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John Henry Newman's Clash with the Heritage of Modernity

By

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List of Abbreviations

<i>Apo.</i>	<i>Apologia pro Vita Sua.</i>
<i>Arians</i>	<i>The Arians of the Fourth Century</i>
<i>Ath I, II.</i>	<i>Selected Treatises of St. Athanasius, 2 Volumes</i>
<i>Call.</i>	<i>Callista: A Tale of Third Century</i>
<i>CS</i>	<i>Catholic Sermons of Cardinal Newman, ed. at the Birmingham Oratory (London, 1957)</i>
<i>DA</i>	<i>Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects</i>
<i>Dev.</i>	<i>An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine</i>
<i>Diff. I, II</i>	<i>Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching 2 volumes</i>
<i>Ess. I, II</i>	<i>Essays Critical and Historical, 2 Volumes</i>
<i>GA</i>	<i>An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent</i>
<i>HS I, II, III</i>	<i>Historical Sketches, 3 Volumes</i>
<i>Idea</i>	<i>The Idea of a University</i>
<i>Jfc</i>	<i>Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification</i>
<i>Ker</i>	<i>Ian Ker, John Henry Newman A Biography</i>
<i>LD</i>	<i>Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, ed. Charles Stephen Dessain et al., Volumes I-VI (Oxford, 1978-84), XI-XXII (London, 1961-72), XXIII-XXXI (Oxford, 1973-7)</i>
<i>LG</i>	<i>Loss and Gain: The Story of a Convert (1848)</i>
<i>Mix</i>	<i>Discourses addressed to Mixed Congregations</i>
<i>Moz</i>	<i>Letters and Correspondence of John Henry Newman during his life in the English Church, ed. Anne Mozley, Volumes 1 & 2 (London, 1891)</i>
<i>OS</i>	<i>Sermons Preached on Various Occasions</i>
<i>PPS I-VIII</i>	<i>Parochial and Plain Sermons, 8 Volumes</i>
<i>Prepos.</i>	<i>Present Position of Catholics in England</i>
<i>SD</i>	<i>Sermons Bearing on Subject of the Day</i>
<i>TT</i>	<i>Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical</i>
<i>US</i>	<i>Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford</i>
<i>VM, I, II</i>	<i>The Via Media 2 Volumes</i>
<i>VV</i>	<i>Verses on Various Occasions</i>
<i>Ward, I, II</i>	<i>Wilfrid Ward, The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman, Volume 1 & 2 (London, 1912).</i>
<i>TP, I, II</i>	<i>The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith & Certainty</i>
<i>PN</i>	<i>The Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman</i>
<i>ST</i>	<i>Summa Theologiae</i>
<i>ALDN</i>	<i>A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk</i>

A Chronology of St. John Henry Newman

- 1801 February 21: born in London.
- 1808 Enters Ealing School.
- 1816 Converted to dogmatic Christianity under the influence of the Revd Walter Mayers, an Evangelical schoolmaster.
- 1817 June 8: enters Trinity College, Oxford.
- 1818 Wins college scholarship.
- 1820 Obtains poor BA degree.
- 1822 Elected fellow of Oriel College, Oxford.
- 1824 Ordained deacon and appointed curate at St. Clement's, Oxford.
- 1825 Appointed Vice Principal of Alban Hall
Ordained priest.
- 1826 Appointed tutor of Oriel.
- 1828 Appointed Vicar of St. Mary's, University Church.
- 1832 Completes his first book, *The Arians of the Fourth Century*.
December: sails from Falmouth for the Mediterranean with Hurrell Froude.
- 1833 May: illness in Sicily.
July 8: returns to England.
July 14: Keble's Assize Sermon on 'National Apostasy' marks beginning of Oxford Movement.
September: begins tracts for the Times.
- 1834 Publishes the first volume of *Parochial Sermons*.
- 1837 *Lectures on the Prophetical Office of the Church*.
- 1838 *Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification*.
- 1841 *The Tamworth Reading Room*.
Tract 90.
- 1842 Moves to Littlemore.
- 1843 *Oxford University Sermon*
September: resigns the living of St. Mary's.
- 1845 October 3: resigns Oriel fellowship.
October 9: received into the Roman Catholic Church.
Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine.
- 1846 February 23: leaves Oxford for Maryvale, near Birmingham.
- 1847 May 30: ordained priest in Rome.
Writes *Loss and Gain*
- 1848 February 1: founds the oratory of St. Philip Neri at Birmingham.

1849	<i>Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations.</i>
1850	<i>Lectures on Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans in submitting to the Catholic Church.</i>
1851	Restoration of the Catholic hierarchy to England. <i>Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England.</i> Appointed Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland (resigns 1858).
1852	<i>Discussions on the Scope and Nature of University Education.</i>
1856	<i>Callista: A Sketch of the Third Century.</i>
1857	<i>Sermons Preached on Various Occasions.</i>
1859	<i>Lectures and Essays on University Subjects.</i> Publishes on Consulting the Faithful in <i>Matters of Doctrine</i> as an article in Rambler Magazine.
1864	<i>Apologia pro Vita Sua.</i>
1865	<i>The Dream of Gerontius.</i>
1866	<i>A letter to the Rev. E. B. Pusey.</i>
1868	Collected poetry published as <i>Verses on Various Occasions.</i>
1870	<i>An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.</i> Vatican Council defines papal infallibility.
1873	<i>The Idea of a University.</i>
1875	<i>A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk.</i>
1877	<i>Via Media.</i> Elected honorary fellow of Trinity College, Oxford.
1879	Created Cardinal.
1890	August 11: died.
2019	Canonized 13th October.

For clarity, we will adopt the less formal "Newman" to refer to the man who is now St. John Henry Newman. That is partly to avoid excessive and unnecessary formality and endless repetition of inelegant expressions such as "then, Cardinal Newman." We opted for a simple consistency rather than referring to him by different names throughout the text. However, Newman refers to the man once known as John Henry Newman and later John Henry Cardinal Newman.

General Introduction

The primary object of this research is John Henry Newman's clash with the heritage of modernity. The author of this dissertation analyses and reconstructs Newman's clash with the heritage of modernity in connection with religion, politics, and truth. The goal of the dissertation is to present the relevance of Newman's thoughts to the contemporary socio-cultural situation. Newman's clash with modernity partly epitomises how modernity was received and the clash between rationalism and empiricism on the one side and on the other side tradition and religion in the nineteenth century. It was partly also a contest of truth between science and religion, faith and reason, but connected to the essence of faith and its significance to the individual and society. This question is still valid today because of our changing and challenging circumstances, which often prompt us to redefine those tenets of modernity (i.e. individual freedom, free choice, political liberty, the duty of citizens to one another and the state), refreshing the challenge of modernity. Considering modernity as an epoch and style of thought entails a critical look at Modern Philosophy, especially political philosophy in the nineteenth century expressed as liberalism in all its forms (classical liberalism, conservative liberalism, and Whig liberalism) and their origin in philosophy and Christianity. There are theoretical and practical reasons why it is worthwhile to undertake such research. First, social and philosophical debates on politics, religion, truth, values, and culture are vigorous, vivid, and can ignite the strongest of emotions.

Moreover, debates on the relationship between politics and religion and other related issues, such as authority and reason, faith and reason, Church-State relations and the like, are constantly present in the media. As a result, there is an avalanche of perspectives and views expressed, dealing with various issues and situations consequent to modernity. For instance, Chantal Delsol (2006), in her book, *The Unlearned Lessons of the Twentieth Century: An Essay on Late Modernity*, focuses on restoring the loss of human dignity as a result of modernity's attempt to undermine the socio-cultural structures and philosophical premises that were the bases of human dignity. Martin E. Marty and Jonathan More (2010), in their publication titled *Politics, Religion and the Common Good*, advanced arguments about religion's role in our shared life. Recent publications by Katherine Prath Ewing (2017) on *Religion, Culture and Public Life*; Luther H. Martin (2017) *Religion and Cognition*; John R. Hinnells (2017) *Why Study Religion?*; and Thomas Dixon (2017) *Religion and Science* focus on the influences and interactions of religion with other institutions or organs of the state.

According to Hernan G. Borisonik (2017, 6), since the inception of political thought, it has confined itself within two borders, namely, religion and the economy. Politics, which concerns the organisation of society, has always been accompanied by spirituality and religious institutions either supporting on the one hand and on the other hand disputing or providing spaces with political concepts and action. From the earliest to contemporary times, interactions, relations, and tensions between politics, religion, and the economy have been crucial to the notions, forces, and happenings that have given shape to human societies (Borisonik 2017, 13). The first quarter of this twenty-first century has already witnessed events and strong movements (beginning with the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre, the wars in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroun, the terrorist attacks across Europe) that may continue to influence political and religious conceptions and ideas long into the future. In the meantime, religion has re-emerged alongside certain problems as some of the central issues for political scientists. Thus, Borisonik (2017, 13) states: “In contrast to the secular development that Modern Times seemed to inaugurate, creed and sacredness are back as unavoidable topics in order to understand today's world.” Thus, the contemporary conflict between politics and religion is within the clash of secular and religious worldviews.

Hence, we are plagued by questions of a fundamental nature, dealing with the very foundation stones. What is the source of power? What are the roots of law and rights? What are the limits of governmental authority? Does not democracy have some foundations in the broader society and culture that should be preserved? Do government, power, law and rights have any transcendent values or foundations? Similar questions have been asked about the human person and the world. Some contemporary philosophical theories based on certain rationalistic assumptions and influences have tried to answer these questions: either by ignoring or denying their religious underpinnings or connections, in most cases, the traditional Christian morality that gave birth to the legal system on which the political and social order has rested for many centuries. The casualty for this form of thought is truth. The rejection of truth has brought about the situation whereby it is negotiated instead of communicating the truth. I have chosen John Henry Newman as a scholar who grappled with most of these problems. He witnessed the encroachment of rationalism in the nineteenth century, the influence of secularism, and the gradual loss of faith. Intriguingly, Newman understood these foundational questions and opposed the system of thought that did not affirm religious truth.

Second, historically speaking, Newman stands on opposite sides of modernity and thus “bookends” the disparagement of religion found in several influential contemporary thinkers.

Newman foresaw and addressed many of the problems of contemporary time. He has no written treatise or monograph on politics or religion. Newman has neither a comprehensive theory of truth; nevertheless, considering his thoughts can show his possible contribution to the contemporary debates. If we shift our attention to the foundations of political and social order, I wish to suggest that Newman is a seminal thinker with a formidable level of historical and intellectual nuance, someone whose thoughts merit considerably more attention than it has so far received. Hence, the research on Newman's view would pursue a more detailed analysis of his thought to raise awareness of his potential to contribute to historical and contemporary debates in epistemology, ethics, politics and religion.

Statement of the Problem

The first thing to observe is that politics and religion interact and intersect at a much deeper level that may not immediately catch attention. Politics concerns how society is organised in pursuit of its common good. Therefore, politics unavoidably touches upon and impacts presupposed ideas and tenets crucial to the individual and society or a group of persons in a society. These ideas and tenets relate to values, truths, principles, and the ultimate end or goal of things and persons. They are drawn from a specific worldview that is the source of meaning, interpretation, and belief and inspires action. For many centuries this worldview was strictly speaking a religious worldview. It is no longer so now. The modern worldview is a secular one, and, from it, contemporary political thinking takes its ideas on values, morality, laws, virtues, truths and principles that inspire action and shape individual and national character (Williams, 2002; Jay 2010; Rourke 2010).

Thus, we may say that political thinking nowadays is secularised. It is based on a secular worldview, at least in western democracies. The crucial feature of a secularised worldview is rejecting, denying, and ignoring the transcendent side of reality. Thus secular politics seeks and endeavours to order human society and affairs by using merely expedient, practical and pragmatic ideas (such as utilitarianism, pluralism, toleration, and multiculturalism) rather than ultimate ends. Hence the secularisation of politics undermined appeals to ultimate ends and divinely revealed truth. That has often deepened the conflict between religion and politics and has resulted in the current anarchical condition and confusion. There is still an unsettled understanding of religious and political truths, their sources, and the relationship between politics and religion or the level of interaction permissible. Politics and religion are treated as mutually exclusive. That further creates room for treating politics as an

autonomous enterprise, free of religious values and moral scruples, in which all that matters in politics is efficiency in achieving ends set by whoever rules. “Truth in politics, it was argued, would be achieved by transcending the cacophony of competing voices and allowing those with the skill and knowledge to cut through to the core of problems and deal with them efficiently” (Jay 2010, 23). Religion is treated as a private concern and has nothing to contribute concerning public values. Newman understood the sources of this development and foresaw the end of this situation.

Therefore, the contemporary situation poses questions that it cannot answer, which John Henry Newman's thoughts confidently answer. In what manner should our contemporary liberal society and state uphold religion and politics without undermining their autonomy and at the same time upholding their mutual co-existence? What is the place of religious truths, values and beliefs in a secular democratic society and state? Are there good theoretical positions or arguments supporting any solution that might be proffered?

Following Aristotle and Aquinas, Newman maintains that the real object of our intellect is truth. However, he further maintains that reason arrives at religious truth when correctly employed and exercised. Therefore, the conflict between politics and religion and, more importantly, the contemporary anarchical condition and confusion of things could be resolved through a shared recognition of fundamental principles/presuppositions and acceptance of truths that supports and affirms such exercise of reason. Thus, this dissertation aims to reconstruct Newman's view on truth and show how his understanding can determine the proper relationship between truth, politics, and religion.

Research Questions

This dissertation, therefore, is systematically structured to answer these questions in an attempt to achieve its goals/objectives.

1. What does Newman claim?
2. How does Newman justify his claim?
3. What do Newman's claims and arguments presuppose?
4. What is the contemporary view on the place of truth in politics and religion?
5. Does Newman's view respond adequately to the problem of truth in politics and religion?

The Importance of the Study

This study is vital for many reasons. First, considering that the interaction between politics and religion plays a crucial role in the stability and development of society today, findings might benefit society. The greater demand for peace and progress through a better understanding of politics and religion's roles justifies the need for this study. Today, many people unconsciously are involved in the unsettled understanding of government, politics, and religion. We hope those insights from Newman would explain how secular government and politics interact with religion and the basis for such interactions.

This study aspires to diagnose the sources of the contemporary conflict and confusion between politics and religion and further indicates theoretical/philosophical solutions to resolving the conflict. In addition, the study seeks to deepen our understanding of the proper place of truth in religion and politics in a secular state in our shared life. How can society rediscover a passion for truth in this era of post-truth and fake news without which society will disintegrate?

Therefore, the project undertaken in this dissertation is both interpretative, theoretical, and a practical postulate that would trigger political and religious discourse aimed at foregrounding truth and religion in the public sphere. The rejection of truth has also meant excluding religion in the public domain. That is not without consequences, hence the pertinence of this subject matter. The absence of truth exposes us to the pitfalls of scepticism and relativism, unable to rise to the level of action (cf. *Caritas in Veritate* No. 9). The focus is not to analyse or explain the relationship between religion and politics but primarily to foreground truth in religion and politics. A joint search and appreciation of truth as a universal value hint at how religion and politics are directed and united without losing their autonomy as independent spheres.

The Scope of the Investigation

Issues like politics of religion, the relationship between State and Church, interference of religion in politics, the place of religion in politics, the relationship of religion to freedom and democracy are outside the scope of this research. However, the relationship between politics and religion is not negligible in this dissertation. Nevertheless, it is not the main focus here. The extent to which religion and politics are compatible with the truth and the mutual recognition of this same truth limits the consideration of the relationship between religion and politics. Our examination of the truth is also limited to Newman's understanding of truth but

connected with the correspondence theory articulated in the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition. The consideration of truth is further limited to providing a foundation for a healthy and mutual co-existence of religion and politics in an organised, multicultural, and multi-religious or pluralistic society. Again, the consideration of religion is limited to Christianity.

The hypothesis of the study

The working hypothesis adopted for this dissertation is that truth, as conceived by Newman, is compatible with and is essential for religion and politics. Suppose politics and religion are understood as a web of beliefs and relationships and a hub of interactions and communication involving beings (human and divine) based on shared truth(s) or worldview. The basic assumption in this thesis is that human beings can cognise the world, and therefore they can formulate truths, that is, propositions that correspond to the order of existing things (they say as things are – to use an Aristotelian expression). Thus, the proposition is that there is a way things are in the real world of existence (i.e., there is a Cosmos in the Greek sense); if there is a truth, then there is something to be known. In this cosmos, things have nature and essence in the Aristotelian-Thomistic sense. That paves the way for the Aristotelian-Thomistic view that at the ontological bottom, there is the truth (ultimate reality) that binds everything together. The truth is what makes the world. It holds the world in unity. Religion and politics are parts of the world. Hence, there are truths of religion and truths of politics. There are truths, and there is the truth, and there is the unity of truths. Truth rules the world. Thus, there are no competing or contradictory or contrary truths.

On the other hand, I further assume that if there is no order of things and things have no nature, there would not be truth, understood as correspondence to reality. There is no cosmos in the Greek sense. Nothing (e.g., marriage) has an essence. That paves the way for the Nietzschean view that, at the ontological bottom, "the world is the Will to Power and nothing besides." As parts of the world, we are nothing more than competing centres of power acquisition and power maintenance. I also assume that this proposition is false and incorrect for understanding the world of things and persons. I hope that the findings of this research will show precisely this.

Research Design

This dissertation consists of four chapters that reflect the main themes of issues analysed and reconstructed. In the first segment of chapter one, I will attempt to sketch the

main aspects of modernity. Next, I will attempt to describe the modern world as Newman experienced it, partly reflected in his criticisms of modern ideas. The second segment of this chapter looks at the consequences of modernity. That would be followed by a brief look at the contemporary discourse in religion, politics and truth. That is important to show the relevancy of Newman's thought and the application of Newman's insights in some contemporary issues.

The second chapter explores what sources or causes Newman indicated as responsible for the current situation. This chapter further looks at Newman's response to the challenges of modernity, beginning with his proposal of a modified epistemology that suggests where he thinks the problem with modernity fundamentally lies. Newman's epistemology forms the foundation of his ideas as part of the response to the challenges of modernity. The epistemological foundation serves as a prism for a better understanding of his ideas and a springboard that Newman uses to extend further his response to other domains of culture affected by modernity. Chapter three explores Newman's notion of faith and reason as independent and complementary sources of knowledge. The last chapter is on the vision of Newman's politics and religion. The explication of that vision indirectly reveals Newman's idea of the human person, human nature and society as an integrated whole.

Regarding religion, the aim is to synthesise and present Newman's view of the nature and origin of religion and its epistemic value as the basis of its relations to politics and life in general. Therefore, Newman's social and political thought results from his religious underpinnings. This reflects that Newman's understanding of politics flows from his understanding of (divine) truth and the commitment it engenders. Therefore, it is crucial to have a notion of truth and to establish why the truth matters not only in religion and politics but generally in life. Hence, when every aspect of our lives has been adequately integrated into a perfect whole, humans and society should reflect this truth. That might be the most challenging chapter as we continue to search for a better model for the interactions between religion and culture today.

Methodology

The research project presents a specific difficulty, as Newman has no separate treatise on either truth, politics or religion. Thus, the first approach is to reconstruct his views and ideas scattered throughout his writings. Moreover, Newman's writings were often occasioned by different circumstances. So, to meet a diverse audience's needs and suit the occasion, he consciously applied different literary styles. These facts, in a sense, impose another approach

on the research, that is, to interpret and reinterpret relevant materials to make vivid their relevance to the present condition. Lastly, since this is a study in philosophy, our primary approach shall be philosophical. To achieve these set goals, we shall adopt multiple methodologies. The first is a philosophical analysis that consists of applying tools of general logic to Newman's writings to find his main theses and arguments on the topics of interest and disclose presuppositions and possible consequences of his views.

Modernity is our primary point of reference in the systematic dimension of our studies because Newman considered modernity as his most comparative historical context and sought to reconstruct it. To comprehend the problems, I present an outline of the broader context in terms of the history of philosophy. In the systematic approach, as the table of contents suggests, I have aimed at defining the conceptions important for the period under study and essential for what we call conservative liberalism.

Thirdly, it also allows us to apply the expository method. That is important because to understand Newman's claims, we need to consider that most of his works, such as *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, *Discussions and Arguments*, were in response to theses or arguments that challenged his beliefs and theoretical views. That gives his works the colouration of polemics. Therefore, we need an expository and then analyses as methods to get to both the context, meaning of concepts, terms and the overall meaning of the text. Fourth, Newman is often involved in dialogue or argument with opponents to present his views. Thus, we also need to apply a comparative analysis to study his work. The comparison would be drawn not between him and opponents but with contemporary thinkers. Finally, we use various documents to exemplify various constructs related to truth, politics, and religion. That is to enable us to establish the relevancy of views today.

In sampling terms, our selection procedure is based on the principles of convenience and relevance to develop our arguments and arrive at objective conclusions. Therefore, I rely on texts and contexts that tell cases (Mitchell 1984; Anderson 2017). I agree with Mitchell's view that "the search for a typical case for analytical exposition is likely to be less fruitful than the search for a telling case in which the particular circumstances surrounding a case serve to make previously obscure theoretical relationships suddenly apparent" (Mitchell 1984, 239, cited in Anderson 2017, 457). Unfortunately, that is often the case when dealing with historical texts and theoretical concepts.

Sources of Literature

There are three classes of literature in consideration for this dissertation. The first class of literature is the primary sources. The primary sources are Newman's corpus of available literature, making up his thirty-six volume uniform edition from 1868 to 1886. This body of Newman's literature has been made available in the Newman reader (www.newmanreader.org). Nevertheless, references to the works of Newman would be made to publications that are relevant to this research. Some of which include: *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* 1985; *the Sermons and the Apologia Pro Vita Sua* 1886; *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* 1989; *Loss and Gain* 1874; *Discourses to Mixed Congregations* 1849; *Difficulties of Anglicans* 1850; *Present Position of Catholics in England 1851*; *Idea of a University* 1873, "The Rambler" with *On Consulting the Faithful* 1859 – 1860; *Apologia* 1865; *Sermons Preached on Various Occasions* 1874; *Development of Religious Error* 1885; *Addresses to Cardinal Newman and His Replies with Beglietto Speech* 1879; *Discussions and Arguments* 1872; *Essays Critical and Historical Vol. 1 & 2* 1871; *Historical Sketches Vol. 1, 2 & 3* 1872; *Church and Empires* 1873; *Tracts Theological and Ecclesiastical* 1871. Newman's Philosophical Notebooks, edited by Edward Sillem, are added here as a primary source.

The second class of literature are secondary sources. Newman's significance has continued to rise. That is evident in the number of intellectuals he has influenced notably: John Paul II, Edith Stein, Graham Greene, Alasdair McIntyre, Bernard Lonergan, Frederick Copleston, Alfred North Whitehead, Meriol Trevor, Stanislaw Brozowski, Jean Guitton, to mention only but a few. In addition, Newman's works continue to attract and generate much literature across many academic fields, especially in theology, philosophy, and literary arts. The writings of these authors mentioned above make up the corpus of literature classed here as secondary sources. The most significant secondary texts that would be consulted are commentaries on Newman's works and those who wrote on topics related to this dissertation. Some of these authors are: Ian T. Ker, Thomas K. Carr, Stephen Kelly, and other critical secondary sources include; *Newman's Way: The Odyssey of John Henry Newman* by Sean O'Faolain; *Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman's Thought* by M. Jamie Ferreira; *Newman the Theologian: The Nature of Belief and Doctrine as Exemplified in His Life and Works* by J. H. Walgrave, A. V. Littledale; *Newman and Theological Liberalism* by Merrigan, Terrence; *The Political Thought of John Henry Newman: Newman After a Hundred Years* by Kenny Terrence; *A Conservative at Heart? The Political and Social Thought of John Henry Newman* by Stephen Kelly and *The Personalism of John Henry*

Newman by John F. Crosby; *Heart Speak unto Heart: On the Kinship of Spirit and Thought: John Henry Newman and Edith Stein* by Jan Kłos; *Person and Religion* by Zofia Zdybicka; *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart; *Religion and Politics in the 21st Century: Global and Local Reflections* by Vasile Boari and Natalia Vlas.

The third class of literature is tertiary sources. These are supplementary sources such as encyclopaedias, Journals, Magazines, Bulletins and Newspapers. The authors mentioned above and works have dealt with various aspects of Newman works or ideas. However, none has focused explicitly on the notion of truth and its relationship with religion and politics in John Henry Newman. Hence, this dissertation aims to fill the void partially. I believe that showing the connection of his thought on truth to religion and politics is a feasible and fruitful endeavour that can provide greater relevance to his philosophical project and is most relevant for the contemporary time.

Having set out the intentions of this research, discussed the layout and methodology and briefly reviewed the literature, there remains only to acknowledge a personal hope that the words and ideas that follow do some small justice to the works of John Henry Newman with whom it has been a privilege to engage.

Chapter One

The Main Aspects of Modernity

1.1 Introductory Remarks

The supposition that the contemporary advanced society is an upshot of modernity is true based on two facts: first, the mere fact that modernity is an antecedent of the contemporary advanced society; second, because of what is known of each era concerning the other. Thus, discussion on contemporary society at a deeper level is likely to consider the influence of the past. In this case, that past in relation to the contemporary era is called modernity. In its socio-cultural, political and philosophical contexts, modernity has significant consequences in our contemporary advanced society. Likewise, the consequences of modernity can only be judged adequately within the contemporary context. That is something already implied in the diagnosis and criticism of modernity.

The narrative that modernity liberated humanity is a truism hardly contested by anyone and difficult to disprove. The narrative commands general agreement among modernists/progressivists. That is particularly the case when modernity is associated with liberty, equality, equity, tolerance, human rights, democracy, the end of the slave trade, scientific and technological advancements, the foundations of multicultural and religious societies, and globalisation. Modernity truly represents progress, but the word “progress” is hardly self-evident. Even though some people do not fully understand these concepts, they commonly accept them without considering their implications. It is presumed that pre-modern time is outdated. Besides, why were things worse in the past and in what sense are things in the modern era better than the past, or how is humanity better today than in the past? We do not know or have ready answers to these questions. Pinker (2018, 357) observed that “certain beliefs become symbols of cultural allegiance. People affirm or deny these beliefs to express not what they know but who they are.” The people's conception as hostile to the aristocracy could emphasise the idea of a democratic society. Alternatively, one might prefer to emphasise the idea of humanity's freedom from the bondage of religious belief and its attainment of secular liberties.

Understanding the consequences of modernity might begin with examining the goals, achievements and what was lost in the process. Also, unravelling the consequences of modernity might start with examining the intellectual, philosophical, and socio-cultural developments of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The choice of this period corresponds

with the rise of early modern scholars whose ideas gave birth to modernity. These modern ideas are linked to Machiavelli, Galileo, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke.

The crucial question is, what sort of ideas did they cultivate and spread? The question is very significant because the ideas were cogent and persuasive enough beyond rhetoric and arguments to succeed at inaugurating the modern era. The ideas include the rule of law, freedom of conscience, science without metaphysics, technological mastery, possessive egotism, citizens' dignity, and, more importantly, a new world model. These ideas constitute part of the heritage and legacy of modernity in terms of the challenges faced by contemporary advanced societies. However, examining contemporary issues as consequences of modernity entails being caught up in a net of emotions, mutual and antagonistic, whether of a common or a particular nature and which come under a specific field of specialised studies.

The discussion of the present situation serves as a backdrop to the values of modernity. That is to manifest both the ambiguities, misgivings, and misunderstandings that are often occasioned by a misrepresentation and underrepresentation of the issues, others from the imprecise meanings associated with the heritage of early modernity. It is essential to distinguish between those ambiguities resulting from evaluations and those from determinations. The focus here is on those ambiguities resultant from determinations because of the difficulty in understanding them. Once again, let me assert that modernity both embodies and engenders ideas, values, and goals. Therefore, it is logical that it be judged with these same ideas, values and goals in themselves and not just by their viability but also by their sustainability. That also involves the critical discussion of whether modernity in terms of the sum totality of what it represents is good, evil, inauthentic, acceptable and unacceptable from a specific worldview or perspective and whether modernity is what it is said to be. Given the length of time and range of issues that come under modernity, this discussion on modernity will be limited to the philosophical consideration of the heritage of modernity with the particular focus on some general themes, e.g. assent (the key term on this list), formal inference versus natural inference, certainty versus certitude, explicit reasoning versus implicit reasoning, personal result and realisation.

Modernity was not a creed with one simple, coherent body of doctrines. Instead, it embodies different philosophical movements or trends within an era. Thus, there are many descriptions and diagnoses of modernity. These descriptions and diagnoses all relate to the peculiar awareness, principles, problems, and attitudes associated with modernity (cf. Kłos 2010, 10). A detailed study of modernity is beyond the scope of this work. However, as a matter of importance, we need to broadly understand what modernity is by looking at its

features before we can judge it by any standard. However, first, let us look at the meaning of modernity.

1.2 The Meaning of Modernity

The word “modern” refers generically to the more recent or contemporaneous in its current usage. The term “modern” is used to describe the ideology and style of thought; it refers to a period or an era. Therefore, modernity represents the long period stretching from the late sixteenth century to the early years of the twentieth century, especially the years 1789 – 1914, within which we saw the development of democratic politics and emergence of modern States or nations, social freedoms, anti-clericalism, individual autonomy, the industrial revolution, liberation from received traditions, the supremacy of scientific rationalism, the dominance of capitalism and the advent of secularisation (cf. Ekeh 2019, 39). According to Hughes and Daniel (2019, ix), “it seems reasonable to identify the period from the French Revolution (1789) until the start of the Great War (1914) as a mature stage of this philosophical, economic, social, scientific, technological and religious complex of western life.” Hence, the ideology and style/mode of thought in the era mentioned above was designated as modern, giving rise to scepticism/relativism and liberalism as ways of expressing modernity.

According to Yearley (1978, 97), “[v]arious descriptions exist of the modern, but most agree that modern people have a distinctive consciousness or at least a distinctive set of problems, principles, and attitudes” that are first associated with modern philosophers. The modern period placed particular or special emphasis on reason as the most trusted foundation of knowledge or epistemic authority and the reliable instrument to overcome and solve problems. The modern period with its style of thinking was inaugurated by René Descartes on the basis which he is called the father of modern philosophy. Hence, modernity should include his era because he is the first known philosopher to in modern time to break with the old tradition of relying on authority as the source of knowledge.

“Modernity” designates no unified or specific school of thought about philosophy, theology, art or science. Instead, it refers to a general movement characterised by its rejection of authority, traditions, religion, and scepticism towards truth. The later development and rise of secular thinking could be situated between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when philosophers like David Hume and Immanuel Kant argued that religious truth lay beyond the boundaries of human reason and could not be proven with certainty (cf. Bristow, 2017). Moral foundations were subjected to similar scrutiny and assault. Utilitarianism and Marxism denied

that any transcendent moral law and values necessarily bound man. Consequently, Nietzsche called for a radical overturning of morality and values (cf. Leiter 2000).

Without ignoring the socio-cultural dimension and underpinning of modernity, the “modern is understood here in the context of philosophical, intellectual history” (Ekeh, 2019, 39). Thus, in the above sense, modernity could be a style of thinking with peculiar philosophical features, such as self-consciousness or self-reference, that cut across creativity and innovation in literature, arts, and other disciplines and institutions. Modernity, therefore, is more commonly associated with the kind of progress and thinking that inspires the human person to be creative, innovative, and spontaneous in improving and reshaping cultural and social institutions and the environment with the aid of practical experimentation, scientific knowledge, or technology. From this standpoint, modernity inspired and fostered the re-evaluation and reinterpretation of every aspect of human existence, starting from human nature, human destiny, ethics/morality, culture/customs, education, religion, politics, economy, science, and philosophy. The overriding goal was to diagnose and deal effectively by eliminating everything that hinders progress. In the process, according to Ekeh (2019, 39-40):

two broad tracks defined philosophical modernity. On the one hand, science emerged, which divorced itself from metaphysical underpinnings and tethered itself instead to observations, categorisation, and analysis of evidence. On the other hand, we see the emergence of a new kind of philosophy. Rene Descartes is generally acknowledged as the father of modern philosophy, but we can also recognise the foundational contributions of John Locke and David Hume.

Therefore, modernity was born against what is widely considered as conservative, traditional, outdated cultural, political, and social forms of life and religious worldview. In their attempt to rebuild or renew the old world, modernists swept aside traditional social, religious, and political order (i.e., belief/faith, dogma, authority, and sacred history). As a result, relativism, scepticism and liberalism became the style or mode of responding or reacting to the traditionally-held truths and convictions. That was accompanied by an increase in literacy and the rise of the natural sciences (cf. Hollis 1970, 9-26; Sennett 1977, Giddens 1991 and 2004, and Weber 1984).

A critical feature of the modern world regarding secularisation is the construction that removed religion from the public space of discussion and the demand that religion be kept separate from the rational articulations of modernity in such institutions as politics, law, morality, and science. The only legitimate area left for religion in the secular world is private space. Religion ceased to be a knowledge-producing activity to become a passive repository of beliefs. (cf. Viswanathan: 1998, xv).

The new world of the modernist stood on tolerance, democracy, liberty, equality, pluralism, and equity principles. Two powerful engines drove the modern world; a philosophical movement called liberalism and relativism on the one hand; and on the other hand, science and technology, with the overarching desire for novelty; fuelled by the feeling that the ancient culture of the past was ill-fitted to the new economic, social, and political environment of an emerging fully industrialised world. (cf. De Roche, 2015, 135).

Within this context, the origin of modernism is situated in the Renaissance movement and with it, the appearance in the history of secular humanism; the idea of man as the measure of all things, a worldly civic awareness, and 'utopian' ideas of a perfect society, starting with Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* in 1516. Later in the twentieth century, a comparison was made between ancient and modern society regarding their moral and artistic superiority. We have this comparison even in the nineteenth century. (Newman would often refer to the past, especially antiquity, with admiration). That comparison prompted the consideration of whether modernism had failed. Such reflection implied that modernism had goals. We ought to know these goals to measure their achievements and failures. Among these goals was a pure secular civilisation based on non-religious principles and mentality (cf. Gablik 2004; Pattison 1991, 206).

Consequently, modernism was in direct conflict with religion, particularly Christianity. According to Hollis (1970, 190), “[m]odernism, then, in broad can be said to have launched three separate attacks. First, it attacked the historical reliability of the Gospels- and in particular, their account of the life of Christ. It attacked the traditional Catholic view of philosophy, and it attacked the traditional view of the nature of the Church.” On the above basis, modernism was condemned by the Church, specifically in three related documents: *The Syllabus of Errors*, the *Decree of the Holy Inquisition Lamentabili Sane Exitu* of July 3, 1907, and *Pascendi Dominici Gregis*, of September 8.

However, this is not a complete picture of modernism. For example, modern Christians sought to reinterpret and practise religion, politics, and philosophy using modern ideas and attitudes (cf. Hollis 1970, 190). Within this context, secularisation and liberalism/relativism emerged as expressions of modernity. In this sense, we can talk about liberal or secular arts, liberal or secular politics, liberal or secular religion, liberal or secular education. Therefore, Newman's writings were essentially an endeavour to critically respond to the intellectual/philosophical, social, political and religious challenge of modern liberalism as an expression of modernity.

1.3 Fundamental Tenets and Features of Modernity

As noted in the previous section, modernity is associated with the rise of reason as the foundation of knowledge, epistemic authority and the proven instrument to solve all human problems. Modern philosophers put faith in the powers of reason to propel human development by setting aside epistemic traditions. At the dawn of modernity, the natural human cognitive powers and their ability to attain truth and knowledge were questioned and opened to doubt. The causes of these doubts were identified as uncertainty concerning human perceptions and the human tendency towards errors (cf. Kłos 2021, 41). The rejection of authority and tradition as the foundation of knowledge can be traced back more or less to scholastic and medieval periods when philosophers like St. Augustine of Hippo saw reason not only as God's gift, but associated God with reason, hence the idea of divine reason as something in its own right that cannot be attributed exclusively to ancient authority and divinities like Hermes Trismegistos. The resistance and rejection of traditionalism and authoritarianism grew in time and gave to the Cartesian break in which reason was enthroned as the only true basis of human knowledge (Agbakoba 2021, 16).

Consequently, modern science and philosophy searched for certainty and evidence to eliminate doubt and error in cognitive processes. In philosophy, the consequence was that truth itself was equated with certainty. The dividing line between truth, certainty and certitude was blurred. In religion, the boundary between faith and evidence collapsed; as a result, the two terms are seen as intrinsically united or treated as synonyms. In both cases, the absence of the one meant the absence of the other. Certainty and evidence became the features of truth and faith such that it was impossible to conceive one without the other. Therefore doubt could not exist where faith and truth exist (cf. Kłos 2021, 41-42).

In religion, where faith and evidence could not be separated or are deemed equivalent, it raises the condition of faith to rationalistic and intellectual conditions. Thus, for Newman, it was exclusivist or discriminated against those who had no intellectual capabilities or were not learned in theology or philosophy. Similarly, Newman argues that in philosophy, when truth, certainty or evidence are seen as one, the standard for truthfulness is raised beyond the typical human experience of how we come to know. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the normal process of human knowing. Such high standards only result in suspicion of the natural process of knowing and lead to self-alienation. Consequently, this narrow conception of truth and its relation undermine our natural lives' implicit belief stance (cf. *GA*).

Scepticism arising from human tendencies to error due to the weakness inherent in the natural human abilities to acquire knowledge or truth has prompted science to develop some

common beliefs and strict methodology to attain certainty and acquire truth. That is to the detriment and rejection of natural cognition and intuition in the process of knowing. Hence, truth becomes the property of a few privileged experts. At this point, we have a crisis precipitated by science and scientific progress. The scientific method of inquiry and its model of objectivity became dominant and considered the best and the only objective model through which to determine normative and epistemological values.

Two broad problems bedevil the modern intellectual project. First, the rejection of the final causality in a cosmic sense undermines the teleology of truth. Second, since truth no longer has a metaphysical end, philosophical anthropology is impoverished and cannot support a robust epistemology. If we understand the human being, in his or her fullness, as ordered toward truth, then one can understand that our natural faculties all play a role in discovering the truth. Doubt, a particular intellectual process, would then be revealed as part of the discovery process and not a problem to be overcome. It is vital to maintain that the human propensity for error does not imply a defect in our human constitution. If we can show that doubt, a reaction to past errors or limits in our epistemology, is a natural process to embrace, we progress towards integrating science and its methods into a complete and wholesome view of the human person.

However, modern science was characterised by its induction method and following its emphasis on efficient causality, which meant that it preferred and prioritised acquiring knowledge through observation, thereby limiting itself to phenomena perceptible only to the senses. In philosophy, there were two questions raised. First, the validity of received truths and second, whether natural human cognition was reliable. Consequently, Descartes sought to rebuild the whole structure of philosophy and knowledge on the firm foundation of single unalterable and unmoveable truth. Later, David Hume, in his critique, set the limits of human knowledge. This development meant that both philosophy and science were united in the mutual suspicion of human natural cognitive powers. It meant too that truth is no longer a given or revealed. Instead, truth is made and needs a universal method that assures the attainment of knowledge while eliminating error and doubt in the process. That further resulted in a narrow epistemology unfavourable to religious knowledge that prompted a response from Newman as we shall in the coming chapters.

1.3.1 Assent: Empiricist-Rationalist Judgement

René Descartes is widely considered the father of modern philosophy. During Descartes's time, Scholasticism was dominant in philosophy. Modernity precipitated in human

history the problem of certainty of knowledge. There was a genuine concern about making the process of knowing certain and indubitable. It was a challenge that Descartes took up in his philosophical reflections that resulted in the unique historical “moment which switched European philosophy onto another line of thought [...]”. And that was the moment of his revelatory *cogito ergo sum* [...]” (Kłos 2021, 12). Hence, Descartes is attributed with the revolutionary turn in philosophy that meant a break with Scholasticism with its heavy reliance on sensation as the source of knowledge. That break entailed developing and promoting a new model of scientific explanation based on mechanistic principles. Descartes also inaugurated a view about rationality in Western thinking: strictly demonstrative reasoning that replaces the causal model associated with Scholasticism.

Consequently, the Cartesian conception of rationality laid the ground foundation of evidentialism. A genuinely rational person should accept something only based on its being clear and distinct, just as we have it in mathematics, especially geometry. According to evidentialism, it is irrational for anyone to hold a belief unless they hold it on the ground of other belief(s) that give the belief in question adequate evidential support. A belief is evidentially supported if it is deduced through demonstrative reasoning. The evidentialist argument was also applied to religious beliefs. Evidentialism claims that it is irrational for a person to believe in God unless one holds the belief on the basis of other belief(s) which give adequate evidential support. That gave rise to the so-called evidentialist challenge: it is irrational for one to believe in God because there is no adequate support for the belief in the existence of God (none of the traditional arguments for the existence of God is demonstrative/deductively valid); therefore, it is irrational to believe in God.

The evidentialism of the seventeenth century was first launched and championed by John Locke. In his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke (1670, Book IV, xix, 384) expressed the evidentialist position in these words. There is one unerring mark of a man who seeks the truth for the sake of the truth. He does not entertain

any proposition with greater assurance that the proofs it is built on will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain, receives not truth in the love of it, loves not truth-sake, but for some other by-end. For the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence, it is plain all that surplussage of assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to the love of truth; it being as impossible that the love of truth should carry my assent above the evidence that is to me that it is true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition for the sake of that evidence which it has not that it is true; which is in effect to love it as a truth because it is possible or probable that it may not be true.

Therefore, the empiricist-rationalist judgment is the modern conviction and expression of the belief and value that all held beliefs must be proportionate to the power of producible evidence.

Locke insists that a person should not believe a proposition that lacks sufficient evidence that supports it. Besides, assenting to a proposition without adequate evidence is not only irrational but epistemically irresponsible. Kłos (2021, 71) draws out some of the implications:

Locke's view of what is rational is limited to inference, in which the transition from premises is strictly guided and controlled by reason. Let us note in passing that this approach is typical of enlightened modernity, i.e. to have everything under control, to be the master and author of one's life. *This guidance and control are, in fact, reduced to a mechanical process in which self-evident premises imply the conclusion.* Thus, inference is an event within an immanent logic, and there is no effort on the part of the acting agent. Newman criticises Locke in that he approves of absolute assent only when premises inevitably lead to an infallible conclusion, and he calls someone who would accept something that has no such grounds an enthusiast, but on the other hand, he allows a conclusion which rises to the degree of assurance on the basis of probabilities near to certitude. Whatever is added to the conclusion on the part of the agent that rises above evidence is called surplusage

Both Descartes and Locke set the standard of assent too high and too narrow to exclude other forms of human knowledge or other ways (aside from the intellectual ones) by which the human person may arrive at certitude or knowledge. Religion was the worst affected by the epistemological turn engineered by rationalists and empiricists traditions. Assent must be based on clear and distinct evidence, and anything short of that was condemned as irrational. Consequently, the empiricists' and rationalists' made no distinction between assent and inference. As we have seen from the above the challenge of evidentialism, religious truths or propositions were judged to be irrational and, later, considered nonsensical by the positivists.

1.3.2 Secularisation

Nearly every facet of contemporary life is gradually secularised owing to the influence of liberalism, which transformed hierarchical society into functional society and changed the structure of European society from an aristocratic and stratified one into a functional one. However, that was not always the case (MacIntyre 2006, 210). This transformation, as driven by modernity, is called secularisation. According to Kłos (2010, 301), secularisation negatively means laicisation, and on the other hand, it means the consideration of functions independent of a denomination concerning the distinction between Church and State or religion and politics. The terms separation and distinction refer to two forms or models of co-existence or relationship between the Church and the state. The current strict separation against the idea of distinction of religion and politics or Church and State obtainable in many States and Constitutions is relatively a modern phenomenon brought forth by the French Revolution as the climax of modernity. The idea of distinction is a nineteenth-century proposal by Lord John Acton. However, none of these changes is new in history. Religion's proper role and place in politics is a central and recurring issue (Perry 1997, 3) in political discourse known

as political secularisation. However, the meaning of secularisation continues to change with time, and its application varies from place to place (cf. Kłos 2010, 302).

Secularisation is understood today to mean the decline of religious influence in public life, a feature of modern developed societies. Liberal political philosophers such as John Locke conceived secularisation to restrict or curtail the influence of religion in public life through the principle of toleration and compromise. In practice, it meant neutralising the influence of religion and the reduction or removal of exclusively religious sentiments in public institutions and public space; and the transfer of jurisdiction from religious to secular courts. However, as earlier noted, a rather radical shift in the application of secularisation happened during the French Revolution when secularisation became

a hostile separation, the removal of religion from the public world rather than complementarity. That would be a consequence of the way of the modern subject in its totalising mission, radicalised in particular by the French *philosophes* gathered in the *Encyclopedia*. Its revolutionary slogan is well-known: *écrasez l'infâme*, wipe out the infamy. The French revolutionaries would banish the Church from modernity rather than include her (Kłos 2010, 153).

Within the Catholic Church, secularisation in the simplest terms means the tendency or desire of some section of her clergy to live and bear witness to the Gospel values in the world rather than in exclusion or apart from the world. The idea of a society in which religion, religious life and religious duties are relegated to secondary importance was conceived after the sectarian wars in Europe. However, the full impact of that idea may be said to be felt more in the twentieth century through policies and legislations that require the subordination of religious authority to political authority, religion to politics and Church to State. Bruce (2009, 145) notes that “[t]he details of the decline in the power, popularity and prestige of religion vary from society to society, but that decline has been general and unrelenting.” Nevertheless, politics remains entangled with religion in many European States.

The idea of secularisation has its roots in classical thought. The current attempt at secularisation is linked and influenced by Plato and Aristotle Christianised by Augustine and Aquinas. Attempts at secularisation by early modern philosophers such as Nicolo Machiavelli and Michel de Montaigne departed from the legacy of Augustine and Aquinas by extreme margins. As I noted earlier, Machiavelli specifically recommended that the prince ignore Christian principles when considering issues of state and politics. Montaigne strictly adopted the Roman Stoics' moral principles as a political pathway. It is important to note that none of the above solutions proved to be a remedy and a basis for political action during the sectarian wars between Catholics and Protestants and therefore was abandoned. Hence the idea and possibility of curtailing and minimising the influence of religion and controlling the expression

of religious sentiments became popular among philosophers and aristocrats, particularly in England. Thomas Hobbes was among the first people to articulate the idea of secularisation (Russell 1996, 567).

Nevertheless, it was the moderate but compromised positions and ideas of John Locke that were more acceptable beyond the borders of England. What Hobbes and Locke had in common with other like-minded philosophers within and outside England was the idea and the possibility of rooting political association or politics on legal and ethical principles rather than religious sentiments/beliefs. The achievements of Hobbes and Locke concerning secularisation were consolidated and entrenched by the Enlightenment movement with the actors such as Montesquieu, Voltaire and Jean-Jacques Rousseau for whom (Christian) Religion was an obstacle to political virtue. Consequently, they rejected Christianity. Furthermore, Voltaire's and David Hume's natural history did not refer to divine providence and God. Thus, the divine rights of kings were rejected, and monarchies were no longer considered as resting on divine appointment (cf. Russell 1996, 569).

Undoubtedly, the secularisation of politics was precipitated and fuelled by the widely spread discontent and disenchantment with the religious conflicts and turmoil of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These conflicts showed the danger and the negative impact of unrestrained sectarian and denominational bias, prejudice, and sentiments and the need to checkmate their excesses (cf. Jay 2010, 143).

Thus, it could be argued that political secularisation is a deliberate policy to solve a specific problem rather than the product of culture. Hence, in countries like the United States of America, separation of State and Church and religion and politics could only be established by constitutional law. That is because religion is prior to the State and never the creation of the state. Religion is a product of society and belongs to society rather than to the State. Furthermore, every society understands itself in a given manner that is part of its identity, not created or given by the State. It could further be argued that civil religion or political religion is an artificial creation that cannot be sustained and represents an attempt by the political authority to usurp its authority. Religion stands on faith/belief. No one comes to faith by force of law or legislation. Hence, the State cannot create either religion or belief/faith. Civil religion necessarily entails the dependence of religion on the State, which quickly leads to compromise on its dogmas and moral responsibility. Burleigh (2005, 146) states that political Religion or civil Religion has to do with the

notion that states should have a common and unique religion [...] with Hegel, among others, arguing that such a religion 'expresses the innermost being of all people, so that all external and diffuse matters aside, they can find a common focus and, despite inequality and transformations in other spheres and conditions, are still able to trust and rely on each other'.

Hegel is often traduced for saying that 'man must . . . venerate the state as a secular deity,' whereas he had high regard for codified laws, corporations and written constitutions.

To avoid any kind of extreme, Newman does not deny the distinction between religion and politics or the need for independence between the Church and political authority. However, he rejects the degree of compartmentalisation that has resulted in the separation of one aspect of human endeavour or discipline with others to the point where mutuality gives way to competition, dominance and control that degenerates into a crisis for the individual believer and a challenge for religion in a secular society. To that extent, Newman was weary of secularisation. On the other hand, Newman understands that political thinking needs the inputs that can be provided by reason linked to faith. Newman's idea of the unity of truth articulated in *The Idea of a University* is a key to his approach that religion and politics are not outside the realm of reason and faith when properly understood.

1.3.3 Liberalism

The term 'liberalism' is difficult to define with any precision, for there are numerous varieties of liberalism. Besides, the ambiguity associated with the term allows it to embrace a large number of thinkers with varying nuances and emphases on the meaning and application of the concept. In other words, liberalism represents a broad school of thought that encompasses different philosophic sources, political trends and followers to talk about kinds of liberalism. In this manner, Kłos (2010, 13) lists the forms of liberalism together with names of philosophers associated with a concrete branch of liberalism:

Thus we speak about classical liberalism (also Whig liberalism, John Locke, John Stuart Mill), economic (Adam Smith), aristocratic (Montesquieu), conservative in the sense that concerns us here (Lord Acton, Frédéric Bastiat, Alexis de Tocqueville), and in our own time Catholic liberalism (Michael Novak, Richard Neuhaus, Robert A. Sirico), moderate (goal-based) and modern liberalism. However, unfortunately, the last type of liberalism mentioned is often interpreted as opposed to classical liberalism or even hostile to it.

Nevertheless, the term 'liberal' functions as an adjective and have a negative connotation, e.g., liberal law, liberal man, liberal government and liberal religion. It also functions as an explanatory category in sociological, philosophical, and political literature; hence we speak of liberal arts, liberal politics, liberal education, liberal science, and so on (cf. Kłos 2010, 12).

Therefore, liberalism may be considered as a school of thought that embraces a broad mixture of philosophers with a joint project (cf. *Apo*, 284-285). The project may be identified as building and maintaining political society as a common good in political philosophy. However, what constitutes the common good and how it should be construed and pursued are causes of disagreements that create different forms of liberalism, such as classical liberalism,

Whig liberalism, and conservative liberalism. A political party may define itself as either one or the other. These categorizations of liberalism describe the contemporary political outlook and situation. The construction called conservative liberalism is peculiar to political science and politics. The so-called categorization sounds more like a middle ground or a merger of conservatism and liberalism and may be seen as a distinct political outlook to bridge the gap between conservatism and liberalism by combining various philosophical and political solutions. That may be justified because conservatism and liberalism overlap in certain areas of issues so that there is no clear cut distinction between the two. Kłos (2010, 15-16) states that when speaking of freedom, individualism, and progress, the liberal and conservative lines of thinking meet and complement each other. For instance, in economic and political issues, it is difficult to discriminate between conservatism and classical liberalism because they emphasize the priority of the human person before the community. They share similar desires for a limited government, protection of property, solid internal relation and internal structure in opposition to the individualism of atomized individuals and mechanistic management of isolated individuals. Besides, they reject pure rationalism while stressing the pre-rational, subconscious and personal in epistemology. The conservatives and liberals emphasize the importance of national tradition and history “in which each moment is a concrete situation, a resultant of historical involvement rather than a non-contextual point of reference to solve a problem, and on a critique of naturalism, of the progressivist and rationalistic development of society as a kind of mechanism subject to the processes of manipulation” (Kłos 2010, 16). As we shall see in chapter four, the situation prompted Newman to reject the politics of conservatism and liberalism because the outcome of their political decisions/choices is the same in the long run. Therefore, Harold Laski (1996, 13) was correct in saying that liberalism is “hardly less a habit of mind than a body of doctrine.” Hence Kłos (2010, 11) suggests that the ambiguity of the phrase ‘conservative liberalism’ or the terms taken separately (i.e. conservatism and liberalism) imply that their meaning and application can only be tentative.

However, in philosophy, conservatism and liberalism stand apart as distinct political orientation, program and politics, which entail the pursuit of different values that determine the outlook of political society. That gives liberalism the colouration and status of being a political theory. As such, liberalism is associated with limited government, freedom of press and freedom of association, absence of coercion from others, and the individual's autonomy. Furthermore, it associates freedom with property ownership and views private property as a personification and protection of freedom. However, as a philosophy, liberalism emphasizes the uniqueness and primacy of persons above “social groups and relations, a free choice of the

model of a good life, responsibility, the primacy of natural and spontaneous social relations over ones that are imposed and institutionalized. Therefore, while liberalism is primarily a political theory (Constant), it is something more than a “pure” political theory” (Kłos 2010, 58).

Russell (1996, 545) described liberalism as “optimistic, energetic, and philosophic because it represented growing forces that appeared likely to become victorious without great difficulty and bring great benefits to mankind by their victory.” That is because liberalism was synonymous with liberty, individualism, relativism and favoured the causes of scientific progress as the expression of modernity. It represented a different philosophical, political, scientific, socio-cultural and religious outlook as the development of modernity.

