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PERSON AS CONSTITUTED BY DIALOGICAL RELATIONALITY ACCORDING TO JOSEPH RATZINGER

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Abbreviations

A. A. S.   *Acta Apostolicae Sedis.*

Acts   St. Luke, *Acts of the Apostles* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.

CIC   John Paul II, *Codex Iuris Canonici: Apostolic Constitution, Sacrae Disciplinae Leges* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, January 25, 1983).

CCC   Interdiscasterial Commission for the Catechism of the Catholic Church, *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, June 25, 1992).

CCSL   Dom Eligius Dekkers et al (editors), *Corpus Christianorum Series Latinae* (Turnout-Belgium: Brepols Publishers 1953 -).

CDF   Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith

Col.   St. Paul, *Letter to the Colossians* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.

DH   Vatican II Council, *Dignitatis Humanae: Declaration on Religious Freedom* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, December 7, 1965).

DV   Vatican II Council, *Dei Verbum: Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation,* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, November 18, 1965).

Eph.   St. Paul, *Letter to the Ephesians* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.

Ex.   *The Book of Exodus* in the Old Testament of the Sacred Scripture.

Gal.   St. Paul, *Letter to the Galatians* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.

GE   Vatican II Council, *Gravissimus Educationis: Declaration on Christian Education* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, October 28, 1965).

Gen.   *The Book of Genesis* in the Old Testament of the Sacred Scripture.

GS   Vatican II Council, *Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, December 7, 1965).

Heb.   *Letter to the Hebrews* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.

Jn.	St. John, *The Gospel according to John* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.
LG	Vatican II Council, *Lumen Gentium: Dogmatic Constitution on the Church,* Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, November 21, 1964).
Lk	St. Luke, *The Gospel according to Luke* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.
Mk.	St. Mark, *The Gospel according to Mark* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.
Mt.	St. Matthew, *The Gospel according to Matthew* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.
Num.	*The Book of Numbers* in the Old Testament of the Sacred Scripture**.**
PL	Jacque Paul Migne (ed.), *Patrologia cursus completes. Series Latina,* (Paris: Petit-Montrouge, 1841-1880).
Rev.	St. John, *Revelation to John* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.
Rom.	St. Paul, *Letter to the Romans* in the New Testament of the Sacred Scripture.
SC	Jean Danielou, Claude Mondesert, and Henri de Lubac, *Sources Chrétienne* (Paris: Institute des Sources Chrétienne and Editions du CEF,* 1942-)*
ST	Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (Ohio: Benziger Brothers, 1485).

BIOGRAPHY OF JOSEPH RATZINGER-BENEDICT XVI

In 2005, the year he was elected the 265th Bishop of Rome and Supreme Pontiff of the Universal Church, several biographies[1] of Joseph Aloisius Ratzinger were published. These timely publications provide a cornucopia of information on the life and work of our protagonist, who celebrates his 93rd birthday as I write this biography. Ratzinger was born on April 16, 1927 at Marktl am Inn Bavaria, Germany[2]. His birthday was a Holy Saturday and so he "was baptized late on the morning of his birth with newly blessed Easter water"[3]. Reflecting on the privilege of being baptized on Holy Saturday, Ratzinger writes as follows: "I have always been filled with thanksgiving for having had my life immersed in this way in the Easter mystery…To be sure, it was not Easter Sunday but Holy Saturday, but the more I reflect on it, the more this seems to be fitting for the nature of our human life: we are still awaiting Easter; we are not yet standing in the full light but are walking toward it full of trust"[4].

His parents Joseph Ratzinger Sr. and Maria Ratzinger (nee Peintner) had three children, a daughter named Maria and two sons - Georg and Joseph Ratzinger, who happens to be the last born of the three children. His father Joseph Ratzinger Sr was a police commissioner[5] and his mother is most probably a housewife as can be deduced from excerpts from the following memoirs about his childhood: "The police station – and hence our living quarters – occupied the most beautiful house on the town square…the beauty of the façades concealed living spaces with little comfort to speak of. The paving on the floor was full of cracks, the stairs were steep, the rooms crooked. The kitchen and the living were narrow, and the bedroom by contrast had been the chapter

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[1] Amongst the bibliographies of Joseph Ratzinger which were published in the year of his election as Pope Benedict XVI, include: J. Allen, *The Rise of Benedict XVI: The Inside Story of How the Pope Was Elected and Where He Will Take the Catholic Church* (New York: Double day, 2005); J. Allen, *Pope Benedict XVI: A Biography of Joseph Ratzinger* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2005), being a reprint of Allen's earlier book – *Cardinal Ratzinger: the Vatican's Enforcer of the Faith* (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2001); G. Weigel, *God's Choice: Pope Benedict XVI and the Future of the Catholic Church* (London: Harper Collins, 2005); M. Bardazzi, *In the Vineyard of the Lord: The Life, Faith, and Teachings of Joseph Ratzinger, Pope Benedict XVI* (New York: Rizzoli International, 2005); G. Tobin, *Holy Father: Pope Benedict XVI: Pontiff for a New Era* (New York: Sterling, 2005).

[2] J. Ratzinger, *Aus Meinem Leben: Erinnerungen* 1927-1977 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), translated into English by Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis and published with the title *Milestones: Memoirs 1927-1977* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), p. 8.

[3] See, G. Weigel, *God's Choice: Pope Benedict XVI and the Future of the Catholic Church* (London: Harper Collins, 2005), p. 159.

[4] J. Ratzinger, *Milestones: Memoirs 1927-1977* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), p. 8.

[5] See A. Nichols, "The Bavarian Background", *The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger* (New York: Burns and Oates, 2007), p. 1; see also G. Weigel, *God's Choice: Pope Benedict XVI,* p. 159; See also J. Thornton and S. Varenne, *The Essential Pope Benedict XVI: His Writings and Speeches* (London: Harper Collins, 2008), p. xxxv.

room, which did not exactly make for comfort. For us children, all of this meant mystery and excitement, but for Mother, on whom the burden of housework rested, all of this meant a great deal of hardship. So she was all the happier when she could go out with us on long hikes"[6]. Ratzinger's elder brother – Georg was born in 1924 and he is said to be "the friendly jokester of the family and most outgoing"[7].

Georg is a lover of music and one could not look so far away to see his influence on young Ratzinger's interest in music, which will later be reflected in one of the earliest portraits of his personality, following his election as Pope, hence the *New York Time's* description of the new pope as "a lover of cats and Mozart"[8]. Georg and Joseph Ratzinger were ordained Catholic priests on the same day, the 29th of June 1951 in Freising by Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber of Münich.

His sister Maria is the eldest of the three children, being born in 1921 and so six years older than him. Maria, who never married, certainly "looked after her baby brother in every way"[9], managing Cardinal Ratzinger's household until her death in 1991[10]. In all, Ratzinger's family can be considered a middle-class family, being neither rich nor poor but happy, religious and secure, doing everything together[11].

Ratzinger had a stint of wartime experience as he was drafted at the age of 14 into the *Hitler-Jugend, Bund deutscher Arbeiterjugend*, a paramilitary arm of the German Nazi-Party during the second world war. At the end of the war in 1945, he and his elder brother Georg re-entered[12] the Saint Michael seminary in Traustein to train for the Catholic priesthood. After his

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[6] J. Ratzinger, *Milestones,* p. 11.
[7] C. Mills, *Modern World Leaders: Pope Benedict XVI* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007), p. 30.
[8] M. Landler and R. Bernstein, "A Future Pope Is Recalled: A Lover of Cats and Mozart, Dazzled by Church as a Boy" *New York Times*, April 22, 2005. Accessed online on 10th April, 2020 at 14:16 from https://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/22/world/worldspecial2/a-future-pope-is-recalled-a-lover-of-cats-and-mozart.html "In Germany, at this time, an education almost always included musical instruction. While in Traustein, both Ratzinger brothers would travel to the nearby city of Salzburg Austria, just across the Salzach River. When they heard of performances of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, and Mozart's Mass in C Minor, they were captured by music for the rest of their lives. For many years, Ratzinger tried to play the piano everyday, preferring Mozart and Beethoven to all others." Cf. Clifford Mills, *Modern World Leaders: Pope Benedict XVI* (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2007), p. 38; see also J. Ratzinger, *Milestones,* p. 25.
[9] .C. Mills, *Modern World Leaders: Pope Benedict XVI,* p. 30.
[10] G. Weigel, *God's Choice,* p. 159.
[11] See, C. Mills, *Modern World Leaders,* ibid.
[12] It was the major seminary at Freising that the two Ratzinger brothers were admitted into at the end of the war in November 1945 (see, J. Ratzinger, *Milestones,* p. 45). Earlier in 1939, at age 12, Ratzinger had already entered the minor seminary, where his elder brother had enrolled equally for training for the priesthood. However, they will be conscripted into the Nazi Youth Movement which disrupted the smooth progress of their seminary training for about two-three year (1942-1945). **S**ee, J. Ratzinger, *Milestones,* pp. 25-29. Ratzinger tells of his dislike for sports during his minor seminary: "Every day, for two hours, we had to participate in the big playground of the seminary…I am not

ordination in 1951, he was assigned to work as an assistant pastor in the parish of the Precious Blood, Münich where Father Blumschein was pastor. Ratzinger described his load of tasks in the parish as follows: "I had to give sixteen hours of religious instruction at five different levels, which obviously required much preparation. Every Sunday I had to celebrate at least two Masses and give two different sermons. Every morning I sat in the confessional from six to seven, and on Saturday afternoons for four hours. Every week there were several burials in the various cemeteries for the city. I was totally responsible for youth ministry, and to this I had to add extracurricular obligations like baptisms, weddings, and so on. Since the pastor (i.e. Father Blumschein) did not spare himself, neither did I want to, nor could I spare myself"[13].

The next year, in 1952, he was assigned to the seminary in Freising, which allowed him to zero into an earlier desired academic career[14], having completed both a doctoral thesis based on a competition essay on *The People and House of God in Saint Augustine's Doctrine of the Church*, which he won, enabling him to eventually earn his doctorate in July 1953[15] and a habilitation thesis on *Theology of History According to Saint Bonaventure* in 1957 under the direction of the fundamental theologian from Cologne Gottlieb Söhngen[16]. Subsequently, he was named a lecturer at the University of Münich and on January 1, 1958 a professor of fundamental theology and dogma at the College of Philosophy and Theology in Freising.

In 1959, he accepted an offer to be an ordinary professor of fundamental theology at the University of Bonn. With his inaugural lecture on The God of Faith and the God of Philosophy,[17] he had begun a twenty-year long academic career as a professor of fundamental theology and dogma which will take him from Bonn to Münster in 1963, Tübingen in 1966 and eventually

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at all gifted at sports and also I was the youngest of all the boys, some of whom were as much as three years older than I". see, J. Ratzinger, *Milestones,* pp. 25-26.

[13] Cf. J. Ratzinger, *Milestones,* p. 101.

[14] Ratzinger gave a hint to his longing for an academic career in his memoirs as follows: "I decided to ask the bishop to allow me to study [at the faculty of theology] in Münich, and this is what occurred. My hope was to become more fully familiar with the intellectual debates of our time by working at the university, so as some day to be able to dedicate myself completely to theology as a profession." See J. Ratzinger, *Milestones,* p. 47.

[15] Cf. J. Ratzinger, *Milestones,* p. 102.

[16] Cf. J. Ratzinger, *Milestones,* p. 49, 59, 97; see, T. Rowland, *Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: T & T Clark, 2010), p. 12; see also G. Weigel, *God's Choice,* p. 166; see also A. Nichols, *The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI,* p. 11.

[17] J. Ratzinger, *Der Gott des Glaubens und der Gott der Philosophen. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der theologia naturalis,* ed. Heino Sonnemans (Trier: Paulinus, 2006); see also Emery de Gaal, "The Inaugural Lecture in 1959" in *The Theology of Benedict XVI* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 73-74.

returning to the Bavarian city of Regensburg in 1969 where he lectured until his appointment as Archbishop of Münich and Freising in 1977[18].

During his university academic professorial career, he published his most famous work, *Introduction to Christianity* (1968 while at Tübingen). He had also had fruitful encounters with notable scholars and colleagues both within the universities and during his time as *peritus* to Cardinal Frings of Cologne during the Second Vatican Council. Amongst the scholars he had worked with as fellow *periti* during the Council include Hans Küng, Henri de Lubac, Edward Schillebeeckx, Yves Congar, and Karl Rahner[19]. His colleagues at the universities also include such notable names as Johan Auer (Münich, Bonn and Regensburg), Hans Küng, Ernst Käsemann, Ernst Bloch, Jürgen Moltmann, Ulrich Wickert, and Wolfganag Beyerhaus (Tübingen). While at Regensburg, Pope Paul VI appointed him to the International Theological Commission. The task of this commission was to "implement the new function that the Vatican II Council assigned to theologians and ensure that modern theological developments entered from the outset into the decision-making process of bishops and of the Holy See itself"[20]. It was through his membership in the International Theological Commission that Ratzinger came to make new friends in the persons of Henri de Lubac and Hans Urs von Balthasar with whom he would begin the popular journal *Communio* in 1972[21].

Ratzinger active period as a university professor could be said to have come to an end with his consecration as Archbishop and creation as a Cardinal in March and June of 1977 respectively, by Pope Paul VI. As Archbishop of Münich and Freising, he has chosen as his motto *Cooperatores*

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[18] A. Nichols, *The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI,* p. 14.

[19] R. Barron, "Yves Congar and the Meaning of Vatican II" in *Word on Fire*, June 29, 2012. Available online from https://www.wordonfire.org/resources/article/yves-congar-and-the-meaning-of-vatican-ii/445/. Accessed on 10th April, 2020 at 21:52.

[20] J. Ratzinger, *Milestones,* p. 142.

[21] All three founding members of *Communio* were former members of the earlier journal *Concilium,* founded in 1965 which had been intended to keep the spirit of Vatican II after the end of the sessions. According to Bishop Robert Barron, three are three reasons which the *Communio* founding members had to leave the former journal - *Concilium* to begin a new project: "First they said, the board of '*Concilium'* was claiming to act as a secondary magisterium, or official teaching authority, alongside the bishops. Theologians certainly have a key role to play in the understanding and development of doctrine, but they cannot supplant the bishops' responsibility of holding and teaching the apostolic faith. Secondly, the '*Concilium'* board wanted to launch Vatican III when the ink on the documents of Vatican II was barely dry. …Thirdly, and in my judgment most significantly, Balthasar, Ratzinger and de Lubac decried the '*Concilium'* board's resolve to perpetuate the spirit of the council." See, R. Barron, "Yves Congar and the Meaning of Vatican II" in *Word on Fire*, June 29, 2012. Available online from https://www.wordonfire.org/resources/article/yves-congar-and-the-meaning-of-vatican-ii/445/. Accessed on 10th April 2020 at 22:02.

Veritatis (Co-workers of Truth from 3 John, verse 8)[22]. After four years of serving as Archbishop the next Pope John Paul II called him to the Vatican in 1981, to take on the position of the Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith. This congregation was formerly called the 'Sacred Congregation for the Holy Office' and was previously known as the 'Roman Inquisition'. It is to this very sensitive office, which Ratzinger headed until his election as Pope in 2005.

During his time as the "The Vatican's Enforcer of Faith"[23], Ratzinger saw to the publication of the 1983 New *Code of Canon Law* and the 1992 *Catechism of the Catholic Church.* The CDF also published a number of ecclesiastical documents ranging from decrees, declarations, norms, notifications, instructions etc., some of which significant ones include the 2000 *Declaration on the unicity and salvific universality of Jesus Christ and the Church, Dominus Iesus.* Also it was during his time as CDF Prefect that the liberation theologian *Leonardo Boff* was suspended and the books of Anthony de Melo become the subject of notification. Ratzinger was unwavering in his stance on maintain the traditional church's moral teachings on homosexuality, contraception, and interreligious dialogue.

After the papacy of Pope St. John Paul II, Ratzinger was elected the 265th Bishop of Rome and Pope of the Universal Church at the age of 78 on April 19th, 2005[24]. He published three encyclicals, as Pope, namely *Deus Caritas Est* (2005), *Spe Salvi* (2007), *Caritas in Veritate* (2009), and had already began writing a fourth encyclical, *Lumen Fidei*, which his successor Pope Francis had to complete in 2013 after his resignation. According to the testimony of Pope Francis: "These considerations on faith – in continuity with all that the Church's magisterium has pronounced on this theological virtue – are meant to supplement what Benedict XVI had written in his encyclical letters on charity and hope. He himself had almost completed a first draft of an encyclical on faith. For this I am deeply grateful to him, and as his brother in Christ, I have taken up his fine work and added a few contributions of my own. The Successor of Peter, yesterday, today and tomorrow, is always called to strengthen his brothers and sisters in the priceless treasure of that faith which God has given as a light for humanity's path"[25].

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[22] E. de Gaal, *The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 10.
[23] This phrase formed part of the title of John Allen's work *Cardinal Ratzinger: The Vatican's Enforcer of Faith* (New York: Continuum, 2000).
[24] See, C. Mills, *Modern World Leaders: Pope Benedict XVI,* p. 84.
[25] Pope Francis, *Lumen Fidei* (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana), no. 7.

After a total of seven years and 318 days in office as 'Bishop of Rome' and 'Successor of Saint Peter', Pope Benedict XVI took the surprising decision to resign at the age of 85 on 28th February 2013, becoming the first pope to resign since Gregory XII in 1415. After his resignation, he retired to Mater Ecclesiae monastery in the Vatican garden near St. Peter's square when he lives until today. As Pope Emeritus he has made a few public appearances including the first papal consistory of his successor, Pope Francis on 22 February, 2014; and has granted an interview in March 2016 endorsing Pope Francis's stress on mercy in his pastoral practice. With over 66 completed hard-copy books, three encyclicals and three apostolic exhortations, I cannot agree less with Emery de Gaal, when he testifies that "no previous pope has written as profound and seminal theological works as he; and certainly no pope has influenced the direction of theology over the course of half a century more than Pope Benedict XVI"[26]. Certainly, Ratzinger's works are over 600 titles given the fact that most of them did not lead directly to publications in his own name but overflew into documents published by committees, congregations and addresses given while he held various ecclesiastical posts. An exhaustive bibliography of Ratzinger's pre-Papacy works has been prepared by Sankt Ulrich publishing house[27] and the official collection of his works is equally being undertaken at Vatican by the Joseph Ratzinger-Benedict XVI foundation since December 2007[28].

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[26] E. De Gaal, *The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI,* p. 11.
[27] Cf. Schülerkreis Papst Benedict XVI, (Hrsg), Vinzenz Pfnür (Red.) *Joseph Ratzinger Papst Benedict XVI. Das Werk. Veröffentlichungen bis zur Papst wahl* (Augsburg: Sankt Ulrich Verlag, 2009).
[28] See updates on available works out of the proposed 16 volumes of Ratzinger's *Opera Omnia* and translations in various languages http://www.fondazioneratzinger.va/content/fondazioneratzinger/en/joseph-ratzinger/opera-omnia.html. Accessed on 13th April, 2020.

INTRODUCTION

A few months ago, the Pontifical Biblical Commission published their most recent work on biblical anthropology[29]. The very entry point of their enquiry was a question which the psalmist addressed to God "Lord what is man?" (Ps. 8, 5). It goes to show that the very source of theological anthropology in the Scripture is oriented towards God, from whom is received the Revelation of the true meaning of man as a person. This Revelation is however fully manifest in the Divine Person of Jesus Christ in whom "all the perfections of a human nature"[30] are fully realized. In a nutshell, theological anthropology starts from the mystery of the Person of God in Christ and so it begins from the notion of God as Person and progresses through the consideration of the Divine Person of Christ, to the eventual discovery of the human being as a person. Joseph Ratzinger's approach to the understanding of the notion of person as constituted by dialogical relationality follows this very scheme, which is being lost in contemporary attempts to revive the discourse on person. Hence, the relevance of this dissertation is shown in its attempt to exemplify an instance of how theological enquiry into the understanding of man as a person can contribute to the realization of the true meaning of human person in view of responding adequately to anti-personalist trends in our society today.

As can be noted, a central question which cannot be circumvented in theological anthropology, is that of the meaning of the notion of person. Within the academic community, a human person is insufficiently understood as an individual being whose freedom is unlimited as much as his or her rational capacities are equally unlimited. The seeds of such an ideology of individualism was perhaps sown amongst scholars especially philosophers and theologians, as early as the fifth century definition of person given by Severinus Boethius, which has it that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature[31]. This definition, when applied to the

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[29] Pontifical Biblical Commission, *Che cosa è l'uomo? Un itinerario di antropologia biblica* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2019).

[30] A. Orozco, *Mother of God and Our Mother* (Lagos: Criterion Publishers, 2005), p. 10. In this work, Antonio Orozco, who discusses the implication of the title *theo-tokos,* in relation to the hypostatic union of two natures in Christ, tries to distinguish between *nature* and *person* and so notes that "In Christ, *there is no human person.* But He has nevertheless, a complete human nature. This nature is sustained, actualized, and vivified by a particular person: the Second Person of the Blessed trinity. Mary conceived, by the power of the Holy Spirit, a real human being who from the first moment of his existence was really God" (Cf. A. Orozco, ibid., pp. 8-12).

[31] Boethius, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis contra Eutychen et Nestorium,* translated into English by Rand, Edward Kennard, edited by Hugh Fraser Steward and published with the title *On the two natures of Christ: A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire, USA: W. Heinemann, 1918), passage 3:20. "Latini personam et Graeci πρόσωπα signatius naturae rationabilis individuam subsistentiam ὑποστάσεως nomine » [The Latin *persona* and the Greek *prosopon* signify the rational nature of individual subsistence, we call hypostatis -i.e.

community of persons, results in collectivism which is rather a distortion of the meaning of *communio personarum,* the ideal of which we find in the Divine community of the three Persons of the Trinity.

The task of theological anthropology today is to restore the proper understanding of person in such a way that dialogical relationality is shown to be the constitutive factor which grounds the transcendence of individual human persons towards communion with other human persons. It is a task which seeks for answers to the challenges of individualism on the one hand and collectivism on the other. Such answers when found should highlight 'relationality' as constitutive factor which illuminates the equal dignity of person in my own humanity and in the humanity of others, reflecting the equality of persons in the divinity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit in the Divine community of Persons.

It is significant to note that in the Trinitarian context, there is a unity of the Divine substance which is fully present in each of the Triune Divine Persons, for according to the doctrine, there is only one God, the substance of whom is fully present in each of the three Persons. Such a context does not obtain fully in the case of human persons and angelic persons and so when the concept of person is thus used beyond this Trinitarian context to refer to human beings as well as angelic beings as persons, we cannot but rely on analogical language[32] to point to what is meant by the expression 'man is a *person'* or an angel is a *person*. Notably, analogical language does not only highlight the similarities between the source analogon (e.g. Divine Persons) and the derivative or target analogates (e.g. human person) but it equally implicates dissimilarities, hence it will be a

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person] retrieved on 6th March, 2020 from https://scaife.perseus.org/reader/urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0058.stoa023.perseus-lat1:3?q=individua&qk=form.

[32] At the heart of the language of analogy is the reality of the plurality of beings but even more fundamental is the difference between God and creatures when we speak of God as a 'being' and equally speak of creatures as 'beings'. The word 'being' – which is the most metaphysical notion applicable to all that exists (both Divine and creaturely) can only refer to the plurality of existing entities if used analogically, hence we speak of transcendental analogy, which means a way of using a notion such that its meaning transcend beyond one entity so as to be equally applied to all entities. Unlike the word 'being' however, the notion of person cannot be applied to all entities that exists for there are non-personal beings as well. Hence, we cannot speak of transcendental analogy when we use the word 'person'. At best, we can speak of a categorical analogy – i.e. within the category of beings that are persons. Howsoever, there are different kinds of analogy, irrespective of whether we use it transcendentally or categorically. Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec, the great metaphysician of the Lublin School of Philosophy, is of the opinion that we can speak of analogy in two ways: *"within* beings" and *"between* beings". Cf. M. Krapiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline of the Theory of Being,* translated by Theresa Sandok, New York: Peter Lang, 1992, pp. 452-457. When we use the concept of person to refer to a plurality of beings (Divine, angelic, human), we are simply using the language of analogy *between* beings. It is similar to when we speak of plants, animals, and man as having souls, thanks to which we speak of plurality of different beings as "living" beings. In the case of person, the principal analogon (i.e. basis of analogy) is 'rational life' – for Divine, angelic and human persons all have rational life, hence Boethius would speak of persons as having a 'rational nature' – i.e. a rational mode of dynamism, specific to personal beings.

mistake to assume that since God, man, and angels are persons, then such perfections of a personal nature in God will also be found in man or angels. Thus, we note that each being is what it is according to its nature, hence the difference between humanity and Divinity or angelicity remains such that we can speak of Divine Persons as distinguished in their divinity from human persons, which distinction also implicates the degree of perfections in personhood accordingly.

This dissertation attempts a search for the retrieval of the constitutive relationality of persons in Joseph Ratzinger's notion of person. Ratzinger's notion highlights dialogical relationality of persons which poses a challenge for our contemporary culture of individualism. It attempts to provide solutions for the widespread malaise of loneliness and depression. More than ever before, our contemporary society is being forced by rapidly changing social conditions to de-value interpersonal relationships by substituting physical interactions and encounters with virtual relationships (e.g. social media platforms). We are continuously being threatened not only by techno-scientific developments in information and communication media but also by socio-economic changes in the distribution and organization of social structures.

Even more so are the mitigating factors against real interpersonal relationships arising from materialistic-oriented economic concerns leading to the shrinking of the space and time we allocate for the *other*. The fear of the Malthusian prediction of a geometrically increasing population and the attendant scarcity of resource exert its own pressure on our fast-paced contemporary society which unconsciously nudge us more and more towards individualism, anti-personalist reproductive health technologies which promote abortions, and euthanasia and more recently, the new challenge of management and control of new pandemic spread of diseases such as the highly contagious corona virus, dubbed COVID-19, which tend to entrench the culture of individualism, given the recommended solutions such as 'social-distancing', and 'self-isolation'.

Regarding the new culture of social distancing and self-isolation, which may still have its effect after the COVID-19 wave of viral infections, we can afford a little digression. Interestingly, prior to December 2019, little literature existed on the policy of social distancing. I did read a few of these, the most impressive of which is the multi-authored article on influenza pandemic which argues for its promotion in schools[33]. In the church, from the universal Church to the particular Churches, a series of instructions encouraging various adjustments to liturgical practices – e.g.

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[33] L. Usher-Pines et al, "School practices to promote social-distancing in K-12 schools: review of influenza pandemic policies and practices" in *BMC Public Health* (2018), 18:406, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-018-5302-3.

suspension of exchange of kiss of peace during Mass and dispensation of the aged and the very young from obligation to attend Sunday Masses[34]. The 'pro-individualistic' measures adopted to control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic virus are necessary in times of health emergencies and pandemic situations as we live through today. Such periods however are transitory and emergency measures need not be allowed to define the future of social interactions.

However, the challenge of individualism has been around even before the new way of life in our society, no thanks to the new challenge from coronavirus. Accordingly, we underscore that the number of divorces in marriages have increased in the last few decades and younger people are becoming lesser and lesser interested in building lasting relationships. In short, we are gradually losing the sense of community and interpersonal relationships in our world today as altruistic virtues are gradually becoming out-modish. What then is the solution? How do we recover the true value of interpersonal relationships? First of all, we have to re-think our understanding of person. Perhaps, we have missed an essential aspect of what constitutes a personal being. I consider Ratzinger's vision of person as constituted by dialogical relationality a panacea for the anthropological crisis, which humanity is beset with today, both on the theoretical-conceptual level and on the practical-experiential sphere.

Accordingly, this dissertation attempts to achieve three basic objectives: the one is to discover the fundamental source of relationality of persons in view of proffering lasting solutions to the contemporary loss of the sense of dialogical relationality as an essential constitutive element of what it means to be a person. A second objective is to realize a scholarly investigation into the ground the human person's experience of truth and freedom in the context of dialogical relationality as mediated by the Christian faith, on the basis of Joseph Ratzinger's relational vision of 'person'. Finally, it is equally one of the objectives of this dissertation to show that Joseph Ratzinger theological method of demonstrating the dialogical relationality of persons is not incompatible with other approaches to relationality of persons, for instance as can be noted in the Thomistic personalism of Karol Wojtyła. Regarding this last objective, I have to mention

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[34] Cf. The Apostolic Penitentiary, "Decree on Granting of Special Indulgence to the Faithful in the Current Pandemic" dated 19th March, 2020. Retrieved on 21st March, 2020 from http://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2020/03/20/200320c.html   see also, Catholic Bishops Conference of Nigeria, "Corona Virus: Time for Caution, Not Panic", a letter to Catholics in Nigeria, dated 21st March 2020. Retrieved on 22nd March 2020 from http://www.cnsng.org/viewnews.php?tabnews=2073.

straightaway that while I agree with such scholars like Tracey Rowland[35] that unlike Wojtyła, Ratzinger does not follow so much in the footsteps of Thomas Aquinas as he is more inclined to Augustinian traditions, I attempt in this dissertation to show that the differences in approach does not lead to divergent conclusions on the constitutive relationality of persons.

The anthropological tradition within which I try to realize the above objectives is that of personalism. Of course, it is not common among scholars to speak of Ratzinger as a personalist and this is not what I intend to demonstrate here rather I chose to take this personalist bias as a window of vision, an academic outlook, on the basis of which I attempt the analysis of Ratzinger's anthropological thought so as to highlight those elements that can serve to demonstrate that his notion of person is relational. I also hope that the discovered elements can also serve as a common ground of meeting between his anthropology and those of Thomists, particularly that of Karol Wojtyła. On the practical experiential level, I do intend to present such a personalistic outlook as indispensable in the search for solutions to the contemporary man's crisis of individualism on the one hand as well as the extreme tendency towards collectivism, on the other hand.

As we noted a few lines earlier that there is a difference in approach, it follows that a legitimate question about methodology arises, and one can ask: How does Ratzinger himself understand his claim that person is constituted by dialogical relationality? How does his method differ from that of Karol Wojtyła? Reading a couple of Ratzinger's works[36] one notices that he begins from the traditional notion of person as understood with regard to God, and then with specific focus on the second Person of the Triune God, who is God-man, he naturally derives an appropriate anthropology of man as a person. In his own words "there is a transition from the doctrine of God into Christology and into anthropology"[37].

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[35] See, T. Rowland, *Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London-New York: T & T Clark Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), p. 155.

[36] See for instance, such selected works of Joseph Ratzinger as *Einfurung in das Christentum* (Münich: Kosel-Verlag, 1968)*,* translated into English by J.R. Foster and published as *Introduction to Christianity* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004); *Credo fur heute: Was Christen glauben* (Freiburg: Herder, 2006) translated into English by Michael Miller et al and published as *Credo for Today: What Christians Believe* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009); *Dogma und Verkündigung* (Donauworth: Erich Werwel Verlag, 2005), translated by Michael Miller and Matthew J. O'Connell and published as *Dogma and Preaching: Applying Christian Doctrine to Daily Life* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005); *Glaube und Zukunft* (München: Kosel-Verlag, 1970), translated into English and published as *Faith and Culture* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971); *Das Fest des Glaubens* (Einsideln-Switzerland: Joannes Verlag, 1981),translated into Englishby Graham Harrison and published as *Feast of Faith: Approaches to a Theology of the Liturgy, Jesus von Nazareth,* in three volumes, with English translations provided by the Vatican Secretary of State as *Jesus of Nazareth* (Rome: Liberia Editrice Vaticana,2011); amongst other such works.

[37] J. Ratzinger, "Concerning the notion of person in theology". Translated by Michael Waldstein, *Communio* 17 (Fall, 1990), pp. 439-454, esp. p. 445.

In the light of this methodological transition from theology, through Christology, to anthropology, Ratzinger undertakes a systematic analysis of man's experience of the relational constitutive structures of being a person by privileging the practical-experience of man's response to God's self-revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ – in other words, the experience of the Christian faith is a frequent context for his considerations of the human being as a person. In his anthropology, such ontological or philosophical assumptions as: 'rationality', or 'personal subjectivity' does not play central roles rather he considers these categories as theologically insufficient for explaining the human person in the light of Christian Revelation. This is not surprising, given his starting point from the revealed mystery of God. Beginning from God, therefore, we do not have a direct access to Divine rationality, Divine subjective or such other features of the *nature* or inner dynamic core of person in the Godhead and so we cannot make a legitimate transition from the 'rationality', or 'subjectivity' of God to the rationality or subjectivity of man. Hence, in place of these, Ratzinger's anthropology begins from man's way of access to God, namely the response to Revelation or the experience of a faith encounter in which "relationality towards the other person (in this case, towards the person of God, who is the 'Wholly Other') constitutes the human person"[38].

Relationality as the constitutive feature of person in Ratzinger, can be easily misunderstood since there is a sense in which man can relate to himself rather than towards the other. Such a *self-relation* in its extreme form is simply *relativity*, which is the opposite of relation towards the other. At first my curiously was heightened given the hindsight that one of the major themes reverberating from the homily he preached to the Cardinals before they went into the conclave that elected him Pope Benedict XVI in 2005 was the resounding cautions for the dangers of the "dictatorship of relativism"[39]. I began to wonder why he would both hold that the human person is constituted by relationality while also indicating that relativism is so to speak a plague to be avoided.

From a practical point of view, both concepts 'relationality' and 'relativism' do not mean the same thing as one points to a tendency to 'communion' while the other points to a tendency to

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[38] J. Ratzinger, "Concerning the notion of person in theology", p. 439.
[39] J. Cardinal Ratzinger, "Homily of His Eminence, Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, Dean of the College of Cardinals" at Mass Pro Eligendo Romano Pontifice, at Papal Chapel of the Vatican Basilica on Monday, 18th April 2005 retrieved on Monday, 3rd February, 2020 from http://www.vatican.va/gpII/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-pontifice_20050418_en.html

'individualism' and its social expression in 'collectivism' (i.e. collection of individuals). Even from this preliminary consideration, one can grasp the consistency of Ratzinger in maintaining that man as a person is constituted by dialogical relationality. Here, the need to investigate the implication of man's constitution from relationality arises even more sharply, given that *relation* as such requires concrete subject (s) of the relation, which in themselves are individuals. What then is the difference between a *substantialist* approach to personalism and a *relationalist* approach to personalism? Why is it that on the one hand, *relationality* constitutes *persons* according to Ratzinger, whereas the notion of *relation* is said to be the weaker than that of '*substance'* in Greek philosophy due to the fact that the substance is 'independent' in itself whereas relation, which is an accident of substance is said to be 'dependent' and so weaker than substance. Ratzinger offers some hint, when he notes that "while Greek philosophy regards the reference to the other only as a lack and thus as a form of diminishing the dependent being, Christian faith in relativity and relation to the other has seen fullness. The most perfect is what is most open. We can understand Christ not from the perspective of a strictly defined introverted man and strictly defined introverted God; We can understand God and man from the perspective of Christ, in which God and man are completely open to each other"[40].

From the above, we come to see the difference in perspectives between Ratzinger's primacy of *relationality* over *substantiality*. Based on this primacy of relationality, Ratzinger replaced the very constitutive core of the Greek substantialist approach to the unique specificity of man as person, (i.e. 'rationality') with *relationality*. But does this mean that the Greek substantialist approach which Thomas Aquinas took from Aristotle is no longer useful in this consideration of relationality of persons? Certainly not so; rather what we have is a different approach which as we shall come to see does not nullify the Thomistic trajectory but instead both approaches enrich the central point of the constitutive relationality of persons, albeit from different entry (starting) points. Karol Wojtyła for instance who follows the Thomistic-Aristotelian-Greek tradition works his way up from the existence of the substance, as a *suppositum* towards the spark

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[40] J. Ratzinger, *Opera omnia*, vol. VIII/2: *Kościół – znak wśród narodów. Pisma eklezjologiczne i ekumeniczne*, ed. K. Góźdź, M. Górecka, trans. by Wiesław Szymona, (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL 2013, p. 1163) [The cited words were translated into English by me from the Polish original „(…) człowiek nigdy nie jest sam, jest on ukształtowany przez wspólnotę, która określa jego sposoby myślenia, odczuwania i działania. Te strukturę form myślenia i wyobrażenia, która wstępnie kształtuje człowieka, nazywamy kulturą. Do kultury należy przede wszystkim wspólny język następnie ustrój społeczności, a więc państwo z całą swoją strukturą, prawo, obyczaje, przekonania moralne, sztuka, formy kultu itd."].

of freedom for (i.e. the relationality of "being-for") in the efficacious decision which grounds 'self-determination' in relation to personal *actions*? This approach also takes its analogical cue from the exemplar person, the Divine Person, whose actions also spring from His will, his free choice and his resolve to actualize efficaciously the Redemptive acts of human salvation. Thus through personal actions, the *window* for relationality is equally opened for the substantialist and so converges on the same path towards relationality which the relationalist had accessed through the *door* of transcendence wide open from the beginning. We can thus say that the constitutive relationality of persons remains the model or ideal or nature of person, irrespective of starting points.

Ratzinger presents God first as the ideal Person, and he moves a step further towards the perfect (Divine) Person of Jesus God, who is dynamically active as God as well as dynamically active as man (i.e. hypostatic union). For this reason, the human person looks up to the Divine Person, in search of the realization of this nature (personal nature). In Christ however, this ideal is realized in its fullness, for Christ is fully God and fully man, He is the 'Alpha and Omega' (Rev. 1:8; 21:6; 22:13). Thus, in other to realize our human personhood, we have to be in relation to Christ; we have to be open to the perfect person, the Last Adam, who also shares the nature of Divinity. This relationship with Christ is what is referred to as faith. Without faith in the Person of Jesus Christ, our humanity will have no meaning, no *logos,* no ideal, no model for there is no transition directly from man to God, except through Christ.

Hence, already from the assumptions of the theological starting point (theology of Divine Persons), which grounds Ratzinger's anthropology, the context of dialogical relationality is indispensable. This is what differentiates his anthropological vision and those of many others who also approach the study of man from personalistic traditions. We have to note also that the personalist traditions of theological and philosophical vision of man are varied and cannot be said to be a monolithic movement. However, for our purposes here, I broadly group all the personalist approaches to the study of man into two main traditions: on the one hand, I identify those personalist traditions has as their starting point the individual human suppositum, - i.e. the human being as an individual. These group of personalists highlight such grounds for speaking of the individual human being as a person as follows: 'rationality' (e.g. in Aristotle, Boethius), or 'subjectivity' (as in Wojtyła); on the other camp, I identify those personalist that take as their

starting point, the human being in his relationships with other persons, - i.e. the human-situatedness as experienced in a socially mediated existential context[41].

To this second camp, belongs Joseph Ratzinger's anthropological vision which charts its course from the path of 'relationality'. Both approaches somehow converge for the personalist who starts from the individual or from the subject (subjectivity), sooner than latter raises the inter-personal human community as we can notice in Karol Wojtyła's considerations of the question 'participation' in the building of the common good. In the same way, it is notable that those who begin from the relational encounter of persons, sooner than later searches for the inner experience of personal self as we find in Ratzinger, who himself was influenced by St. Augustine to search for the inner self.

It will be however too misleading to describe these two approaches as '*individualists*' versus '*relationalists*'. What we could safely claim is that contemporary personalism seems to have developed as a result of the discovery of the danger of the extremes of both individualism and collectivism. Ratzinger's vision of 'world of persons', however was influenced by the "I-Thou" dialogical philosophy of Martin Buber, which is neither in support of individualism nor of collectivism dialogical personalism. The same can also be said of Karol Wojtyła, for whom, the *communio personarum* is neither realized through individualism nor collectivism rather by participation in the humanity of others.

On the basis of the above noted specificity and difference of starting points, I formulated the central question which drives the whole enquiry as follows: Why did Ratzinger insist that "the human person is a being or event of relationality"?[42] and what practical roles does the category of 'relation' play in the understanding of Ratzinger's anthropology with respect to his reflections on the experience of faith in Jesus Christ? And if we succeed in providing some answers to these central questions, I shall then proceed to search for answers to the second group of questions regarding the possibility of a dialogue of approaches between Ratzinger and Thomist anthropologies: hence new questions which arise at this stage would be – what differentiates Ratzinger's anthropology from those of Thomists, with specific reference to Karol Wojtyła's

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[41] The context of man's lived experience as understood here is quite close to Martin Heidegger's "being-in-the-world" in which context this 'world-bound' relations are multifaced. Heidegger himself speaks of at least four-fold relations, which he described with the concept of "Das Geviert", in the *Bremen Lectures of 1949* - namely the relations to "earth", "sky", "mortals", and "divinities". A fairly detailed analysis of this context of relationality in Heidegger was undertaken in Andrew J. Mitchell, *The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger* (Northwestern University Press, 2015).
[42] J. Ratzinger, "Concerning the notion of person in theology", p. 439.

Thomistic personalism, and then which elements of Wojtyła's anthropology approach towards a convergence with those of Ratzinger's anthropology? The last group of questions will be in view of the applicability of Ratzinger's anthropological vision to other theological questions, regarding the Trinity, ecumenism and universal salvation of humanity.

Status Quaestionis: On the enquiry regarding the truth about man

The basic academic locus of the enquiry into the truth about man is anthropology. Anthropological studies are however undertaken from a variety of disciplinary contexts, some of which have a long history. Theological anthropology is only but one of the so many anthropological disciplines. Characteristically, theological enquiries about man presupposes revealed sources regarding what can be known about man. Thus, what can be known about man is dependent on the content of what is revealed already about the human person. There is therefore a referent point of verification for theological anthropologies, namely the internal compatibility with the content of Revelation regarding the created human being. Nonetheless, there are a plurality of theological starting points of the enquiry on the truth about man, e.g. the analogical starting point of the notion of person in God and in man, which grounds Ratzinger's *relational* vision of the human person.

Irrespective of the starting point, all theological anthropologies – and in fact most anthropological enquiries, correctly assume that the question regarding the 'truth about man' is not essentially different from the question – 'what is man?'. This assumption is plausible for at least two reasons: first, truth is the goal of the search for the knowledge of any being whatsoever. For when we want to know of any being, we certainly want to know the truth of that being, hence epistemologically the two questions coincide. From the metaphysical standpoint, there is equally, a convergence of the *being* of man and the *truth* about man, given that as Josef Pieper reminds us, "All being is true (omne ens est verum), for what does 'true' mean, in the sense of 'the truth of things'? To say that something is true is to say that it is understood and intelligible, both for the absolute spirit as well as for the non-absolute spirit. So when the old philosophy states that it belongs to the nature of existing things that they are intelligible and are understood, there could not be any being which is not known and knowable (since all being is true); so that it is the same for me to say that 'things have existence' as to say that 'things are known and intelligible'; in

saying this the old philosophy also taught that it lies in the nature of things to be related to the mind (and this – the concept of the "truth of things")"[43].

From the foregoing, we can establish a convergence on the questions about 'man' and 'truth about man' such that we can apply them interchangeably. In any case, this question, posed in different ways, has been at the center of anthropological studies undertaken within several disciplines and academic areas of specializations. The foregoing disinterested standpoints of the consideration of the questions regarding the truth of man focus on the status of the *being* of man in relation to the being of God: for instance, man as a creature in relation to God, the Creator; man as a person, participating analogically in God's nature as a person, etc. Therefore, we note that theological anthropologies consider this very question – What is man? – from a vantage point of the testimony of Revelation, -from which perspective, any theological search for the truth of what has been revealed regarding the human being can be undertaken. If the testimony of Revelation is the privileged resource for theological anthropology (-in fact of all theological enquiries), then the place to begin our enquiry will be the primary sources of Revelation and hence theological research on man inevitably relies on the content of Scripture, interpretations of salvation history as expressed in the Tradition, as well as the Magisterium, which serve as the guide-posts of interpreting subsequent data obtained from other secondary theological sources.

There is however another more experiential route to the search for answers about the truth of man. This route of responses focus not just on the objective status of the *being* of man, but highlights the *experience* of the human in his relationship with God, and so tries to accentuate the primacy of faith, the stories of which faith *experience* are relayed in terms of man's relationships with God in history. Some of such faith experiences are also contained in the Scriptures, such that we can speak about written experiences of man's relationships with God equally as sources of the experience-based pursuit of scholarly answers to the question about man. The faith context, we have to underscore, provides an indispensably specific attitudinal disposition for the theologian within which his scholarly (theological) journey to understand the truth about man must begin. Little wonder, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith when speaking of the vocation of the theologian, writes as follows: "Among the vocations awakened by the Spirit in the Church is that

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[43] J. Pieper, *Musse und Kult* (München: Kosel-Verlag, 1948), translated into English by Gerlard Malsbary and published with the title *Leisure: The Basis of Culture,* trans. by Gerlad Malsbary (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 1998), p. 107.

of the theologian. His role is to pursue in a particular way an ever deeper understanding of the Word of God found in the inspired Scriptures and handed on by the living Tradition of the Church. He does this in communion with the Magisterium which has been charged with the responsibility of preserving the deposit of faith. The theologian's work thus responds to a dynamism found in the faith itself. [Consequently], the theologian is called to deepen his own life of faith [so as to] become more open to the 'supernatural sense of faith' upon which he depends"[44].

The fundamental procedure of enquiry indicated above is already captured in the well-known maxim – '*fides quarens intellectum*' traditionally stressed by both Augustine of Hippo (354-430)[45] and Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109)[46]. This maxim tallies roughly with human experience of acquiring a mature understanding of the meaning of life which begins from our childlike trust given to what our parents and the adults we meet in the early stages of life and only afterwards in later life do we begin to get a clearer picture of how we make meaning out of our lives as we grow older.

Theological faith, however is contradistinguished from the trust we give to human person in the course of our growth and socialization, on account of God's absolute perfection of omniscience and omnibenevolence, for which reasons the Scripture testifies that God is the One in whom there can be no deception (Num. 23:19; Titus 1:2; Heb. 6:18). Consequently, if faith in God's Revelation (concerning) of the truth about man (e.g. as contained in Scriptures) is taken to be the starting point (primordial source) of theological anthropology, it is only reasonable then to affirm that any genuine theological search for the truth about man must take into consideration the contexts of faith encounters, given that this very context shapes whatsoever is discoverable about its contents. The first and perhaps the most fundamental thing to be affirmed about the context of faith is that the human being in this context is a receiver of faith rather than a giver of faith. Almost a decade ago, Lieven Boeve and Gerard Mannion, had discovered in Joseph Ratzinger this same very affirmation of the human being as a receiver of faith when they reports that for Ratzinger, "the human person cannot grant faith to him or herself, but receives it from the Church, which in

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[44] Cf. Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, *Donum Veritatis,* 1990, nn. 2-8, esp. n. 6.

[45] St. Augustine formulated this same maxim in a slightly different way as *crede ut intellegas* (i.e. believe in order to understand). Cf. Augustine, *In Joannis Evang.* XXIX, 6 (CCSL 36:287); also *Sermo* 43, 7 (CCSL 41:511). Both formulations respect the principle of the primacy of faith for theological enquiry.

[46] Cf. Anselem, *Proslogion* II-IV. This treatise is a discourse on the existence of God. Ian Logan claims that the original title of the discourse was "Faith seeking understanding". See I. Logan, *Reading Anselm's Proslogion: The History of Anselm's Arguments and Its Significance Today* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2009), p. 85.

turn does not have faith from herself [but] the Church watches over it [i.e. faith] that the truth [revealed to believing men or people of faith] remains the truth and that it is never lost sight of in the flow of time"[47]. The truths so revealed are however varied, the most central of which is the truth about the revealer, God Himself. Included also are some other truths, one of which we intend to investigate in this research, namely the truth about man. Accordingly, the human being is at once capable of a faith encounter within which he receives truths of revelation, amongst which is the truth about him or herself.

Notably, the faith context in which the truth of Revelation is made manifest implicates an existential *relation* between the source or giver of Revelation and the recipient of the truth of Revelation. Hence, in addition to the sources of theological truths about man and the faith contexts within which the search for such truths (i.e. investigated by theological anthropology) is undertaken, one can also ask about the interpretative principles which guide this scientific activity of understanding these truth (i.e. theological anthropology). No doubt, whatsoever these principles (of understanding man in the light of Christian faith) may be, they logically follow from the nature of the contexts of faith encounters as well as from the very contents of the truths revealed. We have already indicated that the context implicates a giver-recipient relation and what then can we say about the contents? We simply begin from identifying what the contents of revealed truths entail. Accordingly, we note that one of such contents of Revelation (revealed truth), testifies to the existence of man as a creature, hence Revelation points towards the direction of relationality as an anthropological constituent of man's contingency, namely man's relation to the Creator, the Absolute non-contingent being, whom we call God. In other words, the experience-based approach just like the disinterested approach to the question of the truth about man, follow the principle of relationality.

In both instances of *creature-Creator* starting point as well as of the *believer-Truth-bearer* starting point, the same structure of *relationality* is indispensable. Hence, as Ratzinger highlights, the theological truth about man, is therefore made manifest within the context of his relationships, which holds true in all stages of the enquiry. When we speak of man's origin as a creature, we meet this same context for we speak of man as a being whose existence springs from an event of

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[47] L. Boeve & G. Mannion, *Ratzinger Reader,* p. 8; Cf. J. Ratzinger, *Theologische Prinzipienlehre* (Wewel, Augsburg: Sankt Ulrich Verlag: 1982), translated into English by Sister Mary Frances McCarthy and published with the title, *Principles of Catholic Theology* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987).

relationality, with respect to God from whom and in whom the meaning of his existence is to be found. Thus, the revealed truth of man is always to be discovered in the context of relationality, a context which finds its definitive model in the Revelation of God in Jesus, the Last Adam.

Accordingly, from the consideration of the Revelation of God as Creator of man, we are led to the Revelation of man in the being of God who became man. In other words, we can speak of a Ratzingerian transition "from the doctrine of God (as Creator) to Christology and subsequently to anthropology"[48]. This transition follows the logic of relationality given that the existence of man results from the *relation* between an efficient subject and his act, i.e. the relation between a Creator and the act of creation. Man's being, as creature, originates from God, just as St. Paul noted "For we are his [God's] handiwork, created in Jesus Christ" (Ephesians 2:10). The fact of creation already established the most fundamental *relation* between God and man, and this relation constitutes as it were the principle of man's being as a person. By this relation, we can say that to some extent, there is something of God, i.e. his action, which constitutes the being of man and so the truth about man, cannot be complete, if this is rejected. For this reason, the consideration of the being of God remains a legitimate starting point for theological anthropology. Moreover, it also follows that whereas God is an infinite being such that it is improbable that the human person can arrive at a complete knowledge of his being, there is nonetheless, an indirect route of gaining access to a knowledge of his being, namely through his acts (including the Divine act of creation) following the principle "agere sequitur esse". Therefore, aside the fundamental access of the truth about man in the context of relationality, there is equally another viable route of accessing the truth about man, namely the context of action of an efficient personal subject of act.

Thus, on the one hand, given that Revelation speaks of God as a Person, and having noted that we also speak of the human being as a person, it is legitimate to acknowledge Ratzinger's theological vision of the human being as grounded in the notion of person (shared both by man and God) and equally that this same notion of person is constituted by relationality, in this case, interpersonal (Divine-human) relationships. It is thus underscored that specific to Ratzinger's anthropology is the privileging of the principle of 'relationality'.

From a metaphysical perspective following Aristotle's categories, relations or relationality constitutes the weakest category of being. The question thus arises, how could that which

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[48] J. Ratzinger, "Concerning the notion of person in theology" in *Communio: International Catholic Review* vol. 17 (Fall 1990), p. 445.

constitutes the weakest category of being, now become the very constituent of the highest form of being, namely personal beings? As we could speak of relationality in other non-personal beings, what makes the principle of relationality in the understanding of person unique?

These questions, especially the latter, are significant given that our intuition on human uniqueness rests more on other features of interiority (such as man's rationality, subjectivity), which ground the basis of human rights for freedom of both moral actions and cognitive intellection in view of the search for values of truth and good? Ultimately, then how do we understand what Ratzinger's notion of relationality as constitutive of human person without at the same time giving up personal subjectivity upon which rests freedom and intellection?

A preliminary hypothesis which attempts a resolution of both approaches already pops up, precisely in the words of Josef Pieper: "Relationship in the true sense, joins the inside with the outside; relationships can only exist where there is an "inside", a dynamic center, *from* which all operations has its source, and *to* which all that is received, all that is experienced is brought"[49]. If Pieper's idea of relationship can be applied to Ratzinger's vision of the human person, then it can be said that the truth about man is discoverable only in the context of man's relationship, particularly in his relationship with God, a relationship which is most manifest in the interior life of the human spirit[50].

The above hypothesis hints to a path which is not altogether foreign to Ratzinger's vision of man as a person and it gives a broad outlines of the route of investigations which we shall follow in this dissertation in a bid to discover why Ratzinger considers relationality to be the basic context for the understanding of the notion of person in theological anthropology. Following this initial description of the trajectory of our enquiry, we can underscore the significance of Ratzinger's starting point of investigations regarding the truth about man, namely the communal context of the spiritual milieu of faith in Christ, which does not jettison but rather manifests the core features of the interior life, precisely within a relational context of communion between God, the Divine

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[49] J. Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture* (Indiana: St Augustine's Press, 1998), p. 100.
[50] Ratzinger makes two important points in this regard concerning the human spirit: a. "It is the nature of the [human] spirit to put itself in a relation, the capacity to see itself and the other". b. "The [human] spirit is that being which is able to think about, not only itself and being in general, but the wholly other, the transcendent God" Cf. J. Ratzinger, *"Retrieving the Tradition",* p. 451. It is interesting to note that Ratzinger and Pieper agree on the nature of the spirit hence, for Pieper, "By its nature, [human] spirit is not so much distinguished by its immateriality, but by something more primary: its ability to be in relation…spirit is relatedness" (cf. Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture,* pp.104-106).

dynamic center of this relationship (i.e. as source-giver of the revealed truths, including the truth about man) and man, the recipient of the revealed truths of faith.

Significantly it is precisely such a starting point that the International Theological Commission recommends, when she points out that "A criterion of Catholic Theology is that it takes the faith of the Church as its source, context, and norm. Theology holds the *fides qua* and *fides quae* together"[51]. Through faith in Christ, man stands in relation to God the source of all truth. Hence it is in this context that Ratzinger declares that "the concept of the person is thus, to speak with Gilson, one of the contributions to human thought made possible and provided by Christian faith"[52]. He considers the faith encounter as the fundamental context within which the revealed truth, the credibility of which elicits the response of faith can be understood. Notably, the revealed truths so referred includes not only the truth about God as Person but also the truth about man as person. The human person, as a recipient of faith is at once capable of accessing the truth about him or herself. God in Christ becomes, as it were, the personification of the truth received in faith (including the truth about man) as well as the salvific ground of freedom through which man attains personal transcendence by virtue of his relation to God the transcendent being.

The historical changes of nuances in the notion of 'person'

The notion of person did not first arise within theological discourse as it had earlier been used in theatre. Ratzinger himself corroborates this claim when he indicated that 'person' as a concept was borrowed from the world of Greek theatre into philosophical currency[53]. As the history of its usage progressed, there were however shifts in nuances of the notion of person leading eventually to its appropriation in the theological discourse on the doctrine of God in the first four centuries culminating with Augustine's *De Trinitate*. A subsequent philosophical popularization of the notion of person started to take shape in the sixth century beginning with so-called classical definition of Boethius.

Remarkably, in Greek theatre, προσωπον (*proposon*), had referred to the 'acoustical *mask'* worn by actors on the stage, which conceals the real face[54] of the actor who plays the "role" of the

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[51] International Theological Commission, *Theology Today: Perspectives, Principles and Criteria* (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2011), no. 15.
[52] Ibid.
[53] See Ratzinger, "The notion of person in theology", *Communio,* ibidem.
[54] See J. Denis and J. Robichaud, *Plato's Persona: Marsilio Ficino, Renaissance, Humanism and Platonic Traditions* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018), p. 16.

'dramatis personae'. Thus Ratzinger would remind us of the initial challenges posed by Monarchians regarding the transferring of the nuances of make-shifts, entertainment, shows, plays, theatre associated with this word to Christian theology of the Trinity: "The idea of a divine show had been canvassed in the early church by the Monarchians. The three Persons, they maintained were three "roles" in which God shows Himself to us in the course of history. Here it must be mentioned that the word *persona* and its Greek equivalent *prosopon,* belong to the language of the theatre. They denoted the mask that made the actor into an embodiment of someone else. It was as a result of considerations of this sort that the word was first introduced into the language of Christianity and so transformed by the Christian faith itself in the course of a severe struggle that out of the word arose the idea of the person, a notion alien to antiquity"[55]. He also points to similar challenges with regard to the views of Modalists thought that the three forms of God were three *modi,* ways, in which our consciousness perceived God and explains him to itself. Although it is true that we only know God as he is reflected in our human thought, the Christian faith held firmly to the view that in this reflection it is *him* that we know. Even if we are not capable of breaking *out* of the narrow bounds of our consciousness, God can nevertheless break *into* this consciousness and show himself in it"[56].

From the above indications, we realize that at its earliest use, the Greek '*prosopon'* yields to a series of metaphorical nuances associated with the function of the theatrical mask as a device through which actors not only play 'roles' and take on specifically different characters other than their own real self but also a device through which a different 'mode' of reality (i.e. the theatrical) whose symbolic truth-values is nevertheless, not less meaningful to participants as others (non-theatrical). What is however to be underscored is that within the context of 'role-playing', there appears the relationality-principle so far as there is mediated through this context an existential *relation* between the actor and the audience, given that in Greek theatre, actors do not act without an audience. From the perspective of the actor, it can be said that the 'mask' is not just a concealment device but it also serves as a 'window' (i.e. viewpoint, lens, perspective) through which the actor's *eyes* beholds the audience; while on the other hand, for the audience, the 'mask' also shapes the 'tune' (i.e. language, phonemes) of the message of the actor whose *voice* 'resounds' through the '*prosopon'* hence the Latin rendition as *per sonare* or as Aquinas puts it '*per*

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[55] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 87.
[56] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 87.

sonando '[57]. It is important to emphasize here that the analogical reference to 're-sounding' voice here is metaphorical for the proper medium for 'echoes' of the voice of the actors on stage are the acoustic theatre panels.

It could thus be said that various layers of meaning and significance can be highlighted by theatre criticism of Greek plays, amongst which is the audience-actor context implicating the relational principle for the understanding of *prosopon*. Here, I refer to relationality principle that can take different directional poles (actor-audience; or audience-actor) as well as implicates shared roles, (i.e. the *audience* refers to the role of active "hearers" of the voice of actors; whereas the actor-in-mask as *pros optikos* plays the role of a "seer") who visualizes the reality that is dramatized for the consumption of the audience.

Moreover, in the light of a relationality principle, we can also envision yet another metaphoric nuance which suggests a non-individualist interpretation of 'person', namely the notion of 'prosopon' as *peri soma* (around the body)[58] - "mask, as a mimetic covering of the totality of a reality"- which suggest that the 'actor' does not act for himself alone but acts as the representative speaker[59], as the "face" or medium through which the reality is experienced by the audience– in a sense, the actor as "House Speaker" (Greek: *pro edros Boulis*) through whom a theatrical expression is given to the experience of the tragic reality of the whole community which is being dramatized.

Notably, we speak of the implication of a relationality principle here on account of the communal reality communicated by the προεδρος βουλης ('pro edros Boulis') through 'voice' and 'vision' (i.e. audio-visual) which the Greek *prosopon* attempts to capture, as mediated in the context of a 'quasi-dialogical' relationship between 'speaker and hearers'; between 'actor and the audience'[60]. This nuance of person as 'pro edros Boulis' in a remote sense resonates with the

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[57] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 29, art. 3, obj. 2.

[58] See W. Ury, *Trinitarian Personhood: Investigating the Implications of a Relational Definition* (Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2002), p. 82.

[59] It is notable that whereas the Latin rendition of 'prosopon' as *per sona* draws attention to the actor rather than the audience, it retains some elements of the relationality principle since it is assumed that a speaker speaks to a listener (even if both speaker and listener is the same person as in soliloque) or theatrical audience-listeners, as the case may be. On the other hand, the English rendition of *prosopon* as 'mask' highlights the indirect way in which the identity of the 'dramatis personae' is revealed. In some sense, this could be described ironically as a "hidden revelation". More so, the English rendition is even more silent about the audience and does not so much implicate the relationship between the revealed identity behind the 'mask' and the audience to whom this revelation is directed.

[60] As we shall come to see later on, the full significance of 'voice' and 'vision' will become clearer in the way theological explanations of our knowledge of God as person is to be mediated by a 'hearing' experience (understood in the context of a faith experience) which implicates the 'revelation' (understood metaphorically as a 'seeing'

theological significance of the second Person of the Trinity, namely Jesus Christ, the 'Last Adam', *Logos,* the *Word,* the 'Revelation' of the Invisible God. In the meantime, it suffices to underscore that the notion of person, from its earliest use is not intended to implicate an isolated individual entity but rather that of a relation of persons as can be appreciated from the relationship of speaker and listeners (an aspect of which the Latin translation partially captures as *persona* -i.e. [a 'masked' being whose identity is revealed] through 'speech acts')[61].

We shall come to notice in the subsequent sections of this dissertation that for Ratzinger, this aspect of relationality in the original notion of 'person' is central to his theological anthropology hence he announces that "Relativity towards the other constitutes the human person. The human person is the event or being of relativity"[62]. We shall explore more this aspect of the significance of relationality in the notion of person in the main chapters of this dissertation.

Scope and sources of literature for this research

Regarding the sources of my investigation, I make it clear from the outset, that I do not divide the works of a particular scholar into different categories according to his or her change of professional or vocational status. For instance, I do not divide the works of Karol Wojtyła into Wojtyła, the Cardinal and Pope John Paul II, nor perhaps split Ratzinger's academic output according to his different administrative responsibilities, hence I do not divide between works of Joseph Ratzinger (as university professor, Archbishop, Prefect) and those he wrote as Benedict XVI (as Pope). This seamless approach is coherent with the way our protagonist would want his thoughts to be presented. In an interview he granted to *O Estado de S. Paulo* in 1990, where such a question as:-"What are the more significant differences between the Ratzinger of Vatican II and the Ratzinger of today? Who changed more: you or the Church?"-, was raised, he had responded as follows: "I do not see a real, profound difference between my work at Vatican II Council and my present-day work. While preparing this course for Bishops, I went to review a course of

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experience) of God in the Divine Person of Jesus Christ, who is Himself, the Word of God spoken for all ages and places and the Last Adam in whose Divinity we have come to believe through the testimony of "eye-witnesses" (i.e. faith of the Apostles as foundational for Christian faith. For a further study of this trajectory, see Gerald O Collins, *Rethinking Fundamental Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. pp. 56-95.

