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The Interplay between post-critical beliefs and self-consciousness

D. Wulff (1991) developed a notion of post-critical beliefs as a proposal for the description of religion in the light of the progress of secularization and socio-cultural changes. According to his theory, we can situate(place) potential attitudes toward religion in a two-dimensional space. The vertical dimension stands for Inclusion vs. Exclusion of Transcendence, and the horizontal one—for the way an individual interprets religious content: Literal vs. Symbolic. In this way, the two dimensions determine four quadrants, each reflecting a potential attitude towards religion, operationalized by D. Hutsebaut (1996) in the Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS) as: Orthodoxy, External Critique, Relativism and Second Naiveté.

The research presented in this paper is our attempt at finding an answer to the question whether the religious attitudes determined by Wulff are related to self-consciousness types. We tested 159 adult individuals by means of the PCBS scale by D. Hutsebaut and the Self-consciousness scale (O-Z scale) by Z. Zaborowski and Z. Oleszkiewicz. The results of these tests are that the reflective type of self-consciousness correlated positively with Orthodoxy and Second Naiveté and negatively with External Critique and Relativism.

Key words: self-consciousness, religiosity, post-critical beliefs

Introduction

Numerous authors have confirmed that there is a relationship between cognitive structures and religiosity (Hunsberger, 1991; Pyysiäinen, 2001; 2004; McCauley, Whitehouse, 2005; Ozorak, 2005; Dezutter, Soenens, Hutsebaut, 2006; Gauthier, Christopher, Walter et al., 2006). These relationships refer to automatic as well as controlled processes (Hill, 1997). Many authors claim that the cognitive processes involved in a religious experience do not differ from other forms of intellectual activity in an individual (Andersen, 2001; Boyer, 2001). They point to the contribution of attention, perception (Ash, Crist, Salisbury, Dewell, 1996; Guthrie, 2001; Wenger, 2004) and memory (Ozorak, 1997; McCauley, 2001; Whitehouse, 2002; McCauley, Lawson, 2002) in religious practices and experiences. Some researchers, however, hold the opinion that the cognitive processes involved in religious experiences are specific and not present in other forms of activity (Oser, Gmeunder, 1991; Sinnott, 2000). These authors attach particular importance to various forms of

insight and intuition (Watts, Williams, 1988; Miller, C'De Baca, 2001).

Going through the works of psychology classics, we may find statements which describe religious experiences in relation to self-consciousness (Freud, 1967, after: Głaz, 2003) or even assertions that we may reach complete self-consciousness only in a transcendental act (Marcel, after: Pastuszka, 1963). About self-insight, for instance, John Calvin (1960/1559, pp. 35–37) once argued that “without knowledge of self there is no knowledge of God” and that “without knowledge of God there is no knowledge of self”. However, there is not a lot of data in the empirical field. In English literature, we most often come across the Self-Consciousness Scale by Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975). Some authors noted a positive interrelation between private self-consciousness and internal religious motivation both in Christian samples (e.g. Gorsuch, McPherson, 1989; Maltby, 1999; Wenger, Yarbrough, 2005) and Muslim samples (Watson, Ghorbani, Davison, et al., 2002; Ghorbani, Watson, 2006). Polish researchers tended to apply the O-Z scale by Zaborowski and Oleszkiewicz

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(Zaborowski, 1989; Zaborowski, Ślaski, 2003–2004), pointing to the correlations of self-consciousness types with religious experience (Dawidowicz, Zarzycka, 2011) and religious relations among adolescents (Śliwak, Szoldra, 2005) and students (Zarzycka, Dawidowicz, 2008).

In the studies by Śliwak and Szoldra (2005), Dawidowicz and Zarzycka (2011), reflective self-consciousness determined the most optimal perspective for the shape of a positive relationship with God. According to the findings of the research by Zarzycka and Dawidowicz (2008), individuals with high individual and defensive self-consciousness are prone to rebelliousness and to becoming independent from the normative function of God; they also seek objective, rational grounds for their religious beliefs. Individuals with the domination of outer self-consciousness stress the normative dimension of religion.