The principles of Enlightenment and modernity, such as equality, liberty, egalitarianism, and justice, failed to realise their goals of peace, mutual coexistence, respect, social cohesion, and social progress, consequent to the decline of religious influence, political power, and the resultant deteriorating social cohesion. Toleration and individualism were needed to make sense of the freedom of conscience and the principles and goals of modernity. Liberalism provided the philosophical foundation and intellectual articulation of tolerance, progress, liberty and individualism necessary for their viability. Besides this, liberalism as the cultural expression of modernity favoured and valued highly free trade and free associations, industry, rights for private property and defended the cause of the individual. As a result, liberalism rejected the hierarchy principle, theocracy and its associated idea of the divine right of kings. Liberalism encouraged mass education because of its emphasis on the equality and dignity of all citizens (cf. Russell 1996, 545).

Furthermore, because the principle of tolerance and individualism characterizes liberalism, it is opposed to absolutism, universalism and extremism both in religion, philosophy and politics. Thus, it came clashing with Scholasticism. It rejected scholasticism because the latter favoured and provided the theological articulation that supported and upheld aristocracy and the divine rights of kings. The close affinity between Christianity (that is, the establishment of state/national religion) and the politics of the time set the Church against the liberals. The principles of tolerance and individualism posed a severe challenge to those States whose outlook was dominated either by Catholicism or Protestantism through a single synthesis of dogma, law, and custom and thus provided social cohesion, religious, and cultural unity. It is important to note that Protestant churches such as Lutherans, Calvinists and Anglicans were the first to compromise this system by applying the principles of liberalism in religion. Many Protestant churches rejected the authority of the General Councils on the basis

that they might err. Therefore, the determination of the truth was no longer a social or collective responsibility but a private duty. However, chaos, confusion and wars broke forth as consequences of people holding individual truths and seeking to impose their truths through might. However, with no clear victor at the battlefields, an alternative was sought to reconcile intellectual and ethical individualism with ordered social life, and liberalism was the answer (Russell 1996, 546).

From the conservative point of view, tolerance on the above basis meant a compromise of the truth, and both tolerance and compromise were akin to and entailed relativism in respect to the religious truth. These were ‘ambiguous virtues’ which often involve the dilemma of accommodating a situation one holds as wrong. Even when toleration means recognizing the rights of others either from the political, religious, cultural and social standpoint to co-existence or concerning the crucial issues of respect to the plurality of different ideas, ‘good’ may affect consciences and trigger strong emotions with adverse consequences.

From the preceding, we cannot agree less with Kłos (2010, 16, 52; 2021, 39-57) that whenever liberalism is condemned, it is rationalism in liberalism that is rejected. Thus, conservatism appeared as a response to and an attempt to correct the rationalistic approach to reality inaugurated by modernity by proposing a vision of life that integrates all dimensions of human existence to create a vision of man as a whole. Kłos (2010, 12-13) describes such conservatism as not opposed to changes but against arbitrary and destructive changes associated with violent revolutions. Conservatives’ approach to change may be described as cautionary and prudential. The term ‘tradition’ better describes conservatism. It is associated with limited government, respect for family life, respect for hierarchy and natural authority, the sacredness of human life and the recognition that human person is weak but perfectible, respect for natural law, and respect for the rule of law, as a fundamental value for underlining a progressive, productive, prosperous, and peaceful society. In philosophy, conservatism can be seen as a rejection of rationalism, especially a particular form of it that treats human knowledge as purely technical, which in politics was manifested as a myth of social engineering that is responsible for the quest for a model and method of a more rationalized (ideal, perfect) form of society. Conservatives emphasize practical knowledge, experience, customs and beliefs, the importance of historicity and local communities, voluntary associations in opposition to cosmopolitanism as embodied in the Enlightenment, rationalistic planning, abstraction and theoretical knowledge.

1.3.4 Human Nature

That is the fundamental aspect of modernity that human nature is inherently good. There are no obstacles to complete human fulfilment both at the individual and social levels. The idea of human nature tainted by sin or the concept of original sin is denied. The long-held traditional view of human dividedness, estrangement or alienation due to sin and the awareness of God's judgment and punishment are non-existent. On the contrary, it entails an optimistic and satisfactory view of the human condition and the world in general (though the Reformation damped this view, but it is that once we focus on deism the way to self-salvation is open). Therefore liberalism in theology embraces and emphasizes the positive aspects of the Gospel of salvation. In the nineteenth century, let us observe that another kind of alienation was advocated (by Karl Marx) due to a bad social organization (capitalist production).

This view directly contrasts the internal and self-discovery of God's existence and His laws and demands through the voice of conscience that Newman had envisioned. At most, self-reflection or conscience according to liberals reveals human weaknesses that individual efforts can master or eliminate through the proper method. Therefore, he rhetorically asks, "What is the world's religion now? It has taken the brighter side of the Gospel – its tidings of comfort and its precepts of love; all darker, deeper views of man's condition and prospects being comparatively forgotten [...]. Everything is bright and cheerful. Religion is pleasant and easy; benevolence is the chief virtue; intolerance, bigotry, excess zeal, are the first of sins." (*PPS*, I, 311-312). The overall attitude and vision arising from the conception of human nature as good is the confidence in human potentials, possibilities and harmony in the world of nature.

Modernity in relation to liberalism in theology stands on two fundamental beliefs as its foundation. First, human beings have the inherent power to attain fulfilment within them. It is the natural capacity to know what is good and diligently work to achieve this through well-intended actions and choices. Second, human beings are not divided against each other and are not alienated from fulfilment in the worldly and religious senses. Closely associated with the belief mentioned above is the concept of the responsibility of individuals to decide for themselves in all issues of religion. These beliefs put together give rise to the confidence that the critical questions concerning man's spiritual needs have their answers and can be appropriately answered.

1.3.5 The Question of Revelation

Therefore, human beings are free and independent of authority in their judgments, decisions, and choices and accept only the congenial ones. It is drawing from such judgments based on available public evidence that God is perceived as a principle in the world (cf. Gilley 1990, 55-56). God is understood not as a separate divine being who transcends the world. Divine presence is only a principle of unity and order. Consequently, revelation is merely a manifestation of this principle. Hence, revelation must be comprehended, and its content is made clear. That is against the understanding that revelation is a mystery and gift of the transcendent divine being. The content of Revelation is comprehended adequately to leave nothing transcendent or mysterious about it. Besides, the meaning of any revelation is measured by its usefulness to individuals and society at large (Gilley, 1990, p. 144).

The idea of revelation as a manifestation and not a mystery describes the attitude, character and reception of Divine Revelation that strips Revelation of having any sense of transcendence and uniqueness in history. According to Yearley (1978, 111), revelation “manifest(s) an understandable and ever-present situation. It neither unveils mysterious, transcendent realities nor records unique, world-changing events. The half-true in the idea is that ‘when Providence would make a revelation, He does not begin anew, but uses the existing system [...]’. Thus, the great characteristic of Revelation is addition or substitution.” That implies that Revelation means historical events in the world witnessed, interpreted, understood, and applied in life by the human agent. Therefore, manifestation describes these events aptly because the entire events or object of revelation is intelligible to the mind.

Furthermore, people should accept only those aspects of revelation that they find reasonable. Personal witness and judgment are most worthy of trust and belief. Hence everyone is responsible and accountable for the beliefs they hold. The resources and information necessary to arrive at such beliefs are provided by nature and history. The ultimate object of religion discoverable in nature and history is the divine principle (God) with three essential characteristics: power, wisdom, and goodness. Yearley (1978, 126) explains that,

These attributes must be understood to have only muted personal analogues. For example, love refers only to the existence of a world where people feel at home and find their greatest happiness through the love of others. Religion’s final object does not contain other perfections that people call personal – such as will, mercy, or judgement. To personalize a deity by saying that deity makes particular judgments on people or wills specific things for people is to engage in unwarranted anthropomorphic speculation at best and crass superstition at worst.

The above pattern of thinking rejects judging an idea by ultimate standards. Instead, an idea should be weighed based on its contribution or precisely usefulness to attaining a just and humane society. Applying the above idea makes religion, politics and education more

pragmatic in their approach to human needs and tends to discourage speculation of whatever kind. Building a just and humane society is necessary to attain human fulfilment. Through education, people will actualize their human potential and be wholly fulfilled. In other words, education can make people better and, consequently, instrumental in creating a just society (cf. DA, 255-305). A practical educational system without reference to the supernatural or metaphysical is all that is needed to empower citizens to solve their problems and attain peaceful coexistence and development in the society.

1.3.6 The Argument of Utility

A direct corollary of the above thought is that persons should seek only the ideas and actions that are of immediate and material benefit or that are useful to them as individuals and as a group of persons. The utilitarian connection is obvious. However, it reflects modernity's critical attitude towards religion concerning its relevance. Spiritual or integral goods are mainly unknown. In other words, human knowledge concerning spiritual goods is minimal and insufficient as an incentive for action. Besides, spiritual goods have little significance in achieving human potential even when and where fully comprehended. Hence people should seek only useful goods or useful knowledge. Consequently, aligning or basing education on the principle of usefulness/utility would enable creating and establishing a just, harmonious, and progressive society.

This argument is extended to the realm of values, truth, and ultimate standards. Therefore, it is expedient for people to determine their values based on what is knowable in the real context of existence. That means that the values will reflect the changing needs of the people, both as individuals and communities. Thus, only those valuable things to the general public will determine or inform the decision-making process in society. This further means that values are not a given but conscious human creations determined by their usefulness in response to their existential needs.

Similarly, truth is not a discovery. It is made. Seeking and finding truth, values, and ultimate standard becomes impossible. The only possibility is making and creating our values, truths and standards. In a sense, the same argument applies to the ultimate standard. The ultimate standards are not discovered but arise from the concrete human existence of a social group. They do not necessarily have a link with the sacred or metaphysical realm. In every society, people determine their good and set their standard of good accordingly "by attending to complex group needs, rather than find their good by attending to some higher stable realm."

(Yearley 1978, 116). Arendt (as cited in Yearley 1978, 116-117) further states that the above view amounted to a complete shift of perspective in

the traditional hierarchy of thought over action, contemplation over labour, and philosophy over politics. Theory changes from a system of reasonably connected truths which as such has been not made but given to reason and the senses into [...] a working hypothesis, changing in accordance with the results it produces and depending for its validity not on what it reveals but on whether it works'. This, in turn means that values are social commodities that have no significance of their own but, like other commodities, exist only in the ever-changing relativity of social linkage and commerce [...] The good loses its character as an idea, the standard by which the good and the bad can be measured and recognized; it has become a value which can be exchanged with other values, such as those of expediency or power [...] so that idea finally becomes mere values whose validity is determined not by one or many men but by society as a whole in its ever-changing functional need.

The assumption that human nature is good and that persons can be trusted to discern and seek the common good in place of their desires means that human fulfilment is attainable. People are fulfilled in a just and harmonious society. These assumptions form the foundation on which modern society rests. However, the undermining of any one of these presuppositions renders the functionality or practicability of the principles of liberalism impossible in any sense and frustrates the possibility of fulfilment. The combined consideration of the primary criterion for action, the primary goal of action, and the making of a good person or society determine the value of acts and events (cf. MacIntyre 2009, 349).

1.3.7 Private Judgment and Private Choice

Private judgment refers to the right and responsibility of an individual to independently form, hold, judge, and determine personal matters of importance without (political, institutional and ecclesiastical) interference or hindrance. First, the idea of private judgment is closely related to the concept of private choice or liberty as its basis, which guarantees freedom of speech and is integral to religious toleration. Second, it is related to the concept of liberty of conscience as a source of knowledge. This conception of private judgment is based on the awareness that each individual is endowed with dignity and must have the liberty of conscience and intellectual freedom accompanied by the intellectual capacity to judge on matters of personal importance. Each person should be able to make personal decisions and choices. Judging, therefore, entails some level of knowledge arising either from a moral sense, an affection or feeling, or from a rule of life/belief and supported by reason. That is formalized into two basic principles for judgment. Judgment should be rooted in rationally demonstrable things and on things congenial to one's own emotions. These two principles correspond to the two crucial perspectives of private judgment that were at the heart of Newman's criticism of private judgment, namely the rationalistic and pietistic wings of naturalism. This simple

division meant that the rationalists think that reason is the criterion of judgment, while the pietists think that emotions are the criteria for judgment. Within the context of the Reformation leading up to the twentieth century, the concept of private judgment came to be crucially related to *sola Scriptura* and *sola fide*.

This understanding of private judgment came from the backdrop of the Enlightenment's conception and opposition to dogma as the enemy of truth, an obstacle to knowledge and a hindrance to the human ability to impact their environment. Dogma was thought to be worse than doubt, and ignorance put together and feared more than the mind's tendency to make mistakes and embrace illusions; because it hinders the pursuit of truth and progress. Dogma was defined as "the attempt to anticipate the goal which knowledge must attain and to establish the goal prior to investigation" (Yearley 1978, 101). Adherence to dogma was seen as prejudicial to the mind concerning human ability and desire to know. Thus, Kant's definition of the Enlightenment as the movement away from tutelage, external control and the confidence to use one's intellect to attain knowledge (*sapere aude*) encapsulates the mind-set of moderns against dogma and in favour of private judgment (cf. Cassirer 1966, 161-163).

Again within this context, the suspension, withholding, and surrendering of the right to private judgment or submitting to authoritative truths was considered by modern liberals as not just demeaning but the most destructive of all attitudes. That also partly informed the rejection of tradition and authority by liberals as this second principle of liberalism entails. The above background understanding makes it easy to see why Newman objected to the idea of private judgment or at least modified its importance in his transition from the Anglican period to the Roman Catholic belief. In the eighteen principles of liberalism put together by Newman, the fifth principle is congenial with the idea of private judgment. It states that "[i]t is immoral in a man to believe more than he can spontaneously receive as being congenial to his moral and mental nature" (*Apo*, 260). That means that the emotive or affective determines the acceptance and non-acceptance of anything in their judgment. What is not agreeable to a person's emotional state is completely unacceptable.

Consequently, this formed the basis of the principle that (i.e., the third out of the eighteen principles of liberalism) "no theological doctrine is anything more than an opinion which happened to be held by bodies of men" (*Apo*, 261). The enormities of this position are better highlighted by two other principles of liberalism (six and seven). They read as follows: "No revealed doctrines or precepts may reasonably stand in the way of scientific conclusions

[...]. Christianity is necessarily modified by the growth of civilization, and exigencies of time” (*Apo*, 261).

Limiting religion to personal acceptance will result in constantly adapting it to the changing needs of people and time. Besides, it must also adjust to the scientific discoveries of every generation. Therefore, private judgment implies that no religious statements can be taken as objective and permanent truths. Religious affirmations will change with time in the same ways that culture changes when faced with objective results of science. The liberals presume the goodness of human nature. However, besides this presumption, they further assume that ultimate truth is not accessible by human intellect. Based on these presumptions, humans can trust their judgment to be accurate and that some other persons will find the same things congenial to them. This view is in accord with the belief by liberals that human beings are unified against the belief in human dividedness.

On the contrary, as we shall see in chapters two and four, Newman believes in human dividedness and “argues that different things may be congenial to different parts of a person. One aspect of a person (the desire for immediate gratification) might find something that another part (the conscience) will not. A person’s different aspect is drawn to different satisfactions” (Yearley, 1978, 102).

The other idea associated with private judgment is doubt in the ability of human beings to attain the ultimate truth. Liberal empiricists claim that it is self-evident that nothing certain is known about the metaphysical world. Hence, any proposition regarding metaphysical realities is reduced to opinion or probability, and it is beyond our human capability to demonstrate as certain knowledge. Statements, theories and arguments about religion fall within this category (cf. *Idea*, 256). This form of scepticism is vital to private judgment. In the beginning, liberalism in theology emphasized the role of reason in the pursuit of proof for Christianity and specifically in the attempt to know God via a scientific investigation of the world. Nevertheless, this method yielded few self-evident religious truths.

As that fact became evident, the standard of truth shifted to internal heart witness, of which only parts might be considered reasonable. Since little religiously vital was knowable, reason established the norm for what was knowable, but feeling became the true foundation of belief and action. The rationalist and pietist sides of liberalism were merged in this way, particularly in the thinking of ordinary people. The notion of human goodness is combined with religious knowledge’s weakness and the legitimacy of religious sentiment to produce the belief that the self is the sole trustworthy source of authoritative judgment.

1.3.8 The Reduction of Conscience to Private Opinion

There is no single acceptable notion of the term ‘conscience.’ It is variously interpreted by different people to mean different things. However, there seems to exist a loose understanding that persons generally are conscious of holding moral standards that serve either as motivation to act or not to act, judge, and blame oneself based on these standards. This sense of understanding conscience as self-assessment often involves a subjective turn to look inward for approval and disapproval based on personally and deeply held standards of behaviour. It is also referred to as the voice within the person or the voice of God, as Newman suggested. These standards or principles are not connected to any ontological or metaphysical reality, even if they are held to be permanent.

Consequently, conscience was not linked to any specific moral or religious view. Hence, the principles and judgements of conscience could differ from person to person, and the determination of these principles became a matter of taste and preferences. Therefore, a shift presumably beginning from the seventeenth century onward disconnected conscience from its moral dimension. It was then linked to the psychological dimension of the person. This was contrary to a long-held view on conscience by the Catholic Church in Pre-modern times. It marked the development of secular accounts of conscience as an autonomous faculty and intrinsically unrelated to any substantial moral content. Conscience then may be described as a subjective (personal/private) moral content of an individual’s expectations, actions, aspirations, behaviour or character in connection to a sense or feeling of responsibility to act in a certain way or not. When the ideal of private judgement or the development of a personal system of faith and knowledge are combined with those of liberty of conscience and freedom of expression, it means that in matters of faith, morals and politics, an individual may choose for himself/herself his/her belief system and model his/her actions accordingly by appealing to the conviction of his/her conscience. From the above perspective, conscience is reduced to being a private opinion.

1.4 Other Consequences of Modernity

The pattern of thinking in the modern era emphasised the powers of the intellect. In particular, the nineteenth century was characterised by unprecedented confidence in the abilities of reason. Having been liberated from the stranglehold of religious superstitions and traditionalism, reason was entrusted with laying the foundation of society and subsequently building a better society for the future. God was dethroned, and man was enthroned as the

centre of the universe. Consequently, this gave rise to an emphasis on man as an autonomous, free, individual, and social being in concrete history (cf. Kłos 2003, 209). That was accompanied by the triumph of science and technology that led to the one-sided development of the human person, i.e. his technical abilities to the negligence of the whole person. The vision of the world that emerged from science and technology was deterministic, atomistic and predictive. It painted a picture of a universe necessitated out of the forces of evolution and comprehensible only by science.

The metaphysical thinking that articulated faith in God and divine providence was rejected in preference to positivism or scientism, which promised endless progress supported by secular eschatology and morality (cf. Kłos 2014, 112). The new world had no place for divine providence, God, and the dogma of Original Sin. A new vision of man and nature as perfect was invented that did not require the idea of divine salvation and perfection through culture. The idea of the perfect man of nature was an *a priori* hypothesis. It was not a fact that could be asserted in ontogeny or phylogeny.

Nevertheless, the idea became an inspiration for changes in many domains of culture, especially in politics (the French Revolution), education (liberalism), and religion. If there is no God, it also follows that there is no Creator, and consequently, there is no given human nature. What is called human nature is the creation of man. Sartre (1946, 27) sums up this view in the following words: “Man is only what he makes himself [...]. We want to say that man before all else exists, i.e., he creates himself only in the future and is conscious of his development in the future. Man is before all else a subjectively experienced project, instead of being froth, mould, or cauliflower. Nothing exists prior to this project, and nothing else exists in the sphere of knowability.”

The above view finds its ideological expression in socialism in which a person is said to lack a given nature and dignity that is permanent. Human nature is but a product of society and social conditions. According to Karl Marx, human nature comes from society. It is entirely determined by society and thereby is subject to society (As cited by M. Heidegger 1977, 82). From the individual and social perspective, culture makes nature, which means that one does not need to take nature into account (and indirectly, one does not need to take reality into account). Nature is comparable to a plastic material shaped differently with no reference to any *a priori* principle. That material can be described as an indeterminate subject (cf. Levi-Strauss, 1962). Culture becomes the realization of a *priori* project in all domains and takes the form of various cultures and civilizations but without the ability of self-reflection because it lacks a standard of reference such as the human person with a definite nature provides so that

respect and development of that nature would determine the value of culture. Hence, either a person, for his part or society arbitrarily resolves the nature of the human person. He/she does so in the light of an arbitrarily accepted standard.

The dichotomy created between culture and nature results in various kinds of anti-culture because a culture that negates reality, such as human nature, acts destructively on reality. When nature as the origin of human action that aims at specific ends is rejected, human subjectivity is denied by nature as a dynamic expression. There is no person without the subject because such a conception of the human person would lead to totalitarianism, which finds theoretical and ideological support in theories that present a non-personal conception of human existence. Culture then becomes an instrument for enslaving man (e.g., surrealism). The Protestant notions of culture, nature and grace as articulated by Martin Luther and Karl Barth, Rousseau's naturalism, the Sartrean existentialism are all implicated as sources of totalitarianism and contemporary liberalism.

The classical understanding of culture does not hinder human creativity and spontaneity because man is open to infinity through immaterial reason and will. However, we do not need to identify human creativity with divine creativity because man is not the cause of his existence. Human reason and will are constitutive parts of man's nature or essence as a person, and they do not appear as the result of self-creation or all the more as the result of some sort of pure existence. We must emphasize that man no doubt is capable of forming his personality, but his nature is a given as a fact already present before the human faculties. In the standard order of things, human creativity does not occur in isolation from reality or contrary to reality, but it begins from imitations and passes into a phase of more and more original creativity. The horizon of that creativity is set by openness to Transcendence.

The understanding of culture does not lead to cultural monism, i.e. the reduction of all cultures to one paradigm, e.g., Hellenism, because the classical understanding of culture allows analogical differentiated ways to actualize human potentialities in different societies and at different times. Culture does not need to be linked with values (as separate from being) because the 'transcendentals' are the foundation for realistic axiology. The transcendentals express properties of being, as being, is analogically understood (not univocally understood).

Our conception of culture cannot be removed from the context of our understanding of being and nature, of the subject and the person, because culture is not something in itself, nor is culture merely the consequence of biological or social factors. However, it manifests the human way of being and should be interpreted primarily by reference to the key metaphorical categories (cf. Jaroszynski 2007, 217-221). As discussed below, the specific consequences of

modernity appear as a result of wrong interpretation and application of modernity's central tenets or ideas. In this context, we should situate the clash and response of Newman to modernity. Thus, Newman strove to reconstruct the ideas of modernity because, as they stand, i.e. misinterpreted or corrupted in the words of Kłos (2003, 210), they serve neither the modernists nor the believers. Christianity is not against the good value in modern thinking when rightly understood and applied.

1.4.1 Scientism

Science is not the invention or child of modernity. Human beings have always experimented, interacted and tried to explain the world around them. Driven by curiosity, adventure, and the shared existential challenges they faced at different times, human beings have generated knowledge and inventions to meet their growing needs. These drives, the desire to know, the sense of adventure, and existential needs have been at the heart of human inventions and developments in education and culture, communication systems, science and technology.

Comparatively, scientific and technological development and education/literacy were not at the same levels worldwide. There is no doubt about the outstanding intellectual and technological developments and impact of specific ancient cultures and civilizations, even from the contemporary standpoint. Notwithstanding, there may be no realm of human accomplishment comparable to that of modern science in the last two or three centuries coming from Europe and Western Europe in particular.

Science in the modern era has made a significant breakthrough in developing knowledge production. Consequently, science has utterly changed how we acquire and approach knowledge. The modern period might be rightly credited with the determination and inauguration of scientific thinking and the scientific method, that is, the methodological and systematic approach to empirical knowledge, which guarantees the process of knowledge as a movement from the unknown to the known. This is highly significant because it has prompted a way of thinking in science that ensures the continuous growth of knowledge at the heart and source of inventions, innovation, technological advancements, cultural and societal progress.

It is difficult to imagine that there still exists an aspect of human existence, which has not been impacted by science and technology. The impact and influence of scientific and technological advancements and the level of their dominance in our private and collective consciousness are altogether unprecedented in history. This is a peculiar feature of the contemporary world and life due to modernity. Scientific discoveries and technological

advancements have resolved many problems previously considered as mysteries. They have answered questions about the physical world/nature that were unanswerable. First of all, they have combined nearly perfectly to do things thought unthinkable and undoable in the past. Science and technology have impacted the human condition and the world, thereby setting it on a course probably unalterable with severe consequences for meaning, morality, culture, politics and human existence (see Pinker 2019, 385).

Thus, there is probably a growing consciousness both at the personal and public levels of not just the increment of knowledge, inventions, innovations and the tremendous growth of science but of what kind and what use and quality. There is a growing concern also over the possible or foreseeable effects of scientific and technological advancements in the public consciousness. We now know the destructive powers that atomic and nuclear energy could cause. We now also live with the awareness of the possibility of repeating its horrors at any time in history. We are aware of the possibility of biological warfare and the ‘weaponization’ of plagues capable of exterminating the world population. Future generations not far away will have to contend with the problems raised by the long years of biological revolutions, genetic editing or DNA manipulations, human and animal hybrids, Artificial Intelligence, and human implants.

Exposure and acquaintance with some of the realities of scientific and technological developments are inevitable in contemporary society. It will be a requirement to exist and function in the new world that will be characteristically digital. The seemingly unstoppable and progressive march of science means a continuous production of knowledge and inventions, from toys to machines/equipment at a rate impossible to keep pace with the world around. Though some of these inventions and discoveries are significant, others are needless or undesirable. A lot more is taken for granted due to the shared busy nature of contemporary life. Thus, there is complacency and growing ignorance of the broader implications of the activities of science arising from a lack of reflective and systematic attempts to comprehend either the why or the how of these developments.

Science seems to be running out of control as scientists push the boundaries of knowledge and inventions through limitless and unregulated experimentations with living and non-living specimens, including human beings. At the same time, the outcome of experimentations, good or bad, is uncritically accepted as unavoidable, unpredictable, and uncontrollable as a necessary part or fate of science. Whether some or few inventions and discoveries of science should have been sanctioned to happen is hardly asked. The presumption is rarely questioned that every generation will learn and adapt to the ongoing

biological and other evolutions and revolutions. We have adapted to living with computers and cell phones. Similarly, we will learn and adapt to living with chips and Artificial Intelligence.

Accepting and getting acquainted with scientific and technological creations entails learning, adapting and changing within the human person and the living environment. This is upsetting as it affects what is normal (natural, cultural, customary and traditional) in our already ordered universe and could ignite emotions favourable or unfavourable. This is because scientific creations and science in themselves are not value-free. Hence, in some instances, they are accepted or rejected by society.

Science and technology embody many ambiguities in terms of their creations and side-effects. Determining these ambiguities is not easy and demands some levels of expertise, not only in science and technology. Based on this, science and technology have become matters of public debate. One scientific or technological decisions or creations raise relevant questions, controversies and conflicts in other areas of our lives, such as politics, economy, culture, and religion. This highlights the problematic relationships between science and any of these institutions and society. It also raises the genuine challenge of regulation of science and technology when it comes to choice and funding available scientific and technological research options, implementation of research results, the direction of research activities, beneficiaries of research, and so on. Therefore, the fundamental and underlying criterion for choice and decision concerning scientific and technological activities appears in some sense the most significant consequence of modernity as science seems to have lost any metaphysical connection. This is altogether not in keeping with the founding fathers' intentions of modern science (Rose and Rose 1969, 13).

1.4.2 Progress

“Progress” connotes advancement, growth, development, or improvement. Therefore, it is commonly used to mean advancement to higher stages or attaining the next level on the scaffold or ladder of achievements. Progress in this sense means, according to Bury (As cited by Bossard, 1931, 5-14), “that civilization has moved, is moving, and will move in a desirable direction. The idea of human progress is a theory which involves a synthesis of the past and a prophecy of the future. It is based on an interpretation of history which regards men as slowly advancing in a definite and desirable direction and infers that this progress will continue indefinitely.”

The earliest recorded conception and use of the term “progress,” in the above sense in the history of philosophy, refers to speculation on the ever-changing conditions of human life or the changing conditions of civilization. This is attributed to Lucretius, “the Roman poet whose *De Rerum Nature* includes the first usage of the word progress, and whose conception of it is akin to that of later centuries [...]. However, his writings have no projection of the idea to the future. Man has progressed from savagery, but the highest point has been reached, and only destruction looms” (Bossard, 1931, 5-14).

The idea of history as moving in cycles was rejected by medieval thinkers due partly to the influence of the Christian faith, which conceived history as a linear movement to perfection or fulfilment directed by divine providence. This was translated into the hope of a glorious triumph and a belief in a better future of nations and individuals in a new world. To this extent, medieval thinkers had a sense of progress associated with human advancement, which was taken up and developed by later thinkers into a modern theory of progress. Bossard (1931, 5-14) notes, “[t]hat these hopes and possibilities all related to another and later world seems a difference of detail rather than of the principal idea. In other words, the medieval conception was like that of later centuries. Wherein it differed was in regard to time, place and means of achievement.” The modern conception of progress took much of its inspiration from the Enlightenment movements, which broke the past. There was confidence in the thinking that the height of civilization attained by the Greeks and the Romans were not only attainable again but could be superseded. According to Condorcet (as cited by Bossard 1931, 5-14), this means setting the human race free from its chains to march forward on the firm road of truth, virtue and happiness. This meant an attempt to understand and explain the world to improve the human condition (cf. Pinker 2018, 39).

The above thinking was consolidated by the achievements of modernity and gave rise to progress as a diachronic and horizontal movement of history upward understood in the sense of human improvement/advancement.¹ Thus, progress was conceived and described as

¹According to Bossard “Those of outstanding significance in connection with the development of the modern idea of progress will be referred to briefly. The increase of wealth in Western Europe undoubtedly was of great importance. ‘As it multiplied,’ writes Durant, ‘it displaced the hope of heaven with the lure of progress.’ Furthermore, the achievements, material and otherwise, of the Renaissance period created a spirit of confidence by man in his own ability. The reward of doing a thing is the ability and incentive to do another and a bigger thing. Again, the break with the past had to come before man could face the future with optimism. ‘So long as men believed that the Greeks and Romans had attained, in the best days of their civilization, to an intellectual plane which posterity could never hope to reach, so long as the authority of their thinkers was set up as unimpeachable, a theory of degeneration held the field, which excluded a theory of progress.’ Finally, there had to develop a foundation of scientific understanding of the universe before a theory of progress in the modern sense could develop. In other words, man had to see that it was not fortune but general causes that govern the world. So long as the world or man's career on it are the result of unrelated and accidental occurrences or of an

humanity's painful and slow march toward an ever-increasing perfection (cf. Bossard 1931, 5-14). This means that progress entails a systematic, consistent and irreversible positive development/ improvement in human history. This view of progress was preceded by a scientific and naturalistic understanding of the universe which means that the world is governed by causes rather than divine providence or fortune. The knowledge of these causes or principles in operation in the universe puts human beings in control of their progress and future. The most significant aspect of the modern theory of progress, according to Bossard (1931, 5-14), is the idea that

[n]o bounds have been fixed to the improvement of the human faculties; the perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite; the progress of this perfection, henceforth above the control of every power that would impede it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us. In summary, then, the idea of progress, as ultimately formulated during this period, was a conviction that man and his world were moving upward to a constantly rising level of perfection. It was a philosophy of optimism, based on the immediately preceding achievements of man and projection of their continuance into the future. The consciousness of the social changes of the time led, first to their approval and subsequently, to the expectation of their continuance.

The term 'progress' is applied to nearly every aspect of human existence, resulting in various theories of human progress. Thus, we speak of biological, moral, social, political, economic, historical, etc. However, the term's meaning is generally not affected by its various applications. For example, progress could be a deliberate and conscious attempt to guide the cause of human advancement towards a specific direction considered for humanity's best interest. Progress understood as such involves change, valuation and control. Thus, progress can be measured and based on these measurements, as the indices indicate, there has been a steady advancement in countless aspects of human existence and endeavours. However, progress pursue in this sense raises concern as Pinker (2009, 121) rhetorically asks the question:

But is progress sustainable? A common response to the good news about our health, wealth, and sustenance is that it cannot continue. As we infest the world with our teeming numbers, guzzle the earth's bounty heedless of finitude, and foul our nests with pollution and waste, we are hastening an environmental day of reckoning. If overpopulation, resource depletion, and pollution don't finish us off, then climate change will.

This is the consequence when human progress is assumed historically to be limitless or infinite. It leads inevitably to a crisis that has been termed as a 'progress trap'. Cimorelli (2019, 143), citing other sources, has described the phenomenon called progress as those human behaviours or projects that initially seem to be good and worth accomplishing for their perceived benefits in the short term, but in the long run they lead to unforeseen disaster because they are unsustainable. This situation has to do with small scale changes or developments

omnipotent dramatist, the idea of progress is a futile speculation. Given a knowledge of the principles which determine their general development, the hope of conscious control follows apace." (1931, 5-14).

considered good progress in the short term but snowballing into complex and uncontrollable effects on the society in the long term. Cimorelli (2019) associates this kind of progress with advancements to higher stages that emphasizes material development to the detriment of progress in a moral sense, presuming that both types of progress go hand in hand. He states that “seen in this light, it would be more accurate to define a progress trap as the commitment to material progress without an adequate consideration of associated moral principles and long-term sustainability” (Cimorelli 2019, 143).

That is part of the ambiguity and paradox that unbridled science and progress can pose to humanity, in that there is so much good they bring, but there are also significant consequences that are to the detriment of human survival in the long run that cannot be taken for granted. Progress runs into a trap when it is uncritically presumed that the solution to the consequences of progress is more progress in innovation and invention with less or no attention to underlying moral considerations and the resultant consequences.

1.4.3 Humanism

We will set aside the complexities and the complicated origin and history of the term ‘humanism’ to focus on its meaning and application in the contemporary period in connection with modernity. Humanism is vague and admits broad application that makes it difficult to define. Citing other sources, Fowler (1999, 5) notes that “there seem to be as many different varieties of Humanism as there are grades of wine and cheese, and breadth of interpretations is no less evident. Since Humanism is involved with life, it is necessarily wide in dimension.” Thus, we speak of Christian humanism, scientific humanism, pragmatic humanism, secular humanism, atheistic humanism, naturalistic humanism, political humanism, religious humanism, evolutionary humanism, to mention only but a few. The initial or prefix is crucial because it shows both the area of emphasis and the underlying (philosophical) conception of the human being and human nature.

Humanism, therefore, applies to various modern beliefs, doctrines, and philosophies that are human-centred in contrast to God/god centred. They may differ significantly in content. Nevertheless, they share one common emphasis, humanness. Fowler (1999, 10) asserts that

what can be said of humanism as a whole – is the vision of the dignity of human beings and the acceptance of the capabilities of human beings for rational reflection and choice. This is the vision of a human being who is unrestrained from the constraints which society, culture, religion, state oppression have so often imposed – a gospel for the individual.

From the above exposition, we may safely say that humanism is multi-layered and rich in meaning. Nevertheless, it may be a general term used to describe the contemporary human situation. However, it can also refer to, more specifically, an organized movement with some set goals, such as seeking to inaugurate a non-supernatural/non-theistic basis for meaning and ethics and good without God (cf. Pinker 2018, 410). In line with the above thought, Fowler (1999, 5) views humanism “as a response to life which is in contrast and often open opposition to the religious stance for life.” Levinas is more emphatic in this sense when he describes humanism as “a system of principles and disciplines that free human life from the prestige of myths, the discord they introduce into ideas and the cruelty they perpetuate in social customs.” (As cited by Ernst Wolff 2011, 84).

Humanism assumes a deliberate and conscious focus on the human being in opposition to the divine, on the secular in opposition to the religious, on material and temporal life here, on the world in opposition to eternal life in the future or heaven. Humanism encompasses everything except organized religion or reference to the supernatural. Therefore, this brand of humanism's philosophical, epistemological, and ethical outlook is naturalistic, rationalistic, scientific, atheistic, and akin to affirming the extreme notion of human liberties, secularism, and progress. In this worldview, says McMahon (1968, 129), “man, the earth, and the unending universe of space and time are all parts of one great Nature. The whole of existence is equivalent to Nature, and outside of Nature, nothing exists.” These combine to make humanism explicitly and peculiarly focused on human flourishing in the world with no interest in the metaphysical dimension of human life. In other words, humanism seeks self-preservation, self-realization, self-fulfilment, happiness, social cohesion and morality in the society and the world at large, detached entirely from any form of a religious worldview. Fowler (1999, 9-10) further states that “for Humanism, free expression – so necessary for the full dimension of the word human – as well as morality which is secularly decided and not religiously dictated, will bring about differences in opinion, but differences which do not depart from the basic tenet of the fulfilment of individuals and societies everywhere in a peaceful, happy existence.”

Understanding human beings and human nature as a being and as something without any metaphysical relation, destiny and property bind and confirm all human hopes and aspirations of flourishing to this material universe. Fowler (1999, 47) claims that:

Humanists reject this theory of the composite and dual nature of the body and soul or mind, claiming that body and mind are one, and both disintegrate at death. This is a monistic theory as opposed to a dualistic one. As opposed to the dual nature of body and mind, the idea of one-ness is essential to Humanism, for the monistic theory precludes any possibility of supernatural life in any form beyond death: immortality is an impossibility. To the Humanist, then, man and woman consist of body, mind and personality in an indissoluble

unity. Mind and personality, indeed, are felt to be products of the conditioning environment, the end products of genetic inheritance and interaction with the stimuli in the physical and social environment, and the result of responses to the countless choices that are made in life's varied tapestries. The self is thus an inter functioning of mental, physical and emotional qualities that form the unity of the individual.

Consequently, human responsibility and freedom of choice take on a special significance in humanism. The human being is responsible for his being because of the possession of the free will. Human beings create themselves, values, goals and society by freedom of choice independent of external factors or powers. They are responsible for themselves as individuals and for others in fulfilling their great potentials. Humanism, therefore, embodies a profound belief in the human potential and the embodiment of inalienable responsibilities of human beings to make themselves and shape their lives and destinies in freedom through the exercise of free will (cf. Pinker, 2018, 420).

The combination of human potential, responsibility, and free will is compatible with any conception of God who grants grace, salvation, and rewards good deeds and punishes wrongdoing, gives unmerited favours, and promulgates a code of moral law. It mitigates human fulfilment by unduly constraining human potential and diminishes human responsibility for good or bad. From this perspective, Fowler (1999, 11, 20) says, "[i]t is easy to see why religion is rejected by modern-day Humanists, though it is not exclusively so and has not always been so [...]. Today, however, Humanism – standing as a word on its own – could be said to reject religion and its concomitant doctrines."

It is therefore intriguing to see how humanism as a purely Christian movement has drifted in history to become not just anti-Christianity but anti-religion as a consequence of modernity, arising from what has been described by Rober (2009, 73-74) as

the anthropocentric shift in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, beginning with an 'eclipse of this of further purpose' and thus 'of the idea that we owe God anything further than the realization of his plan [...] The second part of this shift, embedded in the title of the present essay, is 'eclipse of grace,' wherein the world becomes increasingly defined by the scientific method and by the mundane or every day. Economic in the form of industrial and mercantilist capitalism begins to assume its present-day dominance over everyday life. This brings us to those, such as Locke, who attempt to establish this modern situation by diagnosing a rational order of things. In a related move, Taylor argues, 'The sense of mystery fades, replaced by self-interest and benevolence depending on the circumstances. Finally, human nature begins to appear self-sufficient, with no sense that God was planning a transformation of human beings, which would take them beyond the limitations which inhere in their present condition.

The above conception of a human being and human nature has led not only to the idea of man as self-made and as an independent agent but the deification of the human person and absolute conception of human freedom, which in turn has led to individualism and subjectivism in morality and the understanding of truth. The famous assertion of Protagoras that 'Man is the measure of all things' assumes symbolic importance as the expression of humanism.

1.4.4 Rationalism

Rationalism consists of the attempt to use or apply reason to verify things or acquire knowledge of things. Rationalism is a process of validating and vindicating all truth claims by reason, a feature associated with modernity as its source. In this sense, rationalism becomes a way of approaching knowledge first, through scepticism, doubt and reason. The reliance and confidence of rationalism on reason means respect for evidence and facts and lack of respect and rejection of other means of knowing. Falling into this category are all forms of esoteric knowledge: myth, superstition, supernaturalism, intuition, mysticism, and subjectivism. In this way, rationalism aligns itself with atheism, naturalism and science; and rejects religion, authority, and any claim for the truth that is not supported by verifiable evidence. In other words, truth claims are not verifiable by reason. Again, many religious truths and beliefs fall into this category. In judging good and evil, right and wrong, rationalism resorts to reason as the ultimate point of reference against feeling, custom, and authority. Anything based on authority should not be accepted (cf. Fowler 1999, 225).

Science of success in the modern period coincided with ascendancy and recognition of reason as the foundation and test of knowledge, which led to the attack on authority resulting in the crisis of trust and the loss of moral and epistemic authority. The consequences have only exacerbated with time (Zagzebski 2012, 4).

The idea of self-autonomy, equality, egalitarianism, and rationality cherished by modern thinkers was considered irreconcilable with authority. From an egalitarian standpoint, the argument preceded from the presumption that human nature and abilities, including intellectual and epistemic capacities, were evenly distributed by nature among normal average human beings irrespective of experience and situation. All persons are presumed to be equal so that the requirements for applying such epistemic concepts as knowledge, justified belief, and reasonable doubt are satisfied by any average person. In discussion with others, each person is presumed to articulate his/her views based on his/her insights. To uncritically accept the views of others is seen as lacking maturity, autonomy, self-direction and powers of personal judgment. This line of thought failed to acknowledge that some persons, besides acquiring more through intellectual inheritance, have expanded their intellectual abilities to levels higher than others and are therefore privileged to have acquired more knowledge. The differences mentioned above are taken for granted, but they are crucial in approaching epistemological issues (cf. Zagzebski 2012, 6).

The rejection of heteronomous authority was rooted in the autonomy of reason and the values of equality and egalitarianism because if persons possess equal epistemic capabilities,

the need for an epistemic authority² does not arise (Zagzebski 2012, 7). John Locke in *A Letter Concerning Toleration* states: “[I]t is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws which are not in men’s power to perform. And to believe this or that to be true does not depend upon our will.” (Locke, 209:24). This claim arises from the conception of the will and reason without reference to any metaphysical relation. This meant that the will and reason are purely independent and that reason is unaided by any external factor. Hence, the human mind can attain knowledge without divine help. This understanding elevated reason over and above faith and made reason the arbiter of religious truth with the added function of justifying or verifying faith. Again, this understanding goes back to the Enlightenment era with thinkers such as Kant. Prior to Descartes and Kant divine/religious truths were affirmed and accepted as certain truths. However, at the dawn of modernity, these truths were questioned and subjected to the judgment of human reason. According to Carroll (as cited by Fowler 1999, 227), Descartes enthroned reason as the presiding judge of modern culture and consequently freeing the mind from the control of the authority and tradition. This gave rise to philosophical analyses of the powers of the human mind independent of external influences such as Divine Will and triggered a wave of philosophical, scientific, political, religious, ethical and cultural nationalism, which became characteristic of modernity.

Modern thinkers' rationalisation of these institutions was anti-religion and anti-political traditions. Their rationalism did much to set faith and reason, science and religion, on a collision course and prepare the ground for the fierce religious wars in Europe with many colourations, culminating into revolutions such as the French Revolution (Russell 1996 482-483). On the one hand, the long years of philosophical and theological conflicts and political and religious wars had a devastating effect. On the other hand, according to Russell (1996, 482), “gradually weariness resulting from wars of religion led to the growth of belief in religious toleration, which was on the sources of the movement which developed into eighteenth and nineteenth-century liberalism.”

² Zagzebski (2012, 5) claims that [e]pistemologists occasionally use the term epistemic authority to refer to experts – people who are reliable sources of information in some domain – but the existence of expertise is typically denied in any domain pertaining to value or religion. The fields in which experts are recognized are carefully circumscribed, and experts are not treated as authorities in the sense in which political authorities are authorities. Most philosophers assume that they do not command belief, and nobody has an epistemic duty to believe them.”

1.4.5 Individualism

Individualism probably started with Thomas Hobbes but was firmly entrenched into philosophy by Rene Descartes self-reference certainty of ‘I think; therefore I am.’ The affirmation of each existence became the beginning and foundation of knowledge in contrast to tradition and authority. Descartes’ stress on the capacity of the mind to grasp clear and distinct ideas had the same consequence. The certainty of clear and distinct ideas grasped by the mind is attained and affirmed by self-reflective thinking. This form of intellectual individualism became a feature of much philosophical and scientific thinking after Descartes but with variations in depth and consequences. Intellectual individualism in science meant that the scientist resorted to the power of argument to persuade others to accept as accurate his discovery based on the accepted standard of practice and confirmed by other scientists to produce an agreement. Scientific truth has the elements of being both individualistic and procedural. Thus, liberalism from the beginning was individualistic and intellectually based. Moreover, according to Russell (1996, 547), liberalism influenced the English eighteenth-century intellectuals, the founders of the American Constitution, and the French encyclopaedists.

Beginning with Rousseau, the foundation of individualism was soon extended from its intellectual base to the region of passion/emotion, which gave expression to the anarchic aspects of individualism better represented by Carlyle and Nietzsche (Russell 1996, 547). Consequent to the shift in the foundation, individualism emerged as a form of rebellion against popular culture or a challenge of established culture.³ It rejected every form of collectivism and institutionalism, religious, political, social or cultural. Hence individualism asserts the rights of each person to independence and self-determination (cf. Lukes, 1971, 46). This means the ability to choose their course according to their wishes and understanding without any interference of others.

Consequently, it is a duty to reject and resist the evil and oppressive government. Individualism rejects inherited social obligations and restrictions attached to the place of birth

³Russell (1996, 547) explains the nature and the extent of this rebellion. “Nineteenth-century revolt against the system of the Holy Alliance took two forms. On the one hand, there was the revolt of industrialism, both capitalist and proletarian, against monarchy and aristocracy; this was almost untouched by romanticism and reverted, in many respects, to the eighteenth century. This movement is represented by the philosophical radicals, the free-trade movement, and Marxian socialism. Quite different from this was the romantic revolt, which was in part reactionary, in part revolutionary. The romantics did not aim at peace and quiet, but at vigorous and passionate individual life. They had no sympathy with industrialism because was ugly, because money-grubbing seemed to them unworthy of an immortal soul, and because the growth of modern economic organizations interfered with individual liberty.”

or origin. Individualism embodies personal optimism, social mistrust, and a lack of interest in collective action (Spicker 2013, 5; cf. Russell 1996, 617). According to Lukes (1971, 47),

defenders of individualism refused to go back to a source higher than individual conscience.' They considered the individual as the centre and preached egoism, providing an ideological justification for the prevailing anarchy, especially in the economic and political spheres. The doctrine of individualism with its two sad deities [. . .] two creatures of reason - conscience and public opinion led to one political result: opposition to any attempt at the organization from a centre of direction for the moral interests of humanity, to hatred of power.

The rise of individualism came along with the rise of personal opinion over established truth, the rejection of absolutes, less emphasis on social unity and cultural/moral uniformity, disaffection of persons from the traditionally held views about the world, the system of meanings, and rejection of authority in religion, politics, and intellectual domain resulting to the crisis and loss of (religious) truth and belief.

1.4.6 The Crisis of Truth

The crisis of truth is perhaps apparent in its connection to the loss of authoritativeness in contemporary politics, which is expressed in the dilemma of what to believe or accept as authoritatively correct. The crisis is not unrelated to competing world views resulting in disagreements or contradictions on important issues and positions with grave consequences. Some of these issues are as old as humanity. There is no one answer to human nature, human destiny, origin, or the ultimate meaning of human life. The ideas of self-autonomy, freedom of expression, and freedom of conscience have led to scepticism, the loss of authority and rejection or denial of expert's knowledge. The vacuum left has enabled the flourishing of relativism, which has created a fertile ground for competing opinions that are conversed or shared as truths.

Public trust in the credibility of experts and authorities is low in many areas of public interests, for instance, in politics, religion, science, economy, and the media. The above situation is fuelled by misinformation and propaganda. It is crucial to note how this sort of misinformation or fake news touch on the sensibilities of the public, beginning from science, technology, religion and culture. It is a crisis because, as noted earlier, the lines separating truth and falsehood, facts and opinions are blurred by sentiments, so fact-checking does not immediately tell you where the truth lies. As a result, our natural virtues such as trust and sincerity are compromised. There immediately arises the need to diagnose some aspects of our current culture that are in a critical state and isolate them and determine the solutions.

First, there is a problem with some contemporary philosophical accounts of truth, which misunderstand the moral nature of the truth. Academic discussions of truth are far from real life, its metaphysical relation, and restricted to inference/logic and placeholder of reality. That is only a clue about how narrowly truth is understood or conceived so that what is missed or not stated or understated is significant and can be against the very truth itself. That is the case with half-truths or when the truth becomes a matter of personal convenience. The existence of objective truth is rejected, favouring a relativistic understanding or approach to the truth. Hence, it is difficult or impossible to see the current situation as a crisis.

Furthermore, the crisis might be missed or unnoticed because the demand for truth and its usage is hardly made in daily living. We take it for granted that truth exists. Moreover, in our daily interpersonal relations, we naturally expect to be told the truth, i.e., the facts, how things are. Now aside from these particular truths, there is the question about the Truth. The question of truth will usually arise in situations that entail a search, a questioning, and an inquiry about the state of an affair or what is/was the case. A testimony is then needed to separate the truth from falsehood. In which case, the search and recognition of truth is an external demand rather than the manifestation of integrity. However, the truth is crucial, not less, but more in everyday life and intellectual pursuit. Moreover, it is akin to philosophy, religion, and science.

What is truth or the nature of truth, the truth of the case, feature more in the disciplines mentioned above but especially in philosophy, where different and competing theories of truth have been propounded and debated for centuries. That indicates that we commonly know that such a thing exists as the truth. We acknowledge that truth is crucial, but philosophers disagree with what it is and how it should be construed or understood.

Such disagreements do not exist when it comes to recognising truth or the absence of truth and the need to disentangle truth from falsehood. Failure in this respect gives the problem of truth a moral charge. We are careful besides human error not to make truth by any form of rhetoric and description look like a lie and vice versa. A lie is the opposite of truth and a statement that does not correspond to any known fact. For instance, when persons make a declaration or promise without the intention of fulfilling it. The least consideration we can make of such a statement is that it is a fraud or deception. We are dealing with a crisis of lack of truth. Hence we are living in a Post-Truth Culture. The consequences are psychological and material due to the widespread culture of lying, fraud and covering up the truth. It weakens trust, spreads suspicion, and increases the burden and scope of vigilance and verification.

We want other persons to trust and believe what we say; in the same manner and for the same reasons that we want to trust and accept what they say. Trusting and believing are rationally based acts in the sense that we accept on trust the truth held by others because they are required by the same logic/rationality to accept the truth we hold on trust. When we have persons or authorities such as the state or institutions like the Church and experts such as scientists, we take their responsibilities and expectations of mutual reliability, integrity, and trust for granted. On the other hand, public awareness and involvement in the technicalities and intricacies of government, politics, economy, health policies and issues, finances, investments, manufacturing, and security are limited because of human limitations. Therefore, mutual dependency and especially trust is necessary between people for the proper functioning of society.

Sometimes it is assumed that a more educated, literate, and informed public capable of cross-checking facts will counter the crisis of truth. We do not doubt the contribution that an informed public can make in the struggle to delineate truth from falsehood. The assumption is based on the thought that the crisis of truth springs from error, misunderstanding, misplaced trust, and ignorance. That may be the case for the victims of lies, deception, and fraud. We may need to distinguish between errors arising from holding a particular view or theory, for instance, evolutionism, creationism, human nature, natural law, empiricism or idealism, realism, and so on, which can be corrected by education or persuasive arguments. They are generally matters of belief on commonly perceived facts that often generate different interpretations and intellectual disputes. A question may arise about the validity of a theory or claim, which most likely do not concern the specific character of the theorist and believer. The above issues may have no immediate moral bearing or connotation and relate to intellectual honesty and integrity. The supposition is that the intellect is made for the truth and nothing less than the truth is its satisfaction, even though it occasionally runs into error. Let us repeat to emphasise that truth is in itself, and its nature is commonly disputed, but there is no such disagreement about the need for truth and to separate it from falsehood.

Therefore, we distinguish moral depravity, the deliberate fabrication of lies to mislead on purpose and for some kind of benefit. Here we may ask questions about the honesty of a promise, the integrity of a manufactured product, the truth of an assertion or claim. The question raised relates directly to persons and their moral character or behaviour. In many instances, a person is deemed to have violated truth or lacks integrity. In extreme cases, like in the court of law, a person may be unworthy of bearing witness to the truth. The crisis is not about disputed truths or facts, for instance, whether the earth's surface is flat or

spherical/round. It is about the deliberate intent to confound/confuse and deceive the inquiring mind with lies. Thus, the moral overtone of the crisis of truth means that the solution is not merely about providing more information, education, or science.

The crisis of truth is partly moral weakness rather than merely the issue of less information or too little education in public culture. Given the level of literacy on the one hand and on the other hand, the contradictions, mistakes, and absurdities in society, the argument can be furthered with one more example. Again, consider simple rules like speed limit, driving under the influence of alcohol, or the dangers of too much alcohol intake and excessive smoking. Where a vice constitutes a problem or crisis may not be as a result of ignorance but as a result of weakness in the moral will of individuals.

Truth has consequences that make it a matter of public interest. Therefore, it is always in contention. In the liberal democratic culture of today, truth is up for debate, and the section of the public with the best and most arguments has it, or whichever side with the majority of votes has it. Thus, it is a matter of consensus. Hence, besides its epistemic value, truth as a virtue in the form of honesty, sincerity, and truthfulness is in crisis and risked being lost or abandoned in preference to falsehood.