[61] See W. Ury, *Trinitarian Personhood,* ibidem.

[62] Cf. J. Ratzinger's opening citation in the article "Retrieving the Tradition: Concerning the notion of person in theology" In: *Communio,* 17 (Fall, 1990): 439-54.

ecclesiology that I taught for the first time in 1956. Naturally, I found elements that needed to be updated. But as for the fundamental vision, I found a profound similarity"[63].

Despite this seamless selection of sources, I would limit myself only to works which the Bavarian theologian published from 1960[64] up till his last apostolic exhortation in 2011[65]. In this span of approximately 50 years of academic output, one could count a little short of 100 books, three encyclicals, three apostolic exhortations, several published homilies, articles, debates and interviews. Since not all of these dealt with his theological vision of human person, the ones which I use in this investigation will be presented as primary sources on the bibliography list of this dissertation. Other secondary sources from contemporary scholars on theological anthropology and commentaries on the theological originality of Joseph Ratzinger will also be used, the list of which will certainly be given also on the bibliography list.

Aim and formal objective of investigation

The key aims of my investigation is to search for a suitable and practical application of Ratzinger's vision of person as constituted by relationality to the resolution of the contemporary human malaise depressions, increasing divorce rates and high rate of suicidal attempts – all of which are results of an overt promotion of individualism by the economic and social structures of our society. I also intend to make more specific what differentiates Ratzinger's theological concept of man in the light of the understanding of the notion of person as relation. I intend most significant to show that Joseph Ratzinger privileges relation as the basic feature of the notion of person in theological discourse and that he employs this concept of relation in his analogous interpretation of the theological understanding of person as applied to God, Christ, and man, such that he was able to smoothly argue from theology through Christology to the truth about man in his anthropology.

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[63] Cf. Interview with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger by Walter Falceta, Jr, 'Acao pastoral requer espiritualidade' in *O Estado de S Paulo,* July 29, 1990. Retrieved on November 30, 2018 from https://www.traditioninaction.org/ProgressivistDoc/A_071_Ratzinger_Same.htm

[64] In this delineation of range of selection of sources, I am taking the dating from the first original edition of the works, mostly in German – rather than the date of the English editions, hence I begin with *Die christliche Brüderlichkeit [What it Means to Be a Christian],* published originally in 1960 whereas the English edition only appeared in 1966 by Sheed and Ward.

[65] The work referred to here is *Africae munus:* On the Church in Africa in Service to Reconciliation, Justice and Peace, published two years prior to his resignation as Pope.

Avowedly, I shall assume all through the development of this investigation that Ratzinger's hermeneutical key for unlocking the mysteries of the human person is Christology, the highpoint around which he weaves through the maze of biblical sources[66], patristic thought[67] and personalistic philosophy in search of the appropriate theological language to express the mystery of the human person, created in the image of God, saved from the ruin of sin through Christ and oriented towards the eschatological vision and communion with God.

If I succeed in refocusing[68] the interest of my audience on Ratzinger's Christocentric vision of man, I would consider my project a success. In other words, I intend here to project the centrality of his Christology as the hermeneutical key for his personalistic anthropology as well as for the harmonious synergy of the totality of his philosophical and theological vision of man[69]. In so

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[66] Ratzinger insists on the Christocentric unity of the whole Bible, hence he notes that "for the Christian, the Old Testament represents, in its totality, an advance towards Christ; only when it attains to him does its real meaning, which was gradually hinted at, becomes clear." see, Joseph Ratzinger, *In the beginning– a Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall,* trans. by Boniface Ramsey, (Michigan: W. B.Eeerdmans, 1995), p. 9.

[67] An increasing number of recent scholars are converging on the Christocentric significance of Ratzinger's appraisal of patristic theology. In his doctoral dissertation thesis, Peter John McGregor, citing an article by Anthony Sciglitano, reports that "according to Anthony Sciglitano, one of Ratzinger's goals in *Jesus of Nazareth* is 'to reunite devotion and intellect by way of a neopatristic theology grounded in Scripture". Cf. Peter J. McGregor, *Heart to Heart: The Spiritual Christology of Joseph Ratzinger* (doctoral thesis submitted at the School of Theology, Faculty of Theology and Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, 2013), p. 37.

[68] That Ratzinger is considered a dogmatic theologian of ecclesiology is not without its merits as can be gleaned not only from his doctoral dissertation thesis in University of Münich on the topic "The People and the House of God in St. Augustine's Doctrine of the Church" (1953); his teaching career in Münster, Tübingen and Regensbug but even more so from the Regensburg publications (1969-1977): *Das Geheimnis von Tod und Auferstehung, Das neue Volk Gottes, Entwurfe zur Ekklesiologie,* all relevant themes of which would be later collected under the English title *Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life* (Washington DC: Catholic University of America, 1988). Significantly, the ecclesiological accent with which he imbued the 1968 *Introduction to Christianity*, is unmistakable and this ecclesiological tone resonates in his later works such that even as Cardinal Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, he would accentuate it anew in the work on the Church's liturgy - *Feast of Faith: Approaches to a Theology of the Liturgy* (1981); so also do we find similar ecclesiological undertones in the trilogy on Jesus of Nazareth, which he wrote as Pope Benedict XVI (2005-2013). In all, one cannot but agree to the widely accepted standard reading that the question of the Church is eminently significant in his theological works.

[69] Notably, the scholarly dialogue between philosophy and theology is very much prominent in Ratzinger right from his inaugural lecture on 24th June, 1959 at the university of Bonn, titled "*The God of Faith and the God of Philosophy",* which was largely inspired not only by Augustine's remark in Book VII of *Confessions* ('In the Platonists I learnt "In the beginning was the Word". In the Christians I learned, "The Word became flesh") but also by Gottlieb Söhngen, his Münich lecturer who ran seminars on Blaise Pascal and by Romano Guardini's book which highlighted Blaise Pascal's *Memorial.* Ratzinger's interest in the dialogue between philosophy and theology perhaps became spectacular in the famous philosophical debates on "Vorpolitische moralische Grundlagen eines freiheitlichen Staates" (Pre-political moral foundations in the construction of a free civil society), which he had with Jürgen Habermas in Münich on January 19, 2004. Also, in one of his homilies on creation, he cited Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* Z_7 in support of his conviction of the resonance of philosophy with theology as follows: "What the pagan Aristotle said four hundred years before Christ - when he opposed those who asserted that everything has come to exist through chance, even though he what he did, without the knowledge that our faith in creation gives us – is still valid today." see Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, *In the Beginning – a Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall,* trans. by Boniface Ramsey, (Michigan: W. B.Eeerdmans, 1995), pp. 17-18.

doing, he highlights the resourcefulness of the nearly two thousand years of Christian reflections on theological anthropology, which stretches back beyond the middle ages up to the patristic fathers. In this regard, we note the methodological import of his response to one of Seewald's questions about the influence of Theodor Steinbückel's *Der Umbruch des Denkens,* on him:

> I didn't want to operate only in a stagnant and closed philosophy, but in a philosophy understood as a question – what is man, really? – and particularly to enter into the new, contemporary philosophy. In this sense I was modern and critical. Reading Steinbüchel was very important to me, because he – also in the book *Die philosophischen Grundlagen der christlichen Moraltheologie* – gave a comprehensive overview of contemporary philosophy, which I sought to understand and inhabit. Unfortunately, I could not go as deeply into philosophy as I wanted, but just as I had my questions, my doubts, and didn't simply want to learn and take on a closed system, I also wanted to understand the theological thinkers of the Middle Ages and modernity anew, and to proceed from this. This is where personalism, which was in the air at that time, particularly struck me, and seemed to be the right starting point of both philosophical and theological thought[70].

To be sure, Ratzinger's resource tools for the analysis of questions about man are not exhausted by philosophy and so he makes good use of other 'handmaids' like natural science in his theology of man. He also takes some anthropological insights from other such sources as theatre and literature. As indicated by Peter Seewald's interviews, he was quick to respond to a question about what interests he relished in the theatres and operas in Münich as follows: "Fundamentally, the representation of human life, of human affairs. I was particularly fascinated by *Der seidene Schuh* by Paul Claudel, or also *Des Teufels General* by Zuckmayer, and the opera *Dialoge der Karmilitinnen* by Francis Poulene, the libretto of which is based on the play with the same name which Georges Bernanos wrote after the original *Die Letzte am Schafott* by Gertrud von Le Fort. I also remember a very beautiful performance of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* by Shakespeare, and a piece by Paul Claudel about Queen Isabella, which had black-and-white drawings of Spaniards and Indians which today must seem astonishing"[71]. This dissertation promises therefore to present Ratzinger's understanding of person as constituted by relationships. If I succeed in moving the attention of researchers successfully towards this direction, however, I would consider the aim of my inquiry as realized.

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[70] J. Ratzinger, *Der Gott des Glaubens und der Gott der Philosophen. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der theologia naturalis* (Münich: Schnell & Steiner,1960). This work was originally Ratzinger's Inaugural Lecture upon assuming the Chair of Fundamental Theology in the University of Bonn on June 24th, 1959. It was translated into English and published under the title *The God of Faith and the God of Philosophy: A Contribution to the Problem of Natural Theology*, ed. Heino Sonnemas (Trier: Paulinus, 2006), pp. 75-76.

[71] Ibid., pp. 79-80.

Methodology

Having indicated the scope of the sources which shape my basic working field of investigation as regards the pool of literature and non-restricted 'handmaids' (in this sense, "tools") of investigation, it is expedient to indicate the preferred methodology of this investigation. In that regard, I announce that I shall use the method of analysis of texts. I use this method to analyze the contents and themes in the works of Ratzinger so as to sieve out from a panoply of his scholarly output the very object of investigation, namely his theological vision of the human being as an event of relationality. Subsequently, I shall use the method of comparative review of at least one selected author, who represents personalistic anthropology for the purpose of cross-checking for the convergences and divergences regarding his understanding of human person as a being of relationality.

In addition to the above noted methods of text analysis and comparative reviews, I shall privilege Ratzinger's universalized Christological approach for presenting the truth about man as resplendent in the event of Incarnate Son of God who as the 'Last Man', is the unique highpoint revealing both God to man and man to himself. It is notable that his method of Universal Christology carries with it a lot of historical significance for his theological hermeneutics of the truth of Revelation, which encapsulates his understanding of the Divine Persons of the Triune God in terms of relation, i.e. as a "Being-for", and as historically manifest in all of God's saving acts (in creation, redemption, and eternally abiding presence); a Revelation, which allows the believing human person to experience the Freedom (liberation) which comes from these Divine saving acts continuously accomplished throughout salvation history (both past, present and future). This will allow me to draw the connection between Ratzinger's vision of the person of the 'Last Adam' (i.e. God-in-Christ) as a relation and the saving acts of God (creation, salvation, sanctification) equally implicated as a relation which encapsulates the historical ecstasies of past, present, and future. This unmistakable Christological echo in his theological anthropology equally serves as a trail guide in the selection and arrangement of the themes which I will choose to be discuss in the sub-sections.

Limitations

Any scientific attempt to synthesis the works of Joseph Ratzinger into a seamless theological system meets with a peculiar constraint due to the fragmentary nature of his ideas

scattered throughout several books whose themes are often unrelated, except for their being for the most part of a theological character. Consequently, it remains the case that such a task as the one I have embarked upon is not so modest as can be implied by this fragmentary nature of his writings, about which Joseph Murphy cautions: "The writings of Joseph Ratzinger are marked by a certain *fragmentary* quality, in the sense that he never produced a complete synthesis of the Christian faith and that many of his writings, being occasional pieces, do not fully develop the profound intuitions that he enunciates. In part, this is in keeping with his insistence that the faith is not a system but a path, along which we travel together in the communion of the Church toward the fullness of truth. … Ratzinger is well aware of the unfinished character of much of his writing, yet, as his former student Vincent Twomey points out, 'He makes a virtue out of this 'weakness'" and presents his various writings as "contributions to an ongoing debate'"[72].

Murphy's attestation to the fragmentary nature of Ratzinger's thoughts is also corroborated by other scholars investigating on his works. In her work on the 265th successor to the Petrine Office, Tracey Rowland did report that Ratzinger did not consider himself as presenting a completely original theological synthesis[73]. In this sense, we can contrast his narrative theological approach with the more systematic approach of such other contemporary thinkers like Karl Rahner,[74] Jürgen Moltmann[75], Wolfhart Pannenberg[76], John Zizioulas[77] or Marc Cortez[78]. The above claim that Ratzinger's contributions to most fundamental themes in theology is distinctively fragmentary rather than systematic does not imply any lack of depth rather this goes to highlight his conviction that the task of theology is not to construct alternative theories that replace the

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[72] J. Murphey, *Christ Our Joy: The Theological Vision of Pope Benedict XVI* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), pp. 6-7.

[73] Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, *Salt of the Earth: The Church at the End of the Millennium an Interview with Peter Seewald* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), p. 66. Significantly Tracey Rowland cites this very work when she reports that "in an interview given in 1997, Joseph Ratzinger stated that he had never tried to create a theological system of his own" supporting her claim by quoting Ratzinger as clarifying in the course of that interview that 'the aim [of his theological engagements] is not an isolated theology that I draw out of myself but one that opens as widely as possible into the common intellectual pathways of the faith'. Cf. Tracey Rowland, *Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London-New York: T & T Clark Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), p. 1.

[74] Cf. A. Losinger, *The Anthropological Turn: The Human Orientation of the Theology of Karl Rahner* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).

[75] Cf. J. Moltmann, *Man: Christian Anthropology in the Conflicts of the Present* (London: SPCK, 1974); also see, J. Moltmann, *Human Identity in Christian Faith* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974).

[76] Cf. W. Pannenberg, *Anthropologie in theologischer perspektiv* (Göttingen: Vandernhoeck und Ruprecht, 1983).

[77] Cf. J. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (Crestwood, New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1997).

[78] Cf. M. Cortex, *Resourcing Theological Anthropology: A Constructive Account of Humanity in the Light of Christ* (London: Harper Collins, 2017).

"depositum fidei" but simply to give indications to genuine paths to its interpretation in the light of the historical dynamics of Revelation. This understanding of the task of theology by Ratzinger reflects in Peter Seewald's appraisal of his theological output as follows: "Notwithstanding the abundance of his writings, sermons, meditations, letters – there are 30,000 letters just from the time before his appointment as bishop – Joseph Ratzinger never developed his own theological system. As a theologian he took on what was there, discerned its essentials, situated it in relation to the context of the time, and then expressed it anew – to preserve the message of the gospel and the accrued knowledge of the Christian past for generations to come"[79].

Given the above, it could rightly be said that I am committing myself to embark on a tedious project, the relevance of which lies on the hopeful presentation of a coherent thread of anthropological trajectory in the theological vision of the most celebrated Bavarian theologian of our time. One need not however be so enthused with naïve excitement given that such a project as this is also easily prone to become a miscellany of patchwork views lacking a common thread except for their theological significance for anthropological questions.

Structure

The dissertation is divided into two parts, each of which has two chapters. Hence it consists of a total of four chapters. The first part will be expose Ratzinger's notion of person and the key elements of the analogical derivation of dialogical relationality of person. The second part will introduce a comparative approach which by virtue of its purpose will be taken from an approach which reverses Ratzinger's starting point. Finally, will be the third part which will concentrate on the applications of the key themes of Ratzinger's anthropology.

In all four chapters of the dissertation, my choice of themes to be treated will be guided by the need to organize Ratzinger's dispersed theological oeuvre on the theological questions of the human person as an event of relation, and so I certainly will circumvent the typical traditional thematic signposts of theological anthropology. Conversely, I shall adopt a structure which will allow me some flexibility of choice of themes.

Assuredly, whatsoever may seem to be lost in this decision for a somewhat uncommon structure due, perhaps, to its lack of resonance with traditional scholarship on theological

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[79] P. Seewald, *Benedikt XVI: Letzte Gespräche mit Peter Seewald* (Droemer Verlag, 2016), translated into English by Jacob Phillips and published with the title *Benedict XVI Last Testament in his own words with Peter Seewald* (New York: Bloomsbury Continuum), foreward p. xviii.

anthropology will, on the long run, be regained by its adherence to the theological 'principle of unity'[80]. Accordingly, in the first chapter, I shall discuss questions regarding the analogical application of the notion of person to God and to the human being. In the second chapter, which is designed to the longest of all the chapters, I shall focus on man's experience of the two most essential features of a personal being: the experience of truth and the experience of freedom. On the one hand, I shall consider the derivation of the experience of man's relation to the Truth, which has been revealed as a Person in Jesus Christ, the Last Adam. In the second half of the same chapter, I shall consider themes related to the human experience of freedom and the question of the futility of the attempts to separate truth from freedom. The third part of the second chapter will consider the two key sacraments of Christian life, namely baptism and Eucharist as sources of salvific freedom in Christ. The third chapter will turn its focus to anthropologies which differ from that of Ratzinger in terms of its starting point but arrive at the same conclusions. The goal in this chapter is to amplify the specificity of Ratzinger's claim that persons are constituted by dialogical relationality while at the same time showcasing what is common between Ratzinger and philosophical strands of dialogical personalism of Martin Buber. I shall also try to consider the possibility of getting dialogue partners from Thomistic personalism with whom I shall approach the problematic of the fourth and final chapter, namely the anti-personalist tendencies arising from the culture of individualism and collectivism. Such dialogue partners will eventually be selected not from dialogical personalism as could have been expected but rather from Thomistic personalism of Karol Wojtyła. In this way, I provide some elements of alternative approaches to Ratzinger's theo-centric vision of human person. In this way, the solutions to individualism and collectivism to be eventually proffered can be corroborated from different entry points to the personalist approach to the question of the fundamental constitutive relationality of Divine and human persons.

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[80] The theological principle of unity is presented in two forms: "unitas veritas" and "unitas caritatis" by the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, when in regard to the collaboration of theological enquiry with the teachings of the Magisterium, she teaches as follows: "When there is a question of the communion of faith, the principle of the unity of truth (unitas veritas) applies. When it is a question of differences which do not jeopardize this communion, the unity of charity (unitas caritatis) should be safeguarded". See CDF, *Donum Veritatis,* 1990, no. 26. The basis thrust of the teaching regarding this principle is to safeguard the diversity of theological methods and contexts from the danger of losing sight of the One source of truth, Jesus, the Incarnate Word of God.

PART ONE

EXPOSITION OF RATZINGER'S NOTION OF PERSON

CHAPTER ONE: PERSON AS THE EVENT OF DIALOGICAL RELATIONALITY

Introduction

One might wonder why the heading of this first chapter includes the word 'event' rather than 'being' given that the considerations we are about to make focuses on the description of persons rather than happenstances. It is significant to note that this sort of language is taken from Ratzinger's considerations on the notion of persons[81]. Ratzinger does not mean to argue that persons (*hypostasis*) are relations (*processions* or *perichoresis*) but he points out that relationships are constitutive contexts of the full realization of personhood. Of course, persons (*hypostasis*) – whether Divine or human as the case may be, - are subjects (*hupokeimenon*) of relationships (thanks to Divine *processions* or human *social nature*). This is what the doctrine of the Trinity shows and it also goes to corroborate the age-long saying about human social nature, namely – "No man is an island"[82].

Relationships are thus existential constitutive contexts in which the full dynamics of the personal nature is fully realized. For this reason, in his theological anthropology, Joseph Ratzinger would privilege the context of an encounter (e.g. conversion or the encounter of faith experience) for his considerations of man's relationship with God in Jesus Christ, which context in its very first instance is basically an event. This claim is corroborated by Andrzej Proniewski who noted as follows "Joseph Ratzinger's scholarly reflections and ideas convey a philosophical theology of the person that points to relational complementarity"[83]. It was also hinted that such a stance contrasts sharply with the more popular Western (European) orientation towards a substantial ontology of personal beings. Before we delve more fully into how Ratzinger discusses the notion

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[81] See, J. Ratzinger, "Concerning the notion of person in theology", *Communio* vol. 17 (1990), p. 445.
[82] This sentence is attributed to the English poet, John Donne (1572-1631). It appears for the first time in his *Devotions upon Emergent Occasions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1624), see the 17th Devotion, Meditation XVII.
[83] A. Proniewski, "Joseph Ratzinger's Philosophical Theology of the Person", *Rocznik Teologii Katolickiej,* vol. XVII/3, 2018, pp. 219-236, especially p. 219. DOI: 10.15290/rtk.2018.17.3.16.

of person as a being-in-relation, it is pertinent to consider the sources of the said Western fixation with substance in the discourse on person.

The earliest theological reflections on the notion of person was sensitive to the relational constitution of the Persons in the Triune God. A little after the end of the theological formulations of the doctrine of the three Persons in one God, we find the first shifts of emphasis in what I could safely describe as the philosophical theology of Severinus Boethius. It was from this time that we find the earliest seeds of corruption of the notion of person and the forgetfulness of the relational context of its original meaning as used by theologians of the first four centuries. Today, it is common to speak of Boethius' definition of person "substantia individualis naturae rationalis" (an individual substance of a rational nature)[84] as the classical definition. This misreading of history of the scholarly use of the concept of person can in fact be corrected by a keener interest in Ratzinger's vision of the human person.

As history would have it, the Boethian definition held sway, not only in the subsequent theological considerations but even more philosophical traditions right up to the twentieth century schools of personalism beginning from Emmanuel Mounier's revolutionary works[85], which gave some philosophical direction to the French personalistic movement of the time. Earlier in the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative, had trailed the blaze for the revival of the appropriate moral sense of the value of person in the context of the relation of 'means-goods' to 'end-goods'. Of course, one can also go even further back to the thirteenth century in the works of Thomas Aquinas, even though he had restricted the treatment of the relational constituent of persons (hypostasis) to his reflections on the Triune God, while retaining the older Greek Aristotelian philosophy/metaphysics of the composition of substance (ousia) from matter and form in his considerations of the human being(i.e. body and soul)[86].

Even though Aquinas appraised Boethius' contributions and even wrote commentaries in view of its clarifications and modifications, his definition of person was far more adequate than that of Boethius, as he defines person as the highest excellence of being. The Angelic Doctor, who

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[84] Boethius, *Liber de persona et duabus naturis contra Eutychen et Nestorium,* translated into English by Rand, Edward Kennard, edited by Hugh Fraser Steward and published with the title *On the two natures of Christ: A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire, USA: W. Heinemann, 1918).

[85] See E. Mounier, *A Personalist Manifesto* translated from the French by the monks of St. John's Abbey, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1938); and also E. Mounier, *Le Personalisme,* 1946, translated into English by Philip Mairet and published with the title *Personalism* (University of Notre Dame, 1952).

[86] See, Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* Prima pars, q. 29 (for a brother context, qq. 27-43); then for considerations on man, see qq. 75-76.

discusses person with regard to the Divine beings, argues that the person is the perfection of being: "persona significant id quo est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura [person signifies what is most perfect in all nature – that is, a susbsistent individual of a rational nature]"[87]. Given that for Aquinas as well as for Boethius, the context of the consideration of the notion of person is Divine beings, it is not surprising to have noted that 'person' as in the case of God, is the highest, excellent and most perfect being. But then this is also applicable to the human being within the category of created beings. Man's lofty status in relation to all created beings is attested to in all personalist traditions of thought, both in theology and in philosophy (as well as in several other non-theological disciplines).

1.1 The replacement of 'rationality' with 'relationality'

Perhaps the most popular constituent of the notion of person is 'rationality' or rational nature. Ratzinger's vision of person circumvents this feature of rationality and in its place adopts 'relationality'. This circumvention of 'rationality' and its replacement with 'relationality' is consequent upon Ratzinger's rejection of the Aristotelian substantialism (*ousia*), which Boethius and Aquinas also adopted as their starting point for the considerations of the notion of person. Rationality, we have to underscore, is rightly acknowledged to be the distinctive feature of the nature of persons. Ratzinger does not deny this in any way, but he completely moves away from this essentialist starting point in the consideration of what is specific about persons. With the circumvention of substance (ousia), also follows the circumvention of what it entails for the personal beings, namely rationality. Ratzinger is quite justified in this change of focus because in the original theological discourse on the doctrine of God as a person, there is a distinction between essence/substance (ousia) and person (hypostasis). This means that the reflection on what is specific about essence/*nature* (Divine *ousia*) is, by that very fact of this distinction, slightly different – even if correlated – with the reflection on what is specific about *person* (Divine *hypostasis*). This shift of starting points from in Ratzinger is significant not only because it serves as a corrective to the limitations of the substantialist context (ousia) of the feature of rationality in persons but also because as it highlights the specificity of the Ratzingerian vision of personal beings.

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[87] See. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* Part I, q. 29, a. 3.

We had already noted in the preceding section that Thomas Aquinas, in his modification of the Boethian definition did retained the feature of 'rational nature' which had been traditionally upheld since Aristotle (for whom man is a '*rational* animal'). Hence, we note another key difference between Ratzinger's vision and the Thomistic vision of personal beings. What is however common to both Ratzinger and Thomists is that there is no disparity regarding the necessity of analogical transition of the notion of person from the discourse on God to the discourse on man.

It is noteworthy that Aquinas was also sensitive to the deficiency of the classical philosophical tradition of both Aristotle and Boethius. The Angelic Doctor did acknowledge the significant modifications of this classical definition by Richard of St. Victor, whose contributions regarding the senses in which 'individual' implicates 'incommunicable existence' were most informative about the difference between the Aristotelian *substantialist* (ousia) notion of person and the more theologically adequate *subsistence* (hypostasis) specificity of the personal being[88]. Thus, we have to keep in mind that the specificity of the personal being is not so much based on its substantiality as an individual being but more on the incommunicable subsistence of the 'I' as the subject (*hupokeimenon*) of relations. We shall however return to the experience of personal subjectivity as understood in the Thomistic tradition when we discuss the possibility of highlighting Ratzinger's specificity in the light of the personalist philosophy of Karol Wojtyła, whose follows closely in the Thomistic tradition.

The decision to leave the trail of this tradition for the meantime is justified by the fact that Ratzinger, our main protagonists does not so much rely on the Boethian-Thomistic trajectory of the discuss on person to argue for his anthropological vision of man as person. In fact, he blames the corruption of the original understanding of person as constituted by relationality on this very tradition. As he complains, "Boethius concept of person, which prevailed in Western philosophy must be criticized as entirely insufficient….[It]cannot clarify anything about the Trinity or about Christology; it is an affirmation that remains on the level of the Greek mind which thinks in substantialist terms. By contrast, at the beginning of the Middle Ages, Richard of St. Victor found a concept of the person derived from within Christianity when he defined person as *spiritualis naturae incommunicabilis existential,* as the incommunicably proper existence of spiritual nature

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[88] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologia,* I, q. 29. art. 3, reply to obj. 4.

[*unmittelbar eigene Existenz*]. This definition correctly sees that in its theological meaning "person" does not lie on the level of essence, but of existence"[89].

Even much more than his critique of Boethius, Ratzinger equally does not have a high regard for the Thomistic tradition which had prevailed in schools during his formative years. In fact, he criticizes of the scholastic tradition in general and of Aquinas in particular: "…Scholastic theology developed categories of existence out of this contribution (of Richard of St. Victor) given by Christian faith to the human mind. Its defect was that it limited these categories to Christology and to the doctrine of the Trinity and did not make them fruitful in the whole extent of spiritual reality. This seems to me also the limit of St. Thomas in the matter, namely that within theology he operates, with Richard of St. Victor, on the level of existence, but treats the whole thing as a theological exception, as it were. In philosophy, however, he remains faithful to the different approach of pre-Christian philosophy"[90].

In my opinion, Joseph Ratzinger's swift dismissal of the philosophical tradition of Boethius-Aquinas trajectory is rather too hasty and disregards the historical context within which their genial contributions had clarified the theological concerns about the concept of person. Theirs were attempts to extend the discussion beyond the already settled doctrinal question regarding the Trinity. It was important to search for possibilities of applying the concept of person to other personal beings. Granted, Boethius was so glued to the Greek categories of substance in Aristotle, but as scholarship on the person grew and matured, we find improvements and amendments to his initial definitions, first from Richard of St. Victor some 600 years after the death of Boethius, and even as the understanding of theological issues become sharper, in Aquinas, there was also a further improvement that saw to the replacement of the notion of substance (ousia) with that of subsistence (hupokeimenon), which was more appropriate with regard to the nature of the personal being.

On the other hand, when Ratzinger speaks of the separation of theology from philosophy in Thomas Aquinas as a limitation, he overlooks the fact that this is essentially what the Angelic Doctor had set out to do. The advantage of this separation is that we gain more tools for dia-logue with those who may not accept the data of Revelation on such an important issue of the notion of person. Besides, the analogical language with which we express the notion of person in God

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[89] J. Ratzinger, "The notion of person in theology", *Communio,* pp. 448-449.
[90] J. Ratzinger, "The notion of person", *Communio,* p. 449.

requires that we equally make room for more tools of explanation for the distinctive features of other personal beings other than God (i.e. angels and humans) since analogy does not manifestly highlight dissimilarities but rather focus more on the similarities between the analogon and the analogates (i.e. God as *perfect* Person in relation to other non-Divine persons). The point is that it is truly only in the case of God can we speak of the fullness of a personal being and with respect to other personal beings, we can only use the term in an analogical sense. There is a similar application of analogy when we use the term 'soul' for all living beings, given that human soul is not spoken of in the same sense as animal soul or plant soul.

What is however demonstrated from the above considerations is the validity of the claims of such authors as Tracey Rowland, who draw our attention to Ratzinger's deference to Augustine rather than Aquinas, in the construction of his anthropological convictions – a view which she expresses in such words as follows: "it was in part the ahistorical character of the work of St. Thomas which left Ratzinger with the impression that Thomism is too dry and impersonal, in contrast to the works of Augustine, for whom, 'the passionate, suffering, question man is always right there, and one can identify with him'"[91]. Nonetheless, it remains the case that in the very question of the understanding of 'person' in God simultaneously as *relation* as much as *subsistence,* in other words as a 'subject (*hupokeimenon*) of relationality', Ratzinger's vision is reconcilable with Thomas' position, albeit with different emphasis.

Significantly, this complementary correlation cannot be said in regard to the definition of person by Boethius, because it is obvious that Boethius takes the substantialist (ousia) position of Aristotle and does not refer to the Ratzingerian sensitive to the constitutive relationality which clarifies the meaning of person, primarily in the context of the Trinitarian doctrine. Each person of the Trinity is distinct, not by virtue of having different substances but by virtue of the different relations which results from the dynamic processions. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are of the same *substance* of Divinity but are distinct Persons, thanks to their relations. This is what is missing in the so-called classical definition of Boethius. In Thomas Aquinas, the dimension of relationality which Ratzinger highlights can be inferred from the referent of *subsistence,* which means subsistence of subjectivity of the "I" of each of the three Persons in one God. Each is a distinct Person, subsisting in personal existence and exercising distinct free personal acts in unity

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[91] T. Rowland, *Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: T & T Clark, 2010), p. 14. She also cites Joseph Ratzinger, *Salt of the Earth: The Church at the End of the Millennium* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), p. 61.

with the other Divine Persons. The Father is not the Son and the Son is not the Holy Spirit, yet they are united in the bond of love, which efficacious realizes creation, salvation, and sanctification of human beings and the whole of created reality.

A further remark about the way the category of 'relation' is understood in the Aristotelian tradition. This we must underscore differs slightly from the understanding of relation as perichoresis in the Trinity. The Aristotelian category of relation, which does not certainly appear in the Boethian Neo-platonic considerations of the notion of person, is an accidental property. This means that it is more or less the property of a substance. The implication is that this way of understanding relation does not explain what Ratzinger demonstrates when he says that person is an event of relationality. If we apply the Aristotelian-Boethian substantialist basis of relation to the doctrine of God as person, we will have to commit ourselves to the assumption that Persons (hypostasis) in God are substances (ousia), in which case we shall have three Gods (Tritheism), each of whom has the *property* -relation, which is an accidental property of their substances (persons). Boethius does not argue this way as he did not include the category of relation in his definition of person and so does not even attempt a correlation between properties in God (in this case the property of relation) and the Divine substance (*ousia*). What we noted however is the incompatibility of Boethius's definition of person as a substance (*ousia*) with Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by relation (*perichoresis* in the case of God and *communion personarum* in the case of man). To be sure, Aristotelianism would have considered it illogical to speak of a categorical identity of 'person' and 'relation', for the one is a *substance* and the other an *accident* of the substance.

It is however my view that St. Thomas Aquinas who follows the Aristotelian trajectory succeeded in avoiding the substantialist trappings of the Stagirite. Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by relationality does not contradict Aquinas definition of person as signifying that which is most perfect in all nature[92] as can be deduced from the latter's commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate,* hence the Angelic Doctor declares that "every word that refers to the persons, signifies relations"[93]. In the relevant passage of *Summa* under consideration, the Angelic Doctor goes on to embark on an extensive justification of the absolute identity of God's essence (being) and the internal relations in God, arriving at the following conclusive response: "Distinctio autem

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[92] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 29, art. 3.
[93] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 29, art. 4, sed contra.

in divinis non fit nisi per relationes originis, ut dictum est supra. Relatio autem in divinis non est sicut accidens inhaerens subiecto, sed est ipsa divina essentia, unde est subsistens, sicut essentia divina subsistit. Sicut ergo deitas est Deus, ita paternitas divina est Deus pater, qui est persona divina. Persona igitur divina significat relationem ut subsistentem. Et hoc est significare relationem per modum substantiae quae est hypostasis subsistens in natura divina ; licet subsistens in natura divina non sit aliud quam natura divina"[94].

What our considerations above have shown is that despite their different points of emphasis Ratzinger, Aquinas and Boethius were in agreement with regard to the understanding of person as a being of relationality. Whereas Ratzinger and Aquinas acknowledge the adjustment which Richard of St. Victor made to Boethius classical definition, we can at least show that they all agree on this principle of relationality. Howsoever, this evident agreement on the principle of relationality does not however imply that Ratzinger is in the main a Thomist nor could it be said that his theological anthropology draws its fundamental inspiration from the classical philosophy within the Aristotelian trajectory as those of Boethius and Thomas.

In the third chapter of this dissertation, we shall return to this question of determining to what extent Ratzinger and Thomism can be correlated. Perhaps the best candidate for such a comparative correlation will be the philosophy of personalism in Karol Wojtyła. It is no gainsaying the fact however that, unlike Karol Wojtyła, who draws from Thomism the basic insights of his personalism, Ratzinger would rather opt for alternative insights from Augustine and Martin Buber both of whom inspired his relational conception of the notion of person. This claim is corroborated by Tracey Rowland when she writes as follows: "Both John Paul II and Benedict XVI understood this [i.e. the need to move beyond the boundaries of Aristotelian categories] from their earliest pastoral years and while one worked on developing the Thomist tradition in a more personalist direction, the other worked on mining the Augustinian tradition with reference to the same pastoral ends. Wojtyła was working on the Aquinas-John of the Cross-Mounier-Scheler line, while Ratzinger was working on the Augustine-[Bonaventure]-Newman-Guardini-Buber-Wust line"[95]. It is within this Ratzingerian trajectory that we shall try to explore the analogical derivation of the understanding of man as a being of relationality from the understanding of God as a Person.

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[94] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I, q. 29, art. 4, respondeo.
[95] T. Rowland, *Benedict XVI,* p. 155.

1.2 God as Person

1.2.1 Conceptual tools for the doctrine of God as Person

The theological language with which we speak of God as Person is expressed in a language of analogy which makes use of specific concepts such as essence (ousia), person (hypostasis), relations (perichoresis), which needs to be first explained in order for us to engage more fruitfully in the considerations of the understanding of God as Person. In general, analogical language differentiates between the 'analogon' (the ground of comparison) and the analogates. In our case, the *analogon* is 'person' but since God is the fullness of personal being, as he is the fullness of all beings as the Absolute, there is a perfect identity between God and the primary analogon so much so that the sentence "God is Person" acquires the same status as similar sentences like "God is Truth"; "God is Love"; "God is good". Hence, in the notions to be clarified in this section, we shall simply focus on how they apply to the most ideal personal being, God.

The identity of God with Person thus constitutes our primary *analogon*, on the basis of which other subsequent analogical applications of the term "person" will be derived. The first of such derivations will be made in chapter one, when we shall discuss the human being as a *person.* In other words, in this section, the primary meaning to which the terms associated with 'person' refer is to be taken in relation to God and in the light of its meaning in relation to God, we can then apply them to the human being. The justification for this analogical way of understanding the meaning of person and the concepts associated with it has already been provided by Richard McBrien, for whom "the God-question is in actuality the reverse side of the question of human existence"[96].

In general, however, the analogical application of these terms in metaphysics can be extended to all other beings in so far as they exist, first to other personal beings (e.g. angels) and secondarily to non-personal beings in nature (plants, animals, rocks etc), and even to artificial or cultural beings made by man albeit in a more restricted analogical sense. The stricter sense intended however is the application of the terms to personal beings (God, man, and angels) respecting the analogical principles which obtains at each instance of the cognitive shift from Divine to human to angelic persons.

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[96] R. McBrien, *Catholicism* (London: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 275.

1.2.1.1 The notion of 'Essence' as applied to God

The notion of 'essence' connotes several other concepts like 'being' (ousia), 'substance' and in the case of the Triune God, even implicates 'perichoresis'. The term 'essence' is used in metaphysical language to express properties of beings. In this sense, its primary referent indicates the *transcendental* properties of being, namely 'being' qua being, qua *ens*. It is in this sense, the first transcendental property from which other transcendental properties (res, unus, aliquid, veritas, bonum, and pulchrum) are derived. It is however the very co-constituent of every being, together with existence. For every being that has existence has a content, i.e. an essence. Without *ens,* we cannot establish the reality of these other transcendental properties. The secondary sense of essence in metaphysics presupposes an already existing being and so focuses on the categorical considerations, where 'essence' is the substance, the first *categorical* property which is the subject of accidental properties. In this case, the notion of essence as 'substance', is contradistinguished from the notion of 'accidents' in terms of dependence for the substance is that essence, which does not depend on another (accidental) category for its existence, but rather supports (substantia) the existence of accidents.

In the light of the metaphysical clarifications above, we note that the theological reflection on the essence of God makes use of the philosophical tools already made available by metaphysics, hence God's essence is so to speak the Divine substance, hence during the first four centuries during the seminal development and formulations of the doctrine of God, we find the frequent use of the Greek word for substance - *ousia*. Accordingly, the understanding of the relation of reflexibility of essence in the Divine Persons or simply of sameness of Divinity which the doctrinal formulations of Trinity maintained was expressed *homo-ousios,* i.e. 'One' substance of Divinity. We note from history that the theological formulations of this doctrine had become settled by the time of the Council of Alexandria in 362, following the aftermath of the Nice Council of 325 where the earlier debates regarding the Arian contentions of whether or not the Son is equal to the Father was settled against the Arians.

Given that after Nice, there was also the camp of Eusebius of Caesarea who argued from similitude (*homoios*) of substance – that is to say, the Son is 'like' the Father, rather than sameness of substance – that is, the Son is God just as the Father is God, a reconciliation at the Council of Alexandria became necessary, resulting in the reconfirmation of the formula introduced by Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen: One *ousia* (being, essence, substance)*,* three *hypostases*

(persons). It is legitimate to ask how the term essence (*ousia*) is to be understood in the light of the trinitarian formula given that 'substance' understood as 'beings' (*ens*) implicates unity (*unus*) rather than multiplicity? In his entry on the "Trinity", Edmund Dobbin notes that the emphasis on this formula swings more to the unity of the Divine substance, given that what it tries to safeguard was the belief in monotheism. This unity of Divine substance in the Triune God is better understood in the light of the Trinitarian economy, hence in his explanation, "Irenaeus …used the word 'economy' (*oeconomia* = organization, distribution) in reference to the unfolding of God's plan in the history of salvation. [Equally] Tertullian uses it to refer to God's own self-distribution in connection with the saving history. [Hence] it becomes here a trinitarian term expressing the unity between God's inner life and salvation history. It is this "economy… which distributes the unity (*unus*) into trinity (*trinitas*)[97].

A more developed doctrine of God's essence, in the light of the debates on the Divinity of the Holy Spirit, would however be formulated later in the light of insights on the principle of mutual indwelling of the three Persons from St Augustine in the fifth century and St Anselm in the eleventh century. This led in turn to the use of a yet another Greek term "perichoresis" to refer to the dynamics of unity of the Divine essence. Noting that the notion of essence in God refers primarily to the Divine 'being' in itself, accounting for the unity of the nature of God as demonstrated above; we can also draw from the principle of analogy, corresponding accounts of the *essence* of the human being in reference to the constitutive elements of the "unity" of the human substance.

Accordingly, this "unity" of the human essence or human substance, will be accounted for from the composite nature of the human being – namely the composite unity of body and soul. This unity of the human substance is however not *distributed* into a trinity as we could say of God, neither is it correct to say that human essence is *separated* into a duality of body and soul. Man's unity is a composite unity of body and soul. We can thus speak of essence (*ens*) of God and essence (*ens*) of God analogically in terms of substantial unity (*unus*), but like all analogies, it is to be born in mind that the nature of the being of God as Triune is dissimilar to the nature of the being of man. Analogies therefore not only highlight aspects of similarities but they equally show aspects of dissimilarity in the beings so considered analogically.

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[97] E. Dobbin, "Trinity" in Joseph A. Komonchak et al (editors), *The New Dictionary of Theology,* (Bangalore: Theological Publications in India, 2006), p. 1053.

1.2.1.2 The notion of 'Hypostasis' as applied to God

The notion of *hypostasis* is not the same as that of 'essence' in the Trinity. Unlike 'ousia' which was already current in philosophical language, 'hypostasis' as a term was coined in the context of theological considerations of the apparent contradiction in the doctrine of the Trinity – i.e. how can God be one (in substance) and at the same time (three Persons)? This problematic can be resolved by paying attention to the difference of meaning of the words 'ousia' and 'hypostasis'. Whereas 'ousia' highlights the distribution of Divine essence simultaneously in each of the three Persons in One God, and so shows the relation of Divine unity to be grounded in the sameness of essence in the Divine persons, 'hypostasis' highlights the term or end of this distribution of essence in each Person, implicating different ends of that Divine essence, which had some origin or source. Hypostasis implicates relation of difference with respect to the end towards which the distributed Divine essence actualizes in each instance as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively. The Person of God the Father (end of Divine essence as paternity) differs from the Person of God the Son (end of Divine essence as filiation), so also is the Holy Spirit a distinct Divine person (end of Divine essence as spiration). So, just as the considerations of the fact of Divine economy (i.e. distribution of essence) led to the determination of the Divine Trinity in its source as 'One essence' (Divinity), thereby emphasizing the absolute relation of unity (unus) of the being (ens) of God; so also the very notion of 'hypostasis' attempts to emphasize is the *processions* which results from this distrib*uted essence* of the one God.

The notion of person in God is thus in *stricto sensu*, intended to implicate the processional relations resulting from the distributed essence of the One Divine being. Seen in this way, it becomes even more evident why Joseph Ratzinger insists that persons are constituted by relationality. This is most true in the case of Divine Persons, each of whom is the end of a processional relation which has its origin in the Divine essence shared by all Three. The first relationality in God constitutes the origin of the economic distribution of Divine essence, hence we call it by the name "Father"; the next relationality follows accordingly as a *"being-from"* in relation to the Father, hence the name "Son", and the next relationality constituted by the same economic distribution of Divine essence is the Holy Spirit, which processionally comes along the same pattern as a *"being-with"* (i.e. love) in relation to both the Father and the Son. This being-with can be understood in terms of the origin of the procession – namely the Father or in terms of

the logical sequence (not metaphysical sequence) following the second procession – namely the Son. Thus, we speak of the Holy Spirit as God's Spirit since it is at once of the same essence (*homoousios*) with both the Father and the Son and thus co-adored, co-worshipped, co-eternal as God.

The personal terms –'Father', 'Son', 'Spirit' here employed are obviously drawn from metaphorical language, hence it is burdened with the limitations associated with human language of metaphors but with the hindsight of the earlier explained "Trinitarian economy", it should kept in mind that what is communicated is the reality rather than the language which represented this reality. For this reason, Karl Rahner notes that "when we speak of the Trinity in abstraction from the economy to deal with a question like the pre-existence of the *logos,* we refer to such realities as: "..the second (mode of subsistence) is exactly identical with God's *ability* to express himself in history" suggesting the God *actually* becomes triune in history"[98].

Of course what is intended in these clarifications is not the exactness of language for even to use such terms as "mode" could mislead one to the heresy of modalism yet the emphasis of Rahner lay on the term 'subsistence' of the Divine nature in the Son as well as in the Father. This equality in essence, in subsistence, can also be shown from the perspective of the immutability and eternity of the Divine nature, hence Pope Leo I explains that "To the immutable nothing is added, nothing taken away; because to be belongs always to what is eternal. Hence, remaining in himself God renews all things, and receives nothing which he has not given"[99] and thus to say that the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God is to say that all three Persons are eternal, immutable, by virtue of having the same Divine nature.

Notably, however the exact word 'hypostasis' in Greek transliterates into the Latin, not so strictly as 'substance' (a common Divine essence), but as 'subsistence' (that which subsists in its specificity of being when all that it shares with other similar beings is removed). It is important to underscore that it is not the case that all hypostasis are persons. There are rational *hypostasis* which we call persons and there are non-rational *hypostasis* which we cannot refer to as persons. It thus implies that rationality makes the difference between the hypostasis we call persons and the ones we do not refer to as person. In the case of God as the Creative *logos,* we come to know of Divine

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[98] Karl Rahner as cited in Edmund Dobbin, "Trinity" in *The New Dictionary of Theology,* ibid., p. 1059.
[99] H. Denzinger and A. Schönmetzer (eds.) *Enchiridion Symbolorum: Definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum* (Wiceburgi: Sumptibus Stahelianis, 1865), no. 285.

rationality indirectly, (rather than directly). We know that God is rational – a logic– because the cosmos which is a work hands is an expression of his Person through his actions. The creation of the world is itself a testimony of God's rationality for only a rational being can bring about order (cosmos).

1.2.1.3 The notion of 'Relation' and 'perichoresis' in Divine Persons

In the same way, we note that the basis of hypostasis is the Divine "ousia" (essence), which is its originating *source*, so also the basis of relations is the Divine "hypostasis" (Persons) which are its *subject* of relation. In our considerations of *essence* ('ousia') as the complete unity of distributed Divinity (Divine economy), arising from the same source, *amongst* the Triune Persons and Person ('hypostasis') as the end of the *processions*, arising from the distributed Divine economy, we already meet the notions of relations, in the ordinary language concepts of "among" (within) and "procession" (between).

Relations can thus be considered both *within* and *between* the Divine Persons. The relations 'within' are closed-term relations, for instance '*paternity* with respect to filiation*'* and '*filiation* with respect to paternity*'*. Then relations 'between' are open-term relations, for instance, the relations of *spiration* (both active and passive) and that of *perichoresis*. The terms of Divine relations are for the most part based on hypostasis (subject of relations), hence the Divine Persons themselves are subsistent subjects of the Divine relations, hence the Father is eternally the subject of the relation of paternity; the Son is eternally the subject of the relation of filiation; and the Spirit is eternally the subject of the *passive* spiration.

However, *active* spiration does not have a subsistence subject since it can be a procession from the Father (*per Patrium*) or the Son (*per Filium*) or from both (*Filioque*). In all, there are four Divine relations: paternity, filiation, active spiration and passive filiation. It should however be noted that in this clarification of the meaning of relation in Divine Persons, the terms 'relation' and 'person' are not identical. Quantitatively, there are three Persons in one God but four relations. Also, a relation entails a reference to more than one person, and it is defined from the standpoint of one of the persons in relations. This is most evident in the case of spiration, where the distinction between the relation of active spiration and that of passive spiration are spoken of in terms of the standpoint, as active spiration is from the standpoint of the originating source of the procession whereas passive spiration is from the end point of the spiration-procession. Persons in relation can

however be either the originating *subject* of the procession which defines the relation or the end *subject* of the procession which defines the relation. This is why, paternity and filiation are considered to be two relations rather than one, just in the same way active and passive spirations are different relations. In each instance, relations are defined in terms of the position of the subject of relation, i.e. the Divine Person, on the basis of which the procession of Divine essence is being considered. Each of the Divine Persons are subjects of relation, thanks to perichoresis (Latin: circumincession), which is the *relation* of the three Persons in the Triune God to one another.

1.2.2 Relations in Divine Persons

That relationality constitutes person in Ratzinger's theology of personal beings is manifestly evident in his analysis of the way the ancient world appropriates the Greek notion of *prosopon.* In this regard, we underscore that one of the possible nuances of the Greek *prosopon* is the reference to "face". Perhaps it is the English rendition of *prosopon* as 'mask' that comes close to this reference. Notably, one of the most frequent terms employed by the Old Testament when referring to God's close/intimate relationship with the people of Israel is *panim,* a word which translates into English as "face". Emery de Gaal in his *Theology of Pope Benedict XVI* noted that "In this Hebrew term, the people of the Old Covenant recognized God as being a person. God is concerned with His people. It is a term stressing that God accompanies the course of human history with concern and empathy. It expresses God's close relationship with the Israelites. Moses sought God's face and conversed with him (Ex 32:31ff). A recurring topos is the 'seeking the face of God' especially within the psalms"[100]. Thus, we can already note that in both the earlier Hebrew *panim* (English: "face") in religious contexts and the subsequent Greek use of *prosopon* (English: "mask") in the context of theatres (i.e. in performative arts), the notion of 'person' for the ancients implicates the relational principle such that to be 'person' is understood by them as to be in relation.

Unfortunately, when in the course of its history, the notion of 'person' (the English rendition of which is not strictly a translation but rather a transliteration of the Latin *persona*) acquired a more philosophical significance, it began to lose some of the above implicated elements of relationality (i.e. actor-audience relationship) and gradually replaced this element of relationality with the features of individuality. This gradual process of supplanting the element of

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[100] E. de Gaal, *The Theology of Benedict XVI: The Christocentric Shift* (New York: Palmgrave, Macmillian, 2010), p. 120.

relationality with individuality came to its climax in the sixth century with classical definition of Boethius of 'person' as an individual substance of a rational nature[101].

In order to see this conceptual degenerative process in the use of the notion of person, we need to retrace its history of transformations back to its earliest stage. Ratzinger is convinced that this first stage of transformation of the notion of person is connected with the question of God and the question of Christ, hence he writes as follows: "The concept of person as well as the idea that stands behind this concept is a product of Christian theology…. It did not simply grow out of mere human philosophizing, but out of the interplay between philosophy and the antecedent given of faith, especially Scripture. More specifically, the concept of person arose from two questions that have from the very beginning urged themselves upon Christian thought as central: namely the question, "What is God?" (i.e. the God whom we encounter in Scripture); and, 'Who is Christ?'"[102].

I think that Ratzinger overstates the claim regarding the Christian origin of the concept of person for two reasons: the one is historical and the other is already implicated in his claims. Historically, the notion of person was already in use in Greek theatre as we had indicated above before the advent of Christianity around 4 BC. Its use even predates classical Greek philosophy so to speak. Hence it could not have been an entirely new invention of Christian theology as Ratzinger avers. Secondly, when the question of God was first raised in the Scripture, it was raised by hagiographers of the Hebrew Bible (now the Old Testament of the Christian Bible) whose attempts to make sense of the God-question is captured by cultural (i.e. Near Eastern cultures) notions of a Creator being who is the ground of all that exists, the being behind all reality. That this notion is to be linked with the notion of person will still have to wait for Greek theatres to invent the word *prosopon.* More so, given that the biblical notion of the being who himself is existence and the source of all that exists also predates Greek philosophy and by that fact also predates Christian theology.

However, Ratzinger's claims are justifiable in the sense that it is in context of the interplay of Greek philosophy and Christian theology that the conceptual transformation of the concept of person acquired the very significance which it retains till today, namely that of an existing, living, rational being, whose actions are self-determined. Obviously, the key elements of rationality and

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[101] Boethius, *De persona et duabus naturis* ii, iii, in J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, LXVIV, 1342 sqq.
[102] Cf. J. Ratzinger, "The notion of person in theology", Ibid.

self-determination of the personal being were not evident in the Greek *prosopon* when it referred to the 'mask' of the *dramatis personae* in the theatres. It is in this sense that we can justify Ratzinger claims regarding the highpoint (rather than the origin) of the transformation of the theatrical lexicon of *prosopon* into a theologically important concept for considerations regarding the question of God and subsequently, the question of Christ, - the two foundations upon which Ratzinger roots his discussions on the question of man as a person.

Thus, in order to begin from a more remote context of the Scriptural presentation of God, which Ratzinger is also convinced to be linked with the notion of God as Person, we can re-engage Ratzinger's theological interpretation of the creation accounts in the first book of the Old Testament. We shall also realize in the course of this discourse that Ratzinger's accounts agrees in its basic outline with the patterns of thought which underlay the middle ages to search for convergences between Aristotelianism and Platonism, an example of which can be found in the so-called 'Metaphysics of the Book of Exodus'[103].

There is also another way through which we can highlight relationality as the constitutive feature of person according to Ratzinger. This alternative route of justification is in relation to the considerations we understood regarding the conceptual tools with which theology discusses the doctrine of God. The last of the series of conceptual tools we had explained is that of relation, which as we have noted depends on the hypostasis (persons) as their subject, both with regard to the origin of the processions (e.g. paternity) and with regard to the end of the processions (e.g. filiation as the end of paternity).

What is however to be noted in the considerations of the notion of relations of the Person of God as a being of relationality, is that it is a feature which can be applied either to the internal relations (i.e. intrapersonal *perichoresis*) of all three Persons in the being of Triune God and also by way of analogy is equally applicable to interpersonal relation between the Divine-human relations. Given that we are focused on anthropological questions, the latter becomes more expedient for us. However, Ratzinger takes a more detailed analysis of the former, given that it grounds his theological starting point. Another reason for this is that he intends to derive the

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[103] Cf. M. Kurdzialek, "O tak zwanej metafizyce Księgi Wyjścia [On the so-called Metaphysics of The Book of Exodus], in *Średniowiecze w poszukiwaniu równowagi między arystotelizmem a platonizmem [The Middle Ages in search of equilibrium between Aristotelianism and Platonism]* (Lublin: PTTA, 1996), pp. 99-119; as found in M.A. Krapiec & A. Maryniarczyk, „The Lublin Philosophical School: Historical Development and Future Prospects", *Studia Gilsoniana* 4:4 (Oct-Dec., 2015), pp. 423-442, esp. footnote no. 24, p. 437.

Divine-human relations from the internal relations of the Divine Persons. Remarkably, this method of analogical deduction from the relations in God to the God-man relationship or even the human interpersonal relationships is reminiscent of St. Augustine who tries to understand the human memory, intellect, and will as essentially one but relatively three, hence analogous to the internal relations of the Divine Persons of the Trinity[104]. This is no surprise as Ratzinger's predisposition to Augustinian tradition is undisputed.

Given that feature of relationality constitutes the key specificity of Ratzinger's notion of person in the theological doctrine of God, it is justified that we focus on the role it plays in his consideration of the notion of persons with regard to the Divine Persons. As it is not necessary for our purposes and aims in this dissertation to show this with all three Persons of the Trinity, it suffices to focus on the Person of Jesus Christ, for the very purpose of following the pattern of Ratzinger's methodological transition from the doctrine of God, through Christology, to anthropology. We shall not dwell on the consideration of the Person of the Father and the Person of the Holy Spirit because these will lead us afar away from our goal, namely the derivation of Ratzinger's vision of man from his understanding of 'person' as constituted by relationality. This does not mean that the human person is not related to other Persons in the Trinity except with Christ, but it is more so, due to the centrality of the Person of Jesus Christ, in the economy of human salvation for Christ is both God and man. He is the Revelation of God to man as well as the Revelation of man, being himself the Last Adam. Accordingly, in the next section that follows, we shall turn our attention to how this relationality is highlighted in the person of Jesus Christ.

1.2.3 The Person of Jesus Christ as constituted by dialogical relationality

The constitutive feature of relationality, which Ratzinger highlights in the notion of 'person' is most manifest in the Person of Jesus Christ, whose entire being is constituted by his filial relation to the Father on the one hand and his salvific relation to humanity as the Last Adam. This claim can be substantiated not only from the doctrine on the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ but from a more attentive reflection on what evidence the written Revelation of God's word presents. Accordingly, to the question, "who is Jesus?", we can search for answers from Jesus' own self-presentation of himself in the Gospels. Scripture scholars generally agree on the set of sayings that are referred to as the seven "I am" sayings in the gospel of John. One of

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[104] Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate,* Book X, Chapter 11, 7.

these is noted in John chapter 14 verse: "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life". A methodic exegesis of this passage of Scripture is not needed to highlight that in presenting himself as the "Way", Jesus intends to communicate to his followers, (whom Luke identifies in Acts of the Apostles as those "belonging to the Way" -Acts 9:2, 19:9,23; 24:14, 22), that his being is constituted by relationality. He is the *Way* through which God enters into human history, having himself become the immanence (presence) of God among men through Incarnation as "Immanuel" (Isaiah 7:14; Mt. 1:22-23) as well as the *Way* through which man is reconciled with God by virtue of the Paschal Mystery.

In the meantime, we shall focus on the significance of Jesus's self-referent to his Person as the "Way" and in the second and third chapters, we shall attempt the considerations of what the self-Revelation of Jesus' Person as the "Truth" and as the "Life" implicates for Ratzinger's vision of the person as constituted by relation. Accordingly, we underscore in this section that following Ratzinger's vision of person as constituted by relationality, the reading of Jesus's self-presentation of his Person in the Scriptures, as the 'Way' can be understood in relation to the *universal* (or cosmic) relationality of the Person of Jesus to all that is created, for through Him all things were made (John 1:3; Colossians 1:16). This cosmic relation takes on a more particular personal character with regard to the salvation of man throughout *history*.

Christ as the 'Way' is thus to be understood as both "Lord of creation (cosmic/universal) and of history (esp. salvation history)"[105]. This reading of the Johannine "I am" saying of Jesus becomes clearer in the light of the presentation of the Person of Jesus in the other gospels, thus providing for us a convergence of theological symbolisms for all the gospels regarding the response to the question of 'who Jesus is'? How could such a convergence be identified, given that the synoptics (esp. Matthew and Luke), offers us a genealogy of Jesus's origin, whereas we do not find any genealogy in John's gospel, rather a theological reflection on the origin of Jesus is what John presents to us without having to present a genealogy?

In his Christology, Joseph Ratzinger conspicuously appreciates the Johannine self-presentation of the Person of Jesus as the "Way", which corroborates his vision of the person as constituted by relationality, hence he insists that "Only [a Christ] who is both man and God can be the ontological bridge leading from one to the other. And therefore, he is this for everyone, not

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[105] Benedict XVI, *Light of the World: A Conversation with Peter Seewald*, transl. by Michael Miller and Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2010), p. 33.

only for some"[106]. Hence for Ratzinger, Jesus's self-presentation of his own Person, as the 'Way' (John 14:6) who leads from God to man and vice versa, provides us with the yardstick for accounting for the adequacy (and/or inadequacy) of other third-person responses which we can extract from the Bible regarding the question -Who is Jesus?

In other words, the notion of person as relation in Ratzinger's Christology serves as the guide to the search and eventual discovery of the true being (and mission) of the Person of Jesus, the "Divine Son" of the Father and the "Last Adam" on whose destiny the redemption of mankind hangs. Emery de Gaal corroborates the above assumption as he points out that "For Ratzinger, Jesus' self-disclosure is the basis for all of the subsequent unfolding moments in Christology. Biblical titles such as Son and *Kyrios* (Lord) connect him with God's divine being. These titles are so closely linked to him that they became part of his name among the people. Office, interpretation and person blend into one reality. In this vein, Peter can state that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of the living God. Based on this biblical background then, so Ratzinger informs us, men standing in apostolic succession, dared to elaborate on the nature of Jesus. In AD 325, in the Anatolian town of Nicaea, they defined Jesus relationship with God the Father as *"homoousios",* that is of one substance with the Father. This explains how exclusively Jesus is able to state that he is the "Son of Man"[107].

In addition to his knack for referencing apostolic and patristic traditions, Ratzinger himself makes ample use of this understanding of the Person of Jesus as constituted by relation when he highlights the paradox that is elicited from third-person responses to the identity of Jesus as presented in the Scriptures. For example, in *Jesus of Nazareth,* he highlights that Scriptural evidences abound with instances where the question about "who Jesus is" is posed in connection to the question of "where Jesus comes from", thereby demonstrating that "the two questions are inseparably linked"[108]. In this way, the personal identity of Jesus is thus revealed in the dual context of his relationship to his origin (from above/below); and his relationship to all humanity in all ages (to the past, present, and future): thus, on the one hand is his origin from God the Father "above"

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[106] J. Ratzinger, *On the Way to Jesus* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), p. 68.

[107] E. de Gaal, *The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 120-121.

[108] J. Ratzinger, *Jesus von Nazareth. Prolog. Die Kindheitgeschichten* (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2012) translated into English by Philip J. Whitmore and published with the title *Jesus of Nazareth: The Infancy Narratives* (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), pp. 4-13; also See the earlier published volume which in chronology of themes appears to be the vol. 2, *Jesus von Nazareth,* with English translation by Adrian J. Walker and published as *Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration* (London, New York, Berlin: Bloomsbury, 2007), pp. 9-24.

as well as his genealogical belonging to a specific cultural human family in a concrete Jewish society "below"; and on the other hand is his relationship with Israel past (a historical past which embraces the history of Israel's patriarchs – Abraham, but also Noah and Adam), his relationship contemporaneous post-Paschal present as the unique Redeemer and Savior of the world, and finally his relationship with humanity's eschatological expectations.

Ratzinger, who has acquired a considerable mastery of the discourse on theology of history[109]employs this aspect of his vision of the understanding of the Person of Jesus as constituted by relation conspicuously in his work *Jesus of Nazareth.* In the volume one of the three-volume masterpiece, he presents several examples to demonstrate this vision. First, he points to Pilate whose question to [Jesus] the accused: 'Where are you from?' came as a surprise within the trial context. Ratzinger explains that "the Roman judge asks where Jesus is from in order to understand who he really is"[110].