The model of religious attitudes developed by Wulff (1991) and its operationalization in the Post-Critical Belief Scale (Hutsebaut, 1996; Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten, Hutsebaut, 2003) have created new perspectives for research on religiosity. This model includes new forms of beliefs which are characteristic of secularized societies and which, so far, have been neglected in studies of the psychology of religion. The research presented in this paper is an attempt at analyzing the relationships between religious attitudes by Wulff (1991) and self-consciousness types described by Zaborowski (1989). First, we will describe the Wulff's model (1991) and the PCBS scale (Fontaine et al., 2003). Next, we will move on to the description of self-consciousness types (Zaborowski, 1989) and the research problem.

The Wulff's model

According to Wulff (1991), we can place potential religious attitudes in a two-dimensional space. The vertical axis (Inclusion vs. Exclusion of Transcendence) determines the extent to which an individual assigns a place to religious objects in the transcendental reality or the extent to which they limit them to immanent processes in the earthly world. The horizontal axis (Literal vs. Symbolic Interpretation) refers to the way how people understand religious contents. As a result of crossing these two dimensions, four quadrants appear; they reflect potential ways of thinking about religion (see Figure 1) (Wulff, 1991; Bartczuk, Wiechetek, Zarzycka, 2011):

- Literal Affirmation stands for the attitude with which an individual affirms the reality of a religious object, and treats religion literally. An example for such an attitude is religious fundamentalism. The representatives of this quadrant have high levels of prejudice and have lower results in cognitive development and adaptation abilities.
- Literal Disaffirmation is a quadrant which represents individuals who understand religious statements literally and deny their authenticity. In psychological

literature, researchers describe attitudes of this type as an anti-religious orientation or atheism.

- Symbolic Disaffirmation represents a belief which denies the reality of a religious object, but assigns a privileged role to the symbolic meaning of religious myths and rituals. This attitude has not been taken into consideration in studies, yet, despite being closely related to Fowler's individuating reflective faith construct, Batson's Quest scale, and Barron's Enlightened Disbelief scale.
- Symbolic Affirmation refers to the attitude in which an individual treats the transcendent reality as real, but does not treat religious concepts and objects as agreeing exactly with this reality. Instead, they search for symbolic meaning enclosed in religious objects, which, finally, points outside these objects. Researchers in the field of the psychology of religion have also neglected this attitude, so far.

Inspired by Wulff's idea (1991), Hutsebaut (1996) created a Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS) for the measurement of religious attitudes defined by Wulff. The Orthodoxy scale is a measure of Literal Affirmation, External Critique—of Literal Disaffirmation, Relativism—of Symbolic Disaffirmation and Second Naiveté—of Symbolic Affirmation (Fontaine et al., 2003).




Figure 1. Integration of Hutsebaut's concepts in Wulff's (1991) theoretical model (after Duriez et al., 2001).

The concept of self-consciousness

Self-consciousness is the procedure of coding, processing and integrating information about self, in which an individual activates concentration, memory, perception and abstract-notional thinking (Zaborowski, 1989). Self-consciousness processes occur when individuals focus on themselves, and then, in confrontation with personal norms

and values, evaluate their own behavior. Zaborowski (1989) differentiates between contents and forms of self-consciousness. Contents, are those phenomena and processes which appear in the self-consciousness of an individual, for example: thoughts, desires, attributions, beliefs, moods and tensions, etc. Contents can be divided into internal and external. The internal contents, such as thoughts, emotions and desires, are the private property of an individual and subjective. The external contents, such as behavior, social relations and physical injuries are inter-subjective. The contents of self-consciousness are coded and processed through the use of specific forms. There are four important forms of self-consciousness (Zaborowski, Ślaski, 2003–2004):