It is difficult to critique or reject the democratic principle that the majority wins in issues of common interest that are in contention. However, there is no denying that the majority is occasionally wrong, if not often. Sometimes it is about having a voice to hold an option or belief, to judge, to decide for one's self in matters of importance that are contested for and conflated with other important values, for instance, the right to life and the right to abortion, or the practice of euthanasia and the obligation to save lives. Sometimes the principle of tolerance, freedom of conscience and expression are invoked to accommodate the wrong beliefs of others.

When truth becomes a matter of consensus, critical aspects of the notion of truth are undermined that deepen the crisis: its ontological or metaphysical relation and implication, the moral nature of truth, and the hierarchy of truths are all but lost. Expert knowledge and epistemic authority are ignored in the end. For example, climate change or the idea of saving the earth with whatever science and technology available at the moment; reaching consensus at every level to enable collective response and action to tackle a common threat to human existence and wellbeing should be the right thing to do. The issues may not be persuasive enough to make everyone act decisively. However, to throw such matters to vote for a decision is defeating even before the vote is cast. It is a vote between supposed few experts and (epistemic) authorities on one side and the public who make a democratic but uninformed

decision that becomes right or true if they are in the majority. To this extent, the crisis of truth was antecedent by the rejection of epistemic authority. Baggio (2012, 48) notes that,

Procedurally, the exercise of political power is not based on truth but on the opinion of the citizens. In reaching decisions at the national, regional, and local levels, the question is not whether the opinions of the citizens are true; just tally them. From this perspective, the logic of political decision making excludes concern for the truth so that conflicts can be resolved in a nonviolent fashion. If the various parties came to blow, each in the name of the truth that allows no compromise, there would be total deadlock and possibility of resolution. This is the justification for making decisions on the basis of majority rule. That being the case, there is no guarantee that the resulting decisions will be true, only that they were made without recourse to violence or war.

There is a widespread situation in which truth is separated from politics resulting from democracy favouring popular opinion or simply that which is in vogue. The current crisis is related to the scepticism of who and which institutions to rely on for expert truths. This type of knowledge is called 'social knowledge' in distinction from technical knowledge. This means knowing the integrity, values, qualities, material interest, virtues and vices associated with the institutions and their representatives and spoke-persons. That is important when subscribing to views on crucial issues that we know next to nothing or laypersons who may not know enough to know what opinion is right or wrong. Of course, that is neither technical nor scientific knowledge. It may not even count as knowledge of any kind. Nevertheless, nearly all knowledge and specific technical knowledge is held based on epistemic trust in others (cf. Zagzebski 2012, 63). If this undoubtedly means and constitutes valid knowledge (which we call social or religious), some difficulties arise, first, how to effectively formulate, deliver and justify the inclusion and acceptance of this knowledge in public culture.

Second, this kind of knowing tends to be subjective and based on the personal experiences of individuals, which differ from culture to culture and from religion to religion. Third, the uniformity and universality of these experiences are impossible to establish because the objects of experience do not only differ from culture to culture and from religion to religion but they are interpreted differently. Last, the subjective elements of this kind of knowledge make it undemocratic and susceptible to prejudice and bias. If such is the nature of social or religious knowledge, it is unlikely or impossible to achieve the requirement for being an objective and universal knowledge where reason or rationality alone is considered the only means to truth.

Attaining certainty about truth is complicated. The human mind is limited in comprehending reality as a whole. Besides, it is unlikely that everyone will reach or arrive at certain knowledge and apprehend the truth even when it seems obvious. Individual discrepancies concerning natural capacities mean that knowledge of facts and theories may not be sufficient to eliminate the crisis of truth. To reach certain knowledge of the truth and to

acquire true beliefs, we may have to trust and believe other people who are more knowledgeable than us in the areas that we are laypersons. Such interdependence and collaboration are the basis of social knowledge. The truth, therefore, is a system of interconnected beliefs. In this sense, the crisis of truth is understood not as a single crisis but a complex crisis comprising the crisis of social knowledge, institutions, trust, legitimacy, and authority. It may be better described as the crisis of culture. The abovementioned crises are not new. Many institutions and domains of learning have difficulties delivering the content of their expert knowledge due to credibility and legitimacy problems.

Given that the crisis of truth concerns institutions, their legitimacy, credibility and knowledge, the question may be asked, how religion enters into the crisis? The contemporary crisis of institutional credibility and legitimacy affecting institutions influences developments within and outside religion. In the case of developments outside religion, take the case of science. Many scientific discoveries about the world and life have rendered some religious truths and beliefs false, obsolete, and meaningless. The origin and purpose of religion are seen as one with Plato's conception of a 'Noble Lie' in *The Republic*. The impact includes the erosion of the plausibility of the Judeo-Christian myths, leading to nihilism that considers human life and the universe meaningless. The myths functioned as structures for construing religious truths and beliefs that gave meaning to existence and provided the metaphysical foundation for morality, religion, and politics. Without such a framework, people denied absolute standards and objective values leading to the loss of homogeneity that characterized premodern society. Consequently, religion's claim to have a straightforward entitlement to the notion of truth based on divine authority was rejected, leading to the loss of her place among the domains capable of generating accurate and useful/practical knowledge.

Furthermore, before the rise of science, theology and philosophy (that is, philosophy in the form of metaphysics) were special sciences with distinctive methods of cognition fully set up with their own methodological and logical tools. Theology and philosophy enjoyed that status until the modern era, when we saw them eclipsed by the rising influence of natural sciences and their subsequent rejection as sciences or domains of knowledge. There was a shift from a metaphysical mode of thinking to an empirical model corresponding with the shift from religious-based thinking to scientific-based thinking about reality. This shift means the rejection of natural human cognition, favouring a systematic and methodological procedure to the knowledge necessary to attain truth and eliminate doubt and error. Thus, attaining truth and certainty became a matter of method and process. The scientists, in turn, claimed that both theology and philosophy do not possess the methodological features and scholarly character

proper to science. The object of study in philosophy and theology is considered beyond the grasp of reason. The propositions of philosophy and theology are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable. They cannot be proven to be either true or false. “By this date, truth and dogma were not merely neglected; they were ridiculed” (Pattison 1991, 142). In this sense, the religious dimensions of the crisis of truth were precipitated by the philosophical and scientific positivism model with the overarching ambition to eliminate doubt and error in the process of human knowledge. That resulted in the conception of a narrow and exclusivist epistemological theory which dispensed with natural human faculties and centred on observations, categorization, and analysis of evidence, elements typical of the natural sciences. As we shall see, Newman formulates his most remarks about this approach. In the area of the natural sciences, the human being does not have to be, say, personally involved. The situation is entirely different when it comes to religion and morality.

1.5 Contemporary Discourse on Religion, Politics and Truth

1.5.1 The Relationship of Politics and Religion

To fully understand the impact of modernity on the relationship between politics and religion, it is important to sketch the history of this relationship, even if briefly. An interest in religion characterises human history. The presence of religion among many people is evidence of this interest. The pre-occupation of philosophy with religion from ancient to contemporary times is another strong indication of this interest. The more significant part of human history and philosophy have seen philosophy and religion converge until modern times. Philosophy set itself practical ends, ends proper to religion. Zdybicka (1991, 25) asserts, “During this period, philosophizing was pursued almost exclusively in connection with religious knowledge; philosophy performed a service function to theology (*ancilla theologiae*).” According to Jordan (2005), for Plato and his academy, “The work of philosophy is thus to lead soul out the snares of sensory and especially political illusion so that they may begin to participate in the divine.” However, history has shown that the relationship of religion with philosophy has not always being cordial or without conflict.

From the pre-Socratic times to the present, religion has never been without her critics, sceptics or agnostics, and above all, atheists who reject religion entirely (Zdybicka 1991, 8-9). Nevertheless, religion has flourished and has been closely connected with culture and, in particular, politics. Hence, religion and politics interact and occupy the same headspace as separate institutions. However, how connected is a religion with politics and what is the basis

of this relationship? First, there is a proper and real relation between religion and politics. The relation is such that we speak of distinction rather than a separation between religion and politics. Religion and politics are anthropologically connected that is, they find their meeting point in the human person who is both oriented towards the spiritual and the religious, and at the same time towards the social and the political. Hence, every religious system and political theory are based and influenced by a specific vision or theory of the human person.

It is crucial to return to the classical notions of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas because when we consider what they have to say on the idea of religion and politics, we find an interesting parallel and an underlying relation between these concepts. In his treatment of the virtues in the *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas closely followed Aristotle. For Aristotle and Aquinas, religion was not a system of beliefs and practices as generally understood today, but religion was a natural virtue, to be precise, a moral virtue. Likewise, politics like religion springs from man's nature. Therefore, we could rightly say that man is a political and religious animal.

In line with this thought, religion and politics embody the human person's religious and social/political aspects. These aspects are part of nature and personal qualities that need to be integrated and perfected by practice (habituation). Hence, they are considered as virtues. Again, virtue has long been thought to belong to the domain of religion and morality. For Aquinas, virtue is said to be a habit when acquired. It perfects the person who possesses it. Besides, Aristotle and Aquinas agree that human beings and, indeed, all things possess an inherent power that inclines them towards a particular end. In other words, everything is inbuilt with a sense of *telos* or is oriented towards an end. MacIntyre (2007, 184) notes that "the *telos* of man as a species [...] determines what human qualities are virtues." In Aristotle, this teleological movement must be directed to the perfection of the entity or the perfection of the species to which it belonged. As it turns out, human beings are naturally inclined to politics, religion, and science. Aquinas adopted Aristotle's belief that the world of nature is good and intelligible, and whatever is made by nature is good. In this sense, both politics, science, and religion have their end in the perfection of man. It is important to note that religion, science, and politics develop or perfect different aspects of man, and one cannot be substituted by the other. In other words, they are perfective of the human person and society. In particular, about religion Walz (2019, 38) says it is "a human perfection imperfectly realized in any given individual." The virtue of religion and politics is a means to an end and not ends in themselves (cf. MacIntyre 2007, 184). In our contemporary time, politics lack any sense of *telos* because the sense of *telos* was suspended in modernity (the prevalence of the efficient cause over

against the final cause). As a result, both religion and politics can easily be turned into mere instruments of domination and control.

The separation between religion and politics arises from historical and human experience and the negative consequence of mixing them. It is a constant temptation to use religion to pursue political ends. Hence, keeping them distinct does not rule out a healthy interaction between religion and politics. The discourse on the place of religion in contemporary times is a question about the value and function of religion. Moreover, it addresses the vital issue of religion in politics. This question is different but not unrelated to the questions of the truth claims of religion as the sole means of salvation besides being the bond of society, the moral guide, conscience of society and, therefore, shaping individual and national identity and character. It may be argued that there is something fundamentally lacking when an individual or community are irreligious. Nevertheless, there exist truths of ends relations between politics and religion. Both religion and politics aided by faith and reason can progressively identify these ends and probe further into the contemporary culture, which seems to be present in the world's architecture, as a mark of progress.

The causes responsible for widening the gap and antagonism between religion, politics, and truth are various and a deeper consideration of which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, it can be said that the rising influence of science and theories such as naturalism, scientism, and liberalism were key factors in this process of separation and compartmentalization without due reference to their relationship with each other. However, this is not exclusively the problem of religion, politics or truth. The other crucial pre-condition for the modern relationship between politics, truth, and religion was the emergence of a conception of politics (for example, political doctrines such as Marxism, Socialism, and Communism) in terms of beliefs and practices that entail projecting a worldview contrary and antagonistic to religion. John Paul II notes that “[t]his is the direction taken by doctrines which have lost the sense of transcendent or which are explicitly atheist” (*Splendour of Truth*, no.32).

The Enlightenment Movement began the epistemological shift in human understanding that was completed by modernity in which we saw the inauguration of reason as the supreme and *de facto* judge of actual knowledge across all disciplines, even in religious matters. The switch towards the subjective (consciousness), the existential, phenomenological, the moral and language (linguistic and semiotic analysis) in philosophy showed that the reductionist tendency that characterized modern philosophy in connection with epistemology was a sort of weakness and limitation that could be diversified and turned to a complex whole. Philosophical investigations have expanded to economic and political spheres to include

interest in scientific and technological themes as philosophy expands its scope of inquiry. However, the emphasis on specialization and particularity of each field of knowledge has led to the separation and autonomy, resulting in rivalry, competition, and the tendency of one discipline to dominate others. The relation between sciences or disciplines is gradually severed, giving way to an endless cycle of contestation that makes sharing of knowledge and interdependence (of research issues and results) strenuous, if not impossible.

The independence of many disciplines (such areas today considered as Social Sciences, Humanities and Natural Sciences) has rendered philosophy less important. Ironically, philosophy first regained its independence from theology and paved the way for other sciences. The rising influence of science as an independent source of knowledge resulted in a clash with religion that diminished its influence, but not without consequences. Maryniarczyk (2015, 23) explains in clear words the consequence of the conflict in these words:

Reason itself perishes under the rubble of destruction of realistic philosophy. Hence in an age of great scientific discoveries, we are witness to the return in both philosophy and in the science of various forms of Gnosticism, irrationalism, astrology, soothsaying, wizards, and so-called miracle workers and healer. All this finds fertile ground in philosophy that is defenceless, sterilized by a post-positivistic cult of reason that is seen in the positioning of reason prior to being and above being. The reason as thus conceived returns to itself, and in its action and in the products of this action it wants to discover the ultimate end-goal of its life and to discover the source of truth.

Therefore, beginning from the Modern period, speculative and naturalistic theories of history and secular society emerged (such as those expressed in John Locke, Rousseau and Darwin). These theories gradually gained acceptance and overshadowed the theological opinions of history and human society.⁴ The above scenario serves to deepen the antagonism towards the truth claims of religion (cf. Mondin, 1991, 382).

Consequently, there are apparent or marked differences in the contemporary conceptualization of religion and politics compared to the Middle Ages and Early Modern times. The meaning and usage of the terms or concepts have evolved along with Modernity. The relationship between religion and politics has inevitably changed, likewise the

⁴ According to David Charles (2005), “After the thirteenth century Aristotle came to represent the status quo in philosophy and science, and to be identified with dogmatic resistance to further speculation and scientific discovery. Naturally, critics arose: in Oxford, William of Ockham and in Paris, Jean Buridan and Albert of Saxony amongst others. By the end of the fourteenth century, they had (like Philoponus before them) criticized Aristotle’s dynamics and the astronomical theories constructed on this basis. The way was open for Copernicus and Galileo to undermine these parts of Aristotle’s physical theories. Perhaps the nadir of this Aristotelianism was reached when Cremonini, a leading Aristotelian in Padua, refused to look through Galileo’s telescope because he suspected that what he saw would conflict with his own theories. In the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon, Galileo and Boyle developed more general attacks against Aristotelianism, accusing it of a resistance to scientific method and empirical observation. Hobbes complained of Aristotle’s continuing influence with considerable vehemence. ‘I believe that scarce anything can be more absurdly said in natural philosophy than that which is now called Aristotle’s Metaphysics... nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethics (*Leviathan* IV. xlv).”

relationship of religion and politics to the truth. The contemporary conceptualization of these two spheres of our lives will inevitably result in conflict. They are often pitched as separate and competing authorities over law, culture, morality, governance/control and knowledge/truth. In many democracies today, this has resulted in the separation of religion and politics or Church and State and the deliberate effort to reduce or remove the influence of religion and Church in public spaces altogether. In the public discourse on religion and politics, there is the recurrent view that they are not only separate but mutually exclusive phenomena.

1.5.2 Religion and Secular Constitution

The constitution of many secular democracies merely accords recognition to religion(s) without adopting any as an official religion of the state. This stance often raises the question or controversy of religion's constitutional and moral role in politics. In making political choices and in public debates, should appeal to religious reason supersede secular reason and vice versa? (Perry 1997). However, secularization has meant a calculated and determined effort to reduce the influence of religion in decision-making processes and shape contemporary society's face. Hence, politics and religion are locked in perpetual conflict and struggle for supremacy.

In the last two centuries, the interaction of religion and politics has been dotted with conflict and violence ranging from destruction and desecration of sacred places to full-scale persecution, suppression or annihilation, and hate crimes directed against some religious groups or individuals. Religion was responsible for many acts of violence and conflicts when and where religious groups controlled power. The reverse is the case in the current context. Political authorities, with some exceptions, are more likely and have committed violence against religious groups.

Many consider religion divisive and counterproductive (cf. Fox 2018, 196). Disenchantment with religion was at its peak in the last century, and many thinkers predicted its demise (Harris 2010, 187). The prediction was based on the continued and sustained progress in science and the conceptualization of science and religion as rival domains in producing knowledge and source of truth and value. Each discovery of science renders one or more claims of religion obsolete. In truth claims, it is a matter of faith versus facts. Facts amount to the truth. Revealed truths make no sense (Hanson 2006, 11). Notwithstanding, religion remains a source of influence. Current scholarship and statistical data worldwide on

religion strongly suggest that religion will continue to have geopolitical consequences for many centuries to come (Harris 2010, 187).

1.5.3 The Conflict between Religion and Politics

The resurgence of faith in contemporary time has led to a renewed and sustained interest in the intricate, complex and historically rich relationship between religion, politics and truth. This is happening in the context of secularism and liberalism, two theoretical forces that continue to dominate large portions of the world (cf. Hanson 2006, 6-7).

Religion and politics are two fronts that the challenges of secularism and liberalism continue to impact, thereby changing society's face. There is no shortage of perspectives and solutions to the challenges posed by the intricate relationship between religion and politics. Depending on the time and place, it has been both turbulent and calm, peaceful and antagonistic, exclusive and mutual. Hence, the tension between religion and politics is not peculiar to contemporary times. Friction and conflict bordering on religion and politics have created instability among many nations (Burleigh, 2005). That should not be completely surprising or out of place. Religion and politics are distinct but have overlapping domains and have a common interest and goals in many areas like belief, loyalty, authority, morality, power, law and order, control, and knowledge (Fox 2018, 201; cf. Lease 1994). Of course, there are also marked differences. Nevertheless, on a closer look, the problem is not unrelated to the emerging political development in the contemporary world.

In comparison, religion's primary concern is the spiritual needs of the human person, the realm of values, meaning, and morals. Politics is concerned with the temporal needs of the human person in society and cannot be said to be indifferent to religion. Politics is about influence or power and the means of securing and sustaining them. On these bases, religion and politics are distinct, but the distinctions do not rule out mutual interest, cooperation and even conflict. Newman grasps and expresses the problem in these words: "The very same persons and the very same things belong to two supreme jurisdictions at once so that the Church cannot issue any order, but it affects the persons and the things of the State; nor can the State issue any order, without its affecting the persons and things of the Church. The very matters which in one aspect are supernatural, in another are secular" (*Diff.*, I, 173).

Interference is resisted, and neutrality in the public sphere is advocated as the ideal enforced by law and not due to cultural evolution. That has come to mean eliminating religion in the public domain and the confinement of religion to the private domain. Consequently, religion is not necessarily connected with public morality but may exercise authority among

its adherence. However, if beliefs inspire actions or are sources and reasons for action, can we hold private beliefs that are the sources or reasons for public actions? (cf. Himmelfarb 1999, 75-90).

The extent to which this denotes the rejection of objective truth is the direct influence and consequence of modernity/liberalism. In effect, the disappearance of religion in the public area and the separation of religion and politics bring the inevitable: removal of truth in the public area and the elimination of truth in politics (Rourke 2010). Of course, this has long been the case that truth and politics are no match, and the same goes with religion and politics. However, the moment the blanket of relativism covers truth and politics, truth becomes a matter of perspective and, at best, a matter of consensus. According to Burleigh (2005, 14 – 15), this development raises important questions:

Can any nation/state survive without a consensus on values that transcend special interests and which are non-negotiable in the sense of Here we stand? Can a nation/state survive that is only a legal and political shell or a market state for discrete ethnic or religious communities that share little by way of common values other than the use of the same currency? Can a society survive that is not the object of commitments to its core values or a focus for the fundamental identities of all its members?

The loss of faith precipitated the fall out of politics from ethics and the separation of politics from the truth; consequently, the low descend of politics to the pursuit of raw power. That has the further consequence of relegating knowledge to the acquisition of the means to secure, safeguard and expand such power, in the process of which both religion and ethics are put aside as obstacles. It was a wrong turn of development in the historical relationship between religion, politics, morality and truth.

That forms the background of the reoccurring conflicts and contests between religion and politics and the challenge of the role of religion in politics (cf. Hanson 2006). That relates to the identity and nature of society, its constitutional status, the necessity and utility of religion and the rationally acceptable limits of its functions and influence in the society or State. Seen against this background, the contest for establishing truth and access to it, religion and politics are not easily dissociated. According to Lease (1994, 159), ideologically, religion and politics are overly

distinct objects in a post-structuralist world behind which lie an onto-theology and meta-ontology (or metaphysics). Bluntly stated, religion is always ideology, though not all ideology is religion. Confusing religion and politics are akin to confusing religion and theology. Like politics, religion is thus an act of contestation and struggle: what gets to count as religion (and politics) is determined by the location, time and complexity of relationships.

Mixing religion and politics or philosophy and theology will result in a misconception of their relationship. Such misconceptions create identity confusion that gives rise to

interference, the struggle for dominance and control, and the view that religion is an instrument for political goals and vice versa. In line with this thinking Machiavelli (as cited in Lease 1994, 159) asserted that “it is, therefore, the duty of the princes and heads of republics to uphold the foundations of the religion of their countries, for then it is easy to keep their people religious, and consequently well-conducted and united.”

The utilitarian view of religion in politics gave rise to a political religion by Thomas Hobbes in his *Leviathan* and was followed by developing the concept of political theology. Himmelfarb (1999, 73) asserts that “[t]he symbiotic tie between religion and politics may be seen as a trademark of this development, which in such a distinct form represented something completely new.” Many years after Thomas Hobbes, Abraham Lincoln (as cited Lease 1994, 180) asserted that “a political religion is necessary to enable society to hold together the natural frame of its physical and social environment. Without a relationship between God and the political leader that runs parallel to and even is the basis for the relationship between this leader and the people he leads, then a division and eventual destruction of that society are unavoidable.” However, the usefulness of religion to politics as a basis to forge a political ideology, national unity, and its ability to create and sustain social cohesion with the strongest emotions makes religion exploitable by political actors with a totalitarian/populist motive for political legitimacy. This is characteristic of contemporary theocratic states and National Socialism and Communism, whereby the political is completely “subsumed by the theological and vice versa” (Lease 1994, 138). Therefore, politics and religion are reduced to ideological conflicts for power which pervades and dominates modernity beginning from the Reformation onward during which the “contestation had nothing to do with truth, right and wrong, but rather only with the most profound level of ideological struggle: that is, it always a question of life and death, of survival” (Lease 1994, VI).

1.5.4 Religion in Politics

The presence of religion in history alongside different forms of government and its function, place and role make the discourse of religion in politics meaningful. It is even crucial in the present context of its resurgence, influence and expansion in developing nations in shaping local and international politics/relations. The contemporary discourse on religion and politics appreciate the significance of studying religion partly to comprehend the nature of politics. Therefore, it is important to attend to politics in studying religion. However, politics and religion interact at different levels. The existing context of each nation dictates the interaction. Hence, what constitutes religion on the one hand and politics on the other are

objects of varying definitions from different perspectives. This, of course, determines whether or not religion has any legitimate role to play in the public sphere.

Politics may be broadly referred to as any form of an organized social relation that involves exercising civil power and recognising offices and roles in a given society. In a strict sense, politics refers to how a given society is organized, maintained, and directed by its institutions through legitimate authority to attain common goal/good. Depending on time and form of government, the obvious political institutions in our contemporary time include parliaments, legislatures, judiciaries, monarchies, and ministries. In addition, politics includes organizations or institutions such as the various security agencies and courts that are not political institutions but vital organs of political society.

In the last two centuries, many nations/states have emerged from monarchy, aristocracy, dictatorship, theocracy to mostly democracy that involves the principle of separation of powers and political participation of all adult citizens. This makes it possible to speak of civil societies, political parties, interest groups, unions, political movements, and various associations that function as a means or mechanisms for mass mobilization to pursue specific interests such as power, influence or representation in government.

The forces of social change such as migration, globalization and economy have gradually transformed many homogeneous societies into religiously pluralistic and multi-cultural societies bringing diverse cultural and religious groups within proximity resulting in the competition of scarce resources. Totalitarian states often reacted to such conflicts by suppressing elements responsible for such conflicts, while liberal democratic states adopted the principles of toleration, secularization, and disestablishment. Disagreements are resolved through negotiation, dialogue and settlement before they aggravate the violent conflict.

On the other hand, there are different religions, but one religion often has varying forms. This also makes it possible to talk of different sects of a particular religion, religious movements, associations, pious societies and organizations with local, regional and international structures of varying influence. Within this context, religion has become an object of interest, and it is being investigated from different perspectives ranging from sociological, political, economic, psychological, comparative, historical, archaeological, and philosophical to scientific (Jonathan Fox 2018, 5). There is no universally accepted definition of religion that captures all its aspects and expressions that may be acceptable to the adherents of various religions.

However, religion generally refers to institutionalized social arrangements, events and activities that embody and express a human relationship with the supernatural or some form

of expression of transcendence. Broadly speaking most commonly recognized activities of religions include prayers, sacrifice, fasting, worship, and pilgrimage. For the present purposes, the interest is on bodies and institutions peculiar to religions such as shrines, churches, synagogues, temples, and mosques. In addition, most organized religions host religiously based organizations with interest in politics, economy, and science and, therefore, may be closely linked with politics. This may include religious movements and professional bodies that seek political relevance to influence public policies.

The interactions between politics and religion are subject to different organizational bodies and activities that make up each institution and are further determined by each institution's interests and belief systems. Some of these relationships in terms of depth or range may be described as being at arm's length, formal transactions, such as diplomatic negotiations between heads of state and heads of religious bodies, while others are informal and thus harder to conceptualize and characterize. Notwithstanding the long history of conflicts and violence, religion serves and interacts with politics in many ways, including the adversarial role and, notably, a critic. Religion is used to organize and mobilize protests or opposition to bad policies and actions of regimes/governments. The involvement of religion in such protests and opposition is based on the belief that it provides higher values and principles concerning morality and the overall human wellbeing, vision and progress. Thus, the attempt to exclude religion from public life is vehemently resisted.

Religion and politics are also known as allies and foes, unwilling co-operators or accomplices, or a tool in the hands of one or the other. Disagreements between politics and religion have attracted interest in the past and the present. Religion and politics' aspirations, passions, and interests are close enough to make them rivals and thus generate conflicts and competition. One of such areas of contention is morality and closely connected to morality are issues of conscience and law. These are the provinces that politics and religion may have or claim to have the right to speak and determine. It is problematic when both appeal to different and contradictory sets of values and authority in determining such issues as abortion, euthanasia, population control, and birth control. Religion appeals to higher principles and values that transcend profit/utility, convenience and expedience in determining issues.

On the other hand, politics may contend that the issues are technical, scientific, and public policy or national interest. This is problematic for religion in contemporary liberal societies where politics and the State look inward or within themselves for legitimacy. Contemporary politics appeals to the secular moral reason for its justification rather than appeals to a high authority outside and above itself.

However, democratic systems of representation ensure that discontents and grievances are addressed, and wishes are expressed through concordats, consensus, legal agreements, negotiated settlements, court injunctions/rulings, and through the ballot box. This reduces the likelihood of violent conflicts and revolutions but draws religion into politics, prompting heightened interaction levels that continue to generate interest. It raises the fundamental question of the foundations of politics and the relationship between politics and religion. It is often presumed that the state's constitution should suffice for such a foundation.

The emphasis in contemporary discourse on religion is on identifying, isolating and describing the historical, psychological and anthropological origins of the beginning and development of religions. This is based on the assumption that religion is circumstantial and undoubtedly a human phenomenon. Therefore, it can be examined and explained under the category of human existence and experience. The method of studying religion is not different from other human phenomena, which require the adoption or construction of theoretical models of the beginnings and developmental processes of any religion and testing these models against concrete examples. The study of religions and contemporary discourse on religion has been influenced and fuelled by a concern to identify its role, function, and place or necessity in society (Lease, 1994, p. 134; Perry 1997). The consideration has often produced conflicting and contradictory results because there is no commonly acceptable perspective or ground to study religion. However, the context in which this discourse is happening is understandably curious and important. This situation brings to the fore the question of not only what is the role of religion in politics but the true identity of liberal/secular democratic society in which religion continues to retain a significant degree of influence.

A significant reason for the turn towards religion is the common acknowledgement by such scholars like Alasdair MacIntyre (1988), Joseph Ratzinger, Johann Baptist Metz and in particular Jürgen Habermas (as cited by Rourke 2010) of the inability of secular moral reason to comprehensibly defend and support the core moral commitment of modernity's project.

The secularization project of modernity to expunge from our political and social culture any trace of religious sentiments, as an expression of the spirit of the times, that is, the triumph of reason has only resulted in confusion and conflict (Fox 2018, 170-175). Despite the so-called triumph of reason, we can hardly attend to any issue with clarity, certainty and consensus, even fundamental issues like rights and life. It should have been the case that, with the full deployment of reason, clarity of thought, diffusion of conflicts and directing politics to focus on means agreed upon ends, not to be so much a problem. However, to the contrary, the predominant trend is disillusionment. As a result, democracy has failed to take firm roots

in many states despite celebrating democratic victory worldwide. People have become apathetic towards politics and democracy. In many democracies, it is difficult to galvanise half of the electorate to participate in political activities and democratic elections. The problem touches the very foundation of politics, law, government, culture, and religion and what constitutes the basis of society (Rourke 2010, 1-3).

However, Ratzinger, Habermas and Mertz differ in their attempt to proffer a common solution to the crisis of modernity (as cited in Eggemeier 2011, 1-14). Habermas stresses the significance of the moral resources and foundations of religion, particularly the Judeo-Christian religion, in the endeavour to recover the lost emancipatory commitments of modernity's project. Habermas (as cited by Eggemeier 2011, 1-14) further notes:

Egalitarian universalism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and social solidarity, of an autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, of the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct heir of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of continual critical appropriation and reinterpretation. To this day, there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we continue to draw on the substance of this heritage. Everything else is just idle postmodern talk.

The endeavour informs Habermas' reliance on this heritage to secularize the moral intuitions of the Judeo-Christian tradition in order to render their moral commitment into a rationally comprehensible language to non-believers.

Ratzinger and Mertz share the concern of Habermas on the vital relationship between the Christian heritage and the political culture of Western Europe. Nevertheless, that is as far as they can go in their interaction on the relationship between faith and reason and religion and politics in a post-secular society. Ratzinger and Mertz criticized secular moral reason and the foundation of politics and democracy as too abstract and formal while pointing to the importance of recovering the tradition-dependent form of reason embodied in the Judeo-Christian heritage to restore the authority of moral reason. Furthermore, Ratzinger and Mertz have pointed out that deliberate accounts of democracy are relativistic. Hence the crucial need to fashion out an authority above the procedural system of democracy as a non-relativist foundation for the State (Eggemeier 2011, 1-14).

In a similar trajectory of thoughts, John Paul II (*Centesimus Annus* 1991, no. 46-48) notes that when the spiritual foundation of politics and democracy is removed, we can be pushed forward and backwards endlessly in any direction without consistency. This is because religion, an essential part of the social order and a vital part of the moral order, is neglected/ignored or rejected with the further attempt to replace it with something else.

1.5.5 Truth and Politics

Arendt (2006, 128) notes that “No one has ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other, and no one, as far as I know, has ever counted truthfulness among the political virtues. Lies have always been regarded as necessary and justifiable tools not only of the politician and the demagogue but also of the statesman trade.” Politics for long has been associated with mendacity, disinformation, manipulation, and being at odds with the truth. Post-truth has been used to characterise politics in recent times, implying a new phenomenon in the conflict between truth and politics. The seemingly irreconcilable relationship between truth and politics is not new. Historically, truth and politics have endured a complicated and conflicting relationship that excludes each other and stretches back in time to Socrates.

The search for truth and meaning in an actual historical situation that often captivates the individual mind and conscience naturally strikes a universal code that turns it into broader relevance and value in society. It will also naturally prompt the existential question of the truth not just for the individual mind and conscience but for the community at this historical moment and place. However, it is not always the case that a truth grasped and communicated by an individual mind and conscience should become a matter of public acceptance. The truth is seemingly set in conflict against politics or political authority.

Socrates was a victim of the conflict between the truth and political authority in Athens. Socrates was found guilty and condemned to die or to embark on exile. A simple majority delivered the verdict of jurists who attended his trial. In detailing the trial, Plato presented the conflict of truth in politics, showing opinion's leading role in convicting and executing Socrates. Plato emphasises certain principles; true or false, an opinion does not share the same level of certainty with the truth, which is certain knowledge; the truth is not attained by tallying opinions as a matter of consensus. (Brickhouse 1989, 121). By choosing to die rather than go to exile, Socrates demonstrated in the words of Baggio (2012, 46) that “where the choice is between truth and falsehood, compromise is not possible because the truth does not allow for bargaining.” However, contemporary democratic politics runs contrary to this Socratic norm of life.

At the trial of Socrates, opinions were tallied to achieve a specific purpose, that is, the condemnation of Socrates. Plato further emphasizes that dialectic, which is the art of searching for truth, was replaced by rhetoric, the art of persuasion, to effectively condemn Socrates, thereby setting historical precedence that would be repeated in contemporary democratic practice. This allows the state to displace the truth with falsehood by simply tallying opinions

through procedural democracy that endorses the majority's desire as true/right even if it is false (Baggio 2012, 47). Therefore, democracy has become a potent instrument in the hands of the State in the determination of truth. Baggio (2012, 47) further explains that:

The state would be able then to embrace a lie officially if it is useful for achieving its ends. Even Plato agreed that officials could lie for the good of their subjects, emphasizing that what is inadmissible in philosophy can be effective in politics. Hobbes's point is that the state is the one thing truly necessary for maintaining order and guaranteeing security in the life of its citizens. For Hobbes, politics is a function of life regardless of how it may be conducted, whereas, for Socrates, a life deprived of truth is not worth living. From Hobbes's point of view, truth and politics are clearly separate, and politics is interested in truth only when it becomes a problem of public order. Therefore, the lie in politics is often justified as the lesser evil. People are lied to for their own good and to avoid recourse to more violent means of persuasion. On that basis, truth and politics belong to two different orders that never communicate.

Consequently, the existence, legitimacy and exercise of political authority are not based on truth but the opinion of citizens. Democratic procedures for making political decisions and political choices have very little concern for truth. If the latter is the case, perhaps we should add; as on defective value independent of human whims and political expediency. The primary concern is where the majority of opinion lies (and not where the truth lies) in the event of discord about the truth. Hence, a compromise must be reached that simply avoids conflict as a political solution and becomes the yardstick for making decisions and choices as the basis of majority rule. The concern is to decide without recourse to violence even if, in the process, truth is compromised (cf. Baggio 2012, 48)

There are merits and demerits of this position. No attempt is formally made to claim as true the decision of the majority beyond the recognition that this is the wish of the majority of citizens. At the same time, this position evades the admission of a truth, which may impose itself and exclude each person's liberty to hold fast to a freely sought and chosen truth. However, there are significant lapses or weaknesses to this strategy. The limit or restriction placed on reason leads to doubt on the power of human reason in attaining certain knowledge/truth. This expression of no confidence or doubt on human reason is extended to human nature and a further scepticism of its relational aspect.

Consequently, truth is made to become a matter of individual preference and choice. What is true is restricted to the private sphere. At this level, truth is relative and lacks universal application and value. Nevertheless, that situation gives individuals the license to freely determine common truths that are not recognized or acknowledged as objective/universal truths. Truth becomes a construct and a product of consensus. This is a conjectural truth forged and attained by an agreement.

This differs from the dialectical search for truth that leads to the discovery of truths that are not hypothetical. Searching for the truth does not necessarily imply agreement or

consensus with everyone who might differ but shows how truth may be commonly reached or attained within a community. This approach allows for the exercise of mutual correction and progress in reaching and accepting the objective truth freely personally and communally sought by persons within a community. This personal and communal search and acknowledgement of truth are currently held to stand apart or be contradictory. As a result, political theorists simply choose any one of the two. However, only by keeping together these two dimensions of the search for truth can a proper base for a democratic and political ideal be built and made to stand. The disregard of this constitutes the problem of contemporary politics and democracy. Modern democracy upholds the value and dignity of the individual but simultaneously acknowledges the power of the majority alongside what has been described as the foundational authority on which the political and democratic state/society rests. “This is the totality of the universally accepted principles on which the political society is based and which are generally expressed in the state Constitution or other documents of similar importance” (Baggio 2012, 48).

Indeed, there are some principles commonly held by all that can be identified (Carr 1996, 98). According to the Cardinal, these principles found deep down in human innermost self are the primary and deeply rooted ideas we hold about things in general, commonly applied in personal judgments and actions. Therefore, Newman classified them as first principles because they form the basis on which individuals or a community construct their worldviews (*GA*, 44; cf. *DD*, 5. II. 9). Carr (1996, 97-99) further explains that “In *abstracto*, first principles may obtain universal validity, but once they enter individual minds they receive unique treatment according to differences in the range, flexibility and imaginative capacity of the minds in which they reside. [...] By the same token, they have a common, universal validity and do not simply reflect the temper of particular minds.” These principles cannot be denied without some form of contradiction. Baggio (2012, 49) asserts that

[t]hese principles are kept alive by the many cultural traditions that contribute to the foundation of the political society. In this process, all the subsequent laws voted on by a particular majority should be confronted with the founding values, and, if there is conflict, they should be modified. The values of the foundational authority were, in fact, acknowledged as true. They can be reread, reinterpreted, and brought up-to-date, but not suppressed unless there is a conscious desire to change the nature of that society itself.

These principles ran parallel to natural law as separate from the power of the majority or any form of government and were commonly accepted as foundational authority that sits above every other authority, could not be violated. This was primarily the effect of Christian influence on politics which was extended to the early formation of democratic states as expressed in their constitutions, in which truth and politics were kept together. However, this

tradition has long changed as politics and the state turned inward to find legitimacy and justify their power and existence through democracy, which empowers politics and the state to construct their truths and discard any truth. Through social and political consensus, the State has the power to independently determine the moral principles underlying political and democratic processes without reference to any superior authority outside it.

Early democratic politics, in contrast to contemporary democratic politics, was aware of its needs for truth, but also it recognized its limitations and subordination to truth outside itself. Politics could not decide or construct truth for itself but freely choose and adapt it based on recognising that truth has primacy and authority over it. However, contemporary politics ignores or rejects the primacy and authority of truth that finds expression in the majority's will to decide for itself not necessarily what is right and true but what it wants. This has the effect of privatizing and relativizing truth by opening up the possibility of persons empowered by law to choose or make their truths and values (Baggio 2012, 49). In this circumstance, the truth can be twisted, denied, modified, and manipulated or made to sound like a lie. This situation is described as post-truth (McIntyre 2019, Lockie 2017, Block 2019, Kalpokas 2019).

The concept of post-truth was the focus in a publication by Ralph Keyes (2004) titled, *The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception in Contemporary Life*, in which he offered a broader social critique of the lack of sincerity and the prevalence of deceit in contemporary society. A year later, Harry G. Frankfurt (2005), in his essay *On Bullshit*, offers a similar critique of modern society/life. However, the term Post-truth is increasingly used to describe the contemporary era (McIntyre 2019, Lockie 2017, Block 2019, Kalpokas 2019). The close association of post-truth with populist politics and new communication technologies, coupled with the understanding of it as manipulative and relying on half-truths and misrepresentation, give post-truth the status of being both familiar and strange, old and new. Post-truth has the status of being familiar and strange, old and new because it represents or is used to describe a way of living and speaking that Newman calls the real and unreal words. The existentialists describe a similar situation using authentic and inauthentic living (cf. Kłos 2021, 133-139). However, according to Yilmaz (2019, 240), this does not undermine the fact that “there are still differences between old-style lies and conspiracies, and post-truth manipulation.”

1.5.6 The Concept of Post-Truth

According to McIntyre (2019, 123 -125), post-truth has its remote origin within the academic discussions at universities and colleges concerning the “standard of evidence, critical thinking, scepticism, and cognitive bias” but in connection with postmodernists’

approach that questioned everything and took nothing at face value and ended up in perspectivism that denied the possibility of objective truth and indirectly attacking evidence-based thought. However, the emergence of post-truth as the word of the year in 2016 and its definition was meant to describe the kind of political rhetoric known today as post-truth politics. Hopkin and Rosamond (2017) describe the contemporary context in which post-truth emerged as a word of the year as, “The rise of populist and anti-elite movements, and the rejection of basic principles of reason and veracity characteristic of much of their political discourse.”

Post-truth highlights a new form of politics and relationship between politics and truth that is the combination of all that was traditionally known as political lies, mendacity, political spin, with manipulation and exploitation of passions through the power of rhetoric to win arguments and consequently electoral votes and endorsement rather than the use of logic/reason and evidence. Post-truth is a form of rhetoric or reasoning that deliberately targets the audience's emotions rather than the facts or the evidence of the matter in consideration (cf. Suiter (2016, 17-25; Hopkin and Rosamond (2017, 2)).

Post-truth entails a conscious and deliberate manner of speaking and acting or relating with the truth that is in disagreement with the facts of the situation or disregard of evidence but not without an interior motif. Hence, the emotions are specifically targeted to stir a reaction from the crowd that will change the facts about a lie (McIntyre 2019, 3-9). Post-truth rhetoric, therefore, might not outrightly deny the truth or reject facts and evidence, but it will blur the distinction between true and false with consequences that exceed those caused by political lies on democratic politics (cf. Zerilli 2020, 4). According to Kalpokas (2019, 12-13)

Any claims that post-truth consists of ‘misrepresentations at best, and at worst, lies’, even including a routinisation of blatant lies ... are somewhat simplistic since the idea of a ‘lie’ is itself anachronistic in the post-truth environment. [...] Hence, the prefix ‘post-’ does not indicate that we have moved to ‘beyond’ or ‘after’ truth as such but that we have entered an era where the distinction between truth and lie is no longer important; hence, we had also moved beyond an era when a consensus about the content of truth was possible.

In political lies, the distinction between true and false still holds, but in post-truth, the difference between true and false is erased. In a sense, it is a cognitive manipulation; hence, a post-truth actor like a populist’s politician cannot be easily indicted for lying because he/she has succeeded in destroying the very idea of truth (cf. Jay, 2010, 149). Post-truth political actors exploit the resulting atmosphere of scepticism and confusion.

Nevertheless, there is still more about post-truth that these definitions or understandings do not capture and therefore do not translate seamlessly to our current predicament concerning the relationship between truth, politics, and the public that is genuinely new in our situation. Thomas Hobbes (*Leviathan*, Ch. XV) seemed to have

anticipated this aspect of post-truth. “Before the names of Just and Unjust can have a place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants [...]. Where there is no commonwealth, there nothing is Unjust.” The coercive power exists in material benefits that citizens gain when they deliberately choose lies as a preferred option against the truth. Nevertheless, Zerilli (2020, 3-4) aptly describes this new situation due to post-truth.

[M]aterial interests outweigh fidelity to truth, but truth itself remains in principle knowable. It assumes that citizens are poised to recognize what is right before their eyes if only their material interests could be properly aligned with what is real. It is a view of mystification and deception familiar to anyone who has worked on the classic question of ideology, where how things appear is a distortion of what really is, but a distortion in which subjects are invested because it aligns with what they take their interests to be. Understood as ideological mystification, this account of post-truth suggests that reality is there to be seen by all those who have an interest in seeing it and are conscious of what that interest is.

Furthermore, part of the novelty introduced by post-truth that is peculiar to the current situation is the interplay between science and technology and their combined abilities through social media to create fantasies/illusions, to manipulate, polarise and entrench opinion and determine the public’s response to issues as asserted here by Bendall and Robertson (2018): “Social media intensifies systemic manipulation. Political marketing and propaganda have long existed [...], but the micro-targeting revealed by Cambridge Analytica is based on academic research that shows the efficacy of using social media, natural language or Internet clickstream data for psychological profiling or mass persuasion.” Therefore, post-truth creates a new challenge; that is, politics is not about reality but about how people react to reality (McIntyre 2019, 172) which can be created to suit the emotions and cognitive biases of the public. Politics becomes a sort of manipulation, ‘promotionalism’ and entertainment with what the public wants and not necessarily with what is right and true (cf. Kalpokas, 2019, p. 41). Therefore, post-truth is about inauthenticity and unreality, the gap between real and unreal. Newman was aware of this irregularity and writes: “We sometimes find men loud in their admiration of truths which they never profess” (*GA*, 209). On another occasion, he states that people “do not really dwell on what they profess to believe” (*PPS*, 1227).

The enabling factor of post-truth politics is the complacency and cooperation of the wider society with post-truth political actors. Hence post-truth politics is not merely a manipulation but a co-created fiction and a collusion of the post-truth political actors and the wider society. Kalpokas (2019, 18) asserts that

[d]ata is created by users themselves, which is a permanent process in the current era of ubiquitous connectivity: messaging records, social media posts, browsing and search history etc., as well as data generated by various connected smart devices and appliances that gather and transmit data by default, is collected, collated, and analysed, sparing data

users the need to specifically collect what is necessary for them, ultimately allowing for complete quantification and datafication of the subject.

However, people's online data are collected and used without their knowledge and approval for such political manipulations, and intent makes them unconscious or unwilling co-operators (Kalpokas, 2019, 29-31), which rules out the possibility of meaningful consent and responsible political action. Democracy is not merely about a system of voting. It is about choosing the moral content and value that a candidate or political party represents. It is a violation of conscience to manipulate people to make a wrong choice or come to a wrong conclusion. The significance of that cannot be overemphasized in connection to democracy because it creates a form of participation in politics directed to the satisfaction of emotion and the endorsement and promotion of what is in vogue over that which is good. Kalpokas (2019, p. 30) writes that

[t]he Cambridge Analytica scandal is illustrative here: while the harvesting of user data has allowed for campaign planning in the most rational-qua-efficiency-maximising sense, it may not have led to the most rational outcome as far as electoral choices of the affected societies are concerned.

This raises many concerns, first, regarding the moral and legal permissibility of taping into the private lives of citizens and using such data or information for political purposes. Second, concerning the legitimacy of the advantage of using such technologies and data over the people and political opponents. Third, it raises legitimate moral and legal concern over such indirect means for political campaigns and the extent to which the public has been manipulated into giving their consent, notwithstanding whether it is for their good or not. Fourth, it further raises concern over the intent of gaining political power. Therefore, post-truth politics may represent a modern form of grasping power achieved through (the force of) datafication to claim some form of democratic endorsement in elections.

Legitimate questions can therefore be raised about the use of datafication as a campaign strategy or mechanism for mass persuasion and profiling, particularly the extent to which online personal data are used to create political/campaign content that deliberately distracts the public from core political issues and into making bad decisions and choices. Political rhetoric produced through datafication is tailored and can be understood as a distinct type of reasoning and communication that is manipulative by intentionally anchoring political utterances on emotions/feelings instead of basing them on verifiable facts. This form of politics is consequential as it is employed to keep rhetoric at bay with the truth and can be illustrated in contemporary campaigns in which we have seen the apparent disconnection in the relationship between political rhetoric and truth.

As employed by post-truth politicians, political rhetoric is primarily concerned not about truth but power and its sustenance. To sustain that power the public must not be only

bewildered and confused by rhetoric that blurs the line between truth and falsity so that their capacity for veracity is lost, especially if they are at the same time offered narratives that they would like to believe as accurate (cf. Pinter, 2012, 10; see also Zerilli 2020, 6). Hence, according to Forough, Gabriel, and Fotaki (2019, 18), “Human progress is not assured, and the environment in which post-truth narratives have taken hold poses many threats.”

Chapter Two

Newman and his Modified Epistemology

2.1 Newman's Critique of Liberalism

Before we delve into the reconstruction of Newman's epistemology, it is essential to consider his critique of liberalism briefly. This critique is situated here to understand his modified theory of epistemology better. Newman's critique of liberalism is well-known as constituting his critical stand on modernity. The criticism of modernity in connection with liberalism is among the common thread of his writings. In his Biglietto speech, Newman dedicates most of his intellectual powers and resources to resisting liberalism. However, it must be stressed from the beginning that Newman's critique of liberalism was directed explicitly to liberalism in theology, although not unconnected with political liberalism.

Newman traced the origin of liberalism in theology to the fourth-century heresy of Arianism. Liberalism in theology or theological liberalism for Newman is a mutation of a strain of Arianism. From the backdrop of the historical development of the heresy of Arianism, Newman draws his meaning of liberalism, which he equated with heresy and regarded as the distortion of Christianity. Theological liberalism is a form of rationalization of the Christian faith (cf. Pattison 1991, 124). Rationalization of faith consists in making natural reason the standard and measure of revealed truth and placing reason above revealed truth as its judge. He calls this the usurpation of reason (*US*, 67/68) because it invalidates every other means of attaining truth except through logic and empirically demonstrated evidence (cf. Sillem, 62). The implication is that logical procedure and evidence replace faith, resulting in evidentialism. (We shall return to consider Newman's critique of evidentialism shortly). The interference of reason in faith was illegitimate and led to the deification of reason and the self, giving rise to a distorted understanding of human nature and Christianity.

Newman's critique of liberalism is understandable from the response to the thread of heresy running from ancient to modern times. Socinianism is the modern expression of the ancient Trinitarian and Christological heresies, otherwise known as Arianism.⁵ The social

⁵ Pattison (1991 134-135) makes an important explanation concerning Socinianism. He states that the "Socinian doctrine that no single interpretation of the Bible could claim the sanction of absolute truth followed where everyone could read Scripture for himself, and so an officially sanctioned vernacular Bible prepared the way for the separation of belief and action. There was the exact Socinianism of Puritans like John Bidle, who denied the divinity of Christ; ...A similar unity of belief and activity is apparent in statecraft, religion, and philosophy. The Socinian denied to the creeds Christianity any transcendental truth, and so rejected the possibility of absolute truth. The political expression of this denial was religious toleration."

expression of Socinianism is what Newman identified as liberalism. The tolerant spirit of the seventeenth century had enabled Socinianism in connection to liberalism to mature and spread. In science, religion, politics, and philosophy, the influence of liberalism by the seventeenth century in England was rather evident. (cf. Pattison 1991, 134). So that by the nineteenth century, as Pattison (1991, 6; see also 75-76) further notes, “the liberalism of modern culture was pervasive, ubiquitous, and comprehensive.”

In the seventeenth century, the rise of science,⁶ Socinianism, and liberalism coincided and united to annihilate the dogmatic principle. Nevertheless, the larger upshot of development is the crisis of modernity which has been both a crisis for religion caused in certain respects by modernity and a crisis for modernity itself (cf. Rober 2019, 69).

Newman describes the causes of this radical standpoint with theoretical penetration. He identifies and isolates the causes of heresy in its dislike of mystery in religion associated with philosophically minded believers coming precisely from a sophistical pagan philosophy and the influence of Judaism on the fourth century of Christians. Newman also emphasizes Aristotelian philosophy as being responsible for the cause that aided the rise and success of the Arian heresy. Besides, because Christian faith is Christological, heresy will always be associated with errors in articulating some of the crucial mysteries of faith, e.g. the Incarnation of the Son of God, the relation of the Three-Person in one Godhead.

The desire to achieve reasonability of belief led to the adaptation of philosophical methods and concepts to explain what was considered mysterious. That grew into an uneasy systematization that occasionally and successively slipped into heresy, sometimes due to logical sequence in thought associated with a particular school of philosophy or method of inquiry. Consequently, the Church was dragged to engage in polemics involving rhetoric and philosophy to combat philosophically sophisticated heresies. Thus, for Newman, the root causes of the crisis of modernity are to be found in the clash between two ancient schools: the first located at Alexandria and the second at Antioch. Newman saw the history of fifth-century Christendom repeated in sixteenth and nineteenth centuries England (*Apo*, 155). However, in the nineteenth century, it was not Arianism that was the problem but a mutation of it that he calls liberalism. In other words, he claims that heresies of the early Church were characterized

⁶ Pattison (1991, 134-135) further explains that in relation to science, “Socinianism was the handmaiden to Newton’s *Principia*. Newton was a thorough Arian in his religious opinions and a Socinian in the broad sense. His scientific view of a universe governed by physical law and ruled by a remote and ineffable divinity developed in tandem with a well-concealed Arianism in which Christ the subordinate Logos was the demiurge, while Jehovah remained in unutterable mystery behind the veil of absolute space and time. In the dogmatic view of history advocated by Newman, it would be useless to inquire whether Newton’s Arianism was the cause or the effect of his physics. Like the Father and Son of orthodoxy, the two are consubstantial, indissolubly one even while appearing in the different personalities of science and theology.”

with the same liberalism he saw in the modern era. Consequently, it has affected philosophy and religion. The mixture of this mode of philosophy with religion is what he called rationalism or theological liberalism, which meant infidelity to the dogmatic principle.

Liberalism was his chosen term to describe the modern heresy of unbelief. In the appendix of *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, he gives the following definition: “Liberalism then is the mistake of subjecting to human judgment those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it, and of claiming to determine on intrinsic grounds the truth and value of propositions which rest for their reception simply on the external authority of the Divine Word.” (*Apo*, 255/256).

Cardinal Newman further highlights the nature of the mistake flowing from what he calls usurpations of reason illegitimately into faith. In so doing, reason set itself up, over and above faith as the ultimate measure of revealed truth. As a result, it gives rise to heresy or error. That is reflected explicitly in the misunderstanding of the relationship between faith and reason, science and religion, and philosophy and religion/theology. The Cardinal is quite explicit at indicating a positive way by which reason and philosophy, in general, could be deployed in the study of religion and theology in particular. That is what distinguished the Alexandrian school, which represented orthodoxy from the school of Antioch. However, the undue influence or the interference of philosophy in religion was not associated with only one school of thought (cf. *Arians*, 21).