In other words, the search the identity of Jesus is conducted via the relations of origin through which his Person is constituted. Next, he goes on to show that in other gospel periscopes, both in the Johannine corpus and in the synoptics, such a question about Jesus's origin plays similar roles but even more highlights a paradox regarding Jesus' true being. Thus, "on the one hand, counting against Jesus…is the fact that people knew exactly where he was from (i.e. his hometown, here on this earth below): he does not come from heaven, from 'the Father', from 'above', as he purports (Jn 8:23). No. 'Is not this Jesus, whose father and mother we know? How does he now say, 'I have come down from heaven'?' (Jn 6:42)"[111].

Even more telling is the amazement of his townsmen when in the synagogue at Nazareth, Jesus relates himself to the Scriptures, thereby revealing himself as the "Word" of God. Here again, we notice the application of the principle that his Person is constituted by relation, hence in Jesus's self-disclosure of his identity, he presents himself as the personification of Scripture, the eternal Word (*logos*) for all humanity and for all ages, the personified Truth (*logos*) who comes *from* God. Ratzinger was quick to point that in that incident "Jesus had expounded the words of sacred Scripture not in the customary manner but by relating them to himself …with an authority that went beyond the bounds of all exegesis (cf. Lk 4:21). [Expectedly], the listeners were

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[109] It is worthy of note that in his habitation thesis of 1953, he had worked out a theology of history based on Bonaventure's *Collationes on Hexaemeron,* the last of three sermons given by the Seraphic Doctor at Paris in 1273.
[110] J. Ratzinger, *Jesus von Nazareth. Prolog.* vol. 1, ibid., p. 2.
[111] Ibid., p. 2.

understandably shocked by this treatment of Scripture, by the claim that he himself was the inner point of reference and the key to the exegesis of the sacred text. Shock led to denial: 'Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary and brother of James and Joseph and Judas and Simon and are not his sisters here with us. And they took offence at him' (Mt. 6:3)"[112].

It should be noted that in demonstrating that the Person of Jesus is constituted by relation, Ratzinger shows that this understanding highlights a double implication with regard to the interpretation of the universal significance of Jesus as God-man: hence on the one hand, it implicates a cosmic interpretation to the effect that Jesus's being is constituted by his relation to God above and by his relation to man below; and on the other hand, it also implicates a historical interpretation to the effect that Jesus as the Last Adam is constituted by his relation to the whole of humanity from Adam onwards to people today as well as to humans tomorrow, till the end of time.

In the considerations of the above instances from the first volume of his *Jesus of Nazareth* where we have indicated that Ratzinger employs the vision that the Person of Jesus is constituted by relation, he demonstrates the *cosmic* interpretation (above/below) of the mystery of his Incarnation, thus we note that in those instances, the identity of Jesus is implicated as a 'vertical' bridge between heaven and earth, God and creation. On the other hand, there is equally another perspective, in which such questions about Jesus' origin takes on a *historical* significance for the economy of salvation, which not only implicates a 'horizontal' bridge between past, present and future but even more so connects time and eternity. In this regard, Ratzinger applies the same vision of the understanding of person as constituted by relation. Once more, the Person of Jesus as an event of relation becomes the interpretative key to the understanding of the identity of Jesus.

The convergence of both interpretations (the cosmic and the historical) of this Ratzingerian vision is well captured by Emery de Gaal when he reports as follows: "If God and humankind meet in Jesus Christ's Incarnation and sacrifice, then, Ratzinger holds, once cannot discern a contradiction between history and the cosmos…[for in addition to the Incarnation] the Cross and Resurrection are bridges conjoining time and eternity"[113]. It is thus not surprising that we also find the temporal (historical past, present and future) significance of the understanding of the Person

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[112] Ibid., p. 3.
[113] E. de Gaal, *The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI: The Christological Shift* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 251-252.

of Jesus as relation in the very same work, *Jesus of Nazareth,* in which Ratzinger had equally considered the cosmic significance of the question of whether Jesus comes 'from above' or 'from below'[114], when he masterfully turns his focus on the exegetical analysis of the genealogies of Matthew and Luke so as to eventually expose the fuller theological significance of the prologue of John's gospel.

Ratzinger points out that in Matthew's genealogy, "two names are of key significance if we are to understand Jesus' provenance: Abraham and David"[115]. Why is it so? Ratzinger demonstrates that the reason is found in the roles these two names play in highlighting the historic significance of the symbolic structure of the genealogy. First with regard to the figure of Abraham, he explains his role in Matthew's genealogy of the birth of Jesus in relation to the universalization of salvation *history* which trails the dynamic fulfillment of a promise made to Abraham, and through him to Israel and extended to all nations (Gen. 12:2-3), a promised which Matthew attempts to present as being fulfilled in the mission of Jesus and his disciples (Mt. 28:19).

Hence Ratzinger demonstrates the universalized historical significance of Matthew's genealogy which begins with Abraham, who "is a wayfarer, not only from the land of his birth into the promised land, but also on the journey from the present into the future. His whole life points forward, it is a dynamic of walking along the path of what is to come. Thus, the letter to the Hebrews rightly presents him as a pilgrim of faith on the basis of the promise: 'He looked forward to the city which has foundations, whose builder and maker is God' (11:10). For Abraham, the promise refers in the first instance to his descendants, but it also extends further: 'all the nations of the earth shall bless themselves by him' (Gen. 18:18). Thus, the whole history, beginning with Abraham and leading to Jesus is open towards universality – through Abraham, blessing comes to all. [Hence], from the beginning of the genealogy, the focus is already on the end of the Gospel, when the risen Lord says to the disciples: 'Make disciples of all nations' (Mt. 28:19). In the particular history revealed by the genealogy, this movement toward the whole is present from the beginning: the universality of Jesus' mission is already contained within his origin"[116].

With respect to the figure of David, he indicates that in Matthew's genealogy, this history of salvation, which finds its highpoint in the Person and mission of Jesus, is recounted around the

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[114] Cf. J. Ratzinger, *Jesus von Nazareth, Prolog.* vol. 1, p. 2.
[115] Ibid., p. 4.
[116] J. Ratzinger, *Jesus von Nazareth, Prolog.* vol. 1*,* p. 5.

symbolic structure of the figure of David. Ratzinger tries to show the equally universal and historical significance of David to whom the promise of an eternal kingdom was also made: "Your throne shall last for ever" (2 Sam 7:16) and so argues that "the genealogy that Matthew puts before us is steeped in this promised. It is constructed in three sets of fourteen generations, at first rising from Abraham to David, then descending from Solomon to the Babylonian captivity, and then rising again to Jesus, in whom the promise comes to fulfilment. The king who is to last forever now appears – looking quite different from what the Davidic model might have led one to expect"[117]. He goes on to show that hint in the numerical symbolism of the Hebrew letters of the name 'David' which add up to fourteen, pointing thus to the convergence of both the name 'David' and the promise to David, both of which are showcase the path from Abraham to Jesus, such that "the genealogy, with its three sets of fourteen generations, is truly a Gospel of Christ the King, towards whose everlasting throne the whole of history looks"[118]. In other words, in accounting for the genealogy, the cultural origin of Jesus, Matthew provides a symbolic answer to the Person of Jesus as constituted by the relationality of his being as the Promised King and the Universal Lord of the whole of salvation history stretching backwards to Abraham through David to an everlasting future. The point is thus made regarding the Person of Jesus as constituted by relation to the cosmic (universal) and historical (eternal) dimensions of our human experience of God's being and action as revealed and accounted in the gospel of Matthew.

In the same trajectory, though with a different emphasis, Luke's genealogy is shown by Ratzinger to have given the same answer to the question of 'who Jesus is' – namely by leading his audience to the appreciation of the constitution of his Person from his relationship to the whole of mankind throughout salvation history. That the two genealogies converge on central issues regarding the centrality of the Person of Jesus in salvation history, Ratzinger points out the similarities and dissimilarities of both accounts, hence while noting that there exists differences in the names of Jesus's ancestors which Matthew and Luke supplies, even to the surprise that "not even the name of Joseph's father is common to the two", Ratzinger goes on to hold that "Neither of the evangelists is concerned so much with the individual names as with the symbolic structure within which Jesus' place in history is set before us: the intricacy with which he is woven into the

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[117] Ibid., p. 6.
[118] Ibid., p. 6.

historical strands of the promise, as well as the new *beginning* which paradoxically characterizes his origin side by side with the *continuity* of God's action in history"[119].

What is striking is that Ratzinger's analysis shows that Matthew's genealogy begins 'from below' as he "climbs from the beginnings – from the root – to the present, to the top of the 'tree'"; whereas Luke's genealogy begins 'from above' as he "descends from Jesus, the 'treetop,' down to the roots, in order to show that in the end the ultimate root is found not in the depths, but rather in the 'heights' – God is there at the beginning of human existence: 'Enos, the son of Seth, the son of Adam, the son of God' (Lk 3:38). In spite of these two different starting points, Ratzinger is able to show that with respect to Jesus' paternity, both genealogies suspends the pattern of accounting for ancestral lineage and "breaks off and comes to a stop when it reaches Joseph (Mt. 1:16 '*legally*, the husband of Mary' and Lk. 3:23 'Jesus, being *socio-culturally* called the son of Joseph)"[120]. This goes to show that the true Father of Jesus, just like the true origin of Adam is God (Lk. 3:38). In this sense, the Person of Jesus is prefigured already in Adam, from the beginning such that His Person is constituted by his relation to the origin of all humanity, being himself the 'Last Adam', the eternal Son of God, who also as the *legal* 'son' of Joseph, inherits the throne of David and as such is the personified fulfillment of the promise of an eternal kingdom just as Luke already indicated earlier in his gospel (Lk. 1:31-32).

At this point, the synoptic accounts of Jesus's origin coincide with the prologue of John who reports that the Word made flesh, who dwells amongst us was from the beginning, that eternal Word who was with God and who is God (Jn.1:1). Without supplying a genealogy like Matthew and Luke, John provides a more theological in-depth response to the question as to the Person of Jesus in terms of his relationship to the whole of humanity such that in the light of the Johannine prologue (Jn.1:1-14), the man Jesus becomes "the dwelling place of the Word, the eternal Word of God, in this world. Jesus' 'flesh', his human existence, is the 'dwelling', the 'tent' of the Word: the reference to the sacred tent of Israel in the wilderness is unmistakable. Jesus is, so to speak, the tent of meeting – he is the reality for which the tent and the later 'Temple' could only serve as signs. Jesus' origin, his provenance, is the true "beginning" -the primordial source from which all things come, the 'light' that makes the world into the cosmos. He comes from God. He is God. This 'beginning' that has come to us opens up – as a beginning – a new manner of human existence.

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[119] Ibid., p. 8.
[120] Ibid., p. 9.

'For to all who received him, who believed in his name, he gave power to become children of God; who were born, not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God' (Jn. 1:12f)"[121].

Therefore, in a bid to reach the conclusion as to the convergence of the gospels on the constitution of the Person of Jesus by relationality expressed in the gospel stories regarding the origin of Jesus, Ratzinger considers it needful to take on an even more historically significant exegesis of the genealogy of the gospel of Luke. He notices that Luke arranges his 76 names on the basis of a symbolic structuring of historical time such that it "contains eleven times seven members".[122] This for him could be a discreet allusion to the 'fullness of time' in regard to the dawning of the "decisive hour of world history"[123]. Jesus is thus to be seen as "the 'new Adam', who once again, comes 'from God' – but in a more radical way than the first Adam, not merely breathed into being by God, but truly God's 'Son'. In contrast to Matthew, for whom the Davidic promise permeates the symbolic structure of time, Luke in tracing the line back to Adam, wants to show that humanity starts afresh in Jesus. The genealogy expresses a promise that concerns the whole of humanity"[124]. He cites Saint Ireneus's *Adversus Haereses: On the Detection and Overthrow of the so-called Gnosis* III, 22, 3 -as corroborating this same conclusion, namely that "Jesus takes upon himself the whole of humanity, the whole history of man, and he gives it a decisive re-orientation toward a new manner of existence"[125].

From the foregoing, it is demonstrated that the Person of Jesus is constituted by his cosmic and historical relations to his origin: On the one hand, his origin "from above" namely, his being 'from God', as 'Son of God' and as 'God'; and on the other hand by his cosmic and historical relations to his being "from below" namely his being as the Last Adam (universal/cosmic – all of humanity) and legal son of Joseph, hence inheritor of the everlasting throne of David (historical – forever), the conclusion that Jesus as a Person is a being constituted of cosmic and historical relations of the widest range, since "through Him all things were made" (John 1:3; Col. 1:16) and as the "alpha and omega" (Rev. 21:6; 22:13), He is not only the primordial source (alpha point of history), and the eschaton of salvation history (omega point of history) but he is equally the "mid-

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[121] J. Ratzinger, *Jesus von Nazareth, Prolog.* vol. 1, pp. 11-12.
[122] Ibid., p. 9.
[123] J. Ratzinger, *Jesus von Nazareth, Prolog.* vol. 1, p. 10.
[124] Ibid., p. 10.
[125] J. Ratzinger, *Jesus von Nazareth, Prolog.* vol. 1, p. 10.

point" (the central turning point) of history, communicating a new reality of salvation history from which a new beginning erupts into human history and by taking into himself the whole of human history (past, present and future) re-orients the human being towards a new manner of existence in him. Hence as Ratzinger would report, in his analysis of Oscar Cullman's eschatology, "Salvation history is therefore, not merely the past. It is also the present and the future, as we continue on our pilgrimage till the Lord returns"[126]. From this event of God becoming man, of the *eternal* divine presence of God's entering into human *history*, the true relationality of each historically existent human person becomes rooted as the event of relationality with Jesus the Last Adam. The next section will thus focus on what follows from this conclusion for the understanding of man as a person.

1.3 Man as Person

1.3.1 Martin Buber's influence on Ratzinger's notion of man as person

In the preceding subsection, we have noted Ratzinger's preservation of the theocentric significance of the notion person as most manifest in the Person of Jesus Christ. On the basis of this, we shall attempt in this subsection to justify the analogical derivation of the vision of man as person, in tandem with the testimony of Scripture regarding the origin of man and as well as man's access to salvation through man's relationship with the Person and work of Jesus Christ.

However, it stands to reason that we spare some time to consider the philosophical inspirations which influenced Ratzinger's notion of human person as constituted by relationality. Such a consideration will throw more light on the considerations we shall make regarding the stated objective of realizing an analogical derivation of the notion of man as person from the understanding of the notion of person in the doctrine of God.

According, we note that Ratzinger's vision of person was decisively influenced by the relational outlook shaped by philosophical personalism of Martin Buber. This claim is evidently corroborated by his own personal testimony, as can be found in an interview, which he granted to Peter Seewald, regarding a remarkable influence which Martin Buber's I-Thou philosophy of dialogical personalism had impressed on him. In his words, "I revered Martin Buber very much.

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[126] See J. Ratzinger, *Eschatologie -Tod und ewiges Leben* (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet Verlag, 1977), translated into English by Michael Waldstein and published under the title *Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life* (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1988), pp. 51-55, especially p. 54.

For one thing, he was the great representative of personalism, the I-Thou principle that permeates his entire philosophy. Of course, I have also read his complete works. He was a bit fashionable at that time. He had newly translated the Holy Scriptures together with Rosenzweig. His personalistic viewpoint and his philosophy, which was nourished by the Bible, were made fully concrete in his Hasidic tales. This Jewish piety, completely uninhibited in faith and simultaneously always standing in the centre of the concerns of this time, his mode of having faith in today's world, his whole person – all this fascinates me"[127].

We shall in subsequent sections consider in more details the key implications of grounding his theological vision of man on Buber's brand of personalism. In the meantime, we highlight that Ratzinger was fascinated by such aspects of Buber's philosophical personalism as its dialogical and relational conception of the human being. He has considered these two aspects as equally present in the theological discourse on the understanding of God as Person and so they remain significance as convergent entry points for the derivation of the understanding of man as a person in the light of the understanding of God as a personal being. Thus, the echo of Buber's influence on Ratzinger is unmistakable whenever he speaks of the essence of the human person as constituted by "relativity towards the other"[128]. In other words, for Ratzinger, the essence of man is to be understood in terms of an ontological category which can be referred to as 'dialogical relativity'. This understanding as we shall see in the later part of the dissertation, will also influence his views on the truth about man, about man's origin, and about human freedom as measured by the truth or essence of the human being.

More so, in other to appreciate even more profoundly, the way in which Ratzinger has come to appropriate the personalistic conception of the human being in philosophy, through Buber's dialogical trajectory, it is pertinent to recall that the term key 'person' was introduced into philosophical anthropology from an otherwise Christian theological context of a discussion on the essence of the Divine being. Ratzinger is himself well informed about this historical background of the concept of person and its development. In an article he published in *Communio,* he traces this hallmark contribution of Christian theology to the history of intellectual thought as follows:

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[127] P. Seewald, *Benedikt XVI: Letzte Gespräche mit Peter Seewald* (Droemer Verlag, 2016), translated into English by Jacob Phillips with the title *Benedict XVI Last Testament in his own words with Peter Seewald* (New York: Bloomsbury Continuum), p. 99.
[128] Cf. J. Ratzinger, *"Concerning the notion of person in theology"* in *Communio 17* (Fall, 1990): 439-454.

"…the concept of person arose from two questions that have from the very beginning urged themselves upon Christian thought as central: namely, the question 'What is God?' (i.e., the God whom we encounter in Scripture); and 'Who is Christ?'. In other to answer these fundamental questions that arose as soon as faith began to reflect, Christian thought made use of the philosophical insignificant or entirely unused concept *"prosopon" = "persona"*. It thereby gave to this word a new meaning and opened up a new dimension of human thought. Although this thought has distanced itself far from its origin and developed beyond it, it nevertheless lives, in a hidden way, from this origin. In my opinion, judgement one cannot, therefore, know what "person" most truly means without fathoming this origin"[129].

It is pertinent to note in the above citation that Ratzinger calls our minds to the theological concerns for the use of the term 'person' as framed in terms of two key questions regarding "essence" (i.e. the "in se" question = *What* is God?) and "relation" *(*i.e. the "per se" question = *Who* is Christ?). This observation is for me quite significant for the understanding of how Ratzinger interprets the transposition of the original questions regarding the Divine being to the questions regarding human beings (i.e. theological anthropology). It is thus in the light of what is true about the essence of God (What is God?) and relations in Godhead (Who is Christ?) that he raises theologically analogous questions about man: namely "*What* is man?" and "*Who* is man?" – questions to which appropriate responses can also be found only in the light of our understanding of man's relation to God, the source of human existence (i.e. Creator) and the source of purpose or meaning (*logos*) of man's existence (i.e. Saviour). In this sense, we can surmise that Ratzinger's appropriation of Buber's philosophical personalism, which leads him to conclude that *dialogical relativity* constitutes human essence, ultimately finds its theological fulcrum in Christology, given that for him, Christ is the One Mediator through whom the *relationship* of the created human being with God as Creator is *dialogically* sustained (i.e. Word of God as *logos* was present right from the beginning at *creation*; became flesh at *incarnation* and through *paschal* mystery effects reconciliation throughout historical distortions and restorations; and eventually as 'Last Adam', makes permanent "as representative of human race" the universal efficacy of Divine-human loving relationship at *resurrection*).

Hence, we find that in Ratzinger, Christology becomes for theological anthropology, what metaphysics is to philosophical anthropology, namely its foundation and ultimate source. It is in

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[129] J. Ratzinger, *"Concerning the notion of person in theology"*, pp. 439-440.

the light of the Person and work of Christ that the two key questions which sparked the theological reflections on person is to be transposed from questions about Divine Persons to questions about human persons (i.e. theological anthropology). Accordingly, in the sections that follows, I shall attempt to present Ratzinger's derivation of the understanding of man as person in relation to God. In the light of the foregoing, the theo-logical discourse on the question of God as 'person' will proceed in two segments, the first of which will consider the trinitarian dimension and the second of which will focus on the Christological dimension. Following these will be the consideration of two analogous-correlate questions namely "What is man?" and "Who is man?" respectively.

1.3.2 The analogical derivation of the notion of man as person

Ratzinger is not alone in the affirmation of the analogical derivation of the notion of man as person from the consideration of God as Person. Marc Cortex also noted that "theological anthropology expresses one of the basic convictions that …what it means to be human is revealed only as we understand the human person in relationship to God, and more specifically as we view the human person through the person and work of Jesus Christ"[130].

Objections to this method of analogical derivation of the understanding of the human person from our understanding of the Divine Person can be raised. For instance, it could be asked given that we do not have a direct access to understanding God, will not have been more adequate to reverse the order, i.e. to derive the understanding of God as Person from our understanding of our human nature as personal? This objection misses the point that even though we do not have a direct access to understanding the Divine Person, it does not mean that we do not have an indirect access, namely through Divine actions, since 'agere sequitur esse'. But even more is that Revelation, which theology admits as a source of its investigation is God's own self-Revelation and so it is a direct access through faith in what God has revealed about himself. Of course, Revelation does not at the same time mean that we are granted fullest knowledge about God but what has been revealed is enough to have sufficient access to the Divine Persons as much as is necessary for us. Even the Scriptural record does not claim to have presented us with all that God revealed about himself in the Person and actions of Jesus Christ. This is attested to in the gospel of John: "Of course, there are many other things, and I suppose that if everyone of them were written down, the world could not contain the books that would be written" (John 21:25).

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[130] M. Cortex, *Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: T & T Clark International, 2010), p. 5.

Moreover, we speak of ongoing self-Revelation of God in history. In a sense, Revelation has been fully accomplished in Jesus Christ but this also means that Jesus is constituted by his relation to history of salvation, which encompasses not only the time from Incarnation to Resurrection but also includes both proctology and eschatology. Even more significant is the fact of the mystery of God, who is both revealed and hidden. What we know about the Person of God does not exhaust His being as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

However, it is enough to gain sufficient knowledge of the Person of God through His actions, one of which is creation of the world and within which creative act of God, we find the human being. As a creature, man is fully understood in the light of God, his Creator. An objection that we do not know this Creator does not vitiate the conclusion that a full knowledge of the human person cannot be gained without reference to his Creator, without him the sense or meaning of man will be lost. It remains an indispensable concern for theological anthropology to ask: Why did man come into being? What was the plan or purpose of human life according to his Creator? From where did the human being come, hence what was the origin of man? We are again full circle back to where we began in the consideration of the Person of Jesus. The question of origin arises once more with regard to the considerations of the person of man.

The above responses highlight both the limitations as well as the strengths of the objection on the theological method of deriving the notion of human person from the understanding of the Person of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. Howsoever, what is to be recalled as specific to Ratzinger's method for the derivation of the understanding of human person from the notion of person as contained in the doctrine of God is that he privileges the context of relationality as more primary than the commonly accepted property of rationality. Of course, analogical considerations can be made from both starting points: if we focus on the traditional feature of rationality in personal beings, then as person, God is a rational being as can be shown in the rational order (i.e cosmos) of the world he created and so also can we speak of the rationality of man as expressed in the various forms of organized human culture (e.g. politics, education, etc.).

Accordingly, as we come to know of God's rationality through his actions (act of creation), we can also use the same indirect method to discover the rationality of other personal beings, especially that of man, whose handiwork also shows rationality in itself. We shall return to the traditional principle of rationality, however in the third chapter when we try to correlate Ratzinger's vision of person and the Thomistic personalism of Karol Wojtyła. Presupposing the

Latin age-old adage, Karol Wojtyła had taken up an investigation into this project of getting to know the human being through its actions, in his celebrated work *The Acting Person*. Notably, the limitation of this traditional method is that the principle of rationality is limited to interpersonal relations since only persons can be so related. Ratzinger's 'relationality' is on this basis a much more extensive cosmic principle which not only highlights God's relationship to all his creatures (of both rational and non-rational natures), but also it is equally true to our human experience of what it means to be a person, for we experience of our personhood in a much more wider sense than the rational contexts. The human person is at once capable of rational, emotional, and mystical experiences, all of which experiences, have the human "I" as its subsistence subject (*hypostasis).*

It is also important to recall that whether we use the rationality principle or the relationality principle of Ratzinger, we cannot afford to lose sight of the analogical language through which we communicate the similarities and differences between the person (Divine and human) through actions. God's actions and God's relations, we must admit do not realize any additional content in His Person, for God's personhood is complete and fully realized already. The human personhood is a project, that is continuously realized in each of his actions. Man strives through his actions towards the full flourishing and actualization of his personal nature. Therefore, we can only speak of the analogy of methodological procedure when we attempt to gain access to the nature of person (Divine vs human) through the analysis of personal actions.

That relationality is the basic constituent of the notion of person is primarily manifest in the Divine Person of Jesus Christ, whose subsists (hypostasis) eternally as the only Son of the Father and in him the whole of humanity are grafted into the filial relationship with God. The way of derivation of this relational constitution of the man, Jesus for each human being is faith. Ratzinger privileges the faith context as the ground of justification on which we deduce the relational constitution of person perfectly realized in the man Jesus for each human person throughout history. Jesus's Divine sonship demonstrates the subsistence (hypostasis) of man's relationship with God and in turn God's relationship with humanity. Therefore, in him and through him, each human being shares in this perfect relationship with God, through whom the end/purpose of human person is made known. In a sense, the individual human person, by this principle of relationality to the Divine being, transcendence himself or herself in both being and action. The transcendence of the being of man through such a relationality is actualized in the sacrament of baptism, which moment we shall discuss in the second chapter. So also the transcendence of the

actions of man also goes beyond what man's limited 'rationality' could offer as it is aided by the grace of Christ. In other words, through Ratzinger's relational principle in the notion of person, human transcendence in being and action is equally explained.

Being a subsistent-subject, the human hypostasis (person), just as the hypostasis of other personal beings, subsists in itself but the incorporation of man's personal subsistence into the subsistence of Christ, hence Paul would write in his letter to the Galatians "It is no l who live, but Christ lives in me; and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave Himself for me" (Gal. 2:19-20). Thus it is by relationality not simply by rationality that the human person is able to transcend the actions he could not have performed without Christ. It can be said that the personal "I" transcends each and all of its actions but through the relationality to Christ, the "I" transcends even itself, hence self-transcendence. I transcend my writing and my reading as I can through self-determination but through my relationship with Christ, I even more radically transcend myself.

Described in yet another way, the relation of subject of actions to the acts is contextual and may be highlighted from one of its varied contexts, for instance the moral context of personal actions ("I-kill"; "I-love", etc.). This relation at least in the moral context is dependent upon the ascertainment of my rationality. However, in the context of faith, there is an enhanced aid from grace which does not remove my subjectivity but it rather incorporates it into the Divine. The constitution of the personal subject from the *relation* of personal agent to its moral acts reveals efficacy, given that man is a rational being, and he is conscious of his personal actions.

There is in moral actions a relation between the "human act", and the "human person" who is the efficient cause of the moral act. It is this act-actor relation that constitutes the grounds for moral evaluation of personal responsibility for actions. But in the light of faith, this relation of person-act becomes more significant because the one acting is now acting together with Christ, even in a more fundamental relation with him as a baptized. This relationship and its enhanced expression in the Christian man rests on an even more basic relational structure of the personal I (i.e. hypostasis), namely the relation of body and soul. The human person is constituted by an essential relation of unity which exists between body and soul. The human person is neither soul alone nor body alone and so we can appreciate Ratzinger's vision of man as constituted by relationality in this very basic sense of "corpore et anima unus"[131].

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[131] Vatican II Council, *Gaudium et Spes,* no. 14.

1.3.3 The anthropological structure of relationality in the human person

The theological vision of the human person necessarily relies on the testimony of Scripture, for as Ratzinger reiterates, "where theology is not essentially an interpretation of the Church's Scripture, such a theology no longer has a foundation"[132]. Accordingly, we note that in the light of Scriptural testimony, theological anthropology opens wider into the common intellectual pathways of faith[133].

As the Christian faith speaks of God as a personal being, so also Ratzinger trails this path in his search for the understanding of man in relation to God. However, it is pertinent to note that in his approach to the derivation of what is meant by the theological perspective in the understanding of the human being, he circumvents such repeatedly theorized phrases as 'image of God' in preference for the more fundamental grounding of the being of God as a 'Person', the analysis of which makes even clearer, the truth about God 'as Person' to which truth, we can then refer when we speak of man as 'image of God'. In other words, it is only when we understand God to be 'Person' that we can then speak of man, His image, analogously as person.

Notably, the specificity of Ratzinger's theological anthropology is already evident from his starting point, namely from God – hence a truly theo-logical starting point. Rather than assuming the understanding of God as Person, which understanding the Christian faith teaches, Ratzinger begins his theological anthropology by considering what is meant when we say that God is a Person, an analysis which begins from the consideration of the notion of person as applied to God in theology.

Relying on the testimony of Scripture regarding the origin of the human person as a creature, we come to note the very foundation for the relational constitution of the human person as revealed in the first instance of man's existence or coming into being. Man is conscious of the fact that he is not his own origin and so at the most fundamental level, he is aware that he is related to some other being outside of himself hence he is constituted as a "being-from". This sense of being constituted by relationality towards another being, responsible for his origin is both evident to those who believe in God and those who deny God's existence since it is impossible to deny

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[132] Pope Benedict XVI, Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation on the Word of God in the Life and Mission of the Church, *Verbum Domini* (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 30 September, 2010), no. 35, esp. n. 31.
[133] Cf. J. Ratzinger, *Salt of the earth*, p. 66; Tracey Rowland, *Benedict XVI,* p. 1.

that we do not give existence to ourselves, at least we are born of somebody – a mother at least, or perhaps a scientist in his laboratory. It is only secondary to dispute about the means through which we came to exist (creation, evolution, in-vitro-fertilization, etc.); what is undeniable at this stage is that we came from some-body, from some-where and as such as human persons we are constituted by relationality in this sense as "being-from". It is also the experience of our situatedness that we are persons constituted by relationality as "being-with". This holds true even for hermits, who at the very beginning of their lives remained connected with their mothers and even as hermits are in relationality with God in prayer and also with other beings in environment (whether human/social or non-human/cosmic). It is also the case that the God-man relation which in the case of God manifests in the relationality of Jesus, the Saviour as "being-for" us and for our salvation. In like manner, the human person is constituted by responsibility for himself and for others, which is most manifest in the experience of moral life, at least in its basic anthropological structure.

From these clarifications, we can thus understand the notion of hypostasis in the light of Ratzinger's insistence that person is constituted by relationality. This is so confirmed from all three dimensions of the anthropological structure of 'being-from', 'being-with', and 'being-for'. It also tallies with one of the most popular applications of this analogical derivation of the vision of man as person in the light of our understanding of God as Person, namely the oft-used description of man as the image of God. In fact, Ratzinger's principle of relationality is equally highlighted with the three-dimensional anthropological structure, the analogical model (exemplar) of which already exists in the theological notion of person in the doctrine of God as manifest in Jesus Christ, who is a being-*from* (Father, as from *above;* and from Adam, as from *below*); who is a 'being-with' (Son of the Father, as from *above;* and Last Adam, as from *below*) and a 'being-for' (fully disposed in obedience to the Father even unto death, as from *above* and fully expiated as a libation for us - *propter nos et propter salutem*[134], as from *below*).

Thus we see that primarily, the three-dimensional anthropological structure, has as its primary '*analogon'* in Christ the God-man such that when we speak of man as '*imago Dei',* we already have a model of humanity in Christ, such that all who are baptized become as it were,

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[134] See, L. Feuerbach, *Wesen des Christenthums,* (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1841) translated into English by Mary Ann Evans as 'Geoge Eliot' and published under the title *The Essence of Christianity* (New York: Dover Publications, 2008), p. 238.

'imago Christi'. It can thus be noted that the popular notion of man as 'imago Dei' is not only in tandem with the analogical sense in which man is said to be a person in the light of the notion of God as Person, but this same analogical sense extends to Ratzinger's insistence that relationality constitutes person for as it is in the Divine Person of Christ, so also does relationality constitutes the way in which man experiences the anthropological structure of his own person.

There is also another way through which we can confirm this. One only needs to attempt a response to the question: "How does Ratzinger appraise to this oft-referenced notion of 'imago-Dei'? First, it is notable that he rarely makes use of this phrase 'imago Dei' in his own writings and when he does, his interpretation does not seamlessly tally with traditional models[135]. In place of the traditional referents to man's participation in the rational nature of personal beings, Ratzinger sees in this popular expression, his favourite principle of relationality. Hence, in one of his homilies on the doctrine of creation, he takes on a brief discourse on the essence of the notion of imago Dei as follows:

> The essence of an image consists in the fact that it represents something…. Its nature as an image has to do with the fact that it goes beyond itself and that it manifests something that it itself is not. Thus, the image of God means, first of all, that human beings cannot be closed in on themselves. …To be the image of God implies relationality. It is the dynamic that sets the human being in motion towards the totally Other. Hence it means the capacity for relationship…Human beings are, as a consequence, most profoundly human when they step out of themselves and …. discover their relation to their Creator. Therefore, the image of God also means that human beings are beings of word and of love, beings moving towards Another, oriented to giving themselves to the Other and only truly receiving themselves back in real self-giving[136].

From the above citation, we notice that Ratzinger re-interprets the sense in which man is said to be God's representative (cf. Gen. 1:26-28) in the light of relationality. In fact, he speaks of man's stewardship of creation in terms of relationality. More so, from my readings, I noted that

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[135] From a cross section of tones of literature in this regard, see: Millard Erickson, *Christian Theology,* (3rd edition). 2013. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic; Marc Cortez, *Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed,* (London and New York: T & T Clark, 2010); Johan de Smedt and Helen de Cruz, "The Imago Dei as a Work in Progress: Perspectives from Paleontology" in *Zygon,* vol. 49, no. 1, March 2014: 135-156. Marc Cortez particularly lists and discusses such models as structural, functional, relational, multifaceted, representational, personal presence, and covenantal presence models. Cf. M. Cortez, *Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed,* pp. 14-40. It will be an exercise in futility to try to fit Ratzinger into any one of such models. Of course, it is east to realize that he comes close to the relational model, but overall, he does not use a model as such rather he privileges the experience of dialogical relationality of person and takes as his favourite context in this regard, - the context of response to revelation, - in other words, the context of faith encounter.

[136] J. Ratzinger, *In the beginning: A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall,* (Michigan: W.E. Erdmans Publishing Co., 1995), pp. 47-48.

the International Theological Commission did publish a document in 2002 with the title "Communion and Stewardship: Human Person, created in the Image of God" in which the dominance of the relational model of imago Dei was prominent. This would not really be a surprise give that Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger was the President of this commission during the years 2000 – 2002, when the text was discussed by numerous sub-commissions and several plenary sessions and he was responsible for the publication of the finally approved text[137].

It is on this note that I consider the two key remarks of one of the members of the said International Theological Commission regarding Ratzinger's insistence on the principle of relationality as the constitutive essence of man as a person to be the most befitting testimony to conclude this chapter: First, he observed that "Like most scholars, he privileges the revealed truths of faith contained in the written Word of God, hence he starts from the Genesis account of human creation which is acknowledged to be the most relevant text which highlights the key words 'selem' and 'demut' (Gen. 1:27; 5:1; 9:6), in reference to the notion of *imago Dei.* In fact, a majority of scholars would agree that the biblical account of creation finds its climax in Genesis wherein we read of God's intended model for this 'crown of creation'[138] – "Let us make man in our own image, after our likeness"(Gen.1:26). A significant number of scholars, including Ratzinger himself would also extend their search for meaning to other parallel texts in Genesis (2:4-9) and even more to other books of the Old Testament and eventually, in the light of a Christological principle, to the whole of Scripture (both OT and NT - *eikon*: Col. 1:15; 1 Cor. 11:7; 2 Cor. 3:18; 2 Cor. 4:4; Eph. 4:24; Jas. 3:9).

Secondly, he confirms that "Ratzinger adopts a Christocentric hermeneutical key to unlock biblical anthropology. This is evidently implicated in his theological commentaries on the anthropological themes which featured in *Gaudium et Spes,* one of the pivotal documents of the Second Vatican Council. Corroborating our claim here in favour of a Christocentric hermeneutic key in Ratzinger's theological anthropology, Augustine di Noia reports that "in one of the first theological commentaries on *Gaudium et Spes,* the now Joseph Ratzinger argued that it is essential to take into account the intrinsic linking of anthropology to Christology (and thus with

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[137] Cf. M. Sharkey and Thomas Weinandy (editors). *International Theological Commission: Texts and Documents 1986-2007,* vol. II. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009), p. 319.
[138] See C. Schönborn, Sixth Catechesis: Is Man Really the Crown of Creation? Translated by John F. Crosby, (Vienna: St. Stephen's Cathedral, Sunday, March 12 2006), retrieved 4th March, 2020 from https://www.catholiceducation.org/en/science/faith-and-science/what-is-man-that-thou-are-mindful-of-him-is-man-really-the.html.

eschatology) which unfolds across the entire text and that in his view constitutes its crucial insight"[139].

We shall now summarize the key points raised in this chapter and in the next chapter, we shall consider in more details how Ratzinger demonstrates that the centrality of Christology in his methodological transition from the revealed mystery of God to theological anthropology serves an indispensable purpose for the determination of the basis of truth and experience of freedom in the understanding of person as constituted by relationality.

Chapter Summary

In this first chapter, we have attempted to sketch out the basic outlines of Joseph Ratzinger's analysis of the notion of person as constituted by relationality. The themes considered are quite inexpedient for the general overview of this Ratzingerian theological anthropology. The three sections of this chapter are arranged purposefully so that we begin from most specific uniqueness of Ratzinger's vision, namely the replacement of the 'rationality' as a constituent principle of the essence of person with 'relationality'. This ushered us into the considerations of his notion of person in the revealed mystery of God and the analogical derivation of this in relation to our understanding of man as person.

Attempt is made in this chapter, to correlate the sub-sections so that we have begun with conceptual tools for the discussion on God as Person, and in turn when we began the discussion of man as person, we presented the personalism of Martin Buber as the philosophical inspiration for Ratzinger's relational principle constituting the human being as a person. In the same way, just as we had considered relationality in Divine Persons and subsequently exemplified this in the Divine Person of Jesus Christ, we maintained the same pattern of given following the presentation of the analogical method of deriving the understanding of man as person with its exemplification in the demonstration of the anthropological structure of relationality in which man experiences his personhood.

In the next chapter, we shall focus on the centrality of Jesus Christ as the *logos* in whom and through whom is revealed the meaning of the whole of creation, thus accentuating the essential relation of Christ (as God) to the world, but the relation of Christ, the 'Last Adam' as the perfect

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[139] J. Augustine di Noia, "Imago Dei-Imago Christi: Theological Foundations of Christian Humanism" in *Nova et Vetera,* English edition, vol. 2, no. 2 (2004): 268.

ideal of humanity. In presenting Jesus Christ as *the Last Adam,* this second chapter will attempt to show the significance of Ratzinger's universal Christology for the totality of history (past, present, and future), in which context each human being gains access through faith to the full actualization of his or her personal nature, namely the realization of personal freedom.

CHAPTER TWO: PERSON AS TRUTH AND GUARANTOR OF FREEDOM

Introduction

The Revelation of person as truth in Jesus Christ is about the most revolutionary notions of person. A striking observation in this regard has been made by Tracey Rowland who noted that "one of the most revolutionary aspects of Christian revelation is the notion that Truth is a Person"[140]. That this observation captures the inner logic of Ratzinger's vision of the person as constituted by relationality is confirmed by the metaphysical notion of *truth* as a transcendental relation of being such that for personal beings (i.e. those beings to whom the 'truth-relation' is accessible by virtue of their rationality), every real being is a vehicle of truth. In this sense, the convertibility of being (including the person being) and truth is ascertained.

In this chapter, we begin our investigation on the significance of Jesus' presentation of his Person as the 'Truth'. We do this in search of new trajectories of considering relationality as a constitutive feature of the notion of 'person'. This relationality which we investigate is that between person and truth, and precisely between Jesus, who personifies truth in a double sense, thanks to the hypostatic union: Jesus personifies and reveals in himself the truth about God and the truth about man. The question which thus occupies at the beginning of this chapter is: How do we understand the symbolism of Jesus' self-presentation of his person as "Truth"?

John the evangelist, records for us, several instances of Jesus' self-presentation. These Johannine self-presentations of Jesus are popularly referred to as 'I am' sayings. One of such 'I am sayings' is of particular interest to us, namely that of John 14:6: "I am the Way, the Truth and the Life". Notably, we had focused only on the symbolism of the Way for the understanding of Ratzinger's vision of the person (of Jesus) as constituted by relationality. We also did show that this reading tallies with the presentation of the Person of Jesus in the synoptics, if we try to find out what convergence of responses can be retained from the gospels regarding the question 'Who is Jesus'?

In the Revelation of person as truth, it has to be underscored that what is at stake here is not simply a metaphysical understanding of truth and its convertibility with being (i.e. a personal being). We are confronted here with the truth of Revelation, the self-Revelation of Jesus as the

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[140] T. Rowland, "Foreword" to Christopher Collins, *The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI*. (Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2013).

Truth. As a transcendental property, we can distinguish between the relational properties of truth, good, or beauty/perfection (*veritas, bonum, pulchrum*) and the primary properties of being, one, thing, individual (*ens, unus, res, aliquid*). So also in terms of the cognitive encounter with truth, there is a real distinction between propositional truth which is metaphysically cognizable in terms of its convertibility relations (correspondence) with the really existing being and the ontological identification of being and truth. Thus, the revolutionary character of the Revelation of 'Truth as being/Person' in Jesus is very significant for the understanding of the Person of Jesus as the 'Word', the *Logos.*

Notably, the Ratzingerian vision of person is oriented to the relational constitutive character of the nature of truth, since truth as such has a special epistemological relation for the human person, because there is a certain sense of attraction which the truth has for the human mind. This natural epistemological attraction already acknowledged by Aristotle, who in the first paragraph of his *Metaphysics,* asserts that πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. [all men, by nature, desire to know]. As desire for knowledge is universal to all humanity so also is the desire to know the truth for no one desires to know falsehood. When known, 'Truth' presents itself as 'worthy of belief', hence that truth is *to be believed'* essentially implicates are relationship between the believer and the truth that is believed. The communication of truth to another is equally relational (between God, the *Speaker* – and man, the *hearer*). So also is this reading quite significant for the theological understanding of the human person as constituted by a Christological relation, precisely by man's relation to the Person of Christ, the Truth.

Truth revealed as Person is not just an abstract reality, metaphysical transcendental property of being or any such dry non-committal logical system of propositions consisting of premises and conclusions. In fact, Ratzinger himself insists that he "could not imagine a purely philosophical theology" given that "the point of departure for his theological anthropology is first of all the revealed Word"[141]. This starting point from Revelation is typical of his method as can be noted in his major works such as *Introduction to Christianity* as well as in the earlier works right from his habilitation thesis[142]. According to him, this pattern makes for a systematic study within

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[141] J. Ratzinger and Peter Seewald, *Salt of the Earth: Christianity and the Catholic Church at the End of the Millennium*, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), p. 283.

[142] J. Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure,* translated by Zachary Hayes, (Illinois, Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1991).

the already established theological tradition. He already provided an example of such a pattern of study which begins from the data of Revelation and proceeds to question other aspects of considerations on the basis of the content of Revelation in his *Theology of History in St. Bonaventure,* where he had sketched the questions addressed to his partner procedurally from Revelation to history and finally to metaphysics. He did describe this pattern as follows: "First, I studied the nature of revelation together with the terminology used to express it. On the basis of this material, I attempted to describe the relation between history and metaphysics as Bonaventure understood it"[143].

Having demonstrated that Ratzinger insists that the most adequate starting point for our considerations of the relational constituent of the human person's access to that truth now revealed as person is the data of Revelation, we shall also follow this pattern in our considerations of the revolutionary character of the Revelation of 'Person as Truth' and accordingly sketch out the following patterns of relations: Logos-Dialogue-Communio. Hence on the basis of the understanding of the revealed Word as *Logos*, we shall demonstrate that the truth about the human person is anchored on the basis of man's relationship with the eternal *Logos* and on account of this relationship, which constitutes a *Dia-logue,* man's relationship with his fellow men is shown to be constituted essentially as a *Communio.*

The above pattern also translates into the sketch of relationships, which Tracey Rowland had noted with regard to Ratzinger's model of analyzing complex theological questions regarding the role of history in the realm of ontology or the discourse about being (e.g. the continuity of the being of man, of humanness in history). On the basis of such a pattern, an attempt is made to account for the relationship between "grace, nature, and culture" or otherwise between "Faith, Reason, and Tradition"[144]. For Ratzinger, we begin with the relation which defines most appropriately man's relationships with the Personified Truth -i.e. the *faith* relational context from which we begin the Christian journey and proceed by way of a deeper encounter (i.e. *dia-logue*)

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[143] Ibid., p. xii.

[144] Tracey Rowland had noted that in his 1987 *Principles of Catholic Theology,* Ratzinger argues that this pattern provides us with a deeper understanding of contemporary post-Vatican II theological conflicts. She resonates Ratzinger's insistence on this pattern when she writes as follows: "Indeed, many of the theological conflicts of the last two centuries can be reduced to questions about the relationship between history and ontology (also described as the grace, nature, and culture relationship) and the relationship between history and revelation (which includes the territory of the relationship between faith and reason and tradition). Cf. Tracey Rowland, "Foreword" in Christopher Collins *The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger,* (Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2013).

with Christ, who is the One Logos towards the full experience of *love*, most expressed in the Paschal Mystery. In other words, the pattern *fides, quaerens, amoris* more adequately represents Ratzinger's understanding of the structure of human relationship with Christ, the *logos* of all that is created, including the human person. This pattern we must underscore tallies with the trilogy of his encyclical letters on faith[145], hope[146] and love[147] during his pontificate as Pope Benedict XVI.

Accordingly, we note that Ratzinger's *fides quaerens amoris* contributes a slight modification to the agelong theological method of St. Augustine (fifth century) and St. Anselm (eleventh century), -namely "fides quaerens intellectum" – which insists that the assent of *faith* to the Person of Jesus (made efficacious by *grace*) provides the fundamental context of the *rational* search for the truth about man, a search which is not closed (in its *nature*) to the individual but rather draws its sources from Christian *culture,* hence from the living *tradition* of the Church as testified in the writings of the Church Fathers and which resonates historically with the experience of all believers stretching into the primordial past history of salvation as far back as Abel (Heb.11:4). Hence the patterns 'Faith-Reason-Tradition' and/or 'Grace-Nature-Culture' are shown to follow from the fundamental sketch 'Logos-Dialogue-Amoris/Communio'.

And yet a fourth pattern, - 'Person-Truth-History' - which is even more fundamental in its direct derivation from the Revelation of "Person as Truth" can as well be derived from these two, given that the *Person* of Jesus, being the eternal *Truth* of God remains accessible to all humanity throughout *history.*

Taken either separately or comparatively, each set of these patterns provides the model of explanation which Tracey Rowland has identified as being characteristic of Christopher Collins presentation of Ratzinger's theological vision of the "relationship between God and each human person situated in history"[148]. I am in agreement with her on this explanation and so what follows in this chapter can be read in the hindsight of these sketched out patterns, viz: Logos-Dialogue-Communion; Faith-Reason-Tradition; Grace-Nature-Culture; Person-Truth-History.

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[145] Benedict XVI-Francis, *Lumen Fidei: On Faith,* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 29 June, 2013).

[146] Benedict XVI, *Spe Salvi: On Hope* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 30 November, 2007).

[147] Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est: On Christian Love,* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 25 December, 2005); *Caritas in Veritate:* (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 29 June, 2009).

[148] T. Rowland, "Foreword", in Christopher Collins, *The Word Made Love,* ibid.

2.1 The Cosmic and Historical Revelation of Truth as Person

Following the relationality principle notable in the pattern –'Person-Truth-History', we consider in this section, the implication of Ratzinger's understanding of person as constituted by relationality in its cosmic and historical dimensions. Already the basic elements of our considerations have been highlighted in the previous sections where attempts were made to demonstrate the patterns of relationality in the Person of Jesus Christ, whose origin "from above" is known through his *relation* to the Father, as the eternal 'Son *of* God' (Mk. 1:1; 15:39; Mt. 14:33; 27:54; Lk. 1:35; Jn. 1:34;11:27; 20:31) and the eternal 'Word' who was *with* God right from the beginning (John 1:1); but also according to the genealogy of the gospels, He equally comes "from below" and thus shares the nature of our humanity, being himself the "Last Adam", the first of whom Luke did identify as the 'Son of God' (Lk. 3:38). In other words, as a Person, Jesus is constituted by a cosmic (above/below) as well as a historical (first and last Adam) relationships. Being himself the revealed Word of God, who as the eternal Truth, is the complete *Logos* about all reality, he becomes as it were the complete Revelation of the human person, and thus as the model human person, it is in him that the whole truth about man is to be found. The Person of Christ is thus revealed as the full truth about man.

In like manner, Jesus is also revealed as the full truth about God. Gerald O'Collins reminds us of the explanation which St John of the Cross gives in this regard: "In giving us his Son, his one Word (for He possesses no other), he spoke everything to us at once and in this sole Word -and he has nothing more to say"[149]. Gerald Collins was quick to note that St John of the Cross was commenting on the gospel of John wherein the evangelists "develops the theme of Jesus as the Son who reveals the Father…:'Whoever has seen me has seen the Father' (Jn 14:9)… [hence] John of the Cross, biblical scholar and mystic, brings out the implications of what the evangelist has written. In his one and only Word, God has once and for all said everything to us, and now has nothing more to say. Jesus is not merely *a* revelation of God but is *the* full Revelation of God"[150]. As the Revealer of the Father, Jesus fully reveals God not only in His Person but also in his actions

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[149] Cf. Gerald O'Collins, "Jesus, the Fullness of Revelation" in G. O. Collins, *Rethinking Fundamental Theology,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 96. See also John of the Cross, *The Ascent of Mount Carmel,* 2.22.3; *The Collected Works of Saint John of the Cross,* trans. K. Kavanaugh and O. Rodrigues (rev. edn. Washington DC:ICS Publications, 1991), p. 230.
[150] G. O. Collins, "Jesus, the Fullness of Revelation". Ibid., pp. 96-97.

as well. The Person of Jesus reveals God just as the preaching and miracles of Jesus equally reveals God's actions. As the evangelist has noted in the prologue to his gospel, the Word was with God from the beginning (Jn 1:1). Being with God eternally as Son, Jesus is the eternal co-worker with the Father (Jn 5:17) and having been "sent by the Father" (Jn 8:18), He continually fulfills the will of the Father in whose name he preaches (Jn 12:49; 14:10) and performs his Divine works (Jn 10:25). Given that the primordial action of God in our world is creation, we shall then begin with some considerations of the truth about man as revealed by God's creative actions in Jesus, the Word through whom all things were created (Col. 1:16).

2.1.1 *Creative Logos as immanence of Divine Persons in the world*

On the basis of what has been discussed above regarding the understanding of person as constituted by relationality, we continue further the analysis of guiding relationality pattern of our current discourse - Person-Truth-History - in the context of a broader perspective that takes into account the whole of created reality. In this broader perspective, it is easier to transpose this pattern into a more congenial pattern that accommodates not only person beings but rather extends to the whole of creation (all created beings: personal and non-personal, visible and non-visible) such that we arrive at the analogous pattern 'Being-Thought-Freedom'. As we have already noted in the Revelation of Person as Truth, the basis of the relation is essentially Christological, given that the Truth as *Logos* is personified in Jesus, hence our analysis of 'being-thought-freedom' in this broader sense of creation, equally begins from the consideration of the Person of Christ, as the Creative *Logos,* who as the principle of creation is equally revealed as God's immanence in the world.

In the Person of Jesus, the equation of Person and Truth (otherwise Being-Thought) obtains, given that as the uncreated but eternally begotten Son of the Father, He is essentially Pure Act[151], and does not *come to acquire* the truth (in potency to know the truth) as He is Truth to be

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[151] The metaphysical explanation of the identity of 'being' and 'act' (e.g. person and thought) in God follows a reasoning that is unarguably Thomistic. It is an identity grounded on an even more fundamental identity, namely that of God's essence and God's existence. If God is a necessary being, with respect to contingent beings, then God cannot but "be". His essence is simply 'to exist'. God must exist in order for contingent beings to come to be. God's existence, following from the acknowledgement that He is a necessary being is thus His essence. Since existence is an act of being (i.e. the act we can described as "to be"), we can thus speak of God's existence as an act. And since God cannot but exist, then his existence admits of no beginning or end, God exists eternally. Now, to exist eternally is to be in this 'act of existence' necessarily, with no admixture of a possibility of any 'mirror-act' – i.e. potency of non-existence for God cannot but be in act of existence. Therefore, God is a Pure Act. His existence, being eternal, is a Pure Act.

known; It is His Thought which found expression in creation, hence the cosmic dimension of the Revelation of person as *truth* (logos) about the cosmos and all that it contains; He is the 'Word' spoken, which gave rise to creation, to the beings that are created. In other words, created 'being-**is**-thought/word/truth/logos', and so the Creator-creature relation, when correctly grasped is the truth/logos (purpose, meaning) of the existence of beings.

The ancient equation 'being is truth'[152] thus obtains as a *relation* of being **to** thought, hence we speak of truth as a *relative* transcendental property to the extent metaphysics considers each being as a *vehicle* of truth, with respect to the thought/plan responsible for its existence, or with respect to the essence constituting its nature of operations. The existence of created beings – both material and spiritual - is thus realized/actualized only as effects of thought, as (creative) actions of the *logos*, as expressions of the Divine plan, of Divine thought, of Divine *logos*. Being ordered according to an intelligent principle (*logos*), an intelligent design or plan or thought, the world is correctly referred to as a *cosmos*, because it is not a chaotic world rather it is primarily a 'being-thought', a 'being-ordered' according to a plan, an intelligent design.

It is in the above noted sense that Joseph Ratzinger argues for the 'primacy of the logos', which he considers to be methodologically significant for understanding the Christian faith in God

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[152] The equation 'being is truth' is essentially a relation. Its primary reference is metaphysically given and then secondarily epistemologically grasped. In the absolute sense, 'being/person is truth' refers to the being of God not only metaphysically, given that God is the source of all that exists, and so as Pure Existence, His Being is Eternally True; but also epistemologically given that God is Pure Act; there is no potency in God and so he does not come to know beings. It cannot be said that God is actualizing a potency to know since that will mean that there was a 'previous' moment when he was ignorant of XYZ and then latter he gets to know XYZ. That is absurd since He is the source of all that exists in the first instance. Nor can it be said that God comes to know the truth (since every truth is the truth of what exists, and God created all that exists) but rather He is the source of all truth to be known by other rational beings, who as created beings are rather expressions of His thought. As expressions of His thought, all beings are vehicles of cognition of God's thought. All beings are therefore true to God's thought. On the other hand, this equation 'being is truth' can be understood as a metaphysical transcendental in reference to all beings in so far as they exist. But from the epistemologically point of view, that is, from the point of view of human cognition, there could be a mistake in cognition of the truth of being, hence we can mistake non-truth for truth. In itself, and according to its maker/creator, every 'being is true to its essence'. This implies that every being corresponds to its nature, to its essence, to the thought of the being responsible for its existence. For instance, the table is true to the thought of the carpenter, who in giving 'form' to the matter -wood, produces the wooden table. So also in creation, God is responsible for the existence of man, plant, tree, etc as He is the source of the nature of created realities. In this way, beings are *vehicles* of the truth of their essence for in the way beings exists, we can decipher their essence and even further determine their nature from their operations/actions/acts (agere sequitur esse), hence the truth of their being, or the plan inscribed in their essence/nature by their maker (cultural beings) or creator (natural beings). Created beings are primarily 'thought-beings' which subsequently find expressions as concretely existing beings. In the same manner, cultural beings are first 'thought-beings' before their human producers found objective expressions (using already available natural matter) to the 'form' of thought which gave rise to the cultural beings. The *equation* 'being-thought', 'being-logos', 'being-true', is notably a *relation* of 'beings' to the 'thoughts' of their maker/creator and this relation, when grasped by a knower, is what we call truth. In logic, it is considered to be a judgement, which is also a *relation* of terms.

as well as faith in creation as the work of God. Accordingly, he writes as follows: "Christian faith in God means first the decision in favor of the primacy of the *logos* as against matter. Saying 'I believe that God exists' also implies opting for the view that the *logos* – that is the idea, freedom, love – stands not merely at the end but also at the beginning, that it is the originating and encompassing power of all being….that all being is a product of thought and, indeed, in its innermost structure is itself thought. To the extent faith means in a specific sense deciding for the truth, since, to faith, being itself is truth, comprehensibility, meaning, ….This decision in favor of the intellectual structure of the kind of being that emerges from meaning and understanding includes the belief in creation"[153].

Ratzinger maintains this insistence on the primacy of the *logos* regarding the belief in creation decades after the publication of *Introduction to Christianity* and even right into his pontificate as Benedict XVI. In one of the interviews granted to Peter Seewald, he takes on a variety of sources ranging from Jewish tradition, (wherein the Hebrew word 'Torah' can stand for the Greek '*Logos'*) and contemporary science (wherein the notion of 'inner structure' also implicate the sense of the Greek *Logos* as 'idea' or 'principle' or 'plan') in addition to what is given in Revelation to make this same point regarding the *logos* as the principle of creation. He insists that the various accounts of the beginning of the world as given in Scripture, in Jewish tradition and in science explain each other.

Already the resonance of the prologue of John's gospel and the first book of the Torah, namely the book of Genesis has been established and so Ratzinger reminds us that "the first sentence of the Torah – 'In the beginning God made the heavens and the earth' – is taken up quite deliberately in John's Gospel, indeed the entire account of creation is to some extent summarized in a single sentence: 'In the beginning was the Word' -…which serves as a key to the interpretation of the account in Genesis, hence making it clear to us that the individual elements in this account of creation are to be seen as images"[154]. In the light of John's Gospel then, we are expected to consider the details of the images in the account of creation given in the first book of the Torah as symbolic, the goal of which is to focus our attention on the central significance of the 'Word', the *Logos*. As Ratzinger explains: "The images express the basic content of the account, that the world was created and that it derives from the *Logos,* which means 'significance' as well as 'word'.

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[153] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 79.
[154] J. Ratzinger, *God and the World,* p. 114.

Logos, that is to say, the "dynamic of reason," was one of the great fundamental terms in the Greek and Hebrew world of that time, and what was important about it was that Logos means not just idea but also at the same time speech. In other words: This God is not just thought; he is also speech; he is action, 'In the beginning was the Word', that is to say, the spiritual meaning, the idea of the world, comes before the world itself. The world is, so to speak, the physical embodiment of the idea, of the original though God carried within him and which through this embodiment has been made into a historical setting for the relationship between God and his creation"[155].

The letter to the Colossians which repeats aspects of John's prologue (John 1:3) also confirms Ratzinger's observation that John's Gospel intends to place the accent on the *Logos,* as the principle of creation, in the attempt to highlight what is being communicated in the creation narratives given to us in the first book of Torah. Even more notable is the pointer to the relational principle between God and man in the said epistle, Paul's reference to Christ, is unmistakable: "The Son is…the firstborn of all creation. For in him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things have been created through him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold together" (Col. 1:15-17).

What is however noted as common to the above Scripture passages in both testaments is the idea that Christ, the Logos – is the principle of creation. This same intuition is highlighted in early Judaism as Ratzinger indicates: "…in the period when Jesus was living, they developed the idea that the Torah came into being before the creation of the material world. With the creation of the earth, so to speak, a workshop was provided for the Torah….the world has a spiritual significance. The world is created in order to provide a setting for the Covenant by which God binds himself to man. It is created, so to say, in accordance with the inner structure of the Covenant, and the Torah is the official document that sets out both the Covenant and the marriage"[156].

Ratzinger was convinced that what the Scripture references and early Jewish traditions point to regarding the centrality of the *Logos*/*Torah* as the principle of creation is equally corroborated by the testimony of science. One of the scientific hypotheses which Seewald recalls in his interview with Ratzinger was in respect of the discoveries of genetic research. The hypothesis holds that some thousands of millions of years ago, a kind of book containing all the

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[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid. pp. 113-114.

information needed for biological life ranging from primitive cell, plant life, animal life, human life to all kinds of life, was written from four alphabets, A, C, G, and T. The book contains countless sentences all made only from these four alphabets and it was written just once for all and it all written in the same consistent style. In other words, the sum of human genes, the genome, is quite genuinely a book[157].

In reply, Ratzinger ascertains this consideration as another new way of looking at things which modern science provides and so "by such means, we can …look at the alphabet of the story of creation". He also added that the ancients talked about the mathematical relations as constituting the structure of the world, and now we are able to verify this new version. Truly, then, the Word is the generative principle, and creation is thus to a certain extent the development and making concrete of an primordial document"[158].

On the basis of these evidences, we can reasonably hold that in the nature of the *Logos* (Word), there is constituted a relationality structure of dialogue or perhaps of communication (speaker-listener) relation. The world as a whole came to be through God's *logos,* that is, 'God's word', God's thought, which gave order to the primordial chaos, hence bringing about meaningful existence, purposiveness, form, or ordered reality of galaxies such that the *cosmos* is said to be God's world. Aside the order which the world manifests, we also notice that the world undergoes changes (climatic change; evolution; etc.), hence the fact of dynamism, which equally points to history and development in time and space.

Therefore, we underscore that in relating the world to God's *logos* as the source of order, we also implicate the primacy of the 'logos' as containing the historical significance of the dynamism within which this ordered world is kept in existence by God. As Ratzinger himself observed "that the world was created and that it derives from the *Logos,* which means 'significance' as well as 'word'. Logos, that is to say, the 'dynamic of reason', was one of the great fundamental terms in the Greek and Hebrew world of that time, and what was important about it was that Logos means not just idea but also at the same time speech. In other words: This God is not just thought; he is also speech; he is action, 'In the beginning was the Word', that is to say, the spiritual meaning, the idea of the world, comes before the world itself. The world is so to speak, the physical embodiment of idea, of the original thought God carried within him and which through

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[157] Ibid. p. 115.
[158] Ibid.

this embodiment has been made into a historical setting for the relationship between God and his creation"[159]. Thus, the *logos* contains as in a seed the very dynamism which effects the relation between God and the cosmos, by way of bridging the gap in relationship through expelling the 'chaos' and darkness and in their place introduce order (meaning, purposiveness) and light, not only at the beginning but also throughout the totality of cosmic history, and so it can be said that the fullness of cosmic history is already fulfilled in the *logos,* revealed at the fullness of time in the Person of Jesus Christ. Christ is therefore not only the One through whom all that exists came to be but He is equally the *logos,* which gives meaning to history, without whom the passage of time will be simply a flow of events, without a purpose. Hence, it is said that he is the not only the Alpha and Omega points of history but equally He stands at the centre of history, the source from whom history derives its meaning[160].