- The individual form is a personal, subjective processing of information about self. It is connected to self-esteem, self-schema, self-concentration, and smaller distance to self. Representatives of this type stress their own subjectivity, manifested by the advantage of personal attributions, strong emotions and memory intensification.
- The defensive form arises on the background of fear, the feeling of danger, and the frustration of needs. It is connected to biases in thoughts and beliefs, lower self-esteem and lower trust in people. The result of the fear dynamics is that the consciousness field tightens, openness to new information is reduced and negative thoughts and ideas prevail. Rational and abstractive thinking pulls back under the pressure of concrete-imaginative thinking, marked by inflexibility and egocentrism.
- The outer (social) form consists of objective, descriptive processing of information concerning self. It facilitates effective task completion and social adaptation. People who represent this type are dominated by social norms and standards, and the self-assessment dynamic depends on conformity and the need for adjustment.
- The reflective form implies an abstract, symbolic processing of information about self, often on the basis of the accepted values, and facilitates understanding of one's own behavior and self in various contexts. It also facilitates taking into account both one's own needs and the requirements of the environment permitting a better self-knowledge and achieving a biographic clarity.

People usually display a specific level of each of these forms. Therefore, we can assign a relatively specified level of each form to a particular person, and draw individual self-consciousness profiles (Zaborowski, 1989).

The research problem

In the research presented in this paper, we aimed at analyzing relationships between self-consciousness types

and Wulff's (1991) attitudes toward religion. First, we identified the relationship of individual self-consciousness type with PCBS in the whole sample and in samples separated by gender and level of education. Next, we conducted the analysis of canonical correlation, which enabled us to categorise the analysed groups of variables and establish the range of variance. We formulated the following hypotheses:

1. As the reflective form of self-consciousness correlated positively with a positive relationship with God (see Śliwak, Szoldra, 2005), it should also correlate positively with attitudes which encompass Inclusion of Transcendence (Orthodoxy, Second Naiveté).
2. Given that the individual form of self-consciousness correlated positively with the negative dimensions of the religious association, e.g. rebelliousness, rejection of the normative function of religion (Zarzycka, Dawidowicz, 2008), we may assume that it will correlate positively with attitudes based on Exclusion of Transcendence (External Critique, Relativism).
3. The findings of the research conducted so far (Duriez, Hutsebaut, 2001; Śliwak, Zarzycka, 2010, 2011) point out the relationship of Orthodoxy with anxiety; therefore, we may expect that the defensive type of self-consciousness will accompany a literal understanding of religion rather than a symbolic interpretation; so it should correlate positively with Orthodoxy.

As neither of the studies carried out so far, nor theoretical assumptions, make it possible to formulate predictions regarding demographic variables (gender, education), we treated the nature of this part of the analyses as completely explorative.

Method

Participants

We conducted our research on a sample of 159 adults: 88 women and 71 men, aged between 19 and 60¹. Individuals with a higher level of education at the MA or MSc level (N = 73) and individuals with a secondary level education (N = 58) dominated the sample. Almost 50% of the participants live in a big city.

Measures

In the research, we applied the Self-Consciousness Scale (O–Z) by Z. Zaborowski and B. Oleszkiewicz (Zaborowski, 1989) as well as the Post-Critical Belief Scale by D. Hutsebaut (1996; Fontaine et al., 2003; Bartczuk, Wiechetek, Zarzycka, 2011).

Self-Consciousness Scale

The Self-Consciousness scale, developed by Z. Zaborowski and Z. Oleszkiewicz, includes 80 items which

¹ This empirical research was conducted by Grzegorz Tomasik in 2010 as a part of his master's thesis, supervised by Prof. Jacek Śliwak.