St. John Henry Newman seems to have concluded that the combined influences of Alexandrian and Antioch schools created an intellectual pride that held its reasoning to override the authority of antiquity. He states that “[o]ur doubts if we have any, will be found to arise after disobedience [. . .]. It is sin which quenches the Holy Spirit [...]” (*PPS*, 198-202). Heresy can lay in sacrificing truth for expediency and comfort or overweening scepticism, which replaces revelation with an idol of reason.

That constitutes only a fair representation of liberal religion from the perspective of Newman. Liberalism does not represent a coherent and unified theory held by any individual or group. Liberalism amounts to some sets of principles held loosely by different individuals with variations that at the same time seem out rightly contradictory. Firstly, conceptually, theoretically and practically, it is difficult to reconcile or harmonize the idea of private judgment⁷ with Revelation. Thus, Newman rejects private judgment on the suspicion that it is

⁷ Newman’s attitude to the idea of private judgment was rather critical and complex than dismissive as some aspects of his writings showed. His insistence on the personal character of belief, his view on the integral role of emotion and his argument on the difficulties in rational knowledge of ultimate truths are not divergent from the idea of private judgment. Thus, he was not completely opposed to the idea of personal decisions in religion. Therefore it could be said that he was in favour of a moderate use of private judgment. He asserts that without

against revelation and that the advocates of private judgment wrongly describe human decision processes. Obedience was crucial to Newman and rejected by modernity unless obedience to oneself. He states: “No revelation is conceivable which does not involve a sacrifice of private judgment” (*DA*, 397). Such a sacrifice entails obedience; otherwise, revelation and private judgment are incompatible. Given that both revelation and private judgment are crucial to Newman, he advocated a moderate and limited space for private judgment. He further argues that the rejection of guidance results from a misunderstanding of the human cognitive process as he highlights areas that acceptance and reliance on authority are normal and that limiting private judgment is required (*US*, 312-315).

Secondly, it is difficult to reconcile the existential human condition with the belief that human nature is good and the idea of divine salvation. Newman acknowledges that it sounds attractive because of the semblance of truth it carries. On the other hand, it is objectionable in what it misses or neglects about human nature: the fallen state of humanity and the world, as a result, risks trivializing the consequences and the remedy for human depravity. Hence the liberal conception of human nature is due to the lack of self-reflection/introspection and an exaggerated optimism of the idea of human progress and inherent human abilities. The understanding of human nature that liberal religion offers is circumstantial based on the momentary experience of economic prosperity and peace. Consequently, Newman describes it as naïve and shallow because it does not take cognizance of the historical human experience of evil in the world and the individual consciences of people.

Newman may be right in criticizing the liberals’ vision of human nature. Nevertheless, the understanding and feasibility of such a vision of human nature fit modern times. Notably, the difference between Newman and the liberals is an instance in the clash of first principles. Cardinal Newman traces the optimistic notion of human nature and progress to the classical vision exemplified by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics*. On the one hand, the human propensity to evil and the human capacity to control its evil tendencies is acknowledged. On the other hand, the re-emergence of this vision of human nature came along with the crucial issue concerning the extent to which persons can or could be said to transcend and overcome human evil and weakness and attain self-fulfilment without external assistance. The serenity and optimism expressed in *Nicomachean Ethics* directly contrast to the passionate perplexity of Augustine’s confessions (*DA*, 261-281; see also Yearly 1978, 99).

private judgment there is no responsibility. A person’s own mind is the only cause of believing or not believing, and of his acting or not acting upon his belief. The bone of contention is what are the means which are to direct our choice, and what is the manner of using them? (*VM*, 130-131). This points to the tone and direction of Newman’s criticism of the concept of private judgment.

Another modern opinion of human nature that came under the critical evaluation of Newman is the view which maintains that evil forces move in persons. However, the elements outside human nature are responsible for them. The liberals think or claim human alienation corresponds to the distinction between nature and civilized or enlightened humanity. The salient implication of this position is that human evil or estrangement is transient. Human evil is transient since the state of nature is not permanent but can and should be overcome by civilization. For Rousseau, Christianity was not rational enough to provide conditions for social peace. That is why he came up with his conception of civic religion. Human beings will blossom in goodness and overcome human alienation in a natural environment not tainted by civilization and its conventional artificiality. In other words, civilization is redemptory and capable of facilitating and accomplishing human fulfilment. The modern reduction of mystery into a problem which can then be solved using the right method, is the way to build civilization anew.

The fundamental implication of this viewpoint is this: salvation ceases to be the fundamental function of religion and is accomplished or mediated by a superior being (God). Human redemption becomes the business of politics attainable simply by the combined effects of social, economic and political developments. Both the classical and enlightened views of human nature share one thing in common: the belief in the possibility of human restoration and fulfilment without any supernatural power.⁸ Hence, Newman rejects all these modern views. First, they are incompatible with Christian revelation. Second, there is no place for God or the idea of a saviour in this vision of human nature. Third, it denies Newman's personal view of the internal experience of God through conscience (I will further explain Newman's theory of the internal experience of God in chapter four). Above all, these views of human nature by the liberals reinforce Newman's conviction and argument that liberalism in religion will ultimately lead to atheism; above all, the quest after solutions within the immanent phenomenal world is counterproductive. I will now return to the problem of evidentialism in religion.

⁸ On the contrary, Newman maintains that "there is a transcendent, incomprehensible Divine agent behind Revelation that give rise to the mysterious nature of Revelation, the givenness of Revelation and the inexhaustible significance and indefiniteness of Revelation in history. Therefore Newman rejects this reduction of mystery to a problem because it constitutes a partial or one-sided reception of revelation. It ignores the mysterious and transcendent aspects of a revelation which is never fully understood but accepted on the basis of religious experience and the source or origin of the revelation. Thus, the endeavour by liberal religion to explain away the mystery of revelation distorts people's response to revelation. However, the problem is not about the misinterpretation but a selective acceptance of revelation that corrupts human religiosity" (*VM*, 24; cf. Gilley 1990, 144).

The attempt to establish God's existence and comprehend His nature through the natural events of the world was known by Newman as physical theology. This is in distinction from Natural theology. He was very dismissive of physical theology as not a "science at all, for it is ordinarily nothing more than a series of pious or polemical remarks upon the physical world viewed religiously" (*Idea*, 49). Newman considers the argument from design as not convincing and proves nothing if a person does not previously believe in God (cf. Earnest and Tracey, 2006, 309).

Newman thinks that natural theology is "powerless against scientific anticipations, for it is merely one of them" (*Idea*, 34). The relative nature of science and scientific results progressively invalidating earlier results as a mark of progress means that the finding of physical theology risks being invalidated with every new scientific discovery. The implication as he sees it is that "if the Spirit of God is gas in 1850, it may be electro-magnetism in 1860" (*Idea*, 39; cf. Armstrong 2013, 239). This is unfitting to the nature of religion. God and religious truth are seen as consistent and immutable. The errors of physical theology spring from its reliance on scientific research and results for the foundation of its arguments and conclusions. This has further raised the significant problem of evidence in religion and how to describe God in relation to such evidence. This is a crucial dividing line between Newman and the proponents of liberalism. Newman relies on authority, while liberals rely on evidence supplied by nature as the basis for comprehending spiritual reality. Liberals argue that

prejudice and mental peculiarities are excluded from the discussion; we descend to grounds common to all; certain scientific rules and fixed standards for weighing testimony, and examining facts, are received. Nothing can be urged or made to tell, but what all feel, all comprehend, all can put into words [...] nothing properly can be assumed but what men, in general, will grant as true; that is, nothing but what is on a level with all minds, goods and bad, rude and refine. (*US*, 230).

In opposition to this line of thinking, Newman argues that evidence is intricately bound up with the witness's state of mind. Thus, evidence is not independent and lacks clarity, as a result influencing the perception of the evidence. Newman asserts that

commonly the evidence for and against religion [...] is not of an overpowering nature ... most men must and do decide by the principles of thought and conduct which are habitual to them; that is, the antecedent judgment, with which a man approaches the subject of religion, not only acts as a bearing this way or that, - as causing him to go out to meet the evidence in a greater or lesser degree, and nothing more, - but further, it practically colours the evidence, even in a case in which he has recourse to evidence, and interprets it for him (*US*, 227).

The point is that the liberal's pursuit of evidence merges with faith, or evidence becomes synonymous with faith. In any case, evidence becomes the primary source of faith and the faith in question is attained through logic. Newman did not dismiss the relation of evidence to faith or the influence of evidence on faith but acknowledges first the tendency of

faith to colour evidence or interpret it to suit its purposes. He stated that “[f]aith, considered as an exercise of reason, has this characteristic, - that it proceeds far more on antecedent grounds than on evidence; it trusts much to presumptions, and in doing this lies special merit [...] We decide one way or another, according to the position of the alleged fact, relatively to our existing state of religious knowledge and feeling” (*US*, 222; 228). Belief does not necessarily spring from evidence and cannot be based on it. Faith or belief is unconditional and therefore demands assent. Faith has its roots from myriads of combined experiences such as love/desire, moral character, antecedent probability and other related experiences. Evidence, according to Newman, is “not the essential groundwork of Faith, but its rewards” (*US*, 294).

It is clear why Newman was critical of evidence in religious belief. Evidence cannot generate faith or be the source and foundation of religion. Misjudging the role of evidence meant a specific approach by physical theology that is not consonant with human religiosity and generates a distorted vision of God. Seeking God in and through nature reveals only a divine principle. That is the evidence of nature. Newman’s approach to God and religion is through conscience, which reveals a Judge. Natural theology approaches God through nature, and it is bound to those things that can be experienced only through the senses. This is the approach and method of science. Its object of study is matter. It cannot rise above matter and therefore cannot give a complete vision of the nature of God. Similarly, this principle is a half-truth and consequently a distortion of the true vision of the ultimate object of religion.

While incoherence may not be a peculiar feature of liberalism in theology, these contradictions may be something found in many systems and theories. These cases of incoherence within theological liberalism and the conceptualization of the principles of liberalism form the disagreement between the liberals and Newman. The interpretation and application of these principles substantially modify Christianity to the point that Newman considered it corruption or deformation of the human potential for religiosity. However, the perspective that liberals or moderns were concerned about making religion more attractive and relevant still raises questions relevant to Newman, the moderns, and the contemporary world. This highlights the need for a better model of the relationship between religion, society and politics.

Newman thought that the best way and the only way to checkmate the growing influence of liberalism, which had threatened the integrity of religion, but attempted to destroy it was to firmly establish political and religious dogma that mutually supported each other. In Newman’s theory of ideas, an idea develops in an interlocking fashion in its many aspects

against chaotic or disrupting and unconnected development of the said idea. Hence, Newman asserted that

all the aspects of an idea are capable of a coalition, and of a resolution into the object to which it belongs [...]. There is no aspect deep enough to exhaust the contents of a real idea, no one term or proposition which will serve to defuse it; though of course one representation of it is more just and exact than another, and though when an idea is very complex, it is allowable for the sake of convenience, to consider its distinct aspects as separate ideas (*Dev*, 35).

A constructive reinterpretation of religion, politics and science that integrates all the dimensions of the human person may be part of the way forward today (we shall elaborate more on this in chapter four).

Hence for Newman, the fragmentation of knowledge was part of the crisis of modernity which was reflected by the self-proclaimed autonomy of various sciences as part of the process of secularization that triggered the spiral decline of the influence of religion given a single hegemony of rational epistemological certainty. Newman objected to this hegemony of epistemological certainty because reason was inaugurated as the sole factor in a wider reality of relations. Reversely Newman articulates an understanding of the self that fully recognizes the complex/composite sense/nature of personhood that appreciates the spiritual/religious dimension of existence amidst others, thereby promoting the many relations that sum up reality. In dealing with the fragmentation of systematic thought, Newman expresses an understanding of the complexity of reality that reformulated human relations with the external world as a series of probabilities. Newman emphasizes belief as a relationship representing the complexity of various forms of existent relation. Thus, he rejected the rigid sense of the rational epistemological hegemony championed by modernity that excluded the possibility of certitude reached through faith. The stress Newman lays on faith as a crucial or fundamental component in understanding reality/truth implicates more than merely the spiritual or religious dimensions of life/existence (*GA*, 111-117; 130; 150).

Consequently, Newman's critique of modernity offers a reformation of the perception of humanity within the complex existing reality of relations that reject the modern secular-religious divide. Understanding this complexity did not mean a complete rejection of liberalism and secularization, nor involves the choice and endorsement of a particular narrative over another; for instance, secular or religious but entails a critical dialogue with modernity/liberalism in establishing what counts as truth/reality (Kelly 2012, 37-40). This is the core of humanity's search and struggles to create access to the truth/reality. From that perspective, a narrative political or religious should endeavour for such signification as establishing the truth.

2.2 The Epistemological Critique of Liberalism

There are two philosophically related arguments that Newman makes against liberalism. In the first argument, Newman seeks to counter the empiricist epistemological claims of liberalism and relativism. According to him, the claim of empiricists on how people in the real world assent to propositions is not in congruence with everyday experiences of real people and therefore, they are wrong. This mistake cancels the standard and primary claims that some empiricists, like Locke and Hume make on how people ought to assent to propositions. Newman asserts that in real life we naturally assent to propositions based weaker grounds than Locke or Hume demanded. We rely on our natural endowments (cf. Kłos 2021, 87). Since Newman asserts that nature is good or, to be precise, it is the only one that we have, and a standard guide. It is morally right for people to assent in this way and manner; in everyday life we simply use ourselves, as we have no one else to use, for it is we who are under concrete circumstances. Hence, Newman accuses the empiricists of armchair philosophizing by setting unreasonable and unattainable standards for assent that runs contrary to our human nature. Any person attempting to meet Locke's standard for assent before acting would never be able to initiate an action. Such a person will be trapped in a kind of sceptical paralysis such that he or she is at the same time never able to access the truth, especially that which is offered by divine revelation. Newman states:

we shall never have done beginning if we determine to begin with proof. We shall ever be laying our foundations [...] Resolves to believe nothing, and you must prove your proofs and analyse your elements, sinking further and further, and finding in the lowest depth a lower deep, till you come the broad bosom of scepticism [...] Life is for Action. If we insist on proofs for everything, we shall never come to action; to act, you must assume, and that assumption is faith. (*DA*, 295).

Newman understands the modern world engineered by liberalism as a complex network of inferences without beginning or end. The prevailing liberalism of the modern world does not only accommodate and believe but tolerates everything. The modern craving for novelty means constant change and adopting a new philosophy. Consequently, truth, principle, and dogma are relative and transient, moving with the spirit of the time and ultimately determined by utility. There was a displacement of values and institutions based on the utilitarian principle of the highest pleasure for the largest number. Newman saw where both relativism and liberalism would lead us to: the ceaseless activity of material evolution, which assures only the stultifying inertia of doubt masquerading as progress (cf. Pattison 1991, 179).

Newman was committed to the belief in the existence of divine truth and proceeded to relate and explicate human life based on belief. The existence of this truth was for Newman actual, absolute, present to the mind, and determinative of all actions worthy of the name.

Human action will have no meaning except in relation to true belief. Hence, belief and truth influence social events when assented to and apprehended. Like ideas, truth and belief have consequences. Consequently, he rejects and criticizes the notion of truth held by liberalism. Pattison (1991, 195-196) asserts that

[t]he liberals' truth is merely relative to man's fallible reason, and the empirical facts of nature were for Newman merely ideas, not truths at all. The belief that can do no more than acknowledge its subjugation to the forces of history or the laws of nature is no belief, and the rational choice that only selects various relative and material options is no choice. Truth must be the handmaid of God, not the daughter of time. Belief must have an enduring object above nature. A choice must be free to select between what is absolutely true and what is absolutely false.

Belief and truth commit a person to a specific form of life, choices, and action. By anchoring the object and content of belief, it becomes possible to envision human existence and morality. That is a near impossibility in a prevailing liberal environment where standards and structures are fluid because they are simply matters of opinion.

Newman maintains that actions and life generally should be anchored on belief. However, the modern liberal world constructed by liberalism has no belief. Consequently, the modern world is in a state of moral paralysis (cf. *DA*, 293). Liberalism is tolerant towards all beliefs while adhering to none. For this reason, it is most appealing and constitutes its strength and worse weakness. This is always a weakness because liberalism most cherished principles are themselves opinions permeated with doubts. This is inconsistent with any true nature of religion, morality and society. Newman rejects the principle of toleration that subjects and ranks all truths as equals. It amounts to the denial of the truth and leads to the loss of dogma.

The second argument put forward by Newman against liberalism concerns the vital issue of morality and education. Liberalism claims that education is salvific because the intellectual and moral instruction referred to by education can help humanity reach its full potential. People can be nurtured in schools to attain full humanity. Education will fulfil humanity's potential goodness. It will liberate and direct the exercise of private judgment, allow for the study of the numerous natural and historical expressions of religion's object, and expressly apply the concept of use to make better people and society. This notion of education, according to Newman, shows how deficient it is both as a means for any kind of salvation.

Consequently, he rejects the claims of liberalism on the nature of society, human potential, and humanity's moral nature as practically unattainable. Liberal views run contrary to fundamental (Christian) moral tenets, and more importantly, liberal views are not compatible with natural human religiosity. Newman argues that practical knowledge cannot substitute religion (*DA*, 257-260). According to Sir Robert Peel, "in becoming wiser, a man becomes better" (*DA*, 261). Peel meant that education which consists of knowledge of facts

and theories in physical sciences, would automatically raise a person “at once in the scale of intellectual and moral excellence” (*DA*, 261). Science was seen as an instrument of advancing selfhood and actualizing human potentials so that in studying science a person will feel the moral dignity of his nature exalted. This meant that more knowledge in the natural sciences would lead its students to excellent moral living and personal happiness.

Newman, on the contrary, argues that “to know is one thing, to do is another; the two are altogether distinct” (Ker 1989, 309). In other words, there is no necessary correlation between knowing the good and doing it. Likewise, knowing the truth and affirming it, or living by it, are two different things. The truth has often been denied and rejected. Pilate famously found Jesus not guilty but still handed Him over to be crucified. He knew the truth but acted contrary to it. Secular knowledge is not a direct means of moral improvement. If truth is a virtue, rational knowledge, especially that concerning to the physical sciences, is not enough to command strict adherence (cf. *DA*, 261-269).

The liberals’ confidence in human reason and belief in the progress of human development meant that the human person in the future could achieve by his efforts all that was thought impossible and could only be conferred by God. This, according to Newman, was an attempt to replace religion with science and “an attempt by philosophy what was done by religion” (*DA*, 292). Yearley (1978, 120) adds that “[t]he educational community becomes the new church; educational endeavour the new road to salvation; educational theory the new theology.” Therefore Newman criticizes this kind of education acquired through science that confers not a victory of mind over itself but philosophical expedient (Ker 1989, 309). According to Newman, we use “human methods in their place, and there they are useful, but they are worse than useless out of their place” (*DA*, 274). From the preceding, it is not the case that Newman denies the value and effect of education. He knows that the education proposed by the liberals is ineffectual at solving fundamental human problems, for instance, to grant salvation from sin. Hence, it could be said that the liberal’s education is misapplied/misdirected because education as such lacks the power for self-fulfilment or actualization and, therefore, is not salvatory. The purpose of education Newman writes about is to train and form the human intellect to see things in their proper perspective, their compositions and relations in themselves and with other things, and to discover their ends and their right uses (*Idea*, 461). He further states that

a university training is the great ordinary means to a great but ordinary end; it aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying the true principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspiration, at giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age, at facilitating the exercise of political power, and refining the intercourse of private life (*Idea*, 177-178).

The above analysis for Newman consists of the perfection of the mind, which is an integral good to produce useful goods. However, these useful goods cannot be considered salvatory.

Newman saw the modern liberal project as an illusion. The endeavour to meet the needs of humanity through the application of natural reason not empowered by faith is an exercise in futility. The Enlightenment's error in thinking that science would eliminate humanity's wounded nature by sin was the idea that virtue was the child of knowledge and vice of ignorance (*DA*, 270). Liberalism in theology for Newman has the effect of obscuring humanity's sense of transcendence and consciousness of sin and stifling the desire for God's salvation that were marks of revealed and natural religion even among the most primitive of ancient peoples. Based on these arguments, liberalism is not only a hubris or utopia but dehumanizing in promising to do more than it can offer. It is a disease posing as a cure. According to Newman, "the great practical evil of method and form in matters of religion,—nay, in all moral matters—is obviously this: their promising more than they can affect" (*US*, 266). The concrete facts of human nature render liberalism's hopes fictitious, making liberal ideas guilty of promising more than they offer or achieve.

Liberalism likewise seeks to establish a correspondent view of tolerance but on entirely different bases that, in essence, smack of relativism. For example, it may assert that freedom of conscience exists because the truth cannot be known with any degree of certainty. Alternatively, there is simply a multiplicity of opinions, such that no single opinion has the right or superiority over others. Therefore, every view is to be tolerated because no one has access to any privileged or entitled position from which to judge. The difficulty with this position is that liberals presume that every person can make good moral choices and moral actions.

Newman's idea of tolerance sounds similar to that of the liberals, but they are entirely different on a closer look. Newman's notion of tolerance is rooted in the dignity of other persons as human beings endured with the same legitimate freedom of conscience to sincerely seek the truth freely without coercion and at the same time as a precondition for helping to find the truth. In this sense, a person is obliged to tolerate, but within due limits, the thoughts and actions of those in error so that they may seek the truth without coercion (Ker 1989, 263-284). On the other hand, liberal relativistic tolerance means that every opinion should be tolerated because truth cannot be established. Since we are not in a position to say what is right or wrong, we are required by this principle to tolerate all thoughts and actions because truth cannot be ascertained (cf. Pattison 1991, 179).

This notion of tolerance replaces certitude with doubt or creates doubt and, in the end, obliterates the truth with an attitude of indifference. Such an exercise in toleration presumes that every individual is free and independent and can differentiate right or wrong on his/her terms. Therefore, everyone is left alone to do whatever he/she likes. Freedom in above sense has no higher goal or obligation. There is no necessary connection between any two individuals except agreeing to disagree. What differentiates Newman's idea of conscience is the understanding that conscience has rights flowing from its sacred obligations to truth and ultimately to its author, that is, God. Hence his idea of conscience is not the self-will or self-opinion nor the pure autonomy to act or think as one pleases with no reference to objective truth. Here lies the fundamental distinction between these two conceptions of personal and intellectual freedom in which relativism becomes the source of individualism that ignores and disregards others. The conception of conscience that is true cannot but present itself freely before objective truth. It is extremely autonomous to do so without injuries.

On this account, freedom of conscience became freedom from objective truth/reality and shared obligation. Each person, therefore, defines the meaning of life from his/her standpoint without reference to any sense of objectivity or universality. Within this frame of thought, an individual's free choices are sacrosanct only because they are indifferent and irrelevant to others. Personal freedom becomes a wall separating each person from the others. Conscience ceases to be a sanctuary but an enclosure. This is the consequence when and where the principle of tolerance is elevated to an absolute and an end in itself. Each individual ends up becoming a prisoner within his self-contained freedom. A sense of unity and solidarity is lost, and the preconditions of meaningful interaction are destroyed. The mental state that arises as a corollary here is that others simply suppose that one's deep-seated beliefs are only a peculiar preference, not subject to rational examination or discussion. Truth is not valued for what it is. Truth claims are commonly viewed as automatically invalid.

Where the conditions are such that extol freedom to seek only but one's own (personal) truth, the natural inclination is to quest for personal pleasure, comfort, benefit, and selfish interests, and at the same time subscribe to ideologies that justify such choices in many areas of life. Relativism tends to isolate individuals from one another, consequently impoverishing discussion and undermining the moral bases of community life. Authentic communities cannot be built upon an ideology that incubates interpersonal isolation, personal immorality and encourages intellectual shallowness.

2.3 Newman's Diagnosis of the Modern Era

In retrospect, we can say that Newman was a product of his time and enjoyed the benefits of the modern world but was careful at the same time in all situations not to be caught up in its ills.⁹ The uniqueness of his experience as someone who lived in the old and passing culture and as someone who lived in the new culture or modern world armed him with a peculiar privilege and put him in a better position to assess modernity. Consequently, most of his works focused on relating modern ideas by analysing their implications as they affected Christian living (cf. Hughes and Daniel 2019, ix; Yearley 1978, ix).

He understood the challenges of modernity and was prepared to confront these challenges (cf. Kłos 2021, 41). His lifespan stretches from the beginning to nearly the end of the nineteenth century. Many changes and developments marked the nineteenth century. He lived long enough to witness many of these: the practical application of the industrial revolution, the rising influence of science, political, social, and cultural revolutions (socialism, Darwinism and Marxism), the separation of Church and State or Secularization (cf. Hollis 1970, 9). The watering down of the Christian vision of life and the weakening of faith due to the impact of the Enlightenment project was due to a faulty view of assent (Rowlands, p. 172/3). The cultural milieu was a pulsating shock to Newman as he became increasingly conscious of the consequence of modernity. He experienced the cultural, political, religious, social and intellectual tensions of the nineteenth century on a unique and personal level. These tensions had been deepened with time and were manifest in the sharp contrasts between the religious view of reality and the merely rational view of reality; and between reason and faith.

Reason and faith were set up not merely as different approaches to reality but opposing views of reality, so faith was seen as the enemy of reason and science. Newman called this conflict the 'intellectual movement against religion' (*SE*, 104: see also Norris 2010, 133). He said the intellectual movement against religion is a reality that needs no proof. Sam Harris (2010, 37-38) claimed¹⁰ that

⁹Gilley (Gilley 1990, p. 81) described the moral situation of the times in these words: "True, the Church was probably a more decorous institution than the society she served, at a time when professional standards were low; when parliament was hive of jobbery and rotten boroughs, when the doctor might have bought his degree, and the law was notorious for inefficiency and delay, when the Civil Service was full of well-paid sinecures, and commissions in the army were sold, and when the worst of moral examples were set by the Royal family. From the radical viewpoint, the Georgian Church of England was only the corrupt ecclesiastical arm of a corrupt and venal State and Crown...."

¹⁰Sam Harris (2010; p. 37-38) further claims that: "In the fall of 2006, I participated in a three-day conference at the Salk Institute entitled Beyond Belief: Science, Religion, Reason, and Survival. This event was organized by Roger Bingham and conducted as a town-hall meeting before an audience of invited guests. Speakers included Steven Weinberg, Herold Kroto, Richard Dawkins, and many other energetic opponents of religious dogmatism and superstition."

[t]he chief enemy of open conversation is dogmatism in all its forms. Dogmatism is a well-recognized obstacle to scientific reasoning, and yet, because scientists have been reluctant even to imagine that they might have something prescriptive to say about values, dogmatism is still granted remarkable scope on questions of both truth and goodness under the banner of religion.

In this conflict of faith versus reason and science, Newman foresaw the danger of people abandoning doctrinal truths arising from the ignorance of the values of those doctrinal truths. Newman compares and equates this ignorance with darkness resulting from the impact of modernity. He writes: “I think the trials which lie before us are such as would appal and make dizzy even such courageous hearts as St. Athanasius and St. Gregory, and they would confess that dark as the prospect of their day was to them severally, ours has a darkness different from any that has been before it [...] Christianity has never yet had the experience of a world simply irreligious” (*Moz. II*, 129-30). In these words, Newman thinks that the future conflict, struggle for superiority, opposition and even persecution that awaits Christianity will not be against other religions but irreligion or atheism. A world that lacks any sense of belief would be more hostile to Christianity. Thus, Newman further thinks that liberalism would logically lead to irreligion or atheism and foresaw the consequences of a world without belief. It is a world in which science replaces religion (cf. *DA*, 298-305). This has been described by Rober (2019, 73) as

an eclipse of grace, wherein the world becomes increasingly defined by the scientific method and by the mundane or every day. Economics in the form of industrial and mercantilist capitalism begins to assume its present-day dominance over everyday life. The sense of mystery fades, replaced by self-interest and benevolence depending on the circumstances. Finally, human nature begins to appear self-sufficient.

Since the ascendancy of science on the heels of modernity, there has been a growing intellectual hostility towards belief and a sceptical attitude towards truth; corresponding in time with a complete shift from the religious worldview to the secular worldview in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, wherein the world becomes increasingly characterized by liberalism, secularism, and scientism. It is worth turning to the *Discussion and Arguments* on these particular issues. This brings us to those, such as Sir Robert Peel, who attempt to establish human progress purely on science and knowledge of the physical world.

Newman knew that human action is impossible from the epistemological liberal empiricist position, which demands the strictest conditions and pieces of evidence for certainty and assent.¹¹ Newman maintains a close correlation between belief and action. Liberalism as

¹¹Newman says that; “Life is not long enough for a religion of inferences; we shall never have done beginning, if we determine to begin with proof. We shall ever be laying our foundations; we shall turn theology into evidences, and divines into textuaries. We shall never get at our first principle. Resolve to believe nothing, and you must prove your proof and analyse your elements, sinking further and further, and finding ‘in the lowest depth a lower deep,’ till you come to the broad bosom of scepticism. I would rather be bound to defend the

a matter of principle is at home with every dogma or opinion because it believes nothing and consequently stifles belief which is the true source of action. Newman asserts: “Life is for action [...]; to act, you must assume, and that assumption is faith” (*DA*, 295). Since the modern world lacks faith or does not believe, it is confined to a state of paralysis (cf. Hawley, 189–207). As Cardinal Newman foresaw it, the consequence is a world without the possibility of attaining and practising the truth. Because for him, belief, action and truth are all bound together as inseparable. The mind is made for truth. When true belief and right action merge, they express the truth. This is a manifestation of real assent by an individual. Therefore, in concrete existence, we ought to first attain true beliefs and act on them so that an individual finds truth when he acts believably. This sums up the goal of life (cf. Pattison 1991, 145).

Within this same time, science also emerged, debunking most of the truths of religion¹² as false and rendering the methods and credentials of theology outdated and invalid. This was in part understood as the negative impact of the Enlightenment movement, which emphasized reason and neglected faith (Norris 2010a, 630-634). Newman held both reason and faith in equal dignity. It was a matter of finding the right balance between the authority of reason and that of faith. He was conscious of the challenge to hold in a balance the internal informants such as conscience, reason, natural religion on the one hand and external agencies such as the State, the Church and the Bible on the other hand. Some persons were prepared to discard the former or the latter, and some were eager to dispense with both. Thus, the problem was and is still essentially the problem of wrong belief connected to a faulty epistemology of liberal empiricism. The causative agent was heresy. The effect was apostasy which would end in defection (cf. Norris 1996, 133). According to Pattison (1991, vii), in addressing the problem of belief Newman

addressed a central modern question: is the world we make a product of our belief or are our beliefs a product of the world we make? *He was committed to the proposition that belief precedes action* [Words in italics are mine]. On this premise, he viewed everything and built his philosophy. But if Newman spoke of dogma and heresy instead of superstructure and base, his concerns are nonetheless the same as those of modern ideologists, and if he came to conclusions contrary to what any contemporary would consider orthodox, he saw as far into the problem of belief as anyone has.

Newman travelled back in time to discover that the root causes of the depravity and perversions of the modern era (whether political, social, religious or moral) extended beyond

reasonableness of assuming that Christianity is true, than to demonstrate a moral governance from the physical world (*DA*, 295).

¹²The argument against religion at the time runs very deep as can be seen in Newman’s reconstruction of the argument. Religion can be anything but science. Religion cannot be the subject matter of science. This is because we are incapable of determining whether the object of religion is true or false. So, it is not rational to dogmatise on religion. Inasmuch as we cannot dogmatise on opinions, theories, probabilities and arguments simply because such persuasions are not scientific or certain knowledge and they cannot become public property, likewise religion (*Idea*, p. 256).

the empiricists and far beyond the reformers (Luther and Calvin) and even further than Wycliffe and the Lollards. It had its beginning with Arius in the fourth century. Every other error and heresy in history after Arius, Newman considered a direct or indirect mutation of the Arian heresy and expressed in modern times as liberalism. He arrived at this conclusion through the occurrences of some events. The coincidence of his extensive studies of the early Church fathers concerning Arianism, the passage of the Whig's Reform bill, the French revolution, and Hampden's Bampton lectures of 1832 gave Newman the insight into the pedigree of liberalism. He concluded that the heretical beliefs in the fourth century seemed to repeat themselves in the intellectual and political crises of the nineteenth century.

Therefore, in the heresy of Arianism, he discovered the problem of modernity which demanded a radical revision of the history of western liberalism. Besides this discovery, more importantly, is the fact that belief was vital in understanding human history and life itself. He used Arianism to illustrate the significance and the influence of belief in human endeavours (Pattison 1991, 101-102). Consequently, Newman has shown by his example how we can concretely pursue intellectual and moral developments and still actively engage in proper scientific endeavours without losing or compromising our traditional values. Thus, when properly understood and engaged, modernity is not against tradition nor reason against faith (cf. Kłos 2021, p. 40).

2.4 Newman's Epistemology of Religion

The philosophical climate in England during the nineteenth century was that of rationalism. It was not a philosophical doctrine but a mode of thinking that emphasized the mind as the faculty of reasoning over and above other elements. In its extreme form, it ignored or rejected all other elements of reasoning. Human reasoning was considered unerring in its formal or mechanical process (Boekread 1958, 74). Newman's criticism of rationalism is well known (cf. Carr, 1996, p.89). He objected to the tendency to deploy reason beyond its boundaries. He writes in *Essays Critical and Historical*: "Rationalism is a certain abuse of Reason, that is, a use of it for purposes for which it never was intended, and is unfitted" (*ECH*, 1891, Vol. 1., 31). As such, rationalism undermined belief and religious claims. Carr (1996, 89) further explains that:

He argues against rationalism only as against a mode of orientation that denigrates belief and thus squanders the grand currency of wonder and the risk of a muscular Christian orientation of action and taking a stand. Faith is a principle of action, claims Newman, and action does not leave time for a minute and finished investigations. But this is far from saying the fundamental condition of authentic humanity – i.e. its stance in God – is non-rational. It is more in keeping with Newman's tone to say that rationalism is not enough. Something more is needed.

To this end, his main theoretical and philosophical work, *An Essay in the Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (1870), was channelled to dispute the claims of the rationalist and state what is known today as his theory of knowledge. It is important to note that the *Grammar of Assent* is not a ground theory of epistemology. It was never meant to be. Newman's exposition of the nature of human reasoning is circumscribed or limited to reasoning, which results in the concrete and individual conclusion.¹³ Based on this concreteness and individuality of human reasoning, real knowledge is situated and must be distilled or sieved through the individual's idiosyncrasies because reasoning is personal. There is no such thing as universal reason furnished with all the rules of logic through which an individual thinks. Hence human knowledge is not the question of infallibility but probability. The strength or weakness of a piece of evidence does not change, but "the antecedent probability attending it does vary without limit, according to the temper of the mind surveying it" (Carr 1996, 90). The concrete human existence provides the proper context to analyse and explore how persons form and nurture beliefs.

Newman endeavoured to unpack how people reason and attain certitude in everyday affairs. Therefore, Newman's epistemology is based on the human person in concrete circumstances. It is a state of being that he described as functional disarrangement (*GA*, 159), as the starting point. It is the original and the initial state of human knowledge, that is, from the state of chaos to the state of order "in which man's 'faculties have their rudimental and inchoate state', and they must be 'gradually carried on by practice and experience to their perfection'" (*GA*, 189). Newman's expanded and inclusive epistemology means that reasoning includes powers such as feelings, the imagination, the will, the intellect, and the conscience. This further means it is not just one exclusive part of man that reasons. Instead, it is the living, active, complete and responsible person that reasons in concrete situations. At first, such a being is in functional disarrangement; therefore, he needs solid ground to restore order. The Catholic Church provided that much-needed solidity through her dogmatic framework (Kłos 2021, 89, 93).¹⁴ Thereby the human person can gradually emerge from the shadows and images of the immanent intellectual world. Newman was at pains to avoid the products of his own self, which is why conscience has its rights because it has duties (*Apo*, 230). Where is the

¹³ Concrete circumstances, for Newman, are the great determinants in one's path to knowledge. The hearer's or thinker's situated-ness when making a concrete judgment, the speaker's situated-ness when proposing something or some thesis for another's assent, and ultimately, the situational character of history, its events, occurrences, tendencies, and fluxes and the impact of these on other individuals, on other Christians, on Ecumenical Councils, and on the Church's tradition, are what concern Newman.

¹⁴ The Anglican Church failed in that regard because it is a fruit of modernity and, therefore, a human invention to fulfil human expectations or needs.

origin of these duties? From the revealed Word and the tradition of the Church. *The Grammar of Assent* (1870) is Newman's attempt to explicate this epistemological standpoint.

Edward Caswall (1814-1878), commenting on the intentions of Newman in writing *Grammar of Assent*, states that the "[o]bject of the book is twofold. The first part shows that you can believe what you cannot understand. In the second part that you can believe what you cannot prove." (cited in Dessain 1966, 148; cf. *GA*, 128 and 209). Newman was committed to believing that a person without knowledge of argument for his/her faith is nevertheless rational in assenting to that faith. Similarly, the faith of an educated person does not depend on rational arguments or syllogism but on what Newman calls personal reasoning and implicit working of the mind. Therefore, reason in its proper use and true meaning has a rightful place in our way of arriving at religious faith (cf. *GA*, 261-262, 264, and 266).

We can say that Newman appeals to the natural operation of the human mind to justify beliefs and the certainty of knowledge. More importantly, he does not think there is ever the need to go beyond that. Newman objected to the thesis of Locke that belief could only be warranted on the foundation of self-evident propositions. To do so, John Henry Newman contends, would be to circumscribe all knowledge within the boundaries of inference unduly. Truth is a complex reality that cannot be wholly contained and grasped by a single mind. Knowledge is ever-expanding and changing, and the human mind can only dynamically adapt to this expansion and changes (cf. *GA*, 205-209). No human construct or expression can ever encompass the truth but only approximate the ideal. The same thing could be said of human science, theory, and language. They are intrinsically limited in what they can approximate. Human reasoning fails within a certain ambience of understanding that is always subject to interpretation. While the human mind requires some level of discipline in its thinking, the perimeter within which real human thought works is more comprehensive than formal logic. Chronological reasoning, for instance, is another means one can access facets of the organization of truth. There exists a plurality of reasoning about the reality that any attempt to synchronize thinking into one single whole would inevitably fail because of the evolving nature of human thought.

Newman was aware that we are constantly, among other things, inquiring, thinking, assessing, concluding, and judging (*GA*, 229, cf. *US*, 258). Likewise, centring attention on a single part and neglecting the whole can at best only lead to partial knowledge and worse intellectual blindness. He contended that we do not attain certitude in the end by logic but through intuitive perception. He called this exceptional faculty the 'illative' sense. It consists in the cumulation of probabilities, and that these probabilities are too fine to avail separately,

too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms. He further argued that it is the living mind of a particular person that determines the process of belief: “It follows that what to one intellect is a proof is not so to another and that the certainty of a proposition does properly consist in the certitude of the mind that contemplates it” (*GA*, 233).

The method he employed was to scrutinise how people make up their minds on non-religious issues and argue that by the same standards, religious beliefs were justified. In order to substantiate these claims, he provided his interpretation of the two types of reasoning: assent and inference.

2.4.1 Assent versus Inference

Newman’s analysis of assent and inference constitute his original philosophical contribution. He tried to reconstruct, redefine and salvage the modern European tradition from the loss of religious belief precipitated by the empiricist’s and rationalist’s epistemological standpoints that characterized modern thinking. Therefore, the analysis of assent and inference are the foundation of his theory of epistemology of religious belief.

The concept of assent may be traced back to Augustine in the fourth century and to Descartes and Locke in modern times. In its original meaning and usage, assent is about the ethic of human judgement in respect to one’s “theoretical position [as to] whether we are rationalists, empiricists, or realists” (Kłos 2021, 42). Assent has to do with the very nature of thoughts and conclusions. It is an unconditional acceptance of a proposition. Inference means the opposite. It is the acceptance of a proposition based on a condition. In other words, the acceptance of a conclusion in an argument is based on the antecedent premise as its consequent. Therefore, assent is unconditional because it does not rely upon premises to accept the veracity of a proposition. Inference, on the other hand, is conditional because the acceptance of the truth or false value of a proposition is dependent on the premises that support the conclusion (*GA*, 13-15). The conditionality arises from the dependence of the acceptance of its (the proposition’s) premise. Newman concisely states: “We reason, when we hold this by virtue of that [...]” (*GA*, 170). One more significant distinction between assent and inference is that the latter, being conditional, allows for degrees and the former, being unconditional, unlike in Locke, does not allow for degrees. This distinction is crucial to Newman because, in the words of Kłos (2021, 69), “if there is no gradation in assent, and assent is distinct from inference, then it could be metaphorically understood as a picture of the person at the moment of decision. At the moment of assent, the person reveals what he is; it is

like a momentary reflection in a mirror, but, of course, preceded by the personal history of maturation.”

Assent to truth in the form of propositional or mental assertion is necessary for the personal endeavour of acquiring knowledge. Besides that, the significance of this distinction to Newman is the ambition to explain and justify the possibility of moving from inference to assent. In other words, a person could move from conditional acceptance of a conclusion to an unconditional acceptance of a conclusion, particularly when the evidence or premises supporting the conclusion are only probabilities. Newman also characterized the movement from the conditional to the unconditional acceptance of a proposition as personal effort, personal reflection and certitude. Therefore, certitude is the fruit of personal effort. Certitude is to know that one knows. It is accompanied by the sentiment of peace, triumph, security and possession (*GA*, 204; 259). However, Newman ultimately was in favour of real assent. The important point in this approach is what rational extended beyond inference to include assent and to ultimately show that the concrete thinking person is not circumscribed by logic in his assent (cf. Kłos 2021, 45). Instead, there is a phenomenon called personal logic, and we need to stress that this is especially important in religious and moral matters. There is another crucial element of our thought besides reflection employed in the moment of assent: intuition. The reality of intuition, especially in moral matters and beliefs, explains why we often assent before later reflecting on the object of our assent (cf. Kłos 2021, 69-73).

Newman’s construction of an epistemology of religious belief was necessitated by his belief that the traditional arguments for the existence of God and religion/Christianity are too abstract. Consequently, they are too weak and come short of providing the motivational reason for belief in God and action. Besides, abstract propositions that deal with logical relations among notions lack the psychological force to excite the imagination and warm the heart. Hence, abstract arguments can only lead to a notional assent, not a real assent on the existence of God. We need to look at what he meant by notional and real assent to understand this fully.

2.4.2 Notional versus Real Assent

Newman sharply differentiates between notional and real assent. An assent is notional when the proposition apprehended is notional. A proposition is characterized as notional that consists of nouns or common names that denote the abstract, the general, and the non-existing (*GA*, 34). A proposition is real when the proposition apprehended is said to be a real proposition. Such a proposition is designated as a real proposition containing singular nouns that stand for units and individuals external to us (*GA*, 57). The distinction between notional

assent and real assent is meant to differentiate or indicate modes of apprehension of the same proposition. Commenting on Newman, Kłos (2021, 51) distinguishes between notional and real assent to that “[w]hat is notional and what is real exert a force on the mind, but the real, being concrete, exerts a much more powerful force. In the case of the real, our apprehension is stronger than in the case of the notional. Mere abstract terms or some general knowledge do not stimulate the mind in the same manner and to the same degree as a concrete influence does.”

A notional assent is an act of the mind accepting a proposition, following upon acts of inference and other purely intellectual exercises. It is an assent to a large development of predicates, correlative to each other or at least intimately connected (*GA*, 57). That is, a notional assent is merely an intellectual acceptance of an abstract proposition, while a real assent is an act of mind to accept a proposition, following upon experience and imagination.

Newman asserts that there are three ways real assent is brought about. First, when the mind acquires direct experience or knowledge of the concrete. Second, when the mind reaches out to the faculty of memory to access the present imagination of past things to have real apprehension of the past. Third, a real apprehension is reached through an inventive faculty called the faculty of composition. Consequently, a real assent has the following features: firstly, an image is involved; secondly, the image is presented to the mind by imagination; thirdly, real assents are personal.

Moreover, images, especially the mental ones, can make apprehension of a proposition more vivid and strengthen assent (*GA*, 58). A mental image brings home to the mind a picture of the object of the proposition, thereby causing the apprehension of the proposition to be more intense and livelier. That is something that mere abstract notions cannot do. The intensity generated in the mind due to the apprehension makes belief in the proposition stronger and effective (cf. Kłos 2021, 51). There is a psychological link between apprehension and assent. We will most likely give stronger assents to propositions that generate the highest emotions due to their vivid images. For this reason, mental images are capable of gingering belief and leading to action (cf. *GA*, 62, 63 and, 68).

In this case, the impressiveness and vividness of mental images on the mind are such a force to warrant assent even where sufficient evidence is lacking. Mental images can also stir up passions that motivate the will to action. Mental images can stir up such passions as love, hatred, hope, despair, and anxiety, which are motive powers of actions.

Newman believes that logic, inference, pure intellect, and notional propositions do not lead to action. However, he singled out the imagination as having the means of stirring those

powers of the mind from which action may proceed (cf. *GA*, 68). Therefore, Newman considers notional assent as weak because it does not try to picture the image of the object believed. As a result, notional assent cannot stir emotion toward the object. Newman, therefore, thinks there is a causal link between images and passions, such as love, hatred, hope and fear, which are always accompanied by the image of the object loved, hated, hoped or feared.

Real assent is stronger and more effective than notional assent because mental images play a significant role in producing assent. The perception of objects affects the mind far greater than mere apprehension of notions. Newman states that “intellectual idea cannot compete in effectiveness with the experience of concrete facts. Images and experiences strike us individually as the notions abstracted from them do not. In a condition of real assent, experiences and images strike and occupy the mind, exert a psychological force, and make an impression on the mind that nothing abstract can rival. Human nature is more affected by the concrete than the abstract” (*GA*, 29, 30).

For this reason, persons influence us, examples inspire us, and witnesses easily win us over. That is all because real assent is intensive, vivid, impressive, practical, compelling and, therefore, more potent than notional assent. Newman states, “[t]he heart is commonly reached not through the reason, but through the imagination, by means of direct impressions, by the testimony of facts and events, by history, by description. Persons influence us; voices melt us; looks subdue us; deeds inflame us” (*GA*, 92-93).

2.4.3 Certitude versus Certainty

Having established the distinction between assent and inference, Newman explicates his understanding of certitude and certainty and the possibility of attaining both, especially in religious and moral matters. This is important because certitude is only a form of assent. It is defined as “a deliberate assent given expressly after reasoning” (*GA*, 186). He states the general distinction between certitude and certainty in these words:

Certitude is a mental state; certainty is a quality of propositions. Those propositions I call certain, which are such that I am certain of them. Certitude is not a passive impression made upon the mind from without, by argumentative compulsion, but in all concrete questions (nay, even in abstract, for though the reasoning is abstract, the mind which judges of it is concrete) it is an active recognition of propositions as true, such as it is the duty of each individual himself to exercise at the bidding of reason, and when reason forbids, to withhold (*GA*, p. 344).

It is essential to look at this distinction closely. Certitude differs from certainty arising from logical propositions. Certitude concerns concrete acts that are somewhat personal than

merely logical. Certitude is akin to growing involves a personal maturity in assenting certain truths and concretely living by these truths. Hence, certitude is the product of personal effort achieved through a personal process that results in a better apprehension: Newman calls it a personal result. For Newman, the goal of life is to live by the truths we profess. Such a way of living is referred to as being authentic. Faith is a realisation that transcends natural difficulties to grasp the truth.

Certainty refers to the quality of propositions. The reception of such certainty is rather passive by the mind. On the contrary, certitude refers to the state of mind. It requires the active participation of the mind of the person. In certitude, there is the awareness of assenting and having reached certitude. There is also the consciousness of arriving at certitude (Kłos 2021, 82). Hence, the assured feeling is expressed in the phrase “I know that I know” (*GA*, 162-163), which means that no explicit explanation can be given. Certitude may rely on external effects; nevertheless, the effects must be actively received by the mind to become probabilities and subsequently become a foundation for certitude. While certainty on abstract external propositions is attained through formal logic, certitude in what is concrete is attained through informal logic, which consists in the convergence of probabilities. These probabilities must be independent of each other, arising out of the nature and situations of the particular case under consideration. Hence, in reality, we are deciding with consequent probabilities rather than clear and distinct ideas. These probabilities, when taken separately, would be of no use, and they are too subtle, too circuitous, too numerous and various to be converted into syllogisms. Newman believes that the accumulation of probabilities is the origin of our unrelenting and reasonable certitudes. There are other features or characteristics of certitude. Some definite characteristics are manifested when certitude is attained through reflection on the various inferences.

Firstly, certitude follows investigation and proof. It has a rational basis. Secondly, it is attended by a peculiar sense of intellectual fulfilment and peace. Thirdly, it is indefectible or unyielding. Newman highlighted the significance of each of these features of certitude by claiming that “[i]f the assent is made without rational grounds, it is a rash judgment, a fancy, or a prejudice; if without the sense of finality, it is scarcely more than an inference; if without permanence, it is a mere conviction.” (*GA*, p.258). We may note from the above characteristics that certitude is rightly seen as the result of personal effort (cf. Kłos 2021, 80).

2.4.4 Formal Inference versus Informal Inference

2.4.4.1 *Formal Inference*

This is also called logical inference or simply inference. Newman uses the terms interchangeably. A formal inference is also referred to as deductive logic and can be reducible to syllogisms. It is reasoning circumscribed along a specific channel to keep the mind on track when thinking. Syllogistic reasoning is put in an orderly manner by the use of words. A formal inference is reasoning determined or limited by words, propositions, and syllogisms. This is also referred to as verbal reasoning in distinction to mental reasoning. Logic is further considered as its scientific form. Formal inference overlooks propositions' truth or false value and centres on the mutual consistency or agreements in propositions. Therefore, a formal inference is comparative in its operations. Propositions that comprise unambiguous and straightforward words make comparisons easier and benefit formal inference. However, the best means of conducting formal inference is by using symbols, the simple reason being that their meaning is constant. Newman states:

Symbolical notation, then, being the perfection of the syllogistic method, it follows that when words are substituted for symbols it will be its aim to circumscribe and stint their import as much as possible, lest perchance A should not always exactly mean A, and B means B; and to make them, as much as possible, the calculi of notions, which are in our absolute power, as meaning just what we choose them to mean, and as little as possible the tokens of real things (*GA*, 173).

Newman identifies two aspects of formal inference that constitute its weakness and strength. First, to compare propositions effectively, they must have a narrowness of meaning. Second, it must also lack a depth of reality. Moreover, there are three deficiencies which he associates with formal inference: a) it does not prove its premises; (b) it does not reach the concrete and individual in its conclusions; (c) it is verbal and therefore inadequate in representing thought.

Nevertheless, Newman states that formal inference is the “boldest, simplest, and most comprehensive theory which has been invented for the analysis of the reasoning process” (*US*, 258). Besides, he considers formal inference as something natural to the working of the human mind. We think in logic as we talk in prose, without aiming at doing so, and we instinctively put our conclusions into words as far as we are able (*GA*, 186). Based on the above claims, a formal inference is a valuable scientific method, a principle of order, and an intellectual standard. Let us note what constitutes the advantages of formal inference as a scientific method. First, it enables us to progress beyond what gifted intellects could do by their unaided power (*GA*, 185-186). Second, it helps us find and verify conclusions. Third, it shows us the

coherence or weakness of a theory and where further experiment and observation are necessary (*GA*, 186). Fourth, as a great principle of order in thinking, formal inference catalogues the accumulations of knowledge and maps out the relations of the separate departments of knowledge (*GA*, 186). Fifth, as an intellectual standard, formal inference helps in providing a common measure between minds, thereby freeing us from ‘the capricious *ipse dixit* of authority’ (*GA*, 170/1).

2.4.4.2 Informal Inference

Newman characterises informal inference as a subtle and circuitous, delicate and implicit, intricate/complex form of reasoning (Cf. *GA*, 202, 208). It entails the cumulation of probabilities, each independently pointing to the conclusion but does not constitute or affect the conclusion like in demonstration/logic.¹⁵ Hence, by informal inference, the conclusion in the concrete matter is foreseen or predicted rather than grasped (*GA*, 208). His favourite example is that of a polygon inscribed in a circle that tends ever closer to the ‘limit’ of the circle as the quantity of its sides increases (*GA*, 208). Each known probability functions as an indicator to the conclusion, enabling the reasoner to be sure of a concrete and individual conclusion. Flanagan succinctly explains that “the probability attaches not to the existence of the evidence but to the judgment which each isolated piece of evidence will warrant” (Flanagan 1946, 101; Cf. *GA*, 201). Each known probability must be independent; otherwise, their cumulation would not have much meaning and strength to point out a conclusion (*GA*, 187, 202). In any case, the probabilities pointing to a conclusion must be in mutual agreement and confirm each other, thereby converging toward one conclusion (*GA*, 190). According to Newman, probabilities are too numerous and various, such that they cannot be formulated into a syllogism. As such, the accumulation of probabilities in informal inference is felt as a whole rather than an exact or precise enumeration (*GA*, 219). When all the probabilities are summed up as a single body, together with the conclusion, the mind receives them as proof. He asserts that “[w]e grasp the full tale of premises and the conclusion per *modum unius*... by a sort of instinctive perception of the legitimate conclusion in and through the premises” (*GA*, 196). This level of perception occurs in the way an object of sense presents itself to our view, not in separate parts but as one whole (*GA*, 196).

¹⁵ In a letter written in 1846, when a French edition of his *Oxford University Sermons* and *Essay on Development* were being prepared, Newman said, “I use probable in opposition to demonstrative.” (Ward, 168). Such a meaning for probable is not necessarily opposed to what is certain, but only to what is demonstrated. Arguments which are probable in the sense that they do not demonstrate the conclusion can still require an assent with certitude from us.

