy? On the Concept of Philosophy Developed by Stanisław Kamiński." In *The Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century: Stanisław Kamiński*, edited by Kazimierz Marek Wolsza, 21-40. Kraków: Akademia Ignatianum, 2019.
- Renard, H. "The Metaphysics of the Existential Judgment," *The New Scholasticism* 23, (1949): 387-394.
- Ricketts, T. "Logical Positivism." In *A Companion to Metaphysics*, edited by Jaegwon K., Ernest S., Gary S., 380-385. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009.
- Howard, R. "Substance," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  
<<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/substance/>>.
- Rockmore, T. "Remarks on the Structure of Twentieth Century Philosophy," *The Netherlands*, June 26th, 2003. *Ars Disputandi*, 3:1, 332-339, DOI: 10.1080/15665399.2003.10819801.
- Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. *Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals*. Oxford: Clarendon University Press, 2002.
- Rohlf, Michael, "Immanuel Kant", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =  
<<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/kant/>>.
- Rotenstreich, N. "Kant's Concept of Metaphysics." *Revue Internationale De Philosophie* 8, no. 30 (1954): 392-408. [www.jstor.org/stable/23936829](http://www.jstor.org/stable/23936829).
- Salas, V. and Fastiggi, R. (eds.). "Francisco Suárez, the Man and his Work." In *A Companion to Francisco Suárez*, 1-28. Leiden: Brill, 2014.

- Sentesy, Mark. "Are Potency and Actuality Compatible in Aristotle?" *Epoche* 22, no 2 (2018):239-270. <https://doi.org/10.5840/epoche20171219102>.
- Sentesy, M., "On the many senses of Potency According to Aristotle." [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330910779\\_On\\_The\\_Many\\_Senses\\_of\\_Potency\\_According\\_to\\_Aristotle](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/330910779_On_The_Many_Senses_of_Potency_According_to_Aristotle)
- Sentesy, M. *Aristotle: Movement and the Structure of Being. PhD Diss.* Boston College, 2012. <http://hdl.handle.net/2345/2926>.
- Shanley, B. J. *The Thomist Tradition*, Springer-Science & Business Media, 2013.
- Shottenkirk, D. *Nominalism and Its Aftermath: The Philosophy of Nelson Goodman*. Springer Science & Business Media, 2009.
- Siewert, C. "Consciousness and Intentionality", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/consciousness-intentionality/>>.
- Smith, D. W. "Phenomenology," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/phenomenology/>>.
- Sprigge, T. L. S. "Idealism," In *The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics*. Edited by Richard M. Gale, 219-241. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2002.
- Strumia, A., "Analogy" in *Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science*, Accessed May 5, 2018. [www.inters.org/analogy](http://www.inters.org/analogy).
- Sweeney, L. *Authentic Metaphysics in an Age of Unreality*. Oregon: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2007.
- Sweet, W. "Jacques Maritain," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2019 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/maritain/>>.
- Swieżawski, S. *St. Thomas Revisited*, Translated by Theresa Sandok. New York: Peter Lang, 1995.
- Tallis R. *The Enduring Significance of Parmenides*. New York: Continuum, 2007.