measure 4 self-consciousness types: an individual (25 items), a defensive (23), an outer (15) and a reflective one (17). The reliability and differential validity proved to be psychometrically satisfactory. For example, internal consistency calculated by means of the Kuder–Richardson coefficient amounted to 0.78 for the individual self-consciousness type, 0.85 for the defensive, 0.70 for the outer and 0.82 for the reflective type. The test–retest reliability, measured for 50 individuals after three weeks, amounted to 0.88 for individual, 0.89 for defensive, 0.78 for outer and 0.88 for reflective self-consciousness. The differential validity was assessed with reference to the Self-Consciousness Scale by A. Fenigstein, M. F. Scheier and A. H. Buss (1975). The individual type correlated with the private one ($r = 0.18$, $p < 0.01$); defensive with private ($r = 0.30$, $p < 0.001$) and public ones ($r = 0.28$, $p < 0.001$), and the outer with the public one ($r = 0.35$, $p < 0.001$). Reflective self-consciousness failed to correlate significantly with private ($r = 0.01$) or public self-consciousness ($r = 0.10$). This implies that it measures different dispositions than the types separated by Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (Zaborowski, 1989).

Compared with the SCS, the O–Z scale gives more room for typologization of self-consciousness. Namely, it includes reflective and defensive types, which are neglected by Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss, and which seem to play an important role in the context of studies on religiosity.

Post-Critical Belief Scale

The Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS) by D. Hutsebaut (Hutsebaut 1996; 2000; Fontaine et al., 2003) is a questionnaire with 33 items which belong to 4 subscales (see appendix): Orthodoxy (7 items), External Critique (8), Relativism (6) and Second Naiveté (7). Respondents answer by means of a 7-point format which mirrors the extent of their agreement.

The Polish adaptation of PCBS, carried out by Bartczuk, Wiechetek and Zarzycka (2011), was based on the accurate

mirroring of the psychometric process of compiling the original scale (studies were conducted on various samples and the internal PCBS structure was assessed by means of the multidimensional scaling). The results of the multidimensional scaling in the Polish sample revealed a structure which was similar to the representations in the Flemish sample. The indicators of the discriminative power of items ranged from 0.51 to 0.91, and they were very significant statistically ($p < 0.001$). We can also say that the reliability indicators (α –Cronbach) are satisfactory, too. We observed the highest α -value in the External Critique scale (from 0.84 to 0.90). In the Orthodoxy scale, α for individual groups ranged from 0.50 to 0.73, in Relativism: from 0.68 to 0.74 and in Second Naiveté: from 0.56 to 0.71 (Bartczuk, Wiechetek, Zarzycka, 2011).

In the research presented here, Orthodoxy correlated negatively with External Critique ($r = 0.47$, $p < 0.001$) and Relativism ($r = 0.43$, $p < 0.001$), and positively with Second Naiveté ($r = 0.54$, $p < 0.001$). External Critique correlated positively with Relativism ($r = 0.63$, $p < 0.001$) and negatively with Second Naiveté ($r = 0.57$, $p < 0.001$). Relativism and Second Naiveté correlated negatively with each other ($r = 0.15$, $p < 0.07$).

Result

First, we calculated the correlation of coefficients between self-consciousness types and religious attitudes. Then we carried out a canonical correlation analysis of self-consciousness types and religious attitudes.

Descriptive statistics

Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for religious attitudes and self-consciousness types that we observed in the whole sample, and also for women and men separately.

As for the general group, we noted the highest result in PCBS for Second Naiveté and the lowest for External Critique. In the O–Z scale, the outer self-consciousness

Table 1. Descriptive statistics and a t -test for the differences between women and men and also for different education levels, as per the PCBS scales and self-consciousness types.

