# The Lublin Philosophical School

## History - Conceptions - Disputes

THE JOHN PAUL II CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LUBLIN

THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

# CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY
## AT THE KUL

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# The Lublin Philosophical School

## History - Conceptions - Disputes



Edited by
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# Preface to the English Edition: Faithful to the Truth – Faithful to Reality

S tanisław Kamiński in his entry on philosophy in the *Catholic Encyclopedia* published over thirty years ago made a conceptual declaration of the Lublin Philosophical School with regard to the social role of philosophy. And he repeats this declaration in his in a sense program article „On the Nature of Philosophy":

The most profound and substantively accurate cognition of the world, and the hierarchy of values, is indispensable for a proper human, culture-formative activity. Philosophy should serve as a guide in this endeavor, as it indicates and ultimately justifies in the ontic order, why one should prefer certain value-forming behaviors, uniformly solves issues outside the scope of particular domains of culture (religion, morality, science, and art). Finally, it also provides the means of understanding the transformations of culture, together with the criteria of evaluation of cultural achievements. Philosophy is therefore self-consciousness, as it were, of culture. It permeates culture, but it is not reduced to any of its domains, merging them – through theory – in ways which enable human beings to perfect themselves in a harmonious and complete manner. Human beings are creators of culture, but they themselves are also being formed by it. And for this reason, philosophy should contribute to the personalistic character of culture, that is demonstrate in which way culture can be worthy of human beings and serve their development the best. Such auxiliary [serving, or ministerial] functions of philosophy with regard to culture are nothing else but service to humanity (philosophy satisfies the most profound intellectual aspirations of human beings). And that is exactly why cultural crises in culture are

so closely connected with crises in philosophy and the deterioration of respect for human dignity.[1]

The social role of philosophy stems in a way from our human nature. Kamiński writes:

Everyone philosophizes in one way or another, regardless of whether one is aware of that or not. At any rate, it is impossible for a human being not to philosophize, for the human by his/her own nature wants to investigate the most profound reasons for everything, especially the reasons and meaning of the world, and human activity within it. Particularly in the decisive moments of one's life the human being confronts questions for which he/she does not find an answer in any science, art or life practice.[2]

Andrzej Bronk, Kamiński's disciple, adds:

A philosopher does not have ready recipes to organize the world. Although instant practical rebuilding of the world is not a task for philosophy comprehended as the Greek *theoría*, a philosophical point of view can turn out to be important and helpful. The impact of philosophy is long-term and in the field of the consciousness rather than in outright practice. Philosophizing is a way of fulfilling human intellectuality, and, naturally, it is not restricted to professional philosophers. Everyone who on his/her own is looking for answers to fundamental questions about the meaning of life, philosophizes.[3]

John Paul II – Karol Wojtyła, a philosopher belonging to the Lublin School, who became pope – expresses a similar conviction in his encyclical *Fides et ratio*:

Men and women have at their disposal an array of resources for generating greater knowledge of truth so that their lives may be ever more human. Among these is *philosophy*, which is directly concerned with

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[1]   Stanisław Kamiński, "On the Nature of Philosophy," in Kamiński *On the Metaphysical Cognition,* trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2020), 205-206.

[2]   Stanisław Kamiński, "*Wstęp,*" in Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?,* ed. Tadeusz Szubka (Lublin: TN KUL, 1989), 11.

[3]   Andrzej Bronk, *Zrozumieć świat współczesny* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1998), 113.

asking the question of life's meaning and searching for an answer to it. Philosophy emerges, then, as one of noblest of human tasks.[4]

And he adds: "all men and women, as I have noted, are in some sense philosophers and have their own philosophical conceptions with which they direct their lives. In one way or other, they shape a comprehensive vision and give themselves answers to the question of life's meaning."[5]

These beliefs: that it is impossible for people not to philosophize, that philosophical answers shape individual and social life, that philosophy is capable of assessing directions of cultural changes – define standards of philosophizing. Kamiński claims: "If philosophy has an enormous influence on human thinking and acting, and the human being is forced to philosophize, then he/she should do it in a responsible manner, making use of the accomplishments of the greatest thinkers."[6] Thus, philosophizing becomes a moral task. It is not life-wise and socially indifferent what philosophy one proposes. Kamiński concludes: "In order for philosophy to provide culture – adequately to the personal value of the human being and his/her developmental needs – with the deepest and most strongly justified cognitive as well as substantively accurate foundations, it should be a form of cognition bearing specific features."[7] He enumerates six such features: philosophical cognition is supposed to be autonomous in relation to other types of knowledge, realistic, specialist, rational, theoretical and leading to wisdom, necessary. So, the ultimate purpose is to formulate assertions which are true, i.e. they state, in the Aristotelian spirit, the way things are, and do not state the way things are not. It should be assertions which are objective and not just compliant with the intellectual fad or ideology of a particular period; assertions which respond to the question: why?, and which are well justified because only then an explanation is proportional to the aspirations of human reason. At least at times some assertions are ultimate and certain. "Hypotheses may fascinate, but they do not satisfy,"[8] though one does not exclude them from philosophical cognition. Of course, in order to claim the way things are and not to claim the way things are not, one has to begin

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[4]    John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, 3.
[5]    Ibidem, 30.
[6]    Kamiński, "Wstęp," 11.
[7]    Stanisław Kamiński, s.v. "Filozofia," in *Encyklopedia katolicka*, vol. 5 (Lublin: TN KUL, 1989), col. 254.
[8]    John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, 27.

philosophizing from cognizing the world, and not from mental constructs. The empirical point of departure guarantees openness to any new experience. One must here stress a certain specificity of philosophy, namely, its self-reflectivity. It is not possible to speak about philosophy – its history, methods or objectives – without philosophizing in a way. Such a paradigm of philosophizing – to use the currently fashionable term – is called classical philosophy. This paradigm of philosophizing, as Mieczysław A. Krąpiec indicates, is about such a philosophy which is the "one, unified cognitive discipline, with a distinct method and purpose. If the object of philosophical cognition is the being in the aspect of its existence, then the immanent task of this cognition is to point to such factors which decontradictify the fact of the world's existence (i.e. its fundamental domains), the negation of which is absurd or leads to an aporia."[9] Such an understanding of philosophy gave the foundations for the Lublin Philosophical School.

The history of Poland – and not only of Poland – in a way verified this understanding of philosophy. The Lublin Philosophical School matured in opposition to the "only proper" Marxist philosophy, introduced to Polish universities by political and administrative measures. Paradoxically, both Marxists and philosophers from the Catholic University of Lublin agreed as to the significance of philosophy for the individual and social life of human beings. However, the former, in accordance with Karl Marx's famous maxim that "philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways. The point, however, is to change it," wanted to harness philosophy in their fight for a classless society, subjugate truth to politics, and the experience of the real world – to an *a priori* construction. The latter followed the program of philosophy faithful to the truth about reality and believed that only then will philosophy fulfill its role in society and culture. The defense of thus understood philosophy grew to the status of a moral task. No wonder that a diagnosis in the form of a rhyme appeared: "From Berlin to Seúl, philosophy – only at KUL."

This book is about that paradigm called the Lublin Philosophical School, sometimes the Lublin School of Philosophy, Lublin School, and Lublin School of Classical Philosophy, and some other names. In order to avoid any confusions, in the translation (with few exceptions) the term "Lublin Philosophical School" is used, as in 2010 there appeared a work in English by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk with the title *The*

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[9]    Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Metafizyka – ale jaka?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 17, no. 1 (1969): 60.

*Lublin Philosophical School*,[10] and this term already functions in the philosophical milieu. The articles collected in the volume were written by the second and third generation of the disciples of the "founding fathers" of the School: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Karol Wojtyła, Jerzy Kalinowski, Stefan Swieżawski, and Stanisław Kamiński being the crucial thinkers. This book has three main objectives. First and foremost, to present the readers with a historically based overview of the persons and concepts which constitute the phenomenon of the Lublin Philosophical School. However, the historical dimension is not the only one, because, secondly, the book should allow us to identify hitherto unsolved or completely new problems, and it may then become an invitation to philosophize together. This "Lublin paradigm of philosophizing" is not a closed discipline like Euclidean geometry, but it is open to new data and new experiences. Thirdly, this book is intended to become a source for further research on the Lublin Philosophical School and its "paradigm of philosophizing," and that is why the volume is appended with a rich bibliography prepared and revised for the English edition by Tomasz Łach (a representative of the fourth generation of the School's disciples) as well as with an index of names and terms. The texts are illustrated with photographs from the Archive of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.

Unless indicated otherwise, the articles were translated by Marcin Garbowski who also might be considered a member of the forth generation of the School. Yet, translation means interpretation, so a few words of explanation of terminology is necessary. A domain concerned with cognition usually bears the name "epistemology." However, as reported by his disciples, Antoni B. Stępień preferred the term „theory of cognition" over the term "epistemology," for he claimed the latter term was ambiguous. Moreover, when epistemology is seen as a theory of scientific cognition, it becomes a sub-discipline of the general theory of cognition. We therefore decided to retain the term "theory of cognition" to be faithful to Stępień's intention, but also because it is used in English translations of Stanisław Kamiński's works. In some titles or quotations the word "man" occurs. "Man" here is the English equivalent of the Polish word "*człowiek*" (human being) which is synonymous to Latin *homo* or German *der Mensch*. So it refers to all human beings. Some terms (such as "decontradictification") are directly borrowed from Hugh MacDonald who translated a number of Krąpiec's

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[10]  Mieczysław A. Krąpiec OP and Andrzej Maryniarczyk SDB, *The Lublin Philosophical School* (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2010).

works. We also did our best to use quotations taken from already existing "official" translations of books and papers, especially those by Karol Wojtyła, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stanisław Kamiński, Rocco Buttiglione. Unless it was substantial for articles' theses, we did not translate titles of works in Polish (or in any other language) in order not to expand the book. We also would like to express our gratitude to Christopher Garbowski, Dorota Chabrajska, and Patrycja Mikulska for their helpful comments on the translation and the editorial style of the volume.

Some explanations are also needed as to the terms which should describe the structural units of the Faculty of Philosophy. The Faculty was established in 1946, and at that time it beared the name "The Faculty of Christian Philosophy." Before there was only a philosophical group at the Faculty of Humanities. In the articles various names of the Faculty's structural elements appear. The term "section" refers to the division of the Faculty into theoretical and practical, parts and this was connected mainly with the organization of teaching. The term „division," which is used as a translation of the Polish term "*zakład*," refers to a organizational unit that includes departments concerned with similar subject-matters. We have decided to use the term "department" as a translation of the Polish term "*katedra*." Sometime the term "chair" is used as a translation of that term. However, the *katedra* is the smallest structural unit at the KUL, with a few people employed in it, and not a chair hold by a prominent professor. The term "department" is also maintained in the KUL's official terminology recently elaborated at the KUL. The term "institute" refers to an organizational unit related to scholarly domains broadly understood (The Institute of Philosophy in that case). The structure of the Faculty of Philosophy underwent many changes, and the history of those changes is still waiting for its autor. Also, as the reader might easily notice, the origin and development of the Lublin Philosophical School is complicated. That is why we supplemented some articles with the editor's notes, explaining terms and events relevant for considerations.

The subtitle of the book: *History – concepts – disputes* gives the book a certain order. The first two articles are essentially of a historical character. Katarzyna Stępień in her chapter "Unitas in Pluribus – the History of the Lublin Philosophical School" presents the social-intellectual context in which the School emerged and the formulation of its program as well as the persons and works essential for that process. She also discusses various attempts at distinguishing phases of the School's development. Stępień's article points to three crucial qualities of the Lublin School: the unity of the

philosophical system built in the School, despite of a variety of points of departure, perspectives, and topics (which Stępień emphasizes); developing philosophy with reference to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, since this tradition is seen as faithful to reality, but at the same time treating that philosophy as a contribution to Polish and global culture; developing philosophy in response to a social-cultural need.

Włodzimierz Dłubacz included his main claim in the very title of his chapter "The 'Survival School' for Philosophy." He claims that the phenomenon of the Lublin School:

> [e]merged, it would seem, accidentally, but on the grounds of a great philosophical tradition – European and Polish – thanks to outstanding philosophers, who met at the Catholic University of Lublin, and who – in a friendly scholarly cooperation, aware of the dangers threatening people and culture as a whole, full of enthusiasm and of a sense of responsibility and mission – undertook a grand task of saving and reviving philosophical culture which is most fully expressed in the form of classically understood philosophy. Their activities allowed classical philosophy to survive and develop as well as to carry it into free Poland.

Dłubacz places the accomplishments of the Lublin School in a broader philosophical tradition and understanding of what the term "classical" means. He mentions scholars and organizational structures within which they functioned and shows that the School's theoretical investigations were accompanied by teaching. In the conclusion he stresses that the mission of the School was not completed with the fall of communism in Poland, because:

> It does not succumb to intellectual fads, it is faithful in its cognition to the existing reality, supporting in this way the human being and the culture created by him/her (worldview, social life); according to many, it is more needed now than in times past, when philosophy was administratively liquidated, for today there are similar threats to freedom and truth.

Paweł Gondek in his chapter "Sapientis Est Ordinare: On the Metaphysical and Methodological Phenomenon of the Lublin Philosophical School" analyzes philosophical inspirations of the founders of the Lublin School in the context of building the specificity of its philosophy. He indicates that for the School the crucial binding factor was the development – stemming from these inspirations – of a specific method of philosophizing. On the one

hand, in the systemic aspect, this method was built upon an interpretation of philosophy (metaphysics) classically understood as realistic cognition, and on the other hand, in a methodological aspect, it provided – referring to the achievements of the Lvov-Warsaw School – the way of arranging the system of metaphysics. A distinct profile which gave grounds to the phenomenon of the Lublin School has its root precisely at the intersection of these two tendencies. Gondek stresses the fact that the inspirations stemming from ideas of the Lvov-Warsaw School found their fulfillment at the organizational-methodological level which allowed the Lublin School to develop a unique system of classical metaphysics. In this context one must emphasize that the methodological arrangement of the content of metaphysics gave the Lublin School of Philosophy the character of a consistent, methodically homogenous philosophical project which is valid until this day.

The subsequent texts present the Lublin Philosophical School from a substantive and object-oriented perspective, pointing to essential elements of its philosophical system.

Andrzej Maryniarczyk in his chapter "Philosophy as Metaphysics in the Lublin School of Philosophy" claims that from a historical point of view the realistic metaphysical philosophy developed at the Lublin School belongs to the current of *philosophiae perennis* (perennial philosophy). The specificity of metaphysical philosophy so understood is marked by the following indicators: (1) historicism (a research approach based on the view that investigating the history of a given problem bears on its formulation and solution); (2) methodology autonomous with regard to sciences, the humanities, and theology; (3) seeing metaphysics as the central philosophical discipline; (4) apprehending the being considered under an existential aspect as the object of philosophy; (5) assuming a radicalized concept of cognition where the acts of judging precede acts of conceptualizing; (6) applying the method of metaphysical separation to determine the object of philosophizing. Philosophy of this kind constantly opposes idealism which in the history of philosophy occurred in various forms and types. The history of human thought demonstrates that the alienation of metaphysical reflection is connected with replacing cognition ("reading" or „deciphering") of reality with analyzing exclusively the realm of mind. This is why a contemporary crisis of culture cannot be diagnosed without referring to sources of idealist philosophy. The founders of the Lublin Philosophical School saw the need to defend metaphysical philosophy against other types of philosophy, but they saw this task also as a defense of the human being (his/her rationality) as well as of human culture and organization of social life. Referring to

the thought of Stefan Swieżawski, Maryniarczyk stresses that depriving the human being of metaphysical reflection is a felony against human reason, negating the dignity of human nature.

Arkadiusz Gudaniec gave his chapter the title: "Metaphysics of the Person: The Specificity of Personalism in the Lublin School of Philosophy." Developing further considerations summarized above, Gudaniec claims that reflections carried on in the Lublin Philosophical School in the domain of philosophical anthropology resulted in an original concept of the person, even if the representatives of the School perceived metaphysical problems differently and employed different perspectives to develop personalism. Gudaniec stresses the fact that those various ways of forming the concept of the person were an expression of the openness of the Lublin School. He then analyzes two paths of developing personalism: the path of Krąpiec who emphasizes the role of the human being as a unique being, endowed with personal experience (symptomatic from a philosophical point of view), and the path of Wojtyła who, starting with experience of the acting person, stresses also the role of a theory of the person in justifying ethical theses. Both approaches are characterized by a substantial convergence and complementarity which in fact results from the accepted goal and object of anthropological inquiries. They are an expression of the realistic metaphysics of the person and introduce important ideas into contemporary anthropological debates.

The next chapters in the volume examine the specificity of the Lublin School from a meta-level perspective. Rev. Tomasz Duma in his chapter "The Specificity of the Language of the Theory of Being" claims that in the case of the theory of being, both the process of formulating cognitive results and that of transmitting (communicating) those results have a distinct character. He stresses that the specificity of the language of the theory of being is an expression of a distinct character and autonomy of metaphysical cognition as such. The language of the theory of being is a natural language the rules of which (syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic) render the principles of being and cognition, and this is why it is a language that refers to the cognized reality, describing and explaining the real world. For this reason it does not prioritize conceptualization but gives an essential place to existential judgments. Such properties constitute the distinct epistemic qualities of the language of the theory of being, and that is why this language is sensitive and open to any such references to beings which take into account the existence and essence of those beings. Thus, the language

of the theory of being is prepared to accurately describe, to explain, and to "decontradictify" ontic facts.

Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik's and Rev. Tomasz Duma's chapter entitled "Via ad Veritatem: On the Methods of Developing Philosophy in the Lublin Philosophical School" in a way summarizes and supplements considerations of the four above-mentioned chapters, for it reveals methodological sources of classical philosophy. Starting with an analysis of the notion of method and its determinants: object and purpose of philosophy, the authors characterize basic methodological tools used in the Lublin School: metaphysical separation as the method of determining the notion of being; decontradictifying explanation, i.e. finding such an explanation that if rejected, would force an inquirer to deny facts of which it was an explanation; non-refutable justification, analyzing here the issue of whether there are truths that are at the same time factual and necessary; types of negative justification; possible places for hypotheses in the theory of being; and, finally, historicism, i.e. the postulate to philosophize in the context of the historical formulations of a given problem and its proposed solutions. Those considerations show the methodological specificity of classical philosophy. It is a form of empirical cognition in which the point of departure is some cognitive contact with reality; it is a methodic form of cognition – the first step is to determine the notion of being as being, and this step is followed by the clarification of the content of that notion by separating transcendental notions. Within this language, and thus already within the context of the system, an explanation is pursued why the being exists and why it is the way it is. The being is explained through the indication of internal and/or external factors without which the being would not exist and would not be what it is. Such explanatory reasoning is similar to reductive inferences which from a pure logical point of view are seen as fallible. Yet, in the theory of being such reasoning acquires infallibility. The reason is that it is based not on formal relations between concepts but on grasping in the act of intellectual intuition the being's necessary ontic relations. The theses of metaphysics are necessary in a three-fold manner: factually (they grasp the ontic necessity), epistemically (they are apodictic), and linguistically (they are analytic in a specific way). Since the system of metaphysics permits hypotheses, and, moreover, one can always reach through experience new categories of being, the system of metaphysics has a dynamic and open character.

Bożena Czernecka-Rej in her chapter titled "Non-Classical Logics in the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy" discusses the evolution of investigations in the domain of logic at the Catholic University of Lublin, focusing on

scholars and institutional forms. The engagement in logical investigations stems from the understanding of philosophy as a scholarly discipline, i.e. such a discipline which subjects itself to logical and methodological requirements but also is supposed to support the rationality of other domains in life. This is clearly demonstrated by the research topics chosen at the KUL. Czernecka-Rej lists the following topics: (1) logical foundations for practical cognition and logic of norms. These issues were investigated by Jerzy Kalinowski, and his successors treat his results as a point of departure for building richer logical systems which are to form a basis for so-called formal ethics (connected, among others, with the development of modern-day technologies); (2) the interpretation of logical values of matrices for those logical systems as well as the classical definition of truth apprehended from a formal point of view (Ludwik Borkowski); (3) logic of change and causal logic (Stanisław Kiczuk). The last issue was especially important in the context of the philosophy of nature and natural sciences developed at the Catholic University of Lublin. Although logicality and rationality are not identical with regard to their scope and content, it is difficult to deny their mutual connection. This is why the problem of formulating philosophical claims in the language of logical calculi has been vividly discussed. Czernecka-Rej underlines that a kind of "abundance" of nonclassical logics generates a number of philosophical problems, most of all questions of the cognitive value of logical systems, of what the correctness of a logical system consists in as well as of whether one can speak of formal correctness only or also of material correctness. This way the *organon* of philosophizing became the object of analyses at the Lublin School.

Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik's chapter *"Amicus Plato, Sed Magis Amica Veritas...: Philosophical Disputes in the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy"* complements reflections on the Lublin Philosophical School. The disputes on the following meta-level topics are analyzed in detail: the application of phenomenological methods and their efficacy in attaining objectives of philosophizing defined in the Lublin School; the status of the theory of cognition and its relation to metaphysics (the issue of what domain of philosophy constitutes "the first philosophy" against the background of various understandings of relationships between scholarly disciplines); the object of ethical cognition and the primary norm for morality (*bonum est faciendum* or *persona est affirmanda);* the object and purpose of metaphysics. There are also briefly reported the following disputes: on the status of the philosophy of nature; on the understanding of classical philosophy; on the applicability of formal logic to classical philosophy (complementing

the article by Czernecka-Rej). Disputes on the understanding of Thomism and the existence of Christian philosophy are also mentioned. Lekka-Kowalik presents also three object-oriented disputes within the Lublin School: on direct experience and its role in the foundations of metaphysics, on existential judgments, and on the existence and nature of intentional objects. Those and other disputes, as the author shows in her article, were an essential and constant element of the philosophizing style in the Lublin School and, as Katarzyna Stępień stressed in her article, it was an expression of the School's vitality and dynamism. Lekka-Kowalik adds that those disputes became an opportunity for clarifying and crystallizing views. The disputes were "rough and ruthless," as their participants were genuinely interested in solving a problem; and they were about something central for philosophy – the truth. In Lekka-Kowalik's opinion, those disputes have not reached satisfactorily justified resolutions, and thus she agrees with Paweł Gondek that the realist philosophy of the Lublin School is still a project, albeit a project that is already well outlined.

The author of the last chapter, Stanisław Majdański, was an active participant of the process of the Lublin School's formation. Hence the title of his article: "A Phenomenon within Polish Philosophy: 'The Lublin School' – Fragments of a Testimony and of Reflection." Majdański describes the situation of the Faculty and its social-economic contexts as well as the main figures and concepts shaping the School. He considers the Lublin School, with its emphasis on realism, rationality, logical culture, and with its three dimensions: metaphysics-centrism, methodologism and historicism, a phenomenon transcending the (old)Polish Sarmatian tradition, connected also with Polish "folkiness" and inclination to elevated emotionality. In these three dimensions one should look for the Lublin School's characteristic innovativeness, a supplement and contrast to the Polish heritage. Majdański sees a fourth dimension of the School which he considers to be an original reference to that what was already present in the Polish tradition – the ethical dimension. He claims that in this respect the Lublin School continues and develops the tradition. He points out that at the beginning it was mostly a "spoken" School, and its participants would present much sharper and tougher positions during discussions and casual conversations than in their publications.[11] Moreover, one should situate the Lublin Philosophical School in the context of a broader mission of saving Poland from sovietization,

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[11]    Reflections of important figures of the School can be found on: www.sapiencjokracja. pl [access: 28.01.2020]. Editor's note.

and philosophy – from Marxism. This is clearly visible in the thought and activities of the leading representative of the School, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec. Majdański writes about Krąpiec: "When one observed his efforts, one could notice a certain continuation and reference to the spirit and the struggle of the grand Poland from the times of yore (still before the 18th century partitions) as well as from the times Poland was bereft of its independence, in its pursuit to regain its sovereignty which was to be accomplished in this way or another. His choice of weapon was: philosophy."

Finally, we give the floor to two key figures of the School: Krąpiec and Kamiński, so that the reader could directly get acquainted with their style of philosophizing and get a sense of the atmosphere of the Lublin Philosophical School. These are in a way the programmatic articles of both thinkers: *"What is Classical Philosophy*?" by Krąpiec and *"On the Nature of Philosophy"* by Kamiński.

In conclusion, two things should be stressed. Firstly, the subject matter presented in this volume predominantly concerns the history and conceptual aspect of the Lublin Philosophical School. This certainly does not exhaust all of the issues connected with the School. The chapters concentrate mainly on the shaping of the systemic and methodic foundations of the School, on its metaphysical specificity and personalistic orientation, on its universal program and autonomy in cognizing the world. The determinants of philosophizing explained in the articles may seem too maximalistic when compared to standards of philosophizing most frequently accepted nowadays. And taking the truth as the purpose and motive for philosophizing, admittedly, goes against contemporary cultural trends. This is why the articles are written in such a way as to explain the specificity of the School from its foundations, with the full awareness of the significance of its historical beginnings and the context in which it was created. Undoubtedly, not all aspects of the School shall be interesting for everyone. This is why the book is arranged in such a way that one can read it as a monograph about the School, or else one can reach for particular chapter because they constitute independent parts. This dual possibility has its price: the same topics and persons appear in many articles. However, they are not mere repetitions, for the same idea, placed in a slightly different context, acquires a slightly different sense and reveals additional aspects.

While the majority of the reflections on the School's activities concern the period up until the 1980s, this does not mean that at that point the Lublin School of Philosophy actually was a school and now it is a closed chapter. This monograph is intended to constitute the documentation of those times

and at the same time to demonstrate the value and significance of philosophy developed in the way proposed by the School. A particular emphasis must be placed on the aforementioned openness to confronting new problems which stems from the empirical point of departure. This means that the School has not only a historical significance as a cultural phenomenon, but it formulates new scholarly projects. The most profound criterion for the quality and importance of any philosophical school is its achievements and influence on the philosophical community and culture. If we look from that point of view on the seventy-year-long history of the Lublin School, its current functioning and prospects of future development, we must acknowledge that it is a unique school. For it was able to creatively develop achievements from the past, both distant (classical philosophy) and more recent (the Lvov-Warsaw School). A number of philosophers active today from various academic circles in Poland had direct contact with the philosophical thought of the Lublin School, and many of them are creatively developing its ideas also nowadays. The best proof of the School's validity is a significant number of scholarly monographs which consciously refer to – and draw upon – the accomplishments of the Lublin School and its style of philosophizing. In the last decade we can list at least several dozen of such publications (not to mention articles in academic journals). A particular culmination of those accomplishments was the ten-volume *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* published by the Polish Society of Thomas Aquinas (Lublin 2000–2009) to which 565 authors from all major Polish academic centers contributed their entries.[12] This achievement is a clear proof of the continual activity of the Lublin Philosophical School.

The second thing to be stressed has a slightly broader significance. It is about the significance of tradition. A tradition enables voices from the past to be heard and to learn from the experiences of generations, and thus it becomes a collection of "orientation points" as to what is important, justified, or true. At the same time, it indicates what requires reflection, clarification, rejection, or continuation. When writing about scientific knowledge, and including in it philosophy, Andrzej Bronk claims:

> Any development (progress) in culture always occurred as a result of referring to the cognitive achievements of the predecessors. (…) This

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[12] Cf. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Z dziejów powstania *Powszechnej encyklopedii filozofii,*" *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii: Suplement*, vol. 10, ed. Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: PTTA, 2009), 879-890.

process, called the formation of culture, is particularly visible in the case of scientific knowledge, where subsequent generations of scientists, employing achievements of their forerunners, build upon that, what has already been accomplished, i.e. on an earlier scientific tradition even if it is linked with overcoming it. Contemporary knowledge and, thanks to it, the world of today are built upon the knowledge acquired in the past.[13]

Although at first glance this quote from Bronk's analyses seems to refer to the natural sciences which through technology are changing the world, he also very strongly emphasizes the role of tradition in the humanities and philosophy because "it is hard to imagine [them] without constantly reaching to a tradition as the reservoir of wisdom."[14] For us who philosophize in the twenty-first century, the present volume signifies such "reaching into a reservoir of wisdom." Bronk stresses the fact that in the case of philosophy tradition plays a specific role: "Philosophical education was always about introducing [a student] into a philosophical tradition of a 'school' or current. As a result one is not simply a philosopher but an analytical [philosopher], phenomenologist, neo-positivist, postmodernist, Thomist, or Kantist."[15] This book may therefore be treated as "an introduction to a tradition," in order for someone rooted in his or her own tradition to open scholarly horizons, take on topical problems, and participate in contemporary discussions for this is the way a good philosophy develops.

Therefore in this monograph, we wish to present a certain proposal of doing philosophy – a philosophy which is sapiential, open to reality, constantly pursuing ultimate justifications, and aware of its culture-formative role.

The awareness of a culture-formative role is not something externally added to the philosophy of the Lublin School. It stems from the philosophical conviction that ideas have consequences: we act in the way we understand the world. A significant argument for the veracity of this thesis is given by the totalitarian systems of the twentieth century which – according to John Paul II's memorable words – committed "an anthropological error"; actions based on an erroneous concept of the human being lead to the tragedy of millions of people. That is why the pope in his encyclical *Fides et ratio* stated: "with its enduring appeal to the search for truth, phi-

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[13]  Andrzej Bronk, "Poznawcza rola tradycji," in *Metodologia. Tradycja i perspektywy*, ed. Monika Walczak (Lublin: TN KUL, 2010), 21.

[14]  Ibidem, 24.

[15]  Ibidem, 24-25.

losophy has the great responsibility of forming thought and culture; and now it must strive resolutely to recover its original vocation."[16] The Lublin Philosophical School strives to maintain this original vocation of philosophy. Nowadays it is becoming not only a cognitive mission but, indeed, a cultural one because "at times, this happens because those whose vocation it is to give cultural expression to their thinking no longer look to truth, preferring quick success to the toil of patient enquiry into what makes life worth living."[17] This harsh diagnosis of our times, from more than twenty years ago, retains its validity in a world where it is claimed that "everybody has his/her own truth" and "truth is an obstacle to freedom." In this sense this book becomes also a testimony.

And yet another aspect is worth emphasizing. The School emerged at the Catholic University Lublin which was founded "due to the passionate love of the homeland and a genuine desire to serve the patriotic ideals."[18] The patriotism of the School's founders, so much stressed in several articles contained in this volume, is not a coincidence but an attempt to fulfill the University's mission. Let us recall once again Kamiński's reflections on philosophy: "philosophy should contribute to the personalistic character of culture, that is demonstrate in which way culture can be worthy of human beings and serve their development the best. Such auxiliary [serving, or ministerial] functions of philosophy with regard to culture are nothing else but service to humanity"[19]. That is where cognitive and moral tasks meet, the defense and development of both philosophy and Poland, patriotism and universality. These tasks that the prior generations of the Lublin Philosophical School strove to fulfill have now been entrusted to us. In the article cited above Bronk claims: "The duty of a scholar is not only to enrich and diversify the hitherto acquired knowledge of reality but to preserve it, pass it on, and popularize it."[20] This book on the Lublin School of Philosophy is to be a fulfillment of this "scholarly duty."

*Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik and Paweł Gondek*

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[16]  John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, 6.
[17]  Ibidem.
[18]  An interview with Rev. Idzi Radziszewski by Rev. M. Szkopowski, published in *Kurier Warszawski* newspaper on the 7th and 11th of September 1918. Reprinted in Radziszewski, *Pisma* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2009), 535-541.
[19]  Kamiński, "On the Nature of Philosophy," 206.
[20]  Bronk, "Poznawcza rola tradycji", 21.

Katarzyna Stępień

# *Unitas in Pluribus*:
# On the History of the Lublin
# Philosophical School

"Gainst death and all-oblivious enmity – Shall you pace forth"
William Shakespeare, Sonnet LV, fragm.

The Lublin Philosophical School, also called the Lublin (Polish) School of Classical Philosophy, School of Realist Philosophy (theory of being), School of Christian Philosophy, or simply the Lublin School[1] is chronologically the second, after the Lvov-Warsaw School, and as far as its prestige is concerned – a leading 20th century Polish philosophical milieu. The School has a program, idea profile, its own methods, a richness of covered topics, an enormous body of accomplishments at a world level as well as originality and relevance of its message (despite the passage of time), not to mention didactic attractiveness and an irrefutable position in Polish academic culture.[2] The first usage of the name is attributed either to Kazimierz Kłósak (Lublin School),[3] or Jerzy Kalinowski who while describing the works of philosophers from

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[1] Each of these terms concerns a slightly different aspect and each of them is contentious. See Andrzej Bronk and Stanisław Majdański, "Klasyczność filozofii (w rozumieniu szkoły lubelskiej)," *Ethos* 9, no. 3-4 (35-36) (1996): 129-144; "Filozofia klasyczna to filozofia metafizyczna. Z profesorem S. Swieżawskim rozmawia ks. Jarosław Merecki," *Ethos* 9, no. 3-4 (35-36) (1996): 253-261.

[2] See Stanisław Janeczek, "Ciągłość i rozwój. Osiemdziesiąt lat filozofii na KUL-u," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 47, no. 2 (1999): 145-159; Stanisław Janeczek, *Filozofia na KUL-u. Nurty – osoby – idee* (Lublin: RW KUL, 2001).

[3] For various aspects of understanding the Lublin concept of philosophy (metaphysics) in a more recent publication see Paweł Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej* (Lublin: PTTA and Wydawnictwo KUL, 2015), 51-86.

the Catholic University of Lublin in the journal *Revue philosophique de Louvain* "*école philosophique lublinoise*".[4] Kalinowski referred this name to the milieu of Polish philosophers and a distinct way of philosophizing developed in the 1950s in an institutionalized form at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin.

## The Historical and Social context of the founding of the Lublin philosophical school

The interwar period was a time of dynamic development of Polish arts and sciences, including philosophy. The analytic Lvov-Warsaw School continued its activities which had been initiated at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Philosophical inquiries were also conducted at other institutions of higher education, and various Neo-Thomistic approaches as well as phenomenology were developed.[5] The philosophical culture of that era, as Wojciech Chudy indicates, "features a variety of currents, richness of topics, fundamental linguistic exactness and precision, the adequacy of methods of philosophizing, and ultimately, the pluralism of approaches and genuine openness to dialogue."[6] Three philosophical congresses took place and demonstrated the abundance of topics and concepts as well as the concern for the development of Polish philosophy during post-partition period (1923 in Lvov, 1927 in Warsaw, 1936 in Cracow).[7] Numerous publications came out.

A specific continuation of the development of Polish philosophy – with all of its limitations and devastation caused by World War II and Nazi German as well as Soviet occupations – was observed in the early post-war pe-

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[4]     See Andrzej Maryniarczyk and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna," in *Encyklopedia filozofii polskiej*, vol. 1, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), 894.

[5]     See Antoni B. Stępień, "Filozofia polska w wiekach XIX i XX," in *Wkład Polaków do kultury świata*, ed. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec et al. (Lublin: TN KUL, 1976), 177-191.

[6]     Wojciech Chudy, "Filozofia polska po II wojnie światowej," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 21, no. 1 (1985): 130.