2.1.2   The 'Last Adam' as Logos about humanity

As demonstrated in the preceding section, the Creative *logos* is the principle of creation through which God's relationship with the world is effected, hence in the order of significance and meaning, we underscore the primacy of the *logos* over created beings, which came to being through the *logos*. This claim is corroborated by the first book of the Torah which presents the creation narrative as the effect of God's Spoken Word: "And God *said,* Let there be light…And God *said,* Let there be…" (Gen 1:3, 6,9,11ff). This pattern of creation through the Creative *Logos* was also followed in the creation of man, the crown of creation, albeit with an announcement of the inner relations of the Trinity, indicated by the inner dialogue of God: "And God *said* Let *us* make man in our own image" (Gen. 1:26). The human being, like other creation is essentially related to God through His Divine creative *Logos*, but even more so, as created in God's image, man is uniquely able to decipher the meaning, having come at the end of the creative process, and so as the last of beings to be created, man is as it were the crown of creation as well as the goal towards which history moves for "it is at the end of history that the goal of history appears"[161].

Ratzinger brings our minds back to the significance of the creation of man as the last of creatures, for it can be said that all that were created before man were only but a setting of the

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[159] J. Ratzinger, & P. Seewald, *God and the World: Believing and Living in Our Time: A Conversation with Peter Seewald,* translated by H. Taylor, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), p. 68.
[160] See. J. Ratzinger, *Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life,* pp. 55-57.
[161] J. Ratzinger, *God and the World,* p. 116.

stage for the 'crown of creation'. He however transposes this intuition of being the last of creation, the epitome of created related to the man Christ, who is the Last Adam. As he avers, "this is specifically said about Christ, who is the fulfillment of man's potential, that he has come at the end of time"[162]. If man in Jesus Christ reveals the full meaning of creation as a whole, then the relationship between *person* and *logos* is well established and it thus follow that we arrive here full circle to the Revelation of person (being) as logos (truth) for in Jesus the logos of creation becomes personified.

Ratzinger explains this relationship between *person* and *logos* in another way when he recalls how the ancient world presents the metaphysical understanding of man's cognitive access to the *logos* which confers being (existence) and truth (essence) to creation: "For the ancient world and Middle Ages, being itself is true, in other words, apprehensible, because God, pure intellect, made it, and he made it by thinking it. To the creative original spirit, the *Creator Spiritus,* thinking and making are one and the same thing. His thinking is a creative process. Things are because they are thought. In the ancient and medieval view, all being is, therefore, what has been thought, all being is meaningful, *logos,* truth. It follows from this traditional view, that human thinking is the **re**thinking of being itself, **re**thinking of the thought that is being itself. Man can rethink the *logos,* the meaning of being, because his own *logos,* his own reason, is *logos* of the one *logos,* thought of the original thought, of the creative spirit that permeates and governs his being"[163]. Hence, given that man can have access to the *logos,* the meaning, of creation, it thus follows that he is endowed with a "capax Dei"[164] and so the being of man as such points significantly to the immanence of God in the world in a unique way distinguishable from other created realities. Man's place in the cosmos, as crown of creation, is thus already indicated right from the beginning of creation. This unique place of the human person in the world will however become more pronounced at the event of Incarnation when God's Creative *Logos* will take on the human flesh.

Perhaps, it is in the prologue of John's Gospel that we find the most succinct expression of the Revelation of *logos* as person, when we read as follows: "And the Word was made flesh and

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[162] Ibid., p. 115.
[163] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* pp. 33-34.
[164] Literally, 'capax Dei' means capable of God. The expression comes first from St. Augustine, who noted that inspite of human limitations, the human person is still capable of launching into the infinite and man has a longing for the absolute. For John Paul II, this is true for the human person has, in the depths of his heart, a yearning for the absolute truth. Cf. John Paul II, General Audience, Wednesday 26th August, 1998 retrievable from https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/audiences/1998/documents/hf_jp-ii_aud_26081998.pdf

dwelt amongst us" (John 1:14). In this passage of John's gospel, we see not only the identity of *logos* and person but also the relationship of solidarity of the personified logos with the rest of humanity, a relationship which as we had noted in the previous section was already present with respect to the Creative Logos who as the Last Adam, is equally the *logos* about man, the crown of creation.

It could be asked what is the basis of the relationship between the human person and Christ, the Logos-made flesh on the one hand, and the relationship between the world, humanity and Christ, the creative Logos, on the other hand? To both questions, there could be only one foundational basis, which in the case of humanity's relationship with Christ acquires a slightly specific anthropological significance. Already in the previous sections, we had demonstrated, on account of Luke's account of the genealogy of Jesus that Christ is the "Last Adam", taking into His Person, the whole of human history from the primordial Adam to the all other members of the human family situated in history.

In a similar way, the human person, being the last to be created takes on an exalted position right from the beginning as the steward of the creator who takes on the dominion of all other creations, hence the crown of creation. Ratzinger harps on the historical significance of the human being as the last of creation in regard to man's relation to Christ, the Last Adam as follows: "It is specifically said about Christ, who is the fulfilment of man's potential, that he has come at the end of time. The Holy Scriptures give us a picture in which there is a whole prehistory. This prehistory is not merely a preparation for what was coming later. …But it does become clear that it is an immeasurably long path, and the adventure of human existence as a kind of finale"[165]. That the story of creation presents the creation of man on the last day is not a mistake. The human person is so special a creature that of all created reality- visible and invisible, God will only take on human flesh so that through man, all of creation and all of history (pre-history, history, and timeless eternity inclusive) may be brought into union with Christ, the Last Adam, who is the Creative Logos at the beginning.

From the foregoing, it can be shown that the sequence of the creation narrative in Genesis which places the Divine creation of man on the *last* day of creation, is not arbitrary. There is an inner symbolic referent to the notion of the *fullness* of the beginning of creation. Significantly, the Gospel of Mark as well as Paul's Letter to the Galatians also speaks of the event of God's sending

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[165] J. Ratzinger, *God and the World*, p. 116.

his Son to the world as taking place at the *fullness* of time (Mk 1:15; Lk 16:16; Gal. 4:4). For Ratzinger, Christ's coming at "end of the ages, means that he is the goal and basic underlying meaning of the whole creation"[166]. Thus we are given some hints to the resonance of identity between the Person of the *Incarnated* Christ (Mt. 1:16) and the Creative *Word*, (Jn. 1:3) and so as the Last Adam (1 Cor. 15:45; Lk 3:38), takes up our human nature and through us, the *last* of all created beings, recapitulates[167] in himself all of creation (Eph.1:10), being himself the eternal principle of all creation (cosmic) from beginning till the end (historical). Taking on human nature, he takes on himself the nature of Adam, created in the image of God (Gen 1:26) to be the crown of creation, the 'overlord' of creation (Gen. 1:28), and so reveals to us, the original Divine plan and full potency of our nature to us (1 Cor.15:22). As the Creative *Logos,* the 'firstborn' and 'principle' of all creation (Col. 1:15, 17), Jesus is the true 'Lord of creation' and so in Him, as 'Last Adam' (son of God: Lk 3:38) is revealed to humanity, the full truth about man, - in the human person's relation to God as 'image of God' but also in his relation to the rest of creation as the 'crown of creation' or otherwise, as the 'overlord' of all creation.

The evangelist John captures the historical continuity of this relation from the time of creation up to the event of incarnation already in the prologue: "In the beginning was the Word,…And the Word became flesh, and dwelt amongst us" (John 1:1,14). It can thus be said that the two dimensions – *cosmic* and *historical* - of this relation of Jesus, the 'Last Adam' to humanity in Adam, the 'first Adam' (1 Cor.15:45; Lk 3:38) can be placed side by side with the two foundational moments in the economy of salvation, namely *creation* and *incarnation,* both of which are oriented towards the Paschal Mystery and the resurrection of Christ in anticipation of the eschatological end when "all creation will be reconciled in Christ" (Col. 1:20). The reconciliation of all creation in Christ is the work of God in Christ. It is made efficacious through

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[166] J. Ratzinger, *What it means to be a Christian,* p. 51.

[167] The doctrine of recapitulation which was developed by St Irenaeus of Lyons as early as the second century AD has its biblical foundations in the Letter to the Ephesians 1:10, wherein Paul speaks of God's purpose as being realized "in the fullness of time, to sum up all things in Christ, the things in heaven and things on earth". This doctrine in the Eastern orthodox tradition is taught as 'deification', a doctrine of atonement called "theosis". The West however focuses more on Christ's "participation" in our human condition, culminating in the ultimate sharing in our suffering and dying (Paschal Mystery). In his work *Against Heresies,* 4.6.2, St. Irenaeus quotes St. Justin Martyr in support of this doctrine as follows: "In his book against Marcion, Justin does well say: 'I would not have believed the Lord Himself, if He had announced any other than He who is our framer, maker, and nourisher. But because the only-begotten Son came to us from the one God who both made this world and formed us, and contains and administers all things, summing up His own handiwork in Himself, my faith towards Him is steadfast, and my love to the Father immovable, God bestowing both upon us" cf. Irenaues, *Against Heresies,* chapter IV, edited by Anthony Uyl (Ontario: Devoted Publishing, 2018), p. 231.

the merits of the Paschal Christ (Col. 1:20), through which man's vocation is brought to completion (Gen.1:28). The human person in Christ does becomes the perfect steward, who will bring all creation through Christ to the very end intended by the Creator. This end intended by the Creator is however made manifest in the life and works of Christ the Last Adam, who revealed God to man as well as revealed man to himself. In him is the full *logos* of man as well as the full *logos* of all creation. Therefore, it is by way of conversion to the truth, to the *logos* revealed in Christ that the human person is able to live his vocation, to bring about the perfect orientation of humanity as well as of the whole world towards God's purposes. To achieve this, the human being will have to reconcile himself or herself to Christ by way of conversion to Him in faith. In the next section, we shall focus on the experience of such a conversion to the truth in Christ, otherwise known as faith in Christ.

2.2 Man's experience of the Truth revealed in Christ

The experience of Christian faith follows the same pattern of human experience in general. The human being comes to experience any reality by some form of encounter, and so in the dimension of human knowledge (of the truth of reality as such), we can speak here of a cognitive encounter so to speak. Such a cognitive encounter with reality evokes the search for understanding the meaning of what is encountered and so begins the gradual process of uncovering, revealing the essence of reality. It is in this sense that the significance of the Greek word for truth αληθεια *'a-letheia'* (uncovering, revealing) becomes quite informative. Hence, the goal of all human attempt to know reality is the reach the actualization of this uncovering, this grasping, this cognition of truth, otherwise described as the knowing of '*that* which is, that it is; (and *that* which is not, that it is not)'.

This process of getting to know reality for what it is, rather than as one imagines it to be, is not given immediately at the moment of spontaneous encounter with reality. Even in the case of the so-called 'self-evident' truth, it is still reality, not the cognizer, that gives 'evidence' of what it is to the cognizer and so, the referent to 'self' in self-evident truths is directed to the '**it**self' of reality rather than to the '**one**self' of the cognizer. Hence between reality and cognizer, there exists a process of manifesting this 'evidence' which is to be received by the cognizer as 'given'. Cognition of truth therefore begins with the *ignition* of the actualization of a potency (to receive truth) sparked by encounter with reality; the end of such a process is the eventual acquisition of

truth 'offered' to the cognizer. Truth is to be received by the cognizer rather than posited. Accordingly, cognition of truth is therefore to be found at the end of the process, not at the beginning of such an encounter. The process of receiving the truth is not in itself without difficulties and sometimes downright failures. It is an adventure and so is to be considered a journey the destination of which may or may not be reached. For this reason, we have to underscore that losing the track (i.e. a mistake due to some red herrings) and thus a failure to reach this end, to grasp the truth is a possibility. This danger notwithstanding, we cannot attempt to circumvent the process by substituting the attitude of reception (of the truth) with that of imposition of what we imagine the truth to be on objective reality.

The foregoing considerations exposes one of the reasons why Ratzinger criticizes Marxism for being "a philosophy…which does not presuppose the truth but creates one"[168]. For this same reason, he is suspicious of the Kantian philosophical tradition, which tries to construct the truth, *a priori* and then imposes this constructed truth on reality. He insists that truth is not *made* but rather *discovered*. The acquisition of truth follows the same path analogous to of every other process of discovery, such that between the seeker and what is sought, there exists a gap/space, which consists in a *relation*, a cognitive relation primarily between the seeker (subject) and the sought (object); and focusing on the seeker – this gap is noted as existing between ignorance and knowledge, due to which gap, the possibility of failure and success, regarding the grasping of the truth can be described.

Regarding the fundamental gap between seeker and the sought, we underscore that what truth we come to know (subjectively) at the end of the search must be such that has to conform with what reality is (objectively). It is in this respect that Thomas Aquinas demonstrated that the cognition of truth consists of a conformity, an adequation, a relation which holds between the intellect and the 'form' or 'essence' of the being cognized[169]. False cognition is thus a dissonance of the cognizer's subjective grasp of the claimed truth with what **is,** with being objectively given. This is equally corroborated by the ancient metaphysics which speaks of the convertibility of truth and being (*verum est ens*: being is truth; hence truth is being). In this sense, we can speak of a true cognition and a false cognition (i.e. a mistake in cognition).

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[168] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 12.
[169] Fratrum Praedicatorum, *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate* in *Sancti Thomae de Aquino: Opera Omnia,* Tomus XXII, question 1, articulus 8, respondeo, 1970, pp. 27-28.

What is to be noted from the foregoing is that truth does not originate from the cognizer; it is to be given, to be received from reality to the cognizer and so cognizable beings are *'vehicles* of truth'[170]. The question is however whether the cognizable being is only but a 'vehicle' of truth or is it also the ultimate 'source' of truth? We shall return to this question in a short while but it suffices in the meantime to focus a little bit more on the understanding of truth as a gift to be received in contrast to the vision of truth as posited and imposed on reality.

The contemporary mindset however finds it bizarre to speak of the truth as a gift but instead attempts to manufacture and impose non-congenial forms of truth on existing reality. In his *Introduction to Christianity,* Ratzinger traces the historical background of this contemporary attitude towards truth and reality to the subjective turn initiated right from the seventeenth century by Rene Descartes(1596-1650), popularized by Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), and fully developed in Kant(1724-1804). Regarding Vico's significant contribution to this revolution on the understanding of truth, Ratzinger writes as follows: "Against the Scholastic equation, '*verum est ens',* (being is truth), he advances his own formula, *verum quia factum.* That is to say, all that we can truly know is what we have made ourselves"[171]. On the hindsight of this historical note, it thus becomes clearer to us from where Immanuel Kant got the inspiration for his so-called Copernican Revolution[172].

The above considerations of the nature of truth as a gift leads us more specifically into Ratzinger's discussion of man's knowledge of Christ, the Truth, as constituted by a dia-logical relation. We have already noted that man's thinking is a re-thinking of God's *logos,* and this is possible because man is endowed with the capacity for reasoning, of re-thinking the already thought-being, of grasping 'meaning', not only the meaning, (the logos) of all creation but more specifically, the meaning of his own life, the *logos* of what being human is all about. Being the

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[170] The expression «vehicles of truth" is borrowed from Professor Andrzej Maryniarczyk. see his "Transcendental Properties of Real Being" in *Studia Gilsoniana,* vol. 5, no. 2 (April-June 2016), pp. 429-444.

[171] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 33.

[172] In his *The Critique of Pure Reason,* Immanuel Kant declares as follows: "Up to now, it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects but…let us once try whether we do not get farther…by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition…This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus, who when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions, if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolved around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and let the stars at rest" (see Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason,* B xvi-xviii). Significantly, Ratzinger also speaks of a 'Copernican Revolution', by which metaphor he refers to the meaning of Christian love as overcoming selfishness: "Being a Christian means having love; it means achieving the Copernican Revolution in our existence, by which we cease to make ourselves the center of the universe, with everyone else revolving around us". Cf. Ratzinger, *What it means to be a Christian,* p. 73.

principle of creation, Christ is the complete *logos* about created humanity. He is the truth of all beings, and so the truth of man. The Christian Revelation of Person as Truth finds its complete realization in Jesus, the Last Adam. How then does the human being gain access to the knowledge of Christ, the Truth? We need not invent any new method, having already demonstrated that truth is received rather than constructed. The specific truth about Christ is gained by that attitude of reception which is called "faith". It is through faith that man receives the Revelation of truth in the Person of Christ.

There is however a specific character of faith which contrasts sharply with what has been discussed so far regarding man's way of grasping the *logos* of created reality. This peculiar character is already highlighted in Paul's Letter to the Romans 10:17: "Faith comes by *hearing*". Notice here that the attitude of reception of the *logos* of faith is presented as 'hearing' which contrasts with the earlier philosophically described act of 're-thinking' the *logos* of created reality. It is precisely within this perspective that the contrast between Christian *faith* and philosophical *reason* is most highlighted. Ratzinger noted that this contrast does not simultaneously implicate an incompatibility of faith and reason but rather sets the proper relationship between them.

Hence, "the assertion 'faith comes from what is heard' contains an abiding structural truth…It illuminates the fundamental differences between faith and mere philosophy, a difference that does not prevent faith, in its core, from setting the philosophical search for truth in motion again. One could say epigrammatically that faith does in fact come from 'hearing', not – like philosophy – from 'reflection' (i.e. re-thinking). Its nature lies in the fact that it is not the thinking out of something that can be thought out and that at the end of the process is then at my disposal as the result of my thought. On the contrary, it is characteristic of faith that it comes from hearing, that it is the reception of something that I have not thought out, so that in the last analysis, thinking in the context of faith is always a thinking over of something previously heard and received" [173].

From the above considerations it can be noted that the relationship between faith and reason is justified by the fact that both faith and reason are legitimate paths to the reception of the *logos,* which means both 'word' and 'thought' but on account of the fact that the *logos* as truth is to be *received*, we can decipher a certain precedence of the attitude of faith (which comes by 'hearing the Word/*logos* of God) over the attitude of philosophical reason (which is developed by reflection/by re-thinking the thought/*logos* of reality). Ratzinger puts it this way: "In faith the

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[173] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 49.

'word', takes precedence over the thought, a precedence that differentiates it structurally from the architecture of philosophy. In philosophy the thought precedes the word; it is after all a product of reflection that one *then* tries to put into words; the words always remain secondary to the thought and thus in the last resort can always by replaced by other words. Faith, on the other hand, comes to man from outside, and this very fact is fundamental to it. It is – let me repeat – not something thought up by myself; it is something said to me, which hits me as something that has not been thought out and could not be thought put and lays an obligation one me"[174].

Given the structural difference between man's knowledge of the *logos* (meaning) of reality by philosophical reason, and the human knowledge of the *Logos* (Word) of God by faith, we now come to appreciate another decisive significance of the difference of the reception of truth by faith and philosophical reason; namely that faith is essentially a *dia-logical* attitude in contrast reason which is essentially a solitary search for the truth. The Greek bishop and apologist, St Iraeneus of Lyons – as early as the second century, already noted the communicative, hence *dialogical* pattern through which the truth of faith (i.e. truth about God) is revealed to man. He explains that man's knowledge of God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is gained "through His Word, who is His Son, through Him He is revealed and manifested to all to whom He is revealed; for those [only] know Him to whom the Son has revealed Him"[175].

It is noteworthy that St Irenaeus naturally expresses the sameness of the "Word" of God (i.e *Logos,* or Truth) as "His Son" (i.e. Person) hence the Revelation of 'Truth as Person' is already known in Christian tradition as early as the second century. More so, the specificity of the Revelation of this *truth* of faith in the '*Person* of the Word' or rather in the '*Word* made flesh' (i.e. the Word/Truth which became personified in Jesus) highlights its communicable nature primarily as 'Word' and as such its dia-logical structure in relation to the 'hearers of the Word' (i.e. believers). This spectacular dialogical structure distinguishes it from the solitary structure of the philosopher's intellectual grasp of an *idea*, of a *meaning*, or *truth* (logos) of reality; a difference that is well noted by Ratzinger as follows: "Philosophy is by its nature the work of the solitary individual, who ponders (i.e. reflects) as an individual on truth. A thought, what has been thought out, is something that at any rate seems to belong to me myself, since it comes from me, although

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[174] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 49.
[175] Cf. St Irenaeus, *Against Heresies,* II, 30 as quoted in Richard McBrien, *Catholicism,* (California: Harper One, 1984), p. 285.

no one's thinking is self-supporting; consciously or unconsciously it is intertwined with many other strands. The place where a thought is perfected is the interior of the mind; thus at first it remains confined to me and has an individualistic structure. It only becomes communicable later when it is put into words, which usually make it only approximately comprehensible to other. In contrast to this the primary factor for believe is, as we have seen, the proclaimed word"[176].

The above noted dia-logical *structure* man's knowledge of the proclaimed Word through faith has as its *content*, the Person of Christ who is the Word of God, hence it is rightly called the 'Christian faith' and in this sense, the dia-logical structure of faith consists of the Christological relation between the believer's "I" and the "You" of God in Christ. Moreover, the reception of Christian faith is mediated within the *context* of a community which facilitates this dia-logical structure of faith, and so it implicates simultaneously the communal "We" of the community of all believers, who have received through faith the One Word of God spoken for all times and for all people.

In this double sense of the *dia-logical* structure of faith as implicated in both its *content* and *context,* the difference between theological search for truth as grounded in the maxim *'fides quaerens intellectum'* and philosophical search for truth as a purely rational search for the truth is clearly notable. Joseph Ratzinger presents this difference in terms of the already noted contrast between *thought* and *word* as follows: "While a thought is interior, purely intellectual, the word represents the element that unites us with others…. In philosophy, what comes first is the private search for truth, which then, secondarily, seeks and finds traveling companions. Faith, on the other hand, is first of all a call to community, to unity of mind through the unity of the word. …. Only secondarily will it then open the way for each individual's private venture in search of truth. If in the dialogic structure of faith an image of man is thus defined (in the light of Christ, the Last Man), we can add that it also brings to light an image of God. Man comes to deal with God in coming to deal with his fellowmen. Faith is fundamentally centered on "You" and "We"; only via this double clamp does it link man with God. The corollary of this is that by the inner structure of faith our relationship with God and our fellowship with man cannot be separated from each other; the relationship to God, to the "You", and to the "We" are intertwined; they do not stand alongside each other.

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[176] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity.,* p. 50.

The same thing could be formulated from a different point of view by saying that God wishes to approach man only through man; he seeks our man in no other way but in his fellow humanity"[177]. Having shown that truth is primarily a gift to be *received* whether in the philosophical attitude of reason which re-thinks by reflection on reality as being-thought already thought by God, the Creative *logos*; and also demonstrated that truth is to be *heard* in the attitude of Christian faith where in the primacy of the proclaimed Word is accentuated, it is now appropriate to consider the manner in which the human person makes the assent of faith in the dynamic context of the experience of conversion to the truth.

2.2.1 The Assent of Faith as a 'dia-logue' of conversion to the Truth

The Christian Revelation of Truth as Person, as we have already noted is revolutionary. It is even more so, given the fact that it equally demands a personal response from the human being unlike the noncommittal structure of the truth of reason, which even when known, does not implicate an urgent call to response. For instance, to know that H_2O is water does not simultaneously demand that the scientist cultivates any specific attitudinal relationship with water bodies. The Christian faith, once *heard*, is different. It calls for a radical assent of the believer to the Person of Jesus who is revealed as the Truth. Much more than the contents of the details of what is believed, there is the primacy of the personal relationships between listener and speaker, between receiver and giver, believer and the One in whom faith-commitment is made. The focus is on the Person of the giver of truth, who is Himself the truth and thus in revealing this truth, reveals His very self. Christian faith is thus fulfilled in love of the revealer of Christian truth. Nonetheless, the content of the truth revealed calls for much more than acceptance of the propositions as it calls for action. Ratzinger notes that "according to Saint Mark's account, Christ's message can be summed up in one message: 'The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand; repent and believe the gospel' Mark 1:15)"[178].

Hence, it is notable that the gospel does not just present us with a beautiful story of God's kingdom but it also challenges us to conversion to what we have heard. The reception of Christian faith in baptism is in fact the beginning of a journey rather than the end of a search. What is however interesting is that in our contemporary time, there is a near loss of the sense and meaning

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[177] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* ibid., p. 50.
[178] J. Ratzinger, *What it means to be a Christian,* p. 29.

of this journey and consequently the contemporary man does not see clearly the reasons for which one should embark on this journey (of Christian faith) in the first place. Ratzinger reminds us that "the movement of becoming a Christian, which begins at baptism and which we have to pursue through the rest of our lives, means being ready to engage in a particular service that God requires from us in history"[179].

More so, there is also the forgetfulness of the dia-logical character of the Christian journey (which begins with the conversion to the revealed truth personified in Christ, the *Logos*), and so what is meant by 'assent of faith' has become blurry to the contemporary man. Ratzinger brings home this point by retelling the famous allegorical story attributed to Kierkegaard about the plight of the clown and the burning village: "According to this story, a travelling circus in Denmark caught fire. The manager thereupon sent the clown, who was already dressed and made up for the performance, into the neighbouring village to fetch help, especially as there was a danger that the fire would spread across the fields of dry stubble and engulf the village itself. The clown hurried into the village and requested the inhabitants to come as quickly as possible to the blazing circus and help to put the fire out. But the villagers took the clown's shouts simply for an excellent piece of advertising, meant to attract as many people as possible to the performance; they applauded the clown and laughed till they cried. The clown felt more like weeping than laughing; he tried in vain to get people to be serious, to make it clear to them that this was no stunt, that he was not pretending but was in bitter earnest, that there really was a fire. His supplications only increased the laughter; people thought he was playing his part splendidly – until finally the fire did engulf the village; it was too late for help, and both circus and village were burned to the ground"[180].

In retelling this story, Ratzinger intends to highlight Harvey Cox's presentation of the plight of the contemporary theologian which Cox compared to that of the clown, whose message the *hearers* fails to grasp. There could however be several other metaphorical analogies to be drawn from this allegorical story but a central point which is significant for us here is the question of how to evoke a genuinely committed assent to the faith, how to stimulate the *hearers* of the 'Word' of faith to engage in a personal *response* to Christ, the *Logos*, how to promote the flourishing of the *dia-logical* character of the Christian experience of faith, the structure of which is presented at the beginning of the journey, at baptism.

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[179] J. Ratzinger, *What it means to be a Christian,* p. 54.
[180] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 24.

In this regard, Ratzinger reminds us of the dialogue which forms part of the baptismal ceremony: "In accordance with the injunction given to his followers by the risen Christ –'Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit' (Mt.28:19), three questions are put to the person to be baptized: "Do you believe in God, the Father Almighty? Do you believe in Jesus Christ, the Son of God….? Do you believe in the Holy Spirit…? The person being baptized replies to each of these three questions with the word *'Credo'* – I believe – and is then each time immersed in water. Thus, the oldest form of the confession of faith takes the shape of a tripartite dialogue, of question and answer, and is moreover, embedded in the ceremony of baptism"[181].

Thus, we note that from the beginning the experience of conversion to the Christian faith is given and received within a dialogical structure. In this same dialogical structure, the journey of faith which begins at baptism, takes its course. Additionally, Ratzinger highlights that in the original setting of the baptismal ceremony, "the Creed – I believe – is pronounced…as the triple answer to the question 'Do you believe in God, in Christ, and in the Holy Spirit?' as a positive corollary to a second set of triple renunciation that precedes it: 'I renounce the devil, his service, and his work, in the *turn* of one's being from worship of the visible and practicable to *trust* in the invisible. The phrase 'I believe' could here be literally translated by 'I hand myself over to'. 'I assent to'"[182].

One notes here the way in which Ratzinger explains the experience of faith received at baptism as constituting an act of conversion, a "turning from" which simultaneously implicates a "trusting in". A handing over of oneself to God the Father, revealed in Christ, through the Holy Spirit, a personal conversion from reliance on forces/agents other than God to an attitude of total commitment to God, an attitude of faith. It is notable that just as there exists a dialogical structure in the manner of reception of faith through *hearing* the proclaimed 'Word', so also in the baptismal ceremony, we find this dialogical structure highlighted in the *question-answer* profession of faith. Faith itself providing the context of the theological journey of *quest* for the revealed truth – *fides quarens intellectum* – equally provides the 'dialogical constant' which shapes the lived experience of the believer's further 'acts of conversion', which develops as he or she grows in the theological virtue of faith. Analogous to the stages of development of every other virtue (whether acquired or

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[181] Ibid., p. 45.
[182] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 47.

infused), conversion to Christianity is not a once for all event but it involves the incremental adjustment (dispositions/attitudes) to the dynamics of the experience of faith throughout the Christian life.

Put in a different way, we can speak of a daily and constant commitment to the "turning away" from the devil which is experienced simultaneously with the daily and constant "trusting in" God, the totality of which experience is also characterized by the same dialogical structure. In other words, throughout each human being's experience of the journey of faith, right from the time the Word is *heard,* up to the time *conversion* is celebrated in baptismal and even the subsequent stages of the journey of faith, the same dialogical structure (of 'hearing', of 'turning to', of 'responding' to the Word in *prayer* and *worship*) is retained. In a sense, the dynamic form of 'assent to', of 'conversion to' the personified *Logos* is dialogical all through the experience of being a Christian.

2.2.2 Man's dialogical relation between 'faith' and 'doubt'

Having noted that the experience of faith is located from its beginning at baptism within a *dialogical* context, perhaps we could go further to ask what end the believer attains through this dialogue. Since the Christian faith rests on the credibility of the Person of Christ, who reveals himself as Truth, it could be said that the dialogue of faith leads primarily to a trusting relationship with the Person of Christ and only then can it be said to grant the believer an access to the propositional truths that flow thereafter. But then, is it assured that faith in Christ grants believers any Cartesian-like 'clear and distinct' access to truth? To respond to such a question, we have to first recall, in the light of the Johannine 'I am' sayings – "I am the Truth" (John 14:6), that the Revelation of truth as Person is the most novel feature of the Christian faith. Presented with such a personified truth, the human person could either respond in faith (trust) or in doubt.

Our experience of faith is nonetheless dynamic rather than a once-for-all experience. We are continuously in a dialogical experience with ourselves, with the community of believers, and with God, the Revealer of the truths of faith. Ratzinger recognizes the fact that believers and non-believers alike do have questions regarding the lived experience of faith. There is however a difference between the experience of doubt within faith-experience and the doubts of a non-believer. All in all, faith experience does not have the same status as that subjectivity attitude towards propositional statements about reality which is better captured by the term - "certainty",

hence we speak of the mystery of faith. This is so because the credibility of faith is not based on our subjective ratio-cognitive judgements rather on our trust in a Person, in Christ. It is primarily grounded in our relationship with the Person of Christ, who is the One revealed as the fullness of the truths of faith.

For this reason, the ground of certainty of the truth of faith does not rest in the believer but on the source of Revelation, for God is guarantor of all revealed truth as we can deduce from the teaching on inspiration: "All Scripture is God-breathed" (2 Timothy 3:16). Thus, the faith experience is a continuous dialogue with God on what He has revealed to us about himself, a dialogue which expresses not only trust in God but also raises faith-filled doubts. The model of such a dialogue is already manifest in Mary, the Mother of Jesus, who did ask about the Revelation of such truths of the mystery of faith: "How can this be?" (Lk 1:13).

Another of such models of lived experience of a faith that includes an admixture of genuine doubts is that of Job. These biblical examples, particularly the story of Job is but all too familiar in this regard and as Ratzinger would note Job's lived experience of the dialogical structure of faith by maintaining, in all circumstances, an open communication with God in whom he trusts, hence "true believing means looking the whole of reality in the face, unafraid and with an open heart, even if goes against the picture of faith that, for whatever reason, we make for ourselves. That is why daring to talk to God, out of the trial of our darkness, as Job did, is a part of Christian life. it is not part of that life for us to suppose we can present only half of our existence to God and have to spare him the rest because we might perhaps annoy him. No, it is precisely to him that we can and we must bring, in complete honesty, the whole burden of our life. …We have to see the whole reality and burden of our Christian life without fear and bringing it before the face of God, as judge and savior, even if, like Job, we have no answer to give about it all, and the only thing left is to leave it to God himself to answer and to tell him how we are standing here in our darkness, - in our fears and doubts, - with no answers"[183]. That the lived experience of the Christian faith encompasses with it the admixture of the experience of doubts, all of which finds their place in the dialogical structure of the relationship of the believer with God to whom the man of faith directs his or her 'questions' and from whom he or she *awaits*, as in Advent, the 'answers'. Note here that the 'question-answer' dialogical structure already noted in the baptismal ceremony is retained even when the roles of questioning and answering are switched (i.e. in the dialogue at baptism

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[183] J. Ratzinger, *What it means to be a Christian,* pp. 19-20.

ceremonies, responses are expected from the candidate for baptism whereas in prayer, it is God from whom responses are anticipated).

On the basis of the constancy of the dialogical structure as shown above, we now proceed further to the consideration of the relation between the lived experience of faith and the place of doubt in the life of the believer. We must underscore that 'doubt' in the life of a man of faith is experience as a dilemma. In a sense, we are inclined to consider doubt as the opposite of faith and vice versa. How does Ratzinger resolve this dilemma? He begins the attempts to analyze this question of the place of doubt in the life of the believer by a very enlightening Jewish story told by Martin Buber: "An adherent of the Enlightenment (writes Buber), a very learned man, who had heard of the Rabbi of Berditchev, paid a visit to him in order to argue, as was his custom, with him, too, and to shatter his old-fashioned proofs of the truth of his faith. When he entered the Rabbi's room, he found him walking up and down with a book in his hand, rapt in thought. The Rabbi paid no attention to the new arrival. Suddenly he stopped, looked at him fleetingly, and said, 'But perhaps it is true after all.' The scholar tried in vain to collect himself – his knees trembled, so terrible was the Rabbi to behold and so terrible his simple utterance to hear. But Rabbi Levi Yitschak now turned to face him and spoke quite calmly: 'My son, the great scholars of the Torah with whom you have argued wasted their words on you; as you departed you laughed at them. They were unable to lay God and his Kingdom on the table before you, and neither can I. But think, my son, perhaps it is true.' The exponent of the Enlightenment opposed him with all his strength; but this terrible 'perhaps' that echoed back at him time and after time broke his resistance"[184]. This story reminds us that the search for the truth of religious faith is a personal experience of a dialogue which does not promise the resolution of any rational dilemma between doubt and certainty, but which points towards the mystery towards which it leads: the mystery of God's relationship with man. Faith is thus a dialogue which searches for that mystery of Truth that is beyond human rational limits as it draws us to a transcendence of our rational judgements into the mystery of God's Truth which has been revealed to us, in the Person of Jesus Christ, true God and true man.

Finally, we could go further to consider how this lived experience of Christian faith, which transcends our personal judgements, doubts and rational certainties, all of which are limited. With

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[184] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 27; see M. Buber, *Werke,* vol. 3 (Münich and Heidelberg, 1963), p. 348.

the limits of our human rationality (judgements, calculations, doubts, certainties) transcended, the faith-dialogue with God effect our self-transcendence, freeing us to make a trusting assent to the One who is himself the Truth. The structure of this dialogue of faith is made manifest already from the beginning in the baptismal 'question-answer' dialogue. As the baptismal faith develops and grows in the individual believer, we note that fluctuations of degrees of faith-doubt attitudes as it plays out in the lived experience of the believer. This experience is best described in the light of the parable of the sower (Mt. 13:1-23; Mk 4:1-20; Lk 8:4-15), where we underscore that the freely given response elicited in each individual person by the proclaimed Word, fluctuates from one individual to another, the extreme poles of which could be described as the 'faith-doubt' limits.

As this dialogical structure is characteristics of all the stages of the believer's life of faith, it follows that the adjustment of the progressive entrustment of his or her whole life onto the personified *logos* is equally marked by such fluctuations such that at some point he or she experienced a firm 'certainty' of faith while at some other times he or she is not able to grasp the meaning of what this Christian life is all about. The story of Job is perhaps a congenial biblical testimony of such fluctuations in the lived experience of what it means to be a Christian. In all of these experiences, the constant of faith remains ascertained in the trusting relationship between the person of the believer and the Divine Person of Christ, who is the "author and finisher of the believer's faith" (Heb. 12:2). Thus is Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by dialogical relationality confirmed in this very context of the lived experience of the dialogical relation between faith and doubt.

2. 3 The experience of freedom as constituted by anthropo-logical relations

The question of human freedom is not only one of the most fundamental themes for theological anthropology but also it is significantly one of the perennial issues which every age has to confront in the human search for the meaning of what it is to be a person. Each epoch has attempted to raise this question anew, providing slightly different formulations of the same aporia which the previous generations had grappled with. Hence, in his attempt to explain Ratzinger's understanding of human freedom, Peter McGregor quips as follows: "The desire for freedom has been constant throughout human history. From the cries to the God of the Hebrews in Egypt to the cries against the Gaddafis, Mubaraks and Assads in the 'Arab Springs', this desire has never waned in the human hearts. The fact that it has never waned, that it has always been a great, yet never

permanently or completely attained goal, prompts one to ask whether or not it is a chimera, a mirage which taunts us with its apparent reality"[185]. Reading this observation by McGregor, one notes at the core of this question is the opposition between freedom and authority – an opposition which is not exclusive to the modern era but equally true of preceding generations in the quest for freedom. Ratzinger makes a similar observation when he concedes that our contemporary society has the tendency to absolutize freedom as the highest good, so much so that "values which compete with freedom or which might necessitate its restriction seem to be fetters or 'taboos', that is, relics of archaic prohibitions and fears"[186].

To drive home this point, he highlights how this is evident in the context of the contemporary debate on conscience as follows: "The question of conscience has become paramount, especially in the field of Catholic moral theology. This discussion centers on the concepts of freedom and norm, autonomy and heteronomy, self-determination and external determination by authority. Conscience appears here as the bulwark of freedom in contrast to encroachments of authority on existence…Morality of (freedom of) conscience and morality of authority, as two opposing models, appear to be locked in struggle with each other"[187].

Thus the core of the dilemma lies in this apparent opposition between freedom and authority irrespective of whether we speak of an oppressive, rogue or unjust political authority as Peter McGregor notes in his example or we speak of an authority which serves to protect, guide and safeguard the moral fabrics of the human society, like the Church as we note in Ratzinger's observations. Given that this opposition exists in so far as there exists any form of institutionalized authority, there appears to be subtle pessimism, a certain "'loss of faith' in freedom"[188] which rears its head as soon as one notes that apparent dilemma in the nature of freedom, in so far as it always co-exists with some form of legitimate or illegitimate definition of its limits. This situation is all too conspicuously manifest across historical experiences of mankind's yet to be completed "long walk to freedom", to borrow Nelson Mandela's expression[189].

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[185] Peter John McGregor, "Joseph Ratzinger's understanding of freedom" in *Radical Orthodoxy: Theology, Philosophy, Politics* vol. 2, no. 3 (December 2014): 335-378.
[186] J. Ratzinger, "Truth and Freedom", *Communio* 37 (2010), p. 16.
[187] J. Ratzinger, "Conscience and Truth" *Communio* 37 (2010), pp. 11-12.
[188] McGregor, "Joseph Ratzinger's understanding of freedom", ibid., p. 335.
[189] Cf. N. Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela,* (New York: Back Bay Books,1995).

Ratzinger attempts a solution in three stages: first he identified the source of the dilemma about freedom as the attempt to separate freedom from truth; second, he goes on to show that the essence of human freedom is linked with the same essence of the truth about man, namely that 'relationality' constituted not only the essence of man as person but also the essence of human freedom; finally, on the basis of this truth about man as constituted by relationality, he argues for the correlation between freedom and responsibility. Of these three stages, Ratzinger arguments for the essence of human freedom as constituted by anthropological structures of 'relationality' manifested variously as "being-from", "being-for" and "being-with" is most ingenious, especially given the fact that he takes on the example of one of the most contentions moral question: abortion – as the context of his analysis.

Considering its centrality to the understanding of Ratzinger's anthropological vision of man as constituted by dialogical relationality, it is rather insightful that I indulge my audience in a copious presentation of this Ratzingerian 'anthropological structure of relationality': He begins with a frank presentation of how the abortion argument is advanced by its proponents as follows: "abortion appears as a right of freedom: the woman must be able to take charge of herself. She must have the freedom to decide whether she will bring a child into the world or rid herself of it. She must have the power to make decisions about her own life and no one else can – so we are told- impose from the outside any ultimately binding norm. What is at stake is the right to self-determination"[190]. Analyzing this argument of the pro-abortionists, Ratzinger puts the question "But is it really the case that the woman who aborts is making a decision about her own life? Is she not deciding precisely about someone else - deciding that no freedom shall be granted to another, and that the space of freedom, which is life, must be taken from him, because it competes with her own freedom? The question we must therefore ask is this: exactly what sort of freedom has even the right to annul another's freedom as soon as it begins?"[191].

The above analytical questions raised by Ratzinger puts the arguments of the pro-abortionists in its true light but Ratzinger goes on to anticipate the objection which could be raised about the case of abortion being a special case and so not suited for a wider consideration of the problem of freedom. He makes it clear that "it is this very example which brings out the figure of human freedom and makes clear what is typically human about it. For what is at stake here? The

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[190] J. Ratzinger, "Truth and Freedom", p. 26.
[191] Ibid, pp. 26-27.

being of another person is so closely interwoven with the being of this person, the mother, that for the present it can survive only by physically being with the mother, in a physical unity with her. Such unity, however, does not eliminate the otherness of this being or authorize us to dispute its distinct selfhood. However, to be oneself in this way is to be radically from and through another. Conversely, this *being-with* compels the being of the other – that is, the mother – to become a *being-for*, which contradicts her own desire to be an independent self and is thus experienced as the antithesis of her own freedom. We must now add that even once the child is born and the outer form of its *being-from* and [being]-*with* changes, it remains just dependent on, and at the mercy of, a 'being-for'. One can, of course, send the child off to an institution and assign it to the care of another "[being]-for", but the anthropological figure is the same, since there is still a "from" which demands a "for"[192].

A failure to grasp the above straightforward but lucid analysis of the anthropological structure of relationality which constitutes human freedom by Ratzinger will rather be absurd as it appeals to the ordinary experience of every human life from conception till death. We are always existing in relationship with other human beings, having been 'born' as children (being-from) of other human beings – mothers, (parents and care-givers in general), our existence become intertwined with theirs (being-with), necessitating that they take some responsibility (being-for) our survival. At each stage of our lives, we are always a "being-with" to which relational structure we are either taking the one or both additional anthropological structures of a 'being-for' or a 'being-from'. Ratzinger quickly points out that we spontaneous strive to deny this anthropological structure due to its apparent limitation of our freedom. Nevertheless, he notes that "I must still accept the limits of my freedom, or rather, I must live my freedom not out of competition but in a spirit of mutual support. If we open our eyes, we see that this, in turn, is true not only of the child, but that the child in the mother's womb is simply a very graphic depiction of the essence of human existence in general. Even the adult can exist only with and from another and is thus continually thrown back on that being-for which is the very thing he would like to shut out. Let us say it even more precisely: man quite spontaneously takes for granted the being-for of others in the form of today's network of service systems, yet if he had his way he would prefer not to be forced to

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[192] J. Ratzinger, Truth and Freedom, ibid., p. 27.

participate in such a "from" and "for", but would like to become wholly independent, and to be able to do and not to do just what he pleases"[193].

McGregor, who has referred to the above explanation as Ratzinger's "anthropology of freedom", submits that "Ratzinger sees our attempt to achieve a freedom of radical autonomy as a kind of false attempt at *theosis* – [for as Ratzinger insists] 'the implicit goal of all of modernity's struggles for freedom is to be at least like a god who depends on nothing and no one, and whose own freedom is not restricted by that of another'. This is a false attempt at divinization, because behind it lies a false image of God, an idol, a conception of divinity as pure egoism. It is a demonic antithesis of the real God, who is 'by his very nature entirely being-for (Father), being-from (Son), and being-with (Holy Spirit). Man, for his part, is God's image precisely insofar as the 'from', 'with' and 'for' constitutes the fundamental anthropological pattern'"[194].

On the basis of the above exposition of Ratzinger's anthropological vision of man as constituted by relationality, we shall proceed in the subsequent sections to consider the revealed sources of freedom, the false and utopic attempts at supplanting these revealed sources with humanly constructed routes to freedom, and finally the efficacious reception of freedom offered to man through the grace of sacramental encounter with Christ. However, before we begin to consider these chosen aspects of human freedom as constituted by anthropological relations, which reveal the truth about man, I wish to add one more significant point regarding the application of what Emery de Gaal has described as the Johannine "Christological symphony"[195] to the correlation between truth and freedom: As we have already noted in the previous sections, in Jesus, the Last Adam, is revealed the perfect realization of human nature. It thus follows that Christ is the Revelation of man to man, the Revelation of the truth about man to man; but also on the basis of the foregoing, He is equally the Revelation of freedom of man to man. From him comes grace which frees the human person and it is He, the Truth which will set man free (John 8:31-32). Even though Ratzinger did not indicate the Christological basis of the connection he makes between truth and freedom, it strikes me as quite significant that human freedom is the very object realized by Divine grace and it is no surprise that in the prologue of St. John, we find the correlation between truth and grace as revealed in the "Word, [who] became flesh and dwelt amongst us…full

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[193] Ibid.
[194] McGregor, "Joseph Ratzinger's Understanding of Freedom", p. 352.
[195] Emery de Gaal, *The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI,* p. 120.

of grace and truth" (John 1:14). Some verses further, John made it clear that grace and truth "came through Jesus" (John 1:17). Paul repeats this same connection in a slightly different way when he confirms that the Colossians "heard and knew the grace of God in truth" (Col. 1:6). As already outlined in the preceding paragraph, we shall discuss the realization of freedom through grace in the context of the reception of sacraments (e.g.– baptism and Eucharist), in the third part (sub-section) of this section; whereas the two sub-sections that will precede this third part will focus on the considerations of the sources of human freedom in the economy of salvation as well as the abandonment of these sources which led to an illusory search for freedom as experienced in the course of history respectively.

2. 3.1 Sources of human freedom in the economy of salvation

In this subsection, we shall consider how the relational-structures of 'being-from', 'being-with', and 'being-for' which are central to Ratzinger's anthropological vision account for the sources of human freedom. We shall discuss these anthropological structures in the light of their significance for the cosmic and historical sources of human freedom.

The cosmo-historical sources of human freedom are chosen for our consideration here because they provided the context for the Revelation of God's offer of salvation to man but we also have to concede that the even though the basic intuition of 'spatio-temporality' of the contemporary understanding of the cosmos and history remains, yet the contemporary understanding of the cosmos as well as history differs significantly from the worldview of the ancients and that of the medieval age.

On the one hand, regarding the 'cosmic' source of human freedom, the context from which to begin our inquiry is that of the debate concerning the origin of the cosmos (and all that is in it, including the human being). Accordingly, we notice that unlike the ancient accounts, contemporary accounts of the origin of the cosmos frequently confront the claims of evolutionary theories, for instance the big-bang theory. It is no gainsaying the fact that there is a difference between the creationist worldview (which was more influential in the past) and the evolutionists worldview (which has a considerable influence in contemporary scholarship about origin of the cosmos). Ratzinger captures the philosophical aspect of this difference as follows: "Philosophically,…one would say that the idea of evolution is situated on the phenomenological level and deals with the actually occurring individual forms in the world, where as the belief in

creation moves on the ontological level, inquiries into what is behind individual things, marvels at the miracle of being itself, and tries to give an account of the puzzling "is" that we commonly predicate of all existing realities. One could also put it this way: Belief in creation concerns the difference between nothing and something, while the idea of evolution examines the difference between something and something else"[196].

On the other hand, regarding the 'historical' source of human freedom, the context of investigation is expectedly the economy of salvation as manifest in history. In a sense, the history of salvific freedom is the central question of theology of history seen in the light of Revelation; and even more significantly, its starting point is *creation* but its theological *ad ultimum finem* transcends the *temporality* of history as it is oriented to the eschatological hope for eternity. But the relation of the historical time which begins with creation to the eschatological eternity which transcendence history can best be described with the Platonic metaphor which describes time as the moving image of eternity[197].

The inattention to the above noted cosmic and historical differences between the worldview which focus on creation and the worldview which focus on evolution on the one hand, and the different schemas of the theological division of salvation history, contributes in no small measure to the greater difficulty of communicating to the contemporary man, the truth and the values contained in the Christian message of salvation, using the very same imageries and stories which hitherto suited the earlier generations of believers whose 'Sitz im leben' (i.e. their lived experience) was shaped mainly by the creationist worldview. If the notion of evolution did exist before Charles Darwin, once could safely say that its significance did not have an overarching influence on the worldview of the ancients and the medieval age in comparison to the post-Darwinian societies.

In order however for the contemporary preacher to succeed as that effect voice of man echoing God's Word to the contemporary, while retaining the original meaning of the message of salvation, it remains paramount that he takes into account the specificity of the contemporary worldviews which shape the cosmic and historical contexts of our search for answers to questions raised by the contemporary man regarding Christian salvation. Accordingly, Ratzinger observes that the apparent intractability of the predicament of communicating God's Word to the men of

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[196] J. Ratzinger, *Dogma and Preaching,* p. 113.
[197] Cf. Plato, *Timaeus,* 37d translated by Benjamin Jowett (The Internet Classics Archives). Available online from http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/timaeus.html Accessed March, 9th 2020.

today stems not only from the fact that "the path from dogma to preaching has become very difficult, given that there are no longer any patterns of thought or assumptions that carry the content of dogma into everyday life"[198], but it also arises from the fact that "the withdrawal of God that distresses us today has roots going back to the change of worldview that commences with the beginning of the modern era, …. Until then God had his fixed place in the gradated structure of the world: the *firmament*; metaphysics was tangible, as it were, in the hierarchy that led from the nethermost and dullest level, the *earth* to ever higher and more spiritual spheres and finally to the pure light, to the Mover of the universe.

Dante's *Divine Comedy* remains the classic depiction of this world view, in which the faith had assumed a tangible form and could not be separated from the idea of the **cosmos**, which pointed to it on all sides. 'Salvation history', too, centered on the Incarnation of God, could be understood graphically, for the earth was certainly, on the one hand, the lowest and basest link in the cosmic chain – the bottom of the universe, so to speak, over which the heavens toward. Yet as the bottom, it was also the very foundation of the structure, upon which everything rested, thus serving as the sensible theatre for God's encounter with his creature, the right stage for the drama of God with his creation. With the advent of the modern era, these reliable bearings, which until then had neatly subdivided the whole, disappeared"[199].

In addition to changing worldviews characterized by the increasing loss of the God-consciousness manifestly evident in the contemporary understanding about the 'cosmos' (i.e. nowadays considered in terms of theories of evolution as against the doctrine of creation) and about 'history' (nowadays re-evaluated without giving due consideration to the significance of the Incarnation event), there is also the need to ascertain whether the contemporary preacher who presents the revealed Word as 'answers' is even listening to the 'questions' raised by the contemporary man. It is in this context that Ratzinger remarks that "the crisis in Christian preaching, which we have experienced in growing proportions for a century, is based in no small part on the fact that the Christian answers have ignored man's questions: they were and remain right, but because they [i.e. the answers] were not developed from and within the question, they remain ineffective. Hence to question along with man who seeks is an indispensable part of preaching itself, because only in this way can the Word [*Wort*] become an answer [*Ant-wort*].

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[198] J. Ratzinger, Forward to *Dogma and Preaching,* p. 7.
[199] J. Ratzinger, *Dogma and Preaching,* p. 78.

Accordingly, as a first step we must enter into this uncertainty of God, as contemporary man experiences it, so as to be able to rediscover and speak about God within it"[200].

Taking into account the above mentioned two features of the contemporary context of the search for human freedom, the subsections which follow will argue for the necessity of advocating for such a return to the cosmic and historical sources of human freedom, in the light of the notion of person as relationality, as applicable to the dia-logical relation of the God whose speech (Word) created order (cosmos) out of the primeval chaos, the teleology of which order is dynamically realized in the history within which human freedom is realized so much so that it becomes a history of salvation.

2.3.1.1 Creation as a primordial act of liberation

Since as we noted, Ratzinger has demonstrated that the essence of human freedom is to be sought in the light of the anthropological structure of man's 'being-from', 'being-with', and 'being-for', it is legitimate then to speak of the sources 'from' which this freedom springs. Certainly, to be 'from' indicates that one is not his own origin but rather receives his or her being from another. In like manner, to be 'with' indicates that this being is not isolated from other realities. Precisely because man is a 'being-with', we can extend this anthropological structure to accommodate the totality of man's relationship with other creatures in so far as we are able to admit of a common source from which all created realities derive their existence– in other words, the admission of a belief in a *Creator* (i.e. the ultimate "being-from"), in whom we can also attribute the act of arranging the whole of creation into an *ordered* set of relationships, hence into "beings-with" which we call *cosmos*.

Whereas the two relational structures of 'being-from' and 'being-with' are quite significant for understanding Ratzinger's anthropological pattern, the very essential relational structure which touches directly on the quest for freedom is that of 'being-for', given that on the one hand, it highlights a certain dynamism which the other two structures 'being-from', and 'being-with' do not seem to manifest. This dynamism however is first given as 'responsibility' since it arises from the structure of 'being-with'. As we already noted, Ratzinger's example about the structure of 'being-for' is demonstrated in terms of responsibility of the mother to the unborn child in the context of 'being-with', which context he also shows to exist even after the child is sent off to 'be-

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[200] Ibid., p. 77.

with' other care-givers. So responsibility as 'being-for' arises from the anthropological structure of 'being-with'. But then responsibility is the context of the exercise of freedom as a right. This is the crucial point which distinguishes the truly anthropological structure given that among created realities, it is the human person alone who can grasp the moral sense of responsibility.

Nowadays, the emphasis of the question of freedom tends to shift from responsibility to that of right. This is however not wrong in so far as the contemporary man takes into account the relationship between right and responsibility. Responsibility is in a strict sense a response to the question about right order, a question which searches for the meaning of freedom as rooted in the right order of creation, in the meaning of the cosmos. Put in other words, this is a question which seeks for an answer that correlates freedom with the right order, and so with the very structure of the cosmos. Ratzinger puts it this way "which right accords with freedom? How must right be structured so as to constitute a just order of freedom. For there doubtless exists a counterfeit right which enslaves and is therefore not right at all but a regulated form of injustice. Our criticism must not be directed at right itself, inasmuch as right belongs to the essence of freedom; it must unmask counterfeit right for what it is and serve to bring to light the true right – that right which is in accord with the truth and consequently with freedom. But how do we find this right order? This is the great question of the true history of freedom, posed at last in its proper form"[201].

The search for answers to this question should begin from the proper understanding of right order, of the true order set by the Creator, hence the right understanding of the cosmos, as ordered by somehow (being-from), and if so ordered, then as having a set of structures and relations (being-with), and if thus structured, then has a nature, a dynamism of operation, and therefore a teleological goal, a meaning, hence (being-for). Now, considering the contemporary worldview of the cosmos in terms of evolution, a convincing answer to such a question about meaning, about the why of beings in the world cannot be reached given that theory of evolution is built on the assumption of 'randomness' rather than that of 'cosmos' (order). It attempts to explain order (cosmos) by disorder or randomness. On the contrary, the doctrine of creation throws more light on the search for answers to this question, as it is coherent with the assumption of the cosmos as implicating an ordered set of relations, of structures and consequently of a telos. This highlights for us the unfortunate inadequacy of the contemporary worldview for providing answers about the cosmos. The previous generations do not have to deal with such an adequacy since the doctrine of

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[201] J. Ratzinger, "Truth and Freedom", p. 29.

creation was generally accepted and even in primeval era, it was taken for granted that there was some agent responsible for the coming to be of the cosmos formed the basic assumptions of ancient mythology (e.g. Gilgamesh epic, Enuma Elish, etc.) hundreds of years before it became the vehicle of Revelation of God's actions in the hands of the hagiographers.

But one could ask: how is the determination of adequacy or inadequacy of the doctrine of creation in comparison to the theory of evolution is significant for highlighting the cosmic sources of human freedom? Ratzinger attempts to throw light on this stepwise beginning from a distinction of the two aspects of the considerations – with regard to the intellectual starting point of both evolutionary outlook and belief in creation as well as with regard to the logical application of any accepted starting point to concrete individual beings. With respect to the beginning of all that exists i.e. principle of reality, the evolutionist completely avoids the problem and considers it an illegitimate question that man cannot answer whereas the belief in creation considers this question to be fundamental and provides an answer by acknowledging a Creator, a creative *logos*, 'from whom' all beings came to be. The second question about the nature of particular beings, both evolutionists and creationist provide specific answers – the latter affirming that God created each individual species while the former "deliberately restricts itself to what is given, tangible, and observable by man" and so posits matter as the *urstuff* from which all the individual beings in reality evolve dynamically.

Be that as it may, the question which concerns us most in this subsection is not necessarily about the origin of created reality per se nor is it about whether creation or evolution best describes the nature of reality but rather we are more concerned as to how the creationist theory answers the very question of source of freedom for created reality, and even most particularly the source of human freedom. To this question, Ratzinger provides a very cogent answer in his *Introduction to Christianity,* wherein he contradistinguished the creationist account from idealism arising from the notion of the creative *logos* (i.e. all reality is thought-being) on the one hand and from materialism (i.e. all reality is material as evolutionist will contend) on the other hand. He argues that "the Christian belief in God is not completely identical with either of these two solutions.

To be sure, it, too, will say, being is being-thought. Matter itself points beyond itself to thinking as the earlier and more original factor. But in opposition to idealism, which makes all being into moments of an all-embracing consciousness, the Christian belief in God will say: Being is being-thought – yet not in such a way that it remains only thought and that the appearance of

independence proves to be mere appearance to anyone who looks more closely. On the contrary, Christian belief in God means that things are the being-thought of a creative consciousness, of a creative freedom, and that the creative consciousness that bears up all things has released what has been thought into the freedom of its own, independent existence"[202].

Hence, we can note that the primordial source of freedom is creation, at which moment God has set created reality free to realize for itself that good which He himself had seen in creation (Gen. 1:31), having himself set the truth, meaning or *logos*, which defines the nature of created reality as a plan or blue print, which is not finished at creation but is to be realized as the final end towards which creation is dynamically ordered (*cosmos*). The human being, as the crown of creation is at the centre of this plan and so is equally imbued in his created nature with this freedom which sets all of creation on its cause (nature as manner of operation) towards its final natural end, which is the glory of God.

2.3.1.2 The 'kairos' of God's salvation as a historical source of freedom

The Greek term '*kairos'* refers to a specific moment considered to be critically opportune, hence the 'right time' when something takes place. John Smith makes use of the adjectives – 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' to contradistinguish the two terms which the Greek employ for expressing time – namely '*chronos'* and '*kairos'* as follows: "one term -*chronos* – expresses the fundamental conception of time as measure, the *quantity* of duration, the length of acceleration as applied to the movements of identifiable bodies, whether on the surface of the earth or in the firmament beyond. The questions relevant to this conception of time are: 'How fast?', 'How frequent?', 'How old?' and the answers to these questions can be given, in principle at least, in cardinal numbers or in terms of limits that approach these numbers. The other term – *Kairos* – points to a *qualitative* character of time, to the special position an event or action occupies in a series, to a season when something appropriately happens that cannot happen at 'any' time, but only at 'that time', to a time that marks an opportunity which may not recur. The question especially relevant to *Kairos* time is 'when?', 'At what time?'"[203].

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[202] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 157.
[203] J. Smith, "Time, Times, and the 'Right Time'; *Chronos* and *Kairos*", *The Monist,* vol. 53, no. 1 (1 January 1969): 1-13.

In the sense, it is applied for our purposes, it refers to the opportune time in history when we can speak of as a springtime of freedom for the human being. In the preceding subsection, we also noted that the creative *Logos* in Divine act of creation, through the Divine Word which expresses the Divine thought, released all that came to exist, into the freedom of its own independent existence, hence creation can rightly be regarded as a *kairos* of freedom for the primordial chaos of an 'earth that was without form and was void over which darkness hovered' (Gen.1:2). The first created element, being 'light' (Gen.1:3), thus became the source of freedom of the cosmos from that darkness that enveloped it. Thus, the world gained its freedom from chaos so as to become a cosmos (ordered reality), thanks to the creative *logos*. But this source of freedom is said to have characterized the "beginning".

As the dynamic progression of the cosmic reality took on a historical orientation, following this beginning, we also find other significant *kairos,* which consolidated the freedom gained by creation at the beginning, thus we find highpoints of historical time which formed the reference points in the construction of various theologies of history, some of which we have discussed in the penultimate subsections of this chapter. Accordingly, we can draw correlations between creation as a primordial source of freedom and other points in history which are equally sources of freedom, nay salvation – the highpoint of which is unarguably the historical moment of Incarnation.

It is notable that the first book of Torah employs the expression "In the beginning…", in order to indicate the relation of this first *kairos* of freedom with the subsequent *kairos* of salvation history. That Ratzinger admits of a correlation between the story of creation and subsequent stories in the Bible which highlight sources of freedom is notable in the words of Emery de Gaal who pointed out that for Ratzinger, "all biblical narratives are testimonies to the one narrative of salvation history"[204]. A reader of the book of Genesis, is thus led to anticipate a dynamic flourishing of the freedom gained at creation in terms of a historical progression as to what happens after 'this beginning', after this primordial origin, principle, *arche,* source of existence and freedom in the world. Hence, the form of writing with which the hagiographers presented the creation event was pointedly narrative (historical) and as such the story did not just intend to exhaust the sources of human freedom in those details which speak of how the cosmos was liberated by bringing "light" out of darkness or by creating "order" (cosmos) out of chaos, by bringing "beings" (including man) out of nothingness (creatio ex nihilo) but also it was intended

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[204] Emery de Gaal, *The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI,* p. 99.

to alert us right from the beginning on the unfolding (historical) story of liberation of all that was created, and most significantly of the plan for human freedom (salvation), revealed already in the protoevangelium of the book of Genesis (Gen.3:15).