Scales	General		Women		Men		t -test		Secondary		Higher		t -test	
	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	t	p	M	SD	M	SD	t	p
Orthodoxy	4.48	1.08	4.68	0.96	4.23	1.16	2.66	0.009	31.17	7.90	31.11	7.25	0.044	0.965
External Critique	3.15	1.29	2.92	1.14	3.44	1.40	-2.58	0.011	24.06	10.34	25.63	10.13	-0.920	0.359
Relativism	5.56	1.23	5.28	1.13	5.89	1.26	-3.21	0.002	31.94	7.66	34.52	6.98	-2.126	0.035
Second Naiveté	5.97	1.04	6.04	0.90	5.90	1.19	0.83	0.407	41.50	7.19	42.12	7.09	-0.527	0.601
Outer	2.97	0.52	2.99	0.43	2.94	0.60	0.71	0.479	42.81	7.28	45.58	8.08	-2.134	0.034
Defensive	1.55	0.70	1.62	0.67	1.47	0.73	1.39	0.167	35.82	15.75	35.17	16.47	0.243	0.808
Individual	1.94	0.43	1.97	0.40	1.90	0.46	1.01	0.314	48.25	9.66	48.75	11.21	-0.279	0.780
Reflective	2.69	0.59	2.83	0.50	2.50	0.64	3.69	0.000	43.51	8.95	47.08	10.39	-2.164	0.032

type scored the highest result and the defensive type, the lowest one. Next, some differences between women and men proved to be significant. Women were higher in Orthodoxy and reflective self-consciousness, whereas men scored significantly higher results in Relativism and External Critique. Individuals with a higher level of education scored higher in Relativism and reflective self-consciousness, in comparison to individuals with a secondary level of educational.

Correlation analysis

Table 2 shows the correlations between the PCBS and self-consciousness types in the general sample and in the subsamples for women and men, and also the differences between the correlation coefficients for women and men which were quite significant.

The reflective type of self-consciousness revealed the greatest number of correlations with religious attitudes

in comparison to other types. Positive correlations referred to the religious attitudes which assume Inclusion of Transcendence (Orthodoxy, Second Naiveté), and negative ones to the attitudes which assume Exclusion of Transcendence (External Critique, Relativism). We failed to note any statistically significant differences between correlation coefficients for women and men. Next, other self-consciousness types did not correlate significantly with religious attitudes in the general sample. However, we noted low positive relationships in women. They referred to Relativism, individual, outer and defensive self-consciousness. External Critique correlated with the defensive type as well.

Table 3 shows correlations between the PCBS and self-consciousness types in the subsamples for education and also significance levels regarding differences between correlation coefficients for secondary and higher education. Regardless of the level of education, the reflective type

Table 2. Correlations between PCBS and self-consciousness types, and significance levels for differences between correlation coefficients, for women and men separately.

Self-Consciousness	Group	Orthodoxy		Second		External		Relativism	
		<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>
Individual	Gener	0.06		-0.06		0.14		0.13	
	Wome	0.01	0.77	-0.02	0.62	0.20	0.61	0.24	0.28
	Men	0.07	1	-0.10	1	0.12	3	0.07	3
Outer	Gener	0.11		0.06		-0.04		0.09	
	Wome	0.03	0.41	-0.03	0.38	0.01	0.71	0.21	0.23
	Men	0.16	9	0.11	8	-0.05	1	0.02	5
Defensive	Gener	0.10		-0.14		0.15		0.04	
	Wome	0.01	0.38	-0.15	1.00	0.23*	0.48	0.18	0.41
	Men	0.15	5	-0.15	0	0.12	4	0.05	7
Reflective	Gener	0.34*		0.39*		-		-	
	Wome	0.26*	0.63	0.39*	1.00	-	0.72	-0.05	0.23
	Men	0.33*	7	0.39*	0	-	3	-	2

* $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3. Correlations between PCBS and self-consciousness types, and significance levels for differences between correlations of a secondary level of education group and of a higher level of education group.

Self-Consciousness	Level of education	Orthodoxy		Second		External		Relativism	
		<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>
Individual	Secondary	0.13	0.67	0.00	0.72	0.07	0.67	-0.09	0.05
	Higher	0.06	9	-0.06	5	0.14	9	0.25	
Outer	Secondary	0.35*		0.10	0.72	-0.10	0.72	-0.16	0.05
	Higher	-0.02	0.05	0.04	4	-0.04	4	0.19	
Defensive	Secondary	0.15	0.72	-0.02	0.40	-0.09	0.05	-0.18	0.05
	Higher	0.09	1	-0.16	9	0.23*		0.19	
Reflective	Secondary	0.45*	0.30	0.45*	0.44	-0.32*	0.29	-	0.53
	Higher	0.30*	6	0.34*	5	-	7	-	2

^ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$ ** $p < 0.01$ *** $p < 0.001$

correlated positively with Orthodoxy and Second Naiveté and negatively with Relativism and External Critique. In the group with a higher level of education, Relativism correlated significantly and positively with individual, outer and defensive types of self-consciousness, whereas in the group with a secondary level of education – negatively but not significantly. In the group with a secondary level of education, Orthodoxy correlated positively with outer self-consciousness, whereas in the group with a higher level of education there was not significant correlation.

Canonical correlation analysis

To investigate the relationship between a set of predictor variables (types of self-consciousness) and a set of criterion variables (PCBS), we conducted the canonical correlation analysis. The results of this analysis revealed two pairs of significantly correlated canonical variables (see Table 4).

Table 4. Results of canonical correlation between types of self-consciousness and PCBS.

Variables	Canonical variables	
	VC1	VC2
Self-Consciousness		
Individual	0.19	0.60
Defensive	0.18	0.94
Reflective	-0.82	0.15
Outer	-0.07	0.45
	Ad_x	0.19
	R_{xy}	0.06
	R_c	0.54
	R^2	0.29
	X^2	75.70
	df	16
	$p <$	0.001
PCBS		
Orthodoxy	-0.70	0.67
External Critique	0.95	0.10
Relativism	0.66	-0.14
Second Naiveté	-0.80	-0.23
	Ad_y	0.61
	R_{yx}	0.18

The first canonical variable (CV1) was created by the reflective type of self-consciousness (with a negative sign) based on a set of predictors, and from all PCBS subcomponents based on the criteria set: Orthodoxy and Second Naiveté with a negative sign, and Relativism and External Critique with a positive sign. The higher the level of reflective self-consciousness we observe, the higher the Orthodoxy and Second Naiveté and the lower the Relativism and External Critique we note. The canonical correlation coefficient is not high ($R_c=0.54$) but significant at the level of $p<0.001$. The results of the canonical variable of the

reflective type of self-consciousness account for 18% ($R_y/x=0.18$) of the variance within PCBS, whereas the reverse relationship accounts only for 6% ($R_y/x=0.06$) of the results variance within self-consciousness (see Table 4).

The second canonical variable (CV2) was created by defensive and individual types of self-consciousness (both with a positive sign) based on the set of predictors, and from Orthodoxy (with a positive sign) based on the criteria set. Therefore, the higher the level of individual and defensive types of self-consciousness is, the higher Orthodoxy we can observe. The canonical correlation coefficient is low ($R_c=0.31$) but it is significant at the level of $p<0.01$. The results of the canonical variable of types of self-consciousness account only for 1% ($R_y/x=0.01$) of the variance within PCBS. The assumption that there is a reverse direction of the relationship (PCBS vs. self-consciousness) improves the range the explained variance to the level of 4% ($R_y/x=0.04$). Thus, Orthodoxy seems to be a slightly better predictor of the defensive and individual self-consciousness (see Table 4).

Discussion

The subject of the research presented in this paper was the analysis of relationships of 4 self-consciousness types (Zaborowski, 1989) and attitudes toward religion (Wulff, 1991). Based on the results of the study, we may assume following conclusions:

1. A high level of reflective self-consciousness correlates with Inclusion of Transcendence (Orthodoxy, Second Naiveté), whereas a low one correlates with Exclusion of Transcendence (External Critique, Relativism). This correlation pattern is true for both men and women, also for individuals with different education levels. The canonical correlation analysis revealed that the literal and the symbolic Inclusion of Transcendence (positive sign) as well as the literal and the symbolic Exclusion of Transcendence (negative sign) are dependent on reflective self-consciousness. As the only predictor, the reflective type accounted for 29% of the result variability within attitudes toward religion. Therefore, we may infer that the activation of reflective self-consciousness is conducive to the generation of attitudes which facilitate believing. Studies which referred to the relationships between the trait of reflectiveness and religiosity corroborate this result. For example, research conducted by Zarzycka and Dawidowicz (2008) shows that a group with high reflectiveness reveals also a greater acceptance of the normative dimensions of religion and a lower religious sense of guilt, in comparison to the individuals with low reflectiveness. Next, findings by Allen and Spilka (1967, after: Nelson, 2003) show that, on the one hand, individuals with an involved religious orientation assess the world by means of a wide range of categories and their vision of the world is complex and malleable. On the other hand, individuals with “habitual”