- Tatarkiewicz, W. "Perfection: the Term and the Concept," *Dialectics and Humanism: The Polish Philosophical Quarterly* 6, no. 4 (1979): 5-10.
- Te Velde, R. A., *Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995.
- Thomas De Vio Cardinalis Caietanus, *De Nominum Analogia. De conceptu entis*, edited by P. N. Zammit, O.P., and P. H. Hering, O.P. Rome: Angelicum, 1952.
- Thornton, S. "Karl Popper," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  
<<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/popper/>>.
- Tommaso de Vio Cajetan. *The Analogy of Names and the Concept of Being*, translated by Edward A. Bushinnski. Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2009.
- Uebel, T. "“Logical Positivism’ ‘Logical Empiricism:’ What’s in a Name,” *Perspectives on Science* 21, 1(2013): 58-99.  
[https://doi.org/10.1162/POSC\\_a\\_00086](https://doi.org/10.1162/POSC_a_00086).
- van Inwagen, P. and Sullivan, M., "Metaphysics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2020 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.),  
<<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/metaphysics/>>.
- Vella, J. A. *Aristotle, A Guide for the Perplexed*. New York: Continuum, 2008.
- Viglino, U. "Principle of Contradiction" in *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 4, 277 – 278.
- Wasserman, R. "Material Constitution," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2018 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed).  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/material-constitution/>
- White, K. "Act and Fact: On a Disputed Question in Recent Thomistic Metaphysics," *The Review of Metaphysics* 68, no. 2 (2014): 287-312.  
[www.jstor.org/stable/24636345](http://www.jstor.org/stable/24636345).
- Wild, J. *Introduction to Realistic Philosophy*. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1948.
- Wilhelmsen, F. D. "The Triplex Via and the Transcendence of Esse," *The New Scholasticism* 44, (1970): 223-235. [https://doi.org/10.5840/newscholas197044217\\_](https://doi.org/10.5840/newscholas197044217_)

- Wilhelmsen, F. D. "Existence and Esse," *The New Scholasticism* 50, (1976): 20-45.  
<https://doi.org/10.5840/newscholas197650147>.
- Wilhelmsen, F. D. foreword to *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge*, trans. Mark A. Wauck. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986.
- Wilhelmsen, F. D. "The Concept of Existence and the Structure of Judgment: A Thomistic Paradox," *The Thomist* 41, (1977): 317-349. DOI:10.1353/tho.1977.0016.
- Wippel, J. "Essence and existence." In *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Kretzmann N, Kenny A, Pinborg J, 385–410. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- Wippel, J. F. "Introduction" to *The Ultimate Why Question: Why is There Anything at All Rather than Nothing Whatsoever?* Washington DC: The Catholic University Press of America, 2011.
- Wippel, J. F. *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being*. Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000.
- Witt, J. C. "Essence and Existence" in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy*, Edited by Lagerlund H. (Springer, Dordrecht, 2011).  
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9729-4\\_157](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9729-4_157)
- Wojciech, C. "Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec in the Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy," *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, no. 4 (2018):549-569. DOI: 10.26385/SG.070428.
- Wojtyła, K. *The Lublin Lectures [Wykłady Lubelskie]*. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2020.
- Yves, R. S. *An Introduction to Metaphysics of Knowledge*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1999.
- Zdybicka, Z. J. *Participacja bytu*. Lublin: TN KUL, 1972.
- Zelić, I. "The Lublin School of Philosophy," *Disputatio Philosophica: International Journal on Philosophy and Religion* 5, no. 1 (2003): 5-21.



## **Summary of the Doctoral thesis “The Conception of Realistic Metaphysics According to Mieczysław Albert Krapiec”**

This work presents Mieczysław Albert Krapiec’s metaphysics as a proposal for doing realistic metaphysics in our contemporary philosophical era. M. A. Krapiec’s proposal comes at the backdrop of ridicule, subjugation and outright rejection of the Aristotelian-Thomistic classical model of philosophizing. In place of this ‘original’ way of philosophizing, the Cartesian, Kantian, linguistic and positivist models assumed more dominant positions in the agora or philosophical space since the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The effects of this dominance was that classical metaphysics would either give way to more scientific models of rational thinking or would be the subservient to other philosophical disciplines which are more aligned to the demands of the methodological precision of contemporary science. Krapiec, therefore, perceived the need for a revamping and re-instating of classical metaphysics as the integrating hegemony of all philosophical disciplines. This proposal is what is referred to as Realistic Metaphysics.