To differentiate between informal and natural inference, let us note that the latter process is entirely implicit, while the former is more or less explicit. The differences arise from the fact that in informal inference, probable propositions converge to one definite point, that is, the conclusion, is more or less explicitly prominent in the mind though not in all details, whereas, in natural inference, there is no explicit consciousness of antecedents at all (cf. *GA*, 197-202, 200-210, 215-220).

Besides, Newman notes the relation and effect of personal elements in the acquisition of truth in the processes of informal inference. The convergence of probabilities (often subtle and partly invisible) toward a conclusion in informal inference makes personal elements very important. This idea of the importance of personal elements in the acquisition of truth expressed here was hinted at by Newman in his *Oxford Sermons* and only fully developed in *Grammar of Assent*. He states: “A good and a bad man will think very different things probable” (*US*, 191; cf. also 237).

Hence Newman thinks that personal factors are necessarily involved in every stage of the reasoning process and affect an individual recognition of first principles and how a case is viewed, antecedent reasons and prejudice, and the acceptance of probabilities and their convergence. He identifies these personal elements concerning concrete reasoning: moral, intellectual, and experiential aspects. The moral character affects the perception and appreciation of the first principles of truth. Newman states, “perception of its first principle which is natural to us is enfeebled, obstructed, perverted, by the allurements of sense and the supremacy of self, and on the other hand, quickened by aspirations after the supernatural” (*GA*, 202). He makes a similar argument on the relationship between prudence and reasoning. He stresses the necessity and importance of prudence in all non-abstract proofs (*GA*, 206/7).

The *judicium prudentis viri* is the standard of certitude in all concrete matters, in practice and theoretical questions (regarding truth or falsity) as the supplement of logic (*GA*, 205). Besides prudence, the sense of duty and intellectual consciousness are the requirements for inferring in the concrete (*GA*, 207). Furthermore, particular fields of inquiry may require more moral qualities. For instance, religion: “They must be as much in earnest about religion as about their temporal affairs capable of being convinced, on real evidence, that there is a God who governs the world, and feel themselves to be of a moral nature and accountable creatures” (*GA*, 207). The lack of such moral grounding in an inquirer will lead to misunderstanding about religious matters.

Besides the personal moral elements in concrete reasoning, he emphasises intellectual and experiential factors in reasonings, which are also personal. Many other personal elements

concerning intellectual and experiential factors affect reasoning. Newman mentions the following: “The general state of our mental discipline and cultivation, our own experience, our appreciation of religious ideas, the perspicacity and steadiness of our intellectual vision” (*GA*, 198).

Similarly, because the personal element has an important effect in acquiring truth in concrete matters, it portends important consequences in how such matters are taught or learned. To this end, Newman opines that language should be used “to stimulate, in those to whom we address ourselves, a mode of thinking and trains of thought similar to our own, leading them on by their own independent action, not by any syllogistic compulsion.” (*GA*, 200/1). He believes that this method of teaching and learning will yield better output given how the mind works. The mind operates as a living and personal reality against a computer or machine engineered to give specific and predetermined results based on data inserted in it. On the other hand, learning is also affected by the importance of the personal element in acquiring truth. Newman states that “[o]ur criterion of truth is not so much the manipulation of propositions. But the intellectual and moral character of the person maintaining them, and the ultimate silent effect of his arguments or conclusions upon our minds” (*GA*, 196).

The reliability or trustworthiness of what is taught corresponds to the teacher's personal qualities. Informal inference and its processes are not artificial creations of man but the natural method by which we reach certitude in concrete matters from the nature of the case and the constitution of the human mind (cf. *GA*, 187). The human mind is so constituted by nature to use the method of converging probabilities if it is to reason toward concrete conclusions and attain certitude about them. Again, it is a law of our nature to accept as true and assent to propositions that are not logically demonstrated by their premises (cf. Ward, 258).

2.5 Natural Inference

By Natural Inference, Newman refers to instinctual reasoning that depends on experience and the person. He gives the example of a wise peasant who can accurately predict the weather without backing up his claim with scientific evidence. Newman considers natural inference as a mode of reasoning common to all human beings without exception. It differs from formal inference in that it is “not from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from whole to whole” (*GA*, 213-214). Natural inference works directly on concrete and whole realities without the mediation of propositions. A natural inference is characterized by its simplicity.

A natural inference is a simple act, not a process or series of an act (*GA*, 213). The apprehension of the antecedent followed by the apprehension of the consequent happens without recognising the medium linking the two, as if by a direct connection of the first thought with the second thought (*GA*, 187). In some cases, the antecedent is only indirectly apprehended as the antecedent, thereby ignoring the process of inference. Nonetheless, in some cases, the antecedent itself is also ignored.

According to Newman, “[t]o the mind itself the reasoning is a simple divination or prediction” (*GA*, 214). He attributes this simplicity of natural inference to instinctive perception. In other words, it means the reasoning process is unconscious, spontaneous, effortless, and implicit. However, it is important to note that Newman believes that the faculty called instinct is not equally possessed in strength and quality in persons (cf. *GA*, 213-214). Thus, he describes instinct as a “perception of facts without assignable media of perceiving” (*GA*, 216).

Because natural inference is instinctive, spontaneous, and unconscious, its procedure of arriving at a conclusion is unanalysable. Hence, it is impossible to render how a particular conclusion was reached comprehensively. A Natural inference can be likened to taste, skill, or discretion in conduct. These acts are exerted spontaneously and are not entirely explainable (cf. *GA*, 218). Newman hinted at this analysis of instinctive reasoning long before he published *Grammar of Assent*. He writes, “[a]ll men have a reason, but not all men can give a reason. The process of reasoning is complete in itself and independent. The analysis is but an account of it; it does not make the conclusion correct” (*US*, 259). He further explains this instinctive reasoning with the example of the mountain climber. He says that the mountain “it makes progress, not unlike a clamberer on a steep cliff, who, by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot; ascends how he knows not himself, by personal endowment and by practice rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to teach another” (*US*, 257).

Furthermore, Newman says that another significant feature of natural inference is that it is departmental. It is connected to a specific subject matter commensurate to the individual's aptitude. For instance, according to Newman, it is unlikely that because Newton and Napoleon were both geniuses for ratiocination, for that reason, “Napoleon could have generalized the principle of gravitation or Newton have seen how to concentrate a hundred thousand men at Austerlitz” (*GA*, 219). Individuals are gifted or skilful in different departments of natural inference. A Natural inference is not one general instrument of knowledge instead “a collection of similar or analogous faculties under one name” (*GA*, 219). That explains why

some persons are good and excel in one subject matter and are poor or ignorant in another (cf. *GA*, 219-220).

Because natural inference is departmental, it has an important consequence in acquiring knowledge. It requires learners to trust more people who have experience in their area of interest than logical science. Thus, new learners are exposed to the depth of the mental insights of their masters. He emphasizes practice and experience as a preferred medium of learning to reason (cf. *GA*, 221). He references Aristotle on this matter that

we are bound to give heed to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of the experienced and aged, not less than to demonstrations; because their having the eye of experience, they behold the principles of things (*GA*, 220).

Though natural inference is common to all persons, it comes by nature. It is associated more with non-literate persons (cf. *GA*, 213, and 214). Unlettered persons are ignorant of intellectual aids and rules such as logic and aides. We have cited earlier the example of a wise peasant farmer in predicting the weather. He may be unable to explain why he thinks it will be a fine day tomorrow, but this fact does not weaken his confidence in his prediction. His mind does not proceed step by step. He feels together with the force of various combined phenomena, though he is not conscious of them (*GA*, 213-214). These examples¹⁶ show how natural inference is both an instinctive, immediate and spontaneous perception of the conclusion without a conscious comprehension of its grounds, and consequently, the conclusion cannot be defended. The conclusion is about a concrete fact, and the unconscious reasons for the conclusions are themselves perceptions of concrete fact; words, inferences, arguments, and propositions are not employed to arrive at a conclusion. The conclusion is not dependent on any inference or proposition. The only grounds or justification for the conclusion are the past experiences of the reasoner and the actual truth of the conclusion.

2.6 The Illative Sense

Newman's dogmatic stands on matters of religion/faith cannot be overemphasized. Nonetheless, searching for certitude concerning these matters was a question not just of duty but the demands of nature. We "fulfil our nature of doubting, inferring, and assenting and our duty is, not to abstain from the exercise of any function of our nature, but to do what is in itself right rightly" (*GA*, 11). He was committed to the view that the human mind can attain certitude

¹⁶ Some physicians excel in the diagnosis of complaints, though they could not give defence for their diagnosis against that of another physician. Newton perceived mathematical and physical truths without giving proof: his rule for ascertaining the imaginary roots of equations was without proof for a century and a half and rested on no other evidence than Newton's sagacity.

in religious and concrete matters. Notwithstanding that, accounting for such certitude often fails, especially in religious matters. Assent is still warranted or justified. The question is, on what grounds? Newman agrees with Locke that truth about concrete matters is not demonstrable (cf. *GA*, 106). Thus, as we pointed out in chapter one, assent to any concrete proposition is always conditional. Following this line of argument, Locke asserts that certitude, if it exists, must admit of degrees and that there is no basis for unconditional assent. Such assent is impossible to prove beyond doubt. A dictum arising from this argument was not “to entertain any proposition with greater certainty than the proofs it is built upon will warrant” (Carr 1996, 133). Newman rejects Locke’s argument because it failed to distinguish between assent and inference. Newman contention is that there is an intrinsic difference between assent and inference. Carr (1996, 133) explains:

Locke fails to separate assent sufficiently enough from the trial of discursive reasonings that support it. And without doing so, assent is reduced to a mere echo of inference. But in fact, the former is not always dependent on the latter. Either assent is intrinsically different writes Newman, or the sooner we get rid of the word [...] the better.

Newman stated earlier that it is often the case that one is incapable of rationally accounting for his assent in some issues. Moreover, assent may be held while the grounds or reasons for holding it have long been forgotten (*GA*, 110-111). Besides, a sound argument/logic does not guarantee assent. Newman states that,

[v]ery numerous are the cases in which good arguments, and really good as far as they go, and confessed by us to be good, nevertheless are not strong enough to incline our minds ever so little to the conclusion at which they point... We refuse to assent at all, until we can assent to it altogether. The proof is capable of growth, but the assent either exists or does not exist (*GA*, 112).

Therefore, assent and doubt cannot both be held at the same time on a specific matter. Newman does not see the possibility of partly assenting to truth and partly holding doubts on the same truth (*GA*, 113).

If assent is the acceptance of truth, and the truth is the proper object of the intellect, and no one can hold conditionally what by the same act he holds to be true, here too is a reason for saying that assent is an adhesion without reserve or doubt to the proposition which it is given [...]. In the case of all demonstrations, assent, when given, is unconditionally given (*GA*, 114).

However, there is no reason to limit assent only to demonstrative proof. Doubt is natural and a fact of our existence. Newman states that we know this because we “think, feel, and act in the home of our own mind” (*GA*, 117). Again let us recall Newman’s example on the common belief that Great Britain is an Island as an instance in which assent does not admit of degrees, and neither is a firm assent based on demonstrable evidence as he states:

They do not, for instance, intend for a moment to imply that there is even a shadow of a doubt that Great Britain is an Island, but they think we ought to know [...] that there is no proof of the fact, in mode and figure, equal to the proof of a proposition of Euclid; and that in consequence they and we are all bound to suspend our judgment about such a fact, though it is in an infinitesimal degree, lest we should seem not to love truth for truth’s sake (*GA*, 119).

Therefore, if such truths elicit assent without an absolute demonstration, religious faith fails within this category of truth and reasoning. Religious faith requires an assent that cannot be demonstrated. The fact that such faith or truth is resisted is proof of its existence. Ker (1985, xx; cf. *GA*, 264) further explains that:

The Christian revelation may be demonstrably true but it is not true irresistibly because truth, like light, cannot be seen by the blind. Where assumptions are needed, Newman prefers to attempt to prove Christianity in the same informal way in which I can prove for certain that I have been born. First-principles are all important, and here belief in revealed truths depends on belief in nature. Before one can accept the arguments for Christianity, one must have a belief in God, in the individual soul, and in its relation to God.

The proofs for religion presume or assume a belief and perception embedded or garnered within a community by way of influence through varied sources. Newman holds that the arguments for religion then must aim at touching the heart (*US*, 75-98). This sort of argument does not follow the laws of logic. They instead grow and converge one upon another. They are intuitively perceived by a special faculty or power of the mind called the Illative sense. First, illative sense stresses that human reasoning arising from real life is necessarily situated, personal and subjective, which appreciates and perceives non-demonstrable concrete things. Second, illative demonstrates that human reasoning is personal, subjective, and often implicit, informal and even unconscious; it is nevertheless rational.

Informal and natural inferences are not entirely complete in their supra-logical processes without applying the principle of the Illative Sense. Newman describes the Illative Sense as the perfection or virtue of the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty (*GA*, 223). He further identifies it as: “[t]he power of judging and concluding in its perfection” (*GA*, 227-228). In other words, there is a perfection of the mind that helps an individual judge the truthfulness of the propositions that state the conclusion of the different types of Inference, many of which concern concrete things. This is what is called the Illative sense.

In comparison to logical inference, he says that “ratiocination is far higher, more subtle, wider, more certain than logical inference, and its principle of action is the Illative Sense” (Ward, p. 248). He further notes that although the illative sense is called a sense, it is an intellectual faculty. Finally, he clarifies that he uses “sense as parallel to our use of it in good sense, common sense, and a sense of beauty” (*GA*, 223).

For Newman, the Illative sense is the principle of concrete reasoning in everyone and the perfection of reasoning. As a faculty, everyone is endowed with an Illative sense. Besides, possessing it as a faculty implies the perfection of reasoning. Like Aristotle’s *phronesis*, which Newman refers to, the illative sense has two aspects: the first aspect is this power, in as much as it comes from the very nature of man; the second is this power as it exists in gifted or experienced reasoners (cf. *GA*, 229/230).

The function of the Illative Sense is to be the ultimate test of truth and error in our inferences in concrete reasonings (*GA*, 231); it is “a rule to itself, and appeals to no judgment beyond its own” (*GA*, 233). It transcends syllogism, rules and deals with the concrete. It is more versatile in applying reasoning processes than formal inference (*GA*, 233, 268-271). Newman again further appropriates Aristotle’s meaning of *phronesis* and applies it to the illative sense. Just as there is no sufficient test of poetical excellence, heroic action, or gentlemanlike conduct, other than the particular mental sense, be it genius, taste, sense of propriety, or the moral sense, to which these subject-matters are severally committed (*GA*, 232) so also is the Illative Sense the test of reasoning in the concrete.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Newman explored elements described in many ways as basic or primary assumptions of the mind, such as epistemic first principles, antecedent reasoning, collateral aids and starting points in the reasoning processes, which are more or less presumed rather than proved. Beneath these psycho ratiocinative elements is the profoundly personal/subjective dimension as the foundation of reasoning that Newman endeavours to unpack. Carr (1996, 96/7) rightly observes that

Newman, too feels that epistemology must concern itself first with what is happening in the individual mind as it comes to knowing what it knows; that epistemology is, first of all, an investigation into the roots of self-understanding. However, what it finds there embedded within human consciousness are first principles, that is to say, those fundamental, deeply held ideas about things that find their application in personal judgments and actions and that provide the foundation from which a person builds a worldview.

The human mind is not an external rule and can neither be said to be logical modes and figures that determine and guide the process of an argument. Instead, an inquiry involves varied factors and considerations; numerous aspects and different viewpoints from which things can or cannot be considered; memories that could and can determine the significance of a piece of evidence; unconsciously held principles that can influence the determination of what constitutes evidence in a given case.

There is no logic capable of encapsulating and wading through the complexities of inquiries into certain concrete subjects. According to Newman, the human mind is the only intellectual faculty capable of handling the complex and delicate processes that confront the human person concerning reasoning and knowing in the concrete. Newman’s implicit and instinctive reasoning means that the human mind is more than capable of attaining certitude and true knowledge about concrete things through subtle and variegated processes of thought.

Chapter Three

The Autonomy of Faith and Reason

3.1 Faith and Reason

An essential dimension of Newman's contemporary relevance lies in the significant articulation of the relationship between faith and culture. Our contemporary culture is characteristically scientific, technical, naturalistic, and mechanistic in many respects. However, as we noted in chapter one, the most notable aspect of modern science is its methodology which has helped to ensure enormous successes in the conduct of science. Consequently, this has influenced the adoption of the scientific method across other disciplines and resulted in the complete reduction of all reasoning to the model employed by science. In the above context, the relationship between faith and reason becomes scientific knowledge versus belief. Newman challenged the general reduction of rationality to a single approach and articulated a relationship of interdependence between reason and faith as his most significant contribution to the issue.

He rejects the narrow epistemology of the rationalists/empiricists and argues for a multiplicity of non-reducible cognitive habits which work in their own way in moving from grounds/evidence to beliefs. He cautions against the "usurpations of reason," in other words, the mistake of taking characteristics of one cognitive habit to be standard or the norm for others (*US*, 55-74). He maintains that Reason proceeds by direct and definite demonstration. It is limited to acquiring knowledge about man and the physical world. Antecedent considerations influence faith, on the other hand, enabling us to attain knowledge about the invisible and God. Kłos (2014, 118) explains that "[i]n reason we say that we know, and we are ready to present arguments on behalf of our knowledge; in faith, we also say we know, but do not feel it necessary to give reasons why." In maintaining this distinction, Newman accepts the rationalist-empiricist position. However, he is open to adding other forms of reasoning. The concrete human person reasons and involves all his faculties (cf. Kłos 2014, 118). Hence, Newman includes the empirical, psychological experiences and the idiosyncrasies of the person in his considerations.¹⁷ Newman's first point of consideration is the moral state of the inquiring person, which he argues functions as an antecedent probability regarding faith.

¹⁷ Kłos (2021, 105) further explains that "our procedure in knowing reality is an intricate intermixture of explicit elements—the conditional inferences from which we arrive at conclusions from premises—and implicit elements, from which we unconditionally assent to given propositions. Aside from principal knowledge, we need personal experience of the matter at hand in order to issue the right judgements. Instead of focusing, for that

Scientific knowledge is founded on demonstrable facts and follows a strict application of the methodology or principles of science. These principles are known and applied intuitively by the mind (cf. *GA*, 237). The conclusions reached, or results obtained through demonstration are also known intuitively and can be repeated to obtain the same results. The results can even be accurately predicted. We do not doubt our knowledge of the objects in our surroundings, and we apprehend self-evident truths, such as one plus one equals two or that a triangle has three angles. We know all that because such knowledge proceeds from either sense perception or intuition and the shared power of demonstrating the facts. In this way, Newman makes a clear distinction between the things dealt with by science that fall within the domain of reason and those that can only be assented to by believing and at the same time without descending into irrationality. This is the domain of faith.

A belief that counts as genuine knowledge relies on testimony rather than a personal discovery of the object of belief as something trustworthy. In accepting the testimony of another person as true, we will usually do so based on sufficient grounds that warrant our believing that it is true as reported. When belief is questioned, it is the grounds for holding such a belief, not the act itself. Without such sufficient grounds, belief becomes credulous.

Therefore, faith is a distinct form of reasoning based on presumptions rather than evidence or raw fact (*US*, 203/4). It is not contradictory to reason but capable of going beyond reason, and, as such, faith is above not opposed to reason. Because faith can go beyond sense or reason, it covers a wide area of knowledge compared to science. Newman states that “[h]ow few things there are which we can ascertain for ourselves by our own senses and reason” (*GA*, 194). There is a vast area of our lives that we rely on others for information. Much of what we learn in history and geography is beyond our personal experiences. We accept much of the contents of history and geography based on the testimony of trusted persons. Such events like past wars, natural disasters and the life and times of one’s ancestors are accepted based on the testimony of others. We can only believe these stories since we could not have been present when they occurred. Because these facts can only be accepted and acknowledged as accurate, they are less inaccurate. Certitude arising from belief constitutes knowledge compared to knowledge through the senses or reason. Therefore, according to Newman, we assent to propositions of belief and reason or sense in much the same way because assent is always

matter, on the objective truth of the Church, Newman emphasizes the fact that in his honest, inward-looking approach, man is capable of grasping this truth in his person. Therefore, he concentrates on our personal endowment, on our instinctive acquaintance with a particular case and the testimonies of others, rather than on formal argumentation. This is the groundwork of our belief. We should adhere to this personal faculty of our very person and trust it, rather than try to seek general knowledge and then apply it to our lives.”

unconditional, whether regarding scientific or religious beliefs. However, because some beliefs are not true, the problem of knowing which beliefs are true and differentiating between true and false beliefs arises. Newman in the *Grammar of Assent* tried to tackle this problem (cf. *GA*, 230-240).

It is important to remember that Newman thinks natural knowledge is the foundation for supernatural knowledge. In other words, natural knowledge prepares the mind for the reception of supernatural knowledge (*Idea*, 396-398, 415-416). Equally important is what he considers the boundary of reason, which is also the point of contact between natural and supernatural knowledge. When reason has expended its resources and reached its set limits, the mind makes the crucial switch from reason to faith (cf. *PN II*, 101). This raises the question of the nature of divine faith and how it arises in the mind. That forms the context of Newman's explication of the distinction and the relationship between faith and reason.

Newman defended the reasonableness of faith amidst the challenge of the rationalist-empiricist that requires the explicit demonstration of truth/knowledge based on evidence/facts as the ideal form of reasoning across all disciplines. He begins his consideration of faith by denying the assertion that "faith is but a moral quality, dependent upon Reason" (*US*, 182). The Cardinal rhetorically questions the statement: "Will anyone say that a child or uneducated person may not savingly act on Faith, without being able to produce reasons why he so acts?" He says, if the child or uneducated person does not require to produce such reasons for his or her actions, while then, "Reason need not be the origin of Faith, as Faith exists in the very persons believing, though it does test and verify it" (*US*, 183).

Newman contrasts faith and syllogistic reasoning as two different habits of the mind: "Faith is an instrument of knowledge and action, unknown to the world before, a principle *sui generis*, distinct from those which nature supplies, and in particular [...] independent of what is commonly understood as Reason" (*US*, 179). He comprehends faith as a habit of the mind. In his *University Sermons*, we read: "faith viewed as an internal habit or act, does not depend upon inquiry and examination, but has its own special basis, whatever that is" (*US*, 184). It is a property that helps the individual to dependably obtain a result properly. What is acquired by the habit of faith is knowledge. Therefore faith is a cognitive habit. When acts of faith are the origin or source of belief, the belief in question is asserted as correct, right, adequate, but it also constitutes knowledge.

Moreover, faith is independent, irreducible, to the habit of belief-formation, which Newman calls syllogistic reason. Newman asserts that "faith is independent of processes of

Reason, seems plain from their respective subject-matters”¹⁸ (*US*, 180). Faith is a principle *sui generis*, with its own unique basis. It is similar to other belief-forming faculties where substantial questions of great complexity are concerned: moral perception, conscience, judgment about other people’s character. He regarded the act of faith formally as a type of reasoning. That is to say, faith is a way of knowing and attaining the truth. It is a specific type of intellectual assent. Therefore, exercising faith is reasonable but differs from syllogistic or formal modes of reasoning.

Newman articulated an understanding of the relationship between faith and reason that entails no contradiction because faith understood as trust, assurance, or confidence is our usual and basic attitude and our common attribute in dealing with ordinary matters of life. In other words, we more often than not act on faith and act in such a manner that we act reasonably/rightly upon reflection, which entails a broader sense of reasonability. Newman categorised this broader sense of rationality or reasonability as certitude (cf. Kłos 2014, 113-116).

Furthermore, not all the arguments that justify a person’s beliefs need to be instantly cognitively graspable to the reasoner. Faith can exist without formal arguments because not everyone can prove their faith with the force of arguments. Faith is independent of reason, but that does not mean that the faith in question cannot be put into proposition or argumentative statements. Therefore true faith Newman says “admits but does not require the exercise of what is commonly understood by reason” (*US*, 255). The justification of faith lies in its success but first requires a spontaneous response in obedience before reflection. Newman wants to show

that the reasonings and opinions which are involved in the act of Faith are latent and implicit; that the mind reflecting on itself is able to bring them out into some definite and methodical form; that Faith, however, is complete without its reflective faculty, which, in matter of fact, often does interfere with it, and must be used cautiously (*US*, 277).

Following the above line of thought, he differentiates between the situation whereby a person has sufficient grounds for believing something on the one hand and on the other hand a person knowing and being able to tell the grounds for believing something.¹⁹ There are in several areas of belief formation proper grounds for believing something. That is the case in moral

¹⁸ Ker in the Editor’s Introduction to the Grammar of Assent further explains that Newman begins by rejecting the fashionable idea that faith is but a moral quality, dependent upon Reason. He poses the critical question: Will anyone say that a child or uneducated person may not savingly act on Faith, without being able to produce reasons why he so act? If not, then, Reason need not be the origin of Faith [...] though it does test and verify it. In fact, as Newman explains in the next sermon, the act of faith is sole and elementary, and complete in itself, as is indicated by the ordinary common view of faith as weak Reason rather than a moral quality or act following upon Reason.” (xxiv, cf. *US*, 202).

¹⁹ Pattison (1991, 147) cites a similar example in relation to ideas. “A child has valid ideas about its mother long before it can speak, and a person may have valid ideas about gravity without being able to articulate them.

perception and judgement. Newman states that “...in the case of questions in which party spirit, or political opinion, or ethical principle, or personal feeling, is concerned, men have a surprising sagacity, often unknown to themselves, in finding their own place” (*US*, 211). Nevertheless, these grounds may not be promptly comprehensible and articulated to the reasoner. He further states that people

may argue badly, but they reason well; that is, their professed grounds are no sufficient measures of their real ones. And in like manner, though the evidence with which Faith is content is apparently inadequate to its purpose, yet this is no proof of real weakness or imperfection in its reasoning (*US*, 212).

Similarly, he says:

The sheep could not tell how they knew the Good Shepherd; they had not analysed their own impressions or cleared the grounds of their knowledge, yet doubtless grounds there were: they, however, acted spontaneously on a loving Faith (*US*, 281).

Therefore, faith is a habit like other habits through which people can get it dependably correct in many areas. Newman cites the example of the skilful mountain climber, who understands the situation of the climb, and consequently who, “by quick eye, prompt hand, and firm foot, ascends how he knows not himself, by personal endowments and by practice, rather than by rule, leaving no track behind him, and unable to teach another” (*US*, 257). He also points to “the sagacity with which a great army general knows what his friends and enemies are about and what will be the final result” (*US*, 217). In similar circumstances like the ones mentioned above, getting it right in factual matters entails how sharp one’s instinct is apt to master such situations. Newman identifies such instinctive judgment with what he calls the Illative sense.

3.2 Reason

We have seen in chapter one that Descartes, at the dawn of modernity, sought to build philosophy on a sure foundation comparable to that of science and mathematics. This led him to reject previously accepted foundations of knowledge and everything that had the semblance of doubt. He concluded that the rational person could only entertain and accept distinct and clear ideas of the mind in the pursuit of true knowledge. Newman sees that as an error and rejects doubt as a starting point of reasoning. He argues that the human being is oriented towards the truth, aided by his natural faculties. Human doubt is not necessarily an obstacle; instead, it constitutes part of the cognitive process to unravel the truth. Doubt is natural to the mind. Newman states that “we do but fulfil our nature in doubting, inferring, and assenting; and our duty is, not to abstain from the exercise of any function of our nature, but to do what is in itself right rightly” (*GA*, 11).

Similarly, the human tendency to error is not a defect in human nature. Doubt, therefore, should be accepted as a reaction of the mind to error and limit to our knowledge. The recognition of that is important if we are to avoid the mistake of equating certainty with certitude which, according to Newman, are similar cognitive goals. Thus, the notion of truth is not affected by the procedure and standards of certainty. That is based on his understanding of reason and the reasoning process, which is personal.

Newman defines “Reason is the faculty by which we arrive from things known to things unknown” (*TP* vol. 1, 47). We live in a world of things broadly divided into material and immaterial. Their existence is independent of us and vice versa. Our knowledge of the material world is through the senses. Such is not the case with the immaterial world. Newman maintains that no faculty puts us in direct contact with the immaterial realities like the sense does with material realities “except indeed as regard our soul and its acts” (*US*, 205). Still, our knowledge of the world is better described as mediated by some instruments under certain conditions such as time and place. He asserts that

we must be near things to touch them; we must have light to see them; we can neither see, hear, nor touch things past or future. Now, Reason is that faculty of the mind by which this deficiency is supplied; by which knowledge of things external to us, of beings, of facts, and events, is attained beyond the range of sense.

Though Reason may be limited in its power, it is boundless in its reach, transcending the material world and touching the spiritual realm to bring us knowledge. On that basis, Newman maintains that every person reasons and reasoning is nothing other than gaining the truth from a former truth. Reason is self-conscious and self-reflective. “We not only feel, and think, and reason, but we know that we feel, and think, and reason; and not only know, but can inspect and ascertain our thoughts, feelings, and reasoning; not only ascertain but describe” (*US*, 256). Thus, a person is capable of reasoning upon his/her reason. “They reason upon their reason,” Newman states and consequently describes reason as “the faculty of gaining knowledge without direct perception, or of ascertaining one thing by means of another” (*US*, 256). Thinking is a personal act which is not based rules but on an inward faculty. Hence, we reason without effort or consciousness. The exercise of reason is a spontaneous living energy within us, not an art. Like a power, all persons possess reason, but it differs in range and quality as a self-reflective capacity (cf. *US*, 257). Newman says that “the gift or talent of reasoning may be distinct in different subjects *nevertheless* the process of reasoning is the same” (*US*, 259). That explains the possibility of people arriving and sharing the same beliefs, be they political or religious. Reason organises and puts order and uniformity

into the different and conflicting individual opinions/views. This is how we arrived at shared beliefs defended by institutions.

The differences in held beliefs or opinions arise not from the reasoning process itself “but in the first premises from which reason proceeded” (cf. Pattison 1991, 151). Besides, it also explains why some people are gifted in one area and less in another. St. John Henry Newman asserts that a person “remembers better and worse on different subject-matters, and reason better and worse. Some men’s reason becomes genius in particular subjects and is less than ordinary in others”²⁰ (US, 259). Hence, in this sense, reasoning is said to be departmental and admits of specialities (cf. GA, 230). Newman further differentiates between reasoning and the self-reflective process of reason, that is, reason investigating itself. He writes:

All men reason, for to reason is nothing more than to gain truth from former truth, without the intervention of sense, to which brutes are limited; but all men do not reflect upon their own reasonings, much less reflect truly and accurately, so as to do justice to their own meaning; but only in proportion to their abilities and attainments. In other words, all men have a reason, but not all men can give a reason.

He variously calls these two exercises of the mind: reasoning and arguing, conscious and unconscious reasoning, or implicit and explicit reasoning. In the introduction to *Grammar of Assent* Ker (1985, xxvi) gives a precise distinction between implicit and explicit reasoning:

Explicit or conscious reasoning is the analysis or investigation of implicit or unconscious reasoning: it means arguing as opposed to reasoning, it involves giving rather than having a reason. It is critical as distinct from creative reasoning and does not necessarily imply the possession of the latter, which again may be distinct in different subjects, though the process of reasoning is the same, so that some men’s reason becomes genius in particular subjects, and is less than ordinary in others.

Newman associates explicit or conscious reasoning with terms and activities such as “science, method, development, analysis, criticism, proof, system, principle, rules, and others of like nature” (US, 259). In comparison to science, faith is not based on explicit or conscious reasoning processes but on implicit reasoning which is natural reasoning as well. It is unconscious reasoning and largely automatic; it is a peculiar and personal mode of abstraction, “a power of looking at things in some particular aspect; and of determining their internal and external relations thereby” (GA, 256).

There is no reason to think that explicit reason is superior to implicit reason simply because the former involves greater rigour. Implicit reason is the subject matter of explicit reason. Implicit reason provides explicit reason with the raw data it needs to work on. Explicit reason reflects and puts in logical order or argumentative form that is already known through

²⁰ Newman (US, 260) further states that; “But his talent of reasoning, or gift of reason as possessed by him, may be confined to such an exercise, and may be as little expert in other exercises, as mathematician need to be an experimentalist; as little creative of reasoning itself which he analyses, as a critic need possess the gift of writing poems.”

implicit reasoning. Thus, implicit reason is enriched by explicit reason by the overt use of theories, deductions, definitions, and laws. Its function is to sharpen our natural and implicit powers of reason, not replace them. The process of implicit reasoning, according to Newman, “is complete in itself, and independent. The analysis is but an account of it; it does not make the conclusion correct; it does not make the inference rational. It does not cause a given individual to reason better. It does but gives him a sustained consciousness, for good or for the evil that he is reasoning” (*US*, 259).

We have seen earlier that for Newman, faith and reason are two habits of the mind. In other words, they are two distinct modes of knowing. Faith and reason are not unrelated types of knowing distanced from each other but two complementary modes of knowing. Newman will stress that each is complete in its process and a valid source of knowledge. Nevertheless, they have something in common. Like faith, reason, too, proceeds from a measure of assumption, presumption, and prejudice. Newman is emphatic that this is the base from which thought proceeds. Knowing for him is a personal act, very much like the act of faith. Unbelief and its opposite belief are based on presuppositions (*GA*, xxiv). Therefore, doubt is merely a possibility to affirm the contrary view or position; hence, it is a type of assent.

Faith is not irrational or unreasonable; it is an act of the mind and has its grounds obtained or gathered from differences, such as hope and desire. Faith begins with a habit of trust and gradually builds confidence in accepting things based on previously established grounds. This is how we believe that a source of information is trustworthy. There are many instances of belief without a complete proof (cf. *GA*, 106). According to Newman, it is impossible to make progress in our inquiry if we are first to establish that we are certain. By habit, we have come to trust our senses, our memory, and our daily sources of information. We continue to exercise such trust and confidence until they fail us. Faith arises as an acquired habit of trust with its object through frequent repetition over a considerable period. The human mind must, by necessity, be tuned to judge and to receive the truth. In the aforementioned sense, faith is synonymous with implicit reason that is guarded against error more by instinct and habit than by mental sharpness.

According to John Henry, the structure of reasoning and faith begins not by reasoning but by an apprehension of the object, which afterwards inclines our assent. The grounds for assenting are sorted out later and affirmed or asserted. There are numerous occasions in which we believe without understanding and consequently cannot prove. We often believe what we cannot understand and what we cannot exhaustively comprehend or prove. Conviction in the mind is often not something that occurs instantaneously. Rather, we gradually, over time, grow

into it. Concrete rationalities are not ultimate tests, but they are sufficient tests in practical rationality. Newman categorizes assent into two: notional assent, which consists of profession, credence, opinion, presumption, and speculation, and real assent, which he describes as imaginative certitude arising from real-world experiences of the individual. Assent to any belief can either be notional or real. Therefore, we attain certitude (a state of mind) all the time by orienting ourselves towards specific truths, and this existential encounter with our object of assent bestows our certitude a character or hallmark of irreversibility. We have noted earlier that persons possess an illative sense, “the power of judging and concluding, when in its perfection” (*GA*, 227/8) the correctness of inferences in the same ways that our prudence judges life practically. The judgment of illative sense includes decisions such as what authorities are worth placing our trust on. Therefore it will not be wrong to assert that all good reasons to some extent are founded on some measure of faith, and all true faith has some measure of reasonableness in itself.

3.3 Belief and Action

St. John Henry Newman had little or no interest in speculative philosophy, particularly German metaphysics. The dichotomy between action and belief is one of the areas he will disagree with Arians, liberals and Germans, for whom belief tended to be purely an intellectual preoccupation. Life begins when we believe and live by the truths we assent to. That is the case where belief is said to have an epistemic value; consequently, the said belief affects human conduct. According to Pattison (1991, 171), Newman agrees with Marx in criticising liberal Germans that “man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.” For Newman, belief and action are inseparable. Newman first made this connection when he argues, as we stated in the previous chapter, that theoretical propositions are less effective in inspiring action and touching the heart. That is because theoretical propositions engender notional assent. However, an act of belief and real assent can move a person to action (*GA*, 64). Therefore, belief and action are two aspects of a single reality: truth. Analogically speaking, Pattison (1991, 171) further explains:

Belief is for humans what knowledge is for God. God’s knowledge is always realized; so is man’s belief. For God to know the light is for light to exist. God’s truth is a perfect union of knowledge and action. Human truth is constructed after the divine model, but our truth is an imperfect pairing of belief, or the lack of belief, from which it proceeds.

That conception and expression of belief become the standard against which every thought and deed is measured. According to Newman, what justifies a person is a mind that acts

believingly (*GA*, 64). Action is critical to justification. Where a person's acts flow or proceed from his/her belief, it expresses truth. That is authentic living. In other words, belief and action merge to express truth. The intellect does not rest until it arrives at such unity or truth. The goal of life is to acquire true beliefs that inspire the right actions. Kłos (2021, 194) further explains that "[we] need to live an active life. Life is for action as Newman would say, i.e. the person is present in his acts." That squares perfectly with Karol Wojtyła's (1979) philosophy of human action.

As noted in chapter one, secularization led to the separation of politics, morality and religion (more on this in chapter four) as their ontological relations were denied. Secularization as a product of modernity triggered the challenge of the loss of the spiritual/metaphysical vision of the world and the inauguration of the secular and "mechanistic vision of the world in which the individual, within the confines of the independent intellect and limited only by sheer logic, expands the space of his absolutist choices" (Kłos 2021, 40). Consequently, religious belief ceased to be a reference to and motivation for human action. The separation of belief from action Newman thinks triggers every form of personal immorality and social anarchy. He accused the liberals of demoralizing belief to the extent that belief is merely intellectual, that is, a matter of notional assent. Belief, according to Newman, demands a view of life along with intellectual and real assent to realities outside of self. It requires an object and results in action. Newman's rejection of religious liberalism was the basis of his denunciation of modernism. Under the influence of liberalism, the modern world is heading to ruins because it does not believe and, thus, fails to act believingly (cf. Kłos 2021, 194).

Newman's emphasis on the necessary connection between good thought and good conduct can only be compared to a causal relation, that is, one necessarily follows the other, a doctrine that he was committed to. Newman's idea or thought is that if good conduct is required of all persons without exception, and good conduct is the result of good belief, then acquiring and maintaining good belief is important and not reserved for any class or group of persons. Consequently, acquiring and professing true belief is the highest obligation that binds every person without exception.

Newman started with a philosophy that placed reason under the instinctive guidance of the illative sense. However, when it comes to the theory of belief, reason has total authority in human affairs. Everyone learned and uneducated alike must obey or follow the dictates of their reason. Through instinct, we apprehend that God and truth necessarily exist. Nevertheless, it is the function of reason to organize these apprehensions into intelligible principles or rules for action. Belief is more than mere feeling or sensation but the recognition

and coordination of the sensation that results in action or decision. “Belief is what right reason makes out of pious instinct” (Pattison 1991, 174). For Newman, the primacy of belief meant that those below the age of reason were too young to have faith. Though the grounds for belief are intimated by instinct, belief is built on instinct. However, it is reason that holds them together. Similarly, “in religion, the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason” (*TP*. Vol.1., 27; cf. *GA*, 83).

For Newman, human action is controlled and guided by correct beliefs. Therefore, action for him is more than mere reflexes or involuntary actions. This is a well-known distinction made by Karol Wojtyła (1979) between the human act and the act of man. Action for Newman means conduct. It is the area of behaviour over which the mind is thought to exercise conscious control. Likewise, by belief, Newman did not mean mere rational acknowledgement of some propositions, but reasoning so intensely conjoined with feeling and instinct that it is tightly linked with what is personal and individual.

When there is an acknowledgement of a principle or law without the corresponding action or conduct, Newman refers to such recognition of principle/law as an inference or notional assent. Let us reemphasise again that an inference or notional assent does not affect conduct and is not worthy of the name belief. On the other hand, belief or real assent does affect conduct²¹ (cf. *GA*, 64; *JFC*, 327, 293).

Newman maintains a necessary correlation between belief and conduct. Good conduct must necessarily proceed from valid and reasonable belief as their source. Right reason is informed by true belief, which in turn proceeds from pious instincts instructed by right reason. If belief is false, if the instincts are perverse, or if reason is corrupt, the action that results will be wrong, no matter how noble in appearance. Good deeds must come from correct beliefs.

Newman argues that men ought to live by belief, and all life worthy of the name is lived by belief. The modern world lives in a state of (spiritual) paralysis because it does not believe. Newman writes: “Many a man will live and die upon a dogma; no man will be a martyr for a conclusion [...]. No one, I say, will die for his own calculations; he dies for realities” (*DA*, 293). The weakness and strength of liberalism lie in tolerating everything and

²¹ Pattison (1991, 175) explains that “Teenagers may infer from the laws of physics that a Camaro hitting a phone pole at one hundred miles is liable to pulverize its driver, and they may assent to the statement that anyone motoring at this speed violates the law. In spite of these acknowledgements, teenagers continue to behave as if they were immortal. They do not believe what they pretend to know. Here reason acknowledges but conduct does not reflect the validity of an idea, Newman calls such acknowledgment inference or notional assent, and dismisses them as unworthy of the name of belief. Acts of notional assent and of inference, do not affect our conduct, and acts of belief, that is, or real assent, do (not necessarily but do) affect it. Belief results when divine grace and human faith cooperate to rescue an idea from being a mere notion, and bring it home with power to the mind. This faithful belief exists only in its results. If teenagers really believed in the hazards of fast driving, they would try to drive slowly, although they might on occasion break the speed limit.”

believing nothing. Hence, toleration in such a manner is the worst enemy of (objective) truth and can only lead to unbelief which is the direct consequence of action divorced from the dogma of belief.

The implication of the texts we have analysed so far is enormous. We can make the critical connection or relation between truth and politics in Newman's thoughts. He stresses that belief or faith is a novel principle of action and that belief has primacy over action. In other words, belief precedes action, and at the same time, it is its source. In the words of Norris (2009, 76), "faith opens to the believer a whole world inviting to action and driving such action with a unique inspiration and energy [...]. Through faith, a unique principle of action enters history and trans-values all human thinking and acting. Ordinary mortals take upon themselves divinely appointed roles."

Therefore, where and when religion or faith is stifled, actions that originate from belief are hindered, and religious-minded persons are demoralized. They cannot participate and contribute fully to the social, economic and political life of the communities in which they are members. As stated earlier, right belief and right action are two aspects of a single reality: truth. Then truth is the end or goal, not the starting point, of human endeavour. Belief is for humans what knowledge is for God. God's knowledge is always realized, so is man's belief. For God to know light is for light to exist. God's truth is a perfect union of knowledge and action. Human truth is constructed after the divine model, but our truth is an imperfect pairing of belief, or the lack of belief, from which it proceeds. Belief thus conceived is the standard against which every thought and deed is judged. Besides, objective truth could be viewed as the instrument or bridge connecting heaven and earth, politics and religion. This is because Newman is emphatic that truth is one and there are no contrary or competing truths. Humans define themselves by their beliefs. Newman contended that belief is the base of human life, and economic, political, and social institutions are the superstructure. A culture built on false belief is destined to ruin because false belief is always subject to decay. Only a culture built on true belief can aspire to permanence.

The separation of belief and action has the consequence of denying religion its role as the bond of society. Newman traces the attempt to replace or displace religion as the bond of society, first from Cicero to Lord Brougham and Mr Bentham and lastly to Robert Peel. The latter had followed closely the teaching of lord Brougham and Bentham, both of whom were influenced by Cicero (cf. *DA*, 258). Education in natural science is the sure way of progress, and in acquiring the egalitarian form of knowledge, one "will feel the moral dignity of his nature exalted. We are harmonizing the gradations of society, and binding men together by a

new bond” (*DA*, 261). Newman critically assessed these remarks to note, among other things, that the knowledge Sir Robert Peel and his predecessors' offered was “not a victory of mind over itself but a mere philosophy of expedients.” Sir Robert Peel’s proposal amounted to mere speculation in disguise as enlightenment. He failed to substantially articulate any belief system or practice to substantiate these speculations into good actions. In the words of Newman, Sir Robert Peel neglected the higher instincts which steadily seek the truth but assumes the human person to be a mere calculating machine operated by unaided secular reason (*DA*, 258-261). Pattison (1991, 178) notes that Newman was a rationalist whose philosophical rationalism was anchored in an instinctual commitment beyond reason. Hence, for Newman, objective reason was always in danger when left alone to fend for itself without the pious support of subjective reflection. In objection to Sir Robert Peel’s primitive scientism, Newman stated that “man is not a reasoning animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal” (*DA*, 294). In his order of the hierarchy of values, Newman maintained that man’s instincts for God and truth must be addressed before his reason is engaged. “First comes Knowledge, then a view, then reasoning, and then belief” (*DA*, 293). In agreement with Cicero, Peel did not only prioritize reason over faith, science over religion and theology but excluded faith in the formation of moral and religious character. But Newman wants the formation of the moral and religious character of the citizens through faith to come first (which is the function of religion), before utility and amusement to follow accordingly. That follows from the understanding that Christianity is primary in building the character of individuals and consequently the foundation of society (cf. *DA*, 294).

3.4 Newman’s Concern with Certitude and Truth

The search for certitude characterizes Newman’s philosophical endeavour. The search for certitude also forms a thread binding all his intellectual investigations. We can discern a relentless pursuit of certitude from the *Arians* to the rest of his publications. Without the possibility of certitude, there could be no progress in the search for truth or knowledge. For Newman, certitude is a qualitative enhancement to knowledge, truth, and understanding. It is, “[t]he perception of a truth with the perception that it is a truth, or the consciousness of knowing, as expressed in the phrase, I know that I know (*GA*, 197).

In his considerations, it was crucial to reach certitude because in attaining certitude, we do not only know the truth, but we possess it, and, more importantly, we can know the reason for the truth. Besides, we can offer a satisfactory and rational explanation for our assent. To appreciate Newman’s quest for certitude, we recall from chapter one that rationalists and

empiricists claim that demonstration or formal logic is the only foundation for any certainty. Religion has no such certainty (cf. Biglietto speech May 12, 1879). In other words, liberalism claimed that there is no positive truth in religion (cf. *Apo*, 294-296). The implication of this stand was clear and frightening to Newman. It reduces all dogma to opinion or personal sentiment and, consequently, truth and certitude are not akin to all forms of theology. The long-term consequence of the stand of liberalism is the complete annihilation or obliteration of religion and the establishment of atheism, with foreseeable dire consequences. Therefore, in the words of Kłos (2021, 40), “[a]t the time when the applied sciences ruled, traditional views were being undermined, and the revolutionary turmoil seemed to have spread over all the continents, Newman stood up first in defence of the person, and then of the Church with her transcendent claims and her dogmatic structure.” Newman defended the truth by personation i.e., he live by the truth or gave a personal witness to the truth he had come to believe. The importance of that kind of witnessing to and defending of truth still matter today. He asserts that there is positive truth in religion, and there is certitude, that is, the awareness of the positive truth.

3.5 Why Truth Matters

The question of truth in the nineteenth century was and remained an important issue in liberal democracy. Social relations and communications (free speech) should be based on a clear notion of truth that forms the foundation of a free democratic society. Kłos (2003, 165) asserts that “it is on such foundations that responsibility is shaped.” Without settling the argument of what truth means, what it is or whether truth is objective or subjective, it is commonly accepted that there is truth. However, the awareness of its existence does not automatically translate into grasping or possessing it, whether we believe it is given or made (cf. Maryniarczyk 2016, 78/9). Whichever side of the debate one belongs to, truth entails a process of discovery or revelation that is open and unending (cf. Maryniarczyk 2016, 75). The direct corollary from the above view is that while truth can be said to exist, humans cannot know it in full at once. However, the implicit assumption here is that the truth can be known, and such knowledge has its satisfactions besides its usefulness or benefits because the human intellect, as we said, is made for truth (cf. Maryniarczyk 2016, 77). That explains and justifies the human search for meaning.

The desire for truth transcends time and change. Therefore, comprehending truth and bringing it to bear upon existence exacts the greatest positive influence in a person’s life. However, that is far from claiming that everyone loves the truth and would like to base their

lives on what that truth entails. In this sense, truth is implicitly connected with action, such that action, whether it is speaking, being silent, doing or not doing, is the expression of truth. Consequently, finding the truth is crucial in getting it right. Thus, truth precedes and at the same time inspires and influences action. In this context, the search for new knowledge and truth makes sense but only when the discovery of new truth entails the commitment to a corresponding action or behaviour (cf. Maryniarczyk 2016, 78/9).

The human condition is the point of departure in the quest for knowledge and truth, which translates into progress. Nature had endowed human beings with intellectual abilities higher than animals. In comparison, animals have survived and are settled naturally in their environment guided by their instinct. Meanwhile, humans have developed a culture that has facilitated their superior adaptation and survival based on their intellectual abilities and driven by a sense of purpose and progress.

Besides communicating and solving fundamental problems of existence/survival, humans have developed a complex web of mutual interdependence and cooperation as part of cultural evolution. It is also only humans who can self-reflect on their existence and consciously set themselves out on the part of discovery or search for meaning and truth. Furthermore, only human beings are bothered about the ultimate origin and end of life, the destiny of the world and their place in it. Seeking and finding the answers to these ultimate questions of life is the essence and the true meaning of the human search for truth (cf. MacIntyre, 2014, 55). The relentless search for truth means constantly extending the frontiers of knowledge in an attempt to answer the theoretical question of 'why' on the one hand and on the other hand the practical question of 'how.'

However, the search for meaning and truth comes with the humble recognition that the human mind is limited in its capacity to view and grasp the whole of reality from one standpoint and comprehend the whole truth from that standpoint. Besides, human life is finite and fragile. Its lifespan is too short to acquire all the knowledge there is to know. Therefore, human finitude, vulnerability, and the limited nature of human powers mean that we are dependent animals (cf. MacIntyre 2014, 1-5).

We rely on other persons' strength, expertise, knowledge, powers for our well-being and continuous survival. Therefore, human society and cooperation appear natural and fundamental for our survival. However, human action would be impossible if we knew every detail about our decisions before acting. Hence, we must trust others in what they say and represent, as Newman will require us to trust and rely on our natural faculties. Thus, we have roles and responsibilities arising from belonging to the community. This is an existential

human condition that engenders trusting others on the things and areas of life that we do not know or have the capacity to understand that they do and are experts on. In this sense, trust and sincerity are natural virtues and the duties we owe each other without exceptions. In this sense, a bridge of trust or compromise of sincerity has moral and legal implications. If everyone lied, deceived, concealed the truth in our search for meaning, collective actions/goals would be impossible, and our long time survival and progress would be frustrated.

Human beings are social and political animals that embody those relationships of giving and receiving through which our individual and common good can be achieved (MacIntyre, 2014, 129). This sort of shared human survival depends, but not exclusively, on the collective recognition of the virtues of truth, trust and sincerity as the foundation of the political society. Newman understands religion to provide these virtues and more for the wellbeing of society.

As we have seen from the beginning of this chapter, the question of faith, especially its expression as trust, is significant to Newman. That is immediately seen from the moment and from the perspective that he considers faith as the principle of action and a natural human faculty at *par* with the intellect/reason (*GA*, 73). Faith as a principle of action means it is a source of action, even if it is only so indirectly. Furthermore, faith is at *par* with reason, implying an epistemic value. Finally, we reiterate that faith constitutes an independent way of arriving at knowledge that is non-contradictory but rather complementary to reason. Hence, faith and reason co-exist in the human subject, not in opposition as asserted in the pre-modern era. To buttress these aspects of faith, Newman undertook to look at the concrete human experience in the exercise of faith (Kłos 2014, 113).

Let us repeat here by emphasising that he observes that the concrete person found in a real situation is in a state of functional disarrangement. Newman uses the phrase ‘functional disarrangement’ to underline the fact that human existence and knowledge begin at a stage of chaos, confusion and conflicting words and images in concrete situations as against the clear and distinct ideas of Descartes. That means that our starting point is not certainty or certitude, and it is neither doubt. Our starting point is trust. A person is called to choose that or this and act that way or the other way despite this challenge of uncertainty and confusion. At the person’s disposal to navigate through the chaos and confusion are his/her faculties, and he/she has to trust them to be able to make the right decisions/choices that, in the end, are his/her personal effort and responsibility. Trust is prior to certainty. The chain of trust begins with us trusting our faculties and then trusting others and accepting what they say. Therefore, trust is at the very foundation of human existence, such that neither life nor action is possible without

it (*PPS*, 124). This kind of faith arises from our concrete situation as finite beings in relation to our abilities and knowledge.

Consequently, we rely on others and necessarily fall back on others in faith/trust on those matters that we are incompetent. Hence, faith is important because it enables us to transcend the limits of reason to know metaphysical realities. Besides, faith, i.e. trust, open up the possibility of building interpersonal and interdependent relationships that create social bond/cohesion and cooperation necessary for the survival and growth of any society. Therefore, trust enables the attainment of those goals that individual abilities cannot achieve without the help and cooperation of others in society.

3.6 The Notion of Truth

Newman's credentials as a philosopher and the originality of his ideas are no longer in doubt. There is certainly a philosophy that is original to Newman as his own. Though Newman did not develop and state this philosophy concisely. His thoughts on truth and assent constitute an integral part of his philosophy. However, he did not define and articulate a theory of truth at any length. Instead, there are scattered in his writings statements that indicate the notion of truth with which he operated and which formed the foundations of his philosophy. In this section, I will reconstruct his notion of truth. That will be followed by articulating the process and importance of attaining truth as the basis of human existence. That leads to considering conscience and belief, their significant role in comprehending the truth. That is something Newman referred to as realisation. It is important to note here the context he explicated these concepts: truth, conscience, and belief/fait. As we noted in chapter one, he considered the influence of liberalism, e.g. an erroneous conception of liberty, as the main reason behind the breed and spread of heresies. His preoccupation with understanding the roots of heresy, on the one hand, and the other hand, the position of the Anglican Church prompted him to contemplate the subsistence of truth. By and large, in a constantly changing world on the one hand and on the other hand, the developmental nature of the human mind in acquiring knowledge as something continually both in motion and being acted upon from all sides, which developed at this time, is essential to his subsequent account of certainty as part of a process of convergence (cf. *Dev.* forward by Ian Ker, xvii - xxvi).