religiosity interpret religion literally and categorically more often and they are marked by a high prejudice level.

2. A high result in the defensive self-consciousness correlated with the attitudes based on Exclusion of Transcendence (External Critique, Relativism). These dependencies were slightly stronger in women than in men, but differences between correlations were insignificant statistically. However, we observed significant differences in terms of relationships between groups categorized by their level of education. In individuals with a higher level of education, the defensive type of self-consciousness correlated positively with External Critique and Relativism and in individuals with only a secondary level of education—negatively. According to the definition by Zaborowski (1989), the central structural element of defensive self-consciousness is anxiety. Our results seem to follow numerous studies on the relationship between religiosity and anxiety and be consistent with results that indicate a negative correlation (for the review of literature, see Shreve-Neiger, A. K., Edelstein, B. A., 2004). In addition, these studies imply that the effect of anxiety is to encourage non believing, but only in individuals with a higher of level education. And in individuals with only a secondary level education, high anxiety seems to inhibit the rejection of religion (cf. Miller, Thoresen, 2003).

3. A high result in individual self-consciousness correlates only with one attitude based on Exclusion of Transcendence—Relativism. In this case, we failed to observe any differences in relationships in terms of gender. However, we noted differences in individuals with various levels of education—the individual type correlated positively with Relativism only in individuals with a higher level of education. According to Zaborowski (1989), individual self-consciousness correlates strongly with the activation of the structure of self and with the dynamics of self-realization. Therefore, we may risk the proposition that, in individuals with high individual self-consciousness, the dynamics of self-realization determines the way in which religion is perceived. The continuum of personal development and self-improvement is valued highly by those with a higher level of education. And this group of people seems to be interested in looking for a way of believing which would enable them to combine religion with their own dynamic, e.g. individual preferences, beliefs and needs. The relativistic attitude, as the only one in the Wulff concept (1991), allows selectivity in experiencing religion—e.g. it allows rejection of part of the doctrine whilst accepting some of the meanings and religious symbolics. Data gathered in two national surveys of American adults (Schieman, 2011) and in a survey on a representative sample of Poles, conducted by the Polish Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS) in 2009, seem to confirm this interpretation. According to the American results, people with a higher level of education are less likely to rely on the Bible and the teachings of their place

of worship for guidance in their decision making. The CBOS studies (2009) indicate that the proportion of those who participate in religious services compared to non-practicing individuals, increases systematically in a quite stable proportion of believers who have a higher level of education. These trends are similar in women and men.

4. A high result in external self-consciousness correlated in women with Relativism. This dependency was low but it differed significantly from the corresponding result in men. We find it difficult to comment on this finding because, at this stage of the research, there is insufficient data in the literature to make the interpretation possible. However, education level differentiated correlations between the examined variables. In individuals with only a secondary level of education, the external type correlated positively with Orthodoxy, whereas, in individuals with a higher of level education, this dependency was insignificant. Therefore, following these research results, it is clear that the outer type of self-consciousness is predictor of religious orthodoxy. Empirical research results confirm the importance of the external context in accepting or rejecting religion (see e.g. Stark, Bainbridge, 1996; Stark 1996). In addition, based on our findings, we may suggest that the coexistence of these variables is significantly more frequent in individuals who have a lower level of education.