This dissertation dubbed the Cartesian, Kantian, linguistic and positivist demands into what is referred to as the “possibility” and “scientificity” questions. The aim of the dissertation was to determine if Krapiec’s proposal does justice to the scientificity and possibility questions. Scientificity pre-supposes that metaphysics is not arbitrary; that there is a methodological framework with which metaphysics can reliably cognize and explain reality. The simplest way of posing the scientificity question is by asking: “Is metaphysics a science?” The possibility question, on the other hand, is a demand of demonstration. If Krapiec answers affirmatively to the scientificity question, it becomes imperative to demonstrate realistic cognition of the world. The simplest way of posing the possibility question is: “how can we do realistic metaphysics?” This dissertation, therefore, is a re-construction of the whole of Krapiec’s metaphysics as a response to the possibility and scientificity questions.

Chapter one introduces key concepts and formulates the *questio disputatis*. It also engages in key discussions like the relationship between general metaphysics and particular metaphysics as well as establishing *being qua being* as the subject of metaphysical cognition. Chapter two discusses the transcendental properties of being, the use of metaphysical separation in the discovery of these properties and the first metaphysical principles. It further discusses the analogical existence and predication of being. The third chapter delves into the structure of being, an attempt that helps to discern the composition of act and potency, matter and form, substance and accidents, essence and existence in being. Causal cognition is also discussed as

an important way of metaphysical cognition. The fourth chapter focused on key metaphysical and methodological issues as well as an assessment of M. A. Krapiec's metaphysics.

The point of departure was to establish that realistic metaphysics concerns the real world. The scientificity and possibility questions are answered only in the world of persons, animals and things – not in a possible world or in the world of mental/abstract constructs. This world exists irrespective of how we conceptualize or describe it. Its existence is independent of our cognition. This independence does not pre-suppose a no-relation between the world and the cognizer. The confirmation of the previous statement is seen in what is given in experience. The dissertation establishes that what is given in experience should not be disregarded as unreal or a mirage, rather, they are stepping stones for a more rational cognition. This primary contact with things is what is called common-sense cognition. Common sense cognition is not on par with metaphysical cognition because metaphysical cognition offers a deeper rational justification for what is cognized.

To establish the scientificity of metaphysics, this dissertation distinguishes four senses of science according to their ends: *theoria*, *praxis*, *threskéia* and *póiesis*. Metaphysical cognition is connected with the *theoria* – a truth-driven kind of cognition which pursues knowledge for its own sake. It is on the foundation of this conception of science that M. A. Krapiec builds his realistic metaphysics. Most importantly, for the scientific question was to establish the parameters for a scientific consideration for realistic metaphysics. In collaboration with Stanisław Kamiński, Krapiec adopts a broad conception of science, characterized by having an object, method and end. The discovery of the object of metaphysical cognition was actualized through a historical excursus of different objects that have emerged since the inception of philosophy. The result of this exercise was the affirmation that being as being is what metaphysics studies. However, being is understood as a determined content that has an existence proportional to it.

The question of method is an indispensable arm of the scientificity question. The method at the heart of Krapiec's metaphysics is metaphysical separation. This method is an adaptation of Thomas Aquinas' *separatio*. Krapiec stretches the separation into three stages: the affirmation of our first cognitive experience in existential judgment, characterized by its spontaneity; secondly, a separation of the content and existential elements of being; and thirdly the extension of the results of separation to all existing things. Whereas Krapiec demonstrates this in his discovery of *being qua being*, Andrzej Maryniarczyk extends it to all aspects of his

metaphysics. This dissertation follows such reconstruction in the discovery of *being qua being*, the transcendental properties of being and the composition of the ontic pairs of act and potency, matter and form, substance and accidents and essence and existence in being. The causal and analogical ways of explanation are also vital. They manifest the internal and external causal elements for metaphysical explanation as well as the analogical existence and predication of all beings.