[7]     The character of early philosophical congresses was described from contemporary perspective by Wojciech Chudy, "Tradycja i niepokój. W związku z VI Polskim Zjazdem Filozoficznym (Toruń 5-9 IX 1995)," *Ethos* 33-34, no. 1-2 (1996): 323-330.

riod. It maintained its continuity until 1949,[8] despite the years of war and its aftermath as well as the loss of two renowned academic centers (Lvov and Vilnius): books written in the underground academic life were published, universities and other centers of philosophical inquiry functioned, journals were resumed, new research facilities were established and among them the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin from the inspiration of the Grand Chancellor of the Catholic University of Lublin, the bishop of Lublin, Stefan Wyszyński. The faculty was established by the resolution of the Academic Senate of the Catholic University of Lublin on the 17th of June 1946, and officially opened on the 10th of November 1946. During the interwar period philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin was practiced exclusively within the organizational framework of the Faculty of the Humanities (including, however, such renowned professors as Idzi Radziszewski, Jacek Woroniecki, Antoni Szymański, Henryk R. Jakubanis, and Józef Pastuszka). Thus, during the post-war period it gained additional and separate institutional foundations (apart from its continuation in the Faculty of Humanities until 1955), attracting in its initial phase (apart from Pastuszka, the organizer of the Faculty and its first dean) such scholars as: Stefan Swieżawski, Antoni Korcik, and Stanisław Adamczyk.[9]

Prewar pluralism (the Lvov-Warsaw School, Christian philosophy, phenomenology, et al.) in the post-war era began to succumb to the onrush of institutionalized Marxism which strove for exclusiveness. While in the period until 1949 polemics and discussions with Marxism were conducted from the perspective of various philosophical disciplines by, among others, Jan Piwowarczyk, Konstanty Michalski, and Kazimierz Kłósak, aftewards the situation changed and gradually the dialogue became a matter of appearances.[10] In 1948, after the unifying congress of the Polish United Workers' Party and declaring the domination of social realism in culture by Minister Włodzimierz Sokorski, Polish arts and sciences, including philosophy, became subjected to one-of-a-kind interference and intervention.[11] The ad-

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[8]   See Jan Czerkawski, "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna na tle sytuacji filozofii w powojennej Polsce," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45, no. 1 (1997): 1.

[9]   See Wojciech Chudy, "Filozofia polska po II wojnie światowej": 131. See Janeczek, *Filozofia na KUL-u*, 21-75.

[10]  See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Dialog?," in *Wobec filozofii marksistowskiej. Polskie doświadczenia*, ed. Antoni B. Stępień (Lublin: TN KUL, 1990), 9-20; Antoni B. Stępień, "Rys rozwoju filozofii marksistowskiej i problem dialogu filozoficznego z marksizmem od roku 1945," in *Wobec filozofii marksistowskiej*, 21-36.

[11]  See Chudy, "Filozofia polska po II wojnie światowej": 131.

ministrative repressions of the totalitarian state in relation to philosophical milieus were succinctly described by Wojciech Chudy:

> The basis for practicing philosophy was curbed. Philosophy at universities was eliminated (except for the University of Warsaw and the Catholic University of Lublin), The Faculties of Theology at the University of Warsaw and at the Jagiellonian University were closed down (in 1954 the Academy of Catholic Theology was founded in their place which initially was strictly supervised by the state). The Polish Academy of Learning (PAU; also: The Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences) was dissolved and the Polish Academy of Sciences (PAN) was founded in its place in 1951 in Warsaw, provided with an organizational structure which made it easy to steer and control. Soon after PAN had been created, during one day more than two hundred professors were fired from the departments they headed or worked for. (Prof. Kazimierz Kuratowski called this event "the black day for the Polish arts and sciences"). Journals were closed down, including the major ones: *Przegląd Filozoficzny* [Philosophical Review] and *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* [Philosophical Quarterly]. They were replaced by *Myśl Filozoficzna* [Philosophical Thought] (Adam Schaff became its editor-in-chief). It was then that the Library of Philosophical Classics was created, where many philosophers earlier employed at universities were "delegated" as editors and translators, among others Izydora Dąmbska, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, and Roman Ingarden. Tadeusz Czeżowski, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, and Tadeusz Kotarbiński were not allowed to teach philosophical courses but only to conduct research in the field of narrowly comprehended logic.[12]

The point was to separate students from philosophers who represented a different point of view than Marxism. Administrative repressions were supplemented by attacks, libels, and pamphlets by Marxists (such as Adam Schaff, Bronisław Baczko, Henryk Holland, Tadeusz Kroński, Roman Zimand, Leszek Kołakowski, Andrzej R. Nowicki, Władysław Krajewski, and others) targeted at such renowned Polish philosophical scholars as Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Kazimierz Twardowski, Roman Ingarden, or Władysław Tatarkiewicz.[13] As befits a totalitarian state, the goal was to limit administratively the earlier intellectual richness and to reject

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[12]   See ibidem: 131-132. For recollections of those difficult times see Jerzy Kalinowski, "Moje powojenne lata na KUL," in *Księga jubileuszowa na 50-lecie Wydziału Filozofii KUL*, ed. Antoni B. Stępień and Jacek Wojtysiak (Lublin: RW KUL, 2000), 34.
[13]   See Chudy, "Filozofia polska po II wojnie światowej": 132.

the achievements and high ethos of Polish philosophy for the sake of the materialistic monism of Marxist philosophy (ideology).

Also the Catholic University of Lublin was struck by all kinds of repressions imposed by the regime. The Faculty of Law and Social-Economic Sciences was closed down. Rev. Antoni Słomkowski (Rector of the university in the years 1944-1951, called its second founder) was accused of opposing the installment of socialist youth organizations at the university and imprisoned (from 1949 to 1954). In 1952 professors Rev. Józef Pastuszka (Dean), Rev. Stanisław Adamczyk (Vice-Dean), and Czesław Strzeszewski were forced to leave their posts at the Faculty of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin as well as the city of Lublin itself. The newly established and intensively developing faculty was threatened with suppressions of its activities or even closedown. As Stefan Swieżawski recalls, "[…] our faculty was transformed into a real *facultas depopulata*."[14] Yet, this was a Pyrrhic victory for the communists because ultimately it lead to the consolidation of young scholars around a new program. In the place of the expelled dean, Rev. Pastuszka, in 1952 Jerzy Kalinowski, a young and energetic philosopher of law and logician (a disciple of Prof. Czesław Martyniak), was nominated to take that post (in 1950 he was transferred from the Faculty of Law and Social-Economic Sciences which was closed down in 1948). After losing its professors, attempts were made to reconstruct the academic milieu from the organizational perspective. As a result, new scholars from outside of the Faculty arrived: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec (with doctorates in philosophy and in theology), Józef Iwanicki, rector of the Catholic University of Lublin after Słomkowski (from 1951), and Karol Wojtyła (from 1954) as well as alumni of the Faculty who defended their doctoral dissertations: Stanisław Kamiński (from 1949), Marian Kurdziałek (from 1950), and others. Kalinowski himself received his PhD in 1947 on the basis of his dissertation entitled *Teoria reguły społecznej i reguły prawnej Leona Duguit* [The Theory of LD Social and Legal Rule] (published in 1949) and his post-doctoral degree (*habilitacja*) in 1951 on the basis of his study *Logika zdań praktycznych. Z badań nad podstawami logicznymi poznania praktycznego* [Logic of Practical Statements. On the Foundations of Practical Cognition].

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[14]   Stefan Swieżawski, "Karol Wojtyła w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim," in *Obecność. Karol Wojtyła w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim*, ed. Maria Filipiak and Andrzej Szostek (Lublin: RW KUL, 1989), 13.

The extraordinary situation of the Faculty affected by Stalinist repressions forced the young scholars to mature quicker and compelled them to find adequate responses to the dangers they faced. One must remember that those scholars were already shaped by diverse philosophical environments and in various philosophical disciplines. Being employed at the Faculty was not therefore a start for them but rather a new stage of the work that they had already conducted. From the inspiration of Krąpiec who specialized in metaphysics, with the support of Swieżawski, a historian of philosophy, in cooperation with Kalinowski, a logician, and Kamiński, a methodologist, a new style of philosophizing in the spirit of classic philosophy was born. All this resulted in the creation of the Lublin School which was a substantive and organizational defense and response to institutionalized Marxism and the attempt administratively to enslave the Polish academia. Thus, the Lublin Philosophical School has its origin in the tragic situation of the Polish society at the time, the situation consisting not only in an existential threat to the biological fabric of the nation but also in an ideological threat: to the sovereignty of its civilization and freedom of thought, including philosophical wisdom as the deepest foundations for developing culture.

There various reactions of Polish philosophers and scholars to those threats and limitations of the freedom of academic activity: so-called locking their writing in the sock drawer, continuing research and teaching at different institutions, getting involved in translating or else the development of ideologically neutral disciplines such as logic and methodology, and ultimately even indirectly popularizing "bourgeois" philosophy as the object of alleged criticism, etc.[15] Among those reactions the Lublin School seemed to be the best and most strongly integrated community of organized resistance against the nearly half-century period of Marxist enslavement. What made it so extraordinary was a conscious and rational defense of the freedom to think philosophically in the times of the totalitarian destruction and negation of the truth about the world and human being. Other results, in the form of excellent accomplishments and of working out the specificity of realistic philosophizing, constitute an addition to this socially and culturally most important dimension. The organizational framework for this unique activity was provided by the only private university in Poland which was independent from the communist regime, formally owned by the Catholic Church and financed by the community of Poles in Poland and abroad, and in it

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[15]   More approaches of this sort are mentioned by Janeczek, *Filozofia na KUL-u*, 138.

the Faculty of Christian Philosophy, with its separate status and structure, recognized by renowned scholars and professors of many philosophical disciplines, and also – what is stressed by alumni in their memoirs – noble and friendly people who dedicated their lives to pursuing knowledge and who adhere to high moral principles.

It seems that despite its institutional connection one must not identify the Faculty of Philosophy with the Lublin School,[16] for not all of its employees identified or are identifying with the program of the School. Some of them considered their inquiries to be aligned rather with the program of the analytical Lvov-Warsaw School, or else they have chosen to analyze the object of their investigations with other methods than those characteristic for the Lublin School. The Lublin School is attributed inspirations from other scholarly communities: from Poland (the Lvov School, the Cracow Circle) and abroad (Jacques Maritain, Étienne Gilson) as well as from the earlier pre-war period of the development of philosophy (traditional Thomism, Louvain Thomism) at the Catholic University of Lublin itself or in other academic centers (which would put into question the originality or distinctiveness of the School). There were also migrations and transfers of scholars as well as the popularization of the accomplishments of the School in scholarly milieus other than Lublin. One could therefore speak of a Polish (not Lublin) School of Classical Philosophy (including the philosophers from the Academy of Catholic Theology). Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that "one could even include in the scope of the Lublin School the entire Lublin milieu because even those who oppose the manner of practicing philosophy in the way that the creators of Lublin School assumed, remain in the realm of the problems which they considered."[17] In this general sense, the Lublin Philosophical School would encompass all philosophers who were employed at the Catholic University of Lublin, and not only at the Faculty of Philosophy but also at other ones.[18] In a narrower, substantive sense, the Lublin School would be one of a few – although the most influential – currents in understanding and practicing philosophy which originally was formulated and developed at the Faculty of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin and subsequently was continued therein

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[16]   Such a point of view was assumed by Czerkawski in his "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna na tle sytuacji filozofii w powojennej Polsce": 166.

[17]   Janeczek, *Filozofia na KUL-u*, 142.

[18]   Janeczek assumes such a perspective in his depiction of the Lublin philosophical milieu. See Ibidem, 130-151.

or applied at other scholarly milieus. The development of the School and its history are also, due to institutional connections, conditioned multi-laterally by the history of the Faculty itself, by the composition of the particular departments or structural changes within the Faculty as well as by its status within the university and by teaching and services provided to other faculties and academic disciplines. Hence, the description of the Lublin School by default turns into the history of the Faculty (elements of this approach can also be found in this article). In order to avoid that and to present the Lublin School in a narrower (adequate) sense, one should reflect upon the writings of the particular authors from the point of view of fulfilling the primary program of the School. However, such an endeavor exceeds the scope of this historical outline.

## The founders and subsequent generations of the disciples of the Lublin School

Among the Faculty staff and most important founders – masters of the School – were Swieżawski, Kalinowski, and Krąpiec, and later Kamiński, Kurdziałek, and Wojtyła.[19] As it was already mentioned, these professors represented various domains of philosophy: Swieżawski and Kurdziałek – the history of philosophy, Krąpiec – general metaphysics (as well as oth-

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[19]    There is no dispute over the inclusion of these scholars; at most the period of their participation in the works and discussions, priority in formulating basic components [of the program] or the significance of a particular stage [of the School's development] are differently accentuated. In the context of shaping the metaphysical realism of the School ("radical realism was the irrefutable denominator of our philosophical views", 15), Swieżawski in his memoir stresses the role of the "great four" (Swieżawski, Kalinowski, Krąpiec, Wojtyła) and only later the "six": "Thus at our Faculty four powerful personalities came together, quite different in their characters, passions, and attitudes, and yet they formed a strongly unified team that gave the entire Faculty, and what is more, also all of philosophical research and teaching activities taking place in our community, a specific tone and distinct scholarly character. I dare say that this harmonious team of four which took on and carried out a task of great importance, shifting the switches of an ingrained mode of thinking, is a very rare and exceptionally fruitful phenomenon." See Swieżawski, "Karol Wojtyła w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim," 14-15.

er domains of the theory of being), Kalinowski and Kamiński – logic and methodology, whereas Wojtyła – ethics and anthropology.

The key date for the beginning of the School was the year 1951 when Krąpiec came from Cracow to the Catholic University of Lublin (since 1954 he was head of the Department of Metaphysics).[20] Together with Swieżawski, who was employed at the Faculty since its founding in 1946 (and was also head of Department the History of Philosophy), they started a fruitful cooperation to promote existential metaphysics in reference to Thomas Aquinas's original philosophical system and classical philosophical texts. Undoubtedly it was Krąpiec, the Dominican Father who came from the Dominican Institute in Cracow, who played a dominant role in developing the philosophical program of the School, the center of which, or rather the object-oriented foundation, is constituted by general metaphysics (the theory of being). Krąpiec, born in the village of Berezowica near the famous city of Zbaraż, was a young dynamic philosopher with exceptional intellectual capabilities and a rich, strong personality, a representative of the lost generation of the Eastern Polish Borderlands (*Kresy*), equipped with a sense of duty to perform a heroic work for the sake of the common good on behalf of those of his generation who did not survive the Second World War. It is believed that it was he who "had a significant impact on the philosophical character" of the School.[21] Krąpiec's youth and enthusiasm received support from the older professor Swieżawski, a graduate of the Lvov School (a disciple of Twardowski, Ajdukiewicz, and Ingarden), a proponent of Aquinas's original thought (in which he followed his teacher, Fr Jacek Woroniecki), an excellent historian of philosophy (referring in his works to Gilson's existential Thomism). Over time, an unprecedented role was played by the support offered by the Department of the Methodology of Sciences, headed by Rev. Józef Iwanicki and later (since 1957) by Rev. Kamiński, in the area of the methodology of philosophy and, especially,

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[20]  See Tomasz Mioduszewski, *Spór o realizm w lubelskiej szkole filozoficznej* (Ząbki: Apostolicum, 2013), 10.

[21]  Maryniarczyk and Krąpiec s.v., "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," 895; Zofia J. Zdybicka, "Wydział Filozofii KUL w perspektywie pięćdziesięciolecia," in *Księga jubileuszowa na 50-lecie Wydziału Filozofii KUL*, 15. See Stanisław Majdański, "W stronę uniwersytetu, filozofii i kultury w nawiązaniu do M.A. Krąpca i innych mistrzów," *Summarium* 43 (2014): 75-103.

classical philosophy.[22] However, this methodological and logical inclination had been grounded earlier.

> These inquiries were related to K. Twardowski's logical tradition of explaining philosophical concepts, the inquiries of the Lvov-Warsaw School, especially those of Ajdukiewicz and Łukasiewicz; to the tradition of the 1936 appeal by Rev. Salamucha, I.M. Bocheński OP and J. Drewnowski who called for precisation of classical philosophy, particularly Thomism; and, finally, to KUL's inner tradition of Rev. J. Iwanicki (rector KUL, and later at ATK) who in the years 1952-1953 initiated research in the field of the methodology of philosophy.[23]

During the 1950s the program of methodological elaboration of the peculiarity of metaphysical cognition was in a way provoked by Marxists who claimed that only Marxism had a scientific character in comparison to non-scientific and confessional classical philosophy. The program of the School, in its formal aspect, was founded also in order to counter these accusations. At that initial stage, therefore, the reflection on three main indicators of philosophizing in the Lublin School was formulated: object-oriented approach (realistic-metaphysical), source-dependence (historicism which remained in close connection with metaphysics), and formal stand (methodology and logic seen in the role of the tool and guarantor of the scholarly reliability and precision of conducted research).

The subsequent generation of the School are its first disciples who contributed to its activities. Among them the following scholars are usually mentioned: Mieczysław Gogacz, Franciszka Wilczek, Antoni B. Stępień, Marian Jaworski, Władysław Stróżewski, Bronisław Dembowski, Zofia J. Zdybicka, Stanisław Kowalczyk, Stanisław Majdański, and Tadeusz Kwiatkowski. At this stage of the School's development, there were emphasized its methodological unity, the evident teamwork of the departments, and the concern for the development of general metaphysics and other philosophical disciplines viewed as particular metaphysics. That was supposed to lead to the elaboration of a unified realistic philosophy with efficient method-

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22　Kamiński, as Czerkawski claimed, initially "was largely skeptical about a maximal view of philosophy," and he started to cooperate with Krąpiec only in the late 1950s. See Czerkawski, "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna na tle sytuacji filozofii w powojennej Polsce": 178.

23　Chudy, "Filozofia polska po II wojnie światowej": 135.

ological and logical instruments.[24] In 1953 Kalinowski, in response to the expectations of the students and younger staff, organized a so-called meta-philosophical seminar which attracted young enthusiasts of philosophy and philosophical discussions (among others Stępień, Gogacz, Majdański, Leon Koj, Witold Marciszewski, Kwiatkowski, Stróżewski). Within that seminar one elaborated a so-called meta-philosophical questionnaire which served to describe philosophical currents with regard to the methodological rules there applied.[25] Swieżawski, in turn, distinguished, in cooperation with Krąpiec, key metaphysical problems (the so-called metaphysical network) which were helpful in elaborating a historical questionnaire that constituted the criterion for evaluation and the key for interpretation of philosophical views.[26]

Apart from these tasks which directly contributed to the program and accomplishments of the Lublin School, at the Faculty of Philosophy intensive research was conducted in many other fields, along with teaching (the more so that students of philosophy constituted a numerous group, and the Faculty provided courses also for other fields of studies). There were other professors at the Faculty: Wiktor Wąsik, Feliks W. Bednarski (between 1949 and 1956), Kazimierz Kłósak, Franciszek Tokarz, and Antoni Korcik. They conducted research in the history of philosophy in Poland (Wąsik), in Eastern philosophies (Rev. Tokarz), the analysis and formalization of classical ethics (Fr Bednarski), logic (Rev. Korcik), or philosophy of nature (Rev. Kłósak). Although these professors did not directly engage in the main currents of discussion on the program of the School of Realistic Philosophy,[27] their accomplishments shaped generations of disciples and indirectly influenced the recognition of the significance of research conducted in certain fields (Polish philosophy, philosophy of nature, Eastern philosophies). That became over time the trademark and pride of this scholarly community as well as the expression of the richness of its trends, its pluralism and openness. The Faculty of Philosophy hosted also professors from the Faculty of Law and Social-Economic Sciences closed down by the authorities (the aforementioned Kalinowski, Bednarski, Strzeszewski who was temporarily removed from teaching, Jan Turowski, Hanna Waśkiewicz,

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[24] See Maryniarczyk and Krąpiec, s.v. "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," 903.
[25] Mioduszewski, *Spór o realizm w lubelskiej szkole filozoficznej*, 11.
[26] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "'Siatka metafizyczna' w studium historii filozofii," *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 25, no. 1 (1997): 63-65.
[27] Maryniarczyk and Krąpiec, "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," 904.

and others). Between 1950 and 1957 they constituted the so-called practical section at the Faculty, since 1957 so-called specializations. Up until 1981 at the Faculty there were four specializations: 1) theoretical, 2) practical, from 1975 called philosophical-social, 3) philosophical-psychological, and 4) philosophy of nature. Between 1981 and 1992 there remain the theoretical section and the philosophy of nature section (called this way since 1984); in the years 1992-1998 the latter was extended to include environmental studies, and after that period some of the staff moved to the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, and those who remained formed the section of the philosophy of nature and natural sciences.[28] The interests "inherited" from the practical section (ethics, philosophy of law and human rights, philosophy of work, social philosophy) over time became an important element of research at the Faculty, and ultimately they were also been included in the program of the Lublin School, and developed as particular metaphysics or else to a certain degree autonomously from the School.

In 1954 Rev. Karol Wojtyła began to teach at the Faculty. Two years later he became the head of the Department of Ethics, a part of the practical section of the Faculty (superseding Fr Bednarski who left for Rome) gradually expanding, as it is sometimes believed, the program of the School by ethical and anthropological topics treated in a novel way.[29] This anthropological and ethical vein eventually began to dominate over other ones.[30] In 1956 the professors who were earlier removed from the Faculty returned: Pastuszka (rational psychology), Adamczyk (a proponent of traditional Thomism), and Strzeszewski (Catholic social teaching). This situation provoked the first disputes and inner discussions (traditional *vs.* existential Thomism), sharpening the perspective on the role and shape

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[28]   Janeczek, *Filozofia na KUL-u*, 64-65. On the history and accomplishments of the philosophy of nature see, among others, Henryk Piersa, "Filozofia przyrody na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim," *Summarium* 45 (2016): 27-44.

[29]   Swieżawski claims, however, that interests in anthropology were present at the Faculty from the very beginning: "All four of us [Swieżawski, Krąpiec, Kalinowski, Wojtyła – K.S.] dedicated a significant amount of time to philosophical-anthropological themes, approaching them from various sides." See Swieżawski, "Karol Wojtyła w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim," 15.

[30]   One of the reasons for this domination was the generally practical approach of Polish philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s. Marxism ventured in an anthropological direction, hence the challenge for the Lublin School was Marxism's erroneous anthropological conception with its materialistic naturalism and determinism as well as its erroneous explanation of society, labor, etc. See Chudy, "Filozofia polska po II wojnie światowej": 138-139.

of classical philosophy as well as foreshadowing subsequent discussions at the Faculty and, consequently, within the School. In January of 1958 Kalinowski emigrated to France. In February of 1958 the first in the history of the Faculty the Philosophical Week, organized by the Students' Philosophical Circle at the Catholic University of Lublin (Krąpiec was its curator), took place. It was open to the public and included, among others, lectures by Krąpiec on neo-Thomism, by Kamiński on analytical philosophy, and by Stępień on phenomenology.[31] The Philosophical Weeks constituted a platform on which a discussion of the Lublin School with Marxism for decades was conducted[32] as well as – until this day – with other philosophical currents, ideologies and fashions, etc.

In the period between 1959 and 1969 ultimately the program of the School was formulated and the fundamental works were published. Just to mention the books by the main figures of the School: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Teoria analogii bytu* [The Theory of the Analogy oif Being] and *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* [Realism of Human Cognition] in 1959; Karol Wojtyła, *Ocena możliwości zbudowania etyki chrześcijańskiej przy założeniach systemu Maksa Schelera* [An Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Assumptions of Max Scheler's System] (1959) and *Miłość i odpowiedzialność* [Love and Responsibility] (1960); Jerzy Kalinowski, *Teoria poznania praktycznego* [Theory of Practical Cognition] (1960); Stefan Swieżawski (in cooperation with Marian Jaworski), *Byt. Zagadnienia metafizyki tomistycznej* [Being: On Thomistic Metaphysics] (second revised edition 1961); Stanisław Kamiński, *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* [The Notion of Science and the Classification of the Sciences] (1961); Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics] (1962); Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Dlaczego zło? Rozważania filozoficzne* [Why Evil? Philosophical Considerations] (1962) and *Struktura bytu. Charakterystyczne elementy systemu Arystotelesa i Tomasza z Akwinu* [The Structure of Being: Characteristic Elements of Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas's System] (1963); Antoni B. Stępień, *Wprowadzenie do metafizyki* [Introduction to Metaphysics] (1964); Stefan Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii* [History of Philosophy: A study] (1966); Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Metafizyka.*

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[31]  See *Znak* 10, no. 6 (1958): 623-636, 668-680, 637-649.

[32]  See *Oblicza dialogu. Z dziejów i teorii dialogu: chrześcijanie–marksiści w Polsce*, ed. Antoni B. Stępień and Tadeusz Szubka (RW KUL: Lublin, 1992).

*Zarys teorii bytu* [Metaphysics: An Outline of a Theory of Being] (1966); Karol Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn* [The Acting Person] (1969).[33]

The publications refer not only to metaphysics, methodology of metaphysics, ethics and anthropology, but also to the research on source texts conducted at the Faculty. Valuable translations of classical works were made under Swieżawski's and Kurdziałek's supervision: Thomas Aquinas's *Treatise on Man* (fragments of *Summa Theologica* I, q. 75-89) prepared by Swieżawski (1956) as well as the results of Kurdziałek's inquiries into medieval philosophy: *Davidis de Dinanto Quaternulorum fragmenta* (1963) and *David von Dinant und die Anfänge der aristotelischen Naturphilosophie* (1966).

Over time new disciples contributed with their interests and academic accomplishments to the achievements of the School: Bohdan Bejze, Tadeusz Styczeń, Edmund Morawiec, Elżbieta Wolicka-Wolszleger, Jerzy Gałkowski, Tadeusz Żeleźnik, Stanisław Wielgus, Edward I. Zieliński, Kazimierz Wójcik, Feliks Krause, Andrzej Wawrzyniak, Józef Herbut, Andrzej Bronk, Andrzej Szostek, Stanisław Kiczuk, Romuald Jakub Weksler-Waszkinel, Anna Buczek, Andrzej Woźnicki, and Wojciech Chudy. From this group some scholars over time leave for other faculties or other academic centers in Poland (Morawiec, Krause) or abroad (Woźnicki).[34]

In the 1980s a new generation of disciples appeared at the four main divisions: in Division of Metaphysics – the crucial one for the object-oriented specificity of the School – among others Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Henryk Kiereś, Piotr Jaroszyński, Krzysztof Wroczyński, Piotr Moskal, Włodzimierz Dłubacz, Ignacy Dec, Jan Sochoń; there was also a Canadian present at the Faculty – Hugh McDonald, a student and alumnus of the Faculty, and later a translator into English of the School's works and a popularizer of it in the West). In the 1990s – due to the increased teaching needs in the situation of greater freedom and of lifting the prior limitations imposed by the

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[33]   Apart from the publications of the professors, also the works (doctoral dissertations) of the second generation of scholars – disciples of the School – appeared, e.g. books by Marian Jaworski, *Arystotelesowska i tomistyczna teoria przyczyny sprawczej na tle pojęcia bytu* (1958) or Franciszka Wilczek, *Ontologiczne podstawy dowodów na istnienie Boga według Tomasza z Akwinu i Dunsa Szkota* (1958).

[34]   For more on the accomplishments of the professors at the Faculty of Philosophy see Janeczek, *Filozofia na KUL-u*, 95-130. See Janeczek, "Filozofia w KUL – ciągłość i rozwój," in *Nauka i wiara. 80 lat Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego*, ed. Andrzej Szostek (Lublin: RW KUL, 1999), 69-87.

authorities on the number of students accepted at the university – a large increase of the staff at the Faculty took place. The Division of Metaphysics included: Bogdan Czupryn, Bożena Rydzewska-Friedrich, Paweł Gondek, Jarosław Paszyński, Tomasz Rakowski, Arkadiusz Robaczewski, Katarzyna Stępień, Arkadiusz Gudaniec, Zbigniew Pańpuch, Paweł Tarasiewicz, and Paweł Skrzydlewski. They joined the research activities within the School and at the same time actively popularized its results. In the Division of Ethics which took on important and currently most difficult topics the following scholars were employed: Janusz Gula, Henryk Niemiec, Sister Barbara Chyrowicz, Marek Czachorowski, Alfred Wierzbicki, Kazimierz Krajewski, Jacek Frydrych, Artur Szutta, Jan Kłos, Małgorzata Borkowska. In the metascientific divisions there work also new scholars. In the Division of the History of Philosophy there were employed: Marian Ciszewski, Agnieszka Kijewska, Roman Majeran, Marcin Podbielski, Stanisław Janeczek, Joanna Judycka, Piotr Gutowski, Maciej S. Zięba, Paweł Sajdek, Przemysław Gut; in the Division of Logic and Epistemology: Stanisław Judycki, Jacek Wojtysiak, Arkadiusz Gut, Paweł Kawalec, Monika Walczak, Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Rafał Wierzchosławski, Piotr Kulicki, Paweł Garbacz, Bożena Czernecka-Rej, Agnieszka Salamucha. Some of the scholars moved then to other universities (Urszula Żegleń, Tadeusz Szubka, and others).[35]

Throughout the entire existence of the Faculty, research in the field of the philosophy of nature and the natural sciences were conducted by Stanisław Adamczyk, Kazimierz Kłósak, Stanisław Mazierski, Zygmunt Hajduk, Henryk Piersa, Józef Turek, Antoni Czyżewski, Włodzimierz Sedlak, Stanisław Zięba, Józef Zon, Marian Wnuk, Zenon Roskal, Zbigniew Wróblewski, Andrzej Zykubek, and others). Through its alumni the research emanated to other academic centers (Cracow – Michał Heller, Warsaw – Bernard Hałaczek, Mieczysław C. Lubański, Szczepan W. Ślaga).

In 1986 Rev. Kamiński, who was so much indispensable for the Faculty and the entire university, died prematurely,[36] and in 1997 – Rev. Kurdziałek.[37] In the 1990s there retired Krąpiec, then Styczeń, Zdybicka, Stępień, and subsequently other professors, i.e. the first generation of scholars who

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[35] Maryniarczyk and Krąpiec, s.v. "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," 907-908.

[36] The significance of Kamiński's contribution for the university and the Faculty of Philosophy is described in the commemorative issue of the journal *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35, no. 1 (1987): 365-388.

[37] On Rev. Kurdziałek see Edward Zieliński, "Współtwórca polskiej mediewistyki," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 37-38, no. 1 (1989-1990): 5-26.

shaped the School. They still, however, supported the Faculty to the best of their abilities and influenced the activities of the School, inspiring new initiatives for research and for the academic community as such in yet another difficult transition period of general social reconstruction. In the altered social-political circumstances of the 1990s, practical issues dominated over the theoretical ones.

## General Fields of interest: Richness and diversity

In the last decades of the 20th century, inquiries concerned widely-discussed contemporary philosophical currents and scholars worked within divisions or "groups": metaphysics, history of philosophy, logic and methodology, and ethics.[38]

The inquiries in the metaphysical group (directly referring to Krąpiec) concerned among others the philosophy of religion and God (Zdybicka, Marek Kiliszek, Moskal, Dłubacz), metaphysics (Wawrzyniak, Maryniarczyk, Gondek), philosophy of culture and art (Jaroszyński, Kiereś), the theory of civilization and the philosophy of the nation (Skrzydlewski, Tarasiewicz), philosophical anthropology (Weksler-Waszkinel, Dec, Czupryn, Gudaniec, Pańpuch), philosophy of law and human rights (Wroczyński, K. Stępień).

The inquiries in the historical group conducted by the disciples of Swieżawski (European philosophy of the 15th century) and Kurdziałek (medieval anthropology and philosophy of nature) concerned, among others: early modern Polish and European philosophy (Czerkawski), Renaissance philosophy (Ciszewski), contemporary, especially American, philosophy (Gutowski), medieval philosophy (Zieliński, Kijewska), and Polish philosophy (Wójcik, Wielgus, Janeczek, Michał Maciołek, Rafał Charzyński).

The most numerous logical-methodological group, consisting of Kamiński's, Ludwik Borkowski's, and A.B. Stępień's disciples, focused on, among others: semiotics (Majdański), deductive systems, artificial intelligence, and programming languages (Zdzisław Dywan, Piotr Kulicki), methodology of philosophy (Herbut), philosophy of science and the general methodology

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[38]   See Janeczek, *Filozofia na KUL-u*, 97-130; Maryniarczyk and Krąpiec, s.v. "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," 907-910.

of science (Bronk), methodology of the social sciences (Wierzchosławski), ethics of science (Lekka-Kowalik), philosophy of logic and science, and especially the question of many-valued logic and modal logic (Kiczuk), philosophy of language, mind, and the application of logic in philosophy (Żegleń), philosophy of mind and concepts of the consciousness (Judycki), analytical philosophy and hermeneutics (Bronk, Szubka), meta-philosophy and didactics of philosophy (Wojtysiak), cognitive science and philosophy of science (Kawalec).

The ethics group – Wojtyła's disciples – took on the problems of meta-ethics and general ethics (Styczeń, Szostek, Krajewski, Wierzbicki, Niemiec), social ethics, philosophy of work, the questions of freedom and natural law (Gałkowski), sexual ethics (Czachorowski), and bioethics (Gula, Chyrowicz). Wojciech Chudy, first employed in the John Paul II Institute and then an editor of the quarterly *Ethos*, in later years became the head of the Department of Philosophy of Upbringing at the Institute of Pedagogy at the Catholic University of Lublin, the first such department in Poland. He investigated, apart from ethical issues, also some problems of the theory of being, epistemology, the history of early modern and contemporary philosophy, philosophy of lying, philosophy of upbringing and social thought.

## Developmental stages of the Lublin School: attempts at periodization

In relation with the engagement of subsequent generations of disciples in developing realistic philosophy and some auxiliary disciplines, one can distinguish the main stages of the development of the Lublin Philosophical School: the period when the School was taking its shape; the period of its maturity when the seminal works were written (as it was demonstrated, for instance, in the decade between 1959 and 1969, abundant in publications) and the program was crystallized; the period of expansion but also divisions or atomization (or autonomization) of particular stances.[39]

We can find in literature various proposals of periodizing the Lublin School's history. According to Maryniarczyk, there are three stages: 1) be-

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[39] See Mioduszewski, *Spór o realizm w lubelskiej szkole filozoficznej*, 8-9.

tween 1950 and 1966 is the stage when the School developed; 2) 1967–1980 is the time when the directions outlined by the founders of the School were continued and the first generation of its disciples were active; it was also the period of broadening the scope of activities, clarification and deepening of discussed issues; 3) 1981 to 2004 and subsequent years are the period when part of the inquiries became autonomous, and certain elements of shaking the methodological and epistemological unity of the School occurred. The criterion for this distinction is determined by the relations of particular inquiries to realistic metaphysics.[40]

According to Czerkawski, one should distinguish three clear stages in the development of the School: 1) 1946–1958 – the period when it was formed; 2) 1959–1969 – the mature phase; 3) since 1970 – the period of its continuation and then disintegration. This division is connected with the history of the Faculty, including the first years of its existence.[41]

A. B. Stępień, referring to the external circumstances of practicing philosophy and the common periodization of post-war Polish philosophy as well as the organizational changes which took place at the Faculty in 1968 (the 50th anniversary of the university), distinguished the following periods: 1944–1950, 1951–1956 and after 1957. In 1991 he indicated the following periods: 1944–1952 (the organization of the Faculty), 1952–1956 (developing the Lublin style of philosophizing during the Faculty's isolation in the Stalinist period), 1957–1981 (the period when the social science specialization left the Faculty), and after 1986 (the year Rev. Kamiński died) – the period when the most creative solutions were devised, the most valuable publications appeared, and social recognition gained despite external limitations.[42]

Janeczek proposed a simplified two-stage division, treating 1952 as the boundary date: "As far as the substantive aspect is considered, the history of the Lublin philosophical environment can be divided into two periods – until 1952 and after. The basis for this distinction is, most of all, the domination at the Faculty of one of the three formations of European Thomism," i.e. existential Thomism, over its traditional and Louvain versions.[43] Yet, also in this case we can find the aforementioned third stage of the School's

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[40]   See Maryniarczyk and Krąpiec, s.v. "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," 903-908.
[41]   See Czerkawski, "Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna na tle sytuacji filozofii w powojennej Polsce": 167.
[42]   I present A. B. Stępień's periodization following Janeczek, *Filozofia na KUL-u*, 66.
[43]   Stanisław Janeczek, "Wydział Filozofii," in *Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. 90 lat istnienia*, ed. Grzegorz Kramarek and Eugeniusz Ziemann (Lublin: TN KUL, 2008), 91.

development: "After 1970 in the Lublin School differentiating processes increased, but that was however connected with creating within this current proper philosophical schools, the masters of which were the co-founders of the Lublin School"[44] (what he has in mind is the distinction of particular research groups within the Faculty which corresponded with the four existing divisions within the theoretical section).