It is worthy of note that in this protoevangelium is revealed the earlier discussed Ratzinger's anthropological structure of "being-for" in the Last Adam, who will be victorious over the stronghold of sin and evil: "He will crush your head and you will strike his heal" (Gen. 3:15), a victory promised in protoevangelium and a promised finally fulfilled at Calvary, once and for all mankind, by Christ, the Son of Mary. In the Last Adam, the anthropological structure of "being-for" (*propter nos et propter nostram salutem)* thus acquires a historical pattern, not only with respect to its hidden significance before Incarnation but also realized in his earthly life from Incarnation to Resurrection as well as takes on a continuous historical efficacy in His body, the Church oriented as it were towards an eschatological finalization.

In order to highlight the specificity of this history of freedom (i.e. salvific history), a history of liberation, a history of human freedom, as well as account more properly why it is a source of human freedom, I consider it expedient to make a slight digression into a more generic considerations of the notion of history and that of historical time can be helpful in highlighting the complexity of the questions we are about to consider. History can be described as an *ordering* of events according to a reference point that highlights a 'before' and an 'after'. Such a reference, we usually consider to be a fixed 'time' but historical time is not in itself static, rather it is a dynamically measured by the sequence of events from the beginning towards the development of the historical question under discussion. Thus, history as the account of events which took place in time, is itself an ordered account of events with its basic unit of measurement as temporality. If this is the case, the way in which historical time is ordered (i.e. patterns of division of historical time) accounts for the specific differences among theologians of history[205].

From a philosophical perspective, history as the ordering of time (cosmic temporality) is not a settled question. Philosophers of time attempt to clarify the nature of historical consciousness, even from such fundamental questions as "What is time?" whereas this is not a strictly theological question, understanding the different philosophical approaches to this question can throw some

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[205] For an understanding of how Ratzinger appreciates this difference, see the Chapter One of his habilitation thesis on *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure* translated by Zachary Hayers, OFM, (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1989), pp. 1-55.

light on the ontological assumptions to which theologians of history commit themselves even if unconsciously. Be that as it may, our considerations in this subsection focus on issues and themes treated in theology of history, which is concerned with the history of salvation (i.e. of human salvation), -put in other words, an account of the sources of liberation of human beings wrought by God in the course of historical time.

Historical accounts in general depends on the way we conceive the unit of measurement, which we call time, hence the significance of the question– "what is time?". Philosophically, this question refers to the *essence* of time, but likewise, it is a question about the *existence* of time. In other words, the problem of the reality or unreality of time. Given Plato's description of time in *Timaeus* 37d, as a moving image of eternity, it becomes even more necessary to take a digressive detour to pose the question of the reality or non-reality of time, the answer to which question also determines the justification for any philosophical as well as any theological inquiry into history (i.e. philosophy of history or theology of history).

In one of the most popularly discussed works amongst philosophers of time, it shown that this question is as important as it is most widespread across scholars from both the East and the West, hence: "It doubtless seems highly paradoxical to assert that Time is unreal, and that all statements which involve its reality are erroneous. Such an assertion involves a far greater departure from the natural position of mankind than is involved in the assertion of the unreality of Space or of the unreality of Matter. So decisive a breach with that natural position is not to be lightly accepted. And yet in all ages the believe in the unreality of time has proved singularly attractive. In the philosophy of the Eastern traditions, we find that this doctrine is of cardinal importance. And in the West, where philosophy and religion are less closely connected, we find that the same doctrine continually recurs, both among philosophers and among theologians. Theology never holds itself apart from mysticism for any long period, and almost all mysticism denies the reality of time. In philosophy, again, time is treated as unreal by Spinoza, by Kant, by Hegel, and by Schopenhauer[206].

McTaggart considered our conventional notions of tenses (past, present and future) in relational modes, hence he writes as follows: "It seems quite clear to me that [tenses] are not

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[206] The key argument here is that time is not a substance and so it is not real 'in-itself' but it is an accident of quality, precisely the quality of relation which events possess vis-à-vis other events. Taggart developed this argument in the article-John McTaggart, *"The Unreality of Time"*, in *Mind,* vol 17, no. 68 (Oct., 1908), pp. 457-474.

qualities but relations, though of course, like other relations, they will generate relational qualities in each of their terms"[207]. Seen in relational terms, Taggart argues that the historical ordering of events in time can be made in two distinct modes: the first is the *tensed* mode: past, present, future – in which futurity and pastness allow for degrees while presentism does not allow for degrees. He labelled this first mode as the A-series.

The second mode which also fits Taggart's relational understanding of time consists of *tenseless* relations which order events according to a two-term positions of relationality that are asymmetric, irreflexive and transitive: "earlier than" and "later than". This second mode he labeled as the B-series. The difference between them is that while events in A-series change their positions (i.e. what is present can become past, and the future can become present), the events in B-series do not change their positions (i.e. the referent point is static and so what is 'earlier than' this reference point, cannot be 'later than' this same referent point at any time). Most significantly, we can underscore that in the light of McTaggart's A-series and B-series of time, we can in fact divide all theologies of history broadly into two according to how they divide time in their accounts of the history of salvation: On the one hand, would be the A-series theologians of history for whom the '*kairos*' (fullness of time) will not be preserved in the historical Christ event but will in fact depend on the present temporality of the theologian, hence the ecclesial phenomenon will be considered as the fullness of time.

This however can be widened by the A-series theologian of history in the light of the maxim 'Ecclesia ab Abel' but the question of transformations of the Church in time will always point towards eschatological consciousness. In strict sense, the historicity of the fullness of time (*kairos*) for the A-series theologian of history will be accurate only if this theologian was also an apostles (e.g. John, the evangelist) who encountered Jesus as a historical witness, eating with him, drinking with him, and seeing and hearing him work miracles and preach the kingdom of God. Sacramentally, this will be the case when we receive the Holy Communion, given the real presence of Christ in the sacred species. On the other hand, is the B-series theology of salvation history which will be more flexible to historicity, given that it is anchored on centrality of Christ event, in accounting for '*kairos*' of salvation history.

The above philosophical digressions have been undertaken in order to facilitate the understanding of the underlying assumptions of the notion of time and history which reflect in our

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[207] J. McTaggart, *The Nature of Existence,* vol. II. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927), p. 326.

considerations of the historical sources of human freedom. Hence, having taken an overview of these philosophical assumptions which historians and theologians of history make, it is necessary to return to our considerations of the specific kind of history and historical time which interests us here, namely the *history* of the economy of salvation, the history of human freedom (salvation). We had already pointed out earlier, (before we took a philosophical detour), that the *history* of salvation is correlated to the very vision of the *cosmos* upheld by creationists, we can in fact speak of a common *cosmico-historical* source of human freedom. In other words, the context of the theological discourse on the origin of the *cosmos* and the beginning of *history* is one and the same with the same context, wherein we search for the ultimate sources of human freedom.

In tracing the development of the forms of theology of history in the Middle Ages, within which Bonaventure's own new form of theology of history was constructed, Ratzinger noted several patterns of theology of salvation history (e.g. patterns of correspondence between the seven days of creation and the seven ages from Adam to Christ in St. Augustine as well as 1 to 7 different patterns of correspondence between the Old Testament *littera* and the New Testament *spiritus* in St. Paul; the 2 x 7 schema of Bonaventure) all of which historical patterns have been worked out from the Scripture. Hence, regarding the divisions of history in the School-theology, Ratzinger identifies three:

a.) The doctrine of the (single-pattern) seven ages from Adam to Christ, as they were known from Augustine's *City of God.*

b.) A division of world-history into five ages. This was worked out on the basis of Jesus' parable of the workers in the vineyard (Mt. 20:1-16). In this parable, we read about the call in the early morning, as well as at the third, the sixth, the ninth, and the eleventh hour. On the basis of a homily of Gregory the Great, the Middle Ages had seen a doctrine of five world-epochs hidden in this parable. The divisions of history are designated by the names: Adam-Noe-Abraham-Moses-Christ.

c.) Finally, there is the well-known division of history into three ages: the time of the law of nature; the law of Scripture; and the law of Grace. We mention in passing that the three numbers 7, 5, and 3 are finally added together and the number 15 which results from this process is likewise given a mysterious meaning[208].

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[208] J. Ratzinger, *Theology of History,* p. 11.

Noting that even though the Augustinian tradition remains at the background[209], Bonaventure does not rely on any of the above schemata to construct his own theology but rather attempts to contrast them with Joachim of Fiore's *Concordia* which was decisive for his the Seraphic Doctor's own conception of theology of history, Ratzinger identified the developmental stages of the immediate pre-Joachimite and as such pre-Bonaventurian intervention in this debate. In this respect, the first medieval author to be considered is Rupert of Deutz (1070-ca.1135), whose trinitarian superstructure of three sets of seven *days* (of creation by the Father), seven *ages* (of salvation divided as in Augustine from Adam to Christ), and seven *gifts* (marking the time of the Holy Spirit). Notably, Rupert's third schema of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit bears an eschatological character which transcends time and as such is not temporal in the strict sense[210].

This eschatological consciousness sparked by Rupert of Deutz became transformed by Honorius of Autun who in the light of the maxim *Ecclesia ab Abel,* sets up a continuous line of ten historical epochs (*decem status Ecclesiae*) from Adam to the present, dividing into two half: five epochs from Adam till Christ (BC) and five epochs after Christ (AD)[211]. Ratzinger goes on to observe that in Honorius theology of history, there arose "a one-lined concept of history which not only fails to take account of the understanding of the Church as the end-time, but over and above this, makes the Incarnation of the Logos practically meaningless for the total picture of history"[212].

Following Honorius was Anselm of Havelberg (d. 1158), who following the same maxim of "*Ecclesia ad Abel*" to construct his own theology of history arguing as follows: "If the church has existed already since the time of Abel and not only since the time of Christ, then it is clear that *mutatio* belongs to the essence of the Church"[213]. Ratzinger however notices that "at the very inception of this presentation, we find the affirmation of the temporal-historical growth of the Church. This is illustrated by a first example according to which the Old Testament spoke openly of both the Father and the Son; but it left the Spirit in darkness. Knowledge about the Holy Spirit has developed only gradually. But the *mutatio ecclesia* is expressed above all in that the seven seals of the Apocalypse are interpreted as the seven historical periods of time after Christ"[214].

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[209] J. Ratzinger, *Theology of History*, pp. 15-16.
[210] J. Ratzinger, ibid., pp. 97-101.
[211] Ibid., p. 102.
[212] Ibid., p.102.
[213] Ibid., p. 103.
[214] Ibid., p. 103.

From the above it already became evident that the gradual orientation of the theology of history towards an increasing eschatological consciousness that found its culmination in Joachim of Fiore's doctrine of "eternal Gospel" certainly began with Rupert of Deutz. As Ratzinger noted with regard to Honorius of Autun and Anselm of Havelberg, "We could not deny that there is a certain amount of dependence on Rupert of Deutz. But here something has taken place quite decisively, while it had appeared as mere chance in Honorius and as practically nothing more than a possibility in Rupert. The history of the church is depicted as a time of developing history of salvation. This history does not find its end in Christ but enters into a new stage with him. Thus a very significant change in the actual historical consciousness has taken place in Honorius and Anselm under the cover of Augustinian historical schema which is retained even by Anselm"[215].

The above considerations of the notion of time and history as it is employed in theology of history has the singular goal of drawing our attention to the various moments of *kairos* within the history of salvation, which are primarily God's moments of intervention in the history of humanity but pointedly, each of those highpoints are themselves sources of Divine salvation, all of which can be correlated to the primordial source of freedom at creation. Of all these historical moments, the most fundamental remains that of Incarnation, when God did intervene in a special way by sending His Son, Jesus as the anointed Christ for the salvation of mankind. It is *through* this same Jesus, the Creative *logos,* that all creation came to be (Col. 1:16; Jn.1:3) and *in* whom dwells the fullness of the Godhead (Col.2:9) dwells, so that *with* Him is found "mercy and fullness of redemption/freedom/salvation" (Psalm 130). If then the freedom which man and the whole of creation receives both at creation and in historical *kairos* has its ultimate source in the Person of Christ, it thus follows that its proper exercise will be determined in the way in which Christ himself exemplifies in his own life.

The question here arises: how did Christ exercise his freedom? Emery de Gaal reminds us that Ratzinger provides a response: "He quotes Paul's letter to the Philippians 2:5-8 – 'Jesus Christ, who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men. And being found in human form he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even death on a cross.' In the *kenosis* of emptying himself, Jesus remained faithful to God as his eternal and obedient Son. In

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[215] J. Ratzinger, *Theology of History,* p. 104.

contrast to Adam, Jesus Christ goes Adam's way but 'like God': "I do nothing on my own authority" (Jn 8:28).

Therefore, the one who is truly like God does not grasp his autonomy, to the limitlessness of his ability and his willing. He does the contrary: he becomes completely dependent; he becomes a slave. It is into such freedom – which is the most intense form of relationality – that the Bible scholar must enter in order to fully understand, as a scholar and as a human being, the biblical text"[216]. On account of this interpretation of freedom in the light of its source in the Person of Jesus Christ and the exemplification of its exercise in the life and works of Jesus Christ, we come full circle to the relationship between freedom and obedience to God, who is the Revelator of the saving truth. Human freedom, as a gift received is always to be exercises in accordance with the Divine *logos*ˏ (e.g. Creative *logos,* Deca-logue, new commandment of love as the fulfillment of Torah, etc.) which is its very source.

2.4 Sanctification and the liberative efficacy of Christian sacraments

In the first subsections of this segment (i.e. 2.3.1), we addressed our attention to the cosmic and historical sources of human freedom in the light of two of the three Ratzingerian anthropological relational structures, namely man's "being- from" (God's Creative Word in section 2.3.1.1) and the Last Man's "being-for" (God's *kairos* in salvation history in section 2.3.1.2). In this section, we shall complete our considerations on these anthropological relational structures by focusing on the third structure: "being-with". Our context of considerations will be the sacraments which are themselves efficacious means of communion with God, highlighting visible signs of the expression of Ratzinger's third anthropological structure of 'being-with'. I have selected two sacraments in which this is manifestly exemplified: Baptism and Eucharist.

2.4.1 Christian Baptism: an event of relationality and liberation for man

The very first volume of the three-volume work *Jesus of Nazareth,* written by Joseph Ratzinger[217] provides us with the most veritable source for assessing his understanding of the

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[216] Emery de Gaal, *The Theology of Pope Benedict XVI,* p. 113.
[217] Whereas this work was published when Ratzinger had already become a Pope, hence it is equally correct to speak of its author as Pope Benedict XVI, he does not wish his readers to consider it as an exercise of his magisterial office as a Pope. As he writes in the foreword: "It goes without saying that this book is in no way an exercise of the magisterium but is solely an expression of my personal search 'for the face of the Lord' (cf. Ps. 27:8). Everyone is free, then, to contradict me. I would only ask my readers for that initial goodwill without which there can be no

liberating significance of the Baptism of Christ, who as the Last Adam actualizes "the fulfilment of all righteousness" (Matthew 3:15) in order to unite himself with fallen humanity and so commits himself as Emmanuel (God-with-us) to human condition, - in other words, through His Baptism, the Last Adam, becomes a perfect realization of the anthropological structure of "being-with", in relation to humanity as a whole. In Ratzinger/Benedict XVI's discourse on the Baptism of Christ, several aspects of this anthropological structure are discernible: in the relation between the evangelists accounts of Jesus' genealogy and their accounts of his Baptism, in the novelty of John's baptism of repentance, in the actual ritual of Jesus's Baptism, and in the symbolism of the Lamb as found in the fourth Gospel. We shall focus more closely on each of these aspects in the paragraphs that follow.

In order, however, to facilitate our considerations, a brief overview of the composition history of this phenomenal[218] work is helpful. To that end, we note that although, the official year of publication, given by Bloomsbury Publishing Company for the Part One of Pope Benedict's *Jesus of Nazareth,* reads 2007 but when the author indicated in the foreword, that it is a work that "had a long gestation",[219] he made reference not only to the earliest inspirations impressed on him as a young teenager, by the works on Jesus written in the 1930s and 1940s by his favourite authors: "Karl Adam, Romano Guardini, Franz Michel William, Giovanni Papini, and Henri Daniel Rops"[220] but he was also referring to the very concrete beginnings of the manuscripts some four years earlier, about which he grants his readers a privileged knowledge of the exact dates of this project: "I was able to begin work on it during the 2003 summer holidays. Then in August 2004, I gave chapters 1-4 their final shape"[221].

It is notable from the above statement that the chapter one of this book, which had dwelt on the theme – "The Baptism of Jesus" was already completed as far back as 2004. Ratzinger

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understanding". see Joseph Ratzinger, Benedict XVI, "Foreword" to *Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Jordan to the Transfiguration,* (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 30 September 2006), pp. xxiii-xxiv.

[218] Christopher Collins remarks that "it is striking and indeed unprecedented that a pope approaching an eightieth birthday, while serving as universal pastor for a church of well over a billion members, and in addition to the countless commitments that come with that office, including duties of internal ecclesial governance, international diplomacy, and a steady flow of other occasions calling for written speeches, homilies, and various teachings on every aspect of Christian concern, took the time and made the effort to initiate a three-volume theological treatise independent of these other duties". See C. Collins, *The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger-Benedict XVI,* (Liturgical Press, 2013), p. 55.

[219] Ratzinger, *Jesus of Nazareth: From the Baptism in the Joran to the Transfiguration,* trans. from the German by Adrian J. Walker, (Great Britain: Bloomsbury, 2007), pp. xi, xxiv.

[220] J. Ratzinger, Ibid., p. xi.

[221] Ibid., xxiv.

however did not include in the foreword which he wrote on 30 September, 2006 that between 2004, (when these first few chapter were already completed) and 2007 when the book was finally published, the key themes of the chapter on Baptism, especially that of the relation between Baptism and Resurrection, had already been presented to the public at different occasions. Two examples of such pre-publication presentations suffices here: first, in a homily which he preached on 15th April, 2006, on the occasion of the Easter Vigil liturgy, where he conferred the sacrament of Baptism "on a group of adults from different countries"[222]. I even would argue that some of the themes discussed in the chapter on baptism of Jesus (e.g. the understanding of the Baptism of Jesus in the light of His Death and Resurrection) had already been developed in their basic outlines several years earlier.

This claim is consistent with Ratzinger's earlier views on Jesus's Baptism at a public lecture which he had delivered at St Michael's College of the University of Toronto on 13th day of April 1986, some twenty years earlier before his even began to write *Jesus of Nazareth* in 2004. An anonymous blogger who had listened to Pope Francis's TED talk[223] writes of the resonance of this TED talk by Pope Francis and Benedict XVI's correlation of Baptism and Resurrection, a correlation which is both present in the said public lecture by Ratzinger in 1986 and the Easter Vigil homily of 2006 by Pope Benedict XVI. The blogger posits the following questions: "I ask myself: if an individual man is raised from the dead, that is something unheard of and marvelous. But if the Creator and Redeemer of the world becomes man and rises from the dead – and He is my Creator – that is something else, because it will [have] something to do with man himself rising from the dead. That means – me. And if Baptism is a being taken up into the Person of Creator and Redeemer, then it seems that I must understand Baptism in terms of Resurrection, and lo! It has always been part of the Easter Vigil. Resurrection as the explanation of Baptism where the "I" of the Baptism is replaced by the "I" of the Risen Enfleshed God. Benedict calls this "A qualitative leap in the history of 'evolution and of life in general towards a new future life, towards a new

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[222] Cf. https://actingpersonblog.wordpress.com/2017/04/27/ratzinger-in-1986-and-benedict-2006-on-baptism-and-resurrection/ Accessed at 11:14pm on 28th January, 2020.

[223] Anonymous Blogger "Ratzinger in 1986 and Benedict 2006 on Baptism and Resurrection", posted on April, 27, 2017; Accessed by me at 11:29pm on 28th January, 2020.
 Cf. https://actingpersonblog.wordpress.com/2017/04/27/ratzinger-in-1986-and-benedict-2006-on-baptism-and-resurrection/

world which starting from Christ, already continuously permeates this world of ours, transforms it and draws it to itself"[224].

That the chapter on the Baptism of Jesus in Ratzinger's *Jesus of Nazareth,* developed over several years goes to show the depth of his reflections on this theme and so we can only show only those aspects that eventually found their way into the book. Some of these we already identified in the previous paragraphs and it is only proper that we can now take them singly for a closer consideration. First we begin with showing how the differences of chronological motifs employed by Matthew and Luke does not affect the anthropological structure of this event, and so in both accounts it is evident that Jesus's Baptism which introduces his public ministry launches him fully onto the open theatre of our human society, and equally into the whole of human history. Hence the Baptism of Jesus indicates a universalization of His anthropological structure as "being-with", with respect to His solidarity with the whole of humanity's history stretching backwards as well as into the future. Matthew's genealogy impresses us with a timing that corresponds with what we can identify as his working theology of history.

As Ratzinger observes that, Matthew presents history as "divided into three groups of fourteen generations, fourteen being the numerical value of the name David. The history it recounts breaks down into the period from Abraham to David, the period from David to the Babylonian Exile, and an additional period of fourteen generations. The very fact that at the time of the baptism of Jesus, [which historical period the evangelists dates vaguely – "in those time" (Mt. 3:1)] - yet another fourteen generations have elapsed is an indication that the hour of definitive establishment of the kingdom of David, which obviously concerns the world as a whole"[225].

On the other hand, is Luke's account wherein we observe that the evangelist, "does not place his genealogy of Jesus at the beginning of the Gospel but connects it with the story of Jesus' Baptism to which it forms a conclusion. He tells that at this point in time Jesus was about thirty years old, which means he had attained the age that conferred a right to public activity. In contrast to Matthew, Luke uses his genealogy to journey from Jesus back to Adam and so to creation…This is a way of underscoring the universal scope of Jesus' mission. He is the son of Adam – the son of

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[224] Anonymous Blogger "Ratzinger in 1986 and Benedict 2006 on Baptism and Resurrection", posted on April, 27, 2017; Accessed at 11:40pm on 28th January, 2020.
Cf. https://actingpersonblog.wordpress.com/2017/04/27/ratzinger-in-1986-and-benedict-2006-on-baptism-and-resurrection/ Accessed at 11:40pm on 28th January, 2020.
[225] J. Ratzinger, *Jesus of Nazareth,* pp. 9-10.

man. Because he is man, all of us, in His humanity starts anew and reaches its destiny"[226]. Hence as Ratzinger notes, the different historical motifs of the genealogies in which both evangelists inserts their account of this event, aims to make the same point, namely that "Jesus' Baptism, is [to be] understood as a repetition of the whole of history, which both recapitulates the past and anticipates the future"[227].

The next aspect which is indicative of the perfection of the anthropological structure ("being-with") is highlighted in Luke's Gospel. This is related to the novelty of John's baptism. Ratzinger points out the political as well as cultural divisiveness which characterized the Holy Land (the kingdom of David) at the time, and attempts to present the novelty of John's baptism as a new offer of repentance, reconciliation, and a more stable freedom to be given, not by the Baptist himself but rather by the One who comes after Him, who is mightier than he (cf. Lk. 3:16) and this greater personage whom he "did not know" (cf. Jn 1:30-30) but he was so certain that it is was his mission to prepare the Way for this descendant of David in whom God's promises to Abraham and David -hence to all humanity, is to be realized and in whom the fullness of humanity's solidarity with one another as well the reconciliation of sinful man with God is fully realized.

The political and religious climate of the period was already gloomy, hence the timeliness of the appearance of John the Baptist and his novel connection of baptism to the call for repentance. From the political perspective, Ratzinger observes that "Luke lists side by side the emperor and the princes among whom the Holy Land is divided. All these princedoms are dependencies of pagan Rome. The kingdom of David [thus] lies broken in pieces, his "hut" in ruins (cf. Amos 9:11f). His descendant, Jesus' legal father, is a carpenter in the half-paganized province of Galilee. Israel is living once more in the darkness of Divine absence; God is silent, seemingly forgetful of the promises to Abraham and David"[228].

Likewise, from the religious and cultural perspectives, "conflicting movements, hopes, and expectations shaped the religious and political climate. At around the time of Jesus' birth, Judas the Galilean had called for an uprising, which was put down by the Romans…[leaving] behind a party, the Zealots, who were prepared to resort to terror and violence in order to restore Israel's freedom. It is even possible that one or two of Jesus' twelve Apostles – Simon the Zealot and

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[226] Ibid., p. 10.
[227] J. Ratzinger, *Jesus of Nazareth,* p. 20.
[228] Ibid., p. 12.

perhaps Judas Iscariot as well – had been partisans of this movement. The Pharisee, …, endeavored to live with the greatest possible exactness according to the instructions of the Torah….The Sadducees, …, attempted to practice an enlightened Judaism, intellectually suited to the times, and so also to come to terms with Roman domination"[229]. It was in this climate of "a highly charged atmosphere of Jerusalem"[230] experiencing an absence of political, religious and cultural freedom in the once glorious kingdom of David that the figure of the Baptist emerged. On the basis of the discoveries made after the Second World War about the existence of Qumran communities at the time, Ratzinger suggests that John had been possibly a member of the so-called community of Essenes[231].

The significance of the uniqueness of John the Baptist as reflective of the anthropological structure cannot be mistaken for he was a "being-with" in the historical line of prophets, given that he was a bridge between the Old Testament and the New Testament in relation to the Judaic prophetic line. John was the last prophet according to the Old Covenant and as a fore-runner to Christ, he is equally the very first prophet of the New Way. "God's hand was at last plainly acting in history again. John baptizes with water, but one even greater, who will baptize with the Holy Spirit and fire, is already at the door….John's baptism includes the confession of sins (Mk 1:5)… the goal of which is truly to leave behind the sinful life one has led until now and to start out on the path to a new, changed life"[232].

Let us now consider the third aspect which shows this same anthropological structure, namely the actual ritual of the Baptism of Jesus. We have already seen in the earlier paragraphs of this subsection that the key elements – Death and Resurrection - of this aspect were present in Ratzinger's discourses on Jesus's Baptism decades before he wrote *Jesus of Nazareth* as notable in his 1986 lecture at the University of Toronto. The purpose of representing this aspect as found in the book is simply to show that Ratzinger's views, some two decades after Toronto had deepened even more in this respect, even though he retains the basic outlines of his reflections. The first element of the ritual to be considered is the waters of baptism. On the one hand is the symbolism of death, that is "the annihilating, destructive power of the ocean flood. The ancient

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[229] Ibid., p. 13.
[230] Ibid., p. 15.
[231] Ibid., pp. 13-14.
[232] Ibid. p. 15.

mind perceived the ocean as a permanent threat to the cosmos, to the earth…The river (Jordan) could also assume this symbolic value for those who were immersed in it"[233].

On the other hand is the symbolism of life, hence "the flowing waters of the river are above all a symbol of life. The great rivers – the Nile the Euphrates, the Tigris – are the great givers of life. The Jordan too, is – even today – a source of life for the surrounding region"[234]. Herein we can consider the borders of life and death, into which the individual history of every human being, every son of Adam, unfolds. The baptism of Jesus is thus an act of total solidarity – a "being-with" with the totality of the life of every individual human being, who is thus being drawn by virtue of this symbolism of immersion into the life and Death of Christ, the Last Adam. In this way, being a Christian is understood as being drawn, being converted into the very life of Christ as well as being a partaker in the graces of reconciliation which His Death on the Cross effects for all humanity.

Another symbolism to be drawn from the ritual act of immersion is "about purification, about liberation from the filth of the past that burdens and distorts life – it is about beginning again, and that means it is about death and resurrection, about starting life over again anew. So we could say it is about rebirth"[235]. Already as we noted, John's baptism includes a call to repentance, to conversion, to re-orient oneself towards God, to prepare oneself for Divine liberation from sin. In itself it is not yet complete since it will still have to await for this liberation, this freedom which only God can effect. It is in this particular context that Ratzinger took a deeper theological reflection on the fact of Jesus's own Baptism. As he writes, "the real novelty is the fact that he – Jesus – wants to be baptized, that he blends into the gray mass of sinners waiting on the banks of the Jordan (i.e. to receive the baptism of conversion from sinfulness)….Baptism itself was a confession of sins and the attempt to put off an old, failed life and to receive a new one. Is that something Jesus could do? How could he confess sins? How could he separate himself from his previous life in order to start a new one? This is a question that Christians could not avoid asking. The dispute between the Baptist and Jesus that Matthew recounts for us was also an expression of the early Christians' own question to Jesus: "I need to be baptized by you, and do you come to

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[233] Ibid., pp. 15-16.
[234] Ibid., p. 16.
[235] Ibid., p. 16.

me?" (Mt 3:14). Matthew goes on to report to us that "Jesus answered him, 'Let it be so now, for thus it is fitting for us to fulfill all righteousness'. Then he consented" (Mt. 3:15)"[236].

Noting that this is a somewhat strange answer, Ratzinger goes on to emphasis that "the key to interpreting Jesus' answer is how we under the word *righteousness:* The whole of righteousness must be fulfilled. In Jesus' world, righteousness is man's answer to the Torah, acceptance of the whole of God's will, the bearing of the "yoke of God's kingdom," …. There is no provision for John's baptism in the Torah, but this reply of Jesus is his way of acknowledging it as an expression of an unrestricted Yes to God's will, as an obedient acceptance of his yoke" (Mt. 11:29).

What exactly does this mean for the baptized? As Ratzinger goes on to show, "the act of descending into the waters of this Baptism implies a confession of guilt and a plea for forgiveness in order to make a new beginning. In a world marked by sin, then, this Yes to the entire will of God also expresses solidarity with men, who have incurred guilt but yearn for righteousness. Descending into the water, the candidates for Baptism confess their sin and seek to be rid of their burden of guilt. What did Jesus do in this same situation? Luke, … tells us that Jesus was praying while he received Baptism (cf. Lk. 3:21). Looking at the events in the light of the Cross and Resurrection, the Christian people realized what happened: Jesus loaded the burden of all mankind's guilt upon his shoulders; he bore it down into the depths of the Jordan. He inaugurated his public activity by stepping into the place of sinners. He is as it were the true Jonah who said to the crew of the ship, "take me and throw me into the sea" (Jon. 1:12). The whole significance of Jesus' Baptism, the fact that he bears "all righteousness", first comes to light on the Cross: The Baptism is an acceptance of death for the sins of humanity, and the voice that calls out "This is my beloved Son" over the baptismal waters is an anticipatory reference to the Resurrection….Only from this starting point can we understand Christian Baptism"[237].

It thus becomes clear how in Jesus's baptism through which he enters into solidarity with sinful humanity, we can see the full realization of the anthropological structure of "being-with" with respect to all of humanity, burdened by sin and in search of liberation from sin so as to be justified by the baptismal faith through which the righteousness of the Last Adam becomes a liberating atonement for the sins of the whole world. In this way, we can appreciate the deeper theological sense of that fragmentary refrain for the popular devotional Divine Mercy prayer

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[236] Ibid. p. 17.
[237] Ibid., p. 17-18.

composed by the Polish nun, Sr Maria Faustyna Kowalska and popularized by Pope John Paul II, "For the sake of His sorrowful passion, have mercy on us and on the whole world". Our justification for righteousness – our redemption from sin, is thanks to the righteousness of the Last Adam who prayed to the Father at his baptism for the forgiveness of sins of all those seeking for Divine forgiveness "with-whom" he too was immersed in the baptismal waters. Ratzinger thus concludes that "the sacrament of Baptism appears as the gift of participation in Jesus' world-transforming struggle in the conversion of life that took place in his descent and ascent"[238].

The fourth and last aspect for our consideration is the symbolism of the Lamb which we find in the fourth Gospel: "Behold the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world" (Jn. 1:29). In the light of what we have discussed so far regarding the anthropological structure of "being-with", it is easy to guess correctly the meaning of the symbolism of Lamb, as the Vicarious nature of Jesus's Death on the Cross. Ratzinger however calls our attention to the Old Testament allusions in the "song of the Suffering Servant in Isaiah which compares the suffering servant of God with the lamb that is led to the slaughter: "Like a sheep that before its shearers is dumb, so he opened not his mouth" (Is 53:7) which allusion coincides with the fact that Jesus was crucified on the feast of the Passover, and from that moment on could only appear as the true Passover lamb [a true bridge and reconciler, a "being-with"], in whom is fulfilled the significance of the Passover lamb at the time of the Exodus from Egypt: liberation from the dominion of death in Egypt and release for the Exodus, for the journey into the freedom of the promise"[239].

Having discussed at length how the symbolism of the Lamb, together with other selected aspects of the sacrament of Baptism show that human freedom is constituted by this third anthropological structures of "being-with", we need not go further into the theological discussion of how the Exodus itself has become a symbol of dying to sin as well as a symbol of experiencing the freedom from sin which the sacrament of Baptism effects. It suffices here to show from all the four aspects highlighted – historical motifs connecting Matthew's and Luke's genealogies to baptism of Jesus, novelty of John's baptism, symbolism of the actual ritual of Jesus's baptism and finally that of the Lamb found in the fourth Gospel – that just like the previous other two anthropological structures of 'being-from' and 'being-for', man's freedom is equally constituted by the anthropological structure of 'being-with' revealed in the event of the baptism of Jesus, the

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[238] Ibid., p. 20.
[239] Ibid., p. 21.

Last Adam. Now, we can turn to explore how the sacrament of the Eucharist can be another context for the justification of this same claim that in Ratzinger's Christocentric anthropology, our human freedom is constituted by the anthropological structure of 'being-with'.

2.4.2 The Eucharist: as intimacy with the Logos (Truth), who sets man free

The term 'communion' with which the sacrament of the Eucharist is also described is perhaps the most succinct synonym for interpersonal relationship and so implicates the deepest sense of relationality. It is also described as the 'sacrament of love' by the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*[240]. Significantly in the opening words of his encyclical *Deus Caritas Est*, Ratzinger quotes the first Letter of John: "God is love and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him" (1 Jn 4:16), which corroborates Jesus's very words about himself: " I am the vine and you are the branches. He that abides in me and I in him, bears much fruit for without me you can do nothing" (John 15:5). It is evident thus that in the Eucharist, the Divine Person is thus revealed as 'love'. In this way, the Revelation of God in Christ as 'love' brings to its climax, the revolutionary character of the Revelation of person as truth (*logos*). It is notable here that the key anthropological structure of 'being-with' is made manifest in this Revelation of person of love which we have noted in the Eucharist as communion.

More so, in the *Catechism*, we equally find several phrases which point to this same the anthropological structure of 'being-with' we have been considering. The most popular of such descriptions speaks of the Eucharist as the "source and summit of Christian life"[241]. This description is made in reference to the relation between the Eucharist and all other sacraments of Christian life, including that of Baptism which we discussed above. In fact as the entrance into communion with Christ begins as Ratzinger indicates, with accepting "the invitation to be baptized….[and so] to go to the place of Jesus' Baptism…where he identifies himself with us and to receive there our identification with him"[242] so also is it noteworthy that this journey of identification with Christ which began at baptism does not stop at Jordan (at the waters of baptism) but rather starting from the baptismal waters, we follow Christ with whom we have been identified at the waters, – just as the disciples and Apostles did, right through to the Paschal Mystery,

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[240] Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* par. 1323.
[241] Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* par. 1324.
[242] J. Ratzinger, *Jesus of Nazareth,* vol. 2, p. 18.

journeying along towards the Eucharistic meal with him, in which holy meal he offers the whole of himself as food to nourish us with his Divine life, so that we are fully incorporated into the life of the Triune God through union with the God-man.

Such a description of the journey from Baptism to Eucharist implicates a means, a roadmap, a guide. Jesus himself remains the very means for this journey as he, *the Logos,* is equally the exemplar – author and finisher of our faith (Heb. 12:2), that is, of man's response to God. He remains the roadmap, the Way (Jn.14:6), the guiding Light (Jn 8:12), and the Door (Jn 10:9). In a homily given at St John Lateran Basilica, Pope Benedict XVI shows how the Greek idea of '*logos'* as immutable and as eternal wisdom which leads to life refers to Christ in whom is the fullness of truth and eternal life: "Already in Greek philosophy, we encounter the idea that man can find eternal life if he clings to what is indestructible – to truth [i.e. *Logos*], which is eternal. He needs, as it were, to be full of truth in order to bear within himself the stuff of eternity. But only if truth is a Person, can it lead me through the night of death. We cling to God – to Jesus Christ the Risen One. And thus, we are led by the One who is himself Life. In this relationship we too live by passing through death, since we are not forsaken by the One who is himself Life"[243].

Few years earlier Benedict XVI had made similar allusions to the understanding of the *Logos* in the ancient world when he explained the relation between the *Logos* and the Christian life as nourished by the Eucharistic food as follows: "The ancient world had dimly perceived that man's real food – what truly nourishes him as man – is ultimately the *Logos,* eternal wisdom: this same *Logos* now truly becomes food for us – as love. The Eucharist draws us into Jesus' act of self-oblation. More than just statistically receiving the incarnate *Logos,* we enter into the very dynamic of self-giving"[244].

From the foregoing, we can note that the Eucharist as Christ's act of self-oblation is the natural *telos* of his solidarity with humanity, a Divine solidarity which already in the baptism of Jesus, shows his readiness to take onto himself the image of the Lamb (Jn 1:29) sacrificed for the sins of humanity, a solidarity of sacrificial love more conspicuously revealed at Calvary, for as John the evangelist would write "having loved his own,… he loved them unto death" (Jn 13:1). In

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[243] Benedict XVI, "Mass of the Lord's Supper: Homily of His Holiness Benedict XVI," St. John Lateran Basilica, April 1, 2010, accessed on 3rd of February at 8:28 p.m. from: http://www.pcf.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/homilies/2010/documents/hf_ben-xvi_hom_20100401_coena-domini_en.html.
[244] Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est,* no. 13.

other words, we have here a Revelation of Christ's anthropological structure of 'being-with' throughout his life – and so throughout the life of every baptized and even more throughout history as this structure is equally extended to all humanity with whom Jesus had entered into a relationship of solidarity from beginning (at least in baptism – but even more remotely as the Last Adam) till end (at least on the Cross but even more eschatologically as the eternal Son of God with whom we have become identified).

This act of Divine love personalized in Christ is sacramentally efficacious – through his baptism in the River Jordan and culminating in His Death on the Cross. God's love in Christ is for us and for our salvation (*propter nos et propter nostram salutem*) as it salvages sinful humanity from the dominion of sin, hence the true goal of this Divine 'being-with' (*Emmanu-el*) is revealed more directly as the fulfillment of the Torah in the Great commandment of Love (for God and for neighbor). It is in this perspective that Christopher Collins affirms as follows: "The Word (*Logos*) through whom all things were made, when we follow the order of salvation history, turns out to be the Word that is ultimately manifested as love itself in Jesus' self-gift on the cross"[245]. Accordingly, in order to understand the Eucharist as a source of freedom for man within the anthropological structure of "being-with", we should thus focus on how it encompasses all that Jesus taught about love being the summary of the whole commandments, (i.e. Hebrew *Torah*, or Greek *Logos*). We shall return to this relation between love and law (commandments) later. In the meantime, we shall mention one other significant description which the *Catechism* makes about the Eucharist.

Going further, the *Catechism* also describes the Eucharist as "the efficacious sign and sublime cause of that communion in the Divine life and that unity of the People of God by which the Church is kept in being"[246]. This means that the Eucharist does not only unite us with Christ but also unites us with one another in a mystical way. Thus for this reason, each one of us, who participates in the Eucharist meal does not only enter into the anthropological structure of a "being-with" in relation to Christ but equally realizes the same anthropological structure of "being-with" in relation to all other communicants, hence Benedict XVI observes that "in sacramental communion, I become one with the Lord, like all the other communicants. As Saint Paul says, 'Because there is one bread, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread'

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[245] Collins, *The Word Made Love,* p. 91.
[246] CDF, *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* par. 1325.

(1 Cor 10:17). Union with Christ is also union with all those to whom he gives himself. I cannot possess Christ just for myself; I can belong to him only in union with all those who have become or who will become, his own. Communion draws me out of myself towards him and thus also towards unity with all Christians. We become 'one body,' completely joined in a single existence"[247].

Even more is the extensive orientation of communion which implicates a transcendence of historical time global communion of Christians – in fact, what could be referred to as the cosmic dimension of the anthropological 'being-which' which the Eucharistic Liturgy effects, namely the communion of believers living in both heaven and earth with the Triune God. This is spoken of in the same *Catechism* in the following affirmation: "by the Eucharistic celebration we already unite ourselves with the heavenly liturgy and anticipate eternal life, when God will be all in all"[248].

Hence from the foregoing, we note that the anthropological structure of "being-with" is evident in Ratzinger/Benedict XVI's theology of the Eucharist. Given that the full significance of the Eucharist as Christ's gift of himself is made resplendent in the light of the Cross, it is thus evident that the very starting point of reflection on the Eucharist is Christ-crucified on the Cross. Ratzinger insists on the priority of such a staurological Christology which highlights the inseparable unity of the Person of Christ and his work of human salvation, the highpoint of which he accomplished on the Cross. In building the arguments for this claim, in *Introduction to Christianity,* he first points out that the title "Christ" and the proper name "Jesus" are inseparably united in the expression of faith professed in the Apostolic Creed which "formulates its faith in Jesus in the simple phrase 'and [I believe] in Christ Jesus"[249].

In pointing to the transition from the consciousness of the early Christian communities about the notion of Christ (Messiah) as a title to its more advanced fusion of the title (Christ) and the name (Jesus), he not only highlights the earlier preferred practice of putting the word 'Christ' – more evident in Paul – before the name 'Jesus' (i.e. 'Christ-Jesus') but also draws our attention to a practice close to our historical experience: "Ferdinand Kattenbusch, the great student of the Apostles' Creed, illustrates the process with a neat example from his own time (1897) – he points to the comparison with the phrase 'Kaiser Wilhelm'. The words 'Kaiser' and 'Wilhelm' go so

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[247] Benedict XVI, *Deus caritas est,* n. 14.
[248] CDF, *CCC* par. 1326.
[249] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 105.

closely together that the title 'Kaiser' had itself already become almost a part of the name; yet everyone was still aware that the word was not just a name but denoted a function. The phrase 'Christ Jesus' is an exactly similar case and shows just the same development….This fusion of the name with the title [in the case of Jesus] is far from being just another example of history's forgetfulness…for what faith really states is precisely that with Jesus it is not possible to distinguish office and person; with him this differentiation simply becomes inapplicable. The person *is* the office; the office *is* the person."[250]. Thus we note that the starting point from staurological Christology eventually leads to what Ratzinger describes as a "functional Christology" by which he indicates that "the whole being of Jesus is a function of the "for us", but the function, too, is – for this very reason – all being"[251].

Hence, we can underscore that in the being of Jesus, the anthropological structure of 'being-with' is already evident in the inseparable unity of his Person-work structure, which in turn is a structure already oriented towards us. If we remember that the culmination of his whole work (words and deeds) is the Eucharist, which in the light of the Cross is his self-giving, this inseparability of Person and work becomes even clearer, hence applied in the same way to his words, we also realize the same inseparable unity between Person and words of Jesus for it is he himself who is the Word made flesh. As Ratzinger avers "Jesus did not perform a work that could be distinguished from his "I" and depicted separately. On the contrary to understand him as the Christ means to be convinced that he has put himself into his word. Here there is not "I" (as there is with all of us) that utters words; he has identified himself so closely with his word that "I" and word are indistinguishable: he *is* word. In the same way, to faith, his work is nothing else than the unreserved way in which he merges himself into this very work: he performs *himself* and gives *himself;* his work is the giving of himself"[252].

Obviously from the foregoing, we note that it is only in Christ, that the perfect anthropological relation of 'being-with' is perfectly self-reflexive; it is only in him that a complete identity of Person and word, Person and work, is realized. Hence Christ becomes the ideal man, the perfect man, the mirror through which we glance at the essence of man's anthropological structure of 'being-with' and it is because of this complete inseparableness of his Person and works

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[250] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 105.
[251] Ibid., p. 106.
[252] Ibid., p. 106.

(words and deed) that he as the 'eternal' Word of God is able to break into our 'historical time' as Emmanuel (God-with-us). But this 'being-with' is not exhausted at this one moment just as it was not exhausted at creation, so the same structure continues after Incarnation such that through his works (words and deeds), he continues to manifest God's presence amongst men and continues to extend God's offer of himself to man for as his works are inseparable from himself, he thus offers his very self, whole and entire - to us, in all his works (not only his Word: *Logos* but also his Sacrificial Deeds: *Love*). This is the meaning of the Eucharist as Christ's total gift of himself, body and soul, Person and works, Divinity and humanity. Thus, the Eucharist as the *Catechism* teaches "contains the whole spiritual good of the Church, namely Christ our Pasch"[253]. It is the perfect Way to God, for in celebrating the Eucharist, "'until he comes', the pilgrim people of God advances, 'following the narrow way of the cross', towards the heavenly banquet, when all the elect will be seated at the table of the kingdom [of God]"[254].

As can be noted, the Way of the Eucharist is actually the narrow way of the Cross (Mt. 14:13-21), which in practice is the way of love. Love here seen as the 'perfect Way' is to be understood as the perfection or fulfillment of the commandments of God, for God's Torah as the psalmist declares in Ps. 119:105 "a lamp… a light" unto this Way through which man journeys to God. On this point, we now come to the last and significant point to be considered in this subsection, namely Ratzinger's considerations of Jesus's summative interpretation of the whole of Torah, (i.e. the law, *logos,* of God's commandment) in terms of love –in relation to God and in relation to neighbor in the encyclical *Deus Caritas Est.* Benedict XVI had attempted in that encyclical to clarify the Christian use of the term 'love' and its practical implication for the Church as the 'community of love' whose head is Jesus, the 'incarnate love of God'. With this clarification in mind, he divided the encyclical into two parts: the theoretical and the practical. Interestingly, the first part -which is the theoretical part – contains some interesting insights which are useful for our purposes here. The title of this first part undertakes a bold summation of the relationship between creation and history into the anthropological structure of 'being-with', most experientially manifest in the unity of love between a man and a woman.

Accordingly, Ratzinger attempts a discursive analysis of the use of the Greek terms for love – 'eros', 'philia', and 'agape' in Scripture. He notes that 'philia' "is used with added depth of

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[253] CDF, *CCC* par. 1324.
[254] CDF, *CCC,* par. 1344.

meaning in Saint John's Gospel in order to express the relationship between Jesus and his disciples [and] the tendency to avoid the word *eros,* together with the new vision of love expressed through the word *agape,* clearly point to something new and distinct about the Christian understanding of love"[255]. Ratzinger however argues that Christianity did not destroy *eros* but rather attempts to purify it from the Greek misconception that "an intoxicated and undisciplined *eros* is an ascent in ecstasy towards the divine"[256]. He points out that a historical consideration of the use of the term *eros* shows that "there is a certain relationship between love and the Divine: love promises infinity, eternity – a reality far greater and totally other than our everyday experience. Yet we have seen that the way to attain its goal is not simply by submitting to instinct. Purification and growth in maturity are called for; and these also pass through the path of renunciation. Far from rejecting or 'poisoning' *eros,* they heal it and restore its grandeur. This is due first and foremost to the fact that man is a being made up of body and soul. Man is truly himself when his body and soul are intimately united; the challenge of *eros* can be said to be truly overcome when this unification is achieved. Should he aspire to be pure spirit and to reject the flesh as pertaining to his animal nature alone, then spirit and body would both lose their dignity. On the other hand, should he deny the spirit and consider matter, the body, as the only reality, he would likewise lose his greatness"[257].

We can thus see that at the very core of human person is the structure of a unity of body and soul,-- in a sense of an inseparable "being-with" existing between man's soul and man's body, hence of a structure of relationality existing between man's body and soul. This same structure extends outwards towards the interpersonal relationship of a man and a woman, hence of a human being and other human persons as well as of man's relationship with God as most perfectly exemplified in the man Jesus, the incarnate love of God, "the same creative *Logos,* who becomes food for us, - as love in the Eucharist"[258].

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we have undertaken wide-ranging considerations of the theological implication Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by dialogical relationality by focusing on the revolutionary significance of the Christian Revelation of person as *logos* (truth), which

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[255] Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est,* n. 3.
[256] Ibid., n. 4.
[257] Ibid., no. 5.
[258] Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est,* n. 13.

guarantees freedom. Accordingly this chapter is divided into four sections: the first two sections focused on the Revelation of truth (*logos*) as Person and on the way we experience the response of faith to this Revelation; whereas the last two sections concentrated on the relation between truth (*logos*) and freedom, which is guaranteed by the primacy of the *logos*.

The themes considered in the first two sections revolves around the creative and historical senses of this Revelation of the *logos* (truth) as Person; the second subsection of this earlier two sections attempted to consider the human experience of Christian faith as a dialogical response to this Revelation of Person as truth, a response which we notes is characterized by its dialogical admixture of doubt, given that it is an experience of a mystery. In the last two sections, the first subsection was devoted to the presentation of the anthropological relations of "being-from", "being-for" and "being-with", which served to explain Ratzinger's model of considering the notion of person as constituted by dialogical relationality as it pertains to the human person. Following this pattern, the considerations which followed attempts the exemplifications of this anthropological structure by discussing the creative sources of freedom ('being-from'), the historico-salvific sources of freedom ('being-for') and finally the sacramental experience of freedom ('being-with') in Baptism and Eucharist.

PART TWO

COMPARISMS AND APPLICATIONS OF

RATZINGER'S *DIALOGICAL RELATIONALITY* OF PERSON

CHAPTER THREE:

RATZINGER'S NOTION OF PERSON AND THOMISTIC PERSONALISM

Introduction

In this chapter, I shall compare Ratzinger's approach to the notion of person with alternative approaches used by contemporary tradition of Thomistic personalism. I shall try to show that a closer attention to differences in starting points enables us to identify the reasons why Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by dialogical relationality differs from the personalist anthropology of Karol Wojtyła, a renowned Thomist. I will also indicate the common conclusions which Ratzinger shares with Wojtyła in the light of the convergences of their assumptions with those of contemporary personalism. Thirdly, I shall point out the divergences between Ratzinger's attitude towards Thomism and Wojtyła's more positive reception of the thoughts of the Angelic Doctor.

Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three sections, the first of which will focus on the discussion of the relevance of the question of starting points. This will be followed by the other two parts both of which will dedicated to ascertaining the place of personalism and Thomism in the thoughts of Ratzinger and Wojtyła respectively.

3.1 The Question of Starting Points

The crucial significance of starting points in scholarly discourse was noted by ancient thinkers, one of whom had remarked that "a small mistake in the beginning leads to a big one in the end"[259]. We recall that in the introductory section to this dissertation, it is indicated that Ratzinger's starting point for personalist anthropology begins from the theological doctrine of God

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[259] Aristotle, *On the Heavens and the Earth;* see Aquinas, *On Being and Essence,* cc. 1-11.

and transits through Christology to anthropology[260]. Based on this starting point, Ratzinger attempts to analyze how the context of faith demonstrates his claim that person is constituted by dialogical relationality. Could such a theological starting point serve as a foundation for the discourse on personalism in other disciplines, particularly in philosophy? In the subsequent sections of this chapter, responses to this question will be attempted, particularly in the consideration of the possibility of applying Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by relationality to Karol Wojtyła's Thomistic personalism, which is based on a philosophical discourse of man's experience of being a person.

Notably, Ratzinger theological starting point equally allows for the convergence of his principle of dialogical relationality of persons in theological anthropology and philosophical anthropology. In other words, it highlights the correlation of the theological doctrine of 'man as person' with the philosophical reflections on 'man as person'. This is not a surprise as it is corroborated by the observation of the French philosopher, Jacque Maritain who avers that "the human person is ordained directly to God as to its absolute ultimate end"[261]. This means that even as philosophical anthropology begins its enquiry into the notion of person from the consideration of *man* as person, it returns to the primary source of the notion of person in the revealed mystery of God, from which Ratzinger had started, hence both philosophical and theological perspectives of the notion of person converge in such a way that the Ratzingerian constitution of person by relationality applies to all personal beings, human, angelic or Divine. Therefore, if we reverse the trajectory of discourse and so begin from anthropology to the reality of God, we are also going to reach the same conclusions on the *relationality* of 'person' as we would have reached if we had taken the Ratzingerian starting points.

Despite the fact that a reversal of starting points can still lead us to the same conclusion, it remains pertinent that in order for us to understand properly the notion of person and so on this basis have a clearer grasp of the contemporary project of personalism, we have to first settle the key question: Do we start from the consideration of the way in which God is said to be person and so move to the way in which we experience our being as persons? Or do we begin from our experience of being persons and so construct our notion of a personal God? There seem to be some

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[260] Cf. J. Ratzinger, "Concerning the notion of person in theology", *Communio 17,* (Fall 1990), p. 445.
[261] J. Maritain, *La Personne et Le Bien Commun* (Paris, 1947) translated into English by J. Fitzgerald and published with the title *The Person and Common Good* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), p. 15.

excesses to watch out for in each choice (of our starting points) since the one can easily lead to an 'undue' *divinization* of man and the other can equally lead to an 'incorrect' *anthropomorphization* of God. In balance however, our eventual choice (of starting point) should be justified by its level of approximation to the essence of personal beings.

According to St. Thomas Aquinas, "person signifies what is most perfect in all nature"[262]. Applying this definition in our choice of starting point between the human person and the Divine person, it becomes even more evident where the pendulum lies, namely the Divine person, for God as person is definitely more perfect than the human person. It is in this light that Jacque Maritain asserted that "the idea of [human] person is an analogical idea which is realized fully and absolutely only in its supreme analogue, God"[263]. Hence, the suitability of Ratzingerian choice of starting point from the truth about God which decision most significantly follows the biblical presentation of the human being as having been created in the "image of God" (Gen. 1:26).

From the above justification of the starting point of the considerations of the notion of person, we can thus argue for the ultimate theo-logical foundation of the contemporary schools of personalism. It is notable that the historical development of the contemporary schools of personalism does not show a keen attention to the primacy of the theological starting point, we find in Ratzinger. According to Juan Manuel Burgos, "personalism arose in Europe during the first half of the twentieth century as a movement of collective response to a complex combination of social, cultural, and philosophical questions. World War I led to a great crisis of values, perceived by some as a global crisis of Western civilization and connected to a growing de-Christianization. This ideological decline in the optimism surrounding 'modern' civilization gave a space for the growth of individualism, but also collectivisms of the right (fascism and Nazism) and of the left (Marxism)"[264].

It is notable from Burgos' testimony that contemporary personalism includes the various trends of ideological traditions which are united by their common scholarly attempt to correct the excesses of *individualism* on the one hand, and those of *collectivism* on the other hand. This noble project, in my opinion cannot be satisfactorily realized unless personalists undertake a critique of

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[262] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* 1, 29, 3: "persona significat id quo est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali natura".
[263] J. Maritain, *The Person and Common Good*, p. 56.
[264] J. M. Burgos, "Origins" in *An Introduction to Personalism,* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2018), pp. 1-34.

their foundational starting points for understanding the very key notion of *person*, upon which rests their whole project. The justification of the very foundation of starting points will bring to light what exactly differences 'personalism' from 'individualism' on the one hand; as well as the difference between 'collectivism' and 'personalism' on the other hand. It is my contention that if we begin our reflection on 'person' from the revealed mystery of God, we shall arrive at a better and more formidable tradition of personalism that can withstand contemporary forms of individualism and collectivism simultaneously. The relevance of a justified starting point can equally be checked from the response it provides to signs of resurgent tendencies towards individualism and collectivism in our time, for example: Can personalism address contemporary tendencies towards individualism arising from 'social-distancing'[265] in the present situation of COVID-19 pandemic? Can personalism resolve contemporary forms of collectivism which the floundering embers of *Marx-ist* communism in Asia[266], and *Nazi-st* nationalism in North America engenders[267]?

In this chapter, however, I do not intend to provide answers to these last two questions, but rather it is my intention to argue that Ratzinger's theological starting point for the demonstration of his arguments remains the most ultimate foundation for the contemporary project of personalism, irrespective of which form of individualism or collectivism may arise at any historical age. In other words, I aim at a more perennial ultimate foundation which serves as a formidable

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[265] While its practice already existed in earlier generations as can be attested in the scriptural stories of leprosy, a disease which eats up the bodily flesh of its patient, hence described with the Hebrew word '*tsara'ath*'. Leprosy at the time was said to be incurable just as the SARS-Cov-2 disease today, understood as communicable and without cure (see, Lev. 13:1-59). Just as the laws of leprosy included social distancing (Deut.24:8-9), so also today, the term 'social-distancing' has become a buzzword for our contemporary society in the last few months stems from the current health challenges posed by the corona virus pandemic, the earliest cases of which erupted in Wuhan, China in December 2019, hence the code name COVID-19.

[266] My mind thinks of such examples as China and North Korea.

[267] I think here of the recent anti-Chinese propaganda in the United States engendered by a radicalization of President Donald Trump's political mantra of "Make America Great". For the most part, this is precipitated by the fact that Trump had on several occasions referred to the COVID-19 as a "Chinese Virus", which description is not in itself 'nationalist' as we also describe the global pandemic of 1918 as "Spanish Flu". Howsoever, as the number of corona virus victims keep rising in America (totalling 215,344 cases, according to World Health Organization statistics updated as at 9:08 GMT today, 2nd April, 2020: Assessed from https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/#countries), the antagonism against China in America is increasing to a near 'racist' proportions of a similar type the world had notice at the beginning of the German nationalist Nazism. Joseph Ratzinger remarks that "Nationalism not only brought Europe to the brink of destruction de facto and historically; it also contradicts what Europe essentially is, spiritually and politically" (see, J. Ratzinger, *Grundsatz-Reden aus funf Jahrzehnten,* (Regensburg: Verlag Pustet, 2005), translated into English by Michael J. Miller, J. R. Foster, and Adrian Wlaker, and published under the title *Fundamental Speeches from five decades,* edited by Florian Schuller (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012), p. 173.

starting point for the discourse on personalism, rather than a direct response to the contemporary challenges arising from the current global health challenge or the contemporary political power-play between the United States and China.

There is also the need to underscore that even though I will eventually focus more on philosophical discourse on contemporary personalism in the subsequent sections of this chapter, I do not hold the view that contemporary personalism is limited to philosophical traditions nor do I intend to argue that it contemporary return to scholarship was entirely a philosophical project. What is however notable is that the term '*der personalismus*' ('personalism') appears first in print in the 1799 work[268] of the theologian Frederick Schleiermacher*,* its popularization at the beginning of the twentieth century was realized mainly through the works of philosophers, amongst whom are Emmanuel Mounier[269], Max Scheler[270], Jacque Maritain[271].

For this reason, it is observed that unlike its ancient and early medieval theological discourse on the doctrine of God, the contemporary philosophical discourse on 'person' focuses more on the being of *man* as person, -(i.e. philosophical anthropology) rather than on the being of *God* as person. This anthropological focus in contemporary times tends, in most of the cases to reverse the ancient and medieval theological starting point for the discourse on person from the revealed mystery of God. Such a reversal appears to pose an obstacle for the application of Ratzinger's argument that person is constituted by dialogical relationality to philosophical anthropology. I however argue in this chapter that the notion of person as constituted by relationality can be adequately applied to philosophical anthropology as much as it is applicable to the theological anthropology, irrespective of the subtle reversal of starting points since both perspectives (theological and philosophical) converge on the principle of relationality of persons.

Given that contemporary personalism as we know it had most of its themes formulated within philosophical traditions, I shall try to justify my claim that Ratzinger's theo-logical starting point remains the ultimate foundation for the sustainability of personalism by selecting dialogical partners for this justification from amongst philosophical schools of personalism. This

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[268] Cf. F. Schleiermacher et al, *Über die Religion,* (Zürich: TVC Theologischer Verlag: 1799, 1806, 1821).

[269] Cf. E. Mounier, *Le Personalisme,* (1950); translated into English by Philip Mairet and published with the title *Personalism,* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1952).

[270] Cf. M. Scheler, *Person and Self-Value: Three Essays,* edited and translated by Manfred Frings (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987); see also, P. Spader, *Scheler's Ethical Personalism: Its Logic, Development and Promise* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002).

[271] Cf. J. Maritain, *Person and Common Good,* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1966).

philosophical reversal of trajectory of considerations in Wojtyła, as in other philosophical anthropologies, does not in its face value, imply a substitution of the ultimate starting point in its attempt to analyze man's experience of his own being as a personal "I" and the being of 'others' as persons.

This is so because the ultimate question of starting point of the discourse in philosophical anthropology addresses the notion of *being*, rather than that of 'person', in which case, it takes on a metaphysical character. This is why we read from the introductory sections of Wojtyła's magnus opus[272] on man as follows: "In the traditional approach to the person and to action the dynamism proper to man is interpreted by analogy to the dynamism of all beings. The dynamism of being the subject of traditional metaphysics, and to metaphysics – in particular to its great founder, Aristotle – we owe the conception in which the dynamic nature of being is expressed in philosophical terms….The experience of the unity of man as the person stimulates the complexity of man as a being. Such understanding belongs to metaphysics, in which throughout the ages, thinkers have been unraveling the nature of man as a being consisting of soul and body, of spirit and flesh"[273].

It can thus be seen from the above citation from Wojtyła's *Acting Person* that philosophical questions of starting points address the notion of *'being'* and only takes on the notion of 'person' in the context of its status as one of the instantiations of an existing 'being'. Of course, if the philosophical enquirer probes into the last ultimate question of being, he will eventually arrive at the same theological source from which the notion of person is derived, namely God as the ultimate being, whose essence is constituted by his existence as the most perfect being, namely a person.

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[272] *The Acting Person* is arguably Karol Wojtyła's greatest philosophical masterpiece on ethics, due thanks to the deep metaphysical principles which grounds his anthropology and upon which he builds his philosophical ethics. The original Polish title of *The Acting Person* is *Osoba i czyn,* which translates as "Person and Act". Since its first publication in 1969, it has been translated into several languages, viz: English: *The Acting Person,* trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Boston: Rediel, 1979); Italian: *Persona e atto,* (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980); German: *Person und Tat,* (Freiburg: Herder, 1981); Spanish: *Persona y accion,* (Madrid:Biblioteca de autores cristianos, 1982); French: *Personne et acte,* (Paris: Centurion, 1983). It is equally notable that the publication of this work had provoked serious scholarly discussions in the 1970s. Relying on his own testimony, "this discussion began with a meeting of philosophy professors at the Catholic University of Lublin in December 1970; it continued on, however, through a number of written responses (about twenty in all), which are to be published in the 1973 volume of *Analecta Cracoviensia.* Taking part in this discussion were several representatives of several Catholic scholarly circles, principally from Lublin, Warsaw, and Krakow, reflecting somewhat different philosophical orientations. The discussion placed a heavy emphasis on the methodological side of the question….philosophers from Lublin were chiefly interested in the methodological precision of my presentation of St. Thomas' though, in this case in my attempt to translate this thought into contemporary language, while those from Krakow were most interested in the possibility itself of a contemporary interpretation of St. Thomas' thought by means of a properly understood phenomenology. see, K. Wojtyła, *Person and community*, pp. 187-188.
[273] K. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person,* p. 185.