### *Significance and discoveries*

The significance of this work is connected with the conclusions which are vital:

- Krapiec's proposal characterizes philosophy as some sort of metaphysical philosophy. This proposal helps us to see the unity of philosophy, divided into general and particular metaphysics. All the philosophical disciplines are knitted together analogically through the same object (being) and the same method (separation);
- this dissertation admits that there is undeniable affiliation of Krapiec to existential Thomism, however, there is an emphasis on the use of the platform of existential Thomism to advance realistic goals. The primary point of reference is being – the concretely existing thing and the object of cognition. Fidelity to reality is the bedrock of metaphysical realism;
- Krapiec does justice to the scientificity question through the use of concrete methods like metaphysical separation, historicism, and reductive demonstration. Through the use of these methods, this dissertation argues for the validity of the primary question which metaphysics answers – *dia ti* (why?). The possibility question was addressed by series of demonstrations which indicate how a cognizer can engage in a realistic grasp of the world of persons, animals and things. This involves searching for the non-contradictable reasons for the be-ing of beings;
- there are obvious methodological differences between Krapiec's realistic metaphysics and the nominalist and idealist philosophies. On the other hand, there are some metaphysical discrepancies in thought with some realistic philosophers like Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain; these discrepancies are also glaring in metaphysical considerations like the act and fact sense of being, the problem of participation and the method of grasping being as being.

Finally, the dissertation establishes that metaphysics is a science, but not in the same sense as the natural sciences.

**„Koncepcja metafizyki realistycznej w ujęciu Mieczysława Alberta Krapca”**

Praca przedstawia metafizykę Mieczysława Alberta Krapca jako propozycję współczesnej filozofii realistycznej. Propozycja M. A. Krapca pojawia się na tle dość powszechnego odrzucania arystotelesowsko-tomistycznego, a zarazem klasycznego modelu filozofowania. W miejsce tego oryginalnego sposobu filozofowania od XVII wieku na agorze filozoficznej zajęły miejsce bardziej dominujące nurty filozoficzne jak: model kartezjański, kantowski, lingwistyczny czy pozytywistyczny. Skutkiem tego klasyczna metafizyka albo została zastąpiona scjentystycznym modelem racjonalnego myślenia, albo jest podporządkowana innym dyscyplinom filozoficznym, które są dostosowane do wymogów metodologicznej precyzji współczesnej nauki. Dlatego Krapiec dostrzegał potrzebę przebudowy i przywrócenia klasycznej metafizyce statusu metodologicznego i zarazem autonomicznego, a czym właśnie odznaczać się ma proponowana przez niego współczesna wersja metafizyki realistycznej.

W rozprawie tej przedyskutowano postulaty kartezjańskie, kantowskie, lingwistyczne i pozytywistyczne w odniesieniu do kwestii określanych jako „możliwość” i „naukowość” racjonalnych wyjaśnień filozoficznych. Celem rozprawy było ustalenie, czy propozycja Krapca spełnia kryteria naukowości i racjonalności proponowanych wyjaśnień i uzasadnień. Naukowość zakłada, że metafizyka dysponuje własnym instrumentarium metodologicznym, dzięki któremu metafizyka może rzetelnie poznawać i wyjaśniać rzeczywistość. Najprostszym sposobem sprawdzenia propozycji Krapca jest postawienie pytania: „Czy proponowany projekt metafizyki spełnia kryteria bycia nauką?” Z drugiej strony pojawia się kwestia możliwości racjonalnych uzasadnień. Odpowiedź twierdząca na to pytanie sprawia, że Krapca koncepcja metafizyki realistycznej może być potraktowana jako ważna i wartościowa propozycja współczesnej filozofii realistycznej. Ważne jest zatem aby odkryć także i to przesłanie Krapca: „w jaki sposób należy uprawiać tego typu metafizykę realistyczną?” W tym celu niniejsza rozprawa jest rekonstrukcją całej metafizyki Krapca jako odpowiedź na pytania o jej metodologiczną autonomię i naukową wartość.