## The unique program of the School: a contribution to academic culture

First of all, the Lublin School was distinct for its return to classical philosophers, to their texts in the original languages as sources; secondly, for the unraveling methodological reflection on the hitherto manner of philosophizing, including drawing attention to the way philosophy is defined, to the mode of argumentation and building a system (in order to become liberated from the verbalism present in the classical tradition).[45] The point was, as Krąpiec observed, "to continue a certain tradition, a style of philosophizing which we call classical (and also existential, philosophy of being or somehow else)."[46] It was supposed to be a realistic philosophy (metaphysical and epistemological realism), with an existential metaphysics or a philosophy (theory) of being practiced in an Aristotelian manner:

> […] the diaporematic method of philosophizing is about the rational deliberation on philosophical problems in a social academic dialogue. Of course, the problem must be presented in a justified way and determined either by an object-oriented context or by a historical one, i.e. through an analysis of the already provided solutions. Philosophical thinking should proceed, as Aristotle demonstrated a long time ago, aporematically: from the aporia, i.e. by posing a problem, through the

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[44] Stanisław Janeczek, "Lubelska Szkoła Filozofii Klasycznej," *Idea. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych* 18 (2006): 143-159.

[45] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Filozoficzna szkoła lubelska w 60-lecie KUL," in *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet*, selected and edited by Andrzej Wawrzyniak (Lublin: RW KUL, 1982), 303.

[46] Ibidem.

diaporesis, i.e. deliberation, to the euporia, i.e. the solution which again becomes the aporia.[47]

Swieżawski on the other hand believed that most of all:

The primacy of realistic metaphysics, the central role of philosophical anthropology, and the affirmation of rational stances in philosophy seem to be the main presumptions for practicing this sort of philosophy which sometimes is described as the Lublin Philosophical School.[48]

Thus, the program of the School from the very beginning considered realistic (general) metaphysics to be the central philosophical discipline which plays a fundamental role in the practice of philosophy and philosophical education. According to Swieżawski ("Philosophy proper must be a metaphysical philosophy, it must be a philosophy of being"[49]), the conviction of it being primal was (and should remain) the strongest keystone of the School's unity.[50] Those inquiries should be supplemented with a meticulous study of the history of philosophy (ancient, medieval, early modern and the contemporary general metaphysics and the particular metaphysics as well as the understanding of the development of problems) and deepened by reflective methodological, logical, and epistemological awareness.[51]

The point of departure for founding the School of Realistic Philosophy was accentuating the existential aspect of the being as the object of philosophy – it was a new element in comparison with the neo-scholastic tradition. Similarly to Aquinas's position, it was stressed that the act of existence

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[47]    Ibidem.

[48]    Swieżawski, "Karol Wojtyła w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim," 15. Swieżawski indicates that "One of the grand problems entering into the realm of 'practical philosophy' was the problem of natural law; a subject which engulfed everybody but most of all J. Kalinowski and M.A. Krąpiec." Ibidem, 16.

[49]    "Filozofia klasyczna to filozofia metafizyczna. Z profesorem S. Swieżawskim rozmawia ks. Jarosław Merecki," 255. For more on the foundationalism of the Lublin School in comparison with other currents in contemporary philosophy see Andrzej Bronk, "Antyfundamentalizm filozofii hermeneutyczno-pragmatycznej i fundamentalizm filozofii klasycznej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 36, no. 1 (1988): 159-183.

[50]    See Stefan Swieżawski, "Przemówienie na uroczystym posiedzeniu Rady Wydziału Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej KUL z okazji 25-lecia wydziału (w dniu 18 grudnia 1971 r.)," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 20, no. 1 (1972): 150.

[51]    Herbut discussed the insufficient execution of the methodological project of the philosophy of being in Józef Herbut, "Sprawa tak zwanej filozofii pierwszej w szkole lubelskiej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45, no. 1 (1997): 195-199.

constitutes the most important and most perfect ontic factor which requires affirmation and philosophical explanation. The purpose of philosophy is to cognize and explain the really existing world of persons and things in order to point to the necessary and ultimate factors explaining the existence of beings, including the human being. Indicating the existentially comprehended being as the formal object of philosophy became the element which unified particular domains of philosophy in the explanation of reality.[52]

Metaphysical investigations of a maximalistic character were accompanied by a methodological reflection with an analytical-critical approach which indicated the specificity of realistic philosophy and its autonomy in relation to sciences as well as to other types of philosophizing (either those constituting a generalized reflection on data provided by particular sciences or those reduced to the analysis of language or cognition). Kamiński drew attention to the specificity of metaphysical cognition which manifests itself in the analogicity of the language of metaphysics and specific (peculiar) procedures of explaining, argumentation, and justification.[53] He was against applying methodological tools of the natural or mathematical-logical sciences to metaphysics, and he attempted to devise autonomous tools. The result of that was the unique on a Polish and global scale development of methodology of metaphysics elaborated together with Krąpiec. They delivered, among other things, the specificity of realistic metaphysics and its analogical-transcendentalizing language. Krąpiec devised the concept of the analogy of being and cognition, and he completed the concept of cognition through existential judgments as the basis for metaphysical realism. Apart from the main object-oriented discipline, i.e. metaphysics, also epistemology and logic were developed.[54]

The program of the School constantly emphasized the need to maintain the autonomy of philosophy: both with regard to the particular sciences and theology as well as in relation to popular philosophical currents such as phenomenology, analytical philosophy, or existentialism (however, it was not supposed to mean the separation or lack of openness of classical philosophy, what is signified by discussions with contemporary currents).

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[52] Maryniarczyk and Krąpiec, "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," 898.

[53] For more see Antoni B. Stępień, "Charakterystyka dorobku naukowego i działalności naukowej księdza profesora Stanisława Kamińskiego," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35, no. 1 (1987): 5-8.

[54] On the achievements in logic see Stanisław Kiczuk, "Logika a filozofia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35, no. 1 (1987): 49-57.

In the practice of philosophy the necessity to know the results of the mathematical and natural sciences was indicated (and elaborating a philosophy of nature independent from them) but also to know the results of theology and contemporary philosophical currents as elements of erudition and inspiration. The ancillary role of philosophy as the most theoretical and general discipline among scholarly domains and its particular and practical character were emphasized. A lot of attention was dedicated to anthropological and ethical issues that from the very beginning remained in the realm of the School's interest. Those interests additionally increased in connection with Wojtyła's contribution to classical ethics and his work aimed at connecting more closely ethical issues with philosophical anthropology and general metaphysics as well as at supplementing the metaphysical method of understanding objectively the human being with a phenomenological description. On the other hand, the history of philosophy developed by Swieżawski ("This positive approach to the history of philosophy forced us to critically evaluate the ahistoricism of phenomenological and existential philosophies"[55]) and strengthened by Kurdziałek was included in the metaphysical inquiries by presenting not simply the history of intellectual trends (ideas) but the history of problems and their solutions, and by elaborating criteria for evaluating them. A significant achievement of the School consisted in inquiries into medieval philosophy, including Polish philosophy (a strong current of Polish medieval philosophical studies emerged),[56] but also into Eastern philosophies (Rev. Tokarz and his disciples: Leon Cyboran, Maciej S. Zięba, and Paweł Sajdek).

The main factors determining the manner of practicing philosophy in the Lublin School are: 1) understanding the existing being as the object of metaphysics; 2) accepting a radicalized concept of cognition in accordance with which acts of existential judgment constitute the most primal cognitive acts (more primal than acts of conceptualization); 3) the return to the natural, integrated language in philosophy (in it the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects are inseparable); 4) the method which consists of the description and determination of facts, historicism, diaporesis in explaining problems, the question: "why?" and in response indication of such an object-related factor which decontradictifies the explained fact; 5) cogni-

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[55]   Swieżawski, "Karol Wojtyła w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim," 15.
[56]   Maryniarczyk and Krąpiec, "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," 904. See Kazimierz Wójcik, "Zarys dziejów historii filozofii na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 17, no. 1 (1969): 171-208.

tive tools, including logic understood as the theory of improving human cognition (in contrast to improving thinking); 6) theory of justification, i.e. indicating the ultimate, objectively verifiable reason of an examined aspect of being.[57]


## Internal discussions as The manifestation of the life and development of the school


Apart from the aforementioned discussions which the Lublin School conducted within Thomism itself and with other philosophical currents, e.g. Marxism, the internal disputes between the founders of the school as well as discussions between the disciples and the masters were its distinct feature. The object of the former was the concept of philosophy practiced at the School, including the particular indicators of its philosophical style. For instance, the status of the philosophy of nature was the object of disputes: is it a part of so-called applied metaphysics (Adamczyk, Mazierski)? or is it an autonomous discipline and a holistic vision of nature? (Kłósak was a proponent of this view). Among the latter one can mention, among others, Majdański's publications which, based on contemporary semiotics, discussed the concept of transcendentals and the existential judgment. A. B. Stępień discussed with Krąpiec on the relation between the theory of being and epistemology, on the specificity of experience at point of departure of philosophical cognition as well as on the existence of purely intentional beings.[58] Gogacz was another polemicist of Krąpiec. He tried to free existential metaphysics from Neo-Platonist, Avicennian, and neo-positivist elements.[59]

The meta-philosophical reflection on philosophy, on its structure as well as on its unity and plurality, generated in the School a dispute on the primacy of particular disciplines and the question of the first philosophy. The unity which general and particular metaphysics form together was

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[57] Maryniarczyk and Krąpiec, "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," 899.

[58] For more on the role of Antoni B. Stępień in the School see Stanisław Judycki, "Antoni B. Stępień: stanowisko filozoficzne i działalność dydaktyczna," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 50 no. 1 (2002): 9-24; Jacek Wojtysiak, "Z meta-krytyki metafilozofii Antoniego B. Stępnia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 50 no. 1 (2002): 517-525.

[59] See Mioduszewski, *Spór o realizm w lubelskiej szkole filozoficznej*, 17.

brought to attention. Swieżawski, Krąpiec, and Kamiński stressed the central position of the theory of being in the edifice of philosophy, even to the extent of equating philosophy with metaphysics (Krąpiec). At the point of departure general metaphysics is based on experience of the being as being (the broadest aspect) or, as a particular metaphysics, on experience of a particularized being (being-cognition, being-human, being-nature, being-morality etc.). Particular metaphysics (of nature and the human being, human actions and creations) are autonomous due to the separate type of data at the point of departure, but in the justification of their assertions they refer to general metaphysics. As Kamiński notes, "Such a position allows for maintaining the unity of the explanation in the entire theory of being without falling into philosophical naturalism [...]."[60]

A. B. Stępień (and others) remained in opposition to that approach. He considered epistemology to be the first philosophy, alongside with metaphysics. He postulated autonomous epistemology which treats human cognition more functionally, i.e. an informer about reality, whereas metaphysics of cognition treats it as a sort of being.[61] Similarly, there were views in the School placing ethics in the position of the first philosophy (Styczeń, Krajewski[62]).

The object of another dispute was the point of departure of philosophical cognition – being or the concept of being. For Krąpiec the point of departure is the being given in commonsensical cognition which constitutes the basis for philosophical cognition.[63] According to Krąpiec, the primal act is the grasp of the existence of a being in a spontaneous, supra-veridical and direct (experience) existential judgment which guarantees the realism of cognition. According to A. B. Stępień, the existential judgment is epistemologically secondary in relation to the primal perception, for [such a judgment] is a theoretically advanced act built upon perceptual data. In the case of the contact with a concrete entity which exists independently and outside of the cognizing subject, it would be an act of external percep-

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[60]   Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2018), 221.

[61]   Mioduszewski, *Spór o realizm w lubelskiej szkole filozoficznej*, 247.

[62]   See e.g., Kazimierz Krajewski, *Etyka jako filozofia pierwsza. Doświadczenie normatywnej mocy prawdy źródłem i podstawą etyki* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2006).

[63]   See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1995), 29.

tion. Stępień agreed that realistic cognition must be grounded on direct cognition, but this directness is not radical and it does not exclude the existence of a transparent medium. In metaphysical experience he stressed reflectivity, directness, evidentness, insightness.[64]

Another example was the famous discussion on Wojtyła's *Osoba i czyn* [The Acting Person] which was published in 1969. Finally nineteen scholars participated in the debate. They came not only from the author's home faculty (among others Krąpiec, Kamiński, Kalinowski, Kłósak, Jaworski, Styczeń, Gogacz, Stępień, Gałkowski, Zdybicka) but also from other centers (Józef Tischner, Andrzej Półtawski). They drew attention, among other things, to the methodology of this work, the concept of experience as the source of philosophical cognition, the concept of consciousness, nature and the person as a moral subject, freedom, the practical significance of anthropology, and other issues.[65]

In the School there was also a dispute on the object of ethics, the content of the norm for morality, and the concept of ethics.[66] The dispute on the concept of ethics developed after Styczeń published his book *Etyka niezależna* [Autonomous Ethics] in 1980 and *ABC etyki* [ABC of Ethics] in 1981. Bogdan Bakies, Bednarski, Bogusław Inlender, and Edward Kaczyński participated in a discussion that was published in *Roczniki Filozoficzne*, no. 2, 1981. Another discussion, on the norm for morality, took place in 1983. Styczeń and Szostek posed arguments in favor of the personalist norm *persona est affirmanda propter se ipsam*, while objections from the perspective of classical ethics (metaphysical – *Bonum est faciendum*) were formulated by Krąpiec and Bednarski (also Wawrzyniak participated in this discussion).[67] Another dispute on the object of ethics took place in 1984 (Szostek and Styczeń *vs.* Krąpiec). Probably the final act of these dis-

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[64] See Antoni B. Stępień, "O doświadczeniu – ponownie," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24, no. 1 (1976): 147.

[65] See *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5-6 (1973-1974): 49-272. See also Kazimierz Krajewski, "Dyskusja wokół książki *Osoba i czyn*. Podstawowe wątki," in *Wokół antropologii Karola Wojtyły*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2016), 143-153.

[66] These ethical discussions are reported in Wojciech Chudy, "Spór w szkole lubelskiej o podstawy i punkt wyjścia etyki," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45, no. 1 (1997): 200-210.

[67] See Tadeusz Biesaga, *Spór o normę moralności* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Papieskiej Akademii Teologicznej, 1998), 254-264. Tadeusz Ślipko also addressed the dispute, and his view was summarized by Antoni B. Stępień, *Wstęp do filozofii* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1985, 2nd edition).

putes on ethics was Herbut's commentary on Styczeń's article "Etyka jako antropologia normatywna" [Ethics as Normative Anthropology].[68]

Constant inquiries were carried out on the methodology of metaphysics, its character as a system, the method of separation, analogy, autonomy. They were undertaken either by metaphysicians (Maryniarczyk, Gondek) or methodologists (Majdański, Herbut, Bronk) and epistemologists (A. B. Stępień, Wojtysiak, A. Gut).

According to A. B. Stępień, one can distinguish six main disputes within the School: 1) the division of philosophical disciplines, including the relation between metaphysics and epistemology; 2) the problem of the point of departure in philosophy and, in particular, the role of experience and existential judgments; 3) the problem of the existence of intentional beings; 4) the application of phenomenological methods in classical philosophy (including anthropology); 5) the application of tools derived from formal logic in the clarification of philosophy; 6) the point of departure and character of ethics (the dispute between the eudemonic-teleological perspective and the dignity-focused approach).[69] These disputes and others, concentrating on the key issues crucial for the School, constituted a distinct feature of its theoretical life and development, but over time they subsided to, as Chudy described it with regret, "philosophers being summoned to address dire national and social needs. These current and ad hoc issues, although culturally important, do not allow philosophy to focus on its internal problems."[70]

## THE HERITAGE OF THE SCHOOL – RESPONDING TO SOCIAL NEEDS

The output of the School consists of, among other things: the program for practicing philosophy (understood as an autonomous, realistic, specialized, universal, rational, theoretical, and wisdom-oriented general metaphys-

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[68]   Styczeń's article with Herbut's critique, see *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45-46, no. 2 (1997-1998): 5-49.

[69]   See Antoni B. Stępień, "Rola księdza profesora Stanisława Kamińskiego (1919-1986) w rozwoju środowiska filozoficznego KUL," in Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne*, vol. 2 (Lublin: TN KUL, 2001), 188-189; Stępień, "Sekcja Filozofii Teoretycznej na Wydziale Filozofii KUL," in *Księga jubileuszowa na 50-lecie Wydziału Filozofii KUL*, 84.

[70]   Chudy, "Spór w szkole lubelskiej o podstawy i punkt wyjścia etyki": 210.

ics as well as particular metaphysics, together with methodology of metaphysics, methodology of particular metaphysics, the history of philosophy comprehended as the history of metaphysical problems, and the development of logical tools for proper cognition); developed conceptions (existential understanding of being, method of separation, existential judgment, analogy, experience, intuition; concept of the human being as a person, Wojtyła's study of the moral act, Kalinowski's logic of normative sentences, realistic concept of culture, "privative-mimetic" concept of art, philosophy of the university, philosophy of lying, didactic concepts and programs etc.). It encompasses numerous conventions, symposia and conferences, congresses (including a world congress), and lectures open to the public in Poland and abroad.[71] The greatest treasure of all are the generations of disciples educated at the School, both at the Faculty of Philosophy and other faculties, for all the students attended courses on the fundamentals of philosophy. An enormous, though immeasurable, achievement was the broad social education which lasted for decades and addressed the tasks which were bestowed upon the university by its founder, Idzi Radziszewski. A high level of teaching as well as the popularization of philosophy and of achievements of the School in society served this purpose. In this way also the openness of the School was revealed which manifested itself from the beginning for instance in annual Philosophical Weeks and occasional lectures provided to various audiences. The tangible effects which shall remain for the future generations are the publications without which nowadays one could hardly imagine the achievements of Polish philosophy. Excellent monographs and series of books were published, and this activity was culminated by an impressive oeuvre, fairly unique in Polish culture, namely the preparation and publication of the ten-volume *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii* [The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy], the first Polish encyclopedia of this type and the fifth in the world.[72] From an organizational and content-related perspective, the encyclopedia was connected with the Lublin School (37% of its authors were philosophers from the Catholic University of Lublin). Additionally, a two-volume *Encyklopedia filozofii polskiej* [The Encyclope-

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[71]    The achievements of the Faculty of Philosophy and of the School are presented in Zofia J. Zdybicka, *Wydział Filozofii KUL w perspektywie pięćdziesięciolecia*, 13-24; Cf. Janeczek, "Ciągłość i rozwój. Osiemdziesiąt lat filozofii na KUL": 145-159.

[72]    It was created between 1998 and 2009 on the initiative of Krąpiec and under the editorial and scholarly supervision of Maryniarczyk. It was published by the Polish Society of Thomas Aquinas situated at the Department of Metaphysics at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.

dia of Polish Philosophy] was published (also the first of this type) which presents a comprehensive picture of Polish philosophy and its development throughout the ages.[73] An expression of the awareness of the School's distinctiveness and peculiarity were jubilee publications as well as the systemic reflection on its heritage in the light of other views and concepts.[74]

## Unity in Diversity

Solutions within the domain of logic, methodology, philosophy of law and politics, ethics and aesthetics, metaphysics and anthropology, philosophy of culture and of nature as well as the philosophy of God and religion testify to the rich heritage of the Lublin School as well as to the dynamism of the Polish scholarly community. The School's input into Polish and world philosophy is visible in four main fields of inquiry: metaphysical and anthropological, historical and cultural, logical and methodological, social and ethical. Creative works of the Lublin Philosophical School as well as its great and rich accomplishments deserve continuous rediscovery, deepening, and development as well as comprehensive study. The diversity of individual styles and concepts is permeated by the unity which distinguishes the Lublin School from other schools. This unity is connected with the analogical understanding of the object philosophically determined and with the unity of the method and purpose of philosophizing consisting in wisdom, i.e. the ability to explain the world of persons and things in the aspect of their necessary and ultimate reasons.

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[73]    It was created between 2010 and 2011 on the initiative and the scholarly supervision of Maryniarczyk.

[74]    See the multi-volume series *Dydaktyka Filozofii* [Didactics of Philosophy] edited by Stanisław Janeczek.

Włodzimierz F. Dłubacz

# The "Survival School" for Philosophy

## Introduction

The subject of the following reflection is the philosophical phenomenon which occurred and was developed at the Catholic University of Lublin during the period when Poland was controlled by a communist dictatorship and the Marxist ideology (philosophy) reigned supreme. This phenomenon bears the name of "the Lublin Philosophical School." It emerged, it would seem, accidentally but on the grounds of a great philosophical tradition – European and Polish – thanks to outstanding philosophers who met at the Catholic University of Lublin and developed a friendly scholarly cooperation, and who were aware of the dangers threatening people and culture as a whole, full of enthusiasm, a sense of responsibility and mission. They took on an enormous task of saving, protecting, and reviving philosophical culture which is most fully expressed in the form of classically comprehended philosophy. Their activities allowed classical philosophy to survive and develop, and then carry it on to free Poland.

When presenting this phenomenon, one should, at least succinctly, refer to the understanding of the term "school of philosophy" as well as to the notion and significance of the tradition and circumstances of the Lublin School's emergence, its founders and disciples, fundamental concepts developed and professed by them, the institutional framework (structure)

and accomplishments. It is well-known that numerous books and articles have been written about the School and that there is an enormous bibliography of works written by its representatives. It seems that nothing can be added to the existing state of research in this field. Yet, the history of this School has not yet finished because the disciples of the masters are still active, dynamically developing their views. The current stage of its development can constitute the topic of a separate study. The present article is more like a draft which only highlights from the author's perspective the pertinent issues.

## The historical and philosophical background for the creation of the Lublin Philosophical School: Schools of philosophy and the classical tradition

Philosophy from its beginning was developed in schools. The very concept of school (Gr. *schole* – time free from practical tasks and physical labor) as an institution, established to pass on knowledge, recognized as important for the human being from an individual and social point of view, appeared in ancient Greece. The transfer of knowledge in school takes place in a specific (organized) manner and is carried out by competent people. In the history of European culture various schools functioned in various fields of human activity. This was also the case with science and philosophy. It is enough to mention the two famous schools, most important for European culture, which existed in ancient Athens. The first one, founded by Plato in the Akademos olive grove, the famous Academy, existed for almost 900 years and was closed by the emperor Justinian in 529 AD. Aristotle, Plato's both most prominent student and adversary (critic), also founded a school, equally famous: the Lyceum. A school, as can be seen on the basis of these examples, is then a center established by a specific person (persons) for the sake of presenting, gaining, passing on, and transferring specific knowledge (world vision) as well as teaching how to acquire it, discuss it, and rationally defend. The founder of a school is simultaneously its master, leader and guide, author of its program, teacher around whom students gather and share his/her views with regard to the object of interest, the purpose and manner (method) of cognizing it. Both

in Plato's Academy and in Aristotle's Lyceum the purpose was to learn the truth about what actually exists, about reality; the purpose was therefore to acquire theoretical and wisdom-oriented knowledge. The founders of both schools are considered to be founding fathers of the classical conception of philosophy (classical philosophy).

The condition for a school to be created is the existence of a founder-master, educating disciples (followers), creating a program (the concept of a domain, purpose of research, method), collaborative search for the truth (a community connected by truth), commonly shared values, a meeting place, institutional framework of conducting research, the continuity of issues investigated that defines the community's identity. The founding of schools is a response to the fact that humans are social beings, and that cooperation is necessary for the pursuit of the truth. Already Aristotle noticed that:

> The study of Truth is in one sense difficult, in another easy. This is shown by the fact that whereas no one person can obtain an adequate grasp of it, we cannot all fail in the attempt; each thinker makes some statement about the natural world, and as an individual contributes little or nothing to the inquiry; but a combination of all conjectures results in something considerable.[1]

Both institutions (schools) provided the foundations for classical philosophy, although they are the reason for two ways of understanding "classicality" – a broad and a narrow one. In a broad sense both traditions together make up the notion of classical philosophy. However, in a narrow sense, only the Aristotelian realist tradition is considered to be the proper understanding of classical philosophy. This dualism finds its expression also in the philosophical community of the Catholic University of Lublin.

Philosophical tradition, in turn, consists in philosophical accomplishments, heritage, achievements passed on throughout the history of philosophy by subsequent thinkers and schools, considered to be valuable, representative and exemplary, deserving recognition and development, socially and philosophically relevant for both present and future. Referring to a tradition also constitutes a factor of its proponents' self-description. This heritage is passed on from generation to generation and concerns the way philosophy, its object, method, and goal are understood as well as its role among oth-

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[1]    Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* book II (993a, 30).

er arts and sciences, and in the entirety of culture. One always draws from a tradition to such an extent as it helps to solve current problems. Philosophical questions addressed to reality have retained timeliness since ancient times. These are predominantly questions about the reason why the world and humans exist and what is the human being's place in the cosmos. Thus, classical philosophical tradition has its beginnings in ancient times.

The tradition of classically understood philosophy consists of such factors as: taking on philosophical problems designated ("imposed") most of all by reality itself – the nature of the world-being and the human being – which causes that they are constantly – and not only incidentally – undertaken, that they have an imperishable value (life importance) and therefore timeless significance for human beings and the culture created by them.

European culture from the very beginning has been closely connected with philosophy, and almost everything of value in it has its Greek, ancient roots. As Stefan Swieżawski noted, "The importance of antiquity is manifested in the process of its perpetual revival …"[2] There is, therefore, a grand, rich tradition of the entirety of European culture. It pertains also to philosophy. A person who is familiar with philosophy has access to the abundance of thought (knowledge) which came to be in the past. It is always worth recalling that philosophy started with Thales from Miletus (and not from Descartes, Kant or Marx) who first posed the question about the principle of everything that exists (the cosmos). The question about the principle (*arche*) was therefore the first philosophical question in European history and at the same time the first scientific question. Its aim was to explain rationally the cosmos and to understand it. This was supposed to be at the same time a natural explanation, referring to experience of the world, that is to the nature (cosmos) surrounding the human being. Thales's question is considered to be the beginning of theoretical, scientific knowledge; it opens up the history of European philosophy.[3] The question about *arche* was at the same time a question about the being, and being is the most general aspect of reality. The two grand systems of antiquity – Plato's and Aristotle's ones – constitute the basis for philosophizing in Europe. Plato, the father of idealism, linked real reality with ideas to which one has access in his/her mind (thinking). Aristotle, on the other hand, is the founder of philosophical realism, pointing to entities as the real being (beings), demonstrating

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[2]    Stefan Swieżawski, *Dzieje europejskiej filozofii klasycznej* (Warszawa – Wrocław: WN PWN, 2000), 4.

[3]    Wojciech Chudy, *Filozofia wieczysta w czas przełomu* (Lublin: TN KUL, 2009), 48.

the pluralism and dynamism of the entirety of reality as well as providing argumentation for the necessity of the existence of a transcendent absolute being as the ultimate reason for that dynamism. His thought, as much as that of Plato, is constantly present in philosophy (and in all of culture), and his philosophical system is considered to be the most complete one ever created by man. The history of philosophy may be comprehended as a great, inextinguishable dispute between Aristotle and Plato, that is – to put it simply – the dispute between realism and idealism.

Drawing attention to the philosophical tradition significant for the Lublin Philosophical School, one should also, apart from antiquity, refer to scholastic philosophy and Saint Thomas Aquinas. Scholasticism is primarily a particular school (mode) of philosophizing which for the first time in history introduced a literary canon and philosophizing methods. It is, therefore, a sort of revolution in the practice of philosophy – in result, philosophy was practiced at all universities according to one literary canon. Moreover, scholasticism introduced an exact and precise method of philosophizing. Its basis was the distinction between the natural and the supernatural (theological) order. Apart from that, scholasticism was inspired by religious and theological knowledge, and the problems occurring within it were investigated with the use of rational instruments.[4] Saint Thomas Aquinas is perceived as the most prominent scholastic philosopher and at the same time a classic with respect to the distinction between philosophy and theology. He presented a holistic system of classical philosophy which explains reality in a maximalistic way. He also introduced a new element to this system: the aspect of existence. This existential aspect, according to many, was Aquinas's main achievement. Thus, a new crucial question appeared in philosophy: why does something (being) exist?

A separate topic is the Polish classical tradition and the history of Polish philosophy which also, in a way, contributed to the founding of the Lublin School. The so-called Polish philosophy essentially emerged during the Romantic period, and its founders and representatives include, among others, Bronisław Trentowski, August Cieszkowski, and Józef Hoene-Wroński. It was also linked to Polish messianism and popularized by the Polish national bards.[5] Philosophy was practiced in Poland since the fourteenth cen-

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[4]    Ibidem, 59-60.
[5]    The Polish Bards (in Polish *wieszcze,* i.e. prophets or soothsayers) are the national poets of Polish Romantic literature: Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, Cyprian Norwid, and Zygmunt Krasiński. Editor's note.

tury at the Cracow Academy and since the sixteenth century at the Vilnius Academy. This, obviously, was a scholastic philosophy. Modern Polish philosophy began precisely in 1895 at the University of Lvov when Kazimierz Twardowski founded the Lvov School, later called the Lvov-Warsaw School. The philosophy of this School was linked to logic and methodology of science as well as to descriptive psychology. In Poland before World War II logic (Alfred Tarski, Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski), methodology of science (Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski), mathematics (Andrzej Mostowski, Stefan Banach), phenomenology (Roman Ingarden) were rapidly developing; so-called Christian philosophy was also flourishing. The works of Polish philosophers of science and logicians were world-renowned at the time. According to some scholars, if not for World War II and the destruction of Polish culture, Polish philosophy could have become a philosophy disseminated throughout Europe and the world. Such a role can be played today by the thought of the Lublin Philosophical School.

So-called Christian philosophy began to develop equally intensively at the Catholic University in Lublin – the institution which in 1918 had been newly founded – as well as in the Cracow and the Warsaw scholarly milieus (Jan Drewnowski, Józef M. Bocheński, Jan Salamucha, Krzysztof Michalski, Stefan Swieżawski, Stanisław Adamczyk, Jan Stepa, and Jacek Woroniecki). Unfortunately, World War II destroyed almost everything in this respect, and in the postwar period there came a time of pacifying philosophy by communist authorities. Nonetheless, despite immense difficulties and obstacles, Thomistic philosophy was still developed: at the Catholic University in Lublin and the Academy of Catholic Theology in Warsaw, and to a certain degree in Cracow. In that period, generally speaking, philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin changed quickly and substantially.[6]

The 20th century in global philosophy is a period of conceptual pluralism. Despite Marxism reigning supreme in Poland, the Lublin Philosophical School emerged at the Catholic University of Lublin, as if in the context of the traditional and Louvain Thomism which dominated there. Over time it took a special place in Polish (and also world) philosophy on account of its maximalism, realism, focus on existence, its systemic and ultimate explana-

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[6]   See Paweł Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej. Mieczysława A. Krąpca i Stanisława Kamińskiego teoria bytu* [The Project of Autonomous Realistic Philosophy. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec's and Stanisław Kamiński's Theory of Being] (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Wydawnictwo KUL, 2015).

tion of reality as well as multiple publications. Altogether it constituted an antidote for Marxist materialism and various forms of idealism.

There is also another, equally popularized, expression to describe classically understood philosophy, used in order to mark its continuity with regard to content and problems, namely perennial philosophy (*philosophia perennis*). It is used most of all by neo-scholastics to describe so-called Christian philosophy, especially Thomism. This name was coined in the 16th century in the times of the Council of Trent. It was used by the theologian Agostino Steuco in the title of his treatise *De perennis philosophiae.* In his view, so-called Christian teaching is in its foundations compatible with ancient philosophy. This name, in turn, was taken over by Leibniz who used it in reference to his thought. Later Karl Jaspers referred to this idea. Nowadays this name is referred to classical philosophy with Greek foundations. Its proponents are convinced that classical philosophy has an uninterrupted continuity and a specific tradition related to what is basic and essential. This view was supported, for instance, by the prominent contemporary historian of philosophy, Étienne Gilson, who in his inquiries points to the unity of the philosophical experience developed throughout history and forming perennial philosophy. Hegel was the first to use the term "classicality" in reference to the Greek tradition which he treated as the source of what is classical.

Classical philosophy in its essence (content) contains problems as well as their solutions which interest and concern every human being. The questions of truth, good, or objectivism have not aged since Plato and Aristotle; according to many, classically understood philosophy is situated in the center of human culture (spirit). Those who point to the fundamental value of truth, good, beauty, dignity, and God in human life refer to the fundamental assertions of classical philosophy. This is expressed in such statements as: "the truth is immutable," "human dignity is inviolable," "the human being is a person." This signifies the constant necessity for classically understood and wisdom-oriented philosophy to be present in human life. Philosophy in such a sense is the love of wisdom, and the love of philosophy is already an expression of wisdom itself.

The history of European philosophy is as-if marked by three historical periods, and not everything which is present in them can be contained within classically understood philosophy or constitutes its continuation. Taking into account that what dominates in a particular period and serves as the main subject of interest (research), one can discern the following "philosophies":

1. From its beginnings up until Descartes one can describe it as object-oriented philosophy.

2. Since Descartes, when the human consciousness and its content became the main object of philosophy, we have been dealing with subject-oriented philosophy.

3. Recently, in the 20th century, philosophy mainly focused on human creations (signs) in the form of language, works of art, or political systems. Classical philosophy is variously understood in literature: broadly and narrowly as well as in historical and systematic aspects. In a broad sense this notion relates to both the object-oriented and subject-oriented versions of philosophy. In a narrow sense it is only a philosophy of an object-oriented kind. So, classicality manifests itself both as a historical and as a systematic category. It has an evaluative-normative significance as an outstanding, exemplary, crowning accomplishment of the human intellect (spirit). Proponents of classical philosophy oppose the breaching of connections to tradition and as-if starting everything over again (see Descartes, Husserl).

Contemporary culture, in which we function, is characterized by a pluralism of knowledge (including philosophical approaches), its specialization and unification as well as underappreciation of tradition and often enough even disregarding it. Proponents of classical philosophy are in turn aware of the enormous and enriching role of a tradition in reference to the entirety of culture, including philosophy itself. A human being bereft of it becomes impoverished and loses one of the important elements controlling his or her reflections.

Classically understood philosophy by definition must be a rational, objective, and autonomous cognition, and it must supply maximal (ultimate) explanations of the object of its inquiry (the being). Such conditions (aims) were designated by the fathers of the classical conception of philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, although they differed with regard to the choice of its object and method. In the Lublin Philosophical School which openly refers to a classical tradition, the expression "classical philosophy" has both a historical and a systematic sense.