What is however to be underscored is that the philosophical route of enquiry does not begin with this last stage of its enquiry into the nature of Divine being as a person as the theological discourse does. In a sense, where the philosophical enquiry ends in the ultimate source of being in God, theological reflections tends to begin and so both trajectories eventually converge on the same point in the search for the understanding of the notion of person. Nonetheless, in the enquiry about person, which Aquinas describes as signifying what is most perfect in all nature it is to theology, which focuses on the revealed mystery of God, that we defer with regard to the most appropriate starting point.

3.2 Personalism and Thomism in relation to Ratzinger's and Wojtyła's thoughts

The previous section of this chapter had focused on the considerations of the question of starting points in the discourse on the notion of person. In this section, I shall try to highlight the place of Ratzinger's thoughts as well as the place of Wojtyła's thought in the overall context of the traditions of personalism and that of Thomism, (and eventually Thomistic personalism)[274]. In doing so, we shall be able to note the convergencies as well as divergences in their approaches to the discourse on person. We have already noted that Ratzinger's approach begins from the revealed understanding of the truth about God through Christology to anthropology whereas Wojtyła's approach follows the trend in philosophical anthropology which begins from the human experience of what it means to be (live) and act as personal beings. Also, we noted that both approaches lead to the same conclusion that persons are constituted by relationality. In terms of ideological influences, Karol Wojtyła is undoubtedly both a personalist and a Thomist and serves our purposes here very well. Ratzinger on the other hand is more disposed towards personalist traditions than he is towards Thomism.

In the presentations of the main assumptions of both traditions (personalism and Thomism), in the paragraphs that follow, I shall employ both a historical and a classificatory approach while keeping an eye on the need to highlight convergences and divergences. More precisely, historical

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[274] Cf. P. Kreeft, "Thomistic Personalism: A Marriage Made in Heaven, Hell or Harvard" being a 2011 Aquinas Lecture presented at the Centre for Thomistic Studies of the University of St Thomas, Minnesota. Available on Youtube from https://youtu.be/FwWI4PkLpkY. Accessed on Wednesday, April 4, 2020; see also R. Podgórski, "Thomistic and Phenomenological Philosophy of the Person in Karol Wojtyła's Personalism, *Studia Warmińskie,* 53 (2016), pp. 39-53, DOI: https://doi.org/10.31648/sw.87.

considerations are deemed more suitable in the presentation of personalism, whereas classificatory approach will be much more adequate to the presentation of Thomism.

3.2.1 Personalism in the anthropologies of Ratzinger and Wojtyła

It is noteworthy that even though Ratzinger reflects on the notion of person, it could not be said that he is a personalist in the sense we conceptualize personalism today as an ideological tradition. This can be understood even more clearly when we try to distinguish between the philosophy or theology of the person from the personalist movement as a tradition in contemporary anthropology. Certainly, the notion of person is historically older that the specifically referred personalist tradition. It can even be said that a theology of person is much older than what can be called the philosophy of person. This is because it was the theologians of the first four centuries – e.g. Tertullian (c. 155-240), Origen, and the Cappadocian Fathers who first brought the concept of person, (previously used in theatre) into the more academic discussion on the question of the Trinity[275]. Following on the heels of these earliest theological discourses on the notion of person, St Augustine at the end of the fourth century and the beginning of the fifth century had considered theological questions regarding the Trinity[276]. Augustine's (354-430) reflections on the Trinity predates Boethius's (477-524) so-called classical definition of person as a 'natural substance of a rational nature'[277].

Medieval scholarship also abounds with numerous theological and philosophical original discussions and commentaries on the Persons of the Trinity[278]. However, contemporary personalism[279] does not so much consider itself as an inheritor of the earlier theological reflections on the notion of person. Ratzinger however underscored the earlier theological use of the concept

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[275] A very interesting exposition of the contributions of the Cappadocian Fathers in this regard has been prepared by Patrick Whitworth. see his *Three Wise Men From the East: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Struggle for Orthodoxy* (Durham: Sacristy Press, 2015).

[276] See, St. Augustine of Hippo, *De Trinitate (On the Trinity),* Vol. 7 of the works of Saint Augustine (London: Aeterna Press, 1873).

[277] Boethius, *Treatise Against Eutychus and Nestorius,* ch. 3 (PL 64, col. 1343) as found in G. Emery, "The Dignity of Being a Substance: Person, Subsistence and Nature", *Nova et Vetera,* English edition, vol. 9, no. 4 (2011), pp. 991-1001., esp. p. 994.

[278] Russell Friedman had done a very extensive research on medieval scholarship on the Trinity. see his *Medieval Trinitarian Thought from Aquinas to Ockham* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Also interesting is the article by Susan Balderstone "The Evolution of Trinity Images to the Medieval Period" *Journal of the Australian Early Medieval Association,* vol. 13 (Jan. 2017), pp. 95-112.

[279] By 'contemporary personalism', I refer to the twentieth century revival of the discourse on the human person, which is oriented towards anthropology rather than its earlier precedents in the doctrine of God.

of person in his article on the notion of person[280]. So also did Karol Wojtyła corroborate the claim on the earliest historical use of the concept of person as connected with theological problem of Trinity and Incarnation. According to him, "this history is connected with the work of theologians of the patristic period, who sought to clarify, or at least more precisely define, the main truths of our faith. They were concerned primarily with two truths: the mystery of the Trinity and the mystery of Incarnation of the Second Divine Person, which involves the hypostatic union of two natures, Divine and human[281]. In the Middle Ages, the contributions of Richard of St Victor (1110-1173) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) were notable. Hence, we note that various treatises on person from were produced by ancient and medieval thinkers, the key outlines of which influenced modern and contemporary traditions of personalism in various subtle ways.

In the modern era, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Immanuel Kant 's *Critique of Practical Reason*, which struck the personalist highpoint with his categorical imperative, trailed the blaze for modern-contemporary philosophical revival of personalism. This explains why Kantian ethics and anthropology had become pivotal for the contemporary philosophical trends of personalism as from the twentieth century. Nonetheless it will be an overgeneralization to consider all contemporary personalistic schools of anthropology, whether in philosophy or theology as sharing any common tradition with Kantianism. In fact there are several sub-traditions, some of which draw their inspiration from the Hellenistic (Greek) influence on classical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, which found a new appeal in the philosophical and theological discussions the middle ages (e.g. Thomistic personalism, which is rooted in Aristotelianism); whereas others look towards the Hebraic (Jewish) influence to draw their inspirations (e.g. the personalism of Martin Buber). Thus, we can observe two separate traditions of personalism: the one of a Hellenistic root and the other of a Hebraic root.

Accordingly, we can as well speak of two trajectories of personalism: hence on the one hand, we have the Greek classical *philosophical* tradition – at least within the Aristotelian context- where the abstract questions of the essence of being, eventual crystalized into the metaphysics of **substance**. In its purely Aristotelian tradition, this trajectory leads to a perfectly closed metaphysical essence (form) of being, i.e. an "*Unmoved* Mover" which/who as the Absolute

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[280] See, J. Ratzinger, "Concerning the notion of person in theology" *Communio* 17, (Fall, 1990).
[281] For more indepth knowledge of the hypostatic union, see Aaron Riches, *Ecce Homo: On the Divine Unity of Christ* (Michigan: William Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2016); Walter Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century,* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies Press, 1970).

(perfect) form of a substance-being, lacks all dynamisms and so cannot fit into the picture of a personal being (human or Divine) as it lacks the personal dynamism of relationality, i.e. spontaneous openness to enter into relationships with *other* (i.e. other beings of personal nature). However in its Thomistic modification, which emphasizes the primacy existence in the light of the sub-ontic *relationality* of essence and existence in contrast to the Aristotelian substantial constitution from form and matter, it can be shown that the metaphysics of *existing* beings demonstrates from analogical considerations the relationality of *contingently* existing beings to the self-subsistently existing being, as the cause of all beings that receives their existence (i.e. all 'forms'/essences that are actualized in existence) through that being whose essence is constituted by eternal (i.e. self-subsistent) existence[282]; on the other hand, we have another Hebraic classical *biblical* tradition which highlights the centrality of **relationality,** expressed in the context of the special experience of "belongingness" to a dynamically active Supreme deity, a personal God in reference to whom Israel understands her election as the Chosen people.

The act of Divine election reveals the personal dynamism of such a Supreme being, in respect to whom Israel has a lived conscious experience, which constitutes her into a family, a nation, a community, rather than a single individual. The election of Israel by a personal God constitutes here into a corporate personality, on account of her being the forebears of a common ancestral stock -Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Already, on account of the above preliminary lines, it is easy to place Ratzinger's approach as following the Hebraic tradition of personalism rather than the Hellenistic. In order to show this even more clearly, it is necessary to investigate what vision of person the Hellenistic tradition holds and by so doing, point out how its alternative insights differs but also complements the Ratzingerian vision of man as a person.

However, contemporary classifications of personalism do not make use of broad cultural divides (like Hellenistic-Hebraic) rather recent authors tend to be more specific in their identification of schools of personalism according to national groupings, hence American

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[282] See, S. Swiezawski "The Mysterious Essence of God" in *St. Thomas Revisited* , vol. 8 of *Catholic Thought from Lublin,* translated by Theresa Sandok (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, GmBH, 1995), p. 51: The composition of all things from potential and realization, a composition that in its most universal form appears as a composition of essence and existence, leads directly to the cause of existence; that is to say, contingent existence leads directly to necessary self-subsistent existence and we call this self-subsistent existence God.

personalism[283], French personalism[284] or German personalism,[285] Polish personalism[286] or even more specific to cities, for example Lublin personalism[287] or Boston personalism[288] or California personalism[289] as the case may be. In fact, contemporary scholars consider personalism as a wide-ranging schools or traditions that "exist in many different forms, two of the best known of which are the American personalism initiated by Borden Parker Bowne, and the French school of Emmanuel Mounier"[290]. Jan Bengtsson, observes that "there are also strong currents of phenomenological personalism, existential personalism, and Catholic personalism and although there are many significance differences between these various forms, as personalisms they also have much in common, their positions often overlap, and historically they can be seen to have stood in more or less close contact and to have influenced each other"[291].

Most contemporary scholars of personalism consider Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative arguments for the end-value of person in the kingdom of goods as fundamental to the principles of personalism. Accordingly, we note that while the concept of person is not altogether new before Immanuel Kant (given that Locke had earlier used this concept), it can be said that it was Kant who brought the concept back to currency in philosophical scholarship with a more sharpened focus on its ethical implication through his categorical imperative. However, just like Ratzinger, Kant cannot be spoken of as a personalist in the strict sense of the understanding of this tradition, which became more defined in the twentieth century.

From the perspective of French personalism, we note that Emmanuel Mounier's 1923 work with the title "Personalism" bears the imprint of the historical crisis of the period after the first world war. In this work, he intended to counter two trends which were prevalent in the inter-war period: the first was related with the positivist scientism of the time, which tended to eclipse the study of man (i.e. anthropology) on the count that man as "subject" is not a verifiable "object" of

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[283] See B. Gacka, *American Personalism* (Jarocin-Poznań: Oficyna Wydawnicza Czas, 1995); Also, S. Pihlström, „Pragmatism and American Personalism: Problems in Perspectival Metaphysics", *The Jerusalem Quarterly,* 53 (July 2004), pp. 287-324.

[284] See J. Carnus, "The Rise of French Personalism", *The Personalist,* vol. 34, no. 3 (July 1953), pp. 261-268.

[285] See, J. Burgos, "German Personalism" in his *An Introduction to Personalism,* p. 119.

[286] See, W. Lutoslawski, "Polish Personalism" *The Personalist,* vol. 34, no. 1 (January 1952), pp. 15-21.

[287] See. T. Duma, "Personalism in the Lublin School of Philosophy", *Studia Gilsoniana,* vo. 5, no. 2 (April-June 2016), pp. 365-390.

[288] See, A. LoLordo (ed.), *Persons: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 270.

[289] Cf. A. LoLordo (ed.), *Persons: A History*, Ibid.

[290] J. O. Bengtsson, *The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Development,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 1.

[291] J. Bengtsson, ibid., p. 1.

scientific studies, given that we do not have an empirical objective way of verifying the subjectivity of man. From a philosophical point of view, positivism reflects a subtle counter revolution to the 'subjective-turn' which began with Descartes and was equally current in the nineteenth century – and of course had found its way back into contemporary scholarship in the philosophy of consciousness.

Mounier's project in *Personalism,* was also revolutionary on a social level as it attempted to counter individualism on the one hand and collectivism on the other hand. Mounier's project was however enmeshed in a wider socio-cultural revolution that had swept across Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. This revolutionary movement metamorphosed into many strands of personalism, hence Juan Burgos was quick to note that "among scholars, the previously dominant idealistical philosophy (Immanuel Kant, Georg Hegel) was giving way in multiple directions: towards existentialism of the self by readers of Soren Kierkegaard; towards an increasingly arrogant scientistic materialism; which denied the truth-value of any non-experimental affirmation; and towards a greater focus on specific "themes," including woman, interpersonal relations, and community, that had to be elucidated critically"[292].

In this medley of personalist movements however, Burgos' observes, we can identify "among Catholics of this era, an ineluctable need to face modernity in a critical way, following the "modernist crisis" centered in France in the first two decades of the century, even as it was recognized that "modern" ideology was in retreat. The Wall Street crash of 1929 generated a further economic and ideological crisis, and the political instability caused by the debility of the parliamentary democracies (especially Weimar Germany) did not seem able to stem the rising tide of collectivist sentiment. This whole complex combination of problems merged slowly and in very diverse ways into what has been called "the personalist awakening." Personalists became aware that, to face these questions and, above all, to surpass them, it was necessary to have recourse to the concept of person and to construct, from there, a new philosophical project, a new anthropology"[293].

As expected, he goes on to note that this reconstruction of a new anthropology "followed many varied paths, frequently interrelated and, at times, relatively independent: from the proposals

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[292] J. M. Burgos, "Origins", *An Introduction to Personalism,* (Washington: Catholic University of America, 2018), pp. 1-34.
[293] Cf. J. M. Burgos, "Origins", *An Introduction to Personalism,* pp. 1-34.

of the personalist ethics of Max Scheler, through the Thomistic personalism of Jacque Maritain, the communitarian personalism of Emmanuel Mounier, the philosophies of dialogue of Jewish thinkers such as Martin Buber and Emmanuel Levinas, and the personalist existentialism of Gabriel Marcel. They all recognized similar problems and aimed to resolve them within a common philosophical matrix, personalism"[294].

In the light of the above expose on the origins and contemporary resurgence of personalism, we can attempt to draw out convergences in Ratzinger's and Wojtyła's orientations towards personalism. First we already noted Ratzinger's tendency towards the Hebraic 'relational' experience of the God-man encounter as retold in the biblical accounts, which explains why the dialogical personalism of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber had much impression on him[295] and so to the extent we consider Martin Buber a personalist, to that very extent can we say that Ratzinger appreciates Buber's Hebraic-oriented personalism. Karol Wojtyła's personalism on the other hand can be deduced from his scholarly interest in the thoughts of Jewish-German philosopher Max Scheler, who had adopted the phenomenological approach of his master Edmund Husserl in his personalist considerations of the sense of values. Wojtyła had devoted his own habilitation thesis to this same problem of the sense of value in Max Scheler.

Thus, it can be said that Karol Wotjtyla drew a lot of insights from the phenomenological tradition of personalism. But so also had he drawn a lot of inspiration from Kantian ethics with regard to the sensitivity to the dignity of man as a person. Alfred Wierzbicki, who was a disciple of Karol Wojtyła testifies that "in the theoretical dimension, Wojtyła translated that sensitivity (about human dignity) into a bold attempt to develop personalism, which led to the necessity of elaborating a synthesis of an objectively and realistically oriented philosophy of being, inspired by the achievements of St. Thomas Aquinas, with a modern philosophy of the subject, sometimes understood as a philosophy of consciousness"[296].

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[294] Cf. J. M. Burgos, "Origins", ibid.

[295] Ratzinger testified that he had "found the philosophy of personalism reiterated with renewed conviction in the great Jewish thinker Martin Buber. This encounter, with personalism was for me a spiritual experience that left an essential mark, especially since I spontaneously associated such personalism with the thought of Saint Augustine, who in his *Confessions* had struck me with the power of all his human passion and depth." see J. Ratzinger, *Aus Meinem Leben: Erinnerungen* 1927-1977 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), translated into English by Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis and published with the title *Milestones: Memoirs 1927-1977,* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), p. 44; See also J. Ratzinger, *Einführung in das Christentum,* (Münich: Kösel Verlag, GmBH, 1968) translated into English by J. R. Foster and published under the title *Introduction to Christianity,* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1969) p. 27.

[296] A. Wierzbicki, "Introduction" to Karol Wojtyła, *Man in the field of Responsibility,* translated by Kenneth W. Kemp and Zuzanna Maslanka Kieron, (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2011), p. ix.

Wierzbicki goes further to cite Tadeusz Styczeń, another disciple of Wojtyła, to drive home the point that Karol Wojtyła influenced the Lublin philosophical school to take on the personalist orientation. In the words of Styczeń, he writes as follows: "I think that it was Karol Wojtyła who 'infected' the Lublin philosophical circle – and even today soundly agitates it – with his *personalism*"[297]. Significantly, this Wojtylean 'infection' of the Lublin scholars with personalism is not only noticeable in the department of philosophy but it is equally evident in the department of theology in the works of such reputable theological scholars as Czesław Stanisław Bartnik (b. 9th August 1929 – d. 21st March, 2020)[298].

All in all, I consider Karol Wojtyła's anthropology as a representative of not only personalism but also Thomism, hence we can safely speak of this anthropology as a 'Thomistic personalism'. In this way, we highlight the distinctiveness of his approach vis-à-vis the distinctiveness of Ratzinger's approach (which we may speak of simply as a 'theology of person'). Notably, Wojtyła understands his Thomistic personalism not simply as "a theory of the person or a theoretical science of the person"[299] as he insists that its meaning is largely practical and ethical: it is concerned with the person as a subject and an object of activity, as a subject of rights"[300]. We shall return to these themes in subsequent sections when we consider Wojtyła's analysis of the personal *I,* as a subject of actions. In the meantime, we turn to the close affinity between Buber's dialogical personalism and dialogical relativity of persons in Ratzinger.

3.2.2 Dialogical personalism and dialogical relativity of persons

I have already indicated that Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by dialogical relativity is influenced greatly by Buber's personalism. But in which way is this affinity related to our discourse? We had already discussed in the first part the Christian revolution of the Revelation of the *Logos* as Person. But the Creative Logos, revealed as Person is at the same time the Word, God's Word communicated to man and through Him man is able also to enter into communication with God. Hence, the Person of the Divine *Logos* becomes the Mediator of the Divine-human

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[297] A. Wierzbicki, "Introduction", *Man in the field of Responsibility,* ibid.

[298] See, C. Bartnik, "Personalistyczny zarys teologii katolickiej" *Roczniki Teologiczne,* no. 40, z. 2, (1993); see also, R. A. Gorban, "Personalistic Anthropology of Czeslaw Stanislaw Bartnik" 2016; C. Bartnik, "A Personalistic Philosophy of History" *Dialectics and Humanism* vol. 11, n. 1 (1984), pp. 193-199)

[299] K. Wojtyła, "Thomistic Personalism", *Person and Community: Selected Essays,* vol. 8 of *Catholic Thought from Lublin,* translated by Theresa Sandok, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), p. 165.

[300] K. Wojtyła, "Thomistic Personalism", ibid., p. 165.

dialogue, which is essentially a dialogue of persons. Hence "the human person is fulfilled only when entering into the human–Divine, I–Thou dialogue. This encounter makes possible the discovery of the fullness of love that has as its perfect pattern the dialogue that is the love of the Father and the Son, united by the Holy Spirit. The human person is created for participation in this same dialogue. All other human relationships are perfected when flowing from this Trinitarian pattern of dialogue. The figure of Christ, then, opens up new horizons for both the theology of God and that of the human person. In this sense Ratzinger's Christology sets the stage for a profound personalism that can shape our understanding of Christian anthropology"[301].

We can demonstrate this from the analysis of the personal act of faith, which is exhausted in the cognitive realm of a propositional truths (i.e. 'knowledge-acts' of *acceptance* and *confession* of the truth of faith, the *logos* who is a person) but even more truly in dialogical *response* of the man of faith to the Revealed Truth. Such a response finds expression in active disposition to perform *good* deeds in tandem with the *truth* professed. The Epistle of James acknowledges this much in its characterization of the experience of a "living" faith in terms of its deeds, hence "Faith, if it have not works, is dead in itself…show me thy faith apart from thy works, and I, by my works will show thee my faith…Was not Abraham our father justified by works…and by works was faith made perfect" (James 2: 12-22). John Paul II however notes that this moral dimension of faith constitutes for the contemporary society an obstacle to conversion. He laments that the "contemporary man finds it hard to return to faith because he is afraid of the moral demands that faith places before him."[302]

For Ratzinger, however "True dia-logue, however is not where people talk about something. The right conversation comes only when people try to communicate not just something but when people communicate themselves, when the dialogue becomes giving of oneself to the *other*"[303]. Dialogue becomes as it were 'self-Revelation' of a person to another rather than a mere vocalization of propositions. This distinction between true dialogue as communication of *oneself*

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[301] C. Collins, *The Word Made Love: The Dialogical Theology of Joseph Ratzinger-Benedict XVI,* (Minnesota Liturgical Press, 2013), p.66.

[302] John Paul II, "Do not be Afraid" in Ratzinger, J., *The Legacy of John Paul II: Images and Memories,* trans by M.J. Miller and N. V. McKenzie, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), p. 7.

[303] Ratzinger Joseph: *Opera omnia*, vol. IV: *Wprowadzenie do chrześcijaństwa. Wyznanie – Chrzest – Naśladowanie*, ed. K. Góźdź, M. Górecka, trans. by Robert Biel, Marzena Górecka, Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL 2017, p. 89 [The citation is translated by me from the original Polish version which reads as follows: „Prawdziwego dialogu nie ma jednak tam, gdzie ludzie mówią tylko o czymś. Do właściwej rozmowy dochodzi dopiero wtedy, gdy ludzie usiłują wypowiedzieć nie coś, ale siebie, gdy dialog staje się udzielaniem"].

and conversation as the discourse about 'something' reverberates the main vision of person in dialogical personalism. According to György Kunszt, "Pope John Paul II endorsed only a few contemporary thinkers in his book *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*. Nevertheless, he stressed the importance of Emmanuel Levinas 'who continues – just as Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig – the personalistic tradition of the Old Testament, in which the relation between the human "I" and the absolutely sovereign divine "Thou" is adequately emphasized'"[304].

Given that dialogical personalism is noted to be rooted in Jewish or Hebraic tradition which draws inspiration from Israel's experience of her history as a people defined by their relationship with God and their communal identity as a people is drawn from this experience of the nearness of Yahweh: "For what great nation is there that has gods so close to it as the LORD, our God, is to us whenever we call upon him"? (Deut. 4:7). Thus, Israel identity as a nation is constituted by dialogical relationality. But as Ratzinger would observe, this is what constitutes the essence of man as a person since "man is never alone, he is shaped by a community that defines his ways of thinking, feeling and acting. We call culture the structure of forms of thinking and imagination that initially shapes man.

First of all, a common language belongs to culture, then the community system; i.e. the family, the state with all its structure, laws, customs, moral beliefs, art forms of worship, etc."[305] It follows then that the human person is always in dialogical relationality with the community of persons in whose life he or she shares and as such "man is never just himself, or more properly: he is himself in others, with others and through others. Do the others curse or bless him, forgive him and transform his guilt into love – all this is part of his own fate"[306]. This goes to prove the reality of the experience of the anthropological relationality of 'being-with' about which we did

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[304] K. György, "The Word as Ultimate Reality: The Christian dialogical personalism of Ferdinand Ebner" *University of Toronto Press Journals,* (Ontario: UTP, 1997) accessed online from https://www.utpjournals.press/doi/pdf/10.3138/uram.20.2-3.93 on April 16, 2020. Cf. John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope* (New York: Knopf, 1994), pp. 36, 221.

[305] J. Ratzinger, *Opera omnia*, vol. IV: *Wprowadzenie do chrześcijaństwa. Wyznanie – Chrzest – Naśladowanie* edited by K. Góźdź, M. Górecka and translated from German to Polish by Robert Biel, Marzena Górecka, (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL 2017), p. 89 [The citation is a translation by me from the Polish version „Prawdziwego dialogu nie ma jednak tam, gdzie ludzie mówią tylko o czymś. Do właściwej rozmowy dochodzi dopiero wtedy, gdy ludzie usiłują wypowiedzieć nie coś, ale siebie, gdy dialog staje się udzielaniem"].

[306] J. Ratzinger, *Opera omnia*, vol. X: *Zmartwychwstanie i życie wieczne. Studia o eschatologii i teologii nadziei* edited by K. Góźdź, M. Górecka and translated from German to Polish by Joachim Kobienia, (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL 2014), p. 217 [The citation was translated by me from the Polish version: „Człowiek nigdy nie jest tylko sobą samym, albo właściwiej: jest sobą samym w drugich, z drugimi i przez drugich. Czy ci drudzy go przeklinają albo błogosławią, przebaczają mu i jego winę przekształcają w miłość – wszystko to jest częścią jego własnego losu"].

discourse in the second chapter. The source of this relationality in Ratzinger's notion of person is Christ, who made it possible for us to interact with his own innermost act of being – hence with and through Him we dialogue with divinity[307], with the Father but also with the community of believers throughout history.

Such Divine-human as well as human-human dialogical relationality takes place through faith. As Gerald O'Collins observes "the experience of God's revelation in Jesus Christ called forth the faith of the founding fathers and mothers of the church and continues to call forth faith in those Christians who belong to the stage of dependent revelation."[308] More so, this same relation to the totality of the community of believers is evidently expressed in the light of the doctrine of communion of saints, so much so that the baptized child's undeveloped (yet to be developed) sense of faith is complemented by that of the faith community in which he or she is incorporated. In addition, as person, the newly baptized is "capax dei: capable of knowing God and of receiving of the gift He makes of himself"[309] the yet-to-be internalized faith experience he or she received at baptism gradually deepens and grows as years pass by, and if nurtured, soon takes on a deepened personalized response-disposition, at which time it assumes the character of an efficacious response-act (of faith).

At this stage, it becomes not just God's gift of Himself but also man's active response to the call/invitation which God extended to the then newly-baptized and continues to extend to the now-ground adult, who becomes more attuned to the deeper mysteries of the Revelation of God as man (in Jesus Christ) to which mystery he or she was introduced at baptism. Hence the development of faith in the believer takes on a dialogical character since as a 'responsive act', faith does not imply, a one-direction passive reception of the Divine *Logos,* of God's self-Revelation of Himself in the Word made flesh but it reveals the human personal commitment to the truth of faith (i.e. *logos* as person), and as such a dia-logue of persons, human and Divine.

This holds true for the individual as well as for the community extending even beyond liturgical context (i.e. prayer and worship) to include its moral expressions (i.e. deeds performed as charity), where we note the missionary drive to extend God's love to neighbor, thereby linking

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[307] J. Ratzinger, *Opera omnia*, vol. VI/2: *Jezus z Nazaretu. Studia o chrystologii* edited by K. Góźdź, M. Górecka, and translated from German to Polish by Wiesław Szymona. (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL 2015), p. 645.
[308] Gerald O'Collins, *Rethinking Fundamental Theology,* p.166.
[309] John Paul II, General Audience, Wednesday 26th August, 1998, accessed on 26th February 2020 from https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/audiences/1998/documents/hf_jp-ii_aud_26081998.pdf

faith and morality. The discussion of this aspect implicates another relational structure, namely that of "being-for". We can also show this aspect with John Paul II's analysis of the lived experience of subjectivity in the personal act of faith. The questions 'Is morality an essential dimension of the lived experience of subjectivity in the act of faith'? Could a separate analysis of lived experience of subjectivity in personal moral acts allow for a separation of faith and morality? finds most lucid answers rather in this context.

The moral context even go to highlight moral *freedom* from the light of 'revealed *truth'* made available in faith. Accordingly, Ratzinger already argued that "the most radical philosophy of freedom in our century, that of Jean Paul Sartre, …[which in denying the truth about man, proclaiming that man has no nature, but is sheer freedom] by way of separating freedom from truth concludes that there is no truth at all. And in consequence, freedom has no direction and no measure. …But this isolation of a radical concept of freedom, which for Sartre was a lived experience, shows with all desirable clarity that liberation from the truth does not produce pure freedom, but abolishes it."[310] Being quite keen to the correlation of the philosophical question of freedom in the moral sphere and the theological enquiry into the demands of faith, Ratzinger quickly noted that " the crisis of philosophical orientation has its most profound effects in the crisis of moral theological instruction. Here the connection between philosophy and theology, between rational inquiry into man and the theological enterprise, is so obvious as to be unavoidable. When the old metaphysics falls apart, the Commandments also lose their inner coherence; then there is a great temptation to set them aside as an artifact of cultural history."[311]

Our considerations in this section, which had begun with a consideration of the relation between dialogical personalism and dialogical relationality so far led us afar field into the diverse dimensions of the constitution of person from dialogical relationality as manifest in the anthropological structure of 'being-with' and 'being-for'. Since we have already treated these questions earlier in the second chapter, we shall now turn our attention towards the reception of Thomism in Ratzinger and in Wojtyła, which will lead us to the justification of our choice of Thomistic personalism rather than dialogical personalism as a dialogue partner with Ratzinger in

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[310] J. Ratzinger, "Truth and Freedom" in *Communio: International Catholic Review,* 23 (Spring 1996), 17-35, esp. pp.25-26; Cf. Pieper, J. "Kreaturlichkeit und menschenliche Natur. Anmerkungen zum philosophischen Ansatz von J. P. Sartre" in *Uber die Schwierigkeit, heute zu glauben* (München, 1974) 304-321.

[311] J. Ratzinger, *The Legacy of John Paul II: Images and Memories* trans. M.J. Miller & N.V. MacKenzie, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2005), p. 20.

the search for more practical responses to the contemporary challenges of individualism and collectivism in the final chapter.

3.2.3 The role of Thomism in shaping Ratzinger's and Wojtyła's thoughts

In her work, *Benedict XVI: A guide for the perplexed,* Tracey Rowland underscored the differences between Ratzinger's theology and Thomism. She rightly observed that during his formative years, Ratzinger had considered Thomism to be "too dry and impersonal in contrast to the works of St. Augustine"[312]. Her observations are very true to evidence and I totally agree with her. Hence it is not my intention to dispute the truth of those differences. Notably, Ratzinger's impression of Thomism as being "too dry" springs from the abstract manner, in which scholasticism of his school days was taught[313] and could not be a justified basis for his sweeping denigration of Thomism. It will also be mistaken for any scholar of Ratzinger to neglect this context through which his wrong reception of Thomism influenced his views on Thomism, given that his conclusions on the notion of person as constituted by relationality can be reconciled with the Thomistic-inspired personalism of Karol Wojtyła.

It is equally a mistake to assert that Ratzinger had rejected Thomism because it relied heavily on Aristotelian metaphysics of being, since that will equally imply that Ratzinger does not acknowledge the indispensable role which this metaphysics of being (particularly, of the 'absolute' being) plays in the theological question of God. Ratzinger himself has noted that "to deal with this question properly and to grasp the meaning of the Christian notion of God, I think we must look rather more closely both to the biblical idea of God and at the significance of philosophical thinking"[314].

Going further he specifically writes that "early Christianity boldly and resolutely made its choice and carried out its purification [of the image of God] by deciding *for* the God of the philosophers and *against* the gods of the various religions. Wherever the question arose as to which

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[312] T. Rowland, *Benedict XVI: A Guide to the Perplexed* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2010) p. 14.

[313] Ratzinger himself had testified as follows: "I had difficulties in penetrating the thought of Thomas Aquinas, whose crystal-clear logic seemed to me to be too closed in on itself, too impersonal and ready-made. This may also have had something to do with the fact that Arnold Wilmsen, the philosopher who taught us Thomas, presented us with a rigid, neoscholastic Thomism that was simply too far afield from my own questions. And yet, in and of himself, Wilmsen was an interesting man". see J. Ratzinger, *Aus Meinem Leben: Erinnerungen* 1927-1977 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1998), translated into English by Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis and published with the title *Milestones: Memoirs 1927-1977* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), p. 44.

[314] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 130.

god the Christian God corresponded, Zeus perhaps or Hermes or Dionysus or some other god, the answer ran: To none of them. To none of the gods to whom you pray but solely and alone to him to whom you do not pray, to that highest [i.e. absolute] *being* of whom your philosopher speaks"[315]. To be precise, it is this metaphysics of *being*, that Thomas Aquinas would modify from the standpoint of the primacy of *existence* (of being)[316], leading him to conclude that God is "the subsistent act of being-itself" (*ipsum esse subsistence*)[317]. The key word in Aquinas is '*subsistence*' such that it is God who eternally subsists in the act of *being* or 'to-be' which means that in God, *being* is the same thing as *existence* or as Bishop Robert Baron puts it God is the "'shear act of 'to be' itself' such that God is poetically described as 'that great ocean of existence from which the world in its entirety comes"[318].

It is equally on this metaphysical standpoint that Ratzinger's argument makes sense when he writes as follows: "Both the poverty of human existence and its fullness point to God. Where men have experienced existence in its fullness, its wealth, its beauty, and its greatness, they have always become aware that this existence is an existence for which they owe thanks [i.e. human contingency]; that precisely in its brightness and greatness it is not what I myself have obtained but the bestowed that comes to meet me, welcomes me with all its goodness before I have done anything, and thus requires of me that I *give* a meaning to such riches and thereby *receive* a meaning"[319]. Hence, we note that the metaphysics of existence with which Thomas Aquinas modifies the Aristotelian metaphysics of being remains indispensable in theological doctrine of God as the "ground of being" or the ground of all that exists"[320].

Nonetheless, these convergences on the metaphysics of being does not prove that Ratzinger is himself a Thomist, but what I intend to show from the above is that the divergences of approach to Thomism, which we may rightly point out in Ratzinger and Wojtyła need not be overstretched as to lead us to the equally wrong conclusion that Ratzinger is anti-Thomism. In fact, it can be said that no Catholic scholar trained in the 20th century could have officially sustained a thorough-going

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[315] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* Ibid., pp. 137-138.
[316] The primacy of *existence* marks the difference between Thomistic metaphysics of being and the Aristotelian metaphysics of being which focuses on *essence.*
[317] This phrase is frequently used by Thomas Aquinas according to Brian Davies, "Aquinas, God and Being" *The Monist* vol. 80, no. 4 (1997), pp. 500-520.
[318] See, R. Barron "Bishop Barron on Who God Is & Who God Is Not" Interview published on You tube on Oct., 13 2013; Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zMf_8hkCdc, Accessed on 2nd April, 2020.
[319] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 56.
[320] Paul Tillich uses these phrases in his *Systematic Theology* in 3 volumes (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1953); see also his *Theology of Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 15, 127-132.

anti-Thomist stance without coming into conflict with the Magisterium. This is so not necessarily because Thomism was sacrosanct but on account of the fact that towards the end of the 19th century, Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris* had championed the revival of Thomism in Catholic institutions. The most significant paragraphs of that encyclical is worth citing: "We exhort you, venerable brethren, in all earnestness to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it far and wide for the defense and beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the advantage of all the sciences….Let carefully selected teachers endeavor to implant the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas in the minds of students, and set forth clearly his solidity and excellence over others. Let the universities already founded or to be founded by you illustrate and defend this doctrine and use it for the refutation of prevailing errors. But, lest the false for the true or the corrupt for the pure be drunk in, be ye watchful that the doctrine of Thomas be drawn from his own fountains"[321].

The above noted Papal encyclical which promoted the cause of Thomism was published about 30 years before the birth of both Ratzinger (1927) and Wojtyła (1920) and as by the time both scholars received their high school and university educational formations in the 1940s and 1950s, Thomism was expectedly the dominant trend in the curriculum of most Catholic institutions of learning. Notably, the Fathers of the Vatican II Council, re-proposes Thomism as indispensable for the presentation of dogmatic theology in ecclesiastical institutions in such a way that "the students should learn to penetrate them more deeply with the help of speculation, under the guidance of St. Thomas, and to perceive their interconnections. They should be taught to recognize these same mysteries as present and working in liturgical actions and in the entire life of the Church. They should learn to seek the solutions to human problems under the light of revelation, to apply the eternal truths of revelation to the changeable conditions of human affairs and to communicate them in a way suited to men of our day"[322].

Until today, we can still say that Thomism had remained the official Catholic tradition in both theology and philosophy, hence in the 2017 Apostolic Constitution on ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties, Pope Francis, cites the Second Vatican Council's *Optatam Totius,* no. 15, to buttress the guidelines he promulgated to the effect that "the research and teaching of

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[321] Leo XII, *Aeterni Patris: On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy* (Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1879) no. 31.
[322] Vatican II Council, *Optatam Totius,* no. 16.

philosophy in Ecclesiastical Faculty of Philosophy must be rooted in the philosophical tradition which …has developed throughout history, with special attention to the work of St. Thomas Aquinas"[323]. Hence, it is appropriate for our purposes here, to draw the attention of the reader, that our attempt to contrast Ratzinger's and Wojtyła's reception of Thomism, serves only the purpose of counterbalancing their approaches to the discourse on 'person' rather than a presentation of Ratzinger's non-committal attitude towards Thomism, about which issue Tracey Rowland had already offered a better explanation, when she explained that during his formative years, Ratzinger was not impressed with the scholastic curriculum with which he was being educated since for him "it was in part the ahistorical character of the work of St Thomas which left Ratzinger with the impression that Thomism is too dry and impersonal, in contrast to the works of Augustine, for whom, 'the passionate, suffering, question man is always right there, and one can identify with him'"[324].

Accordingly, we note that whereas Wojtyła follows the classical Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition and sought for inspirations for his personalism from this same tradition, Ratzinger will however take to the theological tradition of St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure, (the former of whose philosophical leanings swing towards Neoplatonist traditions, and the latter, being a Franciscan, is understandably out of sync with the Dominican tradition of Thomas Aquinas). In Poland, Wojtyła represents in the main the classical tradition of Thomistic thought.

During the 1960s, when he was teaching at the Catholic University of Lublin, Karol Wojtyła had delivered a paper on Thomistic personalism at one of the annual philosophical week events[325]. In that paper, which was later translated into English from its Polish original version by Theresa Sandok and then published together with other essays in the fourth volume of the *Catholic Thought from Lublin,*[326] Wojtyła claims that Thomas Aquinas' philosophy and theology presented the problem of the person very clearly such that it could be argued that he is a precursor to contemporary personalism in general. He notes that "St. Thomas was familiar with the concept of person and defined it very clearly. This is not to say, however, that he was equally familiar with the problem of personalism or that he presented it as clearly as the problem of the person. We

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[323] Pope Francis, *Veritatis Gaudium,* art. 63, par. 1.
[324] T. Rowland, *Benedict XVI: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: T & T Clark, 2010), p.14. She also cites Joseph Ratzinger, *Salt of the Earth: The Church at the End of the Millennium* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), p. 61.
[325] Cf. K. Wojtyła, "Personalizm tomistyczny," *Znak* 13 (1961): 664-675.
[326] See, K. Wojtyła, "Person and Community: Selected Essays", in *Catholic Thought From Lublin* vol. 4. edited by Andrew N. Woznicki, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), pp.165-175.

would however be correct in thinking that, since he presented the problem of the person so clearly, he also provided at least a point of departure for personalism in general. And although the problem of personalism was formulated much later – in any case, …his overall philosophy and theology allows us to speak of Thomistic personalism. We find in his system not just a point of departure, but also a whole series of additional constitutive elements that allows us to examine the problem of personalism in the categories of St. Thomas' philosophy and theology"[327].

Nevertheless, a fuller appreciation of John Paul II's theological and philosophical vision of person as a representative of Thomistic personalism, entails that we situate his approach in the wider context of those traditions we can group as Thomistic. This is so because Thomism in general is not monolithic school. We can in fact speak of, at least, three kinds of Thomism: traditional Thomism, transcendental Thomism and the existential Thomism. The first of these takes its basic metaphysical assumptions from the interpretations of Thomas Aquinas by his Dominican confreres as represented in the 16th century Italian Cardinal, Thomas de Vio Cajetan and the seventeenth century Iberian (Portuguese) John of St. Thomas, hence it is referred to as traditional Thomism. Karol Wojtyła's earliest introduction to Thomism was from this tradition as the recommended curriculum for seminary training *"ad mentem sancti Thomae"*[328] during his training for the priesthood and that of Ratzinger was set in this tradition. Subsequently, during his doctoral studies (1946-1948) at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas ('Angelicum'), he also deepened his mastery of the basic assumptions of traditional Thomism under the influence of his thesis[329] supervisor, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.

Furthermore, the other two schools of Thomism (transcendental and existential), could be considered as neo-Thomistic trends: transcendental Thomism is largely characterized by a reaction to Kantianism and neo-Kantianism, hence "faced with Kant's impressive claim that the philosopher cannot have any certain knowledge of about reality"[330], transcendental Thomism took up the challenge of showing that knowledge of reality-in-itself (i.e. the Kantian 'noumena') is

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[327] K. Wojtyła, "Thomistic Personalism" in *Catholic Thought from Lublin* vol. 4 (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), p. 165.

[328] J. Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), p. 49.

[329] See, K. Wojtyła, *Faith According to St. John of the Cross* translated by Jordan Aumann, (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2009).

[330] M. Rohlf, "Immanuel Kant" *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (online version), first published May 20, 2020, substantive revision on January 25, 2016. Available from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/. Accessed on April 4th, 2020.

epistemologically possible in the light of Thomistic philosophy. Given its focus on realistic cognition, it is primarily concerned with epistemology rather than metaphysics as such. For this reason, it is prone to the confusion of metaphysics with ontology. Karol Wojtyła's earliest introduction to transcendental Thomism was through the work *Ontologia czyli Metafizyka* by Rev. Kazimierz Weis of Lwów. Weis himself was influenced by the transcendental Thomism of Desire Cardinal Mercier from Louvain, "who tried to rethink Thomism in relationship to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant"[331]. In contemporary theological anthropology, Karl Rahner is arguably the most popular transcendental Thomist, given his method of analyzing epistemological experience of knowledge and freedom from the perspective of the man's openness to "absolute and limitless transcendentality"[332].

Lastly, is the existential Thomism, which has become associated with Etienne Gilson, who considers traditional Thomism as having acquired an overtly essentialist character thanks to the influence of Neoplatonists. As a remedy, he insists that existence, rather than essence, is the core question in the realistic metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. On this count, he attempts to ground contemporary Christian Thomistic philosophy on the primacy of existence of being. Gilson is convinced that a revival of true Thomism should begin from this primacy of existence, if it must retrieve the authentic teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas "freed from glosses, commentaries and historical misinterpretations arising from its overtly essentialists trappings due to influences from such figures like Cajetan, John Duns Scotus and Avicenna"[333].

When Karol Wojtyła came to teach at the Catholic University of Lublin, he encountered this existentialist Thomism already being popularized by Mieczyslaw Albert Krapiec, who was a student of the Dominican Jacek Woroniecki and together with Professor Stefan Swiezawski, they all established the Lublin School of Philosophy on the basis of the already existing tradition of existential Thomism at the Catholic University of Lublin. Having been influenced at specific stages of his academic life by a variety of schools of Thomism, it is simply justified that we take Karol Wojtyła as a representative of the Thomistic philosophy, with whom we can propose as a

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[331] See P. Egan, *Philosophy and Catholic Theology: A Primer* (Michael Glazier, Inc. 2009).
[332] Cf. Karl Rahner, "Reflections on Methodology in Theology" in *Theological Investigations* (New York: Crossroad, 1994). see also a representative presentation of views from Rahner's critics regarding his methods in Francis Schussler Fiorenza, "Method in Theology," in *The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner,* ed. Mary E Hines and Declan Marmion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 65-68.
[333] CF. A. Helms, "Etienne Gilson, Dun Scotus, and Actual Existence" *Studia Gilsoniana* vol. 6, no. 3 (July-September 2017), pp. 331-364.

comparative partner for Ratzinger's anthropological vision of the human person. Put in other words, the contrast of alternative starting points is highlighted from the divergent anthropological assumptions of Wojtyła's Aristotelo-Thomistico-Schelerian personalism and those of Ratzinger's Augustino-Bonaventuro-Buberian personalism.

Chapter Summary

This chapter serves as a preparatory discourse on what will follow in the next and final chapter. It attempts to clear the path for an eventual dialogue of two scholars whose approach are different to the discourse on the notion of person. The one is Joseph Ratzinger, who is the major proponent of in the eventual discourse and the other is Karol Wojtyła, whose personalism I intend to bring into harmony with Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by relationality.

Accordingly, the chapter open with a consideration of their different starting points. As expected, the Ratzingerian theological starting point beings with the revealed mystery of God and proceeds deductively to the application of the notion of person to the human being. On the other hand, Karol Wojtyła takes a philosophical approach and given the "anthropological turn"[334]in contemporary philosophy, he kicks off from man's lived experience of being a person. Both starting points have their pros and cons but eventually they meet on the key point of the constitutive relationality of persons, which equally applies to man as we already noted in Ratzinger's anthropological structures of *being-from*, *being-with* and *being-for* as discussed in chapter two.

The second section of the chapter discussed the place of Ratzinger and Wojtyła in the personalistic movement which was popularized in the twentieth century. It was noted that Wojtyła is more involved in this personalistic tradition as he had devoted the greater part of his philosophical work, particularly in ethics on the formulations of the personalistic norm in dialogue with Immanuel Kant and Max Scheler, influence the Lublin School of Philosophy with his brand of personalism which also infected the theological faculty of the Catholic University of Lublin in which this dissertation is being prepared. Ratzinger on the other hand is not a thorough-going

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[334] See A. Losinger, *The Anthropological Turn: The Human Orientation of the Theology of Karl Rahner* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000); Also, J. Collins, *The Anthropological Turn: French Political Thought After 1968* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020); also A. K. Giri and J. Clammer, "Philosophy and Anthropology in Dialogues and Conversations" in . K. Giri and J. Clammer*, Philosophy and Anthropology: Border Crossing and Transformations* (London: Anthem Press, 2013), pp. 1-18.

personalist but he has produced original ideas on the notion of person, one of which is the constitution of person by dialogical relationality, which is the main thesis of this dissertation.

After considering the place of the two scholars in personalism the final section of the chapter, then undertook a classificatory overview of Thomism as a school with several traditions with a view to the location of the place of Ratzinger and Wojtyła in Thomism. Ratzinger was noted as not so much drawn to Thomism as much as Wojtyła and so his views on person is more or less taken from the personalism of Martin Buber which drew from the Hebraic tradition of person as constituted by dialogical relationality. On the other hand, Wojtyła's personalism is shown to be heavily influenced by Thomism and so we traced his gradual adoption of the existentialist tradition of Thomism propagated by French Thomists such as Etienne Gilson and Jacque Maritain.

The consideration of Thomism served the purpose of demonstrating that Wojtyła's personalism is Thomistic and so in the selection of his personalism as a dialogue partner with Ratzinger, I also intend to show that the general consensus that he does not follows the Thomistic tradition, recommended by the Official Magisterium of the Catholic Church, does not imply that he is anti-Thomist or that his views on person is irreconcilable with Thomism. On both counts, I attempted to show that the Pope Emeritus all along has not been against Thomism even if he does not draw much inspiration for his theological work from the Angelic Doctor. I also made efforts to highlight that Wojtyła's brand of Thomism stems from the French Thomists one of whom is Jacque Maritain, whose discourse on personalism will serve as a moderator of the Ratzingerian-Wojtylean dialogue in the next chapter, the overall objective of which will be to contribute some flashpoints to the contemporary challenges posed by individualism and collectivism to personalism.

CHAPTER FOUR:

RECTIFICATION OF ANTI-PERSONALISTIC TRENDS: 'INDIVIDUALISM' AND 'COLLECTIVISM'

Introduction

In this chapter, I shall investigate the possibility of applying Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by relationality in Wojtyła's Thomistic personalism in attempts to grapple with the problems of individualism and collectivism. The objective of grappling with these noted problems is expected to be achieved through a complementary reading of Ratzinger's *relationality* of persons with Wojtyła's *intersubjectivism* in his participation of persons in co-actions for the common good.

As it is the objective of the last section of this chapter, to propose a response to the excesses of individualism and collectivism from a personalistic point of view, I shall attempt to justify whey I select Karol Wojtyła rather than other equally significant personalist scholars, given that Jacque Maritain had remarked "there are at least a dozen personalist doctrines, which at times, have nothing more in common than the term 'person'"[335].

Given the multiplicity of personalism within contemporary philosophical traditions, a key question to which a justified selection needs to provide a satisfactory response should be its relevance to the proposed objective. In other words, does it provide, more than other personalists, a relevant context for discussing the questions posed by the individualism and collectivism? The Thomistic personalism of Karol Wojtyła certainly meets these two criteria as it both considers the anthropological perspectives of 'individualism' (e.g. lived experience of *subjectivity* of the *I*) and 'social relations' (e.g. 'participation' as the *intersubjective* experience of the *I* of the other). Accordingly, in this chapter, I shall engage contemporary Thomistic personalism as exemplified in Karol Wojtyła as a suitable dialogical partner with Ratzinger's theo-logical notion of person in the search for an adequate personalistic response to the problems of individualism and collectivism.

Having presented an overview of what this final chapter intends to achieve, I shall now investigate on the possible applications of Ratzinger's relationality of person in Wojtyła's Thomistic personalism. In doing this, I shall present my arguments in two sections, the first which employs the Wojtylean notion of 'subjectivity' and the Ratzingerian 'loneliness' will attempt to

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[335] J. Maritain, *Person and Common Good,* p.13.

consider the problem of individuality and the second which will take the Wojtylean notion of 'participation' and Ratzingeran 'relationality' will attempt to consider the problem of collectivism.

4.1. 'Individualism' as an anti-personalist 'atrophication' of the '*I*'

While the individual is equally the person, individualism suffocates the dynamism of the person as a subject constituted by relationality to the *other.* In search of an explanation for the basis of polarity between the individual and the person, Jacque Maritain undertook the scholarly task of distinguishing between 'individuality' and 'personality' in his work *Person and Common Good,* where he writes as follows: "the human being is caught between two poles; a material pole, which, in reality, does not concern the true person but rather the shadow of personality or what, in strict sense, is called *individuality,* and a spiritual pole, which does concern *true personality*"[336]. Maritain's maintains that his description of individuality as a 'shadow' of personality corresponds to the distinction made in Hindu philosophy between the *ego* and the *self*[337].

By describing the individual as a *shadow*, he intends to draw attention to the way the 'self' is a reflection, a shadow of the 'ego', of the *I.* This distinction does not refer to a division of the human being into a 'self' and an 'ego', an 'individual' and a 'person' but in Maritain, the reference implicated is to the closed particularity of the individual as 'self' and open, free liberty of the person as 'ego', as an *I,* hence he explains: "individuality is opposed to the state of universality….it designates the concrete state of unity and indivision, …in virtue of which every actually or possibly existing nature can posit itself in existence as distinct from other beings"[338].

We thus note already that individuality is opposed to relationality since its meaning arises from separability from others, from its isolation and singling out from the *other.* Following Thomas Aquinas, Maritain maintains that "individuality is rooted in matter insofar as matter requires the occupation in space of a position distinct from every other position"[339]. Such an account of individuality describes the practical implementation of the policy of social distancing which requires that people, who must go to public places, take of a locational space of at least 2 meters, from other people. Just like other national governments, an excerpt from the many rules

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[336] J. Maritain, *Person and Common Good,* p. 33.
[337] J. Maritain, Ibid., 34.
[338] Ibid. 34.
[339] Ibid., 35.

and regulations published by the Polish Government reads as follows: „Wychodzenie z domu powinno być ograniczone do absolutnego minimum, a odległość utrzymana od innych pieszych powinna wynosić co najmniej 2 metry" (Leaving the house should be kept at an absolute minimum and the distance from other pedestrians should be at least 2 meters)[340]. That individuality takes on the features of matter, including its positional circumscription in space (i.e. spatiality and so extentionality) as distinct from other beings allows Maritain to describe man's individuality in terms of man's corporeality, such that he is able to conclude that "In man, as in all other corporeal beings, the atom, the molecule, the plant, the animal, individuality has its first ontological roots in matter. Such is St. Thomas' doctrine on the individuality of material things. This common characteristic of all existents, namely, that in order to exist they must be undivided and distinct from every other existence does not in corporeal beings, derive from the form which constitutes them at such and such a degree of specific intelligibility…In each of us, individuality, being that which excludes from oneself all that other men are, could be described as the narrowness of the ego, forever threatened and forever eager to grasp for itself (i.e. selfishness)"[341].

In contrast to individuality, Maritain describes personality as follows: "Unlike the concept of the individuality of corporeal things, the concept of personality is related not to matter but to the deepest and highest dimensions of being. Its roots are in the spirt inasmuch as the spirit holds itself in existence and superabounds in existence. …Personality is the subsistence of the spiritual soul communicated to the human composite…. Personality, therefore, signifies interiority to self. And because it is the spirit in man which takes him, in contrast to the plant and animal, beyond the threshold of independence properly so called, and of interiority to oneself, the subjectivity of the person has nothing in common with the isolated unity, without doors and windows, of the Leibnizian monad. It requires the communication of knowledge and love. By the very fact that each of us is a person and expresses himself to himself, each of us requires communication with *other* and the *others* in the order of knowledge and love. Personality, of its essence, requires a dialogue in which souls really communicate"[342].

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[340] Serwis Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, „Aktualne zasady i ograniczenia" (Current Rules and Regulations) in *Koronawirus: Informacje i zalecenia* (Coronavirus: Information and Recommendations) Available from https://www.gov.pl/web/koronawirus/aktualne-zasady-i-ograniczenia. Accessed on 3rd April, 2020.
[341] J. Maritain, *Person and Common Good,* pp. 36-37.
[342] J. Maritain, ibid., pp. 40-42.

From the above, we can surmise that Maritain's distinction between individuality and personality lies on the distinctive difference between our corporeal nature and our spiritual nature but it will equally be mistaken to conclude that Maritain is a dualist for he acknowledges the integral unity of man's body and soul, for he warns as follows: "If our description is adequate, such are the two metaphysical aspects of the human being, individuality and personality, together with their proper ontological features. However, evident it may seem, in order to avoid misunderstandings and nonsense, we must emphasize that they are not separate things. There is not in me one reality, called my individual and another reality called my person. Our whole being is an individual by reason of that in us which derives from matter, and a person by reason of that in us which derives from spirit. Similarly, the whole of a painting is a physico-chemical mixture by reason of the coloring stuff of which it is made, and the whole of it is a work of beauty by reason of the painter's art"[343].

Given the above presentation of the distinction between individuality and personality, we can ask the following question: How does the distinction which Maritain makes above help our understanding of the contemporary problem of individualism, which social-distancing – irrespective of its necessity in such times of emergency, introduces into our social culture and how can the personalism of Karol Wojtyła and Ratzinger's notion of person as dialogical relationality provide us with a counterbalancing culture to mitigate the challenges of individualism?

4.1.1 Individualism and subjectivity of the 'I'

It is very easy to conflate the notion of subjectivity with that of individualism. Already, we noted from Maritain's claim that subjectivity of the person has nothing in common with isolated unity, without doors and windows[344]. In Wojtyła's personalism, the distinction between individual and subjectivism appears at the beginning of his reflection, when he contradistinguished between two kinds of individuals, on account of the experience or non-experience of self-consciousness: *something* and *somebody*[345]. In Wojtyła, the distinction between something and somebody highlights a difference of the human individual and a non-human individual. Ratzinger however takes up this distinction to show what differentiates Israel's faith in a personal God from the

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[343] J. Maritain, *Person and Common Good,* p. 43.
[344] J. Maritain, ibid., p. 4.1.
[345] K. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person,* 74, 80.

polytheistic faith of her neighbours in idols which are non-personal and so can neither see nor hear (see Ps. 115:6; Jeremiah 5:21). Ratzinger's distinction goes even more deeper in showcasing the constitution of God as Person by dialogical (communicative) relationality hence he argues: "Israel has dared to adore something absolute (i.e. a non-descript *suppositum*) as Absolute Someone (a suppositum *personalorum*). This and only this is the most important difference between them and their polytheistic neighbours. Polytheism is not a statement of the diversity of the Absolute Being (as we usually naively assume), it is based rather on the idea of its unavailability. Monotheism differs from polytheism not by acknowledging the unity of the Absolute (this is the essential content of human consciousness, which is also sustained by materialism in its concept of the absolute matter); the difference is much more in faith in its accessibility and its own ability to communicate. If we think about it, we can see that modern consciousness is very close to the basic assumptions of polytheism and that today, it has just become a temptation that threatens us"[346] (i.e. closed individualism, unavailability to the *other,* activism without relativity to the *other,* a subjectivism of the *I* that transmogrifies into relativism and collectivism, without communicating itself, without transcending the *I* and so remains a *something,* a non-descript *suppositum,* hence individualism is opposed to the dialogical relationality constituting the personal *I* as 'somebody' since in its closedness to itself, it makes the 'self' to become a '*thingified* suppositum' and a contemporary 'idol', having lost the dialogical relationality to experience real communication with neighbor and with God.

Whereas Ratzinger draws out the distinction between 'something' and 'somebody' in the context of the difference between a personal God of Israel and non-personal gods of polytheists, Wojtyła's follows a different route of explanation as he stays within the distinction between human *persons* and non-personal *things.* He then singles out the human *suppositum* and tries to show the difference between individual human beings and human persons. Thus, he goes further to highlight

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[346] Cf. J. Ratzinger, *Opera omnia*, vol. VIII/2: *Kościół – znak wśród narodów. Pisma eklezjologiczne i ekumeniczne*, ed. K. Góźdź, M. Górecka, trans. by Wiesław Szymona (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL 2013), p. 965 [The cited words were translated by me from the Original Polish excerpts which reads as follows: „Izrael odważył się *coś* absolutnego adorować jako *Kogoś* absolutnego. Na tym i tylko na tym polega istotna różnica dzieląca go od politeizmu, w tym także dokonuje się decydujące historyczne przezwyciężenie politeizmu. Politeizm nie jest konstatacją różnorodności Bytu absolutnego (jak zazwyczaj naiwnie zakładamy), opiera się raczej na wyobrażeniu jego niedostępności. Monoteizm zaś różni się od politeizmu nie przez uznanie jedności Absolutu (jest to istotna treść ludzkiej świadomości, podtrzymywana również przez materializm w jego koncepcji absolutności materii); różnica tkwi o wiele bardziej w wierze w jego dostępność i jego własną umiejętność komunikacji. Jeśli się nad tym zastanowimy, to widzimy, że współczesna świadomość jest bardzo bliska podstawowych założeń politeizmu i że dzisiaj właśnie stał się on znowu pokusą grożącą nam wszystkim…"].

a further difference between the human individual as a *suppositum* and a human personal 'I' as a *subject*, as an *ego*. These distinctions are so fundamental that he considers them at the very start of his long discourse on the human being in the field of ethical actions, wherein the '*I'* is a personal subject of action. In this context, it is easy to single out the *I,* as an actor and as an efficient subject, separable from the actions as objects in relation to their subjects. The actions of the 'I' are not substances on their own, hence they are accidents of the I. As accidents, they do not constitute the I as a substance but rather stand in ethical relation to the I as their subject. The I-act relations is not an essential constitutive factor of the I, but so also are other relations which the I enters into with its categorical accidents, non-essential to the I's existence in itself.

Thus, unlike Ratzinger, who privileges relationality and in fact erases the Aristotelian distinction between substance and relations, Wojtyła grounds his notion of man as person on the classical metaphysics of the human suppositum as a substance, a somebody, who is a subject of relations, upon which foundation he moves on to the very core of personal dynamism of the *I,* as an *ego,* a *subject*. This starting point from the individual suppositum aims at highlighting that man as man is an individual like every other individual being but in the sense in which we speak of man as a person, we move on to the transcendence of the closed individualism of the human *suppositum* towards the transcendence-oriented openness of the human being as a person[347], at which point the consideration of the *subjectivity* of the 'I' is manifest and from which it proceeds even more and more towards *intersubjectivity,* which will anchor his considerations on 'participation', which as we shall come to see in the second part of this chapter, approximates Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by dialogical relationality.

For Wojtyła, the category of subject properly belongs to the personal *I* as an *ego* but we can also speak of the individual *I,* certainly as the *self.* The distinction between the individual *I-self,* and that of individual *I-ego* is more evident in Hindu philosophy as Jacque Maritain observed[348]. However, Wojtyła does not follow the Hindu philosophical tradition in his reflections on the personal *I,* but he takes a cue from the Greek philosophical tradition, in which the notion of

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[347] In his *Acting Person,* Wojtyła undertook a broad interdisciplinary analysis of the notion of person as can be noted in his own testimony regarding his dialogue partners: "I wish not only to discuss a question that seems to me to be crucial for the concept of the human person and for the creative continuation of St. Thomas' thought in this area in relation to different schools of contemporary thought, especially phenomenology, but also to inform you of the state of this question among Catholic philosophers in Poland today". see, K. Wojtyła, "Osobowa struktura samostanowienia," in Karol Wojtyła, *Person and Community*: *Selected Essays*, pp. 187-188.
[348] J. Maritain, *Person and Common Good,* p. 34.