Rozdział pierwszy wprowadza kluczowe pojęcia i formułuje *questio disputationis*. Autor przedstawia kluczowe dyskusje na temat relacji pomiędzy metafizyką ogólną a metafizyką szczegółową, a także problem wyodrębnienia przedmiotu metafizyki, którym jest byt jako byt. Rozdział drugi został poświęcony omówieniu transcendentálnych właściwości bytu i ukazaniu zastosowania separacji metafizycznej przy odkrywaniu tych właściwości oraz pierwszych metafizycznych zasad istnienia i poznanie rzeczy. Dalej autor omawia analogiczny

sposób bytowania rzeczy i metodę analogicznego poznania i orzekanie o bytach. W trzecim rozdziale została przedstawiona struktura bytu, która pomaga poznać wewnętrzną naturę bytów, dzięki odkryciu złożenia z aktu i możliwości, materii i formy, substancji i przypadłości, istoty i istnienia. Omówiono także poznanie przyczynowe jako ważny sposób poznania metafizycznego. Rozdział czwarty został poświęcony omówieniu kluczowych zagadnień metafizycznych i metodologicznych, które wypracowuje Krąpiec wraz z S. Kamińskim oraz próba oceny metafizyki. Punktem wyjścia było ustalenie, że realistyczna metafizyka dotyczy poznania realnego świata, a nie jakichś bytów możliwych czy konstruktów umysłowych (abstrakcyjnych). Świat realny istnieje niezależnie od tego, jak go poznajemy lub opisujemy. Jego istnienie jest niezależne od naszego poznania. Ta niezależność nie zakłada braku relacji między światem a podmiotem poznającym. Potwierdzenie tego jest istotna rola doświadczenia w poznawaniu świata osób i rzeczy. W metafizyce Krąpiec podkreśla, że to, co jest dane w doświadczeniu, nie powinno być lekceważone, gdyż tego typu doświadczenie prowadzi w kierunku bardziej racjonalnego poznania. Ten podstawowy kontakt z realnymi rzeczami, to tak zwane doświadczenie i poznanie zdroworozsądkowe. Poznanie zdroworozsądkowe nie jest stawiane na równi z poznaniem metafizycznym, ponieważ poznanie metafizyczne, bazując na zdroworozsądkowym poznaniu, oferuje głębsze racjonalne uzasadnienie tego, co poznaje.

Aby potwierdzić naukowy status metafizyki, autor rozprawy wyróżnia cztery dziedziny poznania: *theoria*, *praxis*, *threskéia* i *póiesis*. Poznanie metafizyczne łączy się z poznaniem teoretycznym, którego celem jest prawda i w którym poszukuje się wiedzy dla niej samej. Na fundamencie takiej koncepcji nauki M. A. Krąpiec buduje swoją realistyczną metafizykę. Co najważniejsze, kwestia naukowa polegała na ustaleniu parametrów naukowych rozważań dla realistycznej metafizyki. We współpracy ze Stanisławem Kamińskim Krąpiec przyjmuje szeroką koncepcję nauki i naukowego poznania, którą określa własny przedmiot, metoda i cel. Odkrycie przedmiotu poznania metafizycznego zostało dopełnione poprzez historyczne odwołanie się do różnych koncepcji przedmiotów metafizyki, które pojawiły się w historii filozofii. Rezultatem tego odwołania się było odkrycie, że właściwym przedmiotem metafizyki realistycznej jest byt jako byt, to znaczy konkret realnie istniejący. A więc byt rozumiany jako określona treść zdeterminowana proporcjonalnym dla niej istnieniem.