Attention is also drawn to the fact that the notion of classical philosophy may refer to its three different aspects concerning: history, content, and problems.[7]

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[7]　Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Czym jest filozofia klasyczna?," in *W kręgu filozofii klasycznej*, ed. Bogdan Dembiński (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2000), 9-23.

Historically, classical philosophy signifies the philosophical systems present in ancient Greece and Rome, up until the liquidation of the Platonic Academy. As far as its content is concerned, it is defined by the real being as the object of cognition, the manner of human cognition, and its purpose. Looking at the third aspect, classical philosophy is based on fundamental questions the human being addresses at reality. These questions manifest themselves as an expression of the amazement with the given structure of being. Among them the most important question is: "why?". The conditions for thus understood classicality of philosophy are: the constant and direct cognitive contact with the real reality and cognition which comprehends and explains that reality. The tradition of classical philosophy maintains the presence and perseverance of philosophical problems, which decides about its continuity and eternal vividness; hence, it is worthy of the aforementioned name of perennial philosophy.

Contemporarily practiced classical philosophy, also from the historical perspective, refers primarily to the Aristotelian tradition and medieval thinkers influenced by it. In the early modern and the contemporary period, broadly understood classical philosophy was developed in various currents. Overall it remained within the peripatetic philosophy, so it is correct to link it with the notion of the classicality of philosophy. Thus (classically) understood philosophy has existed practically incessantly for more than twenty centuries, and it finds its most complete expression on the grounds of Aristotelian philosophy.[8] It is characterized most of all by cognitive intellectualism, realism, autonomy, theism as well as by taking inspirations from Thomas Aquinas. As it was mentioned earlier, it features a certain continuity of the fundamental philosophical subject matter.

As far as the broad and narrow understanding of classical philosophy is concerned, the latter seems to be fundamental and appropriate. It is characterized by an object-oriented approach, i.e. its point of departure is experience of the world. In that tradition the key role is played by the theory of being, that is metaphysics. And all philosophy is divided into general and particular metaphysics. General metaphysics constitutes the basic philosophical discipline. Historically, such a metaphysical form of classical philosophy began with Aristotle and later was developed, in particular, by Thomas

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[8] Stanisław Kamiński, "Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics," in Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2019), 69–304.

Aquinas. In early modern times it was practiced only in peripatetic-scholastic schools where the tradition of perennial philosophy was maintained.

In the Lublin Philosophical School the understanding of philosophy (metaphysics) refers to so-called classical existential philosophy, the object of which is the being considered under the aspect of its existence. Also another term is used for describing it, namely "realistic metaphysics," because it deals with the really existing being. According to the founders of the School's program, the thus understood object of cognition decides about the classicality of that philosophy and serves as the guarantee of its realism. Realism in this case means that the real existence of beings-concrete entities is cognized directly through so-called existential judgments. The frequently used terms "classical philosophy" and "realistic metaphysics" are used interchangeably and are often indeed equated.

Yet another term is used in the Lublin Philosophical School in reference to classical philosophy: "theory of being." Its introduction is connected with the development and deepening of meta-reflection concerning the concept of philosophy itself and it allows one to discern clearly this philosophy from traditional Thomism. According to the representatives of the Lublin School, Saint Thomas Aquinas's understanding of Aristotelian philosophy, its modification, specific development, and supplementation became the basis for the emergence of a new version of Thomistic philosophy, fully corresponding with the views of Aquinas himself, namely, existential Thomism which was initiated in the works of French philosophers Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson. It came to Poland thanks to the philosophical activities of Stefan Swieżawski and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec. In this view the autonomy of philosophy is stressed with regard to the object of inquiry, method employed, aims assumed as well as in relation to other sciences and religion. Those who practice philosophy within that current try to combine tradition with modernity, i.e. the classical approach with modern methodological requirements. Existential Thomism is perceived by many scholars as a contemporary variation of classically understood, wisdom-oriented philosophy.

# The philosophy of the Lublin School:
## its rise, development, and accomplishments

In *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii* [The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy] the Lublin Philosophical School is defined as a mode of practicing realist (classical) philosophy, devised in the 1950s by a group of philosophers from the Catholic University of Lublin and characterized by cognitive realism, maximalism, methodological autonomy, transcendental scope of assertions, methodological and epistemological unity, consistency, and objectiveness. It is further stated that it is a name of a Polish school of realistic (classical) philosophy which emerged as a response to Marxism, imposed administratively on Polish universities and to other philosophical currents which dominated at the time – phenomenology, existentialism or logical positivism. It is additionally mentioned that this term refers in its broadest sense to the entire philosophical community at the Catholic University of Lublin.[9]

It is then commonly accepted that philosophizing initiated in a new form in the early 1950s at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin by Stefan Swieżawski, Jerzy Kalinowski, and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec was given the name "*école philosophique lublinoise,*" probably for the first time, by Kalinowski (since 1957 residing in France) who presented the accomplishments of the philosophers from the Catholic University of Lublin in the journal *Revue philosophique de Louvain.*[10] Since that time the name "The Lublin Philosophical School" has been used to describe the didactic program and the manner of practicing philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin. There are also other opinions on the origin and authorship of that name.

The precursors of the School comprehended philosophy as an autonomous domain of knowledge (scholarly domain), with its own aim, object, and method. The way one understands these elements has a decisive significance, according to its followers, while ascribing philosophers to the

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[9]  Andrzej Maryniarczyk and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna," *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al., vol. 6 (Lublin: PTTA, 2005), 532-550.

[10]  See "W kręgu filozofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego. Z dyskusji o dorobku Wydziału Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej z okazji 60-lecia Uczelni," *Życie i Myśl,* 11 (1978): 30.

school. Over time other names appeared and have been used interchangeably: "the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy," "the Lublin School of Christian Philosophy," "the Lublin School," "the Polish School of Classical Philosophy." The School was founded within the structure of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin which started its activity on the 10th of November 1946.

In the literature on the topic Swieżawski, Kalinowski, and Krąpiec (in this chronological order) are always mentioned as the founders of the School, with Stanisław Kamiński, Marian Kurdziałek, and Karol Wojtyła joining at a later stage. At the same time, Krąpiec was ascribed the predominant role in devising its program.[11]

Keeping in mind the fact that the School was founded in the 1950s, one must remember that World War II was a period of existential and cultural decimation of Europe, and Poland in particular. After the war a great effort to rebuild European civilization was undertaken. An urgent need for realistic cognition in philosophy emerged, especially concerning the human being. Despite the horrible experiences of World War II, the dispute on the human being continued – in general between materialism (Marxism) and personalism (Christianity). In Lublin, at the Catholic University, a new faculty was founded – the Faculty of Philosophy. However, as a result of the repressions from the communist authorities several professors were removed from it, and new ones had to be hired. These new academics, mentioned before, came up with a new form of philosophical studies. Although all of them were strong personalities, they treated philosophy very seriously and were aware of its fundamental importance for people and culture. They shared intellectual resistance against idealism, irrationalism, and materialism as well as the conviction about the central role of metaphysics in philosophy and the fundamental significance of knowledge about the human being (philosophical anthropology). They were proponents of the so-called classical concept of philosophy, its autonomy and special place in human knowledge (scholarly domain). The newly formed philosophical

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[11] Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Rola Mieczysława A. Krąpca w Lubelskiej Szkole Filozoficznej," in *Prawda istnienia. Ku rozumieniu metafizyki M.A. Krąpca OP*, ed. Jerzy Tupikowski (Warszawa: Palabra, 2009), 43-61; Stanisław Janeczek, "M.A. Krąpiec OP – twórca Lubelskiej Szkoły Filozofii Klasycznej," in *Prawda istnienia*, 29-49; Zofia J. Zdybicka, "O. Prof. Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec OP (25 V 1921 – 8 V 2008). 'Człowiek i filozof,'" in *Prawda istnienia*, 7-14.

community was supposed to play and did play indeed a significant role in the ongoing battle for truth.

Thus, many different factors contributed to the emergence of what was later called the Lublin Philosophical School. Among them one can mention the administratively imposed Marxism, the ideologization of the entire Polish culture, the need to modernize scholastic philosophy dominant in Catholic schools, the defense of "philosophical reason," sovereignty of culture, and demonstrating the truth about the human being in philosophy. Referring to the existing reality, its rational cognition and explanation was supposed to resist Marxism and idealist philosophy in its various forms. An enormous effort was made to reconstruct and modernize realistic classical philosophy, considered valuable for the ultimate understanding of the world in its necessary and transcendent aspects. These are those aspects of reality which the natural and mathematical sciences do not deal with, due to their specificity. So, not accidentally, the School turned to the great and abundant tradition perceived as a historical-philosophical experience, to the greatest philosophers of all time, in order to rethink the fundamental problems and their solutions anew, and yet taking into consideration contemporary achievements of logic and methodology of science.[12] There arouse an urgent need to prepare and publish numerous textbooks and monographs written from the perspective of the new vision of philosophy. This need was addressed successfully. Those publications contained a critique of the apparent realism of Marxism but also of anti-metaphysical and minimalistic philosophy as well as of essentializing neo-scholasticism. A complete program of philosophical studies was proposed – in their historical and systematic aspects – which made it possible for students to gain broad and in-depth knowledge. The results of the inquiries made in the School were confronted with the current state of philosophical knowledge (contemporary philosophical currents). Particular emphasis was placed on the knowledge of history of philosophy and methodology of philosophy.[13] General metaphysics was acknowledged, in a justified manner, as the fundamental domain of philosophy. The innovative interpretation of the theory and methodology of metaphysics which was the result of Krąpiec's and Kamiński's cooperation provided the theoretical basis for the subsequent

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[12]    Zofia J. Zdybicka, "O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę oczłowieku – polska szkoła filozofii klasycznej," *Summarium* 9 (1980): 110.

[13]    Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "O filozoficznej szkole lubelskiej," in Krąpiec, *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1998), 249.

development of the unique character of the School.[14] Understanding the history of philosophy as a useful domain in philosophizing (primarily as the history of metaphysics), presented in Swieżawski's interpretation inspired by Maritain and Gilson, also contributed to the formation of a consistent program of the Lublin School.[15]

Logic and methodology of science (as well as the history of philosophy and epistemology) were treated, in an Aristotelian spirit, as most of all an *organon* for improving philosophical cognition. From such a "metaphysically" comprehended philosophy, along with the development of philosophical cognition in the Lublin School, new particular kinds of particular metaphysics emerged: theory of cognition, philosophy of religion, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of morality, philosophy of law, philosophy of culture, philosophy of art, and others. Krąpiec, who quickly became the leader of the School, started to develop them, shaping over time (as the only one) an entire philosophical system. He also trained his disciples who in cooperation with him took on further and more specific research tasks. They did not break ties with the classical tradition, and they did not succumb to pressure of fashionable philosophical trends.

That what is unique and distinct in the philosophy of the founders and proponents of the School is the existential concept of being.[16] Attention was drawn to the act of the being's existence which is the most important and most perfect factor in the being (concrete entity), which requires affirmation and – as a fundamental fact – becomes the first object of philosophical explanation. This fact also designates the goal of practicing philosophy, that is cognizing and explaining the existing being (the real reality). This is done by indicating the necessary and ultimate reasons explaining the existence of being. Acceptance of the existential concept of being, which is the object of philosophizing, as the formal (proper) object of philosophy gave unity to philosophical inquiries because it integrated various disciplines by the task explaining reality.

Inquiries in the realm of the methodology of philosophy focused on the specificity of metaphysical cognition: on the usage of analogical language,

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[14]  Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1962).

[15]  Stefan Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii* (Warszawa: PWN, 1966).

[16]  Communication of Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "W kręgu filozofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego. Z dyskusji o dorobku Wydziału Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej z okazji 60-lecia Uczelni," *Życie i Myśl*, 11 (1978): 24-26.

and the peculiar procedures of explanation, argumentation, and justification specific for this domain. Various forms of judgmental cognition as the basic sort of realistic cognition in philosophy were developed. All this together demonstrated the specificity of philosophical cognition as substantially different from the cognition which occurs in the particular sciences and theology. This also allowed scholars to distinguish this mode of practicing philosophy from among all others: be it phenomenology, existentialism, analytical philosophy, or even neo-scholasticism. The goal was not to separate themselves from these currents and achievements but to discover their own specificity and possibilities as well as conditions for discussions. This also allowed the School's members to make conscious use of their achievements, enriching one's own investigations.

## The heritage and history of the school

The heritage of the School is the entirety of its achievements (created works) of various characters: programmatic, institutional, conceptual, taken both in quantitative and qualitative aspects. One can look broadly upon the accomplishments of the Lublin School, as most of all the founding and organizing a center of philosophical inquiries, educating disciples, publishing numerous works, conducting conferences, disseminating their views in Poland and abroad, the influence on culture, worldview, etc. The heritage of the School and its contribution to Polish and world philosophy are well known and significant. Content-wise it consists in accepting the object-oriented (realistic) mode of philosophizing which takes into account a tradition (history), in admitting philosophy's methodological autonomy and research methods connected with it, most of all the method of decontradictifying investigated facts as well as in providing the rational foundations for shaping one's worldview. Among the School's accomplishments one should count also creating several research units, first of all the Division of Metaphysics and a number of departments at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin as well as scholarly achievements of its members manifested in a great number of publications, symposia and conferences, translations of classical authors in Polish and of Polish works into foreign languages. The crowning of the efforts of the School so far is undoubtedly its grand oeuvre in the form of the *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

The creation and development of the Lublin Philosophical School allowed independent thought to survive at the Catholic University of Lublin during the communist reign. It was, as is signified in the title of this article, a one-of-a-kind "survival school" for philosophy, protecting the right of the human being to cognize freely and think – the right to the truth.

Investigations of the School discovered that the character of metaphysics depends entirely on the assumed and developed concept of being which constitutes its object. The initial and basic question of metaphysics is the question about the being. The realist concept of the being understood as something existing was, according to many proponents of the School, developed already by Saint Thomas Aquinas who also indicated the proper method of reaching it called "separation." So, a "return" to the renewed interpretation of Aquinas's thought, based on the sources, was postulated. It was discovered and accepted that cognitive realism is based on direct cognition by way of existential judgments. Only such cognition can be the guarantee of realism and objectivism of all of philosophy.[17] It was noted that the assumed (most often *a priori*) concept of being as the object of philosophy explains dilemmas occurring in various philosophical systems. Classical philosophy in its realistic version, which the School has attempted to develop, is a cognition of really existing beings (objects and persons), and not a speculation on the concept of the being. The elaboration and the acceptance of the existential concept of being and a new method of its cognition (separation) made it necessary to reconstruct all of philosophy (metaphysics). A number of particular problems were also discussed, among them especially: the theory of judgmental cognition (existential judgments), theory of the analogy of being, theory of the transcendentals as well as the theory of ontic compositions and causes of being. Epistemology was treated differently: as a particular metaphysics because in the light of the new concept of being, cognition is also a being. Seen from such a perspective, a number of epistemological concepts lost their significance. Also the theory of language used in metaphysics was developed, paying attention to its analogical and transcendentalizing character. A new method of metaphysical cognition was devised in the School. An idea of that method has its beginnings in the thought of Aristotle and Aquinas, and the method consists in searching for the reasons which decontradictify analyzed facts (beings);

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[17]   Włodzimierz F. Dłubacz, "Realizm filozoficzny ojca M.A. Krąpca w duchu św. Tomasza z Akwinu," in *O realizm w filozofii*, ed. Wojciech Daszkiewicz (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu 2018), 23-60.

this method can be applied in all domains of philosophy. It allows pointing to such factors (causes), thanks to which beings exist. In spite of numerous philosophical disciplines comprising metaphysics (particular metaphysics), philosophy constitutes a peculiar unity because it has one analogically understood object of inquiry, namely the analogically and transcendentally comprehended being which is ultimately explained in metaphysics. The role of metaphysics (metaphysicality) in this philosophy is fundamental because within it one apprehends transcendental qualities, deciphers the laws of the being and its causes, and finally discovers the necessity of the existence of the personal Absolute Being as the sole ultimate reason for everything that exists. Metaphysics as a theory of being encompasses all disciplines of such a philosophy, and it exhausts the topic of classical philosophy. Particular metaphysics differ among themselves by diverse points of departure (objects of inquiry), but not the manner of comprehending them which is analogically one for all of philosophy.[18]

The Lublin School drew particular attention to the knowledge of the history of philosophy, especially concerning metaphysics, as indispensable for appropriate and reliable philosophizing. Thanks to this knowledge one can avoid many repetitions and cognitive fallacies. Reading source literature was of primary importance – especially works of such classics of realistic philosophy as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas (with the omission of commentaries).

Generally speaking, the seminal accomplishment of the Lublin Philosophical School is primarily providing the contemporary human being with philosophical, rational tools for realistic interpretation of the world and human being and showing the foundations of the rationality of human cognition and action.

The newly created philosophical community developed quickly. Within the School four Divisions functioned: Division of Metaphysics, Division of History of Philosophy, Division of Ethics, and Division of Logic and Epistemology. They took on the task of developing and deepening the accepted program. The dominant role was played by the Division of Metaphysics headed by Krąpiec. He quickly became the leader of the School and the main animator of the new conducted research.

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[18] Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2018), 217-218.

Within the Division of Metaphysics (founded in 1956) the following Departments were (gradually) established: Department of General Metaphysics (headed by Krąpiec, and after 1997 by Andrzej Maryniarczyk) and Department of Particular Metaphysics (headed by Stanisław Adamczyk), Department of Particular Metaphysics I (1969), renamed in 1970 as Department of Epistemology and included into the Division of Logic and Epistemology, Department of Philosophy of Religion (since 1973 headed by Zofia J. Zdybicka, and from 2002 by Piotr Moskal); Department of Philosophy of Culture (since 1991 headed by Piotr Jaroszyński); Department of Philosophy of Art (since 1996 headed by Henryk Kiereś), Department of Philosophy of God (since 2004 headed by Włodzimierz Dłubacz).

The development of the Lublin School occurred together with the expansion of the research subject matter and, what follows, with the founding of new departments and engaging new people (disciples). There are several stages of the School's development distinguished in the literature on the topic: the first one is the creation of the program and gathering a group of scholars who wanted to implement it. It is assumed that this took place in the years 1950–1966. This was the time when the school gradually took shape. Its founders were: Swieżawski (historian of philosophy), Kalinowski (legal scholar), Krąpiec (metaphysician), Kamiński (methodologist), Marian Kurdziałek (historian of philosophy), and Karol Wojtyła (ethicist). The first period of the School's activity is characterized by the cooperation between the departments and by the care for the development of particular metaphysics. The publications of the founders and first disciples reveal the discussed topics and the input of particular scholars in development of the school (among others by: Swieżawski, Krąpiec, Kamiński, Wojtyła, Zofia J. Zdybicka, Stanisław Kowalczyk, Władysław Stróżewski, Antoni B. Stępień).

The second period of the School's development covers the years 1967–1980, when new disciples join their masters; it is a continuation of the program defined by its founders. Gradually the scope of inquiries was broadened, the discussed issues were clarified and explored, new departments were created. In this way also the entire system of realistic philosophy was construed. New disciples become involved in the works of the school (Bohdan Bejze, Tadeusz Styczeń, Edmund Morawiec, Elżbieta Wolicka-Wolszleger, Jerzy Gałkowski, Tadeusz Żeleźnik, Stanisław Wielgus, Edward I. Zieliński, Andrzej Wawrzyniak, Józef Herbut, Andrzej Bronk, Andrzej Szostek, Stanisław Kiczuk). Among the new fields of philosophical inquiry delineated at the time were, among others, metaphysics of the human being and philosophy of law. Methodological research was constantly

conducted, especially with regard to general metaphysics and particular metaphysics, such as philosophy of the human being, philosophy of morality, philosophy of God and religion. Over time inquiries in the field of epistemology lead to the emergence of a new concept of it (Antoni B. Stępień) as an autonomous discipline. In this period investigations on the theory of participation and religion were carried out (Zofia J. Zdybicka), and as a result of that a realistic (classical) concept of philosophy of religion was developed.

The third period of the School's functioning is designated by the years 1981–2004 and subsequent ones, during which many changes occurred, among others, on an institutional and personal level. In that period, apart from the continuation of the hitherto described program and research on new topics, a tendency arose to engage some of the staff to investigate contemporary philosophical currents for the sake of their development. This lead to the departure from the accepted program of the School and specific promotion of other concepts of philosophy, such as, e.g. philosophy of mind, cognitive science, analytical philosophy (among others, works of Stanisław Judycki, Urszula Żegleń, Tadeusz Szubka, or Paweł Kawalec belong to that stream).

In that period new generations of disciples joined the group of metaphysicians. Among them there were: Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Henryk Kiereś, Piotr Jaroszyński, Krzysztof Wroczyński, Piotr Moskal, Włodzimierz Dłubacz, Ignacy Dec, Jan Sochoń, Hugh Mc Donald, Paweł Gondek, Katarzyna Stępień, Bogdan Czupryn, Zbigniew Pańpuch, Arkadiusz Gudaniec, Paweł Tarasiewicz, Paweł Skrzydlewski, Imelda Chłodna, Tomasz Duma. Essentially, in their inquiries they continue the program of the School, but they also attempt to popularize its accomplishments. After Krąpiec retired, the position of the head of the Department of Metaphysics was taken by Maryniarczyk who became a new leader of the school, attracting philosophers-metaphysicians.

The remaining departments are also developing and hire their best graduates. At the Department of Ethics the following scholars are active, among others: Barbara Chyrowicz, Marek Czachorowski, Alfred Wierzbicki, Kazimierz Krajewski, Jacek Frydrych, Jan Kłos, and Małgorzata Borkowska. Inquiries initiated by Karol Wojtyła and expanded by Tadeusz Styczeń, referring, among others, to the question of human dignity and the inviolability of human life, are here continued.

At the Department of the History of Philosophy, the following people were employed: Marian Ciszewski, Agnieszka Kijewska, Stanisław Jane-

czek, Joanna Judycka, Piotr Gutowski, Przemysław Gut, Paweł Sajdek; other Departments (Logic, Epistemology, General Methodology of Sciences) employed the following scholars: Stanisław Judycki, Jacek Wojtysiak, Arkadiusz Gut, Paweł Kawalec, Monika Walczak, Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Robert Kublikowski, Piotr Kulicki, Paweł Garbacz, Bożena Czernecka-Rej, and Agnieszka Salamucha.

After 2004, when the divisions were liquidated, the School became limited to the metaphysical group and the departments which were earlier included in the Division of Metaphysics. At the time there emerged ideas to distinguish, instead of one, several schools at the Faculty of Philosophy, such as the Lublin School of Methodology, the Lublin School of History of Philosophy, or the Lublin School of the Philosophy of Nature.

Over the years the efforts of the particular Divisions and Departments bore fruit in the form of a great number of conferences, symposiums and scholarly assemblies at a national, international, and global level. At this point it is worth mentioning the 5th World Congress of Christian Philosophy organized at the Catholic University of Lublin in 1996 which gathered four hundred renowned philosophers from forty countries from all over the world.

During the five decades of the School's activities thousands of dissertations, books, articles as well as translations of the classical and other renowned philosophers were published. As an example one can mention the publication of the trilingual (Greek-Latin-Polish) edition of Aristotle's fundamental work *Metaphysics* (vol. I-II, Lublin 1996) prepared by the scholars from the Department of Metaphysics (Krąpiec and Maryniarczyk); publishing the series *Zadania Współczesnej Metafizyki* [Tasks of Contemporary Metaphysics] and the series *Przyszłość Cywilizacji Zachodu* [The Future of Western Civilization] (the latter by the Department of the Philosophy of Culture).

 *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii* [The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy] is in turn the result of an international cooperation of philosophers. It presents the philosophical heritage of the Lublin School (the entire community) and the philosophy of many nations, with particular emphasis on the heritage of classical philosophy which forms the basis of European cultural identity.

## CONCLUSION

The Lublin Philosophical School intentionally refers to the classical tradition, taking on timeless problems. As far as its program was concerned, the main founder of the School was Krąpiec who comprehended philosophy as metaphysics, as the theory of being. What distinguishes the Lublin School in a formal aspect is the acceptance of the autonomy of philosophy, cognitive realism, the theoretical purpose of philosophizing, search for the ultimate and irrefutable explanation, methodological realism, and epistemological maximalism as well as historicism. Concerning its content, the School assumes ontological pluralism (hylomorphism), substantialism (the primacy of the subject mode of being), dynamism (theory of act and potency), and theism (ultimate explanation through the Absolute personal being).

Historically, the Lublin Philosophical School is the effect of the convergence of two traditions: the ancient, classical, object-oriented, realist philosophy and the contemporary, logical-methodological philosophy (Lvov-Warsaw School). A model of studying philosophy and philosophizing based on the knowledge of tradition (source historical knowledge) and erudition as well as on logical and methodological culture was developed. In particular, two concepts of prewar Thomism were continued: conducting medieval studies and applying logical and methodological instruments (Cracow Circle). A new form of existential Thomism was developed within the School (mainly the theory of being and theory of the human being), an original theory of philosophy (meta-philosophy) as well as a certain variation of personalism based on the cooperation between existential Thomism and phenomenology (philosophy of the subject). An original, realist concept of being devised by Saint Thomas Aquinas was further developed. History of philosophy was treated as a realm of philosophical experience, a critical discussion with contemporary philosophy was undertaken, yet emphasis was placed on working out a positive program of building from its foundations a realistic philosophy of being (metaphysics) which differed from its traditional interpretations. The School accepted an original concept of cognizing existence (the concept of existential judgments). The theory of analogy of being elaborated in the School distinguished in particular the transcendental analogy of being. Philosophy and science were clearly distinguished, and the "scientific" (scholarly, rational) character of philosophy was indicated, in this way opposing positivism, Marxism, the reductive concept of scientific knowledge, and existentialism (irrationalism). Metaphysics was treated

as the essential manifestation of classical philosophy. The concept of so-called Christian philosophy was abandoned, but the cognitive ideals present in Aristotelianism, Thomism, and neo-scholasticism were maintained. The validity of ulktimate explanation was demonstrated, pointing to necessary ontic states as their basis. Metaphysics as the theory of the really existing being and ontology as the theory of the possible being were distinguished. An effective defense of philosophical realism, empiricism, rationalism, and intellectualism as well as the absolute character of moral norms was undertaken.[19] Among many outstanding creators and contributors of the School, on account of their theoretical and doctrinal accomplishments one should particularly recognize: Krąpiec as the main author of the School's program, Kamiński as the School's methodologist, and Zofia J. Zdybicka. Currently the philosophical achievements of Maryniarczyk and Jaroszyński deserve special recognition. The Lublin Philosophical School turned out to be the only philosophical community which did not succumb to fashionable trends because it knew history and methodology. It has, therefore, a chance to preserve and to transmit knowledge and cognitive skills to subsequent generations of philosophers. Contemporary Polish culture owes to the Lublin School the survival of classical philosophy in a "sea of idealisms," during the reign of anti-metaphysical stances and views,. It does not succumb to fashionable intellectual trends, it is faithful in its cognition to existing reality, supporting in this way the human being and the culture created by him/her (worldview, social life). According to many, it is more needed now than in times past when philosophy was administratively liquidated, for today there are similar threats aimed at freedom and truth.

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[19]    Janeczek, "M. A. Krąpiec OP," 31-35.

Paweł Gondek

# *Sapientis Est Ordinare*: On the Metaphysical and Methodological Phenomenon of the Lublin Philosophical School

The development of philosophical inquiries on reality is connected not only with great names but also with great schools. Antoni B. Stępień in his textbook *Wstęp do filozofii* [Introduction to Philosophy], which for years has been a guidebook introducing future adepts into the field of philosophy, indicated that "philosophy is developed mainly in schools."[1] This symptomatic statement remains valid, regardless of the many paths which the development of contemporary philosophy takes. It is not only about the place and time in which something was created, but most of all about the personality and the doctrine of the masters. The Lublin Philosophical School basically links these two factors. It was established in a specific place and time and it was built upon the personality and the doctrine of its masters. Even the most ingenious philosophical phenomena do not occur in an intellectual vacuum, and philosophical schools are the best examples of that. Their development is conditioned by the place, the time, and established masters. These factors make up the fact that philosophical doctrines which grew out on the basis of something or in opposition to something, in a particular place and time assume a specific form of a school. The Lublin Philosophical School was shaped in such a way in the mid-20th century – as a unique phenomenon in Poland, also gaining recognition in international milieus.

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[1] Antoni B. Stępień, *Wstęp do filozofii* [Introduction to Philosophy](Lublin: TN KUL, 2001), 245.

In this article we shall mainly focus on those currents and concepts which had a significant influence on the shaping of the philosophical program and academic function of the Lublin School. The discussions which have taken place within the School demonstrate that it was a community of scholars with varied academic backgrounds who were able to work out together a uniform style of philosophizing, characterized by cognitive maximalism and by autonomy in relation to other scholarly disciplines. That is why individual inspirations of the particular scholars within the School are not without significance, just as is their path to synthetically formulating what is described as realistic philosophy or the theory of being.[2] This methodological ground seems to have essential significance not only for the description of the School but also for the classification of its members. Identifying the Lublin Philosophical School with the Faculty of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin is not adequate either from the point of view of history or that of methodology. What undoubtedly connects the two is the fact that the School was created at the Catholic University of Lublin, and a number of the members of the Faculty of Philosophy therein were engaged in its development. However, one also has to take into consideration the fact that scholars identifying with the School are likewise from other academic centers.

While concentrating on the philosophical inspirations of the founders of the School, we shall try to indicate that what bound them together was a particular method of philosophizing. This method was consolidated thanks to two things: the realistic interpretation of philosophy classically understood (which has a metaphysical character) and working out methodological means of arranging it, which to a certain degree refers to the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Pointing to the eponymous wisdom-oriented arrangement relates to combining into one these two seemingly opposing philosophical tendencies, but it also has a systemic reference, showing the method of formulating a holistic image of the world on the canvas of the object of research which constitutes the foundation of philosophical wisdom-oriented cognition. On account of this the search for the philosophical and conceptual inspirations of the methodological profile of the School shall predominantly refer to the points where these two research tendencies meet. Due to the scholarly and research assumptions of the School,

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[2]   See Paweł Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej. Mieczysława A. Krąpca i Stanisława Kamińskiego teoria bytu* (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Wydawnictwo KUL, 2015), 73-84.

one must make the most important distinction not so much in the strictly historical context, as the substantial one, assuming as its unifying criterion the manner of developing metaphysics.


## 1. Metaphysical Inspirations


Presenting the philosophical and conceptual inspirations of the founders of the Lublin Philosophical School might seem to be an easy and uncomplicated task. The main ideational reference is indeed the scholastic tradition which with varying intensity occurred as a dominant trend at Catholic universities. For this reason the concept of philosophy elaborated within the School is most often classified as Thomism. With time it became supplemented by a factor which made that approach – defined as existential Thomism – distinct. Such a term points to the fundamental interpretational moment of this philosophy, which is placing emphasis on the act of existence within the proposed concept of being as the fundamental ontic factor that constitutes the foundation for the rational explanation of reality. Such a manner of describing philosophy, which refers to Thomas Aquinas's concept, was initiated at the beginning of the twentieth century by Jacques Maritain, and it was developed especially by Étienne Gilson. Thus, from the Thomistic philosophy commonly practiced at Catholic institutions of higher education a completely new current has emerged.

Initially one must point to the fact which, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, became the program base of the functioning of Thomas Aquinas's concept of philosophy and theology as a leading current in Catholic scholarly institutions. The current was institutionally initiated by Pope Leo XIII in the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* from 1879. It indicated the necessity to go beyond strict commenting the works of Aquinas himself and to update this philosophy.[3] This fact not only led to strengthening the position of Thomism within the Catholic Church but most of all to its development and, what follows, to searching for new interpretations which were eventually described as Neo-Thomism. The tendency at the beginning of the twentieth century to modernize the thought of Thomas Aquinas mainly as-

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[3]    See Leo XIII, Encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, 30.

sumed the form of combining it with other currents that functioned in the philosophical and scientific discourse of the time.[4] These inquiries aimed at showing Thomism as a still timely current, capable of taking on problems as well as formulating research tools in accordance with the philosophical tendencies dominant at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Already at that time Thomistic currents which tried to combine Aquinas's philosophy with Cartesianism, Kantianism, or phenomenology were gaining popularity. Two concepts spring out to the forefront in this respect: Louvain Thomism and Transcendental Thomism.

Louvain Thomism, which developed under the auspices of Désiré J. Mercier in the second half of the nineteenth century at the University of Louvain, was based on the conviction that the return to Thomistic thought required confronting it with contemporary philosophical currents (especially positivism and Neo-Kantianism), with the natural sciences, and with the social thought of the time. This sort of philosophizing was considered a necessary factor in the development of Thomistic thought. The Louvain Thomists treated the natural-physical sciences in a special way, believing that in philosophical reflection one had to include the research results obtained by various sciences. Louvain Thomists emphasized that the particular sciences together with philosophy enable an adequate understanding of reality. Yet, Thomistic thought does not aim at simple synthesis of the results of various sciences, but it pursues philosophical solutions as if in their context; therefore, it is an inductive (*a posteriori*) sort of metaphysics.[5] Within that stance inspirations were also sought for in Cartesianism and phenomenology. They were found their place in the solutions proposed by Léon Noël who postulated Thomistic methodical doubt, trying to analyze it on the basis of Aristotle's aporia method and scholastic form of *dubitatio*.[6] This provoked many discussions in which Louvain Thomism was accused of not having a philosophical method of inquiry as well as positioning at

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[4]    See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Współczesne kierunki epistemologiczne w tomizmie (przegląd stanowisk)," in Krąpiec, *Poznawać czy myśleć. Problemy epistemologii tomistycznej* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1994), 9-229.

[5]    See Zdzisław Pawlak, "Tomizm lowański," in s.v. *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 9, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: PTTA, 2008), 510.

[6]    This was a reaction to Maritain's position and indication that it is impossible to accept at the point of departure the cognitive act of the intuition of the existence of being. See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Realizm poznawczy É. Gilsona," in Krąpiec, *Poznawać czy myśleć*, 213-214.

the point of departure the act of consciousness which in turn undermined the position of autonomy and realism fundamental for Thomism.

Transcendental Thomism aimed at synthesizing Aquinas's philosophy mainly with Neo-Kantianism. Transcendental Thomists looked for common points connecting both philosophies, and hence there emerged an an aim at understanding being accompanied by the search for critical conditions for the cognition of the being itself. The fundamental point for Transcendental Thomism was the stress put on cognition and grasp of being that are essentially apperceptive and rooted essentially in human self-awareness. In this context Transcendental Thomism understands being as a non-contradictory concept without content which constitutes the a priori condition for cognizing reality.[7] The unitary apprehension of being is attained on the canvas of the human being's a priori intellectual cognitive conditions which are the reason for that being's cognoscibility. Consequently, such a view of the being and the apperceptive conditions of its cognition requires on the grounds of Transcendental Thomism the acceptance of a dualistic concept of human nature and emphasizing the function of apperceptive cognition. The human being in apperceptive acts is capable of cognizing being, and this sort of self-aware human cognition encompasses the entirety of being, including God.

These sorts of solutions became the cause of the growth of the essentializing current within Thomism which is not compatible with the spirit of Thomas Aquinas's philosophy. A reaction to that was the emergence of currents in the first half of the twentieth century which opposed such an approach. The position of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange is worth noting. He referred to the traditional manner of practicing philosophy, presenting the simple grasp of the being as a primal cognitive act.[8] The being so apprehended functions in reality as a concrete being, but the indicators of its concreteness are cognized in secondary reflections on cognitive acts. The traditional direction of inquiry in Neo-Thomism assumed thus the form of a search for possible new solutions, to a large extent in the writings

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[7]   See Karl Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, *Theological Dictionary*, ed. Cornelius Ernst OP, trans. Richard Strachan (London: Burns & Oates; New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), 46.