Truth was variously understood and appreciated by many in the Victorian Age. The fact that liberalism dominated the pattern of thinking and acting meant that the Victorian Age and the modern era generally was the age of many and competing truths on various objects/phenomena. That was evident in many Christian sects, religions, and different

philosophical theories of truth (cf. Hughes 1998, 41). The peculiarity of Newman arises from his assertion and insistence of the existence of divine truth(s) and the endeavour to explain and relate human existence, action and history to believe in this truth. In other words, he was concerned about the truth as the driving force and the working principle of the person. How the truth is comprehended and accommodated by the person moves him/her to say that he/she has responded to the truth. The truth in question is not just an abstract principle that appeals to the intellect, but as something realised by the individual. It must be observed that the word *realization* itself is one of key words in Newman's vocabulary. The individual with such realisation of the truth becomes a centre of attraction by a concrete and personal expression of the truth. We see here the link between truth and action. This connection we saw in the previous chapter is further extended to belief and action. Therefore, religion and politics, like belief and action, are distinct and independent but connected as the expression of truth (cf. *Dev*, 33). Newman was convinced that truth and morality consonant with a particular religion could be mediated appropriately through the power of personal presence, in Newman's term personation. As noted in the previous chapter, he considered abstract principles responsible for the notional expression of religion too remote to move the person to action.

Newman operated with a notion of truth associated with Aristotle and later Thomas Aquinas, classified under the correspondence theory of truth. The closest Newman came to answering what is truth begins with recognising that the object of knowledge is truth. Truth means facts and their relations, which are more or less subjects and predicates in logic. These facts and relations are grasped by the mind resulting in knowledge. Hence, the truth here is equated with facts which implies factuality capable of being experienced and knowable (*Idea*, 39). In some other places, the words: fact, idea and principle are used interchangeably to mean the same. Whether we call them facts, ideas or principles, many of which are discoverable by human reason independent of external influence. While a good many of which are merely given. The complete grasps of these truths and their relations are not possible without divine assistance. They are the object of belief. Principles are primary or fundamental and are beyond proof or demonstration. This manner of understanding truth is important because truth, especially at the metaphysical level, is independent of the mind. It is not a construction of the mind or reason that is a logical truth. It is neither truth by consensus; that is political truth.

Newman maintains the connection between truth and being, which recognizes the order of things or hierarchy of truths in the world, making truth the foundation for religion and politics. That is what Newman meant when he states that the measure of truth does not depend on the rightness and manipulation of a proposition but rather on the person's moral character

maintaining them (*GA*, 302). Thus, truth relates to character/action. In other words, there is a correlation between truth and action. The determination of the relationship falls within the faculty of conscience as a judge and moral dictate. It is also possible to see the connection between truth, morality and religion. That is because, as shall be seen later, when we consider truth and conscience, Newman relates the fact of religion to conscience. I consider these connections or relations crucial because they form the foundation for religion and politics in truth and help to resolve the conflict between them.

We have been speaking of truth in general, its nature and characteristics, without distinction. However, given that we are looking at the problem of truth in religion and politics in Newman's thought, it is essential to briefly explore the different kinds of truth concerning the two faculties of the human mind he explores in his writings, the faculty of reason, responsible for the quest for knowledge, and the faculty of faith, responsible for the quest for meaning. The faculty of reason concerns mainly truths of fact or factual truths and rational truth. The faculty of faith concerns the revealed or divine truths and religious truths. These forms of truths belong to the order of supernatural knowledge and are called supernatural truths. Truth, in this sense, is a given. That means that the human mind, unaided, cannot attain such truths as supernatural/divine truths (cf. *US*, 318).

Factual truths and rational truths belong to the order of natural knowledge and are called natural truths. They are verifiable, demonstrable, and knowable by applying the principles of reasoning. Factual truths are those truths that the mind can correctly comprehend through sensual perceptions and are dependent on sensory evidence. The force of evidence establishes the certainty concerning factual truth. The sheer power of the intellect reaches rational truths like mathematical truths or logical truths. Even though factual and rational truths are different, the intellect ensures that humans grasp and postulate both types.

The road to truth begins in the mind, which is home to many ideas received from various sources and categorized as true or false, useful or useless, abstract or concrete. Some true ideas are abstract and correlate with objective realities outside the mind. The mind instinctively performs this function. The conclusion reached by the mind forms its belief by which it compares and contrasts its ideas and, subsequently, forms its judgments, strictly based on the law of reason. Reason helps the mind state its beliefs in propositional forms (*Dev*, 33-37).

That means the mind could choose any view or vision of life. Different ideas open up the possibility of choosing a right or wrong vision of life. The possibility of the mind arriving at truth depends on making the right choice. Each view leads to a specific belief system and

set of truths that conforms to it. The world and life lived in its spiritual and physical dimensions as it is, is a construct based on freely chosen beliefs.

Consequently, each person is responsible for his life because he is responsible for his freely chosen belief, which is crucial to the methodological process of discovering the truth, which inspires his/her actions. Newman dealt with how different people with different ideas could arrive and hold the same belief or truth (as we shall see in the next section and chapter) in his theory of the development of ideas.

It is the nature of truth to be abiding, permanent and eternal. Hence truth will be truth irrespective of time and place. That makes truth absolute, universal and objective to the believing mind. Truth in this sense provides a firm foundation for life. Such truth should not be subject to arbitrary alterations because certitude, once attained, does not change to the contrary and, therefore, cannot fail (cf. Kłos 2021, 92). In the words of Newman, “If by certitude about a thing is to be understood the knowledge of its truth, let it be considered that what is once true is always true, and cannot fail, whereas what is once known need not always be known, and is capable of failing. It follows that if I am certain of a thing, I believe it will remain what I now hold it to be, even though my mind should have the bad fortune to let it drop” (*GA*, 130). This can be interpreted to say that truth is a (divine) order, how things are and should be. The discovery of this order by the mind will then mean certain knowledge. The mind naturally tends to this order that is the truth. In other words, truth is the natural object of the mind.

From the Christian point of view, the discernment of divine truth rests with authority, the Church (*GA*, 127).²² Intriguingly, Newman also affirms the authority of individual conscience, which continually prompts reason to seek out the truth. He notes that heresy sometimes results from a wrongly held private and subjective judgment about the truth (*Apo*, 283). However, the paradox is that heresy has contributed to the progress and shaping of understanding of the truth. When authority like the Church (or political authority) acts to condemn heresy, as it often does, it ends up helping to clarify the truth. The prevailing clash between private judgment and authority demarcates the sphere of truth, from which dynamically it is exhorted indefectibly forward.

Truth contravenes the everyday and ordinary view and thought of men. It is against the province of common sense and expediency. Thus, it is often opposed and “despised by the

²² The infallible voice of the Church is necessary: “some rule is necessary for arranging and authenticating these various expressions and results of Christian doctrine.” This teaching authority is necessary “to impart decision to what is vague, and confidence to what is empirical, to ratify the successive steps of so elaborate a process and to secure the validity of inferences...” (*Dev.*, p. 77).

intellect of the day” (Ker 2009, 311). However, it is the nature of truth to prevail against opposition and errors. Truth is assailed not only by external forces but by internal forces like doubt. That arises from the nature of the mind, and it is the imaginative powers of being able to cross-examine its grounds compared to other minds (cf. *Dev*, 39-40).

Our assents to various propositions are spontaneous, this means we assent without any form of intellectual reflection. This happens at the subconscious level. We may recall again the belief for example that Great Britain is an island. But let us cite another example like the belief about the origin of ones ancestors. This belief is based on the trustworthy testimony of persons we trust such as our parents since we have no empirically verified evidence to warrant such a belief. But it happens sometimes that we forget the initial reasons why we belief, or have never consider the bases of our assent to a particular belief we hold. Assent moves from simple to complex when we rationally reflect on the basis of our knowledge. Now assent becomes a conscious, deliberate reflection on what we have already assented to. This movement from a simple assent to a complex assent is called ‘Investigation.’ Newman defines Investigation as the rational process of examining the grounds for the truth of a proposition to which we are giving assent. The investigation of the truth of a proposition does not demand or involve the suspension of assent in the process of investigating the grounds of our assent. Meanwhile, where and when assent is completely suspended in the course of determining the truth and falsity of a proposition, Newman calls this reasoning inquiry. (*GA*, 105-123). According to Newman, “He who inquires has not found; he is in doubt where the truth lies, and wishes his present profession either proved or disproved.” (*GA*, 125). Inquiring necessarily entails doubt on a proposition and is inconsistent with assent and therefore differs from Investigation.

Newman attributes the inherent power of truth to its divine origin. Truth is a mystery, and as such, it is beyond what language can completely encapsulate in expressions, but at best symbolises ((cf. *US*, 318, *Dev*, 35). Truth is not contained in propositions and verbal formulae. Truth, however, is in the personal and tacit actions of human thought and intuition. Newman further states: “Truth is vast and far-stretching, viewed as a system, and, view in its separate doctrines, it depends on a combination of various, delicate and scattered evidence; hence it can scarcely be exhibited in a given number of sentenced” (*US*, 90). That is particularly applicable to divine truth, the certainty and strength established by the convergence of probabilities as evidence. Truth for Newman is complex and multiform, of which no single mind can apprehend completely. The human mind never fully comprehends truth but relentlessly seeks it. In this sense, truth becomes the object that the mind continuously tends

toward. Besides, the mind is confronted with the dynamic nature of knowledge which is changing and expanding (cf. *Dev*, 37).

3.7 The Unity of Truth

In chapter one, we recall what we said concerning the dualism and dichotomy introduced by modernity: the mind-body problem and the division between faith and reason, science and religion, reason and will, knowledge and belief. In this dichotomy, one set of the aspects about the human person (such as mind, reason, science, knowledge) was emphasized to the detriment of other aspects (such as the body, faith, religion and will). Consequently, the contrivances of the human mind and their mechanical consistency and logical accuracy or soundness were valued above practical conduct. However, this problem can be traced back in the history of philosophy to the ancient division into the theoretical and the practical (cf. Kłos 2010, 173). To reconcile these divisions, Newman considered the human person and his mind from the intellectual and moral standpoint to establish and emphasize an integral vision of the human person. In that vision, each part constitutes an integral part of the person in which the division is complementary, not disjunctive.

Newman's considerations of the unity of truth and unity of knowledge come under his general discourse on the exclusion and relegation of religion to non-knowledge producing activity and confining of religion to the private and personal concern of individuals who might be interested (cf. *Idea*, 23; 257). As we noted in chapter one, theology was commonly considered not a science *per se* because the object of religious/theological knowledge is beyond human experience and the full grasp of human reason (cf. *Idea*, 258).

Furthermore, the methodological or systematic application of science as an instrument in acquiring knowledge is wholly not applicable in the domain of theology. Thus, in particular, theology was considered incapable of yielding certain knowledge. Therefore, theology falls short of being a science (cf. *Idea*, 22). Newman was keenly aware also of those who thought that theology and human science are two distinct and independent provinces of knowledge with no relationship or meeting point. In arguing that theology is a science (cf. *Idea*, 23), he first defends the capacity of the mind to contemplate and know reality variously beyond the borders circumscribed to it by rationalists and empiricists. We shall give Newman's complete defence when dealing with his epistemology of religious knowledge.

Second, he insists on the unity of truth. All knowledge from the individual sciences constitutes a whole. In other words, particular sciences are parts of a single whole and truths discovered or attained in theological sciences or from religion are not only a portion but a

condition of general knowledge (*Idea*, 55-75). Thus, Norris explains that, “[t]he mind is greater than all its works, of which demonstration is only one, and science a product! In the power of the intellect to reach true judgment, which Newman colourfully calls the illative sense, the human person reaches reality, that which is” (Norris 2010, 140). Newman accepts that science is an instrument in acquiring knowledge with a distinct methodology and object of investigation. However, he rejects the attempt to limit the capability of the mind to understand reality as a whole only by natural science. The limitations imposed on the mind by rationalists and empiricists are arbitrary and superficial. They limit knowledge to sense experience and certainty to the amount of empirical and rational evidence the mind can demonstrate on a given reality (cf. Norris: 2010, 140). The human mind is equipped to acquire knowledge that it resolutely sets out to attend without missing. (cf. *US*, 260).

Consequently, Carr (1996, 93-96) explains that knowledge of reality is to be sought less in abstract reasoning than in the active thinking, feeling and willing of human existence. Human knowledge is not the exclusive activity of the mind in isolation but the living person as an individual with all his natural endowments as a unique individual. Human knowing should be based on a clear vision of a concrete person as he is found in his unique circumstances. The limitations imposed upon the knowing act by human finitude means that the human mind or the intellect is naturally structured and conditioned to investigate reality in its various aspects as parts of a complex whole. Therefore, knowledge is the proper apprehension of these realities and their mutual positions and relations (cf. *Idea*, 39). The mind cannot apprehend existing reality at a glance. In other words, there is no single standpoint extensive enough in its range or reach to encapsulate reality and make it comprehensible to the mind at a glance.²³ Reality is made of constituent parts that are interconnected without strict borders and running into one another as seen by the intellect, to form a single whole, that is the combination of all existing things/beings: “from the internal mysteries of the Divine Essence down to our own sensations and consciousness, from the most appointment of the Lord of all down to what may be called the accident of the hour, from the most glorious seraph down to the vilest and most noxious of reptiles” (*Idea*, 39). The mind progressively gains possession of the knowledge of reality by attending to its various parts and sides, one after the other; mastering one thing at a time as it moves continuously towards apprehending the

²³Similarly Newman explained in *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, “that, from the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and perfection of great ideas; and that the highest and most wonderful truths, though communicated to the world once for all by inspired teachers, could not be comprehended all at once by the recipients, but, as being received and transmitted by minds not inspired and through media which were human, have required only the longer and time and deeper thought for their full elucidation. This may be called the Theory of Development of Doctrine.” (Ker ed., 1989, p. 214).

complex fact as a whole by the use of different instruments, which Newman calls sciences as he explains:

So by degrees and by circuitous advances does it rise aloft and subject to itself a knowledge of that universe into which it has been born. These various partial views or abstractions, by means of which the mind looks out upon its object, are called sciences, and embrace respectively larger or smaller portions of the field of knowledge; sometimes extending far and wide, but superficially, sometimes with exactness over particular departments, sometimes occupied together on one and the same portion, sometimes holding one part in common, and then ranging on this side or that in absolute divergence one from the other (*Idea*, 32).

All sciences could be said to have partly the same object or partly different objects and are at the same time grouped in units or separated into single units based on how and from what specificity they view their subject matters. That explains their interconnection and dependence. No single science is exhaustive and complete in the information or knowledge of its subject matter and often depends on other sciences to build, consolidate or launch its investigations. The primary function of the sciences is to inform the mind about the mutual relations of things, their interdependence, and interconnectedness “because truth of any kind can but minister to truth” (*Idea*, 304). In his two articles submitted to the *Christian Observer*, Newman wrote that “no science perhaps is more adopted to confirm our belief in the truth of Christianity than that of mathematics when cultivated with a proper disposition of mind” (cf. *LD*, 1: 102). Hence, the moral state or disposition of the mind is crucial of truth. The mind must be attuned or oriented to the discovery of truth. This is consonant with his idea of functional disarrangement and idiosyncrasy of each mind as the original starting point in acquiring knowledge as we have explained in the previous section. “So that”, Newman asserts, “minds starting differently will, if honest, in course of time converge to one and the same truth” (Ker 1989, 236).

Natural sciences do not tell us about the things in themselves and are incapable of bringing things before the mind as philosophy does. They are abstractions with inbuilt principles, which include assigning predicates to subjects, arranging and classifying facts, transferring knowledge, spreading and advancing knowledge both as instruments and forms of knowledge. These forms of knowledge, Newman says, when

viewed together, they approximate to a representation or subjective reflection of the objective truth, as nearly as is possible to the human mind, which advances towards the accurate apprehension of that object, in proportion to the number of sciences which it has mastered; and which, when certain sciences are away, in such a case has but a defective apprehension, in proportion to the value of the sciences which are thus wanting, and the importance of the field on which they are employed (*Idea*, 41).

It is clear from the preceding that the multiple aspects of reality demand multiple instruments to attain a holistic apprehension of reality. The omission of one or a few will result in an error or incomplete knowledge of reality and ultimately narrow-mindedness. Accordingly, Newman

says, “The systematic omission of any one science from the catalogue prejudices the accuracy and completeness of our knowledge altogether, and that, in proportion to its importance” (*Idea*, 43). In his broad approach to knowledge to apprehend the whole truth, he embraced all sciences and at the same strove to let none exceed its limits or usurp another by encroaching into its sphere (cf. *Idea*, 305).

The sciences make progress by constantly updating their information with new truths discovered in each branch. Thus, making sure each fits into the whole circles of science. By so doing, Newman says, “one corrects another for purposes of fact, and one without the other cannot dogmatize, except hypothetically and upon its own abstract principles” (*Idea*, 42). Newman categorised knowledge into three different domains: philosophy, science and theology. They constitute a complex whole. He states that “[t]he omission of any kind of knowledge whatever, human or divine, to be as far as it goes, not knowledge, but ignorance” (*Idea*, 56). He defends the importance, value and necessity of each aspect of knowledge as he argues for the convergence and integration of truths of knowledge in a complex whole. He further states that “there is no science but tells a different tale when viewed as a portion of a whole, from what it is likely to suggest when taken by itself, without the safeguard, as I may call it, of others” (*Idea*, 75/6).

Newman understood the dynamics of science, its craving for novelty, and its insistence on autonomy. He was conscious of the rising influence and value of scientific discoveries during his time and, more importantly, in the future. He showed that he understood that science was on the rise and constantly changing and developing. He knew that science and theology would clash or disagree. He knew that there would be internal conflicts and disagreements even within one aspect of science on the one hand, and on the other, between one science and others (*Idea*, 308). However, Newman was confident and optimistic

that truth cannot be contrary to the truth [...]. It is that truth often seems contrary to truth [...] we must be patient with such appearances and not be hasty to pronounce them to be really of a more formidable character. It is the very immensity of the system of things, the human record of which he has in charge, which is the reason of this patience and caution; for that immensity suggests to him that the contrarities and mysteries, which meet him in the various science, maybe simply the consequences of our necessarily defective comprehension.” (*Idea*, 305/6).

His confidence may be compared with that of Saint Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas, who maintained that in the honest search of the truth in the deepest recesses of the heart, persons would not come to different and contrasting positions, but the same certitudes of life (cf. Tanzella-Nitti 2019, 57).

Newman assumes that science and theology share the same ultimate goal: the possession of the truth by the inquiring mind. This purpose means for Newman that both

science and theology can confidently pursue their goal independently without pressure and compromise or overtly concerned that their harmony need always be apparent. He thought that conflicts and disagreements would be naturally eliminated when the mind attained the fullness of the knowledge of the truth. Thus, Newman considers many scientific truths to be partial and provisional, subject to modifications or even being entirely discarded in the face of new discoveries. However, he firmly maintains that “the parallel between human and divine knowledge; each of them opens into a large field of mere opinion, but in both the one and the other the primary principles, the general, fundamental, cardinal truths are immutable” (GA, 156). He recognises that some aspects of human and divine knowledge are open to expressing opinion necessary to grow knowledge in such areas, but consonant with those truths, certitude has been reached.

3.8 Truth and Conscience

The connection between truth and conscience is a peculiar and fundamental aspect of Newman’s thought. Truth and Conscience are like two sides of a coin in Newman’s writings. They form the nucleus of the body of his writings. They belong together and mutually support each other in a sort of alliance, such that obedience to right conscience leads to discovery and obedience to the truth. According to Tanzella-Nitti (2019, 27), “[h]uman conscience does not oppose the truth; rather, it guards truth, it makes us listen to the truth, it puts us in contact with its uncreated foundation of being, of our being human.” Besides, truth and conscience are like a single thread binding Newman’s thoughts in unity. Joseph Ratzinger (2006, 75) notes that truth is the central idea in Newman’s intellectual striving. Conscience is central to his thinking because truth is the heart of everything. In other words, the emphasis that he places on the concept of conscience for is connected to how important is the concept of truth in his thoughts and can only be seen and understood from that standpoint. In his *Christmas Address to the Roman Curia* (2010) Benedict XVI further notes that for Newman, conscience is the capacity for truth and obedience to that truth, both in its moral sense and moral judgment.

Similarly, Tanzella-Nitti (2019, 30) says that the two terms, truth and conscience, reoccurred in Newman’s philosophical, theological, literary writings like a refrain. They both served as the object of his intellectual and existential search and the motivation behind his endeavours; therefore, resulting in the production of some of his important writings such as; *The Arian of the Fourth Century*, *The Idea of a University*, *The Grammar of Assent*, *The Development of Christian Doctrine*, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, and *the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*. For Newman, establishing the relationship between truth and conscience and their

link to transcendence is crucial. However, modern people often pitch them in opposing camp. There is the temptation to think that freeing ourselves from the objective truth could finally allow us to act according to our conscience. People say that affirming the truth or giving it too much weight would force us to lose our freedom. On the contrary, if we have to follow our conscience, it demonstrates that it tells us the truth at all times (Tanzella-Nitti, 2019, 32).

Newman's specific but not restricted treatment of conscience is in his *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*. In this letter, he explained several issues such as law and freedom but, more importantly, the phenomenon of conscience. He criticizes the liberal's erroneous idea of conscience as autonomous/independent and disconnected from God and obedience to God. This erroneous idea of conscience would be made clearer as we explain Newman's understanding of conscience. If we comprehend the erroneous conception of conscience put across by the liberals, we can as well with precision identify the problems with the ideology of relativism that arises from it. To a large extent, Relativism today is what Newman described in that work (Ker 1989, 263-284).

We have earlier mentioned that one of the features of modern times is the degree of personal freedom in public life, freedom of intellectual expression and the liberty of conscience enjoyed by people, especially in Victorian England.²⁴ However, the determination of the limits of these freedoms, including individual and intellectual freedom, was hardly thought out when they were granted. What was the ultimate end or finality of these freedoms? Do freedoms of such kind mean better and higher ends? There was the added question of the source of these freedoms. Meanwhile, it must also be asked: what is the source of the rights of conscience? Why are they important or considered even sacred? (Ker 1989, 263-284).

These are complicated questions to answer. However, Newman masterfully explained the phenomena of conscience. In distinguishing between authentic and counterfeit ideas of conscience, he raised the critical question: Is conscience connected to transcendental moral law? He asserts that conscience has sacred rights and crucial responsibilities; like the laws (of nature), which govern the world, they have their origin in the same source, God. Newman's consideration runs contrary to the liberals' and relativists' position, who attempt to explain the

²⁴Newman partly described Victorian England and its understanding of conscience thus: "When men advocate the rights of conscience, they in no sense mean the rights of the Creator, nor their duty to Him, in thought and deed, of the creature; but the right of thinking, speaking, writing and acting, according to their judgment or their humour, without any thought of God at all...Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations. It becomes a licence to take up any or no religion, to take up this or that and let it go again... Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this country it has been superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteenth centuries prior to it never heard of, and could not have mistaken for it, if they had. It is the right of self-will." (*Diff II*, p. 250)

reality of conscience but deny conscience any connection to the transcendent and eternal moral law. Conscience is conceived as independent or autonomous and responsible only to itself. Hence, each person becomes the supreme judge of how he used his individual and intellectual freedom (cf. Ker 1989, 263-284). This thinking led to the absolute conception of free will, as seen in Jean-Paul Sartre's (1956) *Being and Nothingness*. Within this conception of conscience, it is still possible to judge between right and wrong but not to any existing and accessible transcendental standard by which to measure or tell the difference. The existence of this standard is denied outrightly, or it cannot be known with any amount of certainty. It is further claimed that good intentions seem good enough to decide to act or not to act (Ker 1989, 263-284). Some treated conscience as a matter of personal sincerity or subjective intuition. Some people view conscience as an individual and personal rivalry with authority, and to some, it simply does not exist (Fisher 2019). Newman was keenly aware of these emerging views and tagged them as counterfeit. He hinged his teaching on conscience on Joseph Butler's view, who considered conscience as "moral Reason, moral sense, or divine Reason...a sentiment of the understanding, or a perception of the heart by which an agent reflects on action prospectively or retrospectively, applying moral principles available." (Butler, as quoted by Fisher, 2019). Aligning closely to Butler and the authors before him, to people such as St. Augustine of Hippo, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Thomas More, Newman maintained that beyond the conception of conscience as a

sense of propriety, self-respect or good taste, formed by general culture, education and social custom; conscience rather is the echo of God's voice within the heart of man, the pulse of the divine law beating within each person as a standard of right and wrong, with an unquestionable authority (as cited by John Paul II, *Letter on the Centenary*, 3).

As seen in *The Development of Doctrine*, the equation of voice with conscience stresses the directing power of conscience (*Dev*, 248). Newman distinguishes what he called the echo of God's voice in the human heart: conscience, with the voice of Revelation. Conscience is traditionally identified with natural law, which implies that the norm in judgment that "bears immediately on conduct, on something to be done or not done" (*ALDN*, 134; 247). On another occasion, Newman states that obedience to conscience could lead to obedience to divine Revelation, "which, instead of being something different altogether, is but the completion and perfection of that religion which natural conscience teaches" (*PPS*, 202). Similarly, in the novel *Callista*, he expressed the reality of conscience in the feelings in his heart that prompt him to obedience. He writes that "When I obey it, I feel a satisfaction; when I disobey, a soreness – just like that which I feel in pleasing or offending some revered friend [...] An echo implies a voice; a voice a speaker. That speaker I love, and I fear" (*Callista*, 314-315).

The above description served as a prelude to the detailed treatment of the phenomenon of conscience as expounded in the *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*. In this Letter, Newman makes a sharp dichotomy between the conception of conscience, which recognizes the connection with transcendent moral law on the one hand and the other hand, a conscience that rejects or ignores this crucial relation. Therefore, as we said earlier, if a law is the source of conscience, Newman asserts that conscience has rights because it has duties. Consequently, seeking the truth within the ambience of freedom is no doubt a right, precisely because learning the truth and freely obeying it is a duty. According to Newman, a right conscience should embrace objective truth/reality. This kind of truth is not the making of any human being, and as such, it is not up for a democratic vote or negotiation. Conscience must be free of all constraints to give a sincere assent to what is true. Such freedom is not given for us to embrace and follow whatsoever is to our liking (Ker 1989, 263-284).

However, Newman described it as a “miserable counterfeit which now goes by the name of conscience which claims that conscience has rights without any acknowledgement of the corresponding duties of conscience. It asserts the right for each to be his own master in all things and to profess what he pleases,” without due consideration whether his or her opinions genuinely correspond to reality (Ker 1989, 263-284). On this basis, freedom of thought entails no duty to seek and obey the truth, which may or may not exist or be knowable. Those who subscribe to and propagate this view would say that conscience is entitled to freedom precisely because matters of principle are ultimately just matters of opinion, taste, sentiment, and personal preference.

Meanwhile, this “counterfeit” conception of conscience as having only rights but no ultimate obligations became the basis for modern relativism. In continuity with the attitude described by Newman, relativism envisions freedom of conscience simply as the right to think and act as one pleases without any higher justification for doing so and without any reference to the obligation to seek the truth. Newman considers this understanding of conscience as fundamentally wrong and unsustainable in practice. The difference and strength of Newman's view on the one hand and the inherent weakness of the relativist position, on the other hand, can be seen if we compare the conceptions of tolerance that arise from these respective accounts of conscience. By this comparison, we can see why the intellectual flaws of relativism produce such harmful effects in practice. The concept of tolerance for Newman means that it is a duty ordinarily owed by those who know the truth toward those who are in error. Therefore, they too should enjoy a certain freedom of conscience without which they may not freely discover and embrace objective truth (Ker 1989, 263-284).

Newman understands the reality of conscience, which is personal and particular, as the direct experience of God by which an individual discerns a judge and a sense of personal duty to divine authority. In this sense, conscience might be understood as a personal divine disclosure in which a person comes to the proper knowledge of self in relation to God. Ratzinger expressed the same view when he described Newman's conversion as the discovery of "the objective truth of a personal and living God, who speaks to the conscience and reveals to man his condition as a creature" (Ratzinger, 2006). It is our own personal and inner witness of transcendence. Conscience opens up the possibility of proper relation and communion and, at the same time, lays the foundation of our human existence by recognizing the self in relation and communion with God and others. For Newman, that foundation in a word is dogma; in other words, revealed truth. Hermann Geissier (2013, 19) makes a similar interpretation of Newman's idea of conscience. He states that

conscience is the interior rampart against any form of totalitarianism and at the same time disposes people to 'knowledge-with' (con-sciencia) someone else. Whoever follows the path of conscience does not allow him or herself to be misused and does not remain imprisoned in an egocentric world. Such a person has an open heart for others and the One who is Truth and Love. Newman interprets conscience as the advocate of truth in the innermost part of the human person.

In this sense, therefore, he understood conscience to be a guide to the truth. It is a judging power. "For indeed" Newman states, "I find I have great need of some monitor to direct me, and I sincerely trust that my conscience ... may prove a faithful and vigilant guardian of the true principles of religion" (*AW*, 152). Thus, conscience is essentially linked to God. This idea of conscience runs contrary to the purely secular conception that equates conscience (rather not conscience, but a judgement of conscience, or maybe there is no conscience but only opinion on moral matters) with personal opinion, subjective feeling/taste, and self-will. This secular understanding makes conscience susceptible to egocentrism, individualism, subjectivism, and indifference towards other persons, God and religion. Without God, conscience is a law unto itself, honouring its pursuit of pleasure, power and glory and a license to entertain every opinion. In rejecting this secular conscience, he states:

Conscience is not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be consistent with oneself, but it is a messenger from Him, both in nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a veil and teaches and rules us by His representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, a prophet in its information, a monarch in its preceptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood throughout the Church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle would remain and would have a sway (*Diff* II, 248).

Newman further distinguishes two crucial aspects of conscience. The first is the moral sense that he considers responsible for the existence of the elements of morals in human beings. This is made manifest in particular judgments about right and wrong actions, what must be done or what must not be done, which in some cases is developed by the intellect into

ethical norms (*GA*, 73). The second aspect is what Newman identifies as conscience having a sense of duty to obey acceptable ethical norms or ethical code (*GA*, 74). In other words, conscience is the sanction of right conduct or behaviour. According to Newman, this aspect of conscience “does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond the self, and dimly discovers a sanction higher than the self for its decisions, as is evidenced in that keen sense of obligation and responsibility which forms them” (*GA*, 74).

A clear distinction should be made between what some persons call inner lights and strange voices, often related to gnostic or psychotic feelings from conscience experienced as the voice of God. This is crucial because, as Fisher (2019, 24) notes, if Newman’s conception of conscience were an external voice without a link to our reasoning, the consequence would be a double truth in moral theology and, therefore, would have no part to play in moral reasoning. On the contrary, Newman sees conscience as an aspect of the mind or a cognitive part of the mind, just like perception, reasoning, and aesthetic judgment. The fundamental function of conscience is the rational judgment of the moral sense that interprets human nature (*ALDN*, 246). Fisher (2019, 25) further explains that

[i]t is the subjective experience of the objective moral law at play in the actor’s life. Its reliable use requires moral education and practice. Here, Newman follows the classical notion of *synderesis* and *conscientia* mediating a divine law even to unbelievers. The use of the metaphor of voice, then, is to emphasize that conscience does not invent its own principles but receives and recognizes them. Secondly, it is quality of conscience as the ‘rule of ethical truth, the standard of right and wrong, a sovereign, irreversible, absolute authority in the presence of men and angels.

Because conscience is known and manifests itself as “the rule of ethical truth, the standard of right and wrong, a sovereign, irreversible, absolute authority in the presence of men and angels” (*ALDN*, 246), that safeguard and guarantee its dignity and power in relation with the individual and the State or any external authority. The State honours the dictate of an individual’s conscience considering its divine origin and the dignity of the human person. The violation of which necessarily causes great harm to the individual who could have chosen a more expedient action. This is because Newman rejects the utilitarian principles of pleasure/happiness of the greatest number, utility and convenience as the rule and measure of duty (cf. Ker 1989, 263).

In the *Grammar of Assent*, Newman asserts that we usually describe conscience as a voice because of its power to both restrain and command an action like no other dictate in the whole of our experience (cf. *GA*, 40). Conscience should be obeyed because, as stated above, its violation entails severe injury to the person (cf. *ALDN*, 138). Consequently, Newman puts obedience to conscience first before obedience to reason and not only reason to any external authority or power. The following statement is so well known that it has already become

proverbial: “I add one remark. Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner toasts (which indeed does not seem quite the thing), I shall drink – to the Pope, if you please – still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards” (Ker 1989, 267). Newman is careful not to understate nor overstate the functions and roles of personal conscience or those of authority as the Church. He wishes to show how the church and conscience in mutual service and interdependence articulate the purpose of God.

However, it is clear that concerning the truth and the life of a Christian in particular, the voice of conscience is transformed into a sense of responsibility before God. Therefore, a person should rather obey his or her conscience, even if that is the wrong choice, than obey his or her reason (cf. *Apo*, 455). Though reason is never in conflict with right conscience, we should emphasize that the command of conscience is preeminent. This is based on the recognition that conscience is the voice of God. According to St. Pope John Paul II, outside this consideration, Newman was aware that conscience “[l]eft to itself and disregarded, it can become a counterfeit of the sacred power it is, and turn into a kind of self-confidence and deference to a person’s own subjective judgment. Newman’s words are unequivocal and perennially valid: Conscience has its rights because it has its duties.” (*Letter on the first Centenary*, 4).

Conscience, understood as a constituent part of the mind, is a natural capacity possessed by human beings as part of their constitution. Nevertheless, a responsive conscience²⁵ oriented toward God is not automatic (cf. Rowlands 1989, 137). Like other constituent parts of the mind, conscience is situated. The development of conscience is affected by the prevailing circumstances of its coming to maturity. Newman alludes to this fact when he says that

Divine law [...] as apprehended in the minds of individual men, is called conscience; and though it may suffer refraction in passing into the intellectual medium of each, it is not therefore so affected as to lose its character of being the Divine Law, but still has, as such, the prerogative of commanding obedience ...” (Ker 1989, 267).

The influence of Newman on the fathers of Vatican Council II has often been recognised, especially by acknowledging the sacredness and nobility of conscience. However, also following his example, they often qualified the word with adjectives such as ‘right,’ ‘correct,’ ‘well-formed,’ ‘upright’ or ‘Christian’ on the one hand and on the other hand, they were aware

²⁵Though natural faculty, the development of conscience is not automatic. In relation to its growth Newman explains that, “Our parents and teachers are our first informants concerning the next world; and they elicit and cherish the innate sense of right and wrong which acts as a guide co-ordinately with them. By degrees they resign their place to the religious communion, or Church, in which we find ourselves, while the inward habits of truth and holiness which the moral sense has begun to form, react upon that inward monitor, enlarge, its range, and make its dictates articulate, decisive and various.” (*VM*, 132).

of the possibility and existence of an erroneous and deformed conscience. Such consciences inevitably would go astray more often than not and by no fault of the person. Nevertheless, they do lose their dignity. However, conscience may be degraded due to indifference, negligence and sin on the part of the human agent (cf. Fisher 2019).

Hence, conscience must be trained or formed in the light of Scripture, Tradition, Magisterium, and through the practice of positive actions and choices comes to maturity. It needs to be nurtured and inspired. The formation of conscience in other persons demands equal levels of personal presence and influence, otherwise known as personation in relation to the truth. Norris (2010, 141) states that “if human existence is uniquely an imperative to live by the truth and a call to advance towards one’s original goal [...], it must follow that the place and formation of conscience [...] play the decisive role in the drama of each person’s existence, indeed of the whole of the community.” The reason and the need for such compelling personation are because our

sense of right and wrong is so delicate, so fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted, so subtle in its argumentative methods, so impressible by education, so biased by pride and passion, so unsteady in its course, that, in the struggle for existence amid the various exercises and triumphs of the human intellect, this sense is at once the highest of all teachers, yet the least luminous; and the Church, the Pope, the Hierarchy are, in the Divine purpose, the supply of urgent demand. (*Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*. As quoted by Fisher, 2019).

From the above perspective, authority, specifically the Church, is no longer some external power commanding people to act contrary to their best judgments, but instead a divine help for eliminating errors in their moral reasoning and a real source of inspiration. Therefore, Scripture, Tradition, Magisterium, and authority are divinely placed to serve people's consciences by forming and informing them. The self-awareness of God through the command of conscience and the images of God that such awareness creates and impresses on the individual by the power of imaginations are made vivid in the real world of existence through the living example of particular persons and would probably be impossible without such examples (Ker 2009, 640).

This raises the question: can religion/belief, specifically, the Christian faith or (the Christian) conscience, survive in every cultural ambience, social, and political system and milieu? My answer would be; yes, it can, for as Newman said in his sermons “true faith does not covet comforts” (*PPS vol. V, 2*). Modernity makes Christian living not less difficult or impossible but challenging or tempting to the individual. That is because the truths of faith or Christian living itself are not settled achievements once and for all. The individual Christian must make a personal response to these truths in concrete situations of his/her life. Modernity signifies a shift from a religious worldview to a secular worldview. Modernity and secular worldview are linked with many cultural moments and movements/shifts (cf. Ekeh: 2019, 39).

As we observed in chapter one, one of such important movements and shifts is the anthropocentric shift whereby God was dethroned, and man enthroned as the centre of the world and the measure of everything. Within this framework, the authority of conscience (cf. Rober 2019, 73) is affirmed in defence, not for objective truth but selfish ends or personal preferences. The phenomenon of conscience seems to be confused with personal or subjective judgment and opinion set up against legitimate authority and tradition. Ratzinger rightly notes that conscience has become “a cloak thrown over human subjectivity, allowing man to elude the clutches of reality” (Ratzinger, *Conscience and truth*, 79; Cf. *The splendour of Truth*, 32f).

Against this background, Newman remarked that “conscience has been superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never heard of, and could not have mistaken it if they had. It is the right of self-will [...] an Englishman’s prerogative to be his own master in all things” (*ALDN*, 130). As a matter of emphasis, it is essential to pay attention to Newman’s caution as noted earlier that conscience, “left to itself, though it tells truly at first, it soon becomes wavering, ambiguous, and false; it needs good teachers and good examples to keep it up to the mark and line of duty; and the misery is, that this external helps, teachers and examples are in many instances wanting” (In ‘Discourse 5: Saintliness the Standard of Christian Principle,’ *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, 1849; Leominster, Gracewing, 2002; Bibliolife, 2010, 83). In a sense, Newman admits the fact of an erring conscience arising from various situations and may be disregarded if it does not habitually yield to right judgment and godly action. Nevertheless, conscience deserves our respect and obedience because it is God's voice and commands our obedience, and it is about listening and adhering to the truth.

However, in an age where the growing tendency to consider religion as a purely private, subjective matter and a question of personal opinion, conscience as the voice of God must be set apart as always pointing to the objective (moral and religious) truth that must be attained. On the above basis, therefore, the call to respect the command of each conscience cannot be a cause or excuse for toleration that commits us to any degree of compromise, relativism and subjectivism. This is why Newman rejects the view that conscience is purely a personal and subjective judgement without reference to any objective value. Conscience is denied of epistemic power such as ratiocination and reduced to feelings as its moral guide. Against this view, Newman asserts the ability of conscience to know and to be able to distinguish definitively right and wrong actions. Hence, conscience is an act of rational and intelligent nature (cf. Norris 2010, 141).

3.9 The Existential Quest for Truth: Moral and Epistemological Responsibility

It is a fact that many of Newman's writings were prompted by special occasions, which partly explains the apologetic nature of his writings. Nevertheless, the main motive of his apologetics was to state the truth and a commitment to defend the truth. He understood that the certain and strongest basis for our lives is the truth. This fact he exemplified in his life. He also understood the demands and consequences of truth and never shied away from facing them (Rowlands, 135). The quest for truth as a duty and as a theme is discernible in many of his works, especially in *The Idea of a University*, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, and *An Essay in Aid of Grammar of Assent*. Thus, Newman states: "That the search for truth is not the gratification of curiosity; that its attainment has nothing of the excitement of a discovery; that the mind is below the truth, and not above it, and is bound, not to descant upon it, but to venerate it" (Ker 1989, 234). Hence, we understand that the human mind is naturally bound to truth.

For Newman, the human being is not only a rational animal. "He is" as while "a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal" (DA, 294), "who will" Norris adds, "judge, decide and act according to the first principles that constitute his real being. What Newman identifies as central in the pursuit of truth is a love for truth, regard for the good combined with an aversion to evil" (Norris 2010, 134). If it is true that man by nature desires to know, for Newman, it is because "...the human is made for truth, and so rests in truth, as it cannot rest in falsehood" (GA, 145). Therefore, it goes against the grain of human nature and experience to deny or ignore the human capacity and need to know, possess, and embrace truth. The fundamental questions of human life require confident and positive answers. For this reason, the human mind demands and seeks the knowledge of the fullness of truth. Furthermore, Newman was convinced that the human mind could and should attain truth as a matter of duty. Newman states,

Next, I consider that, in the case of educated minds, investigations into the argumentative proof of the things to which they have given their assent is an obligation, or rather necessity. Such a trial of their intellects is a law of their nature, like the growth of childhood into manhood, and analogous to the moral ordeal which is the instrument of their spiritual life (GA, 126).

Human beings are by nature free and rational but committed to the search of the truth that sets us free, and because of their freedom and rationality, the human intellect or mind, in its attempt to reach the truth, is unhindered (cf. Norris 2010, 139). The mind is made for truth and instinctively searches for truth and cannot rest until it finds its object. Pattison (1991, 165) explains that

Newman admitted instinct as a force which spontaneously compels us, not only to bodily movements but to mental acts. One of our instincts is the will to truth: The mind without any doubt is made for truth,' he said. The proof of this is that men instinctively search for

truth. Newman's premise here was that truth exists. Reason is the faculty that enables the mind to pursue its instinct for truth until it obtains its object, and therefore reason has a valid and definable relationship with absolutes outside of itself.

In this perspective, truth is a need, deeper than practical satisfaction. It is the need of the mind as its only fulfilment. Pattison (1991, 146) further states that "[t]ruth is the goal, not the starting point, of human endeavour. Nothing can be said about truth at the outset of human thinking any more than mathematical solutions can be stated in advance of their problems. The search for truth must begin where the mind itself begins, with a jumble of ideas in space and time." For Newman, the issue of the truth of religion was paramount and required a different set of apparatus such as personal influence, personal effort, and personal presence or personation earlier discussed. Consequently, he states, "that truth and falsehood are set before us for the trial of our hearts; that our choice is an awful giving forth of lots on which salvation or rejection is inscribed" (Ker 1989, 234). We have seen the close connection between truth and belief and between belief and action so that the attainment of knowledge or truth either by the light of reason or revelation demands a corresponding action.

Chapter Four

Newman's Vision of Religion and Politics

4.1 The Origin and Nature of Religion

There is no doubt that religion has always been an essential component of society. However, the vital role of religion continues to change to reflect the needs of society at a given time. This is evident in the modern time when religion turned naturalistic with a rational creed to fit into the political system. Newman knew that a change was required that entailed stripping religion of naturalistic rationalism and the influence of utilitarianism. As we shall see shortly, he argued that religion is not a creation of the state. Therefore, it cannot be dictated by political expediency or pragmatism because external situations are incapable of determining belief (cf. Kłos 2021, 140).

The Aristotelian-Scholastic demonstration of the existence of God begins from the observation and experience of the physical world, and on that basis, the existence of God is established as the ultimate cause of the world of things and man. This is primarily obtained in natural theology. The attributes of God, such as Omnipotent, Omniscient, Omnipresent, Just, and Good, are seen as necessarily belonging to God as part of His nature. Newman does not deny the discovery of natural theology on God's existence. Therefore, Newman states that "[a]ll knowledge of religion is from God, and not only that which the Bible has transmitted to us. There never was a time when God had not spoken to man, and told him to a certain extent his duty" (*Arians*, 79, 81). This unbroken communication between God and humanity is expressed in and through human culture. As noted in chapter one, this is true especial when culture is seen as constituting and expressing the spiritual and material, the internal and external dimensions of the human person. From the above perspective, religion could be described as a living relationship between a believer and a personal God, expressed in myths, imagery, rituals, art, music, devotions, and rules/codes of conduct (cf. Merrigan 2011, 338). Newman will accept the above description, but in his own words, he writes, "[b]y Religion I mean the knowledge of God, of His Will, and our duties towards Him" (*GA*, 251). The question is, where does this knowledge come from? For him the source of this knowledge is conscience and he stresses the centrality of conscience for the existence of religion. It is important to briefly describe this relationship between religion and conscience to further explain and complement what has been said already about conscience in the previous chapters.

Conscience for Newman is both the source, birthplace, and the sanctuary of this knowledge and relationship. Through conscience, a person experiences divine presence comparable to being in the actual presence of a human person. That explains the feeling of guilt, shame and remorse. However, this can only be one form of the experience of divine presence. Merrigan (2011, 337) explains that “Newman maintains that the experience of conscience impresses on the mind (or, more accurately, the imagination) a picture or image of God. Indeed, it is precisely because of its role in generating an image of God in the minds of men and women that Newman describes conscience as the ‘creative principle of religion.’” Instead of looking at the physical world and the experience of nature to discover God, Newman turns inward to the interior human experience of conscience. He understands and articulates the idea of God and religion through the phenomenon of conscience. His approach and account are both personal/subjective, experiential and theocentric. Conscience is theocentric because it is primarily directed to God. In other words, conscience is only true because it is connected to God. His notion of conscience is based and informed primarily by his personal experience as one who believes. However, because it is fundamentally subjective, his notion of religion is personal but has a universal/objective implication and application.

Newman also does not deny or contradict the role of human reason in the search for God in the natural order. Instead, he compliments and goes beyond mere logical reasoning. For example, Newman rhetorically asks the question:

Can I attain to any more vivid assent to the being of a God, than that which is given merely to notions of the intellect? Can I enter with a personal knowledge into the circle of truths which make up that great thought? Can I rise to what I have called an imaginative apprehension of it? Can I believe as if I saw? Yet I conceive a real assent is possible, and I proceed to show how (*GA*, 102).

The knowledge and discovery of God correspond to the origin and establishment of religion. The word ‘discovery’ is used to indicate both the personal nature of this knowledge and the personal effort required of the knowing subject. For Newman, religion is based/rooted in conscience as its source. In the experience of conscience, human beings discover God, and, consequently, religion is born. Conscience becomes a means or a path to transcendence. That is achieved through obedience to the dictates of conscience. Consequent to this experience, Newman says we commonly refer to conscience as a command or a voice restraining or commending us unlike any dictate in our experience (cf. *GA*, 105). Therefore, conscience is not only the creative principle of religion “but our great internal teacher of religion” (*GA*, 251). Conscience as the creative principle of religion implies that a person’s idea and sense of being religious springs from conscience. Religion probably would not exist without the reality of conscience. The sense of being religious is experienced in the form of moral obligation through

which a person can gain a real apprehension of God. Newman says he would have been anything but a theist if not for the experience of conscience as a voice (*Apo*, 241).

In comparison to the proofs offered in natural theology such as the arguments from design, ontological and cosmological arguments which are dependent on exterior experience that transcends the world of things and motion, to the spiritual being such as God, Newman's proof of the existence of God and religion is through the interior experience of conscience as the voice of God. Religion begins at the level of awareness and experience of conscience, which furnishes us with the sense of responsibility or being morally obliged. That is why he called conscience a magisterial dictate. It warns, accuses, and commends a person before and after an action. Therefore, conscience may be said to be a personal path to God through obedience (cf. Crosby 2014, 189). Newman affirms that conscience is the nearest and most precise means to God. It offers personalised and accessible knowledge to every individual that requires no external intervention. It is thus adapted for the communication to each separately of that knowledge which is momentous to him individually (*GA*, 251).

The reality of religion or God is primarily a personal and interior experience that can be expressed only by the person of said experience. Logical arguments such as the five ways of St. Thomas Aquinas may convincingly prove the existence of God. Nevertheless, they produce only a notional apprehension of God. Newman seeks a concrete personal and primordial experience that leads to a real apprehension of God. For this reason, He often differentiates the knowledge of God through theological intellect and religious imagination. The former, the theological intellect, merely seeks to prove something external and far from the person. However, Newman desires an experience and knowledge that is original or primordial to call his own and live by it. It must be an existential knowledge that engages the whole person by appealing to his religious imagination and not a part of the person like his intellect (cf. Crosby 2014, 187).

Newman claims that following the arguments and demonstrations of God's existence in natural theology, one only arrives at a knowledge of God and religion apprehended notionally. It is an assent stemming from one inference to another logically interdependent, in how correlated a subject and a predicate are in a sentence or proposition. Hence, it is purely an exercise of the intellect (*GA*, 102. cf. *DA*, 294). He compares the mapping out of the territory on paper that one has not yet seen with such intellectual exercise as the notional apprehension. We arrive at a notional apprehension when the subject or object of our mental intention or focus is not seen, but it is apprehended based on concepts and definitions rather than on the intuitive presence of the reality apprehended in its unity.

Religion and God engender a worldview that influences an individual human person's mode of thinking, choices and actions about the ultimate source of his/her existence, that is, God. Religion is the connection or bridge between man and God and conscience is the personal communication channel between God and man. The point of this connection can only be reached and expressed or explained by the individual and presumably God, who has access to the nature, extent, and manner of their religion. Religion or religious experience is primarily a personal, subjective reality. Its reality is expressed in the first person.

Nevertheless, religious experience, as described by Newman, does not mean that it is not objective, unintelligible or indefinable. It is possible to account for and articulate religious experience universally and objectively to identify its intelligible place and cognitive value within human existence. Newman could only use his own experience as a person. According to Newman:

He knows what has satisfied and satisfied himself; if it satisfies him, it is likely to satisfy others; if, as he believes and is sure, it is true, it will approve itself to others also, for there is but one truth. And doubtless, he does find that allowing for the difference of minds and modes of speech, what convinces him, does convince others also (*GA*, 384).

However, it should be recognised and stated categorically that such an account depends mainly on one's experience and underlying attitude toward religion. There are predominantly two tendencies, namely positive and negative. The positive tendency means recognising and appreciating religion as the virtue perfects the human person. In contrast, the negative tendency will involve antagonism and disparaging of religion as a human deficiency or a vice and unnatural to human beings and society. Thinkers whose attitude reflects the later position are David Hume, Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud and Stephen Hopkin, John Harris and Jean-Paul Sartre. According to Matthew D. Walz (2018, 1-14), "in light of these deflationary accounts, and in the midst of an escalation (in the Western world, at least) of secularization and irreligion, it behoves homo religious to clarify what it means to be religious. Doing so helps *homo religious* not only to arrive at a deeper self-understanding but also to identify what human beings lack when they are not religious." Newman felt that need and set to provide an adequate account of religion to bridge that gap.

The classical approach to religion is rightly said to be objective and metaphysical. It investigates the phenomena of religion causally and categorically (as embodied by Aquinas and others of like minds). On the contrary, Newman takes a personalist and phenomenological approach to religion. In his exploration of human interior experiences, he discovers that they embody and reveal God and religion. This difference in approach is set out from the beginning of the discussion of natural religion in the *Grammar of Assent*. His approach though different, nevertheless, complements the classical understanding of religion. Thus, Newman contributes

to an adequate conception of religion that is experiential and robust. As noted in chapter two, the above intent by Newman is set out in the *Grammar of Assent* by carefully distinguishing between notional apprehension, real apprehension and real assent as the manner to manifest a religious belief.

In drawing attention and rooting religion in the interiority of human life, such as at the inner and personal level of one's conscience, Newman shows or characterises religion as a natural phenomenon to human existence. This is against the backdrop that religion is an external and artificial imposition to human beings and society. However, like natural virtues which still need to be habituated and cultivated, conscience must be formed to respond to God. Therefore religion is about who and what one knows, not about what or how one wills. This means that in terms of experience, religion exists primarily within the cognitive realm, not the volitional. Hence, the difference between religious and irreligious lies in diverse worldviews, which inform or influence one's thinking and choices. For Newman, it is the concrete and personal experience that engenders knowledge and recognition of God. These entail and constitute grounds of religion. This is not just about an intellectual attainment/achievement or theoretical endeavour. A person becomes (truly) religious, such that God is a reality to whom one is personally obliged by experience (in conscience) that both unveils and reveals religion (God).

Newman identifies three main channels through which Nature helps us acquire the knowledge of God, His Will, and our duties towards Him. These are the following; the mind, the voice of humankind or the universal testimony of humanity, and the course of the world, that is, of human life and human affairs. Concrete and practical experiences at these three levels of interacting with the world unveil and deepen our knowledge and recognition of God. These three channels could be said to awaken our conscience to the effect that they bring to our awareness the immediate presence of God, His will and our duties towards Him. Passing through each of these three channels accompanied by the necessary experiences helps map out religion's subjective and inescapable aspect.

4.1.1 The Human mind: The First Channel for Acquiring Religion

Newman emphasizes the priority of the mind as the primary means of acquiring knowledge of God and religion and consequently becoming a believer. The mind provides the most personal, peculiar, and intimate knowledge of God. Newman explains that the mind gives us the rule by which we test, interpret, and correct what is presented to us for belief, whether by the universal testimony of humanity or by the history of society and the world. He further

states that conscience is the internal teacher of religion. It is a personal guide to recognising God and His will (cf. *GA*, 98). Conscience cannot be substituted. Just as its information is binding, a person is also bound to use his/her conscience. He affirms that,

I am as little able to think by any mind but my own as to breathe with another's lungs. Conscience teaches us not only that God is but what He is; it provides for the mind a real image of Him, as a medium of worship; it gives us a rule of right and wrong, as being His rule, and a code of moral duties (*GA*, 251).