Kwestia metody jest nieodzowną częścią zagadnienia naukowego statusu metafizyki. Podstawą metafizyki M. A. Krąpca jest metafizyczna separacja, wydobyta z pism św. Tomasza z Akwinu a współcześnie opracowana. Krąpiec rozciąga separację na trzy etapy: pierwszy polega na afirmacji naszego pierwotnego doświadczenia poznawczego w sądzie egzystencjalnym, który to etap charakteryzującą się spontanicznością; na drugim etapie zostaje

poddana analizie zawartość sądu egzystencjalnego, w wyniku którego następuje oddzielenie treści od aktu jej istnienia; na trzecim zaś etapie dokonuje się przejście od kategorialnego ujęcia przedmiotu do transcendentalnego na podstawie analogii w istnieniu. Wynikiem tego jest wyodrębnienie rozumienia bytu jako czegoś co ma konkretną treść i proporcjonalne do niej istnienie. O ile Krąpiec ukazuje funkcję separacji w formowaniu przedmiotu metafizyki to w Andrzej Maryniarczyk rozszerza zastosowanie tej metody na wszystkie etapy poznania metafizycznego.

Niniejsza rozprawa ukazuje całość projektu M. A. Krąpca metafizyki poczynając do wyodrębnienia przedmiotu metafizyki (bycia jako bytu), odkrycia transcendentalnych właściwości bytu i wewnętrznych złożań bytowych: aktu i możliwości, materii i formy, substancji i przypadkowości oraz istoty i istnienia w bycie. Ważne dla całości metafizyki jest odkrycie uprzączynowanego i analogicznego sposobu istnienia rzeczy oraz sformułowanie teorii przyczynowego i analogicznego poznania.

Ukazuje aktualność i wartość Krąpca koncepcji metafizyki realistycznej. Stąd ważne wnioski płynące z tej dysertacji są następujące:

- Propozycja Krąpca ukazuje filozofię jako swego rodzaju filozofię metafizyczną. Ta propozycja pomaga zagwarantować jedność filozofii, która dzieli się na metafizykę ogólną i metafizyki szczegółowe. Wszystkie dyscypliny filozoficzne łączy analogicznie rozumiany przedmiot (byt) i metoda (separacja);

- w rozprawie ukazano, że istnieje niezaprzeczalny związek Krąpca z tomizmem egzystencjalnym, jednak Krąpiec kładzie się nacisk na ukazanie metafizyki jako współczesnej wersji filozofii realistycznej. Podstawowym punktem odniesienia jest analogicznie rozumiany byt - rzecz konkretnie istniejąca, będący przedmiotem poznania i wyjaśniania. Stąd wierność rzeczywistości jest podstawą realizmu metafizycznego;

- Krąpiec buduje autonomiczną wersję metafizyki i wypracowuje dla niej odpowiednią metodę, którą jest separacja metafizyczna, oraz metoda dowodzenia i wyjaśniania dopełniana historyzmem i dowodzeniem redukcyjnym. Wykorzystując te metody, autor niniejszej rozprawa dowodzi aktualności zaproponowanej koncepcji metafizyki, skoncentrowanej na poszukiwaniu odpowiedzi na podstawowe pytanie - dla ti (dlaczego?). Odpowiedz na to pytanie wymaga poszukiwania niezaprzeczalnych przedmiotowy racji (przyczyn) pozwalających wyjaśnić badany problem;

- istnieją oczywiste różnice metodologiczne między realistyczną metafizyką Krąpca a filozofią Kartezjusza, Kanta, czy innych filozofii analitycznych lub idealistycznych. Z drugiej strony istnieją pewne metafizyczne rozbieżności w myśleniu z niektórymi realistycznymi

filozofami, takimi jak Etienne Gilson i Jacques Maritain i inni; te rozbieżności są również zauważalne w rozważaniach na temat rozumienia doświadczenia istnienia bytu, problemu partycypacji czy metody pojmowania bytu jako bytu. Wreszcie autor rozprawy wskazuje, że metafizyka proponowana przez Krapca jest wersją filozofii naukowo autonomicznej, ale nie w tym samym sensie jak to jest w przypadku nauk przyrodniczo-matematycznych.