[8]   See Krąpiec, "Współczesne kierunki epistemologiczne w tomizmie," 119-124; Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, "Notre premier jugement d'existence selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," in *Studia mediaevalia: in honorem admodum Reverendi Patris Raymundi Josephi Martin, Ordinis Praedicatorum s.theologiae magistri LXXUM natalem diem agentis* (Brugis Flandrorum: De Tempel, 1948), 289-302.

of Aquinas himself. The scholarly approach resulting from the coherence of this system inclined one rather to reject any idealizing solutions and to strive towards consistent realism. This sort of philosophizing was described as Existential Thomism. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, while mentioning the main followers of that conception, i.e. J. Maritain, É. Gilson, E. L. Mascall, or R. Garrigou-Lagrange, emphasized the mutual independence of their solutions and the elaboration of their own interpretational tools in reference to Aquinas's doctrine.[9]

It is not surprising that there were raised some objections against the name "existential Thomism" because of its similarity to existentialism, vividly developing at that time. Its domination in the mid-20th century not only as a philosophical current, but also a literary one, was a pancultural social movement. On account of this, philosophical elements of existentialism took on the shape of non-systemic deliberations, and in many of its variations they were of an atheistic character. Therefore associating existentialism with Thomism may have been fairly surprising. Even the collection of lectures from the week of inquiries at Aquinas's Academy from 1947, which was supposed to be an inspiration and the first organized debate on such a concept of Thomism, included many texts referring specifically to existentialism (Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, or Gabriel Marcel).[10] Yet, already in this collection we can find texts of authors who consciously refer not so much to existentialism as to existential Thomism, concentrating on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas himself and pointing to the problem of existence in being. One should certainly include in this group the texts by J. Maritain and É. Gilson.[11] At that time Existential Thomism was only being formulated, and it was not yet established, even within the current of broadly understood Thomistic philosophy. And yet, what the aforementioned thinkers had in common was the preservation of the autonomous

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[9]  Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Egzystencjalizm tomistyczny," *Znak* 6, no. 2 (28) (1951): 108.

[10]  See *Esistenzialismo: atti della settimana di studio indetta dall'Accademia di S. Tommaso, 8-13 Aprile 1947* [Acta Pontificia Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aquinatis], (Torino: Casa Editrice Marietti, 1947).

[11]  See Jacques Maritain, "L'existentialisme de saint Thomas," in *Esistenzialismo: atti della settimana di studio indetta dall'Accademia di S. Tommaso, 8-13 Aprile 1947,"* 40-64; Étienne Gilson, "La conoscenza dell'essere," in *Esistenzialismo: atti della settimana di studio indetta dall'Accademia di S. Tommaso, 8-13 Aprile 1947,"* 103-114. See also J. Caussimon, *"L'intuition métaphysique de l'existence chez Saint-Thomas et dans l'existentialisme contemporain", Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 55, no. 4 (1950): 392-407.

character of Thomistic philosophy and the negative attitude towards essentializing interpretations which appeared during the revival of studies on Thomas Aquinas's philosophy.

Existential Thomism on the one hand assumed a deeply traditional form because it developed out of the inquiries focused on the texts of Aquinas himself, searching in them for methods to contemporize philosophizing. On the other hand, it engaged in discussion with philosophical currents which dominated in the twentieth century. This tendency primarily manifested itself in the works of J. Maritain: *Sept leçons de l'être* (1934) and *Court traité de l'existence et de l'existant* (1947)[12] as well as of É. Gilson: *Le réalisme méthodique* (1935) and in his article continuing the discussion on these issues *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaisance* (1939).[13] The problematics of Existential Thomism in the context of historical and philosophical deliberations Gilson presented most profoundly in *L'Être et l'essence* (1948).[14] In this work he presented the crucial problems of the existential concept of being, emphasizing the act of existence as the fundamental systemic moment. On this basis he took up extensive discussion with an array of philosophical currents, both historical ones and contemporary for him. Gilson's innovative approach basically stemmed out of the renewed scholastic tradition, as there tell his other works from that period.[15] And although we do not yet find in them an in-depth systemic reflection on the existential theory of being, we can basically point to Gilson as to the philosopher who to the largest degree introduced to Thomism an existential interpretation of metaphysical issues. The emphasis and the attempt to justify realism in the program of building philosophy on the canvas of the existential concept of being became the hallmark of this interpretation.

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[12] See Jacques Maritain, *Sept leçons de l'être et les premiers principes de la raison speculative* (Paris: Pierre Téqui, 1934); Jacques Maritain, *Court traité de l'existence et de l'existant* (Paris: Flammarion, 1947).

[13] See Étienne Gilson, *Le réalisme méthodique* (Paris: Pierre Téqui, 1935); Étienne Gilson, *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaisance* (Paris: Vrin, 1939); Both these works were published in Poland as one book, see Étienne Gilson, *Realizm tomistyczny* (Warszawa: IW PAX 1968).

[14] See Étienne Gilson, *L'Être et l'essence* (Paris: Vrin 1948); Polish edition: Étienne Gilson, *Byt i istota*, trans. Piotr Lubicz and Jerzy Nowak (Warszawa: IW PAX 1963).

[15] See Étienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1938); Étienne Gilson, *Le thomisme. Introduction à la philosophie de Saint Thomas* (Paris: Vrin 1947); Polish edition of the latter work: Étienne Gilson, *Tomizm. Wprowadzenie do filozofii św. Tomasza z Akwinu*, trans. Jan Rybałt (Warszawa: IW PAX 1960).

Gilson's works inspired and facilitated the emergence of this current also in Poland, especially within the philosophical milieu formed at the Catholic University of Lublin. The academic contacts between Stefan Swieżawski and Gilson served as the main impulse. Swieżawski already during his studies at the John Casimir University in Lvov visited Paris (1929-1930) and participated in his lectures. The focus on studying medieval philosophy, which Swieżawski took on under the influence of Gilson (and also after meetings with J. Maritain), led to a closer cooperation. Swieżawski consulted his doctoral and postdoctoral dissertations with Gilson and transferred the traditions of his way of philosophizing to the Faculty of Christian Philosophy which was established at the Catholic University of Lublin in 1946 and where he became the head of the Department of History of Philosophy.[16] This inspiration did not concern just metaphysics but primarily studies on the history of philosophy that were developing at that time.

The influence of Gilson's works as well as undertaking the metaphysical inquiries in the spirit of Existential Thomism at the Catholic University of Lublin found its continuation in the person of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec. His philosophical path was from the very beginning connected with Thomism. Even before he moved to Lublin (in 1951), already during his studies (under the supervision of Father Jacek Woroniecki) and later during his academic work at the Philosophical-Theological Institute in Cracow (from 1946), Krąpiec elaborated the foundations of his own interpretation of Thomas Aquinas's philosophy.[17] His doctoral dissertations – in philosophy: *De naturali amore Dei super omnia in creaturis*, written under the supervision of Fr Woroniecki (Angelicum 1946), and in theology: *De amore hypostatico in Sanctissima Trinitate secundum St. Thomam Aquinatam*, written under the supervision of Rev. Antoni Słomkowski (The Catholic University of Lublin 1948) – were already created under the influence of Existential Thomism. The studies on the treatise *De ente et essentia* and Cajetan's comments on it had a significant impact on this interpretation. On the basis of these inquiries Krąpiec educed the specificity of Aquinas's

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[16]   See Mieczysław Gogacz, "Wpływ É. Gilsona na filozofię w Polsce," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 29, no. 1 (1993): 21-30; Marian Kurdziałek, "Rzecznik philosophiae perennis," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 16, no. 1 (1968): 7-15.

[17]   This is signified by the early typescripts of Krąpiec's lectures (most probably from before 1948) preserved at the Library and Archive of the Dominican Order in Cracow, Poland, in the collection called *Ontologia – jako poznanie bytu. Zagadnienia wybrane* [Ontology as a Cognition of Being: Selected Issues].

concept of being as well as the role that the act of existence plays in it.[18] For Krąpiec Gilson's concept of being, presented mainly in *L'Être et l'essence*, became a confirmation of his own discoveries as well as of the direction of philosophical studies which he chose. When Krąpiec arrived in 1951 at the Faculty of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin, he already had completed a postdoctoral dissertation, *Egzystencjalne podstawy transcendentalnej analogii bytu* [Existential Foundations of the Transcendental Analogy of Being], recognized only in 1956.[19] The work constituted an independent philosophical proposition which stemmed out of the context of Existential Thomism.

The inspiration of Gilson's views was explicitly expressed in a collection of works which Krąpiec dedicated to him: *Streszczenia rozpraw doktorskich, magisterskich i seminaryjnych* [Summaries of Doctoral, Masters' and Seminar Works]. In the introduction to that anthology Krąpiec and Swieżawski directly state that their inquiries were influenced by Gilson's assertions.[20] This inspiration, however, was not to be limited exclusively to studies on Aquinas's philosophy, but it also pointed to the need to confront intellectually contemporary philosophical currents. Thomistic philosophy was in this way gaining a distinct methodological character, which initiated the period of its real "modernization." In order not to pursue the path of the representatives of Louvain Thomism, representatives of the Lublin School of Philosophy strongly stressed the autonomous character of Thomistic philosophy, and this contributed to the development of studies on the history of philosophy. At the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the faculty Krąpiec recalled:

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[18]  See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Metafizyka – ale jaka?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 17, no.1 (1969): 57-58.

[19]  The problem with the delay in recognizing the postdoctoral dissertation (*habilitacja*) was connected with the closing of the Faculty of Catholic Theology at the University of Warsaw. See Wojciech Chudy, s.v. "Krąpiec Mieczysław Albert," in *Encyklopedia filozofii polskiej*, vol. 1, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), 764-765.

[20]  See *Streszczenia rozpraw doktorskich, magisterskich i seminaryjnych, pisanych na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim pod kierunkiem prof. dra Stefana Swieżawskiego (historia filozofii) i prof. dra Alberta Krąpca OP (metafizyka)* [Summaries of Doctoral, Masters' and Seminar Works Written at the Catholic University of Lublin under Supervision of Prof. Dr Stefan Swieżawski (History of Philosophy) and of Prof. Dr Albert Krąpiec OP (Metaphysics)] (Poznań: Pallotinum, 1956), 1-15. This book was also published in French and presented to Gilson. The history of the publication and its delivery was described by Stefan Swieżawski in his book *W nowej rzeczywistości 1945-1965* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1991), 233-246.

> [T]he studies and discussions made us aware of the fact that in the realm of philosophy we must return to studying the classics of philosophy in their original languages, especially in Greek and Latin, and at the same time we must subject to methodological and logical reflection formulations of both classical philosophy and intellectual currents which are contemporary to us.[21]

This statement should be considered as a program formulation of the philosophical path of the Lublin Philosophical School.

Referring to the classics of philosophy, especially to the peripatetic current, constitutes a crucial element in the development of the School in the context of conceptual inspirations. The Thomistic tradition from the beginning constituted a continuation of the philosophical path started by Aristotle. Because of that, this current is also called peripatetic philosophy.[22] Not only metaphysical assertions were taken from Aristotle, but also the general mode of practicing philosophy which was characterized by the thing-related conditioning of knowledge as well as by cognitive maximalism, with the simultaneous grounding of knowledge in a distinct form of historicism (doxographic induction) treated as a research method (the context of the discovery). A new elaboration of this program took into account the accomplishments of contemporary logic and methodology of science. This is why the concept of philosophy proposed by the Lublin Philosophical School did not only constitute a modernization of the Thomistic position, but it was also able to formulate an autonomous concept of classical philosophy, called the theory of being.[23] In this context the scholarly cooperation between Stanisław Kamiński and M. A. Krąpiec initiated in the 1950s played a significant role. Their joint philosophical inquiries led to the formulation of a concept of philosophy that received recognition in Poland and abroad, and which also continues to be a source of numerous inspirations and discussions as well as polemics.

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[21]　Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Pięćdziesiąt lat pracy Wydziału," in *Księga Jubileuszowa na 50-lecie Wydziału Filozofii KUL*, ed. Antoni B. Stępień and Jacek Wojtysiak (Lublin: RW KUL, 2000), 48.

[22]　This was especially stressed by Stanisław Kamiński. See Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics," in Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2019), 69-304.

[23]　See Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej*, 76-84.

## 2. Methodological Inspirations

The Lublin Philosophical School was based on three pillars: metaphysics, history of philosophy, and logic with methodology. As we indicated above, the metaphysical pillar was based on the Thomistic tradition seeking new possibilities of development. Inquiries in the field of the history of philosophy developed, drawing their basis from a completely different source. Their main inspirator was Stefan Swieżawski who completed his studies at the Faculty of Humanities at the John Casimir University in Lvov. Therefore he made use of the program of Kazimierz Twardowski's philosophical school (he was also his student). And although Swieżawski's scholarly interests which oscillated around medieval philosophy were not entirely concordant with the spirit of the Lvov-Warsaw School, his academic apparatus was nonetheless shaped mainly at Twardowski's seminars.[24] After completing his studies, Swieżawski became a doctoral candidate with Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. Ajdukiewicz supervised his doctoral dissertation, *Pojęcie intencji w filozofii Jana Dunsa Szkota* [The Notion of Intention in John Duns Scotus's Philosophy] (1932), and in 1934 Swieżawski became his assistant. Nevertheless, the path of his academic development remained under the influence of É. Gilson and studies on medieval philosophy.

The person and scholarly activities of Swieżawski constitute a living link between Twardowski's school (later called the Lvov-Warsaw School) and the Lublin School. This heritage did not concern matters of theme and content, but rather an academic apparatus and especially the organization of the didactic process.[25] This had a significant impact on the later development of the Lublin School as an academic-research place. The work method transferred by Swieżawski to Lublin led to working out a model of a student-scholar who studies particular issues in order to improve the academic proficiency. This helped work out collaborative forms of academic research which are rarely encountered in the field of philosophy. And yet, a team of scholars was successfully assembled at the Catholic University of Lublin. They worked in accordance with that method and created the foundations for a collaborative philosophical system, patterned on scholastic systems. Among these scholars were (besides Swieżawski): Jerzy Kalinowski (the

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[24]  See Stefan Swieżawski, *Wielki przełom 1907-1945* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1989), 90-101.
[25]  See Mieczysław Gogacz, "Z dziejów historii filozofii na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim 1918-1966," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 16, no. 1 (1968): 184-189.

dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at the time), Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, and later also Stanisław Kamiński, Karol Wojtyła, and Marian Kurdziałek. An additional motivation for the work was the unstable situation of the Catholic University of Lublin in post-war Poland which remained under the communist rule.[26] The growing administrative attacks as well as seeing Thomistic philosophy as the main adversary of Marxism generated an atmosphere of anxiety about the future on the one hand, and on the other – they stimulated the need to respond to the challenges of the times and imparted a sense of mission. In the same period, in the 1950s, due to imposing Marxist ideology at state-run universities, many renowned professors of philosophy lost their jobs within them. This compelled a number of them (e.g. Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Roman Ingarden, Izydora Dąmbska, Tadeusz Czeżowski) to give guest lectures at the Catholic University of Lublin or even supervise doctoral dissertations there. This was one of the reasons why at the Catholic University of Lublin a significant academic center was created.[27] All these circumstances helped consolidate a team of scholars whom we presently call the founders of the Lublin Philosophical School.

An inspiration stemming from the accomplishments of the Lvov-Warsaw School had also an indirect character which was more closely connected with its logical and methodological achievements. In the Lvov-Warsaw School there was no inclination to elaborate a holistic philosophical system. What is more, it had a negative attitude as far as formulating metaphysical assertions was concerned (just as the Vienna Circle), and that is why the subject matter covered was essentially metaphilosophical. The considerations of its members focused on specific issues which were addressed in an analytical manner. Consequently, they focused on logical tools based mainly on the philosophical analysis of language. It is difficult to treat the Lvov-Warsaw School as a program because the scholarly interests within the School varied substantially – besides logical issues (including logical-mathematical ones), axiological and psychological topics were also undertaken.[28] Nonetheless, the School was able to confront tendencies which dominated philosophy at the time and consciously relate to them. One must

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[26] See *Porzucić świat absurdów. Z Mieczysławem. A. Krąpcem OP rozmawia ks. Jan Sochoń* (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2002), 40-43 and 51-53.

[27] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2010), 16-17.

[28] See Ryszard Jadczak, "O tzw. szkole lwowsko-warszawskiej," *Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Filozofia* 11 (1990): 19-37.

add that after World War II the professors who came from that School not infrequently were the main organizers of philosophical faculties at various academic centers, what had an impact on the character and the level of philosophical studies in Poland. Among them were Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (Poznań, Warsaw), Tadeusz Kotarbiński (Warsaw, Łódź), Roman Ingarden, Izydora Dąmbska (Cracow), and Tadeusz Czeżowski (Toruń). In the context of of Marxism that from the late 1940s had a dominant position at state-run universities, the focus on logical and methodological inquiries allowed the School's ideas to survive or even thrive.

The view that dominated in the Lvov-Warsaw School was its anti-irrationalism. Anti-irrationalism may be understood and characterized in various contexts. According to Ajdukiewicz, anti-irrationalism (which may be used interchangeably with the term "rationalism") is linked with the acceptance only those statements which are justified. In his article *Logistyczny anty-irracjonalizm w Polsce* [Logistic Anti-irrationalism in Poland] Ajdukiewicz presents a historical overview of anti-irrationalist positions, demonstrating the influence and inspirations of the accepted solutions.[29] However, the very way in which statements are justified must be such that one can effectively control it. In this context there appeared the postulates of intersubjective communicability, that is the anti-irrational transmission of information (for example, without the use of metaphors) as well as of the intersubjective verifiability, that is the anti-irrationalist manner of controlling the accepted statements, enabling the emergence of an anti-irrationalist conviction about the validity of a particular statement. With that in mind, those positions appear to be anti-irrational which affirm scientific cognition. Rational cognition is limited here to the cognition contained in the mathematical and natural sciences.[30] Anti-irrationalism is supposed to guard our beliefs

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[29] See Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, "Logistic Anti-Irrationalism in Poland," trans. Piotr Kwieciński, in *Polish Philosophers of Science and Nature in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Władysław Krajewski, Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 74 (Amsterdam: Rodopi 2001), 241–249. Kazimierz Twardowski drew attention to that issue earlier in his address: Kazimierz Twardowski, "Przemówienie na Zebraniu Jubileuszowym PTF," in Kazimierz Twardowski, *Myśl, mowa i czyn*, part 2, ed. Anna Brożek and Jacek Jadacki (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, 2014), 427-432.

[30] See Ryszard Kleszcz, "Antyirracjonalizm szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej," in *Fenomen szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej*, ed. Anna Brożek and Alicja Chybińska (Lublin: Academicon, 2016), 111-125.

in order for them to have appropriate cognitive qualities, that is for them to be scientifically justified.

In this context, the key program of the Lvov-Warsaw School remained the metaphilosophical reflection on research procedures, subjected to the formal conditions taken from the hard sciences. The scientific criticism developed in this way did not permit views which were scientifically unjustified. Consequently, such a position excluded metaphysical assertions from the anti-irrational realm, treating them as a body of knowledge (mainly concerning matters of worldview) but not having a scientific character. Metaphysics is characterized by the fact that it remains in incompatibility as to its content with rational beliefs based on scientific findings. The manner in which compatibility is recognized requires an objective research criterion, the procedures of which shall be irrefutable. This is why improving logical tools in the Lvov-Warsaw School was aimed at working out an objective methodological criterion of justifying scientific assertions. This model of practicing philosophy, which at first glance did not suit the Lublin School, has played a crucial role in the shaping its methodological peculiarity.

An important person who combined the conception of the Lvov-Warsaw School with the logic developed at the Catholic University of Lublin was Rev. Antoni Korcik. Although he started his philosophical studies at the Catholic University of Lublin, it was only transferring to the University of Warsaw and the cooperation with Jan Łukasiewicz that allowed him to develop his research on the history of logic. In 1945 Korcik returned to the Catholic University of Lublin already as a lecturer, and in 1948 he became the head of the Department of Logic. His activity was not limited only to doing research, but it was also oriented at didactic and organizational work in the spirit of the Lvov-Warsaw School. This allowed him to unravel logical problems during his lectures on mathematical logic and to run a separate seminar on logic. His research led to greater interest and expansion of the logic curriculum at the Catholic University of Lublin, which, in turn, had a significant impact on the academic profile of the Faculty of Philosophy. The research interest in logic increased substantially and eventually led to the establishment of the Department of the Methodology of Sciences by Rev. Józef Iwanicki in 1952.[31] The research climate of the department (the head of which, since 1957, was Stanisław Kamiński) favored not only inquiries into formal logic and the general methodology of sciences, but it also

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[31]　See Stanisław Majdański and Czesław Wojtkiewicz, "Logika na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 17, no. 1 (1969): 130-133.

created possibilities of applying solutions achieved in contemporary logic to philosophical problems.

Kamiński completed his MA thesis and doctoral dissertation under Korcik's supervision. In the first period of his academic activity he remained under a strong influence of the Lvov-Warsaw School. He mainly dealt then with problems belonging to mathematical logic. He maintained academic contact with the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School: Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Jerzy Słupecki, Andrzej Mostowski, and Tadeusz Czeżowski, and his first academic publications concerned issues which remained in the sphere of interests of that School.[32] His later research topics, such as science and method as well as their relation to philosophy, were also shaped on that basis. The development of the Lublin School prompted his greater interest in methods employed in metaphysics. Along with these topics, Kamiński – entering into discussion with conceptions of the philosophy of science contemporary to him – systematized various methods of scientific and rational cognition as well as conducted broad cooperation concerning the methodological conditions of particular philosophical disciplines. The cooperation was not limited to metaphysics, but it occurred in moral philosophy and the typology of ethics, methodology of the history of philosophy, philosophy of religion and religious studies as well as the philosophy of nature and nature studies. In that period Kamiński participated in the activities of the metaphilosophical seminar (conducted by Jerzy Kalinowski since 1953), the purpose of which was to modernize Thomism through its logical clarification.[33] On account of that at an early stage the issue of applying logic to the clarification of philosophical problems became one of his main areas of inquiry.

In this context one should draw attention to yet another school of philosophy with its roots in the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School which at the same time might in some aspects seem similar to the Lublin School – namely, the so-called Cracow Circle, the guiding idea of which was to make

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[32]  See Stanisław Kamiński, "Fregego logika zdań [Frege's Logic of Propositions]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 5, no. 2 (1955-1957): 31-64; Stanisław Kamiński, "O początkach indukcji matematycznej [On the Beginning of Mathematical Induction]," *Studia Logica* 7 (1958): 221-241. See also Stanisław Kiczuk, "Dociekania ks. prof. S. Kamińskiego w dziedzinie logiki [Investigations of Rev. Prof. S. Kamiński in the Domain of Logic]," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 40, no. 3-4 (1997): 13-18.

[33]  See Antoni B. Stępień, "Konwersatorium metafilozoficzne," in *Studia metafilozoficzne*, vol. 1: *Dyscypliny i metody filozofii*, ed. Antoni B. Stępień and Tadeusz Szubka (Lublin: TN KUL, 1993), 335-341.

more precise, with the use of mathematical logic, the classical assertions of Thomism. The Cracow Circle was founded in the 1930s and its main representatives were Jan Franciszek Drewnowski, Józef Maria Bocheński, and Jan Salamucha.[34] An important impulse for the shaping of its program was the attempt to implement Łukasiewicz's research postulate contained in his work *O metodę w filozofii* [For a Method in Philosophy] from 1927.[35] In this work the author indicated the need of rebuilding the foundations of philosophy anew and formulating it methodologically upon the canvas of mathematical logic. Such a postulate was undertaken by the Cracow Circle, and it was applied in the inquiries on Thomistic issues, such as the arguments (ways) for the existence of God or the theory of analogy. Applying these formal tools was supposed to lead to elaborating a scientific form of these issues. One attempted to accomplish that through the precise formulation of formal causal relations as well as placing emphasis on the logical clarity of applied scholastic terminology.

The project of modernizing Thomistic philosophy through the elaboration of scientific research tools based on the achievements of contemporary logic was formulated very often in the 1950s, and in this way one was searching for possibilities of the genuine renewal of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. However, the methods of formalizing the theses of Thomistic metaphysics elaborated by the Cracow Circle were not accepted by Kamiński, and they became the topic of a debate which he conducted mainly with Drewnowski.[36] Referring to the works of the Cracow Circle became

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[34] See Zbigniew Wolak, *Neotomizm a szkoła lwowsko-warszawska* (Kraków: Ośrodek Badań Interdyscyplinarnych, 1993), 69-112; Zbigniew Wolak, "Naukowa filozofia Koła Krakowskiego," *Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce* 36 (2005): 97-112.

[35] See Jan Łukasiewicz, "O metodę w filozofii," *Przegląd Filozoficzny* 31 (1927): 3-5.

[36] See Stanisław Kamiński, "Logika współczesna a filozofia [Contemporary Logic and Philosophy]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 9, no.1 (1961): 49-84; Stanisław Kamiński, "O zastosowaniach logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej [On the Use of Contemporary Logic in Classical Metaphysics]," in Stanisław Kamiński and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1962), 273-294; Stanisław Kamiński, "Co daje stosowanie logiki formalnej do metafizyki klasycznej [What Gives the Application of Formal Logic to Classical Metaphysics]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 12, no. 1 (1964): 107-112. This last text received a direct polemical response from Jan F. Drewnowski. See Jan F. Drewnowski, "Stosowanie logiki symbolicznej w filozofii [The Use of Symbolic Logic in Philosophy]," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 1, no. 2 (1965): 53-65. This discussion was carried on in the monthly *Znak*. See Jan F. Drewnowski, "Uwagi w związku z artykułem dyskusyjnym ks. Stanisława Kamińskiego i s. Zofii J. Zdybickiej 'O sposobie poznawania istnienia Boga'," *Znak* 18, no. 2-3 (128-129) (1965): 346-355; Stanisław Kamiński, Zofia J. Zdybicka, "W od-

for Kamiński one of the inspirations to inquire into the methodology of classical metaphysics. From that discussion a view emerged that it is impossible to formalize fully the theses of Thomistic metaphysics in the spirit of mathematical logic, the main obstacle being the analogical character of the language of metaphysics. This discussion was no longer only a debate on the level of logic, but it constituted a response supported by a specific concept of metaphysics elaborated within the Lublin Philosophical School.

Kamiński stressed that metaphysics basically constitutes a theory of objects grasped under the aspect of their existence, in which the essential side of being is analogically ordered to existence. Describing these objects in quantitative-scope categories is inadequate because that cannot be performed without changing their meaning.[37] Nonetheless, this does not mean that the cognitive possibilities of formal logic must be seen as in general useless for metaphysics. Kamiński emphasized the need to use logic but with respect for the specificity of the resesarch object of metaphysics and not in an absolutely normative way. He noticed two main areas of application: using the results of contemporary logic (mainly semiotics) in the works on the terminology (conceptual apparatus) of metaphysics, and employing the accomplishments of the methodology of sciences to arrange the system of metaphysics (to different argumentative and systematizing operations).[38] Formal logic and argumentation theory can only be applied exclusively to investigate relations between theses.

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powiedzi na uwagi Jana F. Drewnowskiego," *Znak* 18, no. 2-3 (128-129): 355-365. See also Stanisław Kiczuk, "Spór o stosowalność logiki formalnej do filozofii w szkole lubelskiej [The Dispute in the Lublin Philosophical School over the Use of Formal Logic in Philosophy]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 44, no.1 (1996): 5-19.

[37] According to Kamiński "translating metaphysical expressions into the language of logic would by justified only if both languages were isomorphic. Contemporary logic is, however, extensionalistic, consisting only of extensional functors and variables. On the other hand, the language of the philosophy of being is not only just intensional, but intensional in a distinct way (analogy). The rules of meaning are also different in both cases. For the language of logic axiomatic and deductive rules are sufficient, but this cannot be said about the language of metaphysics in which empirical rules and those referring to intellectual intuition are indispensable [...]. Neither can one notice the necessary isomorphy between logical inferences and the inferences occurring in the system of the philosophy of being." Stanisław Kamiński, "Logika współczesna a filozofia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 9, no. 1 (1961): 74-75. See also Ryszard Maciołek, "Stanisława Kamińskiego koncepcja związku logiki formalnej z filozofią," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 34, no. 3-4 (1991): 13-38.

[38] For more on this topic, see Kamiński, "Logika współczesna a filozofia," 77ff.

The two traditions of philosophizing characteristic for the Lublin School meet at this point. On the one hand, there is the systemically elaborated tradition of peripatetic philosophy, in which the rational explanation of reality is based on the understanding of being as "something which exists," as postulated by Existential Thomism. On the other hand, without abandoning the peripatetic understanding of logic as a tool for philosophizing, the Lublin School accepts the program of the methodological justification of philosophical assertions in the spirit of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The ideas of the Lvov-Warsaw School were implemented in the Lublin School mainly on the organizational-methodological level, and they enabled to develop issues belonging to the methodology of metaphysics. In this context one should recall one of the most important publications of the Lublin Philosophical, namely Kamiński and Krąpiec's *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics] from 1962.[39] The issues covered in that book concern methodological arrangement of metaphysical problems, with the emphasis placed on the question of the applicability of contemporary logic to classical metaphysics. The publication of this study was a result of a continuous academic and scholarly cooperation of these two thinkers on formulation of the contemporary conception of metaphysics which was a response to neo-positivist tendencies in philosophy.

## 3. Systemic arrangement

Defining the methodological conditions of philosophy made it possible to elaborate within the Lublin Philosophical School a distinctly metaphysical way of explaining reality. Its result was an autonomous knowledge about the necessary aspects of reality which are justified from an ontic perspective. The specificity of metaphysical explanation consists in the precise indication

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[39] See Kamiński and Krąpiec, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*. In their review of this work Stanisław Majdański and Antoni B. Stępień stressed that "Kamiński's and Krąpiec's work is the first book of such a scope and type in Polish literature on the topic, and among foreign publications – as far as we know – it occupies a prominent place with respect to the range of the issues discussed and their detailed treatment." Stanisław Majdański and Antoni B. Stępień, review of *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* by Stanisław Kamiński and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec (Lublin: TN KUL 1962), *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 14, no. 1 (1966): 154.

of the object of inquiries.[40] The definition of the object of metaphysics as "being as an existing entity" (it is the result of the operation of distinguishing a research object) shall not be understood unequivocally because this is not allowed by the existential sub-ontic element which can be grasped only analogically. Therefore, the procedure of explaining reality within the theory of being is primarily an operation of clarifying the object so understood in the transcendental aspect. All subsequent systemic solutions constitute a consequence of crucial decisions which are made at the stage of constructing the object. For this reason, the general existential aspect of metaphysical inquiries necessarily requires an autonomous (in relation to the quantitative and qualitative aspects) grasp of the investigated reality, as this guarantees the possibility of general philosophical cognition to occur. Such a thesis, considering the contemporary concepts formulated within the field of philosophy and theory of science, was particularly controversial.[41] It was also inconsistent with the views of the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School. However, in this context the position of the Lublin School was a result of the understanding of philosophy as an explanation of reality under the aspect of its existence.

The complete fulfillment of the condition of methodological autonomy requires not only treating it as a starting postulate in philosophical inquiries but also constructing an entire system of justification in which this postulate shall be fulfilled at every stage. In metaphysical cognition the primal point of reference is reality given directly in experience. Focusing in research on the general existential aspect which is treated as transcendentally universal (encompassing everything that exists) as well as analogically necessary (based on sub-ontic relations within beings) constitutes the moment which distinguishes autonomous investigation of reality. In this context the

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[40] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, "Specyficzność poznania metafizycznego," *Znak* 13, no. 5(83) (1961): 606-616; See Stanisław Kamiński, "The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition," in Kamiński, *On the Metaphysical Cognition,* trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2020), 9-94; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Metaphysics,* trans. Theresa Sandok (New York et al: Peter Lang, 1991), 53-100.

[41] For more on the topic, see Andrzej Bronk, "Demarkacjonizm lubelskiej szkoły filozoficznej [Demarcationism of the Lublin Philosophical School]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35, no. 1 (1987): 345-364; Piotr Duchliński, *W stronę aporetycznej filozofii klasycznej. Konfrontacja tomizmu egzystencjalnego z wybranymi koncepcjami filozofii współczesnej* [Towards Aporetic Classical Philosophy: The Confrontation of Existential Thomism with Selected Conceptions of Contemporary Philosophy] (Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, 2014), 187-441.

dominant role is played by general metaphysics which deals with the transcendental properties of beings, the general structure of beings as well as the relations within beings and between beings. From a methodological perspective, such an approach is characterized by cognitive maximalism in the peripatetic spirit which aims at discovering the ultimate and necessary reason for the existence of beings. This takes place within an intuitive-reductionist research procedure in which one searches for ultimate ontic reasons for cognitively grasped ontic states.[42] Reductionist reasoning in this case gains the property of infallibility, provided that one indicates the only real ontic reason which decontradictifies the explained ontic state. Therefore, the pursuit of thus apprehended reasons is necessarily limited to clarifying the internal structure of being.

Already on the example of the elaborated method and the manner of how it is formulated we can notice that there is no place for the theses of traditional Thomism in the theory of being. The constituted system of the metaphysical explanation of reality, by referring to the philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, gains entirely autonomous solutions both with regards to the objective grounding of theorems and the methodologically consistent program of justifying these theorems formulated on that grounding. The methodological arrangement of a broad and structurally varied metaphysical material, carried out mainly by Kamiński, granted the Lublin School the status of a consistent and, therefore, methodically uniform philosophical project. Łukasiewicz's postulate to create a method for philosophy was adequately adapted by Kamiński to a maximalistic and autonomous philosophy through formulating its metaphilosophical rules.[43] This allowed for construing a modern metaphysics without giving up the heritage of ancient and medieval philosophy.

The manner of arranging philosophical disciplines, characteristic of the Lublin School, which was grounded in the conditions resulting from the thing-related perspective as well as in the unlimited range of investigations of that object, was also part of the program. This enabled undertaking a variety of issues revealed in the content-wise abundant reality, with the simultaneous precise preservation of the general existential aspect in research.

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[42]   See Stanisław Kamiński, "Explanation in Metaphysics," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2018), 135-203.

[43]   See Stanisław Kamiński, "Łukasiewicza koncepcja metody filozofii," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 17, no. 1 (1979): 283-289.

This unifying moment is a distinct ligament of the entire theory of being which enables formulating a consistent philosophical system. The clarification of the content of being does not have the character of a deductive procedure in this case. One can distinguish methodological parts of the system which are determined by the stages of particular cognitive activities as well as arrays of interconnected assertions. Within this structure there are also particular systems of theorems referring to the transcendental properties of beings, ontic assumptions, ontic compounds, modes of existence of being, types of beings, specific causes of being, and the ultimate cause.[44] Particular systems of theorems are connected with each other by content-related (material) relations. However, they form one discipline (general metaphysics) due to the same formal object (being as an existing entity) and the same method (analysis of intellectually apprehended data, conducted in relation to ontic states).