Conscience teaches a person the specific knowledge of God at the heart of being religious. It triggers the sense of being not only moral but religious since, through it, one lives in the cognitively felt presence of God.

The immediate help that conscience provides is that it brings and puts a person in the presence of One whom he/she immediately perceive as the Judge. This is the most prominent, cardinal and distinguished truth that conscience teaches, that He is our Judge (cf. *PN II*, 47). Therefore, the unique attribute under which conscience brings God before us and subordinates all other attributes is (retributive) justice. Through conscience, a person senses or perceives the immediate presence of God as a Judge, who has just expectations for our actions. A person perceives that he/she is morally obliged or responsible. Hence, sensing the presence of God falls within the framing cognizance of retributive justice. The emotion of guilt and remorse manifests this much more than anything. Conscience forcefully convicts a person of wrongdoing (*GA*, 99). Thus, it is our great internal and principal teacher of the personal knowledge of God. That is why conscience serves as the primary means through which religion is born in the life of the individual human being (*GA*, 252; see also *PN II*, 47).

In this way, Newman's idea complements the classical concept of religion, especially that of Aquinas. We noted in the previous chapter that Aquinas associates religion with the will and, more specifically, with justice. For Aquinas, religion as a virtue exists when the will as matter acquires the form of just habituation toward God. Thus, religion is the perfect disposition of the will to strive continuously to live in the right relation to God. Newman starts from the interior experience of being religious, emphasising the concrete and personal way a person's connection to God is felt. Experience is like an agency that mediates the sense of religion to the mind or intellect since God's presence is experienced chiefly as a type of knowledge or consciousness.

This knowledge of God is acquired and transmitted through conscience, which ennoble a person to perceive him/herself as being before an invisible Judge. If the experience of religion occurs in the intellect as a form of knowing, then God and the image of God, it impresses on the mind as the judge is its content. This awareness is most apparent, as noted earlier, when conscience indicts a person for wrongdoing in the presence of a hidden Judge

(God) who sees and knows everything. We observe this phenomenological moment. We hear the voice and are immediately ashamed. We would not feel shame if there were no person behind the voice.

Combining Aquinas and Newman's metaphysical and phenomenological approaches yields a fuller account of religion. For example, Aquinas' idea of the will's continuous habituation in justice toward the Creator resonates with Newman's idea of the mind's growing awareness of an invisible Judge through the internal experience of conscience. Therefore, the most crucial correlation in both Aquinas and Newman in religion is a continuous endeavour to keep the proper relationship with God through governing human capacities, intellect, and will.

4.1.2 The Voice of Humanity as a Way of Acquiring Religion

The voice or testimony of humanity as embodied and expressed in and through culture manifests the universality of religion and its naturalness to man and society. Newman describes this second way in which a person acquires religion as "the influences of religion, as we find it embodied in those various rites and devotions which have taken root in the many races of mankind, since the beginning of history, and before history, all over the earth" (*GA*, 252). The universal voice of humankind and conscience both create, awaken and reinforce the awareness of God, His will, and one's duties toward Him. These rituals, rites, devotions, and cultural practices, are often rooted and permeated to recognise wrongdoing before God. This is what conscience chiefly provides in a person. Hence, Newman says they (that is, culture, voice of mankind and conscience) primarily manifest the severe side of natural religion. They are oriented toward atonement with God, often through vicarious satisfaction, a nearly universal aspect of religious practice that carries with it "the almost ubiquitous and ever-recurring institution of Priesthood" (*GA*, 252).

The complementarity and harmony of Newman's personalistic and phenomenological approach to Aquinas' objective and metaphysical approach to religion could further be seen above in what Newman considers as the second way of imbibing or acquiring religion. This further shows the harmony between Aquinas and Newman. Again, remember that for Aquinas, religion is natural to humanity. However, the naturalness of religion is not the same as the naturalness of the senses to a person. In the case of religion, it is the capacity to acquire religion that is given. Religion as a virtue is acquired and perfected through the practice of certain acts such as prayers, sacrifices, devotions, and through which a person relates justly with God.

The universal testimony of humanity explains experientially or phenomenologically the acquired nature of religion that Aquinas captures in his objective and metaphysical analysis. From Aquinas' causal and categorical viewpoint, a person becomes religious by repeated actions of a specific sort that are directed towards God as Creator. Similarly, from Newman's personalist viewpoint, a person becomes religious by taking part in rituals, cultural rites and devotions, consequently acquiring in part a concrete knowledge of God. The cumulative effects of cultural practices unconsciously but willingly might be said to effectively shape and solidify the virtue of religion through repeated acts to the degree one possesses it. Newman stresses the interpersonal relationship with God. In a prayer for wisdom, Newman writes: "Give me that true wisdom, which seeks your will by prayer and meditation by direct intercourse with you, more than by reading and reasoning" (Newman 1990, 15). Again, in this way, Newman's phenomenological account of religion as influenced by witnesses complements Aquinas' objective and metaphysical account of religion as a phenomenon acquired through one's actions.

4.1.3 The Course of Nature as a Channel for Acquiring Religion

According to Newman, the last way to imbibe religion is "the course of nature." The reference is to the seemingly divine hiddenness, absence and silence in the world. He is pointing to how we react to the natural world. When struck or confronted with nature, intuitively, we know there is something or someone behind the seeming absence or silence. We are filled with the sense of wonder which lays bare an inherent unease in being religious. Newman states:

Now we come to the third natural informant on the subject of Religion; I mean the system and the course of the world. This established order of things, in which we find ourselves, if it has a Creator, must surely speak of His will in its broad outlines and its main issues. This principle is laid down as certain, when we come to apply it to things as they are, our first feeling is one of surprise and (I may say) of dismay, that His control of this living world is so indirect, and His action so obscure. This is the first lesson that we gain from the course of human affairs. What strikes the mind so forcibly and so painfully is, His absence (if I may so speak) from His own world. It is a silence that speaks. He is specially 'a Hidden God;' and with our best efforts, we can only glean from the surface of the world some faint and fragmentary views of Him (*GA*, 255).

That is the divine hiddenness or absence/silence that speaks, and, as such, it is a 'natural informant on the subject of religion'. The experience of hiddenness and silence of God in the world is inherently associated with conscience and the voice of humanity. Hence, God's hiddenness or silence does not occur in a void. On the contrary, Newman claims that God's hiddenness or silence reinforces conscience's claim on us. Divine silence echoes in the

heart even more deeply when one considers the emptiness of life or the flitting nature of life and the preponderance of suffering in one's own life and the world in general. Indeed, God seems increasingly distanced or disinterested, if not absent in the periods of pain and sorrow. However, that kind of situation manifests our separation from God and God's transcendence of the world and worldly concerns (*GA*, 256).

Uniquely Newman captures an analogous dimension of religion comprehensively by pointing to the experience of God's absence, especially in the situation of misery. God is close to us, such that He knows our intentions and speaks to us through the experience of conscience. Reversely in the external world, He is experienced as hidden and unreachable. Though this experience hurts, it simultaneously triggers thirsting and searching for God. Consequently, the combined experience of God's nearness and his hiddenness create an immense hunger for God that drives and characterises a person's life. This aligns with Aquinas' idea of religion as the continuous disposition of the will towards God. Hence as long as a person continues to breathe, religion is an unfinished and permanent feature of his/her existence.

In conclusion, Newman's account of religion is a phenomenological and personalistic approach that uncovers the human experiences which embody and disclose religion. He presents a more stripped-down version of religion consonant with what might be called a real-life scenario or typical case scenario. He departs from the conventional narrative of religion as a revelation from above and presents religion as springing within the internal experience of conscience.

Despite this differing approach, he arrived at a remarkably parallel and complementary account of religion without fear of contradiction. Newman contributes to an adequate account of religion. He draws attention to the achievements of religion as something which actualizes an individual's highest moral potentials. Religion disposes people to respond to the supra-moral and supernatural initiatives in which God reveals Himself or even acts through a person in history. Religion understood in this way functions as a bridge linking the moral and supra-moral, the natural and the supernatural. This aspect of religion highlights the multi-dimensional mode of living to which faith, in particular, opens up to the individual. This mode of living inspires and attracts persons to transcend this world in comparison to the more flattened-out view of human existence to which an irreligious or secularist worldview limits itself. Religion turns out to be a crucial achievement for human beings.

Therefore, wherever and whenever religion is unduly restricted or (its truth claims) rejected (especially in the public sphere), actions that have their source in belief are hindered, and religiously minded persons or institutions are not only demoralized but cannot participate

and contribute fully to the social, political, and economic life of the community in which they are members. That is understandable from the strong connection Newman makes between belief and action as explained in chapter two. Newman's theory of religious knowledge is partly a response to the clamour to stifle or reject religious claims as irrational.

4.2 The Distinction between Opinion and Dogma

In chapter two we have discussed opinion in relation to conscience. In chapter one, we noted that Newman rejected liberalism at all levels and modes of its expression in religion. Liberalism relegated revealed truths to opinions and made man not only the measure of truth but enthroned him to sit in judgment over God. In liberal thought, he writes, "Revealed religion is not a truth but a sentiment and a taste" (Ker ed., 2009, 721). To understand why he will not equate opinion with revealed truth, we need an insight into his understanding of the concept of an opinion.

He notes that the term 'opinion' is ambiguous. Among other things, it is a form of assent. Newman equates an opinion with a notion held by the mind without sufficient evidence or a clear grasp of the issue. An opinion is described as a form of a conviction about belief. Hence, we speak of a "variety of religious opinions or of being persecuted for religious opinions, or of our having no opinion on a particular point, or of another having no religious opinion" (*GA*, 44). However, in everyday usage, an opinion may be used in contrast to conviction. A conviction resulting from opinion may be right or wrong and therefore can be discarded easily. When referring to a person who frequently changes his or her mind, we are in the domain of opinions. Newman, therefore, refers to opinion as denoting an assent to a probably true proposition. An assent resulting from opinion depends on how persuasive or strong the probability that it is true at the time in which the opinion was held. Opinion differs from Inference. The strength of the latter depends and varies with its premises. While the former is an assent completely independent of premises. That is the case when people appeal to the right to reason or think personally. However, Inference is necessarily conditional because of its heavy dependence on premises. For instance, Newman states that, "to say that, we shall have a fine hay-harvest if the present weather lasts, does not come of the same mind as 'I am of the opinion that we shall have a fine hay-harvest this year'" (*GA*, 45). Opinion in this sense represents an assent of the mind to a view not based on premises. That may best be described as a mentality because Newman says that those who hold on to an opinion in this manner are said to be obstinate or opinionated. In contradistinction, he further says opinion

differs from Credence in these two points viz. that, while opinion explicitly assent to the probability of a given proposition, Credence is an assent to its truth. It differs from Credence in a third respect, viz. in being a reflect act, when we take a thing for granted, we have Credence in it, when we begin to reflect upon our credence, and to measure, estimate, and modify it, then we are forming an opinion. Opinion being such as I have described is a notional assent, for the predicate of the proposition on which it is exercised is the abstract word probable (*GA*, 45).

Opinion understood as something probably true, but not outrightly true, cannot be a dogma. This also means that no opinion is right or wrong. The categorization of dogma as an opinion, Newman says, is “consistent with toleration of its contradictory” (*GA*, 45). Therefore, dogma in particular and religion, in general, are considered private opinions and consistent with the idea of personal religious experience.

Newman does not deny the validity and importance of private opinion, private judgment or personal religious experience. Instead, he argues that the reasoning process is the same everywhere. In other words, he argues for the universality of the reasoning process and the human mind. The mind contains ideas both false and true. Nevertheless, because the mind is made for truth, it instinctively chooses a view to judge its ideas. The view is a primordial choice and principle that set all other choices accordingly. In the process of acquiring a belief, a view, an opinion or a mentality precedes reasoning and judgment. This choice of view is the mind’s first step to put order into the chaos of ideas in the mind, and thus life is organized. These true ideas are transformed by reason into true beliefs pretty much the same manner the mind organizes words into sentences because there exists a grammar of language. Newman further explained how this process works:

The Athanasian Creed professes to lay down the right faith, which we must hold on its most sacred subjects, in order to be saved. This must mean that there is one view concerning the Holy Trinity or concerning the Incarnation, which is true, and distinct from all others; one definite, consistent, entire view, which cannot be mistaken, not contained in any certain number of propositions, but held as a view by the believing mind, and not held, but denied by Arians, Sabellians, Tritheists, Nestorians, Monophysites, Socinians, and other heretics. That idea is not enlarged, if propositions are added, nor impaired if they are withdrawn: if they are added, this is with a view of conveying that one integral view, not of amplifying it. That view does not depend on such propositions: it does not consist in them; they are but specimens and indications of it. And they may be multiplied without limit (*US*, 335).

As we have seen in chapter two, this means we have a common and universal source of belief and a shared process of acquiring beliefs that should result in universal belief and truth. Newman identifies the illative sense, a faculty of the mind responsible for selecting and organising this specific view of life. The illative sense Newman asserts is the “action of the mind that determines those first elements of thought which in all reasoning are assumptions, the principles, tastes, and opinions, very often of a personal character, which are half the battle in the inference with which the reasoning is to terminate” (*LD*, 24: 274; *GA*, 233). Newman is aware that the illative sense could choose any view between believing everything and

believing nothing. He writes: “Of the two, I would rather have to maintain that we ought, to begin with believing everything that is offered to our acceptance, than that it is our duty to doubt of everything. The former, indeed, seems the way of true learning” (*GA*, 232-233, 243). This is the argument of the *Grammar of Assent* and the proof of the existence of the dogmatic principle.

4.2.1 Dogma

Newman makes a clear distinction between (theological) opinion and dogma (theological doctrine). A dogma is a revealed truth, while an opinion is a judgment formed by the mind. “Theological dogmas,” Newman asserts, “are propositions expressive of the judgments which the mind forms, or the impressions which it receives, of Revealed Truth” (*US*, 320). Consequently, Newman rejects the view that “no theological doctrine is anything more than an opinion which happened to be held by bodies of men” (*Apo*, 260). He, therefore, defines dogma as “supernatural truths irrevocably committed to human language, imperfect because they are human but definitive and necessary because given from above” (*Dev*, 325). He duly acknowledges the weakness of language. It is not only open to interpretations but also misinterpretations. It is limited in its ability to express the truth as a human instrument in its totality.

Despite these limitations, language remains a necessity without which it is nearly impossible to communicate and perpetuate divine truth (*US*, 333). Dogmas are divine truths expressed and conveyed in human thoughts and language. Newman likens the relationship between dogma and language to the mystery of the Incarnation. We read in his sermons: “The Almighty has condescended to speak to us so far as human thought and language will admit by approximations, to give us practical rules for our own conduct amid His infinite and eternal operations” (*US*, 260). Language constitutes only an instrument used to express the truth, and thus truth and language are separate. Dogmas are stated and expressed only to the extent to which the language has developed and the human mind can comprehend. Newman states that theological doctrines or dogmas fully defined and received constitute the truths “only in as full a measure as our minds can admit; the truth as far as they go, and under the conditions which human feebleness imposes” (*US*, 350).

It is clear for Newman that dogma is absolute and not the language of dogma. Language is not exhaustive in its attempt to explicate the truth or dogma. Although dogma has a history or origin in time and a (material) cause, a dogma is eternal and spiritual. The historicity and material cause of dogma is not exhaustive themselves. Dogma elicits belief.

True belief for Newman necessarily has an object; in the event or case that the object of belief is not only real but divine, belief coalesces or merges with dogma. The notion that dogmas or doctrines are spiritual and eternal on the one hand and, on the other hand, that they have historical and material cause is fully explained in Newman's theory of doctrinal development (cf. Ker 2009, 314).

4.3 Idea and Development

Newman's theory of doctrinal development explained the changes and growth in the body of doctrines professed and believed as revealed truths by the (Roman Catholic) Church. Newman states first the reason and the necessity for an explanation. The explanation demonstrates the originality, authenticity, and continuity of doctrinal development over the centuries. He calls it a 'hypothesis' (*Dev*, 5; cf. Ker, 2009, 302). Doctrinal development has been necessitated by the need to make explicit and definitive the content of revelation given once and for all in time (*Dev.*, 29; cf. Lash, 1975, 12).

In order to understand what Newman meant by the development of doctrine, it is important to comprehend his concept of the development of an idea and understand what the development of an idea is; we need to know what he meant by an idea and its aspects (Ker ed., 2009, p. 302; cf. Pattison 1991, 146). Ideas are the content of the mind. The mind is the natural habitat of ideas. There are various ideas in the mind: dormant, active, true or real, living, simple, and complex. Ideas are mental representations of realities outside the mind, which are either sensible or insensible. True ideas have concrete or real representations (cf. Lash, 1975, 50). In his *University Sermons* he States: "Still there may be a certain correspondence between the idea, though earthly, and its heavenly archetype, such that idea belongs to the archetype, in a sense in which no other earthly idea belongs to it, as being the nearest approach to it which our present state allows" (*US*, 340). Consequently, Carr (1996, 92) commenting on the abovementioned quotation further explains that ideas "are said to exist only in the thinking activity attendant to personal action; their reality independent of human minds is of a lesser degree." The mind continuously weighs its ideas by contrasting, comparing, analysing, rejecting, accepting ideas (*Dev*, 33). According to Newman, ideas "are infinite, and infinitely combined, and infinitely modified" (*US*, 341). An idea is represented by its aspects and sometimes comprehended variously by different minds. These aspects which may appear divergent are correlated. The mind understands the idea by grasping its different aspects one at a time. Newman explains that:

Ordinarily, an idea is not brought home to the intellect as objective except through this variety; like bodily substances, which are not apprehended except under the clothing of their properties and results, and which admit of being walked round, and surveyed on opposite sides, and in different perspectives, and contrary lights, in evidence of their reality [...] so also all the aspects of an idea are capable of coalition, and of a resolution into the object of which it belongs; and the *prima facie* dissimilitude of its aspects becomes, when explained, an argument for its substantiveness and integrity, and their multiplicity for its originality and power (*Dev*, 34-35).

An idea comprehended in the above terms is a living idea. It is dynamic. It can expand and grow and therefore needs time, space, circumstances, and opportunities to reach full maturity (cf. Ker 2009, 303). Newman explains that:

When an idea, whether real or not, is of a nature to arrest and possess the mind, it may be said to have life, that is, to live in the mind which is its recipient [...] then it is not merely received passively in this or that form into many minds, but it becomes an active principle within them, leading them to an ever-new contemplation of itself, to an application of it in various directions, and propagation of it on every side (*Dev*, 36).

A living idea is such that it arrests the minds of individuals and consequently an entire society in various forms and levels. Through the gradual process of growth and unification, its many forms or aspects become a body of thought (*Dev*, 38; cf. Ker 2009, 303). That is brought about through “the suggestions and corrections of many minds, and the illustration of many experiences” (*Dev*, 38).

Newman thinks it is normal or natural for an idea to ‘be chastised’ by conflicts, controversy, battles, rejections, and oppositions. It may be interrupted, modified, or influenced before it may emerge supreme and perfect. He asserts that

the development then of an idea is not like an investigation worked out on paper, in which each successive advance is a pure evolution from a foregoing, but it is carried on through and by means of communities of men and their leaders and guides; and it employs their minds as its instruments, and depends upon them, while it uses them. And so, as regards existing opinions, principles, measures, and institutions of the community which it has invaded; it develops by establishing relations between itself and them; it employs itself, in giving them a new meaning and direction, in creating what may be called a jurisdiction over them, in throwing off whatever in them it cannot assimilate. It grows when it incorporates, and its identity is found, not in isolation, but in continuity and sovereignty (*Dev*, 38-40).

It is important to note here that this is one of the threads or features of Newman’s thoughts. He characterizes life as a battle or struggle of opposites; light and darkness, truth and falsehood, belief and unbelief (cf. Ker ed., 2009, 304). Similarly, the intellectual life is a conflict of (true and false) ideas in their different form and aspects within a given milieu. Therefore, an idea could change and is susceptible to corruption in its interactions with the world. The risk of being corrupted is inevitable (cf. Ker ed., 2009, 304). “It is elicited and expanded,” according to Newman, “by trial, and battles into perfection and supremacy” (*Dev*, 40). Thus, an idea is not defaced by change and development but enters into “new relations” so that “old principles reappear under new forms. It changes with them in order to remain the

same. In a higher world, it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often” (*Dev*, 40).

Changing or developing due to natural growth is necessary for perfection and maturity inherent in a living idea. Christianity is a living idea (cf. *Dev*, 35-36). Hence, change is not uncommon in Christianity. Newman describes this inherent possibility of development in ideas as an antecedent probability for development. In what follows, he briefly distinguishes various kinds of development, among which are: mathematical, physical, material, metaphysical, intellectual or logical, historical, ethical, political and religious developments. Newman’s consideration of the kinds of developments is brief and on purpose. He was only concerned to show that development is natural and happens in similar fashions across other human institutions and endeavours. In keeping with the theme and goals of this research, we shall briefly describe only the last two kinds of development. However, let us consider first what he meant by the term development.

The sense in which Newman uses the term development and how he developed a theory of development is crucial for any kind of consideration. The term development connotes primarily a process rather than progress, especially when applied to doctrinal growth in the history of Christianity. The problem of associating development with progress arises from the account describing how an idea is grasped by the individual and the expansion and comprehension of this same idea by all other minds resulting in a body of thought or system. He refers to such an idea as real, living and objective reality. This notion of an idea and its development lends credence to associating it with progress that is not entirely out of place. However, one or two difficulties arise when this notion of development is applied to Christianity as an idea. First, it may mean that the Church as it exists today is better than the primitive Church in every aspect. Second, as a principle, it is not practicable. It could mean that majority cannot be wrong if objectivity is determined by the number of people embracing an idea. That is contrary to Newman's argument in the introduction to the sixth edition of *the Essay*.

Institutional change, growth and clarity in the number of doctrinal propositions are undeniable facts of development in the long history of Christianity. However, the same statement cannot be made about the holiness and ethical life of the Church over the years. Development seen only as progress will amount to accumulation and gathering, which is not wholly irrelevant but not what Newman means by it. For this reason, he excluded from his consideration physical and mathematical developments as not relevant to his purpose (*Dev*, 41).

He thus defines development as the “process whether it be longer or shorter in point of time, by which the aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form” (*Dev*, 38). The key term in the definition is the word ‘process.’ Process refers to the blending or melting of an idea's aspects into a whole. An aspect is a part of an idea and means a partial understanding of the idea. An idea is the total of all its aspects and represents an objective fact grasped by the mind as a whole (*Dev*, 34-35; cf. Lash, 1975, 50). When, therefore, Newman applied this understanding of the idea to Christianity, Lash (1975, 50) is correct to say that “The *Essay* is concerned to explain the fact that Christianity has known considerable variation in teaching and practice in its history. Here this rich multiplicity of aspects is proposed as an argument for its reality” (cf. *Dev*, 34-35).

The understanding of an idea and truth is situated in the sense that they are often influence or affect by the idiosyncrasies of the concrete individual person. Such an understanding is personal and subjective (*Dev*, 34-35, 36, cf. Lash, 1975, 49). Newman moves further to give an account of the process in which a living idea impresses itself not just on a single mind but on other minds and, indeed, the entire society. So that, as he states, “the idea will be to each mind separately what at first it was only to all together” (*Dev*, 37). Supposing that is not the case, it would be impossible for people with opposing views to reach any form of consensus. Besides, it resolves the dichotomy arising from understanding an idea or truth as situated on the one hand and the other hand as an objective fact grasped by many minds and becoming a body of thought or a system. This process is crucial because it ensures that any form of liberalism did not trap Newman. Hence, it could be said that he enjoyed the benefits of liberalism but was not blind to its pitfalls. In addition to that, Kenny (1957, 147) says, “[t]his shows clearly that Newman can criticise liberalism when thinking of its spirit and motives, while at the same time approving of its particular concrete results.”

4.3.1 Religious Development

Newman asserts that certain feelings and sentiments in us conjure up the existence of particular objects. Put slightly differently, certain feelings and sentiments imply the existence of particular objects. The correlation is such that it necessarily proves the existence of the other. He states that:

Thus conscience, the existence of which we cannot deny, is a proof of the doctrine of a Moral Governor, which alone gives it a meaning and a scope; that is, the doctrine of a Judge and Judgment to come is a development of the phenomenon of conscience. Again, it is plain that passions and affections are in action in our minds before the presence of their proper objects; and their activity would, of course, be an antecedent argument of extreme cogency on behalf of the real existence of those legitimate objects, supposing them unknown. And

so again, the social principle, which is innate in us, gives a divine sanction to society and civil government (*Dev*, 48).

In Aristotle's account of the happy man, Newman also saw a further illustration of religious development. Aristotle's idea of happiness includes the external conditions for its realization, which is the possession of "certain prosperity by moral fitness, not by logical necessity, attached to the happy man. For it is impossible or not easy, to practise high virtue without abundant means" (*Dev*, 48). Nevertheless, Newman quotes another writer whom he claims had better explained religious development. This author argues that sentiments do not manifest the complete religious nature of human beings. If this were the case, religion would be a personal concern. Instead, the fallen nature and experience relentlessly prompt the mind to seek beyond the physical world for answers to its questions and solutions to its predicaments. "The solution of these problems" Newman says, "is the origin of all religion; her primary objective is to discover the creeds and doctrines which contain, or are supposed to contain it" (*Dev*, 50).

Morals are another compelling reason for the existence of religion. Morals point to an author, origin, and destiny beyond this world. Therefore, the origin of religion is to be found in the problem of humans as a fallen nature and the necessity of morals both in their origin and aim. Thus the expression of religion goes beyond sentiments to include the formation and propagation of doctrines universally binding and its benefits commonly applied to all persons. That is an essential element of religion. From this standpoint, religion cannot be a personal concern without attracting the interest of some persons or authorities because of its absolute claims and its universal principle of unity. When this is obtainable, a government spontaneously springs up as a natural need to provide leadership. That is true of every human society. The foundation of power/government in civil society is similar in religious society (*Dev*, 50-52).

4.3.2 Theory of Doctrinal Development

Newman states that "ideas and developments are commonly not identical, the development being but the carrying out of the idea into its consequences" (*Dev*, 53). Development is an inherent quality of an idea and occurs in stages, influenced by time and circumstances. He defines development as the process "by which the aspects of an idea are brought into consistency and form" (*Dev*, p. 38). Development does not alter or change an idea, which will amount to corruption, but happens to explicate an idea, according to Newman, "[i]t changes...in order to remain the same" (*Dev*, 40). Newman refers to development as

‘exhibition’ (*Dev*, 54). The developments are in the idea, which is substantive and are manifested in time, probably based on needs. That is based on the nature of the mind itself, which according to Newman, “cannot reflect upon that idea except piecemeal, cannot use it in its oneness and entirety, or without resolving it into a series of aspects and relation” (*Dev*, 53). In this way, Newman tried hard to maintain the tension in his thoughts between the reality of change and immutability and between the transcendent and the historical (cf. Lash 1975, 53).

The pattern of growth/development associated with an idea is similar to the development of Christian doctrine. Christianity is a living idea, not a theoretical construction (cf. *Dev*, 35). A living idea such as Christianity will have many aspects that will develop in time in keeping with the ever-changing necessities of the world (cf. *Dev*, 56). It is important to emphasize here as noted in chapter one that modernity focused on consciousness, Newman pointed to historical development.

The universality of the Christian religion and continuous relevance in every place and time means that its “[p]rinciples require a very various application according to persons and circumstances vary, and must be thrown into new shapes according to the form of society which they are to influence” (*Dev*, 58). The difficulties of every age and people are met and solved not necessarily with fresh or new revelations but “through the revelation which we have, that is, by development” (*Dev*, 60). Newman points to many instances to buttress his argument. The challenging issues of interpretation, authorship and internal coherence of Scriptures/Revelation are matters “the decision has been left to time, to the slow process of thought, to the influence of the mind upon mind, the issues of controversy, and the growth of opinion” (*Dev*, 60). From this point, it is only proper to assume the existence of a legitimate and infallible authority to decide and put its stamp on what is true or false development and Revelation (cf. *Dev*, 75-92). Newman’s ultimate argument is that Catholicism is a true or nearest representation of the early Church in her doctrinal development (*Dev*, 92-98, 170) and that the history of Christianity and indeed the history of the world may be viewed as the development of an idea (cf. Lash, 1975, 54).

4.3.3 Notes on Genuine Development of an Idea

Since doctrinal developments were expected but not without the possibility of errors as some people might think or suspect. Whatever be the case, true developments should be distinguishable from corruption, and the former should possess certain features as marks of faithful developments. Thus, Newman contrasts genuine development with false development.

Development is genuine when its current expressions and expansions of its various aspects could match or fit into the original idea. Otherwise, the development may be counterfeit or corruption of the idea. Newman briefly explains corruption before describing the notes of genuine development. The term corruption relates to material substances in general but in particular or restricted sense, it relates to living things. Therefore, in restricted sense, the term corruption cannot be applied to objects such as stone. Though it may be crushed to chips or powder, it cannot be corrupted (*Dev*, 169-170). However, corruption can be used to describe the condition of matter like the human body, when it refers to “the breaking up of life, preparatory to its termination” (*Dev*, 170). Therefore, corruption is differentiated from development through its transient nature (cf. *Dev*, 203). Newman puts forward

seven Notes of varying cogency, independence and applicability, to discriminate healthy developments of an idea from its state of corruption and decay, as follows: There is no corruption if it retains one and the same type, the same principles, the same organization; if its beginnings anticipate its subsequent phases, and its later phenomena protect and subserve its earlier; if it has a power of assimilation and revival, and a vigorous action from first to last (*Dev*, 171).

Newman maintains that great ideas are comprehended and perfected in time due to the limitations of the mind (*Dev*, 29). Doubts have been raised concerning the coherence of Newman’s theory of development. According to Lash (1975, 55), there is no meeting point or unifying basis for the kinds of development in ideas as part of Newman’s historical process in the theory of development in ideas. Lash (1975, 55) notes that “it is difficult to see how they could be related within a systematically unified theory of doctrinal development. We are compelled to conclude that the theory has no ideal unity whatever if regarded apart from its subject matter.” It may be objected that this criticism or observation, though correct, is far from the intention of Newman (cf. *Dev*, 29). In the introduction of the essay, he states that his purpose was to set a hypothesis that “is directed towards a solution to a difficult” (*Dev*, 29) against writing a comprehensive theory of development. Therefore, taken as a whole, the theory of development in ideas explicated in the *Essay* fits appropriately in the body of Newman’s thoughts, especially when placed in the context of his idea of truth and unity of knowledge. A living idea continues to expand in the minds of individuals and society, adapting itself to new situations/contexts without losing its substance until all its aspects are unified. Thus, we may safely assume that the theory of development in ideas is still in its early stage and will arrive at full development in time to come. That brings us back to where we started: “from the nature of the human mind, time is necessary for the full comprehension and perfection of great ideas [and ideas] could not be comprehended all at once by the recipients [it] required only the longer time and deeper thought for their elucidation” (*Dev*, 29-30).

4.4 Social and Political Vision of Newman

The investigation into Newman's social and political thoughts has long moved from denial, doubts, and lack of interest to the affirmation of the possession of a social conscience and political thought, even if less developed. This initial problem was because Newman is better appreciated as a theologian than a philosopher. Theological issues rather than social and political matters dominated his thoughts. Nevertheless, he was not ignorant or naïve to his time's political and social issues. It was not the case that his preoccupation with religion hindered him from participating or having any interest in politics. Instead, his interest in religion motivated and necessitated his involvement and inspired his political thinking which often underappreciated.

Therefore, it has been necessary to scan his published works and correspondences to assemble and present his political and social views. Excellent presentations in monographs, books and articles have been published on Newman's views concerning political and social matters. However, no claim of discovery is made here on what constitutes Newman's political and social ideas. Nevertheless, some ideas that underline and constitute Newman political thinking have yet been brought forward. For instance, he anticipated many of contemporary problems such as political correctness, post-truth and inauthenticity. As a result, he focused on the empowerment of the person in various circumstance and sought to put the believer on a solid foundation to respond to his situation. Newman therefore, is the ideal person of our times. These important contributions should be highlighted to be fully appreciated.

4.4.1 Newman's Attitude Towards Politics

In a lifespan that covered nearly a century, Newman lived through significant changes and developments as a person, alongside changes within England and worldwide. He knew that development or progress when it is genuine could not be halted based on the idea behind it. He gave several examples of such ideas and developments in history and his understanding and interpretation of which clearly shows his attitude to politics but in connection with religion on the hand one and liberalism on the other. Like the Reform Act, some of the changes were ideas or developments that their time had come. In other words, they were more or less necessary but needed time and pruning to reach maturity before their consequences could be felt (cf. *Dev*, 36-40; C.L., Bowles, and Easter Monday). That indicates his broad historical knowledge of the socio-political affairs of the past and his time. Newman's interest was not only about the motives and spirit of the ideas in vogue but on the long time and concrete results

of these ideas. He, therefore, adopted a critical attitude rather than being dismissive in his criticisms. Newman did not attempt to develop his thesis and theory on politics. He considered himself less competent on purely social and political matters (cf. *LD* 31:24) and avoided abstract moral judgements in politics (Kenny 1957, 154).

Newman's most relevant publication in socio-political matters is the work entitled *Who is To Blame*, in which he examined the British Constitution. However, mention can also be made of other social and political publications, such as the *Tamworth Reading Room* and the 1859 article published in the *Rambler* on the poignant "Policy of English Catholics Towards Political Parties." Besides that, Newman's views that have social and political relevance are scattered in his publications and the correspondences he shared with people. Nevertheless, they reveal the profound and practical nature of his social and political thoughts in keeping with the general empiricism of the English tradition. In the words of Feiling V. Reade (1945, 139-154), it is a testament to "a fierce realism in politics which characterized Newman."

Newman's adventure into politics and treatment of social issues are well documented but infrequent. However, that is nothing in comparison to the contributions of his contemporaries, such as John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. Nevertheless, Newman's ideas are crucial enough for him to be remembered as an important voice in the socio-political and religious thought of the nineteenth century. As we said earlier, he wrote no treatise and did not attempt to assemble his views on politics and social matters in any coherent form. That is because social, political and otherworldly questions though crucial, are of secondary importance to him. He asserts that "I want faith to come first, and utility and amusement to follow" (*DA*, 281). Concerning Newman's attitude towards worldly matters, Edward Norman (1990, 153) notes that "the institutional arrangements for the world received a fairly lowly position, for he was addressing matters of antecedent gravity." That such social and political questions were valued as secondary is far from not possessing a political and social conscience as has been insinuated by some scholars and critics of Newman.

Furthermore, Newman was aware of the complexities surrounding such ideas and matters and how often they become only a means to an end and are swept aside in social and political discussions after securing power as characteristic of political expediency. In any case, religion is either a tool to be used or a hindrance to political schemes. For every average politician, the priority is first to secure political power as a means and platform for addressing personal interests and, second public concerns. He observed that politicians are keenly interested in government and society not for altruistic reasons but because of their self-interest (cf. *HS III*, 131-132). That criticism is not necessarily aimed at persons but at the system of

values, thought and action engendered by utilitarian principles. As a result, he sought to maintain a healthy distance and curiosity for political affairs both at home and abroad. His duty was to denounce the unethical and irreligious conduct of the political class (cf. *LD*, xxx. 209).

Aside from the above situation, the human condition for Newman was irredeemable by purely materialistic, technical and mechanistic means, and often their deployment reduces religion to an obstacle to human advancement (*DA*, 277). Newman maintained a pecking order of priorities and principles in every aspect of life. Thus, he places principles before expediency, belief before action, faith before reason, conscience before the law, obedience before right, truth before freedom, moral excellence before intellectual excellence, religion before politics, society/nation before State; virtue/character/morality before education; and that rights are correlatives of duties (*GA*, 233; *Diff*, I, 263). Therefore, he had a clear idea of the functions and limitations of political power in relation to the human condition (Kelly 2012, 24). But all these principles are isolated, independent and inconclusive; however, they indicate the direction of the political ideas of Newman, which will become more evident in the following pages.

Three fundamentally interrelated factors and facts necessitate politics for Newman. First, man is a social being that can hardly exist without society (*GA*, 296-297) and imbibes or embraces a religion within a society with a social character. In other words, religion is all-encompassing because it is a social reality and man is a social being. “For man never stands alone here,” Newman says, “though he will stand by himself one day hereafter; but here he is a social being, and goes forward to his long home as one of a large company” (*GA*, 308).

The second factor is the belief in the doctrine of the Fall and the accompanying corruption in the world, which has obvious moral, social, and political implications as Newman saw it. The doctrine of the Fall of man implicates a particular worldview and sense of history and progress. Besides, it means that man is susceptible and inclined to evil and needs divine help to conquer evil and direct him/her to a world better than this in which he now dwells. Therefore, man needs a government here on earth and the church, representing the invisible world and the visible means of an invisible grace (cf. Kenny 1957, 64).

The third factor is that since the Church is a concrete, visible and living human society, the critical issue of its internal government and relationship with the State and the world necessarily arise both at the theoretical and practical level. Thus, Newman’s understanding of man as a social being, coupled with his experience and understanding of religion as a social reality, compelled him to take seriously social and political questions or developments as they

affect the place and the role religion plays in society. These factors express the commitment and the right of the Church to be concerned and involved in politics and political developments. Because the Church is real and exists in time with a mission to accomplish on earth, it must have a structure and face the challenges of its political organisation. Moreover, being a political body requires an organisational structure and theory to maintain and regulate its relations with other political bodies such as the State (cf. Kelly 2012, 25).

The failure to appreciate this scale of preference and the emphasis Newman places on the human condition and its remedy are why he is misunderstood and undervalued. His understanding of the human condition or human nature tainted by the Fall caused him to reject the false optimism and exaggeration of human nature and its potentials. This whole conundrum, the exaggerated optimism of human nature and its abilities that deny the Fall and reserved the pecking order of principles, constituted what Newman considered the basis and common conception of liberalism. From that perspective as its foundation, liberalism is all-embracing; it is both a religious, political and philosophical idea with grave moral and social consequences. In his letter to C. L. Wood dated 14 September 1832, he writes: “Men saw the good in themselves and not the evil, and consequently were puzzled by the failure of certain parts of the social system to work well, ascribing the failure to a lack of scientific knowledge, rather than of personal virtue” (cf. *US*, 103). The human condition and its potential thus conceived formed the basis for the claims of rights, freedoms and the conception of a Free Will that rejects every form of external restrictions. Again that understanding is contrary to the strict scale of preference in which freedom is subordinated to truth and assumes the existence of laws with which it must be in accordance (cf. Kenny 1957, 131).

Consequently, Newman defined liberalism as “the mistake of subjecting to human judgement those revealed doctrines which are in their nature beyond and independent of it” (*Apo*, 493). The religious notion of that definition is rather obvious. What is not so obvious is the political and philosophical connotation. We have to recall the previous definition of liberalism again to see how the philosophical notion of liberalism is implied in this last definition. Liberalism was defined as a misuse of reason for purposes that it was never intended and is unfitted. Thus reason is set up as the measure and standard of revealed doctrine and the content of Revelation. It may seem that rationalism and liberalism are synonymous, but as he explained in his correspondence with C. L. Armstrong dated 23 March 1887, it certainly means that “[l]iberalism is the development of rationalism. It views faith as a mere natural gift, the like and consequence of reason – the moral sense; and by reason and the moral sense [the rationalist] estimates it and measures its objects. He soon becomes satisfied with

other men though they ignore faith and its objects, given they recognise reason and morality. This is Liberalism.”

The political notion of liberalism is aptly seen in the biglietto speech. Newman notes and explains the form of religious liberalism that upholds liberalism as political theory. He writes that:

It must be borne in mind that there is much in the liberalistic theory which is good and true; for example [...] the precepts of justice, truthfulness, sobriety, self-command, benevolence, which, as I have already noted, are among its avowed principles, and the natural laws of society. It is not until we find that this array of principles is intended to supersede or block out religion that we pronounce it evil (Neville 1905, 68).

From that perspective, Newman’s attitude to politics is more critical than merely antagonistic. He understands that liberalism as a political theory has its strengths and weaknesses. That weakness consists in the arrogance of supposing to understand the human being and human condition without reference to God. Its challenge is the conception of man, society and reality that is indifferent to religious truth and God. Therefore, “Religion is in no sense the bond of society” (Neville 1905, 68). On the contrary, Newman argues that the bond which holds and unites society together is religion.

Newman objected to what he considered the attempt to build a new bond for society without reference to religion but based on science as the prosecution of ‘Broughamism,’ which means that “rationalism, not faith was the guiding light of society” (Kelly 2012, 58). He saw the liberalism of the 1840s to be in league with both Broughamism and Benthamism (Lord Brougham and Bentham) to create a society based on science and knowledge but with purely utilitarian goals. Newman says, “[d]o not attempt by philosophy what once was done by religion” (*DA*, 292). That means a kind of education and knowledge dependent upon utilitarian principles. Newman does not think that scientism and utilitarianism advocated by Lord Brougham and Bentham can hold and unite society for good and forever. Newman does not doubt that the principle of expediency, as engendered by scientism and utilitarianism, can keep the liberal state on the path of survival and progress but only for a short while. There is no assurance that broad ethical truths/principles “will stand assailed without religion, and in any case, although a state may endure for some time without true morality, yet without it, its ultimate corruption is ensured” (Kenny 1957, 136). The free liberal state that Newman advocated for has Christianity as its basis, survival and progress.

4.4.2 Conservatism and Liberalism: Towards an Understanding of Newman's Political Idea

The terms conservatism and liberalism²⁶ conjure up opposing philosophical, socio-political, religious and cultural images, attitudes, economic preferences, constitutional form, law, customs, and democratic virtues that characterize and define a social order. Conservatism and liberalism describe the political outlook and ideas of an individual, group of persons, a society, or even a State/nation. Conservatism is often characterized by rigid adherence to beliefs, order, duty, tradition, ideas, justice, loyalty, and unwillingness to embrace change and progress even when necessary. In contrast, liberalism is associated with flexibility, progress, innovations, tolerance and a dislike of authority and tradition. Conservatism and liberalism are two opposing socio-political and religious outlooks that are practically and theoretically difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile.

Based on the evidence, it is difficult to label Newman strictly as a conservative or liberal without reservations or fear of contradiction (cf. Briton 1962, 149). We have already explained that he was an ardent opponent of liberalism in theology. At the same time, it must be admitted that neutrality in terms of his socio-political and religious temper is completely ruled out. Kelly (2012, 28) observes that, "A note of caution must therefore be offered: mere labels are not always helpful in attempting to understand Newman's political position, particularly given that it is almost impossible to accept even his own use of such terms at their face value." There is much in the thought of Newman that portrays him as a conservative thinker. The same claim can be made about his liberal attitude and commitment. This is because he was neither a thoroughgoing conservative nor a liberal on the basis that he was conservative when it comes to his religious belief and liberal when it comes to his social and political belief. This partly explains why both camps bitterly opposed him (cf. Rowlands 1989, 135).

Meanwhile, Newman's attitude to both camps was rather complex. He disliked both the Conservatives and the Liberals (cf. *Apo*, 51). In politics, the conservatives and the liberals sought to diminish the influence of religion (Kelly 2012, 3-4; cf. Rowlands 1989, 135).

²⁶ According to Kelly (2012, 28-29), "The nature and complexity of 19th-century conservatism makes it an extremely difficult term to define with precision. The emergence, in the 1830s, of the modern political conservative party, Tories, had little ideology. Indeed, the conservative politician William Pitt, 'the Younger' (1759-1806), never called himself a 'Tory'. Likewise, liberalism is a notoriously elusive notion, largely because it is extremely difficult to circumscribe and define accurately its terms of reference. The term 'liberal' can of course be used to politics with varying meanings. Newman's use of the term revealed his own ambiguity on the issue of political terminology... In 1868, he wrote that liberalism designated a course of principles, rather than actions. 'You may call me a liberal ... I shall call myself anti-liberal.' It is a measure of the flexibility or vagueness of political terms, that without contradiction, Newman can be easily labelled either a liberal or anti-liberal."

Consequently, he rejected and distanced himself from the endeavours and initiatives to rally Catholics together under one single party because Catholics came from different political persuasions that cut across party lines and class status (*The Rambler*, July 1859, 255–257). Newman's complex attitude and the absence of any treatise on politics and religion makes it challenging to coherently put his political and social views consistent with any single label as conservative or liberal. There is a possible explanation for this and a way to overcome the aforementioned difficulty.

We have noted earlier that much of Newman's writings was occasioned by specific needs. He wrote on-demand to solve specific problems. Some of these writings were delivered as sermons to specific audiences, and others were letters. Thus, when some of the statements or comments in these writings are taken away from their original context, they could have different and contrary interpretations foreign to Newman and his immediate audience.

Let us repeat as a matter of emphasis that he was concerned about fidelity to truth and consistency in belief and practice/action that these engendered rather than the logical consistency of theory or system. "Logicians are more set upon concluding rightly, than on right conclusions" (*DA*, 294). This is consistent with Newman's rejection of complex philosophical systems such as German idealism and rationalism, the introduction of which he blamed for the rationalization of faith and religious liberalism (US, 120; cf. Carr 1996, 84-85; Kelly, 2012, 148-163). Newman was an original and independent seminal thinker. He epitomizes a perfect model of the modern individual scholar and gentleman who thinks for himself and at the same time can maintain the correct balance between individualist and collectivist reasoning and wisdom, holding in utmost reverence truth, authority, tradition and conscience. Newman had the intellectual acumen to synchronize opposed views based on their contribution to the truth and appreciates the practical limits involved in such an attempt.

Therefore, the challenge could be overcome or avoided if we take the conservative and the liberal tags on Newman as the two-footed framework on which he constructed his political thoughts/ideas. This makes it less challenging to present Newman's complex political ideas in the process of which he charted a middle course between two extreme poles, conservatism and liberalism. He offers a unique outlook and presentation of what each of the extreme socio-political, religious poles has to offer by his unbiased recognition of the truth and seeks to unite the poles under this same truth. Again, as noted in the previous chapter, whether natural or revealed, truth has profound implications for life in general and politics in particular and formed the basis of his criticism of modern life. Newman states that "truth is the guiding policy of theology and theological inquiries; devotion and edification, of worship; and government,

expedience ...” and he asks, “What line of conduct, except on the long, the very long run, is at once edifying expedient and true?” (*VM*, xli-xlii). Thus, Newman attempted to make truth (and faith) the integrative existential factor of human experiences and socio-political life. For him, religious truth (and faith) can be combined with a progressive worldview. Because it is true, belief will co-exist and is coextensive with genuine progress in all aspects of human endeavour (cf. *Idea*, 38-44).

Newman’s idea of intellectual, religious, social, and moral formation or the cultivation of liberal knowledge in the university was crafted to achieve the above need. Throughout his life, the relentless search for the truth saw Newman oscillate between conservative and liberal socio-political and religious persuasions but remain detached from party membership. Newman was a clergyman and not a career politician, but “[in] the pursuit of religious truth, he was liberal when he sought to amend what he believed to be wrong, and a conservative when he sought to maintain what he believed to be right” (Kelly 2012, 4). Thus, Newman viewed his public intellectual engagement within the fields of religion and politics to “promote truth by a self-sacrifice” (*Apo*, 55). Newman’s endeavour to uphold the truth despite the consequences but with the assurance that the consequences should be significant by being related to that truth. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this was his way of personation.

Newman’s social and political thoughts were first expressed and developed within the Oxford Movement (1833-1845), which he co-founded and became one of the movement’s most influential leaders in its history. The socio-political and religious outlook of the Oxford Movement was conservative. The reason was that staunch Tory party members founded the Movement. Toryism happens to be the established party of the Church of England with a formidable stronghold at Oxford. In contrast with the Whig Party, the Tory party was more sympathetic in safeguarding the prerogatives of the Church, the general well-being of the Establishment, and maintaining the socio-political status of the day, thereby attracting many Churchmen. They resisted any idea of tinkering with the constitution. Newman’s association with the Tory party was inspired by his religious belief rather than any political motive. He found certain aspects of the conservatism at Oxford congenial to his personality. However, Kenny (1957, 7) notes, “[t]hat Newman always remained a good conservative, through temperament and philosophic conviction, will be maintained, but that he remained for long a Tory, in any important sense, will soon be shown to be a mistaken opinion.”

This underlines and points to the early influence of the Oriel Noetic on Newman. It was short but impactful and left its indelible marks in his life. The perfect synchronization of Noetic/liberal and Tory/conservative influences in Newman meant a break from both camps.

Integrating the best elements from both camps shaped and formed his socio-political and religious view/position. Whatever he did not imbibe from both camps constituted what he rejected and criticised (Kelly 2012, 28-29). This is what the Via Media meant when applied to the liberal-conservative divide. Newman studied the State and the Church extensively and clearly understood what they were in the past, present, and should be. Newman's social and political attitude was shaped by the same principles of the Via Media. He walked in between the two poles of conservative and liberal ideas. The construction of Newman's Via Media between Protestantism and Catholicism is analogous to his conservative and liberal relationship. Thus, we see in Newman a love for the Church and desire for independence and a dislike of the Establishment; a willingness to change and embrace genuine progress that is uncharacteristic of conservative minds and a reverence for established institutions and authority that is uncommon with liberals.²⁷ Newman expresses what may be called existential political realism. When Newman's idea of politics is adequately understood, the attempt to classify him as a liberal, modernist, Tory or conservative will be less important (Kenny 1957, 127).

Newman's realism meant that he accepts the real existence of the Church as a visible reality that is authoritative and dogmatic because the Church has the onus to communicate truth and guard it; to point out and condemn errors and evil in the society as a matter of Divine command. He had a vision of an authoritative Church free from State control. Newman holds the above vision of the Church as conservative but at the same time favoured and advocated a secular State with less authority or involvement in civil life (*Idea*, 64-65).

He had a vision of a free, secular, tolerant modern State founded on Christian principles but with independent authority from the Church (*SD*, 263-264). This marks his rejection of the Establishment. The Church for Newman has a real and physical existence that is true of a human society which necessitates its relation with the State both at the theoretical and practical levels. This marks the foundation of political thought and involvement stretching far wider than its original object. Newman emphasizes that Christianity is a theological system, a religious rite and a political rule. That necessitates the double involvement of the Church in politics. As a polity, the Church has internal politics and government. However, the Church exists within a particular State and has dealings or relationships with the host State and beyond because the Church is universal and the State is always local and exercises a local authority.

²⁷ Kenny (1975, 31-32) notes that; "As far as religion was concerned, Newman took his stand on conservatism and dogma, and took as his special foe 'liberalism', by which he meant the anti-dogmatic principle... It was his very insistence on the Development of doctrine that was to embroil his name in the Modernist controversies of the early twentieth century, and to cause momentary doubts among some pious Catholics whether Newman might turn out to have been a religious liberal after all."

But John Henry, like every other political thinker, has his view of human nature or the human condition that is the basis of his political thought. These presuppositions underlie his conservative thinking. As we have noted earlier, the first is the doctrine of the Fall. The human condition is radically affected by the Fall means that man is weak, sinful, and wicked. Consequently, sin and evil permeate the world and human action (cf. *SD* 108; 242), with the inevitable effect of the melancholy and gloomy view which Newman ascribes to the world and man as their most characteristics (*Dev*, 228; *PPS*, vii, 32). On this basis, Newman says that “men need a local government on earth” (*SD*, 103). Although God’s ordinance establishes states, they have their existence in the necessity of man’s nature (cf. *PPS*, vii, 32).

The stress that Newman makes of the human condition in the world was in part a reaction to a current liberal thought (in his day associated with Schleiermacher) that deemphasized Original Sin and its effects. This opposition naturally inclined Newman towards conservatism in a historical context where only two parties were the conservative and liberal. But Newman’s conservatism must be disassociated from maintaining class distinctions and a comfortable social order by the aristocrats that discriminated between the rich and the poor. Newman’s idea and insistence on development reflect his flexibility and distance from this old-fashioned conservatism. He attests to this fact: “To live is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often” (*Dev*, 40; cf. *Ess ii*, 123-124).

Newman elaborated his concept of change in his *Development of Christian Doctrine*. He argues that it is in the very nature of an idea to grow or develop, and there are certain marks to determine the authentic and inauthentic development of an idea. Many of his examples were taken from politics, which provided crucial clues to his political thought. Newman’s theory of ideas expressed his optimism of progress, but his realism meant the consciousness that often “projected innovations turn out, if not nugatory, nothing short of destructive” (*HS*, I, 180). Newman was aware of the challenge of introducing a change or new idea to the minds that are not prepared for it. Hence he noted that “novelty is often error to those who are unprepared for it, from the refraction with which it enters into their conception” (*VM*, I, iii). Newman was keenly aware of “the philosophical bond which connects one age with another” (*HS*, ii, 54). He was impressed by “the strength of a political establishment which has been the slow birth of time” (*HS*, iii, 106-107). However, he was also aware of the problem of “a slow corruption” that inevitably infects human endeavours (cf. *Dev*, 203). Newman appreciated the fact that the problem of permanence and change is unavoidable and was open to progress that gave him a liberal outlook, i.e. the courage to embrace change or development as a matter of historical necessity.

Another supposition by Newman is the existence of God which for him was simply obvious. The existence of God needed no proof or arguments. The existence of God was for Newman self-evident and led him to declare that only two self-evident beings exist, that is, himself and God (*Apo*, 108). Contrary to his thoroughgoing empiricism, he was led by this self-evident truth to embrace the idealism of Plato and the likes of Augustine of Hippo and Neoplatonism of Clement and Origen. Thus, Newman asserts that all but God and persons were in shadow and are incomprehensible (*CS*, 1). Matter for Newman is a mystery and therefore unknowable to man (*CS*, 60), and the most we can grasp as human beings are shadows that represent realities (*Arians*, 75). The real world for Newman was beyond sense perception, and the physical world is only but a veil (cf. *Apo*, 113).