'person' evokes the nuances of the sense of the Greek term "hypostasis" – that which stands under as a *subject* in relation to *other* categorical entities which it carries. Hence Wojtylean begins by distinguishing the close individuality of the *thing* (something), and the *suppositum* of the *person* (somebody). This *personal suppositum* is however considered from its *relationality* as a "subject" of ethical acts. We note that even though relationality of the subject or the relational subjectivity of the *I,* is here highlighted, it still does not yet show the very kind of relationality towards *another I,* but rather a relationality towards "acts" of one's own I. The specific inter-personal relationality will later be considered by Wojtyła in his discussion on 'participation'. In the meantime, it suffices to simply highlight the *relational subjectivity of the I* as an underlying ground (for its accidents: actions, activations, and relations, as the case may be), which is captured by the Greek "*hupokeimenon*", which the Latin translates as "subjectum". It is thus noted that in his personalistic considerations, Wojtyła begins with the analysis of the suppositum as a 'subject', the personal subject, which underlies all operations, (actions: *moral*, activations: *emotions*, relations: *political*, *cultural*).

At this stage, we are already touching the very ultimate basis of relationality in Wojtyła's anthropology, namely the "subject" as the *term* of relations. Given this starting point from the experience of '*subjectivity'* as the primary element (term) of relationality of persons, other elements which follow from this 'I-*subject*' as ultimate 'term' of relationality will be deduced, namely 'personal *efficacy* of the subject in the context of its actions and relations; and *self-determination* as the concrete manifestation of this personal efficacy in relation to the conscious and volitive freedom of personal 'I' in all its efficacious personal actions (including the subjective actions and the intersubjective free participation in the actualizing the common good). Notably, through such a relation, especially in the context of intersubjective, the personal 'I', transcends its subjectivity and reaches to the experience of the humanity of 'others' such that the constitutive relationality of persons becomes an experiential reality manifestly present in the communion of persons.

Furthermore, a distinction of the notion of 'individualism' from that of 'subjectivity' can be made from the senses of the terms 'self-assertiveness' and 'self-determination'[349]. In colloquial

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[349] In a paper on the personal structure of self-determination, which he presented at Naples in 1974, Wojtyła announced as follows: "the problem of the personal structure of self-determination lies at the very heart of my study *The Acting Person.* In presenting this problem here, I also wish at the outset to emphasize its connection with my native Polish philosophical milieu, with its interests and creative inquiries, which are distinctly connected with overall trends in

usage, the one connotes the context of individualism and the other that of subjectivity. This connotation can be seen from the analysis of the *self-transcendence* of 'self-determination' in Wojtyła, which contrasts from the *self-reflexivity* of 'self-assertiveness' in colloquial language. When we describe a person as self-determined, resolute, we intend to implicate a certain power of the will which seem to drive whatsoever action this person commits himself or herself. In a sense, we are describing a decisive character in someone who can get things done, despite other constraining external influences outside the self. In its true sense, self-determination originates from the individual, but its teleology certainly goes beyond the individual since it describes the resolution to bring oneself to do something, to be determined for *something, someone* other than the 'I'. In this sense, it reveals the Ratzingerian anthropological structure of "being-for"[350], which we discussed in the previous chapter. Since the will "as a property of the person"[351] stands out in Wojtyła's subjectivity of 'self-determination' is the most essential element, he concludes that it is through the will that "I determine myself as often as I bring myself to act. I am the author of my act, and my agency in this act, that is, my will, turns out to be self-determination"[352].

Obviously, he reflects within the context of ethics as can be deduced in the following words, "morality is connected with freedom, and therefore with the will…. Morality presupposes knowledge, the truth concerning the good, but it is realized by willing, by choice, by decision. In this way, not only does our will become good or evil, but our whole person also becomes good or evil. Thanks to our will, we are masters of ourselves and of our actions, but because of this the value of these actions of our will qualifies our whole person positively or negatively"[353]. Wojtyła's approach obviously does not draw inspiration from Augustine rather he takes a Thomistic perspective and demonstrates that "freedom is not given to us as an end in itself, but as a means to a greater end. Freedom for freedom's sake has no justification in the Thomistic view of the cosmos; freedom exists for the sake of morality and, together with morality, for the sake of a higher spiritual law and order of existence – the kind of order that most strictly corresponds to rational beings, which are persons"[354].

European thought". see, K. Wojtyła, "Osobowa struktura samostanowienia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 29.2 (1981): 5-12. A paper presented at an International conference on St. Thomas Aquinas, Rome – Naples, 17-24 April 1974.

[350] See, J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p.67.

[351] K. Wojtyła, "Participation" in *Person and Community: Selected Essays,* p.199.

[352] K. Wojtyła, "Participation" in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, p. 199.

[353] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, p. 172.

[354] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, ibid.

The above description of Wojtyła's ethical description of the will's potency for self-determination implicates that in its ultimate source in the will of a person, self-determination is essentially a personal choice. This personal feature of self-determination is not only present in human choice but it is equally in Divine personal choice, for instance in Exodus 6:7, we read of God self-determination to choose Israel as His own people: "I will take you as my own people and I will be your God". In this passage, we note not only the self-determined act of choice (selection) but also a self-determination of the Divine *I* to be present *for* Israel, revealing not only a Divine personal structure of *being-for,* but also the personal structure of *being-with,* hence Ratzinger notes that "God is he…who grants himself; he is there *for* us, …The God who 'is' [self-subsisting existence] is at the same time he who is *with* us; he is not just God in himself; rather he is our God"[355]. The human person's response to God's self-determination of His Divine *I,* to be *for* us and *with* us, is what we call faith in God. Even in this response act of the human person also implicates a personal experience of 'self-determination' to serve God, to love and obey Him – all of which personal decisions are included in the act of faith.

This experience of the subjectivity of 'self-determination' in man's religious act of faith is thus to be understood basically as a freely chosen human act. Faith is a personal choice, through which man determines himself or rather orients his *I* towards God's initiative to enter into relationship with man. Granted that from the human standpoint, faith takes the structure of a *response*-act which might be structurally different from God's *initiative*-act, yet in the lived experience of the act of faith, the human being experiences his subjectivity, and his self-determination towards God. As a truly personal act, the human person who makes the act of faith experiences himself as a *believer,* hence *a self-determined subject* in much the same way he experiences his subjectivity as interiorly-determined from within (*I believe*) just as in an ethical action (*I act*). Hence, the analysis of the most central core of this lived experience of efficacious subjectivity of self-determination in the context of ethical (moral) actions applies to all other experiences of efficacious subjectivity of self-determination in the context of all human actions, including the religious act of faith.

Our considerations of the lived experience of "self-determination" in the act of faith is that of a lived experience of human attempts to actualize personal commitment to an interpersonal (man-God) relationship. The very significant core of such a commitment can be said to have begun

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[355] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 67.

at the very moment of the baptism but it should not be said that human leanings towards God is exhausted in this moment rather it is more true to experience that internal yearnings for God stretches historically backwards to creation and forwards to eschatological fulfillment just as St Paul noted: "For we know that the whole creation groans and travails in pain together until now. And not only so, but ourselves also, who have the first-fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for our adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body" (Romans 8:22-23).

The problem of individualism does not arise in the subjective experience of the human act of faith, since man's self-determination in this context is always oriented towards the Divine *Other*. It is important to reiterate this point especially today when most churches and religious prayer houses are closed to the public as part of the measures to reduce the spread of the COVID-19. The expression of the act of faith is always oriented towards the relationality of persons, even when we pray alone. The act of faith is essentially a personal striving to actualize a determined commitment to interpersonal relationship with Christ, Gerald O' Collins draws from the senses of meaning already provided by the terms 'fides qua' and 'fides quae' to give the following explanation: "Since revelation offers a vision of *Someone* (i.e. a divine *Other*) to whom we should give our total allegiance and of whom we can also give some account, we can speak of faith as involving both 'believing in' and 'believing that'. A trusting and obedient adherence [a commitment] to Jesus Christ (*fides qua creditur*) allows believers to express [a confession] something of who he is and what he has revealed, giving their assent to truths about God that have now been disclosed (*fides quae creditur*)"[356].

Seen as an act which implicates relationality of person expressed through our total allegiance, faith is obviously not a passive act and even more so, it requires a personal self-determination towards its object, the Person of Jesus Christ. The structure of faith, as constituted by 'interpersonal' (human-divine Persons) relations thus manifests the intersubjectivity of the '*I-Other*' structure of relationality which constitutes personal beings. This relational structure is given in lived experience ("I-experience-*myself*"), as a Christian believer and I also experience the object of my believe as a Person ("*I*-experience-*Christ*"). Thus, what our considerations of man's subjectivity of the lived experience of "self-determination" focuses is not necessarily the propositional articles ('object') of faith but essentially on lived experience of the most essential

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[356] Gerald O' Collins, *Rethinking Fundamental Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 166-167.

features of *fides qua* as an attitude of faith 'commitment', which the believer experiences as the one (subject) who believes.

The above considered context of the faith experience of self-determination towards God, does not in any way encounter the problems of individualism since even without a community of worshippers, we are also oriented towards a personal *Other*. Ratzinger has always considered the faith experience in its original baptismal context which right from the start presents the believer as a member of a community of believers but even in situations where this community cannot gather for worship, for such reasons as a public health emergency (e.g. COVID-19), the constitution of persons by relationality remains integral to the experience of faith.

Aside the above considerations of the ethical and religious instances which manifest the distinction between subjectivity and individualism, particularly in the experience of self-determination, there exists a specific context when the subjective experience of self-determination as oriented towards the human *others,* can acquire an individualistic connotation, namely when it reflects a certain attitude of 'assertiveness'. This is the sense in which it is described in Maritain's discourse on the distinction between individual and person. Maritain imagined a common perceptive experience in our everyday society as follows: "When we represent someone as 'self-assertive,' do we not mean that he is self-centered, imperious, and dominating – scarcely capable of friendship? A distinguished contemporary artist once remarked 'I do not like others'; a remark that reveals a strongly asserted personality. In this sense, we might construe personality to consist in self-realization, achieved at the expense of others"[357].

Thus, we see that the challenge which man's potency for 'self-determination', as it carries with an openness both towards personalism as much as towards 'individualism'. It is in this sense that Christoph Cardinal Schönborn writes as follows: "the openness and indefiniteness of man is both his weakness and at the same time his strength; but he is most of all distinguished by *self-determination,* the wonderful and unique good of *freedom*"[358]. It is however notable that while acknowledging this challenge of man's freedom and openness to transcend the individuality of the *self*, Schönborn maintains that self-determination remains the proper end of human freedom.

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[357] J. Maritain, *Person and Common Good,* p. 31.
[358] C. Schönborn, "What is Man that Thou At Mindful of Him?: Is Man Really the Crown of Creation?" (Vienna: St. Stephen's Cathedral, 2006), retrieved on 4th March 2020 from https://www.catholiceducation.org/en/science/faith-and-science/what-is-man-that-thou-are-mindful-of-him-is-man-really-the.html

Maritain is thus corroborated when he presents the distinction between the self-determination that characterizes personalism as follows: "Each of us is subject to the determinism of the physical world. Nonetheless, each of us is also a person and as such, is not controlled by the stars. We exist not only as other things do, but eminently, in self-possession, holding ourselves in hand, master of ourselves. Personality is thus an imprint or seal which enables us to possess our existence, to perfect and give ourselves freely. For although each of our acts is simultaneously the act of ourselves as an individual and as a person, yet, by the very fact that it is free and involves our whole being, each act is linked in a movement towards the supreme center to which personality tends"[359].

Furthermore, we can observe that 'self-assertiveness', unlike self-determination is closed to the particularity of the individual, as it reveals the insensitivity of the 'self' to the parallel value of my personal *I* to the *I* of the *other* persons. It also fails to actualize the self-determination as the good which freedom of the *I,* tends because it does not transcend the *self,* and so does not actualize the personal relationality towards the *other.* It takes on the trajectory of 'individualism' and does not transcend the individual self. Given that individuality is a 'shadow' of personality in Maritain, self-assertiveness which is only but a semblance of the personal significance of self-determination introduces a false measure within the category of persons. Hence, we can note the difference between individualism and personalism from the way 'self-assertivism' re-enforces individualism while self-determinism opens up the subjective *ego* towards intersubjective relationality of persons.

4.1.2 'Individualism' and relationality of the 'I'

Taken in its strict sense, individualism purports to hold the view that it is possible to separate the *I,* (understood here as the 'self') from its relations, at least from its relations to other persons. In a way, individualism radicalizes the question of the difference between the *I* and *others.* This difference between individualism and relationality of the *I* is not obvious since each one of us, humans, tends to take the fact of the existence of the 'I' for granted. We rarely go beyond this fact in our spontaneous awareness. The *I* exists, and we know this from a conscious experiential access to our own 'I', in our 'self-awareness'. But in what way do we experience the *I* in our

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[359] J. Maritain, ibid., pp. 38, 41, 43.

consciousness? We experience the *I,* in its 'unity' as the center of all streams of consciousness, as the unifying ground of whatsoever the *self* can related itself to or is related to.

Perhaps, we can have a purely experience of the *I* as separated from the things it unifies (i.e. from its relationality to circumstances *of the self).* I do neither know nor have I heard of any example of such an experience in reality. Certainly, from a conceptualization standpoint, we can distinguish the *I,* from the things which co-exist with it (its proper acts or its situatedness in consciousness). But then, singling-out, or separability conceptually does not at the same time imply separability in reality. Perhaps, one of the most engaging discourse on consciousness of the 'self' is found in St. Augustine's *Confessions.* Ratzinger, as Benedict XVI attests that in this work of Augustine "focus on interiority, …on the mystery of the 'I'"[360]. Jonathan Shear observed that "since the time of the Greeks, discussion of the nature of the self has been central to Western philosophy. The great modern philosophers Descartes, Hume and Kant, following in this tradition, characterized knowledge of self as the 'Archimedes' point' of all knowledge, the 'capital or center' of all the sciences and the 'supreme principle of all employment of the understanding'"[361].

Scholars suggest different theories and approaches to the explanation of the obviousness of our common-sense knowledge of the self, its nature, actions and relations. Karol Wojtyła presents us with a way of discovering the self in the context of action. According to him, "action is what most fully and profoundly reveals the human being as an *I* – and indeed, as a person, for that which we express in categories of being by the concept of 'person' is given in experience precisely as a self *(soi)*, as an *I*"[362]. He argues that through conscious actions, "my own *I* is fully manifested for my *I's* consciousness"[363].

Thus, for him consciousness of my action presents a window of revelation of the relationality of the *I,* of the self. In noting that the element of action, of conscious activity, shapes the relational constitution of the human *I,* or self with respect to its acts, he equally warns that "although consciousness for its part conditions action as a *conscious activity*, consciousness itself does not produce or shape action. Instead, action is produced and shaped from different bases,

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from other sources of human potentiality. The essential potentiality that constitutes action as such and gives action its whole actual reality is the will"[364]. My actions spring from the potentiality of my 'I', of the faculty of my *will*, hence from the deepest relationality of my *I*, expressed in the act of my *decision*, rather than from the mere fact of my consciousness, which simply mirrors the actualized effects of this act of decision. Thus, given the demonstrated fact that my consciousness does not produce my action, even as it mirrors the relationship between my action and my 'I', a discovery of the relationality of the 'self'(*ego*) as an 'acting I' would rather be more directly attained if we analyze the relation between conscious *actions* and that very potency of the *acting* I, which produces these kind of actions. Wojtyła however follows this route of discovery of the relationality of my *I*, with respect to its acts (*I-act* relation) from its origins in the Aristotelian principle of 'potency and act', as he does not so much discuss Ratzinger's relationality of person in this consideration. What is however notable is the convergence of both paths in the conclusion about the relationality of the *I*.

Nonetheless, Wojtyła poses the question: "What is it about action that allows it somehow to reveal (indirectly) the wholeness, originality, and unrepeatability of each human being and to disclose our own *acting I*, or self, in a way different from self-consciousness – in what might be called a more profound and ultimate way"[365]? To these questions, Wojtyła provides the following answer: "An essential element for every action consciously performed by a concrete human being is self-determination. And what stands our most essential in this element is the will as a property of the person and of the person's potentiality – not the will as a power in itself, but the will as a property of the person and of the person's essential potentiality. I can determine myself by my will, and I determine myself as often as I bring myself to act. I am the author of the act, and my agency in this act, that is, my will, ("I will"), turns out to be self-determination"[366].

Now, the above general consideration of the indirect way through which human *action* reveals the relationality of the *I*, through human potentiality to decide presents us with the issue of relationality of the *acting I* in the context of the self-determination of the 'I' to bring itself to actualize a conscious act. Taking one example of human act, let us say, the act of love, we are able to note the relationality of the *I*, in its decision to love – as an act which springs from the freely

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[364] K. Wojtyła, ibid., p. 199.
[365] K. Wojtyła, ibid.
[366] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, p. 199.

self-determined will of the lover rather than from mere consciousness of the presence of the beloved. It is actualized as a personal act to the extent that the lover determines to bring himself into a relational structure as an actor, as a love with respect not only to this act of love but also to its object the beloved. In the act of love, we are thus able to see the relationality of the *I,* in a double sense, in its relationality to its act (*I-love*) and in its relationality to the end or object of this act, i.e. the beloved (*I-love-her,* hence the *I-her* relationality of *lover-beloved*).

A human action is thus said to be an expression of the relationality of the *personal I,* with respect to its free act and this act is said to be personal to the extent this *potentiality* to self-determine oneself to act is freely given. In a sense, to be freely given implies a prior possession of what is to be given and so 'self-determination' to act, implicates 'self-possession' which is equally given in consciousness as 'self-knowledge'. Each one of us, can refuse to act as well as can self-determine ourselves freely to act and this refusal (I do not want to do it) as well the internal decision (I want to do it) constitutes both the element of freedom to act and that of the self-determination to act. This freedom reveals self-possession of the 'I', which is a non-transferable, inalienable possession for no one can possess another's *I,* in the real sense of 'subjectivity'. In like manner self-determination is equally non-transferable since power of the will, of the 'I's faculty of decision cannot be delegated to an *other;* it is always 'mine' and it belongs to the *I,* each time it is exercised. Thus, the constitutive relationality of the *I* to its decisive powers is demonstrated as the basis of moral responsibility.

Hence Wojtyła notes that "self-determination, which reveals the freedom of the will and the freedom of the human being in the most direct and complete way, also allows us to define what makes each individual his or her own *I.* It allows us as if to touch what is expressed in the concept of "self." Through the aspect of the self-determination manifested in my action, I who am the subject of that action discover and simultaneously confirm myself as a person in possession of myself. To the essence of my *I,* or self, belongs not just self-consciousness, but more importantly, self-possession. Self-consciousness conditions self-possession, which manifests itself primarily in action. This action leads us into the very depths of the human *I,* or self. All this takes place through experience"[367].

Significantly, the lived experience of the constitutive relationality of the *I,* as expressed in the self-determination of 'I' as well as most concretely expression of self-possession and freedom

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[367] K. Wojtyła, ibid., p. 199.

is equally given in self-knowledge (consciousness). Hence the analysis of our premeditated conscious awareness of the *I,* in self-awareness, reveals to us multiple layers of the relationality, given in the triad of self-knowledge, self-possession, and self-determination, which constitute various layers of relationality in the lived experience of the 'subjectivity' of the *acting I* with respect to all of its conscious (personal) acts – both moral and religious (including the very ones under consideration, namely act of love and the act of faith), which impact the interpersonal relations in the community of persons.

The above overview of Wojtyła's analysis the relational subjectivity of the *I,* specifically focuses on the ethical context of human acts and draws out the relationality of the "*I*" to its acts, such that the "I" subject is singled out as the efficient cause or actor with respect to the 'acts' of the 'I'. Such *I-act* relationality does not occur only in moral actions, it is present in all human acts and can in fact be noted in the religious act of faith, the very context in which Ratzinger highlights the relationality of the believer to the Truth (*Logos*), the Person who draws the believer into relationship of faith and towards whom faith-conversion experience of the believer tends. How can we understand such conversion dynamism using Wojtyła's tools for discovering the relational 'subjectivity' of the *I* in the personal act of faith? We have to first acknowledge that the lived-experience of subjectivity plays a key role in Wojtyła's discourse on the subjectivity of the *I*.

What does this mean? Deborah Savage points out that "the category of lived experience has a rather precise meaning for Karol Wojtyła; it requires the introduction of consciousness into the analysis of human personhood….The fact is that the person experiences himself, experiences his own subjectivity, experiences himself as existing and as the agent of his own acts. The personal subjectivity of human persons is itself an object reality, brought to the fore within the orbit of consciousness. He states: 'consciousness interiorizes all that the human being cognizes, …, and makes it all a content of the subject's lived experience'. Thus, by definition, *lived* experience as understood by Wojtyła is already delimited; it is not merely experience *per se* that interests him, but experience consciously lived and cognized"[368].

Notably, the human personal subject of (faith) experience of the act of faith responds to the source of the object (i.e. Revelation) of faith which response attitude shapes his or her experiences in relation to the One who reveals, and given that the truth of faith is revealed as Person, we thus

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[368] Deborah Savage, "The Centrality of Lived Experience in Wojtyła's Account of the Person" *Roczniki Filozoficzne* vol. LXI, no. 4, (2013), pp. 19-51, esp. p. 28.

note that the very context of the act of faith already brings the human *I* into relation with *the Divine I;* In the very act of faith, it is not the *I-act* structure as such that are dealing with but essentially the *I-Other* structure. This brings us to the lived experience of faith-response as the conversion of my *I* to the very Truth which is revealed as Person, and so a conversion to the *I,* of a Wholly Other. Karol Wojtyła himself had discussed the various layers of faith-experience of conversion in the "Synthetic Part" of his 1948 doctoral dissertation on "The Doctrine of Faith According to St. John of the Cross"[369]. A detailed discussion of his conclusions in this regard as it will take us afar field beyond the scope of our considerations but it suffices to note that the very outlines of his arguments in that work follows the lived tradition of faith experience in Catholic tradition in which context we meet the doctrinal terms which describe faith-responses as both a commitment and a confession, viz: '*fides qua*' and '*fides quae'*. The former ('*fides* qua') is described as the subjectively personal, confident entrusting or '*commitment'* of one's life to Jesus Christ, whereas the latter ('*fides quae'*) is described as '*confession'* of faith in the revealed truths often expressed in propositions about God's existence and his actions in human history.

Put in other words, we can say that the terms '*fides qua*' and '*fides quae*' respectively refer to the 'subjective attitude' experienced as the personal commitment and the 'objective content' proclaimed in the act of personal confession (more correctly, the 'inter-subjective' proclamation) of faith by believers. Gerald O'Collins reminds us that the senses of these terms are already present in Paul's Letter to the Romans. He writes as follows: "Paul mentions *both* 'the obedience of faith' =the obedience which is faith, the faith by which [*fides* qua] we obey the Lord, (Rom.16:26) *and* the 'believing that' or *fides quae*: 'if you *confess* with your lips *that* Jesus is Lord and *believe* in your heart *that* God raised him from the dead, you will be saved' (Rom. 10:9)"[370].

Notably, the two terms are linked with each other as poles of 'subjective' and 'objective' relations in the experience of faith. When speaking of *fides quae* as 'objective', the confessed object of faith here should not be mistaken as a particular 'thing', or 'a specific set of propositions'

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[369] K. Wojtyła wrote his doctoral dissertation on the doctrine of faith according to the sixteenth century Spanish Carmelite mystic, St John of the Cross. The work was completed at Angelicum University in Rome between 1946 and 1948 under the supervision of the renowned traditional Thomist, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. The dissertation was originally composed in Latin, hence the title "Doctrina de fide apud S. Joannem a Cruce". Currently, it has been translated into several modern languages following the election of Wojtyła to the Papacy in 1978. Recent English editions include the version translated by Jordan Aumann and published in 2009 by Wipf and Stock publishers. Earlier editions in English include those of Ignatius Press (1981), and Libreria Editrice Vaticana (1981).

[370] Cf. Footnote 4, in Gerald O'Collins, *Rethinking Fundamental Theology,* p. 167.

but more generally as the totality of revealed truths about the Person of God who acts in human history. Every belief, whether religious or not, is a believe in something for one cannot believe in 'nothing'. In the case of faith of Christian believers, God's Person and His actions in history constitute the 'content'/ 'the what'/ 'the who'/ 'the sense of meaning' which believers assent to as revealed.

We shall come to notice, as our investigation proceeds, that both trajectories are complementary, given that while Ratzinger presents the Person of Christ as the model and the perfect ideal of humanity towards which (*object* of faith) every man is called to respond through faith and so transcends towards the perfection of human person, already fulfilled in Christ, the Last Adam, Wojtyła (John Paul II) would rather show the human experience of the (*subject* of faith) as a journey towards this transcendent teleology of man's personalization in our lived-existence and in our free action of faith response.

In other words, Ratzinger's anthropology could be said to be presenting the object of faith as the perfect *Logos* and the true *Freedom,* towards which man is called to respond in faith, whereas Wojtyła's anthropology presents man's striving towards an experiential knowledge of the *Logos,* now revealed as person from whom the mysteries of truth which guarantees salvific freedom can be accessed through a faith-relationship (belief or trust) which act is within the natural capacity in human nature (i.e. personal trust). Such a relationship of trust in the context of faith implicates man's free response to the invitation for supernatural communion with the perfect 'logos' (truth), who efficaciously brings 'salvation' (freedom) to the human being. In the light of this hindsight on the differences of starting points[371], which nonetheless accounts for the complementarity of Ratzinger's and Wojtyła's theological anthropologies, we can assume the

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[371] From the point of view of their anthropological starting points, the difference is unmistakably clear: On the one hand, Ratzinger's anthropology takes a cataphorical – i.e. downward route from the person of God (in Jesus Christ) to man (perfectly realized in the person of Christ, the Last Adam); on the other hand, Wojtyła takes the anaphorical route from the person of man (created with the capacity for God) to God (towards whom man responds through faith in Christ, the God who became man). Hence to the question – Who is man? and/or what is man? Ratzinger searches for answers in the person of the perfect man Jesus who is eternally a Divine Person, whereas Wojtyła searches for answers in the created human person who is called to actualize the fullness of being a person through grace made available by communion with Christ the God-man. In Ratzinger, we find the primacy of Christology in the determination of anthropology whereas in Wojtyła, anthropology becomes complete in Christology, the goal towards which man's personal transcendence aims.

complementarity of other anthropological starting points of those theological considerations that admit of the relevance of lived experience[372] as a window to understanding 'subjectivity'.

Furthermore, Wojtyła acknowledges that in the field of human experience, the experience of man's subjectivity "appears both as a particular *suppositum* and as a concrete self…This is an experience of the human being in two senses simultaneously, for the one having the experience is a human being and the one being experienced by the subject of this experience is also a human being. The human being is simultaneously its subject and object. Objectivity belongs to the essence of experience [including the experience of faith], for experience is always an experience of 'something' or 'somebody'. The tendency to retreat toward the 'pure subjectivity' of experience is characteristic of the philosophy of consciousness…. In reality, however, experience, so to speak, dispels the notion of 'pure consciousness' from human knowledge or rather it summons all that this notion has contributed to our knowledge of the human being to the dimensions of objective reality"[373] for it always contains its 'object', other than the experiencing 'subject'. Experience therefore always presents the field of relationality between the experiencing *subject* the *I,* and the experience *object*, other than the experiencing *I.* This relational structure of experience holds in all cases, even in the case of the experience of oneself in self-knowledge. Hence subjectivity always reveals in experience the relationality of the *I.*

From a slightly different perspective, Ratzinger's approach, follows Buber's personalism, and highlights the primacy of *relations* of persons over individuality of persons and so bypasses this cognition of individuality, which Wojtyła had begun with. Ratzinger however notes a peculiar experience of insecurity that is connected with individuality in the existential context, namely 'loneliness'. He however describes this experience of insecurity engendered by loneliness as follows: "where man falls into extreme loneliness, he is not afraid of anything definite that could be explained away; on the contrary, he experiences the fear of loneliness, the uneasiness and vulnerability of his own nature, something that cannot be overcome by rational means…What arises here is a completely different kind of fear, not fear of anything in particular but in being alone,… the eerie-ness of loneliness in itself, the exposed nature of existence"[374].

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[372] It is notable that Karl Rahner, whom we have already listed amongst transcendental Thomists, also begins his anthropological investigations from the analysis of human experience. However, unlike Karol Wojtyła /John Paul II, who focuses on the analysis the experience of 'subjectivity', Rahner would focus instead on the analysis of the experience of 'knowledge' and 'freedom'.

[373] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community: Selected Essays,* p. 221.

[374] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity.,* p. 153.

For Ratzinger, such a fear of loneliness can be overcome only by love, the most basic sense of which takes the form of companionship, of fellowship with the *other* since to *exists,* to *live* as a person is to be in relation to *other* persons whereas not to *exist,* to *die,* as person is to be lonely. Such a death is what we can speak of as "hell". Hence he argues that the word "hell" denotes "a loneliness that the word love can no longer penetrate and that therefore indicates the exposed nature of existence in itself. …Thus hell, despair dwells at the very bottom of our existence in the shape of loneliness which is as inescapable as it is dreadful. … Sartre based his anthropology on this idea. …In truth, there exists a night into whose solitude no voice reaches; there is a door through which we can only walk alone – the door of death. In the last analysis all the fear in the world is fear of this loneliness. From this point of view, it is possible to understand why the Old Testament has only one word for hell and death, the word *sheol;* it regards them as ultimately identical. Death is absolute loneliness. Bu the loneliness into which love can no longer advance is – hell"[375].

In fact, for Ratzinger 'loneliness' atrophies the notion of person; it is the opposite of existence, the opposite of life. Its cure is love, companionship, fellowship which fulfills the personal being. He presents the redemptive Passion of Christ as the overcoming of humanity's loneliness, in the following words: "The article of the Creed that speaks of the descent into hell, asserts that Christ strode through the gate of our final loneliness, that in his Passion he went down into the abyss of our abandonment. Where no voice can reach us any longer, there he is. Hell is thereby overcome, or to be more accurate, death, which was previously hell, is hell no longer. Neither is the same any longer because there is life in the midst of death, because love dwells in it. Now only deliberate self-enclosure is hell or, as the Bible calls it, the second death (Rev. 20:14, for example). …Hell, existence in the definitive rejection of 'being-for', is not a cosmographical destination but a dimension of human nature"[376].

Ratzinger's reflection on loneliness as a rejection of 'being-for', a rejection of encounter, a deliberate self-enclosure resonates with Maritain's contention that "subjectivity of the person has nothing in common with the isolated unity, without doors and windows"[377], hence in Karol Wojtyła, we find that the subjectivity of the *I,* is not closed in itself but rather in it is implicated a

[375]J. Ratzinger, ibid., p. 154.
[376] J. Ratzinger, ibid.
[377] J. Maritain, *Person and Common Good,* p. 41.

'self-determination' which transcends its bounds towards a reality *other* than the *I,* towards actions and towards relationships through participation, thereby revealing the "freedom of the human being in the most direct and complete way. In this same sense, Ratzinger presents the contrast between the revelation of the personal God as constituted by relationality and Adam's false attempt to jettison relationality of person as follows: "When God revealed himself, when God willed to show who he was, he appeared as love, tenderness, as outpouring of himself, infinite pleasure in another. Inclination, dependence. God showed himself obedient, obedient unto death. In the belief that he was becoming like God, Adam turned completely away from him. He withdrew into loneliness, and yet God was fellowship"[378].

Obviously, from the above reflections we get a clearer picture of the problem of individualism as contrary to the nature of man as person. Individualism even when such social emergencies like the current measures to reduce the spread of COVID-19 indirectly promotes it through the otherwise necessary measure of social-distancing policies, remains an anti-personalistic culture. Today, unlike in the past centuries, individuals and groups make efforts to overcome the challenges of the increasing culture of individualism which the isolation policies engender through the means of communication made available by the Internet. More and more people have begun to develop soft skills for using the internet to active their potentials for relationality via skype, video-conferences, video-calls, whatsapp chats and other online media. While these means do not assuage the yearnings for physical interpersonal encounters, they are viable means of actualizing the relational potentialities in our nature as persons.

However, these virtual means do not offer a satisfactory experience of relationality of persons and can only serve as 'stop-gaps' for simulating the more concrete physical encounters and even less the truly spiritual expressions of relationality of persons. For this reason, virtual simulations of the relationality of the persons do not actualize the fundamental relationality of the *I,* as manifest in the transcendence of its *subjective* context towards the context of *intersubjectivity,* in Wojtyła, which notably approximates Ratzinger's vision of person as constituted by dialogical *elationality.* In the next section, we shall focus on how *relational subjectivity* can serve as a tool in the search for solutions to individualism which militates against the relational constitution of human persons.

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[378] L. Evely, *Manifest der Liebe: Das Vaterunser* 3rd ed. (Freiburg, 1961), p.26; cf. Y. Congar, *Wege des lebendigen Gottes* (Freiburg, 1964), p. 93; as found in J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 137.

4.1.3 Personalistic rectifications of the excesses of individualism

In our world today, individualism has found a cultural acceptance due in part to the centuries of reactions against traditional forms of community life such that even today, the family unity which provides the first environment for training and inculturation into the relationality of the *others* is being attacked by those who wish to introduce new forms of social units including non-committal partnerships, homosexual unions, etc. Even more than the cultural transformations, we also meet emergent adjustments to social interactions due to health challenges. Of worthy of note is the very current battles against a recent communicable viral diseased named coronavirus Since December 2019, there has been a number of responses to combat the rapid spread of the novel corona virus, the incidence of which was first noted in Wuhan, China.

A group of researchers, in one of several articles published in this regard, wrote as follows: "Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), a novel coronavirus emerged in Wuhan, Hubei, in early December 2019. Since then, the local and national governments have taken unprecedented measures in response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak caused by SARS-CoV-2. Exit screening of passengers was shortly followed by travel restrictions in Wuhan on Jan 23, 2020, halting all means of unauthorized travel into and out of the city. Similar control measures were extended to the entire province of Hubei by Jan 26, 2020. Non-pharmaceutical physical distance interventions, such as extended school closures and workplace distancing, were introduced to reduce the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan. Within the city, schools remained closed, Lunar New Year holidays were extended so that people stayed away from their workplaces, and the local government promoted physical distancing and encouraged residents to avoid crowded places"[379].

The above described scenario of 'social-distancing' as a measure to control the spread of diseases is not completely new as the world did experience such a challenge some hundred years ago during the 1918 Spanish Flu[380]. Social distancing serves a common good in such situations since "Person-to-person transmission is mostly driven by who interacts with whom, which can

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[379] Kiesha Prem, et al, "The effect of control strategies to reduce social mixing on outcomes of the COVID-19 epidemic in Wuhan, China: a modelling study", Available from https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanpub/article/PIIS2468-2667(20)30073-6/fulltext Published online by Elsevier Ltd, March 25, 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/52468-2667(20)30073-6

[380] For an indepth information on the 'Spanish Flu", see L. Spiney, Pale Ride: The Spanish Flu of 1918 and How it Changed the World (New York: Public Affairs Press, 2017).

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vary by age and location of the contact (i.e. school, work, home, and community)…In the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, physical distancing measures, including but not limited to school and workplace closures and health promotions that encourage the general public to avoid crowded places, are designed to drastically shift social mixing patterns and are often used in epidemic settings"[381].

However, the culture of 'social-distancing', even for such an emergency creates its own problems of individualism, which seems to create worrisome challenges for human persons, said to be constituted by relationality. For instance, when people live their lives in isolation from each other, they tend to revert to individualism as the 'norm'. That individualism is a problem in itself is given in evidence from the notable increase in the rate of depressions amongst those who live alone in the society. However, I do not intend to discuss the health hazards or psychological effects of individualism on people, nor are the emergent forms of individualism in 'social distancing' the specific interest of my dissertation. These are topics which are better researched upon by social scientists. It is rather my objective to discuss its theological and philosophical implications for the Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by dialogical relationality. I shall however attempt some analysis and proffer some suggestions for a theological and philosophical appraisal of the problems associated with individualism (and collectivism) in this final chapter of my dissertation in the light of Wojtyła's reflections on the experience of 'subjectivity' of the *I* and Ratzinger's reflections on 'relationality' of persons.

Coming back to my proper trajectory of discourse, we note that the experience of the relationality of the personal *I* is manifest not only in the way of human existence but also in a specific context of human personal action and inter-personal co-actions with others. Karol Wojtyła's personalism (theological or philosophical as the case may be) has done a deep philosophical work in this regard from an ethical point of view. For this reason, I choose him in this discussion to serve as a dialogical partner to Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by dialogical relationality. Accordingly, in the search for solutions to individualism and the problems which arise therefrom, I wish to demonstrate that Wojtyła's notions of 'subjectivity', and

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[381] Kiesha Prem, et al, "The effect of control strategies to reduce social mixing on outcomes of the COVID-19 epidemic", ibid.

'participation' and Ratzinger's notion of relationality can highlight the key problematic issues and perhaps give some hints on the appropriate path to take in search of an ultimate solution.

From the theological perspective of the notion of man, the person of Jesus as the last man stands out in Ratzinger's notion of person. One could thus ask, whether Wojtyła's subjectivity can provide tools for a theological enquiry into Jesus's experience of the *subjectivity* of his personal *I,* as God and man? Furthermore, in the way in which Jesus, the Last Adam is related to humanity throughout history as progenies (sons and daughters) of Adam, can we also get some tools of explanation from Wojtyła's discuss on 'participation' to elucidate Ratzinger's *relationality* in this context more succinctly? These questions are intended to justify the decision to make Wojtyła a dialogical partner with Ratzinger in the discourse on the notion of person as constituted by relationality. However, whether we are able to get answers to this question depends on a number of factors, some of which include the way we understand the analogical use of the notion of person in human and Divine communion of persons respectively. In any case, I try to search for answers in the consideration of the convergence of themes in both scholars for instance we can point at such convergences between Wojtyła discusses 'participation' in his work on man and Ratzinger's 'active participation' which focuses on the Eucharistic liturgy.

It should however be noted that the enquiry into the *other's* (in this case, Jesus') experience of his *I,* is an indirect enquiry, as we do not have a direct access to the *other's* subjective experience. In this regard, Karol Wojtyła was quick to point out that "the *other* [i.e. other person: divine or human], lies beyond the field of the experience of my *I.* Self-consciousness, like self-possession, as the name itself suggests, is not transferable, beyond the individual concrete *I,* or self, that experiences itself and consequently understands itself in this manner. Although I cannot experientially transfer what constitutes my own *I* beyond myself, this does not mean that I cannot understand that the *other* is constituted in a similar fashion – that the *other* is also an *I*....The *other* is always one of those *I's,* another individual *I,* related experientially in some way to my own *I*"[382].

Be that as it may, the relational subjectivity of the *I,* is manifest as a potential source for overcoming individualism even as it only gives the individual subject of experience an indirect access to the *other's* experience of his or her own *I.* The indirectness of such an access is notable in several Scriptural passages and in the case of an access into the self-experience of a Divine person by another Divine person, Revelation tells of a complete openness of *one* Divine person to

[382] K. Wojtyła, "Participation", *Person and Community,* p. 200.

another, hence Jesus declares as follows: "No one knows the Son except the Father and no one knows the Father except the Son, and the one to whom the Son chooses to reveal Him" (Mt. 11:27; Lk 10:22; John 10:15). The Divine Persons also know the depths of the human *self* in a direct way as the psalmist noted "He knows the secrets of the heart [of men]" (Psalm 44:2). Such a perfect knowledge of oneself and of the *other* is only possible in the case of the Divine persons.

If Thomas Aquinas as we already noted, defines 'person' as signifying the most perfect of all nature[383] and Jacque Maritain's insists that the God is the supreme analogue of a personal being,[384] then it follows that experience (both of *oneself* and of *others*) which is according to the nature of personal beings most be perfect in God. In the case of human persons however, it is not the case that we have a perfect of experience of our own *I,* and even much less of the *I* of others. We cannot gain a direct access to the experience of the *other* – be it the Divine or the human *other* but we can assume justifiably that the *other* is another *I,* and so experiences his or her own *subjectivity* as another *I,* another 'person', in much the same way as I do experience my own *I,* my own being as 'person'. For instance, the cognitive experience I have about myself, i.e. the self-knowledge, I have about who I am, as person – in spite of the fact, that it is the most direct, remains incomplete for there are things God knows about me that I do not know about myself, and in fact I have even much less knowledge of the *I* of *another* – and this lesser cognitive experience of the *I* of another person becomes even more limited in the case of my knowledge of the *Divine Other,* since no one can "fathom the Spirit of God" (Isaiah, 40:13) and no one "has known the mind of God" (Rom. 11:34). It does follow that our access to the interiority of the Divine self is gained only by Revelation, the most complete of which is the revelation of Jesus, in whom is "the mediator and fullness of all Revelation"[385].

The incomplete nature of such an indirect access, from the individual human person's point of view, is however completed by the grace of Revelation. This graced-experience of the *other* person, starts from the experience of the Person of God in Christ as mediated by Revelation. In a time of socially-induced self-isolation, the individual can experience the 'openings' towards the *other* (Divine as well as human *others*) which Revelation offers in the Scripture, hence psalmist declares: "Your word O Lord is a lamp to my feet and a light unto my path" (Psalm 119:105).

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[383] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* 1, 29, 3.
[384] J. Maritain, *Person and Common Good,* p. 15.
[385] Cf. CDF, *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* nos. 50-73.

Therefore, Revelation is thus understood as the primary solution and a veritable source of overcoming individualism in the most radical sense of self-transcendence because it gives man an access to the *Divine Other.* In other words, Revelation (both the written, specific and general senses)[386] radically opens the individual man towards transcendence of the individual *self,* and orients man to the fullest extent of overcoming his individualism, and so to the fullest sense of relationality to a personal being. In such a time when the culture forces us into individualism, the Revelation of God becomes a true solace and refuge upon which we can rely in search of escape from socially induced escapism but even more it opens us up to the fullest of relationality. Reading the Scriptures puts us in a direct conversation with the Word, the Divine Logos, revealed as Person, with whom we can converse in the dialogue of hearts. According to St. Ignatius of Antioch, the word of God is both a "bodily and spiritual medicine"[387] for in the Word made flesh, who is the "Mediator between God and man" (1 Tim. 2:5), has become the instrument of our salvation, through "His humanity, united with the person of the Word…for Jesus is present in His Word, since it is He himself who speaks when the holy scriptures are read"[388].

As Ratzinger repeatedly remarks, from the human point of view, such an escape from individualism which puts man in relation with God, the *Other* Person, is essentially a response act, act of reception, act of dialogue (between receiver and giver), starting act of the dialogue which constituted the anthropological structure of the human person as a 'being-from' for we 'receive' even the very existence, the very life we are struggling through measures that promote individualism (e.g. self-isolation as a measure against coronavirus). Man's anthropological structure as a 'being-from' remains a constant theme in Ratzinger's works as it highlights the constitutive relationality of persons. He writes as follows: "We receive our life not only at the moment of birth, but everyday from without – from others who are not ourselves but who nonetheless pertain to us"[389] which is even more remote than our indirect access to the *I,* of *other* human beings. Our experience of the subjectivity of the *human other* is thus different from our experience of the subjectivity of the *Divine Other.* The One is mediated *indirectly* by our

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[386] For these distinctions, see Gerald O' Collins, *Rethinking Fundamental Theology,* pp. 57-65.
[387] St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Letter to the Ephesians,* 7, 2.
[388] Vatican II Council, *Sacrosanctum Concilium,* nos. 5, 7.
[389] See, J. Ratzinger, *Im Anfang Schuf Gott* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Erich Wewel Verlag, 1986), translated into English by Boniface Ramsey, and published under the title *In the Beginning: A Catholic Understanding of the Story of Creation and the Fall* (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1990), p. 72*.*

extrapolation of my own personal experience of my *I,* the Other is mediated *responsively* to Revelation – in other words, received.

We cannot construct our knowledge of God, on the basis of our self-knowledge (in the same way, we construct the knowledge of the *human others* on the basis of our own self-knowledge) rather we *receive* entire this knowledge of the *Divine* Other from outside of our human categories, from Revelation, hence Ratzinger repeatedly harps that "it is only by entering into the experiment of faith that we experience God, and only he who asks *receives*…as it is the nature of Christian existence to *receive* and to live life as relatedness.…But if this is so, then it all means that our relation to God cannot ultimately rest on our planning, on a speculative knowledge, but demands the positivity [the Yes, faith] of what confronts us, what comes to us as something positive, something to be *received*"[390]. So, also is the earth as revealed in Scripture as well as in nature is to be "received back from the creating hands of God"[391]. On the basis of this truth of man's relationality as contained in the man's anthropological structure, even the *earthly* materials which scientists use in their search for vaccines (e.g. animals for experimentation and other created matter) all belong to God and we come to *accept* or *receive* this truth offered in Revelation of the God, who creates not just each one of us, but *other* things (human and non-human creatures).

However, the truth of man's relationality and the overcoming of individualism by a recourse to Revelation (read from Scriptures or reflected upon, contemplation in times of solitude), implicates the context of faith in God. This very context of faith equally implicates man's relationality as understood from the foregoing standpoint reception. In other words, the act of faith in itself is a *responsive*-act since the Christian doctrine teaches that the human person does not initiate the encounter with Revelation rather man is converted, hence responds, to God's self-Revelation of truth in the Divine Person of Christ (i.e. *faith*-response) as well as responds to God's Revelation of Divine salvific actions in history (response of *love*). The explanation of human-Divine dialogical relationality in Ratzinger implicates the fact that it is God rather than man who is **reveals** *or* **gives** Himself as 'Love' and as 'Truth', which love and truth, now revealed in Jesus Christ as 'Person', as Love (Mercy, as Our Salvation, and Freedom), but also as Truth (the *Logos,* the meaning, the purpose, beginning -*creative logos* and end – *eschatological logos* of our existence), the human person or human community **receives** or **accepts** through our responsive

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[390] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* pp. 92, 98, 137.
[391] J. Ratzinger, "The Meaning of the Biblical Creation Accounts", *In the Beginning,* p. 31.

acts of faith, love and hope that the relationality of my *I-Other* structure as (man of faith) or *We-Other* as (people of faith) as the case may be is resplendent, manifest in the Church and society. In this sense, man's acts of faith and acts of love (i.e. man as 'believer', as 'beloved': man's conversion to faith and man's requited love in response to God who loved man first) are response to the Divine invitation or dynamic force which draws us, through faith into a relational communion with Him as Benedict XVI explains in his encyclical *Caritas in Veritate*: "Love-*caritas* – is a force that has its origin in God, Eternal Love and Absolute Truth"[392].

It is equally notable that from the philosophical standpoint, Karol Wojtyła's discourse on the lived experience of inter-human love converges with Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by dialogical relationality. In his considerations, Wojtyła speaks of the 'subject' *I,* as constituted through the acts (e.g. the acts of love) to which it is related as the efficacious subject. The *I-act* relationality is not automatically the interpersonal relationality which Ratzinger talks about but it goes to show that relationality (*I-other;* as well as *I-act*) constitutes the person as subject *of* act (in Wojtyła) and as *being-from* (in Ratzinger). In both contexts, it cannot be denied that man as person is constituted by relationality and this truth about man is not lost even in the cultural emergency of 'self-isolation', self-quarantine, which engenders a culture of individualism. Even in such situations, man's *subjectivity* takes on a more efficacious forms of *relationality* in the context of contemplation of Divine Revelation or in the spiritual experience of God's act of love for man or man's act of faith in God.

This experience is not the mere thinking of the conceptual structure of the idea of humanity (love of our human species) but rather it is given in experience, hence in a specific concrete *hic et nunc* experiential structure of the experience of the *other* in my own *I,* a conscious decisive choice to experience the humanity as well as Divinity of the *other*, (Jesus the Last Adam) in my own *I;* or in the experience of the *other* human person as my *neighbor*[393]. Wojtyła's philosophical considerations of this *I-other* relationships is in this way open to the Divine commandment of love in which it takes the character of the theological virtue of love of *neighbor* whose foundation coincides with our personal *response* to the self-Revelation of God to us in the *Person* of Jesus Christ, who reveals to us through the Paschal Mystery the very essence of a vicarious love for 'others'. It can thus be said that the elements of *subjectivity* of the 'I', (e.g. *efficacy*, and *self-*

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[392] Benedict XVI, *Caritas in Veritate,* no. 1.
[393] K. Wojtyła, "Participation", *Person and Community,* p. 204.

determination) in Wojtyła's personalism highlight the ethical responsibility for personal actions, which at once presents adequate responses to both 'individualism' and 'collectivism' in his subsequent analysis of "participation" in the humanity of others.

4.2 'Collectivism' as a cog-in-the-wheel of actualizing *communio personarum*

That collectivism militates against true communion of persons is noted from the analysis of the quality of relations of persons in collectivist groups. In other words, when we project Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by relationality into social groups, we come to see that collectivism substitutes the personalistic basis of social relations with plurality of 'self-interests' (i.e. 'self-interests' of a collection of 'individuals'). As a result of this substitution, the problem of 'alienation' in collectivism becomes essentially the alienation of 'persons' from one another, hence the obliteration of interpersonal relationships, which is the constitutive factor of being persons according to Joseph Ratzinger.

In order for us to properly analyze this *person-society* relationality or to use the Wojtyła structure, the *I-others* relationality, we should consider two key factors: the one being the determination of the type of relations which exists between man and the society; and the second being the goal which the man-society relationship serves. With regard to the first, we can consider, at least two types of relations, namely – the part-whole relation, in which man as a person is a *part* of the social whole; and the whole-whole relation in which each human person is a 'complete individual' who realizes in his relations with other 'complete individuals', another new reality – the society.

A part-whole relation understands the human person in the society as parts through which/whom the social whole is realized. In this sense, the human person is a 'means' to the social *end*. Is this what Wojtyła means by 'participation'? Certainly, Wojtyła whose reflections on 'participation' has the ethical action (i.e. human act) as its context, retains the Kantian intuition which maintains that person is always an end. In his discussion on 'participation', Wojtyła does not subscribe to the view that the society is a primary substance, whose parts is the human members.

For Wojtyła, participation is a "task which has a primarily personalistic meaning, and the strictly ethical order of values depends in large part upon it. Kant's second categorical imperative

may be regarding as a confirmation of this thesis"[394]. Thus, we can deduce that Wojtyła's focus in this discussion is essential ethical and, in this context,, he follows Kant's assertion that man is always an end and never a means, hence it is not the case that man as person is a means to realizing the social whole. If this is so, then Wojtyła's personalism takes man to be a whole, an end, with respect to the society.

Ratzinger's discussion on 'active participation' is focused however on a different context, namely the religious context of the Eucharistic liturgy, where he considers the whole community rather than individual persons as in Wojtyła. However, he follows St. Paul to speak of the worshipping community as "Body of Christ" who participates in God's Divine act[395]. Still here, we do not meet a part-whole relationality but we even find a completely whole-whole relationality-God being, a community of *Divine* Persons, and the Church being equally a community of *human* persons, Ratzinger thus speaks of whole-whole relationality (i.e. human community – Divine community). Hence, on the question of kind of relations which exist between man and society, we find a convergence of Wojtyła's 'participation' of human persons in social co-actions and of Ratzinger's dialogical 'relationality' of persons (Divine and human) in the Eucharistic liturgy, the most perfect example of Divine-human co-actions of communities, i.e. an inter-communal *participation* in a common action (liturgy).

Secondly, the question of the goal of person-society relationality can be raised according to the specific context of co-actions but in general, let us speak of this goal as a good and so raise the question from another aspect as follows: what kind of good is the appropriate goal of participation of persons in co-actions. In distinguishing the kinds of goods, we do not simply consider the *moral* classification of good into *bonum honestum, bonum utile, bonum delectabile*[396], for in each case, we can apply any of the goods so noted to individual search for good and to the social search for good. Hence, we intend those kinds of good that highlights an *economical* (household or social) character, hence we speak here of the *economic* distinctions between

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[394] K. Wojtyła, *Participation,* ibid., p. 204.

[395] Cf. J. Ratzinger, *Einführung in den Geist der Liturgie The Spirit of the Liturgy* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), pp. 171-172.

[396] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* Ia, q. 5, art. 6; see also several studies on Aquinas classification of good: J. Aertsen, "Thomas Aquinas on the Good: The Relation Between Metaphysics and Ethics" *Aquinas' Moral Theology,* edited by S. MacDonald and E. Stump (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 235-253; G. Mangelli, "Il bene nel pensieno filosofico di S. Tommaso", *Miscellanca Francescana,* 60 (1960), pp. 241-246; D. Schülter, " Der Wille und das Gute bei Thomas von Aquin", *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie,* 1971, pp. 88-136; E. Smith, *The Goodness of Being in Thomistic Philosophy and its Contemporary Significance* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1967).

public/private good, and collective/common good[397]. The economic goods are distinguishable in terms of excludability/inclusivity of consumption rights as well as in term of the level of rivalry involved in their acquisition/ownership.

Accordingly, public and common goods have their inclusiveness extended to everyone in the society whereas private and collective goods are exclusive to the individual or selected individuals, hence they are characterized by individualism. On the other hand, collective and public goods are not contested for by rivals as they are distributed according to those who already have rights to it; whereas private good and common goods require a daily task of labour to realize since there are no recourse to an already pre-established rights of ownership which guarantees their acquisition. Wojtyła and Ratzinger converge in their discussion on common good as both of them speak of love as the common good of persons, albeit from the ethical and theological perspectives respectively. A contrast however exists between *collectivism* (i.e. a *collection of individuals*) which seeks the collective good as its goal and *community of persons* for whom the common good is the appropriate end to be actualized through participation of persons.

4.2.1 The problem of 'alienation' in collectivism

In his reflection on the experience of man's loneliness, Ratzinger writes as follows: "Loneliness is indubitably one of the basic roots from which man's encounter with God has arisen. Where man experiences his solitariness, his alienation from *others,* he experiences at the same time how much his whole existence is a cry for the "You", and how ill-adapted he is to be only an "I" in himself. …This gives some idea of how human existence can be the point of departure for the experience of the absolute, which from this angle is seen as "God the Son", as the Saviour or more simply as a God related to existence"[398].

From another perspective, Wojtyła corroborates Ratzinger, when he notes that our consciousness presents the *other* to us as "someone who lives *alongside* me, and who is both another and one of the others who exists and acts in common *with* me. For the sake of precision, I should immediately add that the circle of *others* is as broad as the sum of human beings in general. Everyone of them can be an *other.* In reality, however, an *other* is always someone in an actual –

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[397] See, A. Marshal, *Principles of Economics* (London: Macmillan, 1890).
[398] See, J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 56.

i.e. some sort of experiential – relationship to me"[399]. Thus, Wojtyła highlights the value of experience in his reflection on the intersubjective experience of the *other*. For him the 'I-other' relationship is not "a purely ontic structure, but a conscious and experiential one"[400]. It follows that since every experience is unique and unrepeatable, then this very experiential structure of the *I-other* relationship is equally unique and unrepeatable in each case and so cannot be universalized. Wojtyła agrees with this claim when he writes that the *I-other* relationship "does not emerge from having a universal concept of the human being, a concept that embraces all people without exception…but it is always an interhuman, unique and unrepeatable in each and every instance – both when viewed as a one-way relationship proceeding from the *I* and when viewed as a reciprocal relationship (the *other,* after all, is also an *I* for whom I can be an *other*). Such uniqueness of the *I-other* relationship in its reciprocal context is manifest in the relationship between a man and a woman who loves themselves.

The above insistence that a universal concept of the human essence does not give rise to the *I-other* relationship does not at the same time imply that such a conceptualization of human essence does not have any consequence for this interhuman relationship. As Wojtyła observes, "there is, as we know, an enormous amount of people living and acting in the world, and all of them are apprehended conceptually by anyone who things 'human being'. In this concept, however, none of them is yet an *other,* in relation to an *I*. The concept 'human being' does not itself create this relationship, rather it brings into clear relief the problem of both the potentiality and the need to actualize participation, through which such relationships properly emerge"[401].

There is however a second and even more significant function of such a universal concept of 'human being', namely it presents the possibility of creating such a relationship with respect to any and every human being without exception, and this is where it makes universally possible the application of the notion of "neighbor" to any and every human being. Hence Wojtyła reminds us that "the concept, 'human being' basically opens the way for me to experience as another *I* everyone who is included in this concept in the same way as my own *I* is included in it – precisely because my own *I* is included in it. This, the first requirement for an *I-other* relationship is an awareness of the fact that both partners in this relationship are human beings"[402]. In this way, the

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[399] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community,* p. 198.
[400] K. Wojtyła, ibid., p. 201.
[401] K. Wojtyła, ibid., p. 201.
[402] K. Wojtyła, pp. 201-202.

universal concept of 'human being' provides the basis for the first impulses towards experiencing the *other,* and each of the *others,* with whom I co-exist and co-act in the actualization of a common good, as equal partners in any *I-other* relationship. It also provides a basis for the extension of the *I-other* relationship to as many persons as are participants in the actualization of a common good.

The above discourse on Ratzinger's 'loneliness' and Wojtyła's subjective experience of the *others,* leads us to discover the source of the real problem of '*alienation'* in collectivism. In the Marxist tradition, which ironically is a collectivists system, there were some attempts to grapple with the problem of alienation but it ended up convoluting it all the more. This is because this problem of *alienation* was not properly diagnosed by Karl Marx as he looks at the wrong direction, at the direction of material goods, whereas the problem lies rather elsewhere, namely in the *relational constitution of persons.* Wojtyła rightly noted this wrong diagnosis by Marx as follows: "According to Marx's philosophy, human beings are alienated by their products: their economic and political systems, their property, and their work. Marx also included religion in this category. Such a formulation of the problem leads, of course, to the conclusion that all we have to do is transform the world of products, change the economic and political systems, and rally against religion – and then the age of alienation will come to an end and a 'reign of freedom' will ensue, bringing with it complete self-actualization for one and all"[403].

As always, solutions to problems begin from the understanding of the problems under consideration hence in health problems, we note that the wrong diagnosis of an ailment leads the physician to administer the wrong medication. Marxism wanted to eliminate alienation, which is a noble project only that the solution suggested was unsuitable and in fact, the class system, being an apartheid structure[404] itself was founded upon the principles of alienation. Perhaps, class-struggle was construed to be a kind of 'vaccine'[405] for the Marxist well diagnosed problem of alienation. Unfortunately, this 'vaccine' of class-struggle in Marx was impotent as it also sustained its own existence symbiotically by way of collectivism of the proletariat. Marxism neglected the personalistic implication of alienation, that is alienation from the very constitutive feature of persons, from our relationality with *others,* hence the medication he administered only sought to

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[403] K. Wojtyła, ibid., p. 205.

[404] For an engaging overview of the apartheid experience in South African, see J. Eby and F. Morton, *The Collapse of Apartheid and the Dawn of Democracy in South Africa* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Reacting Consortium Press, 2017).

[405] The word vaccine refers to a biological preparation that can boost one's immunity against infectious disease. However, I use the term 'vaccine' here metaphorically.

manage the symptoms. Since the source of the symptoms remains even in asymptomatic cases, the disease of alienation was never treated in Marxism, hence it was no surprise that the communist experiment imploded, leaving the adherents only with shattered hopes.

What is however to the credit of Karl Marx is the identification of 'alienation' as a problem, the enormity of which deserves the most urgent of attention. It is such an important thing that Karl Marx draws our attention to, namely that we all should be keenly alert to the various forms of alienation in our society as – irrespective of whether we have justified reasons for accommodating it anywhere and for whichever excuse, questionable or justified (e.g. the questionable justification of social *apartheid* in South Africa in the past or the certainly reasonable justification of individual *self-isolation* in this period of pandemic spread of COVID-19).

The identification of 'alienation' as a problem remains the very first step towards its solution or at least its proper management when inevitable. In our world today, we still have to address the various forms of alienation, some of which are necessitated by circumstance that befall us as calamities, as it is in the case of COVID-19. I shall consider the forms of alienation due to sickness and sin, in the next subsection but it suffices to underscore the point that if we do not make a proper diagnosis, we will still go about proffering wrong solutions frantically. With such health-related forms of alienation which seem to be inevitable – e.g. 'self-isolation', 'quarantine', 'social distance', etc., we can only take precautionary measures for self-preservation as we can see from the policies adopted by various governments to manage the pandemic spread of a communicable disease but certainly these measures are not ultimate solutions to the diseases nor do they provide solutions to the problems of 'alienation' generated by such emergency situations. I insist that solutions to 'alienation' do not come from 'new forms of alienation' for we cannot solve a problem by substituting it with its variants.

For sure, ultimate solutions to 'alienation' can be found and we should search for this solution in the very efficacious anti-dote to 'alienation', namely constitutive relationality of persons which Ratzinger upholds. Such an ultimate solution does not stop at healing the bodily or physical expressions of 'alienation', which are mostly reactions to bodily challenges such as sickness but they go deeper to heal the person wholly in body and soul for in our experience of being persons, we experience our whole "I" (body and soul) as the experiencing subject but also as the very *object* of this experience, we equally experience the whole "me" (body and soul). For this reason, Wojtyła argues that "the totality of the human person also includes the body, where,

on the one hand, the acts of the interior life have their origin and, on the other hand, find expression and resonance"[406]. This is the Catholic principle of '*corpore et anima unum*' and so in our attempts to attains solutions to the problem of man's experience of alienation, we should search for those solutions that will take into consideration the whole man, as a person whose existence is both bodily and spiritually according to the truth of Revelation about man, which revealed truth reminds us time and again, particularly at moments of great challenges and trials that man's life is not sustained by "bread alone but on every word that comes from the mouth of God" (Mt.4:4).

The problem of 'alienation' which we have tried to analysis above becomes even more evident when we turn our attention to the experience of sickness and sin. It is here that we come to see the real danger, which alienation poses to man as a person, namely the destruction of personal relationships. To understand this more clearly, let us consider the correlation of Ratzinger's understanding of sin and the human experience of alienation as a separation from *others*. According to Ratzinger, sin is to be defined in terms of its nature as 'alienation' from the constitutive relationality of persons, as follow: "Sin is the damaging or the destruction of relationality….a rejection of relationality… a loss of relationship, disturbance of relationship…When I destroy a relationship, then this event-sin-touches the other person involved in the relationship"[407].

Thus, in Ratzinger, we are made to think about sin in terms of alienation, in terms of the lack of the constitutive core of what it means to be persons, the lack of relationality.
The diagnosis of alienation as 'sin' amplifies the very danger it poses to man from a theological point of view. It goes to show how sensitive alienation is not only to atheists like Karl Marx but equally to believers as we can see in Ratzinger. That everyone identifies alienation as a problem is at least indubitable but the most significant question remains that of what we can do about it in its current resurgence in form of a remedy to another problem, that of COVID-19?