The fundamental status of metaphysics is a result of its unlimited scope of inquiry. Metaphysics is understood as the primary philosophical discipline which aims at explaining reality under the aspect of its existence by searching for the ultimate reasons why things exist. Thus understood general metaphysics encompasses, in the aspect of its inquiries, all the particular disciplines distinguished on the grounds of the theory of being. General metaphysics does not concentrate on the particularized object, divided into specific object-oriented disciplines. The interdependence between metaphysical disciplines consists in using in the explanation of particular philosophical issues both the aspect under which they are investigated as well as theses of general metaphysics.[45] The factors which determine the realism and the autonomy of the object simultaneously determine all the ways for particularizing the object. The formal object, therefore, remains the same for both general metaphysics and for the particular disciplines described as particular metaphysics.

The basis for distinguishing particular metaphysical disciplines is that what can be clarified in detail within the object. In this context, these disciplines should be first and foremost considered in the realm of objective

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[44]  See Stanisław Kamiński, "The Theory of Being and Its Domains," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, 68-80. Kamiński adds that these systems are distinguished conditionally and on relative terms, and they are accompanied by meta-systemic deliberations as well as pieces of information connected with metaphysics with regard to their content but not belonging therein.

[45]  See Krąpiec, "Metafizyka – ale jaka?," 60-62.

ontic factors which constitute the basis for all metaphysical cognitive per-spectives.[46] The main factor determining the object is the indication of the existence of a being as an ontic basis for distinguishing it from a meta-physical point of view. On account of that, every such particularization of the object takes place on the level of the content of being. The second factor is the indication of the ontic pluralism within which the multitude of existing beings, varied under the aspect of content, is uncovered. This allows us to distinguish many different fields of inquiry which we appre-hend from the perspective of their existential conditioning. The third ob-jective factor shows the analogical unity of beings which is determined by the relational (proportional) structure of its sub-ontic elements. This enables us to grasp relationships between beings as well as to see reality analogically. All of the factors which build up the unity of the theory of being result from the systemic clarification and justification of the object, the particularization of which becomes the basis for distinguishing the particular disciplines of metaphysics.

One should also draw attention to the methodology of the research procedure in which the procedures presented may result from any giv-en experience of being treated as data requiring explanation. On account of that, cognitive procedures in the theory of being are characterized by incessant "returns" to the explained reality with the use of a fundamental conceptual apparatus and a set of basic rules. Because of this, metaphysical cognitive processes constantly draw from the experience of being (reality) and maintain contact with the investigated object (they begin from input data and then return to them). Particular metaphysics originate from data with a basis richer as to its content, focusing around a particular aspect of reality which is determined by a specific mode of existence.[47] On ac-count of this, the specificity of distinguishing particular disciplines is based on the indication of a separate experience within a material object which constitutes the point of departure for a detailed field of inquiry. The object apprehended at the point of departure (the material one) by connecting with the object of general metaphysics (the formal one) generates the sub-ject matter of a given particular discipline. Specific domains of particular metaphysics, despite their self-reliance at the point of departure which is

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[46]    See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Czynniki filozoficznego realizmu," in *Osoba i realizm w filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk and Katarzyna Stępień (Lublin: PTTA, 2002), 113-117.

[47]    See Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej*, 221-229.

built upon the experience that clarifies new contents (aspects or categories) of being, "structurally" rely on general metaphysics. This structural dependence is about using the analogically apprehended method of explanation in the process of explanation and justification as well as a conceptual apparatus and rules that function (and are elaborated) in the realm of general metaphysics.

For this reason, within the Lublin School, the unity of philosophical disciplines within the metaphysical framework becomes highlighted. This does not mean limiting the scope of philosophical inquiries to traditionally understood metaphysical questions, but it construes a systemically coherent concept of philosophy open towards reality. This is why it covers an extensive framework of disciplines, not limited in its scope from the perspective of the material object but always comprehended as an "existing essence." The qualitative-quantitative side of reality is not therefore considered in the material order. The unity of disciplines becomes then determined by the formal unity (indivisibility) of the cultivated philosophy, the basis of which is one analogically understood object considered in a general existential order. The way in which the object so comprehended is explained consists in indicating the ultimate reasons for its existence. This is accomplished by referring to its ontic structure.[48] Thus, the unity of philosophy in the theory of being is constituted by two crucial factors: the philosophical reference to the object and the manner in which it is explained. These factors reveal the entire specificity of metaphysically understood reality.

The consequence of such a view is the cognitive primacy of general metaphysics in relation to particular ones. General metaphysics is here understood as a methodical cognitive foundation on which there occurs the cognitive clarification of the complexity and plurality in the being. Because of that, in the theory of being metaphysical cognition is understood as the "exhaustion" of a general scope of being through the gradual clarification of its content. The clarified content of being provides a starting point for particular disciplines, the scope of which may be limited by explaining the mode of existence, e.g. of human beings, their moral actions, creations, and social functioning. The process of explaining particular categories of being requires referring to the inner structure of beings. That, in turn, functions as the main (ontic) reason within general metaphysics. Theses of general

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[48]    See Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics,* 215-221. Kamiński describes this process as "ultimate explanation."

metaphysics (as metaphysical principles) constitute, therefore, the internal cognitive basis for distinguishing particular metaphysics. Kamiński emphasizes:

> The theory of being understood in this way encompasses all disciplines of the realistically conceived metaphysics and constitutes a uniform philosophical cognition in terms of both epistemology and methodology. It means that the theory of being exhausts the entire fundamental *problématique* of so-called classical philosophy, and solves it principally in the same way in all of its disciplines.[49]

In the context of determining philosophical disciplines one must also indicate a way of arranging metaphilosophical disciplines which is compliant with the peripatetic tradition. They are not conditioned by the nature of the object but by the specificity of human cognition. At the same time they constitute a valuable tool which to a large extent aids research processes, and that is why their significance increases together with the degree of solicitude for the methodological standard of the system. In the Lublin Philosophical School the metaphilosophical disciplines were extensively cultivated, with great care for their substantive quality. In this respect the influence of the Lvov-Warsaw School was the most significant. It especially had an impact on the precision with which these disciplines were being developed. The systematized order of metaphilosophical research became a unique determinant of the Lublin Philosophical School.

Among the metaphilosophical disciplines which are most often mentioned, the first one is logic, especially logic in a broader sense which encompasses several separate sections: formal logic, semiotics, methodology, and theory of science. Logic so understood serves the methodological precization of the theory of being and formulation of that theory's distinct language.[50] The second metaphilosophical discipline is epistemology, the task of which is to formulate the rules of correctness of cognitive acts as well as diagnosing the cognitive value of the ultimate ontic reasons. Epistemological issues in the Lublin School constituted the topic of many discussions concerning the status of that discipline and its systemic functions.[51] The

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[49]  Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," 217-218.
[50]  See Kamiński, "Logika współczesna a filozofia," 76-83.
[51]  See Tomasz Mioduszewski, *Spór o realizm w lubelskiej szkole filozoficznej* [The Dispute over Realism in the Lublin Philosophical School] (Ząbki: Wydawnictwo Księży Pallotynów Prowincji Chrystusa Króla, 2013), 33-93.

third metaphilosophical discipline is the history of philosophy, understood particularly as a historical basis for the formulation of specific methods of cultivating metaphysics. It is a history of philosophical problems, and that became a basis for working out the method of historicism (doxographic induction) as a method of formulating assertions in the context of historical views.[52] All the disciplines mentioned so far have played an important role both in the formulation of the research structure as well as the functioning of the philosophical discourse.

## Conclusion

From the perspective of time, the emergence and the creative functioning of the Lublin Philosophical School seem to be both a historical and a philosophical phenomenon. The communist regime which dominated in Poland after World War II (especially in the 1950s) introduced far reaching changes of an ideological nature. This was connected with imposing on most academic and research institutions Marxist (or Marxist-Leninist) ideology, treated as the only proper scientific philosophy. In these circumstances any autonomy of philosophy was questioned or even repressed. Those actions aimed at eliminating systematically all independent currents of contemporary philosophy, especially those connected with Catholic (mainly Thomistic) institutions of higher education. It was not the main intent of the Lublin School to develop just Thomism, especially since neither the times nor the situation of philosophy itself were favorable for such an endeavor. Rather positivist currents were those that dominated. For Marxism, which unquestionably and officially reigned supreme in Poland, classical metaphysics was not a philosophical discipline. On the other hand, in the Anglo-Saxon area analytical philosophy was thriving. In the continent phenomenology as well as the culturally fashionable existentialism gained a significant place. In such a context neo-scholastic philosophy was pushed to the background and its inquiries leaned towards syncretism. All these tendencies strongly influenced the times in which the Lublin Philosophical was being shaped.

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[52] See Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej*, 120-130.

However, on the whole they remained a context, in opposition to which the idea of the School itself and its philosophical program emerged.

The establishing and academic development of the Lublin School constituted a form of defense of independent philosophical thought; and they were also building the foundations for the sovereignty of Polish scholarly culture. So, in order to signify the existence of an autonomous and maximalist system as well as oppose the aforementioned tendencies, it was decided in the Lublin School not only to elaborate a comprehensive concept of metaphysical philosophy but also to build it in accordance to the requirements of contemporary logic. The unique value of the School was the debate open to diverse positions. It consisted in a collaborative way of formulating assertions and exchange of views on a given topic. Krąpiec indicated that what was distinct in the Lublin Philosophical School was the close cooperation between scholars dealing with metaphysics, history of philosophy, and methodology of science.[53] It was such a cooperation that shaped the actual phenomenon of this School. Working out a coherent and thematically broad program, consisting of, on the one hand, the peripatetic (Aristotelian-Thomistic) tradition of the philosophy of being and, on the other hand, the openness towards the achievements of the Lvov-Warsaw School in logic, became the hallmark of the Lublin School.

Thanks to such teamwork an original metaphysical system was formulated, the purpose of which was to explain rationally reality through indicating its ontic foundations. The specificity of metaphysics with regard to its object was revealed in it: metaphysics takes on in its inquiries the general existential aspect that became the basis for elaborating procedures of justifying metaphysical assertions in this context as well as methods of developing metaphysics. The particular stages of determining the object of metaphysics enable distinguishing specific scopes of research. This had a significant influence on the development of thematically diverse philosophical disciplines with the simultaneous preservation of their unity in the pursuit of ultimate principles. Such a manner of building the program of the School was a consequence of unique methodological solutions which systematized metaphysical reflection. One must not forget that in this case the methodological conditions remain in constant dependence on the objective order which constitutes the primal platform for research. The particular

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[53] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "O filozoficznej szkole lubelskiej [On the Lublin Philosophical School]," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1982), 289-290.

metaphysical disciplines, in turn, preserve methodological autonomy in the aspect of the material object and the methods of justification applied in that context. At the same time the unity of the theory of being, which is a result of the fundamental role of the formal object in metaphysical inquiries, is preserved. All of that contributes to the elaboration of a consistent and orderly philosophical system that aims at the knowledge about the ultimate reasons for reality's existence. And this constitutes the deepest expression of human wisdom-oriented cognition.

Andrzej Maryniarczyk

# Philosophy as Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School

In order for philosophy to be metaphysics it should, according to Stefan Swieżawski, "fulfill certain conditions. It must be, in essence, realistic. It must develop in the climate of objectivism. It must be headed towards the cognitive grasp of beings, that is existing entities. Therefore, genuine metaphysics always and most of all focuses on what exists, on the existence rather than the essence of things."[1] Swieżawski, formulating such conditions, popularized also the expression "metaphysical philosophy" to describe realistic philosophy. While indicating the need to practice metaphysical philosophy, he drew attention to the history of the process of abandoning metaphysics which led to the crisis within philosophy itself.

From the perspective of time, the intellectual reflection of Swieżawski, who was one of the co-founders of the Lublin School of Philosophy, enables one to become aware of the deepest motivations for the development of metaphysical philosophy within that School.

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[1]    Stefan Swieżawski, "O potrzebie metafizyki," in *Metafizyka*, part 2: *Zarys teorii bytu*, ed. Stanisław Janeczek and Anna Starościc (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2017), 9; see Andrzej Bronk SVD and Stanisław Majdański, "Klasyczność filozofii (W rozumieniu szkoły lubelskiej)," *Ethos* 9, no. 3-4(35-36) (1996): 129-144.

## 1. reasons for abandoning Metaphysical Philosophy

The first stage of abandoning metaphysical philosophy, which already started in the late middle-ages, was – according to Swieżawski – "forgetting about the central role of *esse*-existence in beings"[2] and directing the attention of inquiry to the essence of beings. As a consequence of forgetting the fundamental role of *esse* in beings, there emerge philosophical reflections which - although they often enrapture minds with their constructions - in relation to the real reality are nonetheless "partial and mutilated"[3] because they are bereft of foundations in that reality. This happens because, according to Swieżawski:

[These philosophies focus] exclusively on the essence, the nature of things, omitting to an ever greater degree their existence. This type of essentialist metaphysics deteriorates in result of abandoning the realm of reality. It easily slips into idealistic structures which are subjective and often irrational. What a great and deadly danger threatens metaphysics when it loses contact with the *esse*, with the concrete being. In certain circumstances it can then turn into ideology.[4]

The only defense against any ideologization of metaphysics is the continuous "faithfulness to reality," the center of which is the *esse* – existence.

The second stage, or more precisely the result of deforming metaphysical philosophy, is its replacement by the experimental sciences which are supposed to remain in touch with the real being. As Swieżawski explains,

In the situation when metaphysics cannot satisfy the human being's natural "hunger for reality," it begins to turn into a positivistic program in the name of the ominous declaration: "The development of particu-

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[2]     Swieżawski, "O potrzebie metafizyki," 9; for more see Władysław Stróżewski, *Istnienie i sens* (Kraków: Znak, 2005).

[3]     Swieżawski, "O potrzebie metafizyki," 9; for more see Stefan Swieżawski, *Dzieje europejskiej filozofii klasycznej* (Warszawa: PWN, 2000).

[4]     Swieżawski, "O potrzebie metafizyki," 11; see Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Dlaczego filozofia realistyczna?," in *Spór o rozumienie filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk and Katarzyna Stępień (Lublin: PTTA, 2009), 27-50.

lar sciences in the future will make metaphysical reflection completely obsolete."[5]

No wonder then that one of the tasks of positivism was to expunge realistic metaphysics from philosophy.

The third stage of destroying metaphysical philosophy is the departure from the objectivism of philosophical cognition towards its subjectivization. Hence, as Swieżawski indicates, philosophical reflection is limited more and more to the "reflection on the human being comprehended as a subject and on the possibilities of the cognitive activity of the human being. Gradually epistemology replaces metaphysics. Philosophy shall no longer be what it was in the antiquity and in the medieval times. The described state of affairs shall favor idealistic systems, ideologies as well as various anti-intellectual concepts and programs."[6]

It is worth noting that this type of historical experience constituted the stimulus and inspiration for taking on the initiative of creating in the Lublin School of Philosophy a program of contemporary metaphysical philosophy.[7]

## 2. Rebuilding contemporary metaphysical philosophy

Among the main reasons for establishing the Lublin School of Philosophy, which was predominantly a school focused on rebuilding metaphysical philosophy, one should point to direct and indirect ones.[8] Among the

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[5] Swieżawski, "O potrzebie metafizyki," 12.

[6] Ibidem.

[7] For more see: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "*Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii* próbą ogarnięcia i systematyzacji filozofii," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii,* vol. 10: *Supplement*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: PTTA, 2009), 881-885; Henryk Kiereś, "Systematyka nurtów i typów filozofii," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 6, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk (Lublin PTTA, 2009), 887-889; Jan Czerkawski, "Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna na tle sytuacji filozofii w powojennej Polsce," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45, no. 1 (1997): 166-190.

[8] The name "Lublin Philosophical School" appears as the name for scholarly and didactic endeavors initiated in the early 1950s by Stefan Swieżawski, Jerzy Kalinowski, and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Cath-

primary reasons that motivated rebuilding metaphysical philosophy was Marxism which was imposed administratively in the 1950s at all state universities, colleges, and post-graduate schools in Poland. Such an ideologization of the teaching of philosophy generated the risk of a breakdown of the foundations of humanistic culture through perverting the truth about the human being and the world as well as enslaving free philosophical thinking with ideology.[9] Among the direct causes one can also indicate the need to confront other contemporary philosophical currents appearing at that time in Poland. Because of that, formulating the project of metaphysical philosophy was also enforced by the need to respond to "positivism (neo-positivism) which dominated European philosophy in the second half of the 20th century and propagated its program of minimalistic, nonautonomous philosophy as well as to currents of the philosophy of consciousness or philosophy of language."[10]

Although there were attempts to link realistic philosophy with phenomenology, especially that of Roman Ingarden which declared realism, such attempts did not guarantee cognitive success with respect to a deeper understanding of the world and the human being, due to varying objects of inquiry, that is – instead of real entities – intentional beings, existing in the cognizing subject. Moreover, the attempts at connecting realistic philosophy with analytical philosophy, due to the difference of the objects of inquiry, methods applied, and cognitive objectives, did not satisfy the natural need

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olic University of Lublin. These endeavors were called this way by Kalinowski (in 1957 he settled down in France) when he described the work of the philosophers from the Catholic University of Lublin in the journal *Revue philosophique de Louvain* as "école philosophique lublinoise." Apart from this name, other ones appeared which were used conversely with it: "Lublin School of Classical Philosophy," "Lublin School of Christian Philosophy," "Lublin School," "Polish School of Classical Philosophy." See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Majdański, "W kręgu filozofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego. Z dyskusji o dorobku Wydziału Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej z okazji 60-lecia uczelni," *Summarium* 26-27 (1997-1998): 151-205; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 6, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: PTTA, 2005), 532-550.

[9]    For more see: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "O potrzebie filozofii," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 10: *Suplement*, 909-912.

[10]    See Krąpiec and Maryniarczyk, *Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna*, 535; see also: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Odzyskać świat realny* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1999); Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Język i świat realny* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1995); Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Poznawać czy myśleć* (Lublin: RW KUL, 2000).

of the human mind which is driven most of all to comprehend reality.[11] The same can be said about the attempts to "scientify" realistic philosophy and to formalize its language carried out – among others – by Jan Salamucha, Jan F. Drewnowski, or Józef M. Bocheński. Such attempts ultimately led to the trivialization of the problems which are existentially important for the human being.[12] For this reason:

> presented in opposition to charging Marxism forms of practicing philosophy that came from Ingarden's Cracow School of phenomenology or the Lvov-Warsaw School of logical analysis were characterized by cognitive minimalism which already at the point of departure barred itself off from important human problems. For this reason they could not constitute a counterbalance for Marxism. Moreover, they were permeated by positivist mentality which manifested itself by reducing the description and explanation of the world to a narrowly understood form of scientific explanation based on the natural-mathematical model. This was a philosophy which made the data of consciousness or language its object of inquiry; it left beyond the scope of its research that which is most important: namely, the human being and the world surrounding us.[13]

Among the indirect causes one can indicate the necessity of elaborating a modernized conception of metaphysical philosophy and offering as an alternative to other philosophical currents a conception which shall be distinguished by its methodological autonomy, cognitive maximalism, and realism. Analyzing the history of scholasticism, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec drew attention to the fact that:

> [Metaphysical philosophy during neoscholasticism] became increasingly schematized and verbalized by neo-scholastic thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th century. In this measure one referred to an epigonal model

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[11] For more see: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Sens uprawiania filozofii," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 10: *Suplement*, 913-916; Stanisław Kamiński, "O metodzie filozofii klasycznej", *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 34, no. 1 (1986): 5-20. [English translation: Stanisław Kamiński, "Method in Classical Philosophy," in Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2019), 37-67].

[12] For more see: Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Trudne związki logiki z metafizyką," in *Logika*, part 2: *Kultura logiczna*, ed. Rev. Stanisław Janeczek, Marcin Tkaczyk OFMConv., and Anna Starościc (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2018), 9-32.

[13] See Krąpiec and Maryniarczyk, *Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna*, 535.

of scholasticism by formulating philosophical problems in so-called theses to which proponents and opponents were ascribed – as if there could be proponents or opponents of a thesis which is not entangled into an entire system! – and subsequently a syllogistic proof was delivered. Its major premise was usually a definition constructed a priori, and then a conclusion was inferred that was supposed to be some sort of an existential statement, but in fact it was only a defining statement, the equivalent of the major premise. In this manner, with a certain level of a skill to construct a priori definitions and syllogistic operations, one can prove basically anything.[14]

Certainly, one cannot forget that in spite of these deformations the scholastic current in philosophy was the transmitter of an entire rich ancient and medieval tradition, without which one cannot properly understand early-modern and contemporary philosophy. Krąpiec notices the following:

> [Classical problems] formulated in antique philosophy and developed in the scholastic period as well as entangled in various problems and pseudo-problems of the philosophy of the subject (which begins with Descartes), passed on to the contemporary generation in a verbalized form by many neo-scholastic authors, had to be taken on anew and situated as if around the reflected object of "being as being", on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a conception of rational philosophical cognition uncovered in metatheoretical deliberations.[15]

Therefore, it is hardly a wonder that the efforts of the professors who from 1951 on started to elaborate metaphysical philosophy within the Lublin School of Philosophy – and among them especially Krąpiec – headed in that direction. Krąpiec stressed that "the original thought of Thomas Aquinas was different, both simpler and deeper than the one that was passed on by the so-called Thomistic school which was developed by Giles of Rome, Báñez,

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[14]   In order to confirm the validity of this opinion, it is enough to analyze the method of justification employed by such contemporary scholastic authors as Charles Boyer, Joseph Gredt, Paolo Dezza or their Polish continuators and followers. One can then see how very real and important problems of human thought can be trivialized, schematized, and verbalized. See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Metafizyka, ale jaka?," in *Arystoteles XX wieku*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk (Lublin: PTTA, 2010), 55-56. Nowadays we can notice a similar approach among some philosophers who practice so-called analytical theism or analytical Thomism.

[15]   Krąpiec, "Metafizyka, ale jaka?," 57.

and Cajetan"[16] as well as neo-scholasticism. Discovering and appreciating the role of the concept of being as an object of metaphysical inquiry carried with it the need to reconsider theoretically basic philosophical notions within metaphysical philosophy which was supposed to be a continuator of the tradition of realistic philosophy as well as the deepening of suggested solutions against the background of other philosophical systems which had appeared at that time.[17] For this reason, as Krąpiec explains, "keeping in mind the real and individual existence of beings, one should revise the traditional - originating from Aristotle's times – concept of abstraction, and especially metaphysical abstraction, as well as its utility in the realm of philosophy which ultimately explains the really existing reality."[18] In the project of metaphysical philosophy, philosophy was shown as an autonomous discipline which had its own object, goal, and specific method.

## 3. The Specificity of metaphysical philosophy

The project and the program of the Lublin School of Philosophy concentrated on elaborating a new version of metaphysical philosophy that would refer to classical realistic philosophy. Because of that, three very important postulates were included in the program of the School.

The first one stated that one could not develop philosophy ahistorically as was done by positivism (including Marxism), phenomenology, or philosophy of language (analytical philosophy). Metaphysical philosophy must take into account in-depth historical experience. It may accomplish that only through "returning to the sources, to the original thought of significant philosophers, especially Thomas Aquinas, in order to avoid the deformations done by his commentators and later followers."[19] For besides the context of

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[16]  Ibidem, 58.

[17]  For more see: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Filozofia i filozofie," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 10: *Suplement*, 917-922.

[18]  Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Metafizyka, ale jaka?," 59; see also Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Pierwszy polski metafizyk. Mieczysława A. Krąpca koncepcja współczesnej metafizyki realistycznej," in *Pierwszy polski metafizyk*, ed. Tomasz Duma (Lublin: PTTA, 2016), 49-50.

[19]  Zofia J. Zdybicka, "O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę o człowieku – polska szkoła filozofii klasycznej," *Summarium* 9 (1980): 110.

the emergence of a particular philosophical problem, one can also notice its historical development. Moreover, getting to know more closely various systems and currents of philosophizing leads to the conclusion that, actually, we are constantly dealing with the same problems which receive different names and formulations in various systems. The history of philosophy is also a place where one can analyze the formulations and justifications of philosophical problems in various systems and directions of philosophical thinking.[20] In this way one receives an additional confirmation of the equity (or the inequity) of philosophical assertions. If a given issue (even if variously formulated) was analyzed by numerous thinkers throughout the ages, the results of these inquiries must be recognized because then our personal insight into reality shall be clearer and our formulations and justifications shall be deepened by the results of the analyses of the predecessors.

Historicism in metaphysical philosophy also allows us to eliminate many pseudo-problems resulting from different concepts of the object of philosophical thinking.[21] Metaphysical philosophy is not afraid of results of thinking revealed in distinct philosophical currents and systems because only metaphysics can point to their reasons founded on objective reality and consequences which follow from them. On account of that, controversies concerning the value of cognition can be considered in the history of philosophy (in the context of finding errors and distortions of metaphysical thinking), which is also supposed to deliver genuine material for choosing the adequate way of developing metaphysics (philosophy). The history of philosophy so understood is indispensable for metaphysics and metaphysical philosophy, for it is seen as an introduction to realistic philosophy because it brings various solutions of philosophical problems which have appeared throughout history. Moreover, it constitutes a platform for solving epistemological problems and it is helpful when choosing an appropriate type of metaphysics in which the explanation of the world has been objectively, but also historically, set and verified. Metaphysical philosophy confronts its inquiries with other proposals coming from contemporary philosophical currents, being aware that human thought undergoes historical development, and that the human being is a historical being. Because of that, one should pay special attention to the entire history of philosophy and espe-

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[20] For more see: Stefan Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii* (Warszawa: PWN, 1966) 2005².

[21] For more see Paweł Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej* (Lublin: PTTA and Wydawnictwo KUL, 2015), 120-129.

cially to those of its periods when new philosophical currents emerged.[22] The history of philosophy developed by Swieżawski, inspired by the thought of Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson, "is the history of metaphysics. Thanks to that it functions as a specific experience for systematically practised metaphysics."[23]

The second postulate concerned shaping some methodological awareness, which should result in elaborating autonomous methodologies within philosophy, especially a methodology of metaphysical philosophy. The methodological reflection accompanying metaphysical deliberations was supposed to include generally accepted accomplishments of the logical theory of the sciences without depriving metaphysics (metaphysical philosophy) of its methodological autonomy.[24] The methodological awareness shaped in this way was supposed to indicate the origins of numerous emerging philosophical currents as well as ways of practicing philosophy and also the understanding of the specificity of philosophy *per se*.[25] On account of that, logic and methodology are treated in the realm of metaphysical philosophy as tools that improve philosophical (metaphysical) cognition and, secondarily (also taking into consideration didactic needs), as autonomous disciplines.[26]

In methodological inquiries emphasis is put on the elaboration of analytical methods distinct for philosophy, especially for realistic (classical) metaphysics. In the project of metaphysical philosophy an attention is drawn to the need for systematizing methods of rational and scientific cognition in general. The purpose of that is to show the context of scientific cognition, the scope of which encompasses not only the mathematical and natural sciences (what scientism advocates) but also philosophy, theology, and the humanities. Metaphysical philosophy aspires to base philosophical cognition "on broadly comprehended experience, encompassing not only sensual

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[22]   For more see: Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Układ dyscyplin i struktura filozofii realistycznej," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 10: *Suplement*, 885-887.

[23]   Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii*, 250.

[24]   For more see: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1962); it was published also in Krąpiec, *Dzieła*, vol. 4 (Lublin: RW KUL, 1994³).

[25]   Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "O filozoficznej szkole lubelskiej," in Krąpiec, *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1998),  249.

[26]   For more see Maryniarczyk, *Trudne związki logiki z metafizyką*, 9-32.

and intellectual perception but also intellectual intuition (intellectualism)"[27] as well as to preserve the "theoreticity, that is the attitude towards cognizing the truth (*propter ipsum scire*), [pointing to] consequences and practical objectives derived from the truth, [that they, nonetheless] do not constitute, while the evaluations and norms are justified and explain by the ultimate essences of entities."[28]

The third postulate – perhaps the most important – referring to the philosophy practiced at the School claims in turn that metaphysics is the central philosophical discipline; all types of particular metaphysics are its particularizations. The program of the School indicates realistic metaphysics as the central philosophical discipline that plays a basic role in the practice as well as in the teaching of philosophy. Subsequently one distinguished different types of metaphysics which encompassed specific domains of philosophical inquiry. The point of departure for building metaphysical philosophy is the existential understanding of being as the object of philosophy. The existential concept of being was that aspect of a new version of metaphysical philosophy, as Krąpiec emphasized,

> which pointed to the cardinal differences between classical philosophy in its Aristotelian, scholastic, and neo-scholastic versions. The rediscovery of the existential concept of being was caused, among others, by the return to the texts of Thomas Aquinas and also the personal sensitivity of the founders of the School – who themselves bore the tragic experiences of World War II – to the issue of existence (as well as threats towards it).[29]

This experience allowed one to notice that the act of existence is the most important and most perfect ontic factor. What is more, it not only requires affirmation, but it should become the primary and fundamental object of philosophical explanation. As Krąpiec stated:

> This fact defines the purpose of practicing philosophy, that is the cognition and explanation of the really existing world of persons and things. The purpose of philosophy is to indicate the necessary and ultimate factors explaining the existence of the world and the existence of the human being in particular. Indicating the existentially comprehended

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[27]   Zofia J. Zdybicka, "O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę o człowieku – polska szkoła filozofii klasycznej": 111.

[28]   Ibidem.

[29]   Krąpiec and Maryniarczyk, *Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna*, 537.

being as a formal object of philosophy became the point which integrates various sections of philosophy in the task of explaining reality.[30]

That which particularly distinguished metaphysical philosophy cultivated by the Lublin Philosophical School was primarily a new understanding of being, which in a fundamental way determined the way that metaphysical philosophy was developed. This referred to both general as well as particular metaphysics. The object of inquiry within metaphysical philosophy is supposed to be the being as a concrete existing entity. The object of metaphysical philosophy – whether within metaphysics as such or any particular metaphysics – is the really existing being understood in an analogical way. This means that for metaphysics this being is every existing concrete entity; for anthropology – the concrete human being; for the philosophy of living nature – the living creature; for the philosophy of inanimate nature – inanimate material beings; for ethics – real human action, etc. On account of that, the expression "realistic philosophy" is the synonym of the term "metaphysical philosophy." Philosophy understood in such a way is distinguished by realism, maximalism, and cognitive universalism. Moreover, this philosophy is distinguished by its unity. That unity is built upon the unity of the analogically understood object, that is a really existing being, and upon the unity of the analogically understood method of metaphysical separation which is directed at the pursuit of those objective factors, the discovery of which allows us to understand the analyzed being in a given aspect.

The structure of metaphysical philosophy understood in such a way includes two groups of disciplines: strictly philosophical (general metaphysics and particular metaphysics) as well as metaphilosophical ones which constitute a specific *organon*, that is an indispensable tool and aid for philosophizing. The strictly philosophical disciplines include: (1) general metaphysics, (2) particular metaphysics: metaphysics of nature (philosophy of nature); metaphysics of the inanimate being (cosmology); metaphysics of the living being (philosophical psychology); metaphysics of the human being (philosophical anthropology); metaphysics of cognition (epistemology); metaphysics of human action: metaphysics of morality (ethics), metaphysics of society (philosophy of politics), metaphysics of economic life (economics), metaphysics of religion (philosophy of religion), metaphysics of law (philosophy of law); metaphysics of human creativity: metaphysics of

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[30] Ibidem.

art (philosophy of art), metaphysics of culture (philosophy of culture), and metaphysics of civilization (philosophy of civilization). Metaphilosophical (auxiliary) disciplines include: (3) history of philosophy; (4) methodology; and (5) logic.[31]

This structure of metaphysical philosophy – within particular and general metaphysics – is open to distinguishing subsequent particular metaphysics as well as to incorporating into its research achievements of other philosophical currents and schools.[32] With such an understanding of metaphysical philosophy some special attention is drawn to the unity of the so cultivated philosophy constituted by the general metaphysics and various domains of particular metaphysics. This unity of philosophy stems from the fact that philosophy has one analogical object (that which really exists) which is apprehended in general terms (transcendentally and analogically) and explained in metaphysics, whereas in particular metaphysics it is apprehended categorically as a human being, a living creature, a material being, etc. Because of this, metaphysics constitutes the fundamental philosophical discipline. It encompasses the properties of all beings (the so-called transcendental properties), deciphers the laws that rule everything that exists, recognizes the internal structure of all beings as well as reasons for its existence and actions. "The ultimate explanation of beings," as Zofia J. Zdybicka elaborates, "requires the affirmation of the existence of the Absolute Being as the only reason which ultimately explains the existence of complex, changeable, and unnecessary beings."[33]

General metaphysics is the main and basic philosophical discipline in the program of the Lublin Philosophical School. On account of that, it plays a central role in the practice of philosophy. This central place of metaphysics, as Stanisław Kamiński explains, results from the fact that:

> the theory of being understood in this way encompasses all disciplines of the realistically conceived metaphysics and constitutes a uniform philosophical cognition in terms of both epistemology and methodology. It means that the theory of being exhausts the entire fundamental

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[31]   For more see Maryniarczyk, "Układ dyscyplin i struktura filozofii realistycznej," 885-887.

[32]   For more see Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej*, 211-270.

[33]   Zofia J. Zdybicka, "O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę o człowieku – polska szkoła filozofii klasycznej": 112.

*problématique* of the so-called classical philosophy and solves it principally in the same way in all of its disciplines.[34]

Those disciplines are particular metaphysics. One must also stress the fact that in metaphysical philosophy so understood one does not differentiate (due to the method of ultimate explanation) the theory of cognition and metaphysics as two different domains of philosophy. As Kamiński observes:

The theory of cognition as a separate philosophical discipline simply loses its *raison d'être* because many of its main issue arose from the mistaken ways of metaphysics. Hence its meta-philosophical character. The discussion with various idealisms, for instance, may take place on the occasion of meta-philosophical justification of the way in which the concept of being is formed. The controversies regarding the value of cognition can be considered from within the history of philosophy (in the context of specifying the mistakes and deviations of metaphysical thinking). What the history of philosophy is meant to do is precisely to provide the theory of being with actual historical experience in order for the proper way of cultivating metaphysics to be selected.[35]

One must, nonetheless, emphasize that this unity is understood analogically and not unequivocally. As Kamiński elucidates:

This unity of cognition in the theory of being is acquired by the acceptance of objective philosophizing and by basing the ultimate explanation exclusively on the inner structure of being. Those, however, who assume that a non-dogmatic philosophical explanation must be meta-objective (of a reflective or interpretative type), or that it may refer ultimately to exclusively qualitative structures of reality, establish the theory of cognition as the fundamental (first) philosophical discipline and break metaphysics down into disciplines that differ from one another in terms of their methodologies. But metaphysical cognition in the theory of being splits into particular disciplines only with regard to separate points of departure (separate types of the object of experimental data) and not with regard to the way of the ultimate explanation (and formal object of the most theoretical theses).[36]

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[34]   Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics,* trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2018), 217-218.

[35]   Ibidem, 218.

[36]   Ibidem, 218-219.