Newman's belief in the existence of God committed him to the view that the world is neither self-sufficient nor self-explanatory. He takes this physical world as "the instrument, yet the veil, of the world invisible – the veil, yet still partially the symbol and index: so that all that exists or happens visibly, conceals and yet suggests, and above all subserves, a system of persons, facts and events beyond itself" (*Ess ii*, 192). More importantly, the visible and invisible worlds are governed by Divine Providence. The working of the visible world is perceptible and could be studied and explained through observation of the world's internal order. The laws governing the world are discernible in their moral, political, and social order.

Nevertheless, the ultimate final causes and effects in the world are beyond human influence. The same system is applicable in the invisible world. Newman does not detail the bond between the visible and the invisible world beyond the postulating that they are under the same Divine Providence.²⁸

Everything and events in the world have their laws, including the rise and fall of States/Empires. Historical occurrences are providentially executed under some generalized laws so that it is possible to predict the future (*HS*, I, 228-229). The history of the world, in other words, displays a Divine purpose and plan discoverable as facts or laws. These laws, especially the social and political laws, are flexible and general. They have no a priori

²⁸ Kenny (1957, 43-44) notes, "This theory has yet to be examined, but suffice it to say now that Newman thought ideas were reflexions of objects in the real world, and that in the various developments which these ideas underwent in the visible world, they were capable of a normative test by reference to a transcendent and in temporal reality outside history. Such a view clearly rules out at once a certain type of conservatism. As M. Guittou has pointed out, if Newman had to choose between slogans current in Germany about the time he was writing, he would have to affirm that 'only the rational was real', and deny that only 'the real is rational'. That is, if Newman is to speak of a spiritual and transcendent reality outside history, of such a nature that it becomes possible to speak of relations between truths outside the world of time and history, and ideas which represents it in time, and moreover to judge which ideas do adequately represent this truth, then it becomes impossible to consecrate the mere movement of history, to 'divinise' it, as theories of development are accused of doing. To this extent Newman is not conservative, though his fundamental conservatism remains."

necessity in their operation and application. The laws are not causes but merely facts that are the objects of our experience (cf. *GA*, 55). This is because “[w]hat is called, and seems to be cause and effect, is rather an order of sequences, and does not preclude, nay, perhaps implies, the presence of unseen spiritual agency as its real author” (*Ess*, ii, 193). That means these laws exist whether one recognizes or does not recognize the existence of God.

In a letter addressed to P.C. Allies dated 16th November 1854, Newman asserted that human laws drawn out by reason agree with the Divine plan. As difficult as that may be to defend in real life, Newman was willing to live with the contrary that may arise due to disagreement while entertaining the hope that future investigation would resolve the differences (*Idea*, 59-62). Moreover, there is nothing rigid about these laws. They are generalizations and, therefore, not necessary and immutable.

The world and everything in it is subject to law; the social, political order and the State are not exceptions. This understanding of law makes the studies of politics possible by determining the laws of politics. However, these laws are no more than generalizations drawn from experience are not to be confused with the laws of physical nature, which are fixed compared to moral and social nature, which are self-governed (cf. Kenny 1957, 45). The fact of Free Will rules out the possibility of fixed laws. Hence exactitude in social studies is limited. Nevertheless, the fact of Free Will does not imply arbitrary revisions of laws. There might be some generalized rules or accepted patterns of development of society, but in the actual circumstance where this is not obtainable, conscience becomes the guiding norm (*US*, 152).

At this point, reference must be made to Newman’s sense of history, which for him occurs in cycles. Nevertheless, the cycles do not necessarily affect human freedom. Therefore, Newman writes that “the past never returns; the cause of events, old in its texture is ever in its colouring and fashion” (*Idea*, 17-18). Reason ensures progress in history contrary to sin, which ensures the same bad round again (*VV*, 137). The reference to sin at once raises the question of the relation between politics and theology in the thought of Newman. Similarly, Kenny (1957, 46) rhetorically asks,

The question is, does theology slip in at this point? Must Newman, in the end, subordinate his politics to theology, where the empirical evidence alone is useless or inconclusive and the need for some principle of selection if not scale of values becomes necessary? The truth seems to be this. As Newman could take part with others in a common search of the empirical facts of the political world, so he could hold with many others the same general principles and values, which were not a direct consequence of, or in an obviously direct relationship with, his theological views.

Newman’s theory of the unity of truth and sciences means that no science was self-contained and capable of full development without reference to other sciences. Particular sciences are but an aspect of a complex reality or whole. Consequently, politics or political

science could not ignore theology without being deprived of the complete truth, even if it suffers less than other sciences (cf. *Idea*, 72). This was Newman's expression of belief in a truth that all things have a proper position and are in relation to each other. Based on that belief, Newman aimed at objectivity. Newman's politics is better understood from that prism than from the prism of conservatism and liberalism.

The preceding suppositions fairly represent the underlying ideas that form Newman's political and social outlook. He did not make any conscious attempt at developing fully the political ideas he expressed, but a clear direction can be discerned by assembling his numerous ideas, and a broad conclusion can be reached. We should seek to explicate Newman's social and political ideas within this context.

4.4.3 The Early Political Ideas of Newman

Newman's conversion to Roman Catholicism meant a change also in his social and political ideas. The change he underwent could be a complete turnaround from his formerly held traditional view as a member of the Established Church of England. The establishment was an ideal throughout Christendom. Kelly (2012, 14) observes that Newman's "sense of 'Loyalism' made him celebrate the traditional union between the Established Church, the monarchy, and the aristocracy." Newman expressed his support of the Establishment when he wrote, "the (so-called) union of church and state has been a wonderful and most gracious phenomenon in Christian history. It is a realization of the gospel in its highest perfection when both Caesar and St. Peter know and fulfil their office" (*DA*, 23). Newman's concrete historical involvement in politics, as noted earlier, is associated with the founding of the Oxford Movement in an attempt to hinder "the passing of Catholic Emancipation by the Tory government in 1829 and the Whig government's introduction of the Irish Church Reform Bill in 1833. He was convinced that both the Tories and the Whigs sought to erode the Church of England's prominent status in society" (Kelly 2012, 15). Newman generally objected to arbitrary changes to the constitution that might affect the union between the Church and State but based on his Christian faith as a mark of his conservative character.

Consequently, he opposed the Reform Act that extended the citizens' voting rights to include many young males (Kelly 2012, 34-42). His opposition to the Electoral Reform Act and consequently to democracy found expression in a tract entitled "The Patristic Idea of Anti-Christ." He references democracy with the Anti-Christ (*DA*, 72).

The economic and market life was subjected to severe criticism for the same reason directed towards the Tories and aristocrats. The economic prosperity brought about by the

Industrial Revolution, which consequently reduced poverty margins, was greeted by Newman with a sense of pessimism and fear for what he considered as the danger of material wealth. Newman was concerned that it was “a very fearful consideration that we belong to a nation which in good measure subsists by making money” (*PPS*, 2:356). His criticisms were decidedly directed to the businessman and financier of the time. Newman decried the lack of responsibility, charity, justice, piety, and high-level individualism among the men of commerce (cf. *Ess ii*, 348-349).

4.4.4 The Later Political Ideas of Newman

It is difficult to state with any amount of certainty that Newman abandoned his old political views. His attempt to reconcile Roman Catholicism and Anglicanism in 1841 with the publication of the controversial Tract 90 and the resultant backlash earned him the status of a crypto-Catholic. Nevertheless, it was evident that Newman’s views had changed significantly on many issues. These changes are evident and expressed in the publication of *Development of Christian Doctrine* during his stay at Littlemore. (cf. Kenny 1957, 14-15).

Following Newman’s doctrinal standpoints and his emphasis on authority and tradition in connection to the role that these contributed to his switch to Catholicism, the general religious and political outlook or orientation of Newman was expected to reflect those of other conservatives within the Catholic fold closely: but expectedly with Anglican additions upon his Catholic heritage. However, Newman differs significantly from many conservative Catholics, and he departed slightly from the traditional Thomist or neo-Scholastic approach and position on some issues. The difference between Newman and the Scholastics lies in the methodological and epistemological approaches. Besides that, very little between them is contrary or contradictory. Aquinas and Newman are similar in their political ideas and understanding of Natural law. Thomas Aquinas embodied medieval deductive rationalism. Newman embodied the inductive temper of the nineteenth century and did not share the metaphysical starting point and approach of the Scholastics (cf. Kenny, 1957, 75, 98-99).

On the vexed issue regarding Church and State, and religion and politics, Newman, in his latter thought as a Catholic, deemed the issue of Temporal Power in connection to Papal rule over large areas of Italy as something no longer desirable or advantageous to the Catholic Church and should be abandoned. The exercise of political power was something not against the faith but in the context of the nineteenth century as in the present time, Newman saw the exercise of political power as detrimental to the mission of the Church, its independence and liberty. In the context of the siege of the Vatican City and the struggle between the Pope and

Italian Nationalists, Newman thought that the Church's independence was in doubt if it depended on any external or foreign power for security and survival. Furthermore, Newman understood that the relationship between the State and Church was not proper. Under the union, the problem of sovereignty and independence was bound to arise, and the Church would always be at the receiving end. The Church under the Establishment could not maintain her truths and consequently lose doctrinal purity. Newman's realization that any State Church such as the Anglican Church could not be Catholic was partly due to his understanding that it had no power to define its doctrines independently without interference. Newman further determined that (religious) truth is not made or created by the force of argument. The truth is not chosen or elected by a democratic process of deliberation. Therefore, the safety for doctrine provided by political power or parliamentary enactments was false security. As we did mention in the previous chapter, truth should be accepted as given to be discovered and accepted for what it is, based on its own merits.

Furthermore, in the words of Kenny (1957, 18), "Newman insisted as strongly as any liberal Catholic that the modern State must not attempt in any way to enforce a particular religion or its doctrines on its members. He was a positive enthusiast for the secular state, not passively admitting its present regrettable necessity." Again, writing in the context of the crisis of the Crimean war (1853-1856), Newman states that, "[i]ndeed, I have a decided view that Catholicism is safer and freer under a constitutional regime, such as our own than under any other" (*DA*, 307). Within this context, Newman advocated for a small, limited political rule. For Newman, we have seen earlier that man is a social being, free, rational, and progressive by his constitution. These threads of man are the basis of political rule or State. However, man is not drawn to political society or political rule by natural pulse. A modern State is only possible by the creation of a social contract. His preferred terminology for this reality is called 'settlement.' The settlement is a product of a free association for the good of the people. It has two necessary elements: power and liberty. Power ensures protection, and liberty ensures there is a good to protect. A government is the seat of power and holds this power in trust, and a constitution is the seat of liberty and ensures the enjoyment of liberty (*DA*, 3117-318).

Newman here expresses Lockean influence in his understanding of the origin and purpose of the State as the product of a 'settlement.' Human beings are endowed with natural rights and liberties. The independent exercise of these rights and liberties would lead to endless conflict and confusion. Hence the idea of settlement to create the State out of mutual consent and for mutual or equal benefits. The key term is settlement which may be interpreted to mean the willingness by persons of equal dignity to give up a portion of their natural rights and

liberties to create a State that guarantees more rights, protections and liberties (*DA*, 312). The State is more than just individuals coming together by mutual consent. The State is both created and sustained for the good of its citizens. That good existed for Newman as a ‘common possession,’ which is the equivalent of what the neo-Scholastics call the common good. Newman writes that,

[a] state is in its very idea a society, and a society is a collection of many individuals made one by their participation in some common possession, and to the extent of that common possession: the presence of that possession held in common constitutes the life, and the loss of it constitutes the dissolution, of a state. In like manner, whatever avails or tend to withdraw that possession, is either fatal or prejudicial to the social union (*HS*, I, 161).

If a State does not guarantee or relate to the values of the citizens, its politics will be counterproductive to citizens’ deepest and ultimate aspirations, that is, its common possession. According to Newman, the common possession of the State will consist of objects of the imagination such as religion or in objects of sense such as secular interests, country, home, protection of a person, and property (*HS*, I, 162). To ensure the benefits of society and the purposes for which the state was established, such as liberty and justice, the State must have a constitution as its common possession. As the seat of liberty, the Constitution has the fundamental function to provide or ensure checks and balances in the exercise of political power (cf. *DA*, 315). The nature of Power tends towards centralization, while on the other hand, liberty tends towards independence and ends in self-rule. Power and liberty are in perpetual conflict from their very nature because each one tries to limit or eliminate the other. Where you have rules, you have no freedom and where you have freedom, you have no rule. But it should be noted that rules do not destroy freedom, only arbitrary decisions do. Meanwhile, a people that gives up no power to the State or leader cannot be a State nor enjoy the benefits of Statehood. Moreover, a people that give up everything to the State could not be worse off, though it gave up nothing (*DA*, 325).

The evolutionary thoughts of Newman were also extended to the sphere of prosperity. His stern or harsh condemnation of the men of business and financiers had softened over time. The evidence of this change in mind can be seen in the glowing words Newman used to express his approval of the structural developments and Victorian business culture and, in the process, touches on the ideas of private enterprise, free trade, and non-interference of government in business. Again, he does not attempt to develop these concepts in detail (*DA*, 336-337). Similarly, Newman’s opinion evolved when it came to the issue of democracy. His earlier opposition to democracy is understood today in the context of the Oxford Movement as a member of the establishment, and the circumstances surrounding the passing of the Reform

Act of 1832 was instead done in fear than in principles. He did not overtly reject the idea of democratic principles theoretically and intellectually. Kenny (1957, 181) explains that,

For this reason alone it is impossible to take literally Newman's professed detestation of democratic principles. It is clear that it was not so much the principle but what he feared was the practice of democracy which he disliked. This was the real fear: 'When was a demos other than a tyrant?' The problem of democratic tyranny is still with us, in the form particularly of strong pressure to social conformity, and Newman's doubts and fears were far from groundless. It is interesting to note that Newman seems to have been in much sympathy with John Stuart Mill, who saw more clearly than some writers of his day the future threats to liberty involved in the progress of democracy.

Over time Newman came to terms with the inevitability of the process of democratization and did embrace democratic values and acknowledge that a representative government was a legitimate system of governance. First, this was informed by the belief in the unique value of the individual human person as the principle for the acceptance of democracy and democratic rule. Second, the state for Newman was only an instrument created for the service of persons. Therefore, the maintenance of the State was dependent on the consent of free citizens. Third, Newman accepted freedom as the most important operative ideal of modern democracy. Newman believed that freedom involved free speech and that the decisions reached after deliberation should in a democracy be a majority-minority compromise (*DA*, 306-361; cf. Kelly, 2012, 43).

Newman's ideas kept evolving as he confronted new situations. However, he never departed from the fundamental basis of his thought, the dogmatic principle. Therefore, he did maintain an unflinching degree of consistency in his opposition to liberalism in religion and Benthamism with its principle of utility. The flexibility of his thoughts based on objective truth made him embrace political realism and, consequently, some principles of political liberalism. That was consequent to his switch from Anglicanism to Roman Catholicism. He adopted several liberal political positions that saw him oppose the temporal power of the pope and the grouping of Catholics under any umbrella but faith. Hence he rejected the idea of the Catholic party or State, to argue that Catholics were from every stratum, class, and profession in the society, and they all meet together in our religious pale (*The Rambler*, July 1859, p. 256).

Newman objected to the adoption of any existing political party for Catholics. Instead, he showed his preference for forming communities or societies in which Catholic interests and principles and, consequently, Christian ideals were diffused and made part of the community's life. He further argues that the desire for a Catholic State has no peculiarly pastoral advantage (cf. *LD* 19:420-423 and 430-434). In a letter to William Monsell, Newman notes:

I am not sure that it would not be better for the Catholic religion everywhere if it had no very different status from that which it has in England. There is so much corruption,

deadness, hypocrisy, infidelity when a dogmatic religion is imposed on a nation by law that I like freedom better (*LD 20*, 426-427).

Newman understood that the problem of sin and human salvation cut across political barriers and that state status to Christianity did not in the past and may not in the present or the future guarantee either more serious Christianity or temporal success. In the changing relationship between the State and Church, Newman envisioned a new relationship between theology/religion and politics. The path of this relationship is hinted at in the *Idea of a University*, as noted before. Newman asserts that politics, like physics, chemistry, and pure mathematics, will suffer less from disconnection with theology than other subjects such as ethics and metaphysics (*Idea*, 72). This is indicative of the distinction between religion and politics and the end of the heavy reliance of the Church on the State. Again, this is notwithstanding Newman's idea of the interconnectedness or mutual relation of all the elements of civilization and academic disciplines. From this perspective, Newman still holds without a contradiction that religious bond was indispensable in the long run for the prosperity and survival of the State. However, he does not associate the moral decay of the State or nation with the rejection of the religious bond. There is no necessary correlation between the decline of religious belief and morality among a class of people in the society in any given time or generation (cf. Kenny 1957, 136). Hence, Newman saw nothing extraordinary about the State and political ideas. The State and political ideas are essentially non-metaphysical realities and are determined by the order of natural truth or reason (cf. *Dev*, 42; see also Norman, 1990, 155). As a result, Newman dismisses any idea of political theology and argues that the order of natural truth is comprehensible to believers and nonbelievers. That understanding is key to Newman's demand for a free, tolerant and religiously neutral State which guarantees intellectual liberty, freedom of association and freedom of belief and expression. Therefore, Newman expresses his love for independence, self-rule, and free enterprise when he asserts that "nothing great or living can be done except when men are self-governed and independent." (C.L. Blachford, 18 July 1887 as cited by Kenny, 1957)). Kenny (1957, 162) interprets the assertion to mean that Newman was "consciously making a political and moral, and not an economic choice." We may further note that Newman, in this manner, was appealing to political liberalism but only in the sense of freedom of action because the liberal state could become authoritarian just like the religious state.

Kenny (1957, 184) has further explained that Newman's demand for freedom stems from the exceptional value of individual human personality, the enormous importance attached to recognising the individuality of the human soul and to the unfathomable depths of human personality. Similarly, according to Deavel (2014, 429-443), the argument could also be made

that Newman's appeal for liberty was grounded in his social understanding of the world and ideas. Deavel bases his argument on how an idea takes possession of society, beginning with an individual, to conclude that the individualism of Newman does not consist of isolated persons but of the community of interdependent selves with different understandings, experiences and knowledge and self-government working together in a society. Newman highlights the importance of free and private enterprise by which persons collaborate to work together without government control or interference to bring their ideas to fruition and perfection. Newman's approval of free enterprise and political liberalism was based on his strict hierarchy of goods, as discussed previously. His approval of political liberalism, private property, free enterprise and industry was not based on material benefits only but the understanding that they contribute to authentic human and societal development. These developments are good and desirable first, for the individual, second for the society and the Church, and lastly for the State. Newman understood very well that the human dimension of development or progress is not automatic. Every individual and generation must freely rediscover and make their own these goods and virtues. Freedom is necessary for this progress (cf. Deavel 2014, 429-443).

4.4.5 The Meaning of Political Development

Newman described political development as follows: "When society and its various classes and interests are the subject-matters of the idea which are in operation, the development may be called political, as we see it in the growth of States or the changes of a constitution" (*Dev*, 42). In any case, he does not consider the annexation of territory or violent conquest as political development. "This is no intellectual process," according to Newman, "nor is it the mode of development exhibited in civilized communities" (*Dev*, 42). A state or civilization is not guaranteed and sustained by might or arbitrary powers. The ideas in vogue in a civilization shape the interests of persons in society. Newman suggests that such interests include communication, cooperation, security, territorial defence, and peaceful coexistence. He further explained that "[w]here civilization exists, reason, in some shape or other, is the incentive or the pretence of development" (*Dev*, 42). Therefore, political development that involves the expansion of the state is based on interest informed by reason.

Newman asserted that though "the development is material, but an idea gives unity and force to its movement" (*Dev*, 43). There are other kinds of political development which are confined within the state and may take the form of national or party politics, parliamentary debated, (power, economic or bilateral) negotiations, (constitutional) reforms; these "facts or

representations are an illustration of a political development” (*Dev*, 43). He further explains that “political development, though the growth of ideas is often capricious and irregular from the nature of their subject matter. They are influenced by the character of sovereigns, the rise and fall of politicians, the fate of battles, and the vicissitudes of the world” (*Dev*, 43). Therefore, the aspects of a political idea at the inception are often in conflict or unmatched. These unmatched and conflicting aspects are either refined or eliminated by the stronger or dominant aspects of the idea. Thus, change and growth gradually lead to “satisfactory developments” (*Dev*, 44).

Occasionally conflicting ideas for a while may be reconciled or brought together for some common goal, “such is the case,” Newman notes, “of coalitions in politics and comprehensions in religion, of which commonly no good is to be expected” (*Dev*, 44). In this scenario, an organ is set up “to make contraries look the same and to secure an outward agreement where there is no other unity” (*Dev*, 44) through diplomacy. Political developments in the form of revolutions, reforms, and reactions are often mixed and inconsistent, so it is not easy to map out its history scientifically. The reason, according to Newman, is that “[o]ften the intellectual process is detached from the practical, and posterior to it” (*Dev*, 44). This means that the justification and explanation are only given after development has occurred. It is clear from the foregoing that he was not propounding a theory but merely describing how a change happens and then later is accounted for. To buttress this fact, he cites several examples. The reformation of Elizabeth and the Revolution and its political consequences had been firmly established before Hooker and Warburton wrote the Church and State and Alliance theory, respectively (*Dev*, 44). This could mean that an idea is often in operation in society before it is fully understood and articulated. This interpretation is accurate following what Newman says next. “And now again, a new theory is needed for the constitutional lawyer, to reconcile the existing political state of things with the just claims of religion. In parliamentary conflicts, men first come to their conclusions by the external pressure of events or the force of principles, they do not know how; then they have to speak, and they look about for arguments; and a pamphlet is published on the subject in debate, or an article appears in a Review, to furnish common-places for the many” (*Dev*, 44-45). He described other political developments as ‘subjected.’ These are political ideas propounded by individuals and adopted as the blueprint for development. The philosophy of John Locke had such an influence and function during and after his life. It is also not uncommon to find states or societies “founded on no ideas at all, but on mere custom” (*Dev*, 45).

4.5 The Foundation of Political Society

Modern and contemporary social contract theories, such as those invented by Locke, Rousseau, Nozick, Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, are constructed on a single theoretical foundation in which politics and political society are made to stand as a superstructure. The philosophy and theoretical foundation/conceptual framework like justice in the case of John Rawls reflects and constitutes only one aspect of man that is rationality/reason and, by extension, gives emphasis to one dimension of life, which is the material aspect of the body to the detriment of other aspects such as the soul, psychological or the spiritual. Thus, tradition, authority, religion, culture and in some extreme cases, even natural law is not merely neglected but have no place or role in their philosophy and conceptual framework and consequently in the envisioned political society and political system. However, this situation is regrettable since the complexity of human life is irreconcilable and irreducible to these secular theories of a social contract. They are based on purely natural, material and secular notions of the individual or person as rational, independent, and a free agent in close cooperation/collaboration with other persons as unique entities and again in close interaction with the multi-faceted aspects of their world.

Furthermore, the human agent, in particular, is viewed as a radically free and independent agent capable of choosing its values, charting its destiny, directions and commenting on itself as sole arbitrator. In the ‘Newmanian’ perspective, however, among other things, we discern also a single foundation for a human society which, like the human person, is an integrated society. Kłos uses the term “integrated person” to describe Newman’s theory of personalism. The integrated person, according to Kłos (2021, 39-40),

seeks to show the human person as a being that relies on a very complicated, delicate, and idiosyncratic system. Persons are constantly called upon to consolidate the elements of the system and integrate it with their lives. Divided between notional and real assent, and on the way to certitude, the person unites the discarded elements of his and her life into one being. The human person participated in various spheres of life (professional, political, social, and familial). We need to combine them all and understand that for our integrity, we need to realize that the person is one being. Such understanding is universal, though how to achieve it varies across cultures.

It is only proper that society reflects such personalism or understanding of the human person. An integrated society that corresponds to the idea of an integrated person would consist of different dimensions that both reflect, incorporate and integrate the various aspects of human existence and origin. At the same time, it would maintain a balanced emphasis between the material/body and the soul/spiritual and a hierarchy of values as distinctive features of Newman’s politics. It would reflect the multiple aspects of the relationship between the individual and God and between the individual and the community.

Consequently, the various dimensions or realms of human existence: social, economic, religious and political, scientific, and cultural are not isolated and fenced off but are open to the operations and directions of reason informed by faith. In other words, they are open to transcendence but with a greater degree of human responsibility. In comparison with secular social contract theories, Newman's perspective is more inclusive and extensive to consist of three dimensions: theocentric, rational, and anthropological, that require proper integration. We are rational animals, no doubt, but social and religious animals. Kłos (2021, 92) states that,

[t]he human being does not exhaust his essence in one proposition; he is multifaceted and should be considered from many sides. *What is said of the single individual could be said or applied to the whole human society* (words in italics are mine). The single aspect, isolated from the rest, and developed into a series of variations, leads to the oblivion of the others, i.e. to the oblivion of the whole system from which they have been abstracted [...] A single aspect is only a reflection of a larger whole, but the inchoate self may try to use this aspect to build up his own theory that suits him, rather than the truth.”

Therefore, no one dimension of human life should be made to exhaust or dominate human society. We are not ruled purely by reason or passion as integrated human persons. Neither are we solely driven by our material needs. Our principles of existence and morality are not based on the utilitarian theory but the foundation of personhood. Therefore, we must imagine the political society as a system of integrated wholes. The rejection or negligence of one dimension may result in unpleasant consequences (cf. Kłos 2021a, 47). Like many other concepts and ideas expressed by Newman, the entire issue of a foundation for politics is not developed at any length or systematically. Nevertheless, at this juncture, there is enough that has gone by way of explanation and reconstruction consistent with the thoughts of Newman relevant to the idea of the foundations of politics to be able to come up with a fair account of what this concept meant in the mind of Newman. In other words, there is enough information scattered in his writings that points to the direction of his thought when put together.

4.5.1 The Theocentric Dimension for the Foundation of a Political Society

The use of the term theocentric in connection to the foundation of political society is meant to highlight Newman's belief concerning the origin, the basis of human society, and the apparent socio-political implication of this belief, namely conservatism. Newman states this belief as: “The course of events, the revolution of empires, the rise and fall of states, the periods and eras, the progress and retrogressions of the world's history, the great outlines and results of human affairs, are from His disposition” (*Idea*, 52). There is an immediate and obvious

basis for a foundation of politics that is theocentric in what has been related to the cosmological principle. Kelly (2012, 32/33) further explains that

Newman's conservatism may permit him to be described as a follower of the Cosmological principle. According to this principle, God, not man, holds the universe together and is the source of all existence. Newman believed that the existence of man and society was grounded in God. Thus, in holding this sociological maxim, he saw religion as an essential requirement for a good society. In the words of William R. Harbour, that man was a religious being and must adopt a certain kind of religious orientation within his life if it is to be properly ordered and society made stable, morally, healthy and free. Newman conservatism, which rested upon a Cosmological principle, was very different from the perception of the universe held by many liberals of his generation. Newman believed that God was the centre of all things. Liberals, on the other hand, argued that man was alone and at the centre of everything.

Therefore, insofar as the existence of the universe and all that is in it, including man, rest on or is God, centred, meaning that the foundation of politics and political society is theocentric. The reason for this theocentrism was that for Newman, the existence of God was evident and overwhelming and demanded no proof (*Apo*, 108). "But this not all," Kenny (1957, 30) has noted. It was not only that Newman emphasised this one dogma very strongly, with its obvious political implications. Newman was distinguished by his extraordinary insistence on the very idea of dogma itself." The theocentric foundation of politics meant that politics is independent and distinct from religion but cannot be value-free, and political authority/state cannot be absolute or demand complete allegiance from citizens.

The Gospel represents a permanent relativizing of the state [...]. Christianity destroyed the myth of the divine state. It is impossible under the Christian dispensation to conceive of the state as having authority over a divinely conceived politics. Prior to the Gospel, the political was the sacred. Christianity clearly rejected this whole assumption. Although the faith was in many ways apolitical, the rejection of antiquity's unlimited state was firm and paramount (Rourke 2010, p. 43).

A few points to note concerning Newman's theocentric foundation of politics: Firstly, it clearly distinguishes the sphere of religion and politics and acknowledges the legitimacy of the authority of each sphere as something given by God. "Society, laws, governments, He is their sanction" (*Idea*, 50-59). Secondly, Newman affirms that God grants authority to the state. "The pageant of earthly royalty has the semblance and the benediction of the Eternal King. Peace and civilization, commerce and adventure, wars when just, conquest when humane and necessary, have His co-operation, and His blessing upon them" (*Idea*, 51). This should not mean that God sanctions, approves and commands every decision made by leaders, nor does it mean that God chooses every leader in power (Kenny 1957, 74).

4.5.2 The Rational dimension for the Foundation of a Political society

It has been noted earlier that Newman, when stressing the interdependence of sciences and the place of religion in the framework of attaining truth, Newman maintained that politics would be deformed if it ignores or rejects the input of theology. In connection to the doctrine of the Fall of man, Newman believes that political organizations, notwithstanding how good and effective they may be practically and theoretically or in the abstract, “are so intimately bound up *ab initio* with their own corruptions, that they are likely not to be good in fact, and that they need not work well in the concrete” (M. Allies 1907, 123). Hence, Newman emphasizes the role of reason in politics and sees politics as a realm dictated by right reason. He writes: “Reason brought progress in history, but sin brought the same bad round again” (VV, 137, as cited by Kenny 1957, 46). Therefore, political thinking needs the guidance and corrections of right reason informed by faith more than any other sphere of human engagement. This stance or conviction is still the direct consequence of Newman’s theocentric temper and belief that the proper ends of reason are set in nature by God. Hence, politics falls within the sphere of reason informed by faith.

Reason is the criterion by which everything is measured and explained. Human reason, in its function, participates in divine reason where it is said to proceed in terms of its origin/source. This is important because it negates the thesis that the world and everything happened to be by chance. Thus, the world has no ultimate purpose or explanation. But it proceeded from eternal reason and is intelligible. Its intelligibility is discoverable by human reason aided by faith. Benedict XVI (as cited by Rourke 2010, 35; *Idea*, 55-55) mirrors and expresses this understanding of divine reason by Newman in the *Idea of the University* when he writes “that everything proceeds from one source, God, who loves man. Reason is thus lifted, freed to explore and discover the intelligibility of the universe, with God’s blessing.” He further states that “politics is based on reason, but not merely scientific, technical calculative reason, but the classical moral reasoning that goes back to antiquity” (Rourke 2010, 45).

4.5.3 The Anthropological Dimension for the Foundation of a Political Society

According to Kenny (1957, 74), “as all writers on politics have some theory about man, whether explicit or not, which it is wise to grasp if their ideas about the State are to be fully understood, so Newman had certain views, apart from the vitally important religious idea of man.” To understand Newman’s anthropological foundation of politics, it was necessary to

see how his approach to politics was informed and influenced by his prior understanding of man and reason; for politics, in Newman's view, springs from a specific understanding of and belief in man, reached indeed by the exercise of reason but informed by faith.

Newman understands reason to be autonomous in its operation but bound to acknowledge its own limits within the sphere of nature and in conformity with the ends of nature as set out by its Author, God. Thus, it is significant to grasp first Newman's articulation of the boundaries and powers of reason in relation to faith as a starting point towards comprehending his idea of the foundation of politics. The world of nature is a given occupied by reason as its habitat, where its proper ends are also a given by the Creator, who transcends the powers of reason in understanding, defining and setting boundaries on the powers of reason. According to Rourke (2010, 34),

Benedict is particularly forceful concerning these points. 'Christianity,' he writes, 'is the religion of the Logos.' It is committed in its origins to a God of reason, Who creates the universe for a reason, Who has placed reasons—that is, ends or purposes that are intelligible—within creation itself, and Who has bestowed the gift of reason on the crowning point of His Creation, mankind, so that man can go forth and use reason to govern and order his life under God.

Thus, for Newman, political systems, arrangements and activities should conform to the specific understanding of human nature as created, free and rational beings but more importantly ordered to a transcendent good. Furthermore, Newman understands that it is natural for man to live in a community/society as a member. The human being is not an isolated, atomised, abstract individual. As noted earlier, Newman asserts that "...man does not live in isolation, but is everywhere found as a member of society" (*GA*, 296-297). Newman emphasizes this point to say further: "Man is a social being and can hardly exist without society and as a matter of fact societies have ever existed all over the habitable earth" (*Idea*, 169). The social nature of man is a fact observable and confirmable by experience rather than merely a metaphysical or abstract assertion for Newman:

It seemed an empirical fact to Newman that man was a rational, progressive and social being, but in saying this, he claims to do no more than to lay down a general rule. Since, as a rule, men are rational, progressive, and social, there is a high probability of this rule being true in the case of a particular person, but we must know him to be sure of it (Kelly 2012, 108).

This overview of his understanding of reason and man may seem far from the general discourse on politics, but it is a significant foundation. To the extent to which politics could be said to be about persons living in a society or about the shared life of people, it should be grounded on an understanding of what a person is and what a society is. Hence, as noted earlier, politics is grounded in a specific understanding and belief about man, his origin, essence, dignity, and destiny. Therefore, for Newman, politics can only produce its proper and

desired ends or goods if the underlying belief and understanding of the person are sound. Man endowed with both reason and faith is capable of discovering these ends. From this perspective, one can truly appreciate how much Newman has to offer to the foundations of politics based mainly on his understanding of the human person and his relationship with God.

In the end, this allows politics, on the one hand, to be firmly grounded in God in connection to religion and conscience. On the other hand, it also allows politics to be grounded in man with reason and faith employed as a guide and regulator in their individual and collective operations and collaboration. In other words, politics and religion should be directed by reason informed by faith and in conformity to the dictates of conscience. Each aspect of this foundation is equally significant in forming a balanced and healthy politics and society. More importantly, there is no presumption of order between the dimensions of the foundation. Hence, it may be observed or argued that some aspects of the three components may be more emphasized or ignored and rejected in some contemporary situations. In political systems where all these dimensions are maintained, politics and the art of politicking become the complex and delicate art of safeguarding and maintaining equal emphasis and balance between the foundation components.

The major political challenge today is to create a system and culture better suited than the current model to deal with the issues of our global, multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-religious, and postmodern society. Newman was very optimistic about finding a better political and religious model that would suit the current situation. Thus, consistent with his theory of the development of doctrine, he states with some level of confidence that “there may be found out some way of uniting what is free in the new structure of society with what is authoritative in the old, without any base compromise with Progress and Liberalism” (*Diff, II*, 264-268). Such a model would include a decision-making process based on a criterion that shifts the problem away from dogma to politics. But only to politics, the true expression of the human person as created, free/autonomous, rational, and ordered intrinsically to the community.

As a matter of importance, it should be noted that for Newman, religion and Christianity, in particular, are not tied up with any particular political system. The suitability of any political system to religion such as Christianity was for him a mere accident of time, place and circumstance (cf. M. Allies, Thomas, 120). Again, for this reason, Newman did not want to idealise and romanticise any regime, era/epoch, and political system. Therefore, the general significance of his political perspective is the need to rise to the challenge to re-engage and sustain reason and faith in dialogue in a post-secular society continuously.

Newman articulated a very original perspective on the relationship of reason and faith, which led him to realise that relations and interactions of politics and religion in the modern world would have to be based on the State's religious neutrality. Though he does not provide a complete theory of this idea, he provides important directions going forward and opens up many important insights relevant to the current situation. For instance, tolerance, religious pluralism, religious liberty, and confessionalism, and, more importantly, the authority of religion should be freely recognized and accepted both by the individual and the State; otherwise, religion has no means of imposing its commands and demands. Thus, he states, “religion must be defended by reason, not by violence” (*LD*, XX. p. 477). The State's duties concerning religion are to protect and promote individual liberties and the general interests of the citizens with the minimum of State intervention. Therefore, he is most relevant in retrieving the dialogue between faith and reason.

Conclusion

The attempt made here is based on the philosophical, social, political and religious views that Newman articulated in connection to (divine) truth when his belief came clashing with the heritage of modernity. For him, truth, not man, is the measure of all things and the foundation of human life and society. The importance that Newman attached to this truth and the importance that truth makes concerning today's challenges and crisis which he dimly saw from a distance makes him relevant in our search for solutions. In connection with truth for Newman, all other preceding considerations and human endeavour tend towards as their ultimate goal and not their starting point. Politics and religion urgently need to refocus and be reoriented toward their foundation and ultimate end. The need for a foundation and reorientation is not necessarily restricted to politics and religion. Newman's notion of truth in connection with his understanding of human nature provides for this foundation.

He sought to convince the believers that they can come to terms with the challenges of progress, whether it be social, political, and technological. There is nothing to be afraid of in progress, when it is evaluated with an eye to human integral development. And most important, Newman is a witness to values that can never be made relative. When they are undermined, the person is put to the test. At the moment of challenge, he will either shrink back or stand firmly and abide by what he/she has recognised in his conscience as the truth. Therefore, he is the person for our times with their attendant dilemmas like political correctness, scepticism, and relativism. Under such circumstances the result is all too obvious: there is no truth, there are only subjective opinions. Newman proved that truth exists and that the individual person can recognise and act respectively. Sometimes such a decision calls for a sacrifice. Newman did not shy away and was ready to accept the consequences, however difficult, of his decisions. No wonder that he was one of the invisible Fathers of the Second Vatican Council. His contribution to our contemporary challenges is still underestimated.

In one way or another, Newman has something significant to offer those interested in politics, particularly in those circumstances or places where Roman Catholicism or Christianity is a minority religion. This is of particular importance to Nigeria and many other States where Christian is fast becoming a minority population. He offers a suitable alternative of the conceptual understanding of politics, religion, and truth that does not contradict Thomism or Scholasticism but rather compliments it. Newman's articulation of these issues using terminologies, concepts and language outside Thomism shows the possibility of Christian political thinkers and Catholic Christians in particular of being able to engage their counterparts in public discourse and debate to say much that is understandable and meaningful

without using the language of Thomism and, more importantly, without the fear of compromise and contradiction. The point could further be made that Newman did not use the contemporary language of philosophy and politics. In this regard, he was very much influenced by John Locke and his earlier age.

Nevertheless, Newman communicated in English, and as has been noted elsewhere, he was influenced by British empiricism which was understood and, more importantly, is understandable by many people today in a way that the terminology of Thomism is not. Consequently, the influence of using the language of Thomism will be minimal outside the circle of the Catholic Church. Therefore, it is significant that Newman has demonstrated orthodoxy and sensibleness in using a different philosophical system and language.

Although of great importance, Metaphysics outside Roman Catholic scholarship is largely ignored, particularly Thomist metaphysics. It is relevant today to note that Newman did not overtly reject metaphysics. He merely did not base his politics on metaphysics and, at the same time, did not disconnect politics from religion and morality. Instead, he retained his heritage of empiricism and realism, which puts him in a more likely philosophical and intellectual position to influence all those who have difficulties accepting metaphysics and Thomism. His position does not set him up in opposition to thinkers in the Thomist tradition. This is because most of Newman's ideas (as we have articulated in this research work) with a bit of creativity and flexibility could be made to sound like Thomism and can be shown to fit into the system of Thomism with ease. This partly explains the popularity of Newman outside the Catholic Church and especially within where he is widely considered to rank among the great thinkers of Catholicism as a doctor.

Another point of relevance is that in his diagnosis of the problems of modern politics, Newman did not emphasize the contributions of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. He did not romanticize or idealize any age or society. Instead, he traced the problems of modern politics beyond the Middle Ages to the fourth century, where political and social evils were already manifest. It is relevant that Newman in articulating his ideas distanced himself from the reactionary ideas of many thinkers consequent to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Likewise, he avoided all forms of sentimentalism, which helped put him firmly on the side of political realism that was the basis of his acceptance of the modern democratic, secular, tolerant and religiously neutral state. In effect, both sides of the divide politically and doctrinally can identify with and accept the positions or argumentation of Newman.

The conservatism and liberalism of Newman are the most researched, commented and stressed dimensions of his philosophy and religious views. Notwithstanding the significance

given to his conservatism, he was not blind to the bright side of liberalism, which allowed and formed the foundation for his theory of development and theory of knowledge. Newman's opposition to political and/or theological liberalism was rather critical rather than dismissive for being rationalistic. He appreciated the role of reason in politics; nevertheless, his opposition to political liberalism was not founded on the idea of liberal progress, for he was progressive enough to be suspected of being a liberal or modernist. Neither was his opposition to political liberalism a counter-reaction to the rejection of the dogmatic principle of Christianity by the liberals. Newman's opposition was based on his understanding of human nature or human predicament in the world, that is, the Fall, as a result of which he believed that the whole human race is implicated in Original Sin. Newman asserted the possibility of human progress in the world due to the presence of reason. However, he rejected the idea of automatic moral progress attained merely by the passage of time and accompanied by socio-political and economic forces of change without great personal efforts and reference to divine providence. Thus, Newman rejected this false idea of human progress as noted in chapter one that exaggerated notion of human nature said to be good and its potentiality limitless. The most important consideration is that he understands how religious beliefs and commitments relate with our secular beliefs and commitments without compromise the dogmatic principle of religion.

The individualism of Newman is also an essential aspect of his politics and, by extension, Church-State doctrine. Because politics is grounded in the human person, it is not the civil authority but the person who is the principal character in the society. The entirety of the social process revolves around the individual as its centre, foundation, bearer and goal. Consequently, the civil authority has to promote the dignity of the human person by safeguarding the protection and promotion of his fundamental rights. Religious freedom constitutes, among others, a fundamental human right. Newman switched the issue from human dignity to religious liberty before the State; as a result, he made a remarkable achievement in the relationship of the Church-State in modern time. He combined fidelity to tradition, that is, what is authoritative in the old and flexible in adapting to modern conditions' exigencies without necessarily having to compromise to Liberalism or Progress. Newman, therefore, avoided the difficulty that arises from the dualism of the spiritual and the temporal order since in safeguarding religious freedom, the State is not obliged to make judgments or decisions concerning religious truths. Instead, the State deals with the difficult purely in secular terms, for example, justice and the common good; her duty is not to obstruct the exercise of religious liberty. The State so constituted and acts in such a manner as being

religiously neutral enhances the freedom and independence of the Church and the distinction between religion and politics. Newman did not wholly reject the adoption of a particular religion by the State. However, he favoured the reception of the ideals and principles of religion or specifically Christianity in political and social institutions rather than the State's establishment of Christianity or Roman Catholicism. Neither religion nor traditions of religion depend on politics for their survival and expansion. Religion can do without the patronage of political authority, and very often dispenses with it to an advantage. The arguments Newman makes concerning Catholicism applies to the broader situation of religion. He states, "It is but the accident of a particular state of things, the result of the fervour of the people; it is the will of the masses; but, I repeat, it is not necessary for Catholicism" (*Prespo*, 55-56).

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Summary of the Dissertation

Modernity at its very beginning promised a great deal in terms of progress in all areas of human endeavours. The founding fathers of modernity sought a break with the past (i.e. from absolutism, fundamentalism, traditionalism, collectivism, and religiosity) and to set humanity on the rails of progress guided by or based on reason against any transcendent foundation or principles. Modern thinkers reinterpreted culture, history, human nature, human destiny, religion, politics and their relations and ushered in new ideas that constitute the heritage of modernity. Modernity as a project has many bright sides. However, modernity has its dark sides that are the consequences of its ideas. Beginning from the French Revolution to the Second World War, the birth of ideological movements like socialism and communism to the totalitarian regions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the reductionism of naturalism, scientism, rationalism, individualism, subjectivism, and liberalism that characterize contemporary culture to all forms of dehumanization/alienation are consequences of modernity. Liberalism and secularisation emerged to become the mode of modernity's expression. By the eighteenth century, its influence was relatively comprehensive. The traditional separation of religion and politics through secularisation progressively resulted in rejection, elimination of religion in the public sphere (and conferred to private domain) and the separation of truth from politics and religion. Newman came clashing with the heritage of modernity. However, Newman did not merely disavow modernity (secularisation and liberalism). Instead, he adopted a critical attitude in the attempt to reconstruct modernity.

Christianity in particular, the fulfilment of that vision meant the direct intervention of God in history – the incarnation for human salvation. That presupposes the Fall of man (original Sin) and a unique understanding of the human person/nature. Within the province of this belief, Newman locates both the necessity, origin, and purpose of religion and politics. However, for Newman, religion is situated within the internal and subjective experience of conscience. Politics is situated within the boundary of reason. Religion and politics are united in the human subject. Thus, politics should be grounded on the holistic understanding of the human person in relation to God.

In the light of the preceding, the main challenge facing contemporary society and political philosophy is reconstructing the relationship and foundation of religion and politics that is true to the proper understanding of the human person and human destiny. This dissertation defends the thesis that Newman's notion of truth seems to promise and provide a firm foundation for human existence, progress, fulfilment, and the organisation of human activities that appeal to faith and reason and consonant with the proper understanding and

experience of the human person as an integrated being. That such a promise is not a mere sentiment of faith or the illusions of reason, Newman develops an epistemology to justify belief in God, religious belief, the existence of truth, the origin, nature and purpose of religion consonant with the understanding of man as an integrated being.

This dissertation consists of four chapters that reflect the main themes of issues analysed and reconstructed. In the first segment of chapter one, I will attempt to sketch the main aspects of modernity. Then, an attempt to describe the modern world as Newman experienced it, partly reflected in his criticisms of modern ideas. The second segment of this chapter looks at the consequences of modernity. That provides the background to the thoughts of Newman and shows that his ideas were a response to his time. That would be followed by a brief look at the contemporary discourse in religion, politics and truth. This is important to show the relevancy of Newman's thought and the application of Newman's insights to some contemporary issues.

The second chapter explores what sources or causes Newman indicated as responsible for the modern situation. This chapter further looks at Newman's response to the challenges of modernity, beginning with his proposal of a modified epistemology that suggests where he thinks the problem with modernity fundamentally lies. Newman's epistemology forms the foundation of his ideas as part of the response to the challenges of modernity. The epistemological foundation serves as a prism for a better understanding of his ideas and a springboard that Newman uses to extend further his response to other domains of culture affected by modernity. Chapter three explores Newman's notion of faith and reason as independent and complementary sources of knowledge in their own right. His understanding of the relationship between faith and reason flows his epistemology. The conception of faith and reason for Newman has implications. That is reflected in his notion of truth. The fourth chapter of this dissertation is a direct consequence or relevance of his ideas or thoughts. The specific areas covered are religion and politics. The explication of these concepts (i.e., religion and politics) indirectly reveals Newman's idea of the human person, human nature and society as an integrated whole.

Regarding religion, the aim is to synthesize and present Newman's view of the nature and origin of religion and its epistemic value as the basis of its relations to politics and life in general. Therefore, Newman's social and political thoughts are the consequences of his religious underpinnings. That reflects that Newman's understanding of politics flows from his understanding of (divine) truth, human nature, and the commitment it engenders. Therefore, it is vital to have a notion of truth and to establish why the truth matters not only in religion and

politics but generally in life. Hence, when every aspect of our lives has been appropriately integrated into a perfect whole, humans and society should reflect this truth. That might be the most challenging chapter as we continue to search for a better model for the interactions between religion and culture today.

Streszczenie

Nowożytność rozpoczęła się od obietnicy postępu w każdym obszarze ludzkiej aktywności. Ojcowie założyciele nowożytności szukali zerwania z przeszłością, tj. absolutyzmem, fundamentalizmem, tradycjonalizmem, kolektywizmem oraz religią, i wprowadzenia ludzkości na ścieżkę postępu zbudowanego na fundamencie rozumu, a nie na fundamencie transcendentnym lub transcendentnych zasadach. Nowożytni myśliciele zinterpretowali od nowa kulturę, historię, naturę ludzką, przeznaczenie, religię, politykę oraz ich wzajemne relacje. Wprowadzili nowe idee, które konstytuują spuściznę nowożytności. Oświecenie podobnie jak romantyzm oraz nowożytność jako projekty noszą w sobie wiele pozytywnych cech. Nowożytność posiada jednak także swoje mroczne strony, które są konsekwencjami jej idei. W okresie pomiędzy rewolucją francuską a II wojną światową widzieliśmy narodziny ruchów ideologicznych, takich jak socjalizm i komunizm, powstały filozofie redukcjonistyczne: naturalizm, scjentyzm, dominował indywidualizm, subiektywizm, liberalizm. Charakteryzują one współczesną kulturę, w której występują wszelkie formy dehumanizacji oraz alienacji. Liberalizm oraz sekularyzacja powstały jako wyraz nowoczesności. Do XVIII wieku jego wpływ był względnie powszechny. Tradycyjne oddzielenie religii i polityki przez sekularyzację stopniowo dała w rezultacie jej odrzucenie ze sfery publicznej i przesunięcie do sfery prywatnej; nastąpiło oddzielenie prawdy od polityki. Newman podjął wyzwanie, jakie stawiała spuścizna nowożytności. Zajął się nie tyle jej krytyką, ile podjął się zadania rekonstrukcji nowożytności.

Chrześcijaństwo stanowi w szczególności wypełnienie tej wizji bezpośredniej interwencji Boga w historię – wcielenie dla ludzkiego zbawienia. Zakłada to upadek człowieka (grzech pierworodny) oraz szczególne rozumienie ludzkiej osoby i jej natury. W obszarze tej prawdy Newman umieszcza konieczność, początek oraz cel religii i polityki. Religia dla niego znajduje się w obszarze wewnętrznego i subiektywnego doświadczenia sumienia. Polityka z kolei znajduje się w granicach rozumu. Religia i polityka są połączone w ludzkim podmiocie. Polityka zatem opiera się na holistycznym rozumieniu osoby ludzkiej w relacji do Boga.

W świetle powyższego głównym wyzwaniem współczesnego społeczeństwa i filozofii polityki jest rekonstrukcja relacji oraz fundamentu religii i polityki, które byłoby prawdziwe dla właściwego rozumienia osoby i jej przeznaczenia. Dysertacja broni tezy, że Newmana pojęcie prawdy obiecuje i dostarcza pewnego fundamentu dla (rozumienia) ludzkiej egzystencji, postępu, spełnienia oraz organizacji ludzkiego działania, które odwołuje się do wiary i rozumu oraz pozostaje w zgodzie z właściwym rozumieniem i doświadczeniem ludzkiej osoby jako bytu zintegrowanego. Że tak obietnica nie jest tylko jakimś uczuciem lub

iluzją rozumu, Newman rozwija epistemologię, która usprawiedliwia wiarę w Boga, wiarę religijną, istnienie prawdy, początek, naturę i cel religii pozostającej w zgodzie z rozumieniem człowieka jako całości.

Dysertacja składa się z czterech rozdziałów. W rozdziale I zarysowane zostały główne aspekty nowożytności. Rozwija się tu obraz nowoczesnego świata, tak jak doświadczył go Newman, głównie w jego krytyce idei nowożytności. Druga część tego rozdziału analizuje konsekwencje nowożytności. Analiza ta tworzy tło dla idei Newmana i pokazuje, że jego idee są odpowiedzią na problemy jego czasu. Rozważania te są uzupełnione dyskusją na temat religii, polityki i prawdy. Ma to na celu pokazanie znaczenia myśli Newmana oraz jego rozwiązań problemów współczesności.

Rozdział drugi bada źródła oraz przyczyny odpowiedzialne według Newmana za obecną sytuację. Rozdział ten ukazuje jego odpowiedź na wyzwania nowoczesności, rozpoczynając od jego propozycji zmodyfikowanej epistemologii, w której pokazuje, gdzie znajduje się problem nowoczesności. Fundament epistemologiczny służy jako pryzmat dla lepszego zrozumienia idei Newmana oraz jako punkt odniesienia, którym posługuje się kardynał, bo objąć swoją refleksją inne obszary kultury przekształcone przez nowoczesność.

Rozdział trzeci bada Newmana pojęcie wiary i rozumu jako niezależnych i komplementarnych źródeł wiedzy, mających swoje własne prawa. Jego rozumienie relacji wiary do rozumu wypływa z jego epistemologii. Koncepcja wiary i rozumu mają tu swoje implikacje, co odbija się w jego pojęciu prawdy. Rozdział czwarty dysertacji stanowi bezpośrednią konsekwencję i odniesienie dla jego idei. Tutaj podejmuje się dyskusję nad religią i polityką. Wyjaśnienie tych pojęć, tj. religii i polityki, pośrednio odkrywa Newmana rozumienie osoby ludzkiej, ludzkiej natury i społeczeństwa jako zintegrowanej całości.

Jeśli chodzi o religię, celem jest ujęcie syntetyczne i zaprezentowanie Newmana poglądu na naturę i źródło religii oraz jej epistemiczną wartość jako podstawę jej relacji do polityki oraz życia ludzkiego w ogólności. Społeczno-polityczne myśli Newmana są konsekwencją jego religijnego fundamentu. Jego rozumienie polityki wypływa z jego rozumienia (Bożej) prawdy, ludzkiej natury oraz zaangażowania, jakie to rozumienie ze sobą niesie. Rzeczą istotną zatem jest posiadanie pojęcia prawdy oraz ustalenia, dlaczego prawda ma znaczenie nie tylko w religii i polityce, ale także w całym życiu społecznym. Stąd jeśli każdy aspekt naszego życia zostanie właściwie zintegrowany jako całość, wówczas całe społeczeństwo i poszczególnie ludzie odzwierciedlają tę prawdę. Ten rozdział wydaje się najbardziej wymagający, gdy szukamy lepszego modelu interakcji pomiędzy religią i kulturą w dzisiejszym świecie.