We should however focus on solutions based on principles which can be applied in most cases of its resurgence irrespective of what justifies it, hence we have to ask: What then is the proper solution to alienation understood in its true nature as having the dire consequences for man as 'sins' do? I argue that the solution equally lies in the same place where the problem is identified,

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[406] Cf. K. Wojtyła, "La experiencia religiosa de la pureza" in *El don del amor,* 69-81, esp. 79; see Thomas Petri, *Aquinas and the Theolog y of the Body: The Thomistic Foundations of John Paul II's Anthropology* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2016), p. 142.
[407] J. Ratzinger, *In the beginning,* pp. 72-73.

namely in Ratzinger's constitutive dialogical relationality of persons. If alienation means the lack of such relationality, then its solution will also be the restoration of relationality. To demonstrate this, Ratzinger leads us to the very deepest source of alienation, which equally became the very ultimate solution to alienation in the lived-experience of the pain of alienation as well as the efficacious salvific effect which springs from this concrete experience of alienation in the life of the man Jesus, the Last Adam.

Accordingly, Ratzinger argues that "in the last analysis, (the experience of) pain is the product and expression of Jesus Christ's being stretched out (i.e. alienated) from being in God right down to the hell of "My God, why have you forsaken me?" Anyone who has stretched his existence so wide that he is simultaneously immersed in God and in the depths of the God-forsaken creature is bound to be torn asunder, as it were; such a one is truly 'crucified'. But this process of being torn apart is identical with love; it is its realization to the extreme (Jn 13:1) and the concrete expression of the breadth it creates. From this standpoint it should be possible to bring out clearly the true basis of the meaningful devotion to the Passion"[408].

Ratzinger thus identifies the passion of Christ and the experience of being forsaken, of being torn apart from relationality, of being alienated as a concrete insight into the pain of alienation. Today also, we can have a similar insight through reflection on the pain of the victims of coronavirus in this concrete context of being forsaken, being avoided, and being regarded as outcasts which is consequent upon the very nature of the communicable disease of COVID-19, a sort of feeling which we could imagine when reading the following story of lepers in the Bible: "Command the sons of Israel that they send away from the camp every leper" (Number 5:2).

This biblical command resonates with today's *quarantine* policies. Such a command was also given as health safety recommendations for *social distancing*: "Be careful against an infection of leprosy, that you diligently observe and do according to all that the Levitical priests teach you" (Deut. 24:8-9). Equally, we find biblical examples of *self-isolation* "No man of the descendants of Aaron, who is a leper… may eat of the holy gifts until he is clean" (Leviticus 22:4). However, the ultimate solution to the forms of 'alienation' necessitated by the dangers which leprosy posed, which can be likened to the dangers posed by COVID-19 today were to be found in God who reveals himself as "our healer" (*see* Exodus 15:26) as well as manifestly "gives sight to the blind, and lifts up those who are bowed down" (Psalm 146:8), which deeds not only lends credibility to

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[408] See J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 149.

the Divine self-Revelation of his own self as "the healer of Israel's land" (2 Chronicles 7:14) but also confirms the faith of believers who look up to God in prayer: "Heal Me O Lord, and I will be healed" (Jeremiah 17:14). In the Person of Jesus, the self-Revelation of God as healer became even more resplendent in the stories of healing miracles: "When Jesus came down from the mountains, … a man with leprosy came and knelt before him and said, 'Lord if you are willing you can make me clean'. Jesus reached out his hand and touched the man and said. 'I am willing', he said, 'be clean'. Immediately he was cleansed of his leprosy' (Matt. 8: 1-4; Mk 1:40-45; Lk. 5:12-16). In these stories, Jesus is revealed not only as healing individuals of the *alienation* caused by leprosy but also he healed groups of individuals as well: "As he was going into a village, ten men who had leprosy met him. They stood at a distance (social distancing) and called out in a loud voice, Jesus, Master, have pity on *us*" (Lk. 17:11-19).

The above examples of the forms of alienation due to diseases in the Bible go to show us that the measures we have today are standard measures already used in previous generations and the fact that these measures are undertaken due to health related emergency does not still remove the consideration of 'alienation' as a problem. However, these stories reveal to us an additional truth regarding the source of solutions in God, who not only heals our bodily diseases but restores us to our constitutive essence, namely relationality with others which alienation robs us, through various means, including sickness and sin.

Irrespective of its inducing factors, alienation strikes at the very core of our personality. Persons, human and Divine are constituted by relationality and it is this core of personal beings that the disease of alienation destroys. Alienation is to be solved only from a personalistic repay of broken relationships. On the level of human-Divine relationships, this repair is realized in the sacrament of reconciliation. Hence the very words of absolution reflects the constitutive relationality of the Triune Persons as follows: "Deus, Pater misericordiarum, qui per mortem et resurrectionem Filii sui mundum sibi reconciliavit et Spiritum Sanctum effudit in remissionem peccatorum, per ministerium Ecclesia indugentiam tibi tribute et pacem,.. Et ego te absolve a peccatis tuis in nominee Patris, et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti. (God, the Father of Mercies, who through the death and resurrection of His own Son reconciled the world to Himself and poured out the Holy Spirit for the forgiveness of sins, through the ministry of the Church may He grant to you pardon and peace,.. And I absolve you from your sins, in the name of the Father, Son and Holy

Spirit.)"[409]. In the words of absolution pronounced by the priest over the penitent, we come to know that the solution, the true medicine for spiritual alienation is ultimately a person, the uncreated logos, revealed to us in Jesus our Redeemer. Jesus Christ is the solution to the alienation we experience due to sin for He is the Mediator between God and Man.

Regarding the alienation due to sickness, we see already in our time, the experience of alienation in the very examples of our brothers and sisters who are victims of the coronavirus pandemic. It is perhaps, according to our present experiences, one of the worst forms of alienation due to sickness. We see these victims resign to 'alienation' from family, friends, and colleagues, as these *others* also wants to be safe and preserve their lives as long as they can and with as much care as they can afford within their reach. But as we already noted from the hindsight of history exemplified in Marxist communism, 'alienation' is not a problem to be solved by its substitution with other kinds of alienation, hence we should not be too optimistic that 'social distancing' will be a solution to the alienation caused by coronavirus. In fact, the more we avoid the victims who themselves feel alienated, the more we too who run away from them are equally alienated.

This is so because the human persons are constituted by dialogical relationality, and this applies both in my own person and in the person of the *others.* We need to be more creative in thinking out *personalistic* ways of mitigating the long-term adverse effects on self-isolation, social distancing, quarantine in spite of the hoped-for advantages we sure will gain from these in the short run. Are we making serious efforts to maintain relationships with loved ones who are being quarantined, or self-isolating in this period of uncertainty? Are we ensuring that in the time of their temporary alienation from families, friends, that we are keeping communication channels open with them as long as possible?

The anthropological structure of 'being-with' should be safeguarded as much as is humanly possible. This we must do even at the last moment of death and burial. When coronavirus patients or *other* people who are equally sick of some other diseases die, we owe them a decent burial as much as we expect same to be done for us when our time comes. As it is almost becoming a taboo to attend burials of the victims of the coronavirus, we feel even more aware of the reality of the deepest form of alienation, which Ratzinger identifies as "loneliness" at our own death. Condolence gestures, visits, and other ways of commiserate with the loved ones of those we know remains personalistic imperatives which flow from the constitutive relationality of our nature as

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[409] See CDF, *Catechism of the Catholic Church,* no. 1449.

persons. This is even more evident in Ratzinger's reflections on the notion of hell as constituted by the experience of an absolute separation from all relationships[410]. In the agony of the victims of coronavirus at the very moment of death, and in the grief and sorrows of their bereaved loved ones, we come to concrete terms with the lived experience of man's deepest alienation felt by Jesus, the Last Man on the Cross.

Alienation due to sickness and due to death is thus to be understood as the deepest lack of the relational constitution of personal beings, the existential flight from who we are, from oneself. Alienation, is first of all, about the category of persons rather than goods, hence it was not visible to the collectivists who focuses on serving his interest group, while 'alienating' *others.* Little wonder Marxism, which is a collectivist ideology failed to get the accurate diagnosis because it lies beneath the ideological principles upon which the whole system was built, namely promotion of the interest of the *proletariat* (nowadays, the 'liberals') in such a way as to *alienate* the interest of the *bourgeoisie* (nowadays, the 'conservatists'). Neither Marxists, contemporary extreme liberalists, nor any such collectivisms whose basic tenets are rooted in factors which promote 'alienation' of the *other* could have arrived at a good diagnosis of the anti-personalistic roots of alienation. It is only in the light of Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by relationality could such a perfect diagnosis have been possible.

Accordingly, Wojtyła quickly adds that this lived experience of the humanity of the *other* as another "I" does not result from "categorial knowledge, from humanity as the conceptualized essence "human being" but from an even richer lived experience, one in which I transfer what is given to me as my own *I* beyond myself to *one of the others,* who, as a result, appears primarily as a different *I,* another *I,* my neighbor. Another person is a neighbor to me not just because we share a like humanity, but chiefly because the other is another *I*"[411].

However, he points out that there is a certain difference of the experience of my *I,* from the experience of the *I* of another person, hence our lived experience of the 'other' as a person is different from our lived experience of the 'self'. For this reason, the *I* of the *other,* which the experience of 'loneliness' yearns for in Ratzinger's discourse, cannot be substituted by the richness of the experience of my *I,* because as Wojtyła rightly notes, "the other (*autrui*) lies beyond the field of the experience of self-consciousness, self-possession, and self-determination of the

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[410] See, J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 152.
[411] K. Wojtyła, "Participation", *Person and Community,* pp. 200-201.

individual concrete *I"*[412]. Here, we underscore the convergence of Wojtyła's views and Ratzinger's '*loneliness*', which convergence manifests the constitutive relationality of person in my own *I,* it because this experience reveals both *I* of the 'other' is equally given in our consciousness (i.e. as the 'missing-pole') as much as the lived-experience of our own *I* (i.e. concretely present-pole).

The two poles of this same lived experience (i.e. that of my *I,* and the *I* of other) which are simultaneously given in the analysis of the experience of *loneliness* thus corroborates Ratzinger's claim that the human person is constituted by relationality[413]. On the other hand, *loneliness* also proves the point which Wojtyła makes that the experience of my *I,* is not however transferable as it is unrepeatable[414] yet it can stand in *relation* to the experience of the *other* in our consciousness. In this way, we find a convergence of the Ratzingeran notion of person and the Wojtylean personalism. It is worthy of note also that the experiential structure of 'loneliness' presents us with another difference between personalism and collectivism. The collectivist may experience a semblance of 'loneliness' when he or she is detached from the 'interest group' (political party) to which he belongs, but this feeling does not have a personalist foundation in the collectivist's experience of 'loneliness'. This is so because the notion of *humanity* for the collectivist (as that of a specie-essence, or what Karl Marx describes as '*Gatuungswesen'*[415] does not so much arise from the absence of the *humanity* of another 'I' as a person but rather as the loss or 'alienation' of his *self-interest* from the collective *self-interest* of the group of individuals which are his own kind, the loss of 'belongingness' to this 'species' (special) group or club.

4.2.2 The question of 'class-interest' in collectivism

Closely associated with the problem of 'alienation' in collectivism is that of 'class-interest', which sustains it. Thus, we can say that class-interest constitutes another problem arising from collectivism. Class-interest, which appears at its face-value to be self-preservation and so wears a positive fascade is said to be problem for the society because its goal is the actualization of the exclusive interest of a selection of individuals rather than all persons in the society. It can take various forms like such extremes as racism, nepotism, or the milder forms of club-ism, party-ism

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[412] K. Wojtyła, ibid., p. 199.
[413] Cf, J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 153.
[414] Cf. K. Wojtyła, "Participation or Alienation" *Person and Community,* p. 200.
[415] For an overview of Karl Marx, 'Gattungswesen", see, T. Wartenberg, "'Species-Being' and 'Human Nature' in Marx", *Human Studies,* vol. 5, no. 2 (April – June, 1982), pp. 77-95.

or the notorious form of gang-ism. The person in collectivist society is defined according to his or her social status which grants him or her access to the goods owned by the group, hence collectivism serves only but the group interests of a collection of individuals. As we noted, human beings as individuals tend towards particularism of the *self,* or 'self-interest', and self-benefits obtained at the detriment, exclusion or *alienation* of the interest of *others.*

Such individualistic pursuit of good which benefit only the 'self' rather than the *other,* when realized on a large scale of more-then one individual's self-interest becomes collectivism. The collective good, because it tends to serve the interest of a large group of people at times (e.g. a large gang of robbers) attempts to rationalize its tenets in the same way utilitarianism puts forward the calculus of numbers[416] so as to acquire the semblance of an equivalent justification as a public good, or a common good. This sort of justification was used by Marxism, during the failed experiments of communism in Europe. Because it is based on collectivism of the proletariat class, whose 'interest' were championed, not simply for its sake but essentially to the sworn-denigration of the *others* – in this case, the bourgeoisie, it did not take too long before the system imploded on its own principles without fulfilling its promises of solving the problem of 'alienation' and inaugurating a better world. Ratzinger observes that such collectivist division of society into 'interest groups' as Marxism "has the potential to emerge again and again in new forms"[417].

How correctly accurate his observation has proved, decades after the apparent collapse of ideological Marxism! Today, it is not unusual to note the subtle re-emergence of Marxist class-struggle, which reintroduces the question of *alienation* through new forms of the so-called 'political correctness'[418] which purports to assuage the polarizing *interests* regarding contemporary debates around such issues as LGBTQ (Lesbian Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer), Pro-choice, ERGO (Euthanasia Research and Guidance Organizations) and the likes. The contemporary labels for 'proletariat' and 'bourgeoisie' have now become 'liberals' and 'conservatists' respectively. With new class structures re-established, we come full circle back to the Marxist convolution of the problem of *alienation*. How accurate is Karol Wojtyła's

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[416] The notion of 'calculus' intended here is drawn from the utilitarian "felicity calculus" of Jeremy Bentham.
[417] J. Ratzinger, *Werte in Zeiten des Umbruchs: Die Herausforderungen in Zukunft bestehen,* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2005), translated into English by Brian McNeil, and published under the title *Values in A Time of Upheaval,* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), p. 17.
[418] J. Ratzinger, *Values in A Time of Upheaval,* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), p. 17.

observations that the "concept of alienation, which was introduced into philosophy in the nineteenth century and adopted by Marx, seems to be making a great comeback today"[419].

Not the least surprising therefore are the characteristic attitudes common to these interest groups is their 'dissatisfaction' with the traditional (or what is now referred to as 'conservative')[420] moral values, to the extent that they accuse conservatives of 'discrimination' when their opposition to the preservation of the existing order in the world and their collectivist clamor for 'change' is resisted. Ratzinger rightly observed that nowadays, "there exists contrasting human rights, as we see in the conflict between a woman's right to freedom and the unborn child's right to life. The concept of discrimination is constantly enlarged, and this means that the prohibition can be transformed more and more into a limitation on the freedom of opinion and on religious liberty. Very soon, it will no longer be possible to affirm that homosexuality (as the Catholic Church teaches) constituted an objective disordering in the structure of human existence, and the fact that the Church is convinced that she does not have the right to confer priestly ordination is already seen by some as irreconcilable with the spirit of the European Constitution"[421]. Such polarization of people in a society results from collectivism championed by various interest groups.

While there is a sense of self-preservation of one's own group, collectivism meets the same challenge of not being able to transcend the *self,* (i.e. of transcending the interest of *our* group). It meets the same problem we considered in the notion of 'self-assertiveness' hence we can speak of the 'assertiveness' of a collection of self-interests of the individuals belonging to a certain interest group. Hence the key problem of collectivism is its inability to take into consideration the common good of the whole members of the society. It divides the society of persons into parts: into *our-group* and *their-group,* into *classes,* just as Marx did – and so fails to transcend the experience of 'ourselves', just as self-assertiveness fails to transcend the experience of 'myself'. It fails to grasp the society, as a *whole,* as a community.

However, Ratzinger maintains that the relationality of person entails that the proper experience of one's own existence ought to "overstep its own bound and in some form or other,

[419] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community,* p. 205.

[420] Ratzinger observed that the word "'conservative' has become disrepute for it appears that what we must do is not to preserve the status quo but to overcome it". See J. Ratzinger, *Values in A Time of Upheaval,* p. 11.

[421] J. Ratzinger, *L'Europa di Benedetto nella crisi della culture* (Siena: Edizioni Cantagalli, 2005) translated into English by Brian McNeil and published under the title *Christianity and the Crisis of Cultures* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006) p. 35.

…and so should point to the entirely Other"[422]. In this assertion, it is easy to note the convergence of Ratzinger's remarks with Wojtyła's lived-experience of an *I-other* intersubjectivity. With a capitalized *Other* preceded by the adjective 'entirely', one also gets the impression that he refers to this 'other' as the Divine Person. Notably, since as Jacque Maritain reminds us, our "the idea of person (human person) is an analogical idea which is realized fully and absolutely only in its supreme analogue, God, the Pure Act"[423] and for this reason, our idea of the *relations* of human persons to the common good in a society should equally reflect the relations of Divine Persons to the common good of the Divine society. How do we then understand the relations of the Divine Persons to the common good of the Divine society? Is it a relation of parts to its whole? St. Thomas Aquinas argues that in the society of Divine Persons, there is only a relation of personal wholes to the social whole and so "the intelligible value of 'whole', totality, is indissolubly bound to that of person. To say then that society is a whole composed of persons is to say that society is a whole composed of wholes"[424].

Taken in its full sense, this expression leads us directly to the society of the Divine Persons (for the idea of society is also an analogical idea). In the Divine Trinity, there is a whole, the divine Essence, which is the common good of the three subsisting Relations. With respect to this whole, the Three who compose the Trinitarian society are by no means parts, since they are perfectly identical to it"[425]. This same relation applies in the case of human persons for man is a whole unit of body and soul. The human person is not an aggregate collection of *some*body and soul but a unit. In his relation to the society, man is not just an individual, but he is a person. The human members of a society are therefore not a collective of individuals but each one is a whole person. In same way, the common good of the society has to be understood in this relation of a wholes (persons) to a whole (society). This relation of wholes to a whole is not realized in collectivism since the individual members of the group are understood as parts, serving the interest of the whole (group). For collectivists, the society is made up parts, classes, and groups: *ours* and *theirs*. Communism understood human persons in the society as parts, working to realize the collective good of the society, which in practice was the collective interest of a few, a select group, not that of every person, at least not for the bourgeoisie.

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[422] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* pp. 55-56.
[423] J. Maritain, *Person and Common Good,* p. 56.
[424] J. Maritain, ibid. 56-57
[425] Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* I, 30, ad 4; see also III *Sentences,* d. 5, 3,2.

From an anthropological perspective, we also meet such a description of relationality of persons in Karol Wojtylean *I-other* description of the experience of the humanity of others in his discourse on 'participation' which appears in the last part of his *The Acting Person*[426]. A certain resonance of both scholars with regard to Martin Buber's "I-thou" *dialogical* personalism, is thus noted. We have already indicated Ratzinger, predilection towards Buber's personalism and it can in fact be said that Buber's personalism presents us with a quite easier path for the application of Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by relationality in philosophy than Wojtyła's given that Ratzinger does not so much follow the Thomistic tradition as Wojtyła does.

Nonetheless, I do not intend to move along the lines of Martin Buber's dialogical personalism. Certainly, there are privileged advantages if I adopt Buber's philosophical approach, two of which include: its close relation to Ratzinger's theological arguments for the relationality of persons, given that the very notion of "thou" in Buber allows us to apply 'relationality' to both the Divine Person (i.e. the 'Thou') and human person (i.e. the 'thou'); and secondly, in Buber there is a smooth transition from an anthropological "I" to the "Thou" of God. Despite these advantages, I shall not take this clear and simply path of Buber's personalism, because it does not so much problematize the two questions of 'individualism' and 'collectivism' which we intend to address in this chapter. Wojtyła's Thomistic personalism very much highlights these two contemporary problems more directly in his discourse on 'subjectivism' and 'participation' than we could have seen in Buber. Hence, although Ratzinger announces that Buber's personalism influenced his anthropology, our attempts to focus on the contemporary problems leads us more towards Wojtyła than to Buber's personalism.

Conversely, the search for answers in Wojtyła's personalism, which does not assume at its onset the 'relationality of persons' as in Buber and Ratzinger[427], but rather begins from the *ethical*

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[426] K. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person,* pp. 259-366.

[427] It should however be noted that there are points of convergence between Wojtyła's ethical personalism and Buber's dialogical personalism, which Ratzinger implicitly appropriated in his theological discourse on the dialogical relationality of person. First is the notion of 'other' the sense of which is closely associated with that of 'thou' and in fact we can equally extend it to the Divine Person as the "wholly Other", using the expression of Rudolf Otto (**). This convergence however does not eliminate the differences between Wojtyła's *substance-subjective* starting point and Buber's *relational starting point*, which is basically similar to that of Ratzinger. Secondly, it should as well be noted that like Wojtyła, Ratzinger was also focused on the lived experience of Christian love as can be deduced from his encyclicals – *Deus Caritas Est* (2005)*,* and *Caritas in Veritate* (2009). Again this convergence does not blur the lines of difference between Wojtyła and Ratzinger with regard to their approaches to personalism and their divergent attitudes towards Thomism. All in all, it can be noted that Wojtyła's distinctiveness with respect to Buber and Ratzinger stems more from his starting point: He began from the lived experience of the subjective relationality the "I" through 'self-determination' to its efficacious actions and reaches the socially-significant relationality of the

context also heightens the anthropological reversal of Ratzinger's theological trajectory such that the eventual justification of Ratzinger's starting point, when demonstrated, will also serve as a more formidable evidence for its applicability in philosophical anthropology as the ultimate foundation for contemporary personalism.

Karol Wojtyła's personalism, which begins with the analysis of the lived experience of *subjectivity* progresses towards the problem of 'participation' and so converges at this stage, with the Ratzingerean relationality, which grounds his interpersonal starting point. Wojtyła discusses the theme of participation in the last part of his work *Osoba i czyn.* At his stage, the theme of 'participation' serves to bring to light his vision of *intersubjectivity* as an 'I-other' experience of the humanity of one's 'neighbour'. We had already pointed out that the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, whose personalism attracts Joseph Ratzinger was the most celebrated contemporary scholar of the philosophy of inter-subjectivity. We also indicated that there is a difference of methodological standpoint between Buber's "I-thou" and Wojtyła's "Ja i drugi" which he renders in French as "Soi et autrui" (I-and-the-other)[428].

Aside the fact that Buber's Jewish-German context of reflection on relationality differs from Wojtyła's Polish-French context in terms of cultural tonalities, it is more significant to underscore that unlike Buber, Wojtyła begins by positing the experiential polarity of the two subjective perspectives of 'my I' and the 'other person's I', noting their difference: "It seems that in the very positing of the problem *I-other* (*soi -autrui),* we proceed simultaneously from two cognitive situations. One is the ascertainment of the fact of the existence and activity of a concrete human being, designated by the pronoun *I,* who exists and acts in common with other human beings. The *other* is one of them, someone who lives alongside me, and who is both *another* and *one of the others* who exists and acts in common with me….Its basis is not so much consciousness as self-consciousness, conditioning the whole structure of lived experience of the self, the concrete *I.* This consciousness (of the 'other') from its own perspective constitutes that entire world that is simultaneously given to us as a fact. In this world consciousness constitutes all human beings, each

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intersubjective participation in the practical (ethico-cultural) realization of the common good in the life and work of the community of persons. This is the very opposite of Buber's and Ratzinger's approach who privileges the primacy of dialogical relationality of persons, within which context the individual person lives and understands his or her own subjective freedom.

[428] K. Wojtyła, "Uczestnictwo czy alienacja," *Summarium* 7.27 (1978): 7-16. A paper sent in French translation to the Fourth International Phenomenology Conference in Fribourg, Switzerland (24-28 January 1975), and also presented by invitation to the Philosophy Department at the University of Fribourg (27 February 1975).

and every one of them, both near and far. It constitutes them as *different* from me. It constitutes the *other* among them, who is both *another* and *one of the others,* thus also defining the other's relation to me, to my *I*"[429]. In the paragraphs that follow, I shall attempt to analyze the various poles of relationality, given in our lived-experience following Karol Wojtyła distinctions, namely the relationality of the *I,* the relationality of the *other,* and the *I-other* relationality experienced in participation in the co-actions of persons in a society for the actualization of the common good.

4.2.3 Proffering solutions to the problems of 'collectivism'

We have already attempted to highlight some guidelines in the search of solutions when we discussed the problem of alienation in the earlier subsections. I do not intend to repeat those suggested discussion but rather to focus more specifically on the solution of collectivism which the Wojtylean philosophical discourse on 'participation' and the Ratzingerian interpretation of 'active participation' in liturgy provides. This is thus a different approach to the solution of the problem of collectivism from the one we had considered earlier.

To proceed, it is important to consider what we understand by the 'participation'. Our colloquial use of the term 'participation' normally implicates an action or event in which the participants co-act as a team, each of whom plays specifically separately identifiable roles through which they collectively realize some common goal or realize a common project or product. For instance, we invite other people to participate in an event (e.g. in a lecture, a party, a research etc.). In such events, each participant plays some roles using expressed in some form of action/activity or another, including listening, watching, clapping etc. Of course, we do not altogether deny the significance of the *being* of each role-player as a person hence the mere presence of participants does not fully describe the notion of participation without reference to the *roles* played by individual participants (i.e. as role-players). For this reason, we make a distinction between *active* participation and *passive* participation.

Both Wojtyła and Ratzinger discuss the notion of 'participation' in the fourth and last part of their separate works[430]. There is however a difference of contexts in their considerations: on the one hand, Wojtyła's ethical considerations were generic as he had focused on the personalistic

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[429] K. Wojtyła, "Participation", *Person and Community,* p. 198.
[430] Cf. K. Wojtyła, "Intersubjectivity by Participation" in *The Acting Person,* pp. 262-366; Ratzinger, "Active Participation" in *The Spirit of Liturgy,* pp. 172-177.

value of acting together in the context of actualization of a common good in the community; on the other hand, Ratzinger's considerations were much more specific as he had focused on the particular context of liturgy. Notably, the communal nature of the liturgy as "the public worship performed by the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ, that is by the Head and members"[431] necessarily implicates the notion of 'participation'. In fact, Ratzinger discusses the meaning of the concept of 'active participation' which the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council employed in the document, *Sacrosanctum Concilium* (i.e. the Constitution on Sacred Liturgy). For Ratzinger, 'participation' in liturgy describes how the Christian community participates in God's own action. There is however a convergence of conclusions regarding the relational 'intersubjective' emphasis in the analysis of participation by both scholars such that it is the *persons* who act together rather than the eventual *products or effects* realized from their co-actions.

In this subsection, I try to show how the two divergent contexts of discourse on participation converge in their conclusions on the intersubjectivity of participation. This objective, if achieved, will prove that Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by relationality simultaneously explains the novelty of the Christian vision of the divine-human relationship (i.e. man's relationship with God in Christ) in liturgy as well as man's experience of the humanity of the *other* (neighbor) in his own *I* in common socio-cultural projects. In this way, the constitution of persons by relationality will be established in whichever context (whether in the case of Divine Person or human person) it is considered.

In his own analysis, Wojtyła discusses the notion of person in the fourth last part of his most famous work- *Osoba i czyn* (translated into English as *The Acting Person*) wherein he describes the notion of participation in terms of lived experience of the 'other'[432] as another '*I*'. Although he notes that "the actualization of participation in relation to every other human being arises before each of us as a task,"[433] Wojtyła does not fail to emphasis that the realization of this task does not merely consists in its external features as it is always realized internally, as it is "the constitution of the *I* of another in my own consciousness and will"[434].

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[431] Vatican II Council, *Sacrosanctum Concilium,* n. 7.
[432] In this consideration, I use the term '*other',* connotatively rather than denotatively. In Wojtyła's considerations, he refers simply to the 'human' *other* (i.e. 'neighbour'), whereas I extend the connotation of 'other' in this section to implicate all personal *"others"* (Divine *Other*; human *other/*neighbour*;* and angelic *other*). I do not however capitalize it, when it refers to the Divine *Other* but I shall indicate this sense, wherever I intend it specifically but where I wish to generalize (Divine, human, angelic), I shall keep the non-capitalized signification – '*other'.*
[433] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community,* p. 203.
[434] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community,* p. 204.

From the standpoint of the Christian, what this means is the acceptance of God's choice of my humanity in his own *I,* such that with St. Paul, every baptized Christian can say "I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer *I* but Christ who lives in me" (Gal. 2:20). The most expressive ideal of such a choice actualizes the union of persons, most perfectly manifest in the act of love. Love is thus a choice made from within, from the experience of the *I* of another within the subjectivity of my own *I,* of the *I* of the one who loves, the one who experiences the *I* of another in his own *I.* If the person who makes the choice is God, we can speak of God's love for the human person and if the person who makes the choice is man, we can speak of man's love for fellow man or man's response to God's love. The perspective of the Divine person, this will mean God's choice of our humanity in his own Divine Person, such that the Divine *I* of Jesus Christ takes up our human *I,* (choice made from within). This is a specific description of the notion of participation as it focuses more on the human-human intersubjectivity of the constitution of person by relationality. In a sense, Wojtyła's *I-other* structure approximates very closely to Ratzinger's and Buber's *I-thou* dialogical structure of persons. Participation is however realized in the context of co-acting with others, the analysis of which we find in the last part of Wojtyła's *The Acting Person*[435].

Furthermore, it is significant to note that the very notion of 'active participation' was quite recurrent in the very first conciliar document of the Second Vatican Council, *Sacrosanctum Concilium*[436]. However, the Fathers of the Council did not see the need to define exactly what this means. They simply presumed its understanding and so went on to give some guidelines for its promotion and examples of how it can be actualized in liturgical celebration. In their words, "Mother Church earnestly desires that all the faithful should be led to that fully conscious, and active participation in liturgical celebrations ….With zeal and patience, pastors of souls must promote the liturgical instruction of the faithful, and also their active participation in liturgy both internally and externally….To promote active participation, the people should be encouraged to take part by means of acclamations, responses, psalmody, antiphons, gestures and bodily attitudes. And at proper times all should observe a reverent silence"[437].

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[435] K. Wojtyła, ibid.
[436] Vatican II Council, *Sacrosanctum Concilium,* nos. 14, 19, 27, 30, 41, 50, 113, 114, 121, 124.
[437] Vatican II Council, Ibid., nos, 14, 19.

As noted from the above citation, the Fathers indicates two dimensions of 'active' participation: "internally and externally"[438]. In what does each of these dimensions entail? In their examples of what can be done to promote active participation, they gave instances of certain liturgical actions performed by believers together as a worshipping community, for instance: liturgical 'responses' in words/songs and 'gestures' like kneeling, standing etc. As these are *active* external actions, we could speak of them as 'external expressions' of *active* participation (in liturgy). The adjective 'active' differentiates such instances of participation from the 'passive' participation of 'mere presence' (e.g. as in 'spectators'). It highlights the *relation* of the efficient subject of such actions with the very acts and so manifests 'participation' through the *I-act* structure existing between each participant (i.e. as an *acting person*).

It is however misleading in the context of liturgical participation to focus on the expressed liturgical actions (i.e. *responses* and *gestures*) of the worshipping community of believers. No doubt, each person in the worshipping community who is aware (more or less) of the participation of his *I* in relation to the liturgical acts in which he 'participates' experiences such Wojtylean features of *subjectivity* of the *I* as 'consciousness', 'efficacy', 'self-determination' (which we had described in the previous sections) are notable. However, neither Wojtyła nor Ratzinger misses the foundation of 'participation' in the personal experience of intersubjectivity and in the case of Ratzinger, we note the novelty of the Christian understanding of participation in the context of liturgy, which does not consist of the external acts, but rather on the internal experience of participation as a relation between subjects, between persons who co-act with one another.

As the media of experiencing this intersubjectivity, the actions and their external features of intensity, frequency, duration, etc. do not themselves indicate intersubjectivity without reference to the very *persons* who perform them. Merely co-acting with the *others* does not at the same time reveal the experience of the humanity of the other as an *I,* in Wojtyła who insists that such an experience "always involves a discrete choice."[439]. So also, in Ratzinger, we are even more presented with the participation of incorporation with Christ, through whom we take part in *actio Divina* (i.e. God's action), hence a more radical concentration on who we are as 'persons' than on

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[438] Ibid., no. 19.
[439] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community,* ibid., p. 203.

what we do as 'doers of an action'. In Ratzinger's own words "doing, must stop when we come to the heart of the matter: *oratio*"[440].

That our roles as agents in participation does not at the same time deny our subjectivity since at the core of 'active participation' is 'self-determination' which implicates freedom to act from within the core of a person. In the context of liturgy, this initial 'self-determination' towards such a personal choice to 'participate' in a common action is to be understood in terms of the baptismal choice to be a Christian, to be incorporated to the *I* of Christ, the head; to be incorporated to him as a member of his Body, the Church. The baptism choice or faith thus orients the baptized towards the fullness of 'active participation' in the liturgical action, which Ratzinger explains as the *oratio* -i.e. Eucharistic Prayer in which the community of believers participate in Christ's own prayer to the Eternal Father.

Thus, it is not the ethico-religious *I-act* structure, which enables us to experience in participation the *other* (whether in the case of God in Christ or in the case of my neighbor) as another '*I*' even if we co-act 'with Christ'(in *oratio*) or we co-act alongside 'the neighbour' as the co-worshipping or co-acting *others*. Why is it so? The reason is that the *external* dimensions of active participation which is revealed in the ethico-religious *I-act* structure, expresses two valid poles: the one of which is the personalistic *I*-pole which reveals the subjectivity of the *I;* and the other pole is the practical *act*-pole, which focus on the features of *faciendum* or 'makeability' of which Ratzinger discountenances when he writes as follows: "By thinking only of the practicable, of what can be made, of what we can be performed, of our works, man is in danger of forgetting to reflect on himself and on the meaning of existence. Of course, this temptation is present in every age. Thus, in the thirteenth century, the great Franciscan theologian, Bonaventure felt obliged to reproach his colleagues…with having learned how to measure the world but having forgotten how to measure themselves"[441].

The lopsided focus on the 'act-pole' of the *I-act* structure leads towards *activism* (not just in politics but also in religion and ethics) rather than towards 'personalism'. Activism in any of its expressions, measures such aspects of our liturgical actions (responses and gestures) as 'how often', 'how long', 'how audible', 'how sonorous', etc. rather than the relational intersubjectivity of the persons in worship and/or the relationality of our union with Christ as His Body. For this

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[440] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 174.
[441] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 38.

reason, the valid constitutive *subjective* relationality of the *I-act* structures (*I-act;* or *We-act*), does not at the same time highlight the equally valid constitutive *intersubjective* relationality of 'participation'.

Hence the sort of intersubjective relationality which we search for through the analysis of participation (active participation) arises from a different kind of relationality-structure, namely the interpersonal structure between persons (*I-other; We-structure* constituted by the reciprocal interpersonal co-relationality of several *I*-subjects). This is why the *external* expression of 'active participation' in *I-acts,* even particularly in liturgical worship, does not reveal this "interpersonal" relational experience which Wojtyła and Ratzinger argues for in their aforementioned works. Accordingly, Wojtyła notes that, "although we may live and act in common with others in various societies, communities and social groups, and although this life and activity may be accompanied by a basic awareness of each other's humanity, this alone does not actualize participation in that humanity"[442].

Ratzinger, as we already noted, even makes this experience of participation more specific in its liturgical sense as the experience of our unity with Christ, whose 'body' we are as Christians and through whose *I,* we all as head and body, perform the act of *oratio* to the heavenly Father in the Eucharistic Prayer, which the celebrating priest prays in 'persona Christi'. For him, "the word, 'participation' refers to a principal action in which everyone has a 'part'…[According to the liturgy sources,] the real liturgical action, the true liturgical act is the *oratio,* the Eucharistic Prayer, the "Canon", …it is *actio* in the highest sense of the Word. For what happens in it is that the human *actio* steps back and makes way for the *actio divina,* the action of God. In this *oratio* the priest speaks with the I of the Lord – "This is my Body", "This is my Blood." He knows that he is not now speaking from his own resources but in virtue of the Sacrament [of ordination] that he has received, he has become the voice of Someone Else, who is now speaking and acting. This action of God, which takes place through human speech, is the real 'action' for which all of creation is in expectation…The real 'action' in the liturgy in which we are all supposed to participate is the action of God himself. This is what is new and distinctive about the Christian liturgy: God himself acts…and makes himself accessible to us, so that, through the things of the earth, through our gifts, we can communicate with him in a personal way"[443].

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[442] K. Wojtyła, *Person and Community,* p. 202.
[443] J. Ratzinger, *The Spirit of Liturgy,* pp. 172-173.

Ratzinger's rejection of the external expressions of active participation is most evidently expressed in his insistence that "the almost theatrical entrance of different players into the liturgy, which is so common today, especially during the Preparation of the Gifts, quite simply misses the point. If the various external actions …become the essential in the liturgy, if the liturgy degenerates into general activity, then we have radically misunderstood the 'theo-drama' of the liturgy and lapsed almost into parody. True liturgical education cannot consist in learning and experimenting with external activities"[444]. Given that we are not able to experience the actualization of the Wojtylean 'intersubjectivity' of participation and the Ratzingerian constitutive 'relationality' of person in active participation through the *external* expressions of 'active participation', let us then turn our gaze towards the *internal* expressions of 'active participation'. What does the *internal* dimension of 'active participation' consist in?

From the ethical perspective, Karol Wojtyła provides us with a hint by distinguishing between merely living alongside others and experiencing the humanity of *other* as neighbor. Thus, the consideration of participation as a task allows Wojtyła to explain the personalistic end of 'participation' as ultimately oriented towards *'communio personarum'* (communion of persons), which highlights the same constitutive relationality of persons that Ratzinger had discovered, albeit following a different route. The communion of person finds its deepest manifestation in love. Love is thus understood as the specific experience of the constitutive relationality of persons through the experience of the humanity of the *other* person and so he concludes "On the basic, elementary, pre-ethical level, so to speak, the commandment to love is simply the call to experience another human being as another *I*, the call to participate in another's humanity, which is concretized in the person of the other just as mine is in my person"[445].

Secondly, even though the consideration of participation as a task gives the impression that its source might have arisen an external a formal duty, either in the sense in which Immanuel Kant understands a moral law (i.e. arising from an outside law or commandment), Wojtyła observes that participation is not just the experience of the awareness of the *other* , which can be mediated through an external source; rather it is the actualization and affirmation of the humanity of the *other* in my own person, an actualization which arises spontaneously from 'within' rather than from an external source. Hence Wojtyła argues that "the *I-other* relationship, does not exist in us

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[444] J. Ratzinger, *The Spirit of Liturgy,* pp. 174-175.
[445] K. Wojtyła, ibid.

as an already accomplished fact; only the potentiality for it exists. Experience shows that a certain impulse is needed to actualize this relationship. Although this impulse has been expressed in a commandment, this does not mean that it may remain merely on the outside. It must arise from within. The commandment of love prescribes only this: that each of us must continually set ourselves (i.e. self-determine ourselves to) the task of actually participating in the humanity of others, of experiencing the other as an *I,* as a person"[446].

Given that such an experience of participation as the experience of the humanity of others in my own person - i.e. participating in the humanity of others, springs spontaneously from 'within', it is easy to conclude that its source is human emotions. This is the conclusion reached by Max Scheler with whom Wojtyła discusses in this regard. Wojtyła does not locate the source of participation in the emotional sphere of our experience of being persons but he acknowledges that "it would be difficult to deny the significance of human spontaneity and emotions in the development of interpersonal relations … and so, Scheler's analysis also provides an additional argument for maintaining that people have some sort of basic, innate disposition to participate in humanity as a *value,* to spontaneously open up to others. ….[On the other hand, Wojtyła notes], Sartre's analysis of consciousness leads him to conclude that the subject is closed in relation to others…. Hence, an emotional disposition and a purely emotional spontaneity may facilitate participation – but may also impede it"[447].

As experiential field of emotions does not guarantee a stable source for grounding the experience of participation, Wojtyła concludes that the *I-other* relationship as participation in the humanity of others, is given in the volitional experience of myself as a person. In other words, it arises from my self-determination towards such an actualization of the humanity of the *other* in my own person, hence it is an experience which "always depends to a basic degree on the will, such that experiencing another human being, one of the others, as another *I* always involves a discreet choice. First of all, it involves choosing this particular human being among the others, which simply means that this particular one from among the others is *hic et nunc* given to me and assigned to me. The choice here consists in my accepting of this particular individual's *I,* my affirmation of the person. I thus in a sense *choose this person in myself* – in my own *I* – for I have no other access to another human being as an *I* except through my own *I*. …The choice here seems

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[446] K. Wojtyła, ibid.
[447] K. Wojtyła, ibid., pp. 203-204.

to lie on the plane of the spontaneity of the will. The constitution of the *I* of another in my consciousness and will is not the result of choosing among people, among others; it is a matter of choosing the human being who is *hic et nunc* given to me and assigned to me…It is a matter of simply identifying one of the others as another *I,* which does not require a more prolonged process of the will – assent or conflict of motives, etc."[448].

Another significant aspect which shows the convergence of Wojtyła's consideration of 'participation' and Ratzinger's discourse on the notion of person as constituted by relationality is the contrast between 'participation' and 'alienation'. The one being the actualization of the experiencing the humanity of the *other;* and the other being a failure to actualize this task, hence the failure to experience the humanity of the *other,* as another 'I'. Both scholars are well acquainted with the Marxist-inspired notion of 'alienation'. Wojtyła notes that "according to Marx's philosophy, human beings are alienated by their products: their economic and political systems, their property, and their work"[449].

It is equally significant that Wojtyła's consideration of the context of participation involves that of co-acting, of co-realization of a common good. Such a context is equally present in the philosophy of Karl Marx, the goal of which is the realization of the communist state, in which 'co-activity' is extolled. However, there is a difference between Wojtyła's context of actualizing participation in the process of realizing common good and Marx' context of collectivity in communism: In Wojtyła, the notion of 'participation' transcends the subjectivity of "my *I"* as it is oriented towards the experience of the *"I"* of the *others,* the humanity of the *others* as persons – whereas in Marx, the notion of 'alienation' does not transcend beyond the selfishness of the *I,* as it serves instead to highlight the experience of the relation of "my I" to "my product". The irony of the collectivism of Marxism is thus manifest in the notion of 'alienation'. This irony is already evident in the class struggle which separates the 'humanity' of the bourgeoisie from the 'humanity' of the proletariat.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, we tried to apply the conclusions of our considerations in the previous chapters to specific problems which pose challenges to the understanding of person as constituted by relationality. Two key problems were selected for consideration, the one is individualism and

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[448] K. Wojtyła, ibid., p. 204.
[449] K. Wojtyła, ibid., p. 205.

the other is collectivism. Both problems arise from a denial of the Ratzingerian notion of person as constituted by relationality. Individualism attempts to preserve the *self* at the expense of the *other* and in like manner, collectivism which is a collection of individuals – hence individualism seen in the larger scale, attempts to preserve the collective *self*-interest of the group one belongs, equally at the exclusion and detriment of *another,* considered to be a rival group or opponents.

Accordingly, the first part of the chapter dwelt on individualism and attempted to clear the blurring lines between the notion of individualism and the associated notion of subjectivity. The distinction made between individualism and subjectivity was based on the suitability of adapting them into the very notion of person as constituted by relationality. Taking cues from experiences of subjectivity in both moral and religious context, it was noted that individualism is closed to relationality of persons on the one hand whereas subjectivity reveals the relationality of man's *I,* which is manifest in the relation of the *I* to its acts (moral and religious, as the case may be). It was noted that the experience of subjectivity is always felt in all contexts of *operari* (activities as well as actions) and so even if we speak of the encounter of faith, as "lifelong conversion"[450] we are still confronted with relationality since the efficacious experience of subjectivity is not lost even in the faith-act of response to the Divine initiative.

This understanding preserves the element of personal freedom (i.e. to accept or reject, to believe or not to believe). Even more evident is in the demands of faith for righteous actions. A demand which implicates the experience of subjectivity of response (i.e. to obey or to disobey). The experiential evidence that this personal efficacious subjectivity in relation to moral demands of faith is characterized by freedom is that it is independent of whether or not these actions are faith-worthy (i.e. righteous acts) or not. A baptized Christian who performs a righteous action (e.g. charity) experiences his subjectivity as a 'good' (righteous) Christian but also equally experiences his subjectivity as a 'bad' (unrighteous) Christian when he sins. He does not lose the experience of his efficacious (i.e. efficient causality) responsibility for his actions in either instances. He experiences himself as the conscious subject of his actions, irrespective of their moral nature in relation to his being a Christian. Hence the relation between faith and morality can thus be shown from the lived experience of subjectivity, if we focus on the consideration of efficacy (i.e. efficacious causality of the personal subject of action) in the light of John Paul II's analysis.

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[450] J. Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity,* p. 172.

In the second part of the chapter, our focus became even much keener on the practical problem of alienation as can be noted in the current global health challenge on COVID-19. I tried to show that the forms of alienation (self-isolation, social distancing, etc.) which the current circumstances compel us to adopt are not new in human history as these also were the practice in the ancient world of Israel when the cure for leprosy had not been found. But in all, these measures cannot serve as ultimate solutions to the alienation due to health challenges. That we cannot solve alienation by introducing forms of alienation was the contention of my argument. I had concluded in this chapter that lasting solutions to the problems of alienation must be sought only from the constitutive relationality of persons. It was noted that this is why Marxist approach was found to be faulty. I maintain that only God who cures man as a whole person – soul and body, can provide integral solution to the alienations caused by health challenges.

This solution does not conflict with the human attempts to discover vaccines but as far as relationality is to be maintained, the medical experts can only solve the spacio-physical and bodily symptoms of alienation but only a solution which takes into consideration the whole man (body and soul) and that of the constitutive relationality of intersubjective communion of persons. The last section of the chapter provided an additional reflection on participation as a solution to the problem of collectivism. I tried to demonstrate in this last part the convergence of Wojtyła's philosophical discourse on participation and Ratzinger's theological discourse on active participation in their common conclusion that person is constituted by dialogical relationality which is manifest in the context of moral and religious co-actions with others.

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of conclusions from chapters

This dissertation is divided into two parts, each of which has two chapters totaling four chapters overall. The first part, which is expository in its approach comprises of the first two chapters. In chapter one, the basic elements of Ratzinger's analysis of the notion of person as constituted by relationality were presented. The two subsections of this chapter aim at highlighting Ratzinger's procedure of analysis of the notion of person from the revealed mystery of God through Christology to anthropology using the principle of relationality. Hence, the first subsection discussed of the unique feature which distinguishes Ratzinger's notion of person – namely the replacement of the significance of 'rationality' as a constituent principle of the essence of man with 'relationality'. Next the chapter proceeds on the basis of this replacement to discuss the notion of God as person, which forms the starting point of Ratzinger's considerations of the notion of person. According, we proceeded to discuss the derivation of notion of person in man from its primary analogate from God in the Person of Jesus Christ.

The second chapter which concludes the expository part, presents four dimensions of considering the centrality of Jesus as the *Logos* in whom and through whom is revealed the essence as well as the freedom of the human person as constituted by relationality. The first two sections considered relationality of persons from the aspect of its sources in creation and in history, both of which reveal the constitutive relationality of persons and in its full manifested in the Person of Christ with respect to his relationality to God and to humanity. The third section of the chapter focus on the presentation of relationality of persons in the anthropological structure of 'being-from', 'being-with', and 'being-for'. As the structure of being-from and being-for were taken care of by the creative and historical sources of freedom, the last section took up the task of showing how the structure of 'being-with' became manifest in the sacraments, through which true freedom is gained in view of restoring the lost relationship between God and man. This last section took as representative exemplifications of this sacramental dimension of being-with, the key sacraments of baptism and Eucharist, both of which manifest the relational structure of *being-with* with respect to Christ, now revealed as the guarantor true freedom.

The second part which is demonstrative in approach equally consists of two chapters. Accordingly, chapter three serves to prepare the path for introducing dialogical partners in view of applications of Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by relationality. In this third chapter

Ratzinger's vision was compared alongside that of Karol Wojtyła on the basis of their divergences and convergences with contemporary schools of personalism as well as with Thomism. The chapter however begins with a discussion on the question of starting points. It was shown that Ratzinger begins from the revealed mystery of God, which marks his starting point out as essentially theological. Such a starting point from the perfect analogate of the notion of person implicates a deductive method of analogical applications of the notion of person as constituted by relationality to our understanding of man as a person. In contrast to such a theological starting point, it is also possible to focus on man's experience of being a person and then work our way up. However, dangers of divinization of man and 'anthropomorphication' of God should be checked for each of the respective choices of starting points. After this consideration of starting points, the chapter then proceeds to the considerations of the place of Ratzinger and that of Wojtyła in the chosen two yardsticks of our considerations, namely personalism and Thomism. In this second section of the chapter, it was underscored that Wojtyła's approach is more inclined towards the contemporary schools of personalism whereas Ratzinger takes his cue more from Buber's Jewish dialogical personalism. With regard to Thomism, the divergences between the two scholars became even wider as Wojtyła appreciated most of the key elements of Thomism whereas Ratzinger took his cues rather from Augustianism.

The preliminary considerations of the third chapter ushered in the demonstrative discourse of the next and final chapter which focused on the practical applications of the notions of person to the societal problems of individualism and collectivism. In considering the problem of individualism, distinctions were made between terms such as 'self-assertion', 'alienation', and 'loneliness', which re-inforce the individualist notion of *self* to the detriment of the 'other' and the personalist expressions of the lived-experiences of the 'subjectivity of the *I*' in self-determination. The contemporary usage of such notions as 'self-isolation', 'social distance' were analyzed in terms of individualism and personalism respectively. Attempts were also made to provide guidelines for solutions. Worthy of note however is the claim that only if the constitutive relationality of persons is to be taken into consideration, could the problems associated with individualism be resolved. Equally, the analysis of collectivism shows that it is the pluralization of individualism as it refers to a collection of individuals who share the same interest, for which they work hard to preserve at the detriment of 'others'. Thus, in the same way 'self-assertiveness'

is pursued by the individual to the detriment of *others*, so also does collectivism preserve the collective interest of its members to the exclusion of 'others'.

Thus, the solution again rests on the affirmation of the constitutive relationality of persons in the *I-other* relationships. The actualization of the constitutive *I-other* relationality of persons was then demonstrated in the discourse on Wojtyła's notion of *participation* and Ratzinger's interpretation of *active participation.* It was shown that Wojtyła focuses on the intersubjective ethical context of the social (human-human) realization of the common good, on the one hand; while Ratzinger focuses on the religious context of liturgy (Divine-human) in which the community participates in God's own action, on the other hand. As both differences in starting points (doctrine of God and philosophy of man, respectively) and contexts (ethical and religious respectively) does not affect the conclusion of the constitutive relationality of persons, it was then concluded that the affirmation of Ratzinger's notion of person provides a formidable solution to the problems of individualism and collectivism.

The theological relevance of this dissertation

The theological relevance of this dissertation is most evident in its contribution to the discourse on person. The contemporary discourse on person does not so much pay attention to the question of its history. The history of the discourse on person actually began from the theological considerations regarding the doctrine of God as Trinity. It is thus obvious that Ratzinger's starting point retains this heritage, hence retrieves this very tradition of ancient and medieval scholarship on person. We equally note this sensitivity to the starting point of the discourse in Jacque Maritain. It is significant to note that the idea of person as applied to man in anthropological studies cannot be understood in its proper sense, without the understanding of how person is constituted by dialogical relationality in the Triune God. This is because the basic sense of relation implicates the most fundamental idea of a Trinity of Persons in one God, for we cannot have any understanding of Divine Persons in the context of the Trinitarian doctrine without appreciating the sense of Divine relations. Just as the one essence of divinity is made more intelligible in the double language of *distribution* (of Divine economy) and *processions*; and just as the double language of distribution and processions is made more intelligible in the Trinity of Persons (which are the terms of the processions), so also the notion of three Divine Persons can only be made a little more intelligible in the language of the four relations. It is thus even more evident why Ratzinger's vision of person

as constituted by relationality is perfectly in accord with the most ideal perfect exemplar of personal beings, i.e. the Divine Persons. It is thus a strictly theological vision of person from which we can subsequently derive the analogical visions of man as a person.

The way relations constituted the very essence of what it means to be person in God, so also can we in analogical way derive the constitution of the very essence of what it means to be person in man, namely to be in relation with others. In God, there is no paternity without filiation; so also should we search for that which constitutes the relation of one human person with other human persons. Ratzinger tries to illustrate this very basic notion of the constitution of person from relationality by an illustratively description of the Jewish principle of 'an emissary' - whose nature is to stand in relation between the 'sender' and the one to whom the emissary is sent[451].

Whereas this illustration highlights something of a functional role, it indicates that the very essence of relation is cognized always at the very moment its reference to 'another' is grasped. In other words, a being of relation is identified essentially by its reference to something or somebody other than itself. But this is not all that Ratzinger wants to communicate by this notion. He also wants to retain a certain self-identity for persons when he considers persons as relations. From the perspective of Aristotelian philosophy, a 'relation' is an accident of a substance and in this sense, its identity is only in reference to another – to a substance. Ratzinger does not follow this Aristotelian understanding of relation as an 'accident of a substance', rather he equates relation with substance. In fact, it will be more correct to say that he replaces the Aristotelian category of substance with that of relation. How does he justify this categorical replacement? Insisting that "persons are relations, pure relatedness",[452] Ratzinger reiterates that this declaration is not simply in reference to the Trinity but it is the fundamental statement about what is at stake in the concept of person[453].

Ratzinger's reasons for this claim is decipherable from his understanding that the spiritual life marks the distinguishing feature of personal beings, hence he avers that "it is the nature of spirit to put itself in relation, the capacity to see itself and the other"[454]. At this point, the influence of St Augustine on Ratzinger's theology (including his theological anthropology) is unmistakable. For St Augustine, the life of personal beings is essentially an interior life. Hence, if 'person' is

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[451] Ratzinger, "The notion of person in theology", *Communio* 17 (1990), p. 446.
[452] Ibid., p. 447.
[453] Ibid.
[454] Ibid., p. 451.

essentially said of some beings on account of their interior life (spirituality), then this feature of spiritual life, which implicates not only self-reflexivity but also consciousness of other beings, is undoubtedly characterized by relationality, both with respect to the other beings (cognition) and with respect to oneself (self-cognition). On this count, it is plausible to speak of personal beings as constituted in their interior life by openness, at once to the reality of the 'self' as well as to other 'non-self' realities. Such an openness made possible through the interior life can thus be said to be constituted by relationality (i.e. a 'self-to-self' relation; 'self-to-other' relation). In a sense, the interior life of persons seen in this way is even more appropriately defined by relationality than by substantiality (which in depicting 'individuality' implicates a closure of self), which is not in tandem with the data of experience given from the interior life of personal beings.

This is what Ratzinger means when he says that person is an event or a moment of relationality. The experience of such a moment or event of being a person can be given internally, in the interior life of God, angels and human persons. It is not simply an experience peculiar to Divine Persons but an experience which all personal beings can access on account of the capacity for spiritual life. More so, it is not only the case that persons are to be understood as relations from the interiority of the spiritual life but it is even more evident that what is seen as personal relationship of persons (in the human community) is not merely the externality of physical affinity or closeness of distance between one human being and another human being but rather it is an interior phenomenon, more accurately expressed as 'intimacy', hence the interpersonal relationships expressed as a communion of persons, rather than simply an 'interdependence of persons'.

Howsoever, it is noteworthy that the understanding of person as relation is not simply a matter of experience but given that spiritual life is essentially constitutive of the existence and actions of personal beings, it is proper to say that Ratzinger's understanding of person as relation is existential. The interior life of the human soul for instance is an essential aspect of a really existing living human being and this is manifest in the specifically spiritual life of intellectual and volitive acts of the human person. The experience of these acts of man's interior life is only but an evidence of its real existence. That persons exist as relation is not simply a question of psychological experience but this is the ontological structure of personal beings. The primary theological model and ultimate source of this constitutive feature of relation in personal beings is the Divine Persons of the Ab-solute being – i.e. Trinity, in whom there exists such real ontological

relations as 'paternity', 'filiation', and 'spiration'. Thus, in the personal God the Father, 'paternity' is a relation which is constitutive of the Person of God the Father such that it not only constitutes the internal relations of Divine origin with respect to the Father's relation of existence to other co-equal Persons of the Trinity (i.e. generation of the Son and procession of the Spirit) but also, the same relation of 'paternity' constitutes the external relations of origin with respect to the Divine act of creation which brings about the existence of creatures (i.e. the creation of cosmos, man, spiritual entities, etc. *ex nihilo*). Thus as 'Father' of creation, God's 'paternity' constitutes the source-principle of a relation which reveals not only God's transcendence but also God's immanent with respect to the created world.

Analogically, the human person exists as a relation with respect to the Divine Persons, not ontologically as in the case of the internal relations of the Triune Persons, but with respect to their acts (e.g. Creation, Salvation, Sanctification). The human person is a relation as a 'contingent' realization of the acts of the Divine Persons, whose existence fulfills the 'necessary' reasons for human existence (i.e. Creator-creature relation). The existence of man is inexplicable except in 'relation' to God, whose act of creation brought about human existence. This same reasoning applies to human salvation, for it is only in relation to Christ, the One Saviour, the man who is completely in God, can the salvation of human persons be realized.

In the same reasoning, it is plausible to speak of man's sanctification as a receiver of gifts of holiness (i.e. giver-recipient relation), through Christ in the Spirit (sharing in the holiness of the Triune Divine Persons *through* the mediation of Christ, the Incarnate God). From the above, we can understand how the notion of relation as employed in this dissertation and its applicability to social problems of individualism and collectivism, is highly relevant for contemporary scholarship on person. It also shows quite lucidly the very goal of any scholarly research on person to be the demonstration of relationality principle as the basis for communion of persons. The realization of *communio personarum* is not possible without the affirmation of dialogical relationality of persons, whether in the case of community of human beings (human-human communion), or that of human-Divine communion, or the community of Divine Persons, i.e. of the Trinity.

Recommendation for further research

This research does not exhaust all possible dimensions of the relationality of persons. In the area of applicability for instance, there is enough room to explore the challenges of applying Ratzinger's principle of dialogical relationality to the scholarship of the universal significance of

the person and work of Jesus. This dimension can open up theological sources for a renewed discussion on interreligious dialogue and could furnish more insights to those already working on the relationality of ecclesial bodies (i.e. ecumenical dialogue). Another area of further research can focus on the complementarity of differences in starting points. In this dissertation, I tried to show the possibility of such a complementarity in my attempt to introduce Karol Wojtyła as a dialogical partner with Ratzinger, whose theological approach evidently contrasts with Wojtyła's philosophical approach. Such an area of research if pursued can open up more options for interdisciplinary studies on person.

Thirdly is the feasibility of further researches on the personalistic approach to understanding the experience of our Christian faith. Most considerations of our experience of Christian faith focus on the role of the intellect. But a lot more need to be done with regard to relationality faith-experience as involving the whole of the human person, body and soul. The body is not a substrate and it is not a prison of the soul. The body for Wojtyła, in the field of experience, serves as a window to the knowledge of the soul. Looking at human experience of faith, we can thus highlight the role of corporeality as a 'sign' of spirituality. The corporeal and spiritual are both involved in the field of personal experience of faith. The living experiences of faith can be graded – sensual, intellectual, and volitional – and the field of faith experience find expression in all three grades of lived experiences as can be notable in mystical experiences, which transcend each of these fields of experience taken singly.

Yet another feasible area is the deepening research on Ratzinger's anthropological relations of 'being-from', 'being-with', and 'being-for' as constitutive elements of the dialogical relationality of persons. A Christo-centric approach to these relational elements certainly holds a throve of fascinating ideas awaiting theological exploration, which if undertaken will help to show the centrality of the Incarnate Christ as the Revealer of God to man and of man to himself.

Final Conclusion

The objectives announced in the introduction of this dissertation include the following: to demonstrate that dialogical relationality constituted the essence of person; to establish that individualism and collectivism result from the loss of the sense of this dialogical relationality; and to show that Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by dialogical relationality can provide guidelines for mitigating the anti-personalist challenges of individualism and collectivism. It is now ripe at this stage to consider how we have fared in meeting these objectives. In the first part

of the dissertation, which tried to expose the basic elements of Ratzinger's dialogical relationality of person, an attempt was made to highlight such factors as the replacement of the classical centrality of 'rationality' (rational nature) as the constitutive essence of person with the primacy of relationality in the light of Ratzinger's notion of person. In order to do this, we began from where Ratzinger had drawn this conclusion, namely in the Revelation of the mystery of God, where the relationality of the Divine Persons became the principal analogon from where the relationality of other personal beings as derivative analogates was drawn. The most important discovery in this first part which consists of two chapters was the three relationality structures of 'being-from', 'being-with', and 'being-for' around which Ratzinger's arguments for the constitutive dialogical relationality of persons revolve. This expository part of the dissertation therefore realized part of the objectives we set out to achieve, namely the demonstration of the constitutive dialogical relationality of persons and the source of this relationality in God as the ideal Personal Being.

In the second part of the dissertation, more practical issues were brought into consideration. First it was deemed necessary to show that Ratzinger's discovery of the need to retrieve the constitutive dialogical relationality of person is not repeatable in such a manner that its conclusions can be corroborated from other entry points. Hence, the choice of a comparative alternative methods of arriving at the same conclusion was the goal of the first session of the second part. Since personalism was the trajectory of discourse it was natural to search for dialogue partners within this tradition. Again, it was also necessary to select from the most unlikely partners so that if we are able to get to the same conclusion as Ratzinger's regarding the dialogical relativity of persons, then it can be demonstrated that our thesis is corroborated. The closest ally to Ratzinger's method would have been Martin Buber's dialogical personalism but to arrive at a more definitive conclusion, I had taken Karol Wojtyła's Thomistic personalism. Did it pay off? I shall answer in the positive because in the second part of the dissertation, the problems of individualism and collectivism were analysis from virtually opposite sides of the discourse on relationality of persons and the conclusion remains the same to the effect that Ratzinger's notion of person as constituted by dialogical relativity can actually offer not only some solutions to some selected contemporary problems of individualism and collectivism such as alienation and class interest, but it can also promote pro-personalist culture of participation in the human society in view of building a genuine communion of persons.

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