It is also worth noting that in the system of philosophical disciplines the philosophy of God (theodicy) is not treated as a separate type of particular metaphysics; neither God nor the experience of God is accessible at the point of departure of metaphysical inquiries (the distinction which we encounter in practice has purely didactic ends). At the point of departure metaphysics operates with the experience of the being as being or a particularized being (being-cognition, being-human, being-morality, being-culture, being-religion, being-art, being-society, etc.). For this reason the issue of the Absolute (God) appears as the ultimate metaphysical explanatory reason as well as the fulfillment of the rational and ultimate cognition of the world of persons and things.[37]

Another important element characterizing the specificity of metaphysical philosophy is the acceptance of the radicalized form of cognition, according to which acts of existential judgment constitute the most primal acts of cognition (even more primal than acts of conceptualization). In metaphysical philosophy cognition is based on common-sense cognition and is its elaboration. Common-sense cognition links the cognizing agent with the really existing world. This is why one aims at elaborating such a theory of metaphysical cognition which would guarantee the reality and concreteness of the object of cognition both in the case of general and of particular metaphysics. Hence, the case of cognition itself appears in a new light. Cognition is also a being and that of a special type, and therefore it remains within the scope of metaphysical inquiry. It turns out that in such an approach many epistemological issues disappear. Some of them are simply pseudo-problems, and others are set aside. The reconstruction of metaphysics entails a reconstruction of the theory of cognition which is most closely connected with it and which actually should be a particular case or a particular domain of metaphysics.[38]

One must stress that while elaborating a concept of cognition within metaphysical philosophy, attention was drawn to the fact that there are acts of direct cognition in which the opposition of subject-object does not occur. These are the most primal acts in which we reach the very existence of beings. These acts are verbalized in existential judgments, to which metaphysics appeals and which are fundamental for cognitive realism. In the existential judgment we directly grasp the fact of the existence of something

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[37]  Cf. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2010), 126-127.

[38]  See ibidem, 31.

which we have not cognized well. The very fact of the existence of the being, as Krąpiec describes it, "grabs us by the throat" and as-if forces us to affirm the existence of the being which, because of its existence, actualizes our cognitive life. At this moment of primal affirmation there is no doubt or cognitive distance. The division into subject and object is also excluded here; it can only appear in acts of reflection, whereas the existential judgment is the result of spontaneous pre-reflective cognition.[39] This element of metaphysical philosophy is very important, for it constitutes the foundation and guarantee of the realism of metaphysical philosophy developed within general or particular metaphysics. One must add to this also the return to natural, integrated language in philosophy. The point is that in the language of metaphysical philosophy, in which the results of cognition are expressed, there should be three inseparable sides: syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic.

Another element demonstrating the specificity of metaphysical philosophy is the method of metaphysical separation[40] that allows for a description of facts and their explanation by indicating such an objective factor, the rejection of which entails the rejection of the fact to be explained. Thus, the ultimate "authority" for metaphysical philosophy so understood is the really existing being. Moreover, historicism, which was mentioned before, allows us to avoid the error of "reinventing the wheel" and to notice progress in the explanation of philosophical problems; it may also help choose an adequate method for philosophical inquiries.[41]

## 4. Why is a return to metaphysical philosophy necessary?

Philosophical cognition evolved from the common-sense and spontaneous cognition of reality. In ancient Greece, in the first period it was the rationalization of the mythological and religious understanding of the world. Common-sense cognition, which is the human being's most primal cognitive response to existing reality, should be distinguished from naïve and pre-sci-

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[39]   See ibidem, 31-32.
[40]   For more see Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *Metoda metafizyki realistycznej* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2006); Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej.*
[41]   For more see Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej*, 120-140.

entific cognition which is already mediated by some theory. A number of natural questions pertaining to the origins of the world and the human being *per se* were included in mythology, and that is why its imaginative representations constituted a commonly understood illustration in the rational explanation of that what is in reality initial, primal, and essential. A sign of the use of reason is asking questions about reality. Already as a child, a human being constantly poses questions: "what is that?", "where is that from?", "why is that?" Humankind has answered these questions throughout the ages in a reflective and rationally justified way. Among those question there appeared the one that became the basic metaphysical question: *diá ti?* – why? Questions and more and more profound answers constituted the canvas of metaphysical cognition as well as of the formation of science. Originally scientific cognition was equated with philosophical cognition and that in turn – with metaphysical cognition.

As Henryk Kiereś notes:

> [P]hilosophy historically originates from ancient Greece together with the legendary question [...] *dia ti?*, and its purpose is to reach, on the basis of experience and rational argumentation (and not poetic cognition like in myths), the ultimate reasons for the existence of the world and the reasons for its ontic integrity. Two traditions have emerged in the history of philosophy: realism and idealism. These traditions compete with each other, and metaphilosophical reflection reveals that the reason for the polarization of philosophy is the dispute on the point of departure in the process of philosophical explanation. And thus, realism is based on spontaneous experience which lies at the foundations of the conscious life of the human being and on explanation which remains in his or her cognitive horizon. Idealism is, in turn, the aftermath of the so-called critical approach which questions the cognitive usefulness of spontaneous experience (as it is contaminated with errors and cognitive illusions and is determined by context) and purifies it in a critical manner because it wants to reach such a cognitive power, method, or cognitive disposition, the object of which is the "real reality" and not the world-shadow – the object of natural cognition.[42]

The project of metaphysical philosophy proposed by the Lublin Philosophical School belongs to the tradition of realism, and historically it constitutes the continuation of *philosophiae perennis* (perennial philosophy)

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[42]   Kiereś, "Systematyka nurtów i typów filozofii," 887.

which perpetually tries to oppose idealism that occurs in the history of philosophy in various forms and types of philosophy. One must note that all types of so-called critical philosophies, that is idealistic ones, reject spontaneous experience which is the basis for metaphysical (realistic) philosophy, equating it with pre-scientific or naïve experience. In result, philosophical cognition becomes severed from the real world (of real beings). This entails another consequence, indicated by Henryk Kiereś, namely, that what is taking place is a

> change of cognition into thinking about the world with the use of content (ideas) dissected critically from experience. Yet, thinking is not a cognitive activity, and as such it lies at the foundations of art. Idealism, therefore, leads to the poiesization of philosophy, that is to changing it into an art: the art of thinking about the world in the light of an assumed logic or poetics.[43]

That which distinguished philosophy from other sciences, that is *theoria*, cognition directed at wisdom and understanding, gives way to *praxis* and *poiesis*, that is the domain of practice and that of art. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the history of philosophy the entire tradition of idealism was initially divided into two opposing currents, namely, rationalism and irrationalism. Subsequently these currents have diversified depending on the assumed source of knowledge (intellect, senses, will, emotions, irrational intuition or, an act of faith) as well as on the accepted and applied method (noetic-eidetic, analytical, dialectic, constructive, meditational-expressive). Kiereś presented this diversification in a very clear and ordered way, drawing attention to the fact that emerging idealisms may be categorized depending on the adopted criterion:

> With regard to the source (criterion) of knowledge: rationalism, irrationalism, sensualism, voluntarism, emotivism, ecstatic intuitionism, fideism. With regard to the type of ontology: statism, mobilism (variabilism, historicism). With regard to the dominant ideological component: modernism, postmodernism. Depending on the name of the founder: Platonism, Cartesianism, Kantianism, Nietzscheanism, Hegelianism, Marxism, etc. Depending on the name of the school: phenomenology, positivism, analytical philosophy, existentialism, hermeneutics.[44]

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[43]  Ibidem, 888.
[44]  Ibidem, 888-889.

When referencing to the contemporary cultural-philosophical situation, one should note that the present cultural crisis has its roots in idealist currents. They led to nihilism in the realm of theoretical cognition (*theoria*), relativism in the realm of practical cognition (*praxis*) as well as anti-art in the realm of poietic cognition (*poiesis*), what manifests itself in the negation of objective truth, good, or beauty. What is more, this led to a crisis of philosophy as such because it became, so to speak, alienated from philosophy understood as the skill of deciphering reality and explaining it through presenting the ultimate reasons for the existence and activities of beings. As Kiereś notices,

> It is not surprising that this state of affairs casts a shadow of doubt on the cognitive claims of philosophy and makes one see in it something intermediary between science and art or else some other relic of mythological culture, whereas it leaves philosophy itself with the question about its essence and the criteria of self-evaluation.[45]

The creators of the Lublin Philosophical School were aware of this situation from the beginning and it constituted the basis for building "metaphysical philosophy." As Swieżawski explains:

> [Its goal was to] restore fullness to philosophy. In order for philosophy to become again what it is supposed to be, we have to return to the roots, rediscover the climate of objectivism, and harmonize its development with true metaphysics. In this "pilgrimage to the roots" enormous help can be found in appropriately practiced history, devoid of social-historical relativism.[46]

Thus, the founders of the Lublin Philosophical School saw the need to return to metaphysical philosophy in the perspective of the defense of philosophy itself as well as of the status of the human being as a rational entity. The defense of philosophy through the return to metaphysics, and therefore also to metaphysical philosophy, according to Swieżawski, stems from the fact that:

> [A]n essential core of every authentic philosophy is the philosophy of being. (...) This metaphysical core is thoroughly timeless; it does not

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[45]   Ibidem, 887.
[46]   Swieżawski, "O  potrzebie metafizyki,"  12.

age, it can always be rediscovered as alive. The central ideas of Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, Descartes, Leibniz, or Bergson always preserve their freshness and greatness. It would be ridiculous to consider them outdated. A similar case occurs in the realm of art or spirituality. On the other hand, applications of metaphysics as well as various attempts at explaining specific sections of reality depend on temporal-spatial circumstances, on rules of temporality and various transformations in the world [...]. But that does not refer to metaphysics. Keeping this important distinction in mind, on these grounds one has to beware of the dangerous temptation of succumbing to intellectual fads. Let us remember that various "tyrannies" venture into the world of ideas. Let us not succumb to them. Let us learn the "skill of a salmon" which like every noble fish is capable of swimming upstream. Without intellectual courage and autonomy of thought, the return to metaphysics is impossible. Among those who seek nothing but the truth, the cult of modernity and the fear of being called a reactionary should disappear.[47]

As Swieżawski indicated with great reverence:

[Metaphysics in relation to a person who practices it, is] an act of speculative inquiry, most of all the natural contemplation of being. It is the fruit of "theory" [...]. It opens our eyes, in order for them to see, and ears, in order for them to hear. It deepens our intellect. It reveals truths to us. It gives a reinforced certainty, building a firm base for a worldview. By practicing metaphysical reflection, we acquire natural wisdom because philosophy (metaphysics) fundamentally is the same thing as wisdom.[48]

What is more, he emphasizes that:

A human being devoid of wisdom is a dwarfish, stunted man. Therefore, depriving the human being of metaphysical reflection is a felony against the grandeur and dignity of the human nature.[49]

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[47] Ibidem, 13.
[48] Ibidem.
[49] Ibidem, 14.

Arkadiusz Gudaniec

# Metaphysics of the Person: The Specificity of Personalism in the Lublin Philosophical School

The specific type of personalism which emerged in the milieu of anthropological thought in the Lublin Philosophical School constituted not only an important theoretical base in the struggle with the communist ideology but also a serious voice in the philosophical discussion with Marxism, materialism, and utilitarianism. The role of the concept developed in the school, which in any case should not be considered finished and closed, is not reducible to historical and cultural or social and idea-related aspects. Like in the case of other philosophical achievements of the Lublin Philosophical School, although perhaps more distinctly in this case, this context became a historically significant impulse for intensive intellectual effort, aspiring to explore universal problems.[1]

It is not possible in such a short article to present even the most essential elements of the anthropology developed at the Lublin Philosophical School. I shall draw attention only to those elements which seem to best express its specificity and allow us to apprehend its particular consistency, not ignoring the variety of views that were formulated by its most important

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[1] On the Lublin Philosophical School see, among others, Andrzej Maryniarczyk and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al., vol. 6 (Lublin: PTTA, 2005), 532-550; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School* (Lublin: PTTA, 2010).

representatives. The Lublin Philosophical School may and should be perceived in this case as the common foundation for the inquiries conducted within its framework. I believe that in order to understand the originality of its philosophical anthropology, it might be crucial to become aware of the fruitful and creative interdependence between the essential domains of philosophy practiced at the Lublin School.[2] This interdependence, understood as supporting particular domains of philosophical knowledge through the deeper and most basic rules of understanding reality, turns out to be a crucial source of the uniqueness of the reflections undertaken within such a philosophical symbiosis.

The objective of this article is to demonstrate that despite different approach to metaphysical problems and varying platforms for construing personalism, in the anthropological perspective of the Lublin Philosophical School a certain collaborative research task was realized, at the core of which there lies an original philosophical concept of the person. Various modes of realizing this task must be considered essential and significant, for it demonstrates the openness of this type of personalism to modifications and additions as well as the creative development of various aspects of inquiries.

In this article I shall initially outline the specificity of each of these paths for the formulation of personalism in the Lublin Philosophical School, i.e. the concepts developed by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and by Karol Wojtyła. I shall then attempt to present the common elements which allow us to see the basis of one vision of the human being-person, realized within the same or similar research tasks in two methodically different approaches. One must remember that Krąpiec's anthropology was created within a more general theoretical concept which one may call the program of autonomous realistic philosophy formulated in the works by Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński.[3] Wojtyła's concept, in turn, was created on the peripheries of the philosophy of being but within the Lublin Philosophical School, i.e. with the preservation of the foundations of realism, objectivism, and the autonomous concept of philosophy.

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[2]    These issues are analyzed in other articles in this volume.

[3]    Paweł Gondek analyzes this program in his monograph entitled *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej. Mieczysława A. Krąpca i Stanisława Kamińskiego teoria bytu* (Lublin: PTTA and Wydawnictwo KUL, 2015).

# 1. Two paths of personalism in the Lublin Philosophical School

It would be probably correct to state that philosophical anthropology at the Lublin Philosophical School was developed in two ways. The two areas within which the concept of the human being-person was crucial were metaphysics and ethics. The first one acknowledges the crucial role of the human being as a unique being together with his/her distinct personal experience, perceived as a philosophically significant factor. In the other one, the essential role of the concept of the human being (theory of the person) in the justification of ethical assertions is indicated.[4] The first track was taken by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and his disciples[5]; the other one – by Karol Wojtyla and several other philosophers.[6] It should be emphasized that the holistic vision of the world and humanity characteristic of the Lublin school, which was mentioned above, should be perceived first of all as a certain point of reference for conducting general or specialized inquiries.

## 1.1. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec: anthropology as the systematic knowledge about the human being

Among Krąpiec's achievements, his pursuit of modernizing both the language and method of anthropology, which he understood as the metaphysics of the human being, plays a crucial role. However, one needs to

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[4]   The indicated fields of inquiry in fact encompass the border area between metaphysics, anthropology, epistemology, and ethics. Various theoretical disputes and discussions were conducted on the borderline of these domains, but this is beyond the scope of this article. See the article by Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik on the disputes in the Lublin School in this volume.

[5]   The basic theses of philosophical anthropology were applied in their inquiries by: Zofia J. Zdybicka, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Henryk Kiereś, Piotr Jaroszyński, Romuald J. Weksler-Waszkinel, Krzysztof Wroczyński, Piotr Moskal, Włodzimierz Dłubacz, and others (just to mention the most important scholars among those who continued their work at the Lublin School). Some elements of anthropology, similar to the concept characteristic for this current, can be noticed in the studies of Antoni B. Stępień. Stanisław Kamiński dealt with the methodological status of anthropology as metaphysics of the human being.

[6]   Among others: Wojciech Chudy, Jerzy Gałkowski, Tadeusz Styczeń, and Andrzej Szostek.

stress the fact that his main objective was to preserve the traditional perspective and demonstrate its perpetual timeliness. Being human, according to Krąpiec, is to be a self-existent subject (substance), existing in oneself and for oneself. Thanks to that, the human being transcends nature and has his/her personal profile constituted as a result of hierarchizing spiritual acts.[7]

According to Krąpiec, a new anthropological perspective opens up in the analysis of direct data from the range of internal experiences. The human being in such a case presents him/herself as a personal self that participates in nature through which it expresses oneself. It is, therefore, the concept of the person in which one must look for the bases of a more adequate understanding of the human being. Krąpiec's effort to a large extent consists in demonstrating the concurrence of the metaphysical explanation of the human being with a description of the basic experience in which the human subject is revealed as a person. In these investigations, the point of departure for Krąpiec was almost always the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Against this background he shows the theory of the person formulated by Aquinas and stresses its objective as well as subjective aspects. Krąpiec's anthropological reflection can be considered as a continuation of Aquinas's theory.

Krąpiec, despite reaching for Aristotle's solutions, rejects the Aristotelian model of the human being because it shows the human being in an inadequate manner, similar to the plant world, perceiving the human being mainly as an identical and unchangeable subject. And yet, the human being fulfills him/herself through action, especially spiritual acts.[8] Starting from Boethius's definition and at the same time referring to his own anthropological analysis, Krąpiec proposes a new definition of a person: "Therefore, in the light of these facts one can describe the person as the 'I' of the rational nature. In this definition the explanation of the person's nature is contained because the 'I' manifests itself as the existing subject, identical

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[7]    See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Człowiek – dramat natury i osoby," in Krąpiec, *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1998), 14, 20, 26.

[8]    Hence, the Aristotelian terms "substance," "accident," and other similar ones in reference to the human being should be understood analogously. See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Karola Wojtyły *Osoba i czyn*," in Krąpiec, *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet*, 74-75; also Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *I – Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, trans. Maria Lescoe et al. (New Britain, CT: Mariel Publications, 1983), 388 (note 18).

in its actions."[9] Taking into consideration the early modern and contemporary domination of the analyses concerning data of consciousness, Krąpiec claims that they became an opportunity (despite erroneous anthropological solutions) for a fresher look on the uniqueness of the human being in the context of the natural world.[10]

Krąpiec's anthropology, as it was already mentioned, was construed in a broader theoretical context, which gave it a clearly metaphysical profile. As metaphysics of the human being, it is inscribed into the entirety of philosophical knowledge about reality. Since everything is cognized as an existing entity, as a being, metaphysics which explains primal ontic states, out of necessity, becomes a first and fundamental discipline. All other philosophical disciplines, including anthropology, gain in this perspective the status of particular metaphysics, in contrast to general metaphysics that concerns the being as being. The systemic reason for this dependence is the metaphysical method of explanation applied in all these disciplines because the object in each of them is some sort of being. Thus, general metaphysics together with the remaining philosophical knowledge creates a homogenous system of wisdom-oriented cognition which provides objective ontic foundations for every philosophically cognized and explained fact.[11]

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[9] Mieczysław A. Krapiec, s.v. "Człowiek," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al., vol. 2 (Lublin: PTTA, 2001), 376.

[10] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Karola Wojtyły *Osoba i czyn*," 75. Krąpiec mentions here as the most important thinkers considering this issue Blaise Pascal, Henry Newman, Martin Heidegger, and Max Scheler.

[11] Stanisław Kamiński explains these dependencies in the following manner: "metaphysical cognition in the theory of being splits into particular disciplines only with regard to separate points of departure (separate types of the object of experiential data), and not with regard to the way of ultimate explanation (and the formal object of the most theoretical theses). […]. The disciplines of particular metaphysics, although they are independent at their point of departure, are structurally dependent on general metaphysics, as they refer in their ultimate explanations also to its theses. […]. Such a position allows maintaining the unity of explanation in the entire theory of being without falling into philosophical naturalism." Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień, (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2018), 221.

## 1.2. Karol Wojtyla: anthropology as experiential knowledge on the subject of moral action

Wojtyła, who started from the position of realistic philosophy, attempted to conduct an in-depth analysis of human personal action. For this purpose he made use of an adequately adapted phenomenological method.[12] By revealing in his considerations the personal image of the person as a consciously acting subject, he attempted to demonstrate the essence of human morality based on empirically obvious experience. He stood on the grounds of a subject-oriented perspective in order to discover in the internal experience of the human being that what is essential in him/her and nonreductible. Wojtyła's anthropology constitutes one of his most important academic achievements, although he himself was an ethicist.

Wojtyła's intention was to carry out a synthesis of two perspectives of apprehending the human being: the object-oriented and subject-oriented.[13] The point was not to merge two philosophical orientations, i.e. philosophy of being and philosophy of consciousness, but rather to complement the classical theory of the human being with a new subject-oriented perspective, emphasizing the dissimilarity and uniqueness of the personal being.[14] There is no doubt that these orientations have different foundations.[15]

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[12]   Wojtyła claimed that the traditional versions of that method could not grasp human action, and that is why he adapted it to his research objectives, thanks to which he achieved something that can be called "transphenomenology." See Rocco Buttiglione, *The Thought of the Man Who Become Pope John Paul II*, trans. Paolo Guietti and Francesca Murphy (Grand Rapids, Michigan and Cambridgre, U.K.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997), 120-121. When explaining the method used in *The Acting Person*, Wojtyła mentions induction and reduction; however, he distinguishes phenomenological and metaphysical reduction. See Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Reidel, 1979), 14-17, 78, 82.

[13]   It seems that the merging of the object-oriented and subject-oriented perspectives is comprehended by Wojtyła as something more than only a meta-object research postulate. These perspectives, as two modes of apprehending the human being in experience, turn out to be crucial elements of understanding the person as such.

[14]   See Karol Wojtyła, "Słowo końcowe po dyskusji nad *Osobą i czynem*," in Wojtyła, *'Osoba i czyn' oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, red. Tadeusz Styczeń et al. (Lublin: TN KUL, 1994), 355-357.

[15]   On the grounds of the philosophy of being, the person is seen as a substance, i.e. a concrete rational nature of a human being. The second of these traditions, in its phenomenological-existential version, perceives the person as the center or the deepest level of the human being.

Therefore, Wojtyła had to find an adequate way to make use of two great discoveries of modern philosophy, i.e. consciousness and freedom, without abandoning the philosophy of being.[16] In his considerations, he postulated the necessity of reinterpreting the philosophical image of the human-person through confronting Aquinas's metaphysical concept of a person with a holistic human experience. He took into account the possibility of greatly deepening the insight into the essence of the human being which allowed, among others, to investigate the cognitive sources on which Aquinas based his metaphysical claims.

Such a confrontation was supposed to enable the encounter of traditional anthropological perspectives with contemporary philosophy as well as rejecting or correcting in the latter those assertions which are not true.[17] Wojtyła believed that the only way to apply the general theory of being to the conception of the person is distinct human experience. According to Wojtyła, the ontic objectivization of the human being as an acting subject, accepted in metaphysically oriented philosophical anthropology (e.g. in Krąpiec's theory of the human being), should be supplemented by "the revelation of the person as a subject *experiencing* its acts and inner happenings and with them its own subjectivity."[18] This supplement must protect itself from subjectivism, for the sake of revealing the authentic subjectivity of the person, with the disclaimer that this subjectivity should be placed within the domain of the realistic interpretation of the human being as a being.[19]

The aim of Wojtyła's synthesis was to expand the perception of the human being as a person through incorporating into the scope of philo-

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[16]  According to Rocco Buttiglione, "the distinction between the capability to cognize in an object-oriented manner and the capability for subjective interiorization enables implanting the discovery of subjectivity into the trunk of the philosophy of being" (Buttiglione, "Kilka uwag o sposobie czytania *Osoby i czynu*," in Wojtyła, *'Osoba i czyn' oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, 27). The human being indeed creates his/her own world, but he/she does that on the basis of primarily given existence, i.e. by being a real being. The consequence of such an implantation is a thesis that recognizes the ontological difference between the person and other entities: the being reveals its mystery the most in the person as compared with other types of being. See ibidem.

[17]  See Karol Wojtyła, "The Personal Structure of Self-Determination," in Wojtyła, *Person and Community: Selected Essays,* trans. Theresa Sandok (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 194-195; also Wojtyła, "Słowo końcowe po dyskusji nad *Osobą i czynem*," 353-354.

[18]  Karol Wojtyła, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being," in Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 213.

[19]  See ibidem.

sophical anthropology the entire richness of the person's lived experience of oneself as the subject of his or her own act. The aspiration to objectivize lived experience should be accompanied, in his view, with the "subjectivization" of the theory of the human being, i.e. with the allowing for the distinct character of the subjective revealing of a person, apart from the theses concerning human nature which apprehend the human being in an object-oriented way. This was an expression of a deeper search for the essence of the human being resulting from dissatisfaction with traditional approaches characterized by a narrowed subject-oriented perspective, contemporary absolutizations of the consciousness, or reductions with an epistemological basis.

## 2. Metaphysical foundations of personalism in the Lublin Philosophical School

The differences between these two perspectives on developing anthropology in an obvious way result from the differences in the methods applied. Bearing in mind this basic dissimilarity, I shall draw attention to an essential concurrence and a certain complementarity between Krąpiec's and Wojtyła's views.[20] It becomes particularly apparent from the moment when one indicates the essential foundation for this concurrence: the object and purpose of anthropological inquiries assumed by both thinkers. In short, the object of anthropology in both of these approaches is the really existing subject given in internal and external experience. Differences appear predominantly in the case of the selected method, which is dependent on the appropriate research platform. One should also mention that divergences appeared already in internal disputes and discussions which were conducted on the borderline of these two perspectives of developing anthropology.[21] Due to the universal character of the Lublin Philosophical School, the

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[20]  I drew attention to the complementarity of these approaches in my book entitled *U podstaw jedności bytowej człowieka. Studium z metafizyki osoby* [At the Basis of the Ontic Unity of Man: A Study in the Metaphysics of a Person] (Lublin: PTTA, 2016). This article includes fragments of this study.

[21]  Probably the first of such discussions was the debate on Wojtyła's *Osoba i czyn* [The Acting Person] published in *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5-6 (1973-1974): 49-297.

purpose of these disputes was nothing else but cognizing the truth about the human being. And it was that truth on which there concentrated the intellectual efforts of any anthropological views built and developed here.[22]

The intention to present the concurrences and complementarities of both concepts of the person, which emerged and were developed within the Lublin Philosophical School, is based on the initial definition of a research endeavor, the conduction of which remained in connection with other works carried out within the School. This endeavor may be called a project of realistic personalism, based on classical metaphysics, or in short: the project of the metaphysics of the person. Initially one can describe it as a specifically understood synthesis between personalist experience, ascertained at the point of departure of anthropological inquiries, and a metaphysical sort of justification, indicating the direction of building a theory of the person. One should stress that this task was realized in one way in Wojtyła's thought and in another way in Krąpiec's reflections, although both thinkers were aware of its theoretical significance. Both of them pointed to metaphysics as the ultimate grounding of the theory of the person. The essential concept was then very similar. Reconsidering it seems to be very necessary with the passing of time, not only to clarify it more precisely but also to be able to look at it in the light of new concepts of the human being and contemporary anthropological challenges.

## 2.1. A Concept of experience

The basic concern not to overlook any essential aspect of experience contacting the human being with reality and with oneself compelled both thinkers to include all sides of cognition which were possible to differentiate. This concern is part of a more general philosophical position which is called cognitive realism. It is one of the distinct characteristics of the Lublin Philosophical School, and it assumes some objective order of reality which is the point of philosophical reference for any fact or phenomenon.

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The disputes conducted at the time concerned more than simply the two-fold manner of developing anthropology within the Lublin Philosophical School.

[22] In the 1970s emphasis was placed on the differences between the ways in which Krąpiec and Wojtyła were building anthropology. Today it is worth stressing, for various reasons, what they had in common and what currently constitutes the value of the Lublin Philosophical School's anthropological heritage.

Together with a holistic understanding of experience, including also sensual and intellectual elements, both authors manifest a concern for the possibly most direct cognitive reaching for the object of inquiry itself – the human being. Krąpiec dedicates more attention to the issue of direct cognition because he treats it as an epistemic basis for philosophical cognition *per se*. He claims that direct cognition does not concern the essence but solely existence. Wojtyła's concept of experience is in turn subordinate to anthropological and ethical goals; therefore, it concentrates on the human beings (direct cognition of "I") and reduces it to the phenomenological insight into contents of conscious experience.

The concept of experience assumed in classical philosophy is based on pre-scientific cognition which guarantees cognitive self-reliance and independence of philosophy from the sciences and their assumptions.[23] According to Krąpiec, cognition or else experience which lie at the foundations of Thomistic anthropological reflection must feature directness as their main quality. The direct cognition in such a radical sense consists of two elementary judgments, called existential judgments, namely: "something exists" and "I exist," which mean the affirmation of the existence of reality and of oneself.[24] Explaining the human being must start from this primal experience in which the autonomous "I" becomes revealed.[25] Krąpiec calls experience so

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[23]  Krąpiec criticized the postulate, which was brought up already in his times, that the basic fact for philosophical anthropology, to be the image of the human being provided by the particular sciences. However, this image, as he claims, is only seemingly uniform, and, moreover, of necessity it contains also many cognitive implications in the form of assumptions referring to a specific philosophy or theory of science. See Krąpiec, *I – Man*, 29.

[24]  See ibidem. The theory of the existential judgment postulated within existential Thomism was systematically elaborated in Krąpiec's monographs. It is worth mentioning that this theory is closely connected with the theory of metaphysical separation, and only when taken together, does the former become fully comprehensible. Cf. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1995), 563–568; Meczysław A. Krąpiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline of the Theory of Being*, trans. Theresa Sandok (New York et al.: Peter Lang, 1991), 86-100; Krapiec, s.v. "Metafizyka," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al., vol. 7 (Lublin: PTTA, 2006), 102-116.

[25]  The existence of the being is the reason for the existential judgment which, in turn, is the reason for the primal (accompanying) reflection that activates the subject-oriented element in the form of an egotic existential judgment. I presented Krąpiec's analysis of internal experience in the article "The Foundations of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec's Metaphysical Personalism," *Forum Philosophicum* 19, no. 1 (2014): 68-75.

understood the vernacular situation of being a human being.[26] Due to this experience, the primal fact and not some basic notion of the human being becomes the point of departure in anthropological reflection. Such a concept is compliant with Krąpiec's metaphysical system and the basic rule of realism: the sources of all thoughts are objective, real facts, comprehended as existing entities.[27]

Although, in Wojtyła's view, the human being is also a being in the world, the basic experience leading to the cognition of the human being is his/her internal experience, i.e. self-cognition. The primary object of analyses is the human act which bears within it a personal mark. An act cannot be analyzed exclusively on the basis of the data of consciousness, but one must look at it in the context of the entirety of human experience, i.e. with the inclusion of external experience and the cognition of the entire reality. When comparing their internal experience of the "I" and external experience of "the human being," Wojtyła stresses their qualitative identity (as opposed to numerical identity) and simultaneously their disparity.[28] This subject-oriented and at the same time object-oriented manner of giving the human being in experience is a characteristic moment which manifests the human being's uniqueness as well as the necessity to include both of these perspective of looking at a person.[29]

The external and internal experience of the human being, analyzed from an appropriate angle, shows the division of philosophy into object-oriented and subject-oriented. Wojtyła clearly postulates that instead of absolutizing these aspects, one should aim at their mutual relativization which consists in an attempt to harmonize both of these orientations.[30] Namely, he claims

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[26]  See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Doświadczenie i metafizyka," *Roczniki Filozoficzne 24*, no. 1 (1976): 15; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Ciało ludzkie," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al., vol. 2, 177. Experiencing oneself as the subject of one's own acts is a distinct source for explaining human nature because it reveals in a certain way the mysteries of being, being the only possible insight of the being "from within." See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek jako osoba* (Lublin: PTTA, 2005), 11, 13.

[27]  Cf. Krąpiec, *Realizm ludzkiego poznania*, 72-77.

[28]  See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 5ff.

[29]  See Karol Wojtyla, "The Person: Subject and Community," in Wojtyła *Person and Community*, 221-222.

[30]  See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 18. The platform for this harmonization is supposed to be the philosophy of being: "Indeed, we indirectly owe to philosophy of consciousness a deeper understanding of the human being from the perspective of his/her consciousness – and this certainly leads us to the enrichment of the vision of the

that internal and external experience can be integrated if understood adequately, i.e. in their mutual relation because experience is fundamentally homogenous. The human being is given in the entirety of experience: cognizing the external world really occurs in the human being, whereas the subject cognizes oneself as somebody who exists in the world as one of the beings.[31]

At the point of departure the human being is therefore examined as a real being, cognized in the context of other beings which surround him/ her as well as in the light of the specific human experience of oneself. The elementary experience of the human being must be understood comprehensively – it cannot be narrowed down either in a phenomenalistic or rationalistic manner. To simplify the perspectives of both authors, one can conclude that they accept a similar concept of experience. However, Krąpiec concentrates on its structural elements, and Wojtyła stays with its functional aspect because he is primarily interested in the phenomenological description of data provided by experience.[32]

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person and the act. Remaining on the grounds of philosophy of being, we would like to benefit from this richness." Wojciech Chudy, "Aneks," in Wojtyła, *'Osoba i czyn' oraz inne studia antropologiczne,* 339. In the second Polish edition of the book this fragment was not included. [The third edition here quoted includes an "Annex" which lists most important changes in the second edition (Kraków 1985) in relation to the first edition (Kraków 1969). The English edition does not have such an "Annex." Editor's note].

[31]　See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 7. It is also crucial to stress the simplicity of experience which is something more primal and apparent than its complexity. For this reason, experience is not only a sum of acts which constitute it, but it also concerns a certain whole (e.g. the human being). See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 3-5, 8. Cf. Jerzy Gałkowski, "Pozycja filozoficzna kard. Karola Wojtyły," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 29, no. 2 (1981): 78.

[32]　Wojtyła assumes a concept of the direct insight into the object, akin to phenomenology, which contains in itself both the sensual insight and the intellectual understanding (so-called understanding experience). See Karol Wojtyła, "The Problem of Experience in Ethics," in Wojtyła, *Person and Community*, 113-114; Karol Wojtyła, "The Personal Structure of Self-Determination," 188-189; Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 9-10, 15. This means that the reasons explaining the investigated fact are contained in the experience itself. Thanks to that, it is possible to analyze experience and acquire an understanding of its subject, i.e. the human being. Experience grasps certain holistic and distinguishing structures, which enable the initial understanding of the experience *per se*. However, those structures require the ultimate explanation in the form of metaphysical justification. See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 4, 8ff, 79-80.

## 2.2. The subject – person

On the basis of the concept of experience so understood one reaches the understanding of the object: the human being who is a real being, a subject, a self-aware "I", and a person. However, the last term, despite being used predominantly as a theoretical term by both authors, appears at their points of departure (although in a different way). Wojtyła assumes that the person is given in insight in a primal and direct manner, while according to Krąpiec the experience of the "I" reveals the person through some reasoning.[33] When trying to formulate essential differences between the perspectives of both authors, in the context of the general similarity in the understanding of experience, one should acknowledge that in Krąpiec's concept, the human being, provided in internal experience, is in a way the "I" objectivized in relation to Wojtyła's concept in which the dominating role is played by subjective aspects. Krąpiec's analyses, in turn, are based on the metaphysical analogy of the human subject as a being, whereas Wojtyła concentrates on the unitary experience, striving not so much for its objectivization but rather for its intersubjectivization.[34]

According to Krąpiec's theory, the experience of one's own personal being reveals itself in the experiencing of one's own "I", it is, therefore, given directly in spontaneous cognition.[35] The subsequent task of philosophical reflection should be the accurate exposition and appropriate explanation of that what is given directly in order to be able to demonstrate the personal nature of the human being.[36] The primordial experience of the "I" is ex-

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[33] For more on Wojtyła's concept see *The Acting Person*, 15-16. In Krąpiec's anthropology the directly experienced "I" reveals its autonomous subjectivity and the fact of experiencing its own onticity. This provided the basis for the equation of the "I" with the person as an individual rational subject. See Krąpiec, s.v. "Człowiek," *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 2, 376.

[34] See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 16-17.

[35] A remark which Krąpiec makes in the footnote of his analyses seems significant: "This does not mean, however, that a strictly phenomenological description and point of departure would be accepted here, or that consciousness would be something primordial in philosophical analysis […]. It means merely that the self-cognition that each of us has of himself, is, in the sphere of philosophical anthropology, something that is primordially given." Krąpiec, *I – Man*, 386, footnote 5.