5. Finally, the last result of our study sheds light on the Wulff model itself, on the Orthodoxy construct in particular. Although the canonical correlation analysis for the other pair of canonical variables is significant statistically, it is very low. On the criteria side, only Orthodoxy (positive sign) formed a part of the canonical variable, and on the predictors' side—the defensive and individual types of self-consciousness (positive sign). The variance range of results in Orthodoxy explained by the types of self-consciousness is extremely low. Interestingly enough, assuming the reverse dependency direction, that is explaining the results variability in types of self-consciousness by means of the Orthodoxy results, increases the range of the explained variance, slightly. With such low results, we cannot formulate any explicit conclusion, but we may suggest that the interpretation, which is contrary to the one assumed in our research, is also possible. This means it may be true that it is the orthodox attitude toward religion that determines the way information is processed.

The research presented in this paper is not flawless. First, the examined sample is quite varied and small. This made it impossible for us to categorize the study participants by other demographic variables, such as place of residence or age. However, based on the results, we may suggest that these variables may modify religiosity's relationship with self-consciousness. Second, the Zaborowski and Oleszkiewicz scale which we applied in our work, may also arouse reservations—the theoretical construct itself and its operationalization are sometimes unclear and only vaguely

established in the context of well-known and tested tools. Possibly, we should have applied the Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss scale (1975) as it is a more established instrument in the research on self-consciousness and in future studies we may do so.

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APPENDIX

THE POST-CRITICAL BELIEF SCALE

In this appendix, all items of the The Post-Critical Belief scale are listed for the four subscales separately, i.e. Orthodoxy, External Critique, Relativism and Second Naivete’.

Orthodoxy

1. God has been defined for once and for all and therefore is immutable.
2. Even though this goes against modern rationality, I believe Mary truly was a virgin when she gave birth to Jesus.
3. Only the major religious traditions guarantee admittance to God.
4. Religion is the one thing that gives meaning to life in all its aspects.
5. Only a priest can give an answer to important religious questions.
6. I think that Bible stories should be taken literally, as they are written.
7. You can only live a meaningful life if you believe.
8. Ultimately, there is only one correct answer to each religious question.

External Critique

1. Faith is more of a dream, which turns out to be an illusion when one is confronted with the harshness of life.
2. Too many people have been oppressed in the name of God in order to still be able to have faith.
3. God is only a name for the inexplicable.
4. A scientific understanding of human life and the world has made a religious understanding superfluous.
5. The world of Bible stories is so far removed from us, that it has little relevance.
6. In the end, faith is nothing more than a safety net for human fears.
7. In order to fully understand what religion is all about, you have to be an outsider.
8. Faith is an expression of a weak personality.
9. Religious faith often is an instrument for obtaining power, and that makes it suspect.

Relativism

- 1 Each statement about God is a result of the time in which it was made.

2. Official Church doctrine and other statements about the absolute will always remain relative because they are pronounced by human beings at a certain period of time.
3. God grows together with the history of humanity and therefore is changeable.
4. The manner in which humans experience their relationship to God, will always be colored by the times they live in.
5. I am well aware my ideology is only one possibility among so many others.
6. Secular and religious conceptions of the world give valuable answers to important questions about life.
7. There is no absolute meaning in life, only giving directions, which is different for every one of us.
8. Ultimately, religion means commitment without absolute guarantee.

Second Naivete'

1. The Bible holds a deeper truth which can only be revealed by personal reflection.
2. The Bible is a guide, full of signs in the search for God, and not a historical account.
3. Despite the fact that the Bible has been written in a completely different historical context from ours, it retains a basic message.
4. Because Jesus is mainly a guiding principle for me, my faith in him would not be affected, if it would appear that he never actually existed as a historical individual.
5. The historical accuracy of the stories from the Bible is irrelevant for my faith in God.
6. Despite the high number of injustices Christianity has caused people, the original message of Christ is still valuable to me.
7. I still call myself a Christian, even though a lot of things that I cannot agree with have happened in the past in name of Christianity.
8. If you want to understand the meaning of the miracle stories from the Bible, you should always place them in their historical context.