[36] Cf. Krąpiec, s.v. "Człowiek," 376. The human being, experiencing directly his/her existence, still does not know who he/she is. This means that he/she does not know one's essence. The analysis of the acts recognized as "mine" in the dynamism of this direct experience is aimed at a comprehensive cognition of who someone is, that is

pressed in ("my") acts which emanate from it. Since they are an expression of the subject-person, they also demonstrate the source from which they come and in which they exist as in the subject. Consequently, they become, according to the principle *operari sequitur esse*, a path to its cognition. The philosophical analysis of these acts, which consists in their objectivization, leads to a discovery of the structure and properties of human nature. This is an object-oriented analysis (it focuses on the object of acts, and not on their experiencing), and in that point it differs from Wojtyła's phenomeno-logical analyses. Due to this object-orientation, it is possible to distinguish certain structures of action that are projected onto the ontic structure of their subject.[37]

In Wojtyła's analyses concerning the understanding of the human being as a person, i.e. a consciously acting moral subject, anthropological aspects are necessarily connected with ethical aspects. The person most fully manifests itself, in Wojtyła's view, as a subject of morality who constitutes oneself in truth.[38] The objective of anthropological analysis is the attempt to understand "the human person for the sake of the person himself; it is thus designed to respond to the challenge that is posed by the experience of man in all its richness brings, and also the existential problems of man in the contemporary world."[39] On the other hand, anthropology based on metaphysics, that is on the theory of being, constitutes the proper basis of ethics.[40] This is essential also in the context of the contemporary tenden-

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cognizing the essence of the experienced "I", and thus of its nature understood as the source of determined action.

[37] See Krąpiec, *I – Man*, 326-333.

[38] Extracting anthropological aspects is possible thanks to an operation that Wojtyła himself applied in *The Acting Person*, when speaking of the so-called extraction of the ethical issues beyond the parenthesis, in order to give voice to anthropological elements. See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 13-14.

[39] Ibidem, 22.

[40] "The problem of the meaning of human life remains closely associated with the problem of the human being, and of being in general; hence it is that the authentic philosophy of being is the proper foundation for ethics. If any ethics deserves the name 'scientific,' it is that which is associated with the true philosophy of being. (…) This must be so, since without an honest reflection on the human being and on his finality or telicity, one cannot construct a rationally justified knowledge about what is morally good or evil, i.e. ethics." Karol Wojtyła, *Ethics Primer* (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2017), 29-31.

cies to separate ethics from anthropology and replacing the latter with the psychology or sociology of morality.[41]

Thus, placing a strong emphasis on the subject's perspective in Wojtyła's philosophy does not lead to the subjectivization of anthropology or to breaking its ties to metaphysics.[42] Human acts provide insight into the structure of the person. This structure – considered from the point of view of methods – reveals itself as "a set of the necessary conditions of the occurrence of that what is insightly – therefore experientially – given."[43] Therefore the path from the experience to understanding, that is to the theory of the person, must lead through metaphysical analysis because phenomenology is not capable of leading to the understanding of causal relations.[44] One must then reach for the metaphysics of the person developed by Thomas Aquinas and to regain the induction method as the possibility of going from what is singular to what is universal.[45] Aquinas's concept of *actus humanus*, which points at what is irreducible in the human being, assumes the ontic substantiality of the person. In order to understand the relation between this act and the action given in experience, a phenomenological description of experience is insufficient because it is necessary to complement this description with metaphysical understanding.[46]

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[41]   See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 12.

[42]   One of the arguments backing that claim is the fact that the categories of the subject, soul, act and potentiality are understood by Wojtyła as metaphysical notions in the classical variation of the theory of being.

[43]   Wojtyła, "Osobowa struktura samostanowienia," in Wojtyła, *'Osoba i czyn' oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, 430. [This sentence does not appear in the English text "The Personal Structure of Self-Determination," cf. 193. Editor's note].

[44]   Due to applying phenomenological methods for his own use, Wojtyła could conduct inquiries into the field of the philosophy of being and at the same time make use of the accomplishments of the philosophy of consciousness, avoiding the confusion of orders and ambiguity. See Buttiglione, *The Thought of the Man Who Become Pope John Paul II*, 274-275; Buttiglione, "Kilka uwag o sposobie czytania *Osoby i czynu*," 16, 26, 27.

[45]   See Buttiglione, *The Thought of the Man Who Become Pope John Paul II*, 275-276. According to Buttiglione this induction refers to the notion in Socrates's understanding: it is the result of the encounter of a person with an object, the encounter which does not lead to instrumental knowledge. See ibidem, 277.

[46]   See ibidem, 124-125. The discovery of the functioning of a person, its efficient causality, and responsibility for one's acts is the phenomenological confirmation of the metaphysics of the potency and act in its exemplification in relation to the human being. See Buttiglione, "Kilka uwag o sposobie czytania *Osoby i czynu*," 17. Wojtyła, similarly to Krąpiec, recognizes the classical concept of the act and potency as the most adequate theory explaining human dynamism. In Wojtyła's reflection, applying

Wojtyła's and Krąpiec's concepts of personalism differ both with regard to their language and method. Despite that, the complementarity of these approaches is noticeable at some points which are open towards each other in various ways. Wojtyła's phenomenological description, as it was already mentioned, is aimed at understanding experiences, assuming the ultimate explanation of a metaphysical character (Wojtyła uses the method of so-called metaphysical reduction).[47] This description is to a certain degree concurrent with the description used by Krąpiec in the phase of analyzing experience. Krąpiec uses the metaphysical method of decontradictifying facts, i.e. pointing to the necessary reason which explains a particular fact. However, the metaphysical method of justifying facts does not start with some general or particular theses of the system of metaphysics but with original anthropological data which stem from the description of experience; in that Krąpiec is getting close to Wojtyła's analyses. Both authors are connected by their search for the ultimate reasons for the investigated facts, what stems from the common heritage in classical philosophy. On account of this, their paths lead to the same goal: to explain ultimately the human being as a real fact, i.e. as a being and as a subject given in the primal experience of the self ("I").[48]

### 2.3. Personal existence

It is crucial at this stage to point to the factor which in the case of both authors plays a key role in the comprehension of the person and in the justification of its ontic status which is simultaneously given in the direct experience of oneself as a subject. This factor is personal existence (*esse personale*).[49] Cognition of existence is the bridge connecting thinking with

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this theory to the analysis of the person leads to the assertion that the metaphysical basis (potentiality) of a specifically human act is the irreducible interior of the person which becomes realized in the act. See K. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 63-65.

[47] See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 82-84.

[48] In the analyses of both authors the key role is played by the moment of the transcendence of the person and its spiritual dimension. For Krąpiec the expression of transcendence are the acts of cognition, love, and freedom, and for Wojtyla – the structure of self-determination. See Krąpiec, *I- Man*, 120-236, and Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 105-186.

[49] I presented this concept in more detail in my book *U podstaw jedności bytowej człowieka*, 317-328, 389-411, and 430-435.

objective reality which assures the unity of the human being with the world. According to Wojciech Chudy, the division of reality between the level of being and the level of consciousness may be eliminated on the grounds of classical philosophy by the concept of the existential judgment (Krąpiec) or the personal cognition of the being (Wojtyła)[50], i.e. on each of the two paths of personalism developed in the Lublin Philosophical School.

Both concepts are based on a common core: the personal *esse*. Wojtyła reaches the affirmation of the personal being on the basis of the experience that "the human being acts," and, by employing phenomenology, he attempts to demonstrate in what way the metaphysical basis apprehended as his/her personal existence is reflected in his/her consciously experienced existence.[51] At the same time Krąpiec, following Thomas Aquinas, on the basis of the general theory of being comes to the claim that the person as a being-rational subject may be constituted only by the *esse*. Although the two authors conducted their inquiries on a different philosophical basis, both of them attempted to build the theory of the human being as a person, with Aquinas's classical theory as a point of departure. Nevertheless, despite placing emphasis on different aspects, due to putting the person in the center of anthropology and also thanks to drawing attention to the specific data of human experience, these interpretations could meet at the point which constitutes the very core of considerations about the human being, i.e. recognizing the fundamental role of personal existence.

One can point to numerous parallels between results of Wojtyła's description of understanding experience and categories of classical metaphysics of the human being which also, as he stresses, is based on a specific sort of experience.[52] The most convergent point is personal existence. By reaching for Aquinas's concept, in which existence is the first act of the being, Wojtyła wanted to show that the connection between existence and

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[50]  See Wojciech Chudy, *Rozwój filozofowania a "pułapka refleksji." Filozofia refleksji i próby jej przezwyciężenia* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1995), 101-102. In accordance with the point of departure of Wojtyła's analyses, the truth about the being and existence (of the object) is cognized in the context of personal reflection. See ibid., 78. What is more, the philosophy of the human being forces us to pose the problem of being as such. See Buttiglione, *The Thought of the Man Who Become Pope John Paul II*, 136.

[51]  See Rocco Buttiglione, "Kilka uwag o sposobie czytania *Osoby i czynu*," 15.

[52]  Wojtyła wanted to reach to this experience in his analyses in order to "illuminate" it, but also to use it as light. See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 186; Wojtyła, "The Personal Structure of Self-Determination," 195.

action (*operari sequitur esse*) consists in the fact that the existence is the principle of the entire dynamism of being; therefore, the personal *esse* manifests itself in the dynamism of the person. Thus, in the dynamism of the person, there manifests itself the personal *esse*, i.e. the person as a metaphysical subject.[53]

Krąpiec emphasized the role of personal existence when speaking of the affirmation of the "I" given in internal experience. The direct experience of the "I" which is constantly present in the experienced acts allows one to notice clearly the primacy of existence over essence. Personal existence, despite being unique and irreducible to any other mode of being's existence, must be comprehended analogically on the general ontic level, in the context of existence as the fundamental ontic factor. Personal existence is the existence of the person as a special and unique being present in the real world.[54]

Krąpiec also drew attention to the substantial difficulty in comprehending existence, which constitutes an obstacle in discovering existence as the reason for explaining onticity. The obstacle comes from the impossibility to imagine existence in another way than only as a certain content or essence. It is then necessary to accept a certain cognitive difficulty which inevitably accompanies the cognition of existence in order to pursue the path indicated by Wojtyła's and Krąpiec's analyses. In this way, it is possible to discover personal existence, along with its bilateral (subjective-objective) uniqueness, thanks to which we discover that it is the obvious foundation of the unity, identity, and uniqueness of each human being as a person.

## 3. Conclusions

The foundation for the metaphysics of the person, which was developed within the Lublin Philosophical School, is the synthesis between the specific personal experience described at the point of departure and metaphysical

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[53]    See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 72-74. According to Rocco Buttiglione, the phenomenological description applied by Wojtyła allowed him to notice the metaphysical consistency of the person and show that due to the acceptance of the ontic substantiality of the person, the integration of the person and the act may be more fruitful. See Buttiglione, *The Thought of the Man Who Become Pope John Paul II*, 121-122.

[54]    See Krąpiec, *Metaphysics*, 89-90.

explanation. This synthesis is in a distinct way revealed by the concept of personal existence which for this reason should constitute the core of the thus understood metaphysics of the person.

Krąpiec is the author of the metaphysics of the person that can justly be called metaphysical personalism which fits into the program of the Lublin Philosophical School, compliant with its assumptions and priorities. Metaphysical justification in this case had a systemic form and was harmonized with the holistic philosophical knowledge about reality in its maximalist dimension. Wojtyła's concept is the metaphysics of the person in a different sense. Constituting – as intended – only an aspectual implementation of philosophical anthropology,[55] it did not aspire to a complete explanation of the essence of the human being, neither did it ascribe in a strict sense to the project of metaphysical philosophy. Its crucial role was to demonstrate the experiential basis of knowledge about the human being as a person in a more convincing manner than before. Therefore, the phenomenological description of experience was not supposed to replace the metaphysical dimension of explaining the person but only to confirm it and make it more clear. For this purpose one had to "go deeper" into the subjective aspect of examining the person and reach for an encounter with the objective, object-oriented perspective from the side of analyses of experience. Wojtyła's anthropology is then methodically different, but ultimately it also becomes the metaphysics of the person.

As the most important elements of the metaphysics of the person, elaborated on both paths of formulating the personalist philosophy of the human being at the Lublin Philosophical School, one should, first of all, mention the concept of personal experience which is the source of knowledge about the human being. A description of experience is the fundamental phenomenology of the person which, in varying ways, was incorporated into the anthropologies of Krąpiec and of Wojtyła. The understanding of experience by both authors, on the other hand, has a substantial connection with cognitive realism, hence the emphasis placed on the directness of experience as well as the large scope of its occurrence, thanks to which the concept resists any form of reductionism.

Secondly, the kernel of personalism characteristic for the Lublin Philosophical School is the search for the essence of the human being-person in the metaphysical sense. The search for the ultimate justification of

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[55]   See Wojtyła, "Słowo końcowe po dyskusji nad *Osoba i czynem*," in Wojtyła, *'Osoba i czyn' oraz inne studia antropologiczne*, 360.

the person is the pursuit for the ontic grounding of personalism, thanks to which the personal experience becomes to a certain extent correlated with metaphysical theories (admittedly also based on an analogical type of experience). This type of justification is the essence of a properly understood metaphysics of the person.

Thirdly, the person is a subject in a metaphysical sense, i.e. a substance, and at the same time a self-aware subject – the unique and unrepeatable "I". The personalism of the Lublin Philosophical is a realistic conception, and that is why the person is understood as a real being, cognized commonsensically, and at the same time accessible in a distinct inner experience.

And finally, fourthly, the culminating point of thus understood metaphysics of the person, leading to the indication of the ultimate philosophical reason explaining the person, is the category of personal existence. Personal existence, on the one hand, manifests its ontic analogicity because it presents the human being as a real being, and on the other hand, it distinguishes a fundamentally and entirely human manner of existence from any other form of existence. This concept raises awareness of the necessity to include the double perspective in analyses of the human being. It also reveals the ultimate basis for the analogy of existence, thanks to which the human being is comprehensible as a real and self-identical being. For the "I" is a being insofar as one can analogically apprehend its existence, and at the same time it differs so greatly from beings-objects that it is apprehensible only as a personal existence, i.e. existence of a non-object, completely unique existence.[56]

When summarizing the characteristics of personalism developed at the Lublin Philosophical School, one should stress that it is an open conception which needs to be further developed.[57] Wojtyła expressed his optimism concerning the progress in the field of knowledge about the human being in

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[56]    Existence is most perfect in the person because it is simultaneously internal experience, as if "from the inside," but also cognized "from the outside," analogously to the existence of all beings.

[57]    The openness of this conception is expressed in the fact that multiple forms of conducting reflection on the human being are possible within it. This is signified by the dual way (which does not mean limiting the number of options to two) of practicing metaphysics of the person. Moreover, Krąpiec's and Wojtyła's conceptions reach, to varying degrees and in different configurations, for the achievements of the early modern and contemporary era with regard to the human being (subjectivity, consciousness etc.). Apart from that, one can point to areas of anthropology which are awaiting to be described within this concept of a person, like, for instance, the historical dimension of the person (in the individual or social-universal aspect).

the following manner: "in our philosophical thinking about the human being we are not in a situation of an irreversible rupture or tear – one could go even further, trying to merge together a multitude of paths."[58]

The realistic metaphysics of the person is simultaneously a deeply rational and philosophical conception which goes against frequently encountered contemporary attempts that try to explain the human being in a solely eclectic or methodologically inconsistent manner. This personalism indicates a path to ultimate justification of the person and leads to showing its deepest dimension which can be reduced neither to the purely empirical level nor to a purely immanent one. In this sense one can consider the metaphysics of the person developed at the Lublin Philosophical School as a unique conception on a world scale, the conception which can constitute an important voice in the contemporary anthropological debate.

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[58] Karol Wojtyła, "Słowo końcowe po dyskusji nad *Osobą i czynem*," 369. Krąpiec, in turn, noticed that emphasizing the personal moment of human beingness as well as stressing the individual existence of the subject is concurrent with the postulates of the philosophy of the subject, concerning the role of the consciousness, and it is also reminiscent of the analyses of the existentialists who emphasized human uniqueness. See Krąpiec, "Karola Wojtyły *Osoba i czyn*," 76-77; Mieczysław Krąpiec, *Człowiek – dramat natury i osoby*, 24-25; Krąpiec, *I – Man*, 112-113.

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# The Peculiarity of the Language of the Theory of Being

In linguistics, language is most often understood as a system of signs generated in the process of cognition, serving the formulation of cognized content and communicating it to other subjects. The sign refers its user to an object (a signified thing), assuming both a natural (concepts, judgments) as well as a conventional-instrumental form (expressions, words). The function of signifying encompasses, therefore, the cognizing subject or else the one establishing the sign, the object which is grasped by the sign as well as the content of the sign corresponding to the content of the object, although only in certain aspects.[1] In the language of the theory of being, both the formulation of cognition and communicating it has a peculiar character. This is connected with a distinct way of understanding signs, starting from their function of referring, through natural signs, up until conventional-instrumental signs. The language of metaphysics belongs to the category of natural languages where the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic rules are grounded in the laws of existence and of cognizing things. It differs from an artificial language which may have no relations with the real world. Nonetheless, the question of the reference

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[1] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Język i świat realny* [Language and the Real World] (Lublin: RW KUL, 1995), 21-23.

to reality in the language of metaphysics is much more radicalized than in other natural languages.[2]

When speaking about the peculiarity of the language of the theory of being, one has to take into account the fact that this domain does not deal "either with the qualitative-quantitative or the formal aspects of reality but rather, as no other science does, with the general existential aspect: it is occupied with being that is real."[3] This sort of a theory of being was practiced in the Lublin Philosophical School, and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec had here the greatest merit.[4] One should also note the important contribution made by Stanisław Kamiński who focused on the methodological aspect of the theory of being.[5] It is, therefore, an untypical sort of knowledge which is aimed at the ultimate and necessary explanation of reality apprehended "at first sensibly and intellectually from the point of view of a concrete existence, and then, by virtue of appropriate cognitive acts, generally, but in the analogous and transcendental aspect."[6] Except for that, the aim of the theory of being is to demonstrate the ontic grounding of the principles of human cognition, implicitly assumed by different types of knowledge. While reflecting on the principles of human cognition, the theory of being poses also the question about the language in which this cognition is expressed and communicated. Thus, presenting the specificity of the theory of being includes the issue of the ontic foundations of human language as such. To be more specific, it is about explaining the dependencies occurring in the

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[2]   See Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Rola języka naturalnego w metafizyce realistycznej," *Roczniki Humanistyczne* 59, no. 8 (2011): 9.

[3]   Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics,* trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2018), 217.

[4]   Krąpiec most often called the theory of being "metaphysics," "general metaphysics," or "realistic metaphysics." Although in a strict sense "theory of being" means "general metaphysics," following Krąpiec, we shall also use the term "metaphysics."

[5]   Apart from these authors the issue of the language of the theory of being was covered, among others, by the following thinkers within the Lublin Philosophical School: Stanisław Majdański, "O naturze logicznej transcendentaliów," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 10, no. 1 (1962): 41-85; Antoni B. Stępień, "Istnienie (czegoś) a pojęcie i sąd," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 9, no. 1 (1973): 235-261; Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Uwarunkowania logicznej charakterystyki języka metafizyki," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 27, no. 2 (1991): 109-117.

[6]   Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," 213.

triad: being – thought – language.[7] The general characteristic of the theory of being presented above presupposes certain properties of the language which are indispensable for both the theory of being to play the role of a basic domain of human cognition and for the language itself not to be exclusively a conventional construct of the human mind, but also a tool which enables cognizing the real world and communicating the acquired knowledge. According to Krąpiec and Kamiński, the language of the theory of being is an extension of the natural (ordinary) language, and thanks to that, it retains its objective character because the structure of the language is grounded in the structure of being.[8] What is more, that language is based on transcendental expressions within which the remaining terms are clarified. Another defining feature of the language of the theory of being is its analogical character which directly results from its prior properties, guaranteeing at the same time their realizability. These properties ensure specific cognitive qualities to the language of the theory of being, indicating a fundamental position of this domain among the remaining types of knowledge. Showing the peculiarity of the language of the theory of being requires a closer look at the aforementioned problems. However, their breadth as well as the scope of this article do not allow for an extensive treatment.

## 1. An extension of the ordinary language

Cognition achieved in particular scholarly domains is expressed in a specific theoretical language. That language allows to construct a system of expressions ultimately justified by the assumptions that constitute the foundation for a particular discipline. Even if at the point of departure certain terms are accepted only intuitively (among others from everyday language), in theoretical descriptions and explanations one gives them a fairly precise meaning. That is why colloquial language has a limited application in science. The theory of being is a different case, as it deals with the basis for the world's cognoscibility. Colloquial language is treated as an element

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[7] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Język i jego kreatywne aspekty," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 27, no. 1 (1979): 22.

[8] Krąpiec, *Język i świat realny*, 57-62.

of pre-theoretical cognition which is more about the cognitive contact of the human being with reality *per se* as well as its initial apprehensions than about theoretized cognition. From the perspective of the theory of being, it is not insignificant that despite all of its imprecision, colloquial language allows us to formulate a particular description of the world as well as of the situation of the human being in the world with regard to his or her knowledge about the world and the possibility of communicating it. In colloquial language the human being's basic cognitive aspirations are revealed. They concern the understanding of empirically available reality, the purpose of human life, and the nature of cognition. On account of that, Kamiński believes that colloquial language is sufficient to formulate initial assumptions and questions indispensable for building a theory of being.[9] Apprehensions of reality expressed in colloquial language are usually enriched by certain elements of particular sciences and some philosophical systems which entered into the conceptual schema of a given culture. This, however, does not change the fact that it is about pre-theoretical apprehensions; and it is necessary to discern them if the theory of being is to maintain neutrality in relation to its object and, because of that, to be a domain which explains the foundations of human cognition.

What sort of initial assumptions and questions does then colloquial language allow us to formulate, on the basis of which one can develop a theory of being? Why cannot this role be played at the same time by theoretical languages developed within the particular sciences which currently seem to be the basis of the only rational apprehension of the world available in experience? At the point of departure of the theory of being, one initially assumes the existence of the world independent of the human mind and the possibility of cognizing that world a mind.[10] This is confirmed already at the level of colloquial language in which the spontaneous reaction of the cognizing subject towards surrounding objects is expressed. Their existence in the realm of cognition actualizes cognitively the subject. In colloquial language primal and spontaneous conceptualizing activities occur, and thanks to them in linguistic expressions the content of cognized entities is grasped and communicated by means of conventional signs.[11] Prop-

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9    Stanisław Kamiński, "On the Language of the Theory of Being," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*,116-117.

10   Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," 208-209.

11   Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Znaki i rzeczywistość," *Człowiek w Kulturze* 4-5 (1995): 11ff.

ositional cognition – most characteristic for intellectual cognition – is also formulated, and in it the cognizing agent actually adjusts itself to cognized reality, what traditionally is described as "truth." Apart from that, three key aspects of the language reveal themselves: syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic which unveil accordingly the structure of the language, its reference to reality, and its functions.[12]

Basically, every theoretical language describing the world accepts to a lesser or greater degree the aforementioned properties of colloquial language. However, it looks quite differently in the theory of being and the so-called real sciences. The difference concerns, among others, the sources of terms, the manner of formulating them, the rules of applying them, and the degree of their constructiveness. In effect, the theoretical language of the real sciences almost entirely cuts off ties with colloquial language, assuming same form of a domain-specific artificially constructed conceptual schema. In the theory of being, on the other hand, ordinary language is appreciated because on its basis the process of determining formal object of this domain of cognition is initiated.[13] What is specific of the theory of being is that the transition from the pre-theoretical to the theoretical language occurs already within colloquial language. In this language one expresses the content of the most basic acts of cognition by means of which the fundamental aspects of being that constitute the formal object of the theory of being are grasped. That is why one cannot point to a clear demarcation line between ordinary and theoretical cognition as well as that between colloquial and theoretical language, for here the most basic acts of human cognition which find their "natural" expression in language are at stake. An essential feature of primal cognitive acts is their grounding in the properties of the cognized being which define the aforementioned formal object of human cognition as such.

These problems are significant not only on account of indicating the adequate object of the theory of being but also on account of discovering the basic determinants of the being which, on the one hand, decide about the understanding of reality and, on the other hand, about the nature of human cognition and language. Traditionally, linguistic expressions describing the being and its universal properties are called "concepts", but those concepts are distinguished from regular universal concepts. According to

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[12]  Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Czy językoznawstwo warunkuje filozofowanie?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 35, no. 1 (1987): 126ff.
[13]  Kamiński, "On the Language of the Theory of Being," 119.

Krąpiec and Kamiński, the entire language of realistic metaphysics is built upon the being transcendentally comprehended.[14] Hence the most characteristic feature of the language of metaphysics is its transcendentality. Although it concerns only the very basic concepts developed on the basis of this domain of cognition, it does not change the fact that other concepts are formulated on their basis.

## 2. TRANSCENDENTALITY

The fundamentality of the concept of being was noticed already by Saint Thomas Aquinas who stated that "all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by additions to being."[15] That is why in the theory of being one attaches great importance to determining the content of the concept of being. For this determines, in turn, the subsequent process of cognition, including also formulation of universal concepts which, if they are to describe real reality, must be an expression of the cognition of the properties of concrete entities. It is most of all stressed that the determination of the basic apprehension of the being should not have an *a priori* character because in such a case cognition would be a specific sort of construction and not an actual grasp of the content of cognized entities. For this reason, in place of abstraction, which is usually used for construing universal concepts, Krąpiec suggests for determining the proper object of metaphysics the method of separation which is based on existential judgments that are fundamental acts of human cognition. They guarantee a direct cognitive "contact" of the subject with the object or else also the actualization of the process of cognition. They are still, however, pre-reflective and sign-less cognitive acts with minimal theoretical content. What is crucial for the formulated concept of being is the fact that thanks to existential judgments it preserves in its content also the very moment of the existence of a being. Krąpiec notes, "The first concept is then based on the earlier apprehended

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[14]  See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "The Universal and Transcendental Level of Human Language," in *Theory of Being: To Understand Reality*, eds. Stanisław Kamiński, Marian Kurdziałek, and Zofia J. Zdybicka (Lublin: RW KUL, 1980), 25-29.

[15]  Thomas Aquinas, *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1, resp. http://www.clerus.org/bibliaclerusonline/en/g14.htm [accessed July 18, 2020].

existence whose affirmation still continues, and the content which in sensual cognition occurred as 'this one here,' at the first stage of intellectual cognition reveals itself as entirely potential and undetermined."[16] Thus, the existential judgment constitutes a peculiar synthesis of sensual and intellectual cognition which on the side of a being corresponds to the material essence and immaterial existence. A contentless character of existence makes that it can be apprehended only in judgment-based cognition with the act of the intellect itself.

In this way the determination of the transcendental concept of the being as being is done. In it – as Krąpiec notices – "we ultimately do not put emphasis on 'dividing' but on combining, assigning, binding every essence with a proportional existence."[17] This concept expresses every real being which is always a concrete, internally determined essence bound with its distinct proportional existence. The concept so formulated has a character of the "judgment of relative identity" which states that the beingness of an entity is created by "any existing content with its proportional existence."[18] This is the first object of intellectual cognition, the least perfect concept and the most potential. Nevertheless, virtually (*actu confuse*) it contains everything which will be uncovered in subsequent cognition, both pre-scientific and scientific. According to Krąpiec, all our concepts originate from that primal perception of being, also those that are construed by means of various forms of abstraction in which the essence of an entity is apprehended also in a purely univocal manner, as it occurs in various domains of knowledge. Nevertheless, from the perspective of metaphysical cognition, the concepts which are important are first of all those which clarify the being in its entirety, unveiling its subsequent new aspects in the form of so-called transcendental concepts. Since they express not only a specific aspect of the being's content but also the entire being as a "concrete existing essence," they differ substantially in their structure from universal concepts.[19] The duality of existence and content is present not only in the process of construing transcendental concepts but also in the concepts themselves. They are analogical because they express ontic relations which, on the one hand,

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16   Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Teoria analogii bytu* [The Theory of the Analogy of Being] (Lublin: RW KUL, 1993), 77.
17   Ibidem, 65.
18   Ibidem, 64.
19   See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Transcendentalia i uniwersalia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 7, no. 1 (1959): 5-39.

are common for all beings, and, on the other hand, they are fulfilled in an individual manner in every being.

Formulation of transcendental concepts is made through the clarification of the concept of being. As result one obtains so-called strict transcendentals whose scope is equal to that of the concept of being, and which simultaneously reveal some properties, not revealed by the latter. They reveal the being in itself by grasping it in an absolute manner ("the thing," "the one," "the separateness") and in a transcendental relation to the personal being ("the truth," "the good," "the beauty"). By expressing the transcendental properties of being, they clarify it as a "concrete essence assigned to an act of existence," hence they do not abstract from existence, but they encompass the entire being in its concreteness. On account of that, Krąpiec thinks that they have a judgment-based and not conceptual nature, for what is at stake is not so much obtaining an intellectual "image" of a particular being but rather affirming what the intellect discovers in a given being.[20] Only then the transcendentals become comprehensible when they express that fact of the being's "content endowment" (the thing), "internal indivisibility into being and non-being" (the one), "separation from other beings" (separateness), "cognoscibility" (the truth), "amability" (the good), and "the perfection" (the beauty). Kamiński also stresses their "semantic bond", as it is impossible to understand adequately one of them without understanding the others.[21] The order in which they are formulated is not, therefore, without significance, what is confirmed by the complexity of formulating the particular concepts in which the mutual conditioning of the ontic, cognitive, and linguistic aspects occurs. These "concepts" point to the grounding of basic linguistic expressions in reality. Accordingly, "the being" is the basis of existential expressions, "the thing" – essential, "the separateness" – relational, "the truth" – cognitive, "the good" – moral, "the beauty" – relevant to perfection.

As a result, also the so-called first principles of being, which are determined together with the transcendentals, have a judgment-based character. Thus, they are not exclusively logical rules organizing human thinking but

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[20]   Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics] (Lublin: RW KUL, 1994), 81ff. The issue of comprehending transcendentals as concepts was broadly discussed by Majdański in his "O naturze logicznej transcendentaliów [On the Logical Nature of Transcendentals]," 61-84.

[21]   Kamiński, "On the Language of the Theory of Being," 124.

laws of being affirmed by the human intellect in every cognitive contact with real entities. On account of that, these rules, similarly to the transcendentals, are analogical, which means that they are universally binding, but at the same time they are relativized to concrete ontic cases. In metaphysical cognition one should not, therefore, see them in a purely logical manner, namely, univocally, for reality explained on their basis would then lose a lot of its realness, especially in the aspect of dynamism. Such an understanding of the principles of being confirms that the rationality of human cognition is grounded in the rationality of the being.

Another way of clarifying the concept of being is its so-called particularization which consists in differentiating in the being various general modes of existence (in itself – not in itself; derived – no derived, necessary – unnecessary) or structural elements constituting every cognized being (existence – essence, act – potency, matter – form). Transcendentality is not attributed to them, but their role in metaphysical cognition is fundamental, for they point to that what is most proper for this sort of cognition, i.e. to the necessity to search for reasons which could decontradictify particular ontic states. Similarly to the case of the strict transcendentals and the principles of being, also concepts which express particular modes of existence and structural elements of the being have an analogical character because they describe specific ontic relations which, in spite of occurring sometimes in every ontic instance, are, nonetheless, always realized individually.

The transcendental properties, principles of being, modes of existence, and universal ontic structures enable the formulation of the theory of categories which renders the properties of really existing things and is not just a purely logical construction. The basic feature of thus understood categories is analogousness. It shows that the main basis of linguistic categories is given by the properties of real beings. Yet, such properties, despite their univocality in cognition, are always uniquely realized in beings. These findings play a crucial role mainly for the language built in so-called particular metaphysics which concern beings of specific categories. Due to that, the language of the particular domains of philosophy preserves a distinct universality, and explanations formulated by means of it maintain their metaphysical character. Thus, when discussing the language of the theory of being, it is not possible to ignore the issue of its analogousness.

## 3. Analogousness

In analyses of the language of the theory of being a key role is played by the analogy of predication. That is why one should pay particular attention to that aspect of analogy, although one cannot explain it without referring to the analogy of being and of cognition. The problem is that cognition by mind has a general character and it concerns things that exist as individuals. Using language in reference to concrete existing entities requires therefore an adequate understanding of general expressions, the understanding which goes far beyond their formal aspects.[22] Signifying individual entities by general terms constitutes the analogy of predication. The language of the theory of being is to a great extent an analogical language because it expresses real properties of entities or ontic states which are always individual and concrete. The reference of the language to reality, according to Krąpiec, is best visible in judgment-based cognition in which the cognizing subject conforms oneself with reality. An example of that are the simplest forms of judgments expressed in the statement "S a P" which contains a subject, predicate, and the propositional copula "is."[23] All the elements of a simple affirmative statement which refers to really existing entities are analogical. Hence, e.g. the statement "the man is ill," despite containing general predicates, is understood analogically in relation to a real state of affairs because it presents a "singular case of a general sense." The terms "man" and "ill", despite their general character, taken from the cognitive side describe a specific human being who happens to be ill. From the cognitive perspective, therefore, it is not always about "setting up general, necessary, and abstracts laws but about a concrete situation which occurred in an individual being in an individual way," i.e. it is about adapting the mode of cognition to the mode of being.[24]

Krąpiec ascribes special significance to the propositional copula "is" which reveals analogousness even clearer than predicates. It may occur in a cohesive, assertive, and affirmative function, among which the second and third functions in particular require a reference to the cognized entity. Ascertaining (assertion) in a judgment and expressing a particular state

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[22]  See Stanisław Kamiński, "O zastosowaniu logiki współczesnej do metafizyki klasycznej," in Krąpiec and Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, 281-302.

[23]  Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Poznawać czy myśleć* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1994), 270.

[24]  Krąpiec, *Język i świat realny*, 248ff.

of affairs in a statement and even more so the affirmation of the existence of the being in the existential judgment cannot take place without making contact with concrete entities. The role of existential judgments deserves highlighting because thanks to them the cognitive relation binding the cognizing agent with the cognized reality occurs. That is why Krąpiec considers the affirmation of existence by means of "is" to be the ultimate foundation of the veracity of human judgment-based cognition.[25]

The analogousness of metaphysical concepts as well as statements based on them that express judgments about the cognized reality assume the form of analogical cognitive structures which in diverse ways apprehend reality and, on account of that, fulfill to a various degree the requirements of metaphysical cognition, directed most of all at necessary states of affairs. Krąpiec includes among this sort of cognitive structures metaphors, attribution, general and transcendental proportionality as well as the heuristics of thoughts.[26] Each of them in its own way reflects reality and finds its expression in the structure of analogical predication. In every such structure there is an apprehension of the relational community (unity, identity) of particular properties of many objects and a simultaneous preservation of the fundamentally different content of these properties as well as the separateness of objects. In the theory of analogy it is called the "dissimilar similarity." The function of "signifying" may be attributed to particular terms as well as to an "entire" statement in such a way that sometimes it is hard to understand particular signs in separation from the whole.[27] This is visualized well by a metaphorical analogy which, although it has secondary significance in metaphysical cognition, its structure may be expressed in the same schema as other, typically metaphysical analogies – A is related to B as C is related to D.

Yet, while in the case of a metaphorical analogy, transferring one name which has its own meaning (independently or in a context) to other objects is aimed at invoking among cognizing subjects similar cognitive-emotional reactions (e.g. the smile on the face of a person is like flowers on a meadow), metaphysical analogies are about expressing cause-and-effect relations occurring within the realm of the properties of being or ontic structures. The reference to one distinguished cause founds the analogy of attribution (*pros hen*), (e.g., health is attributed to a living creature, that is why food –

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[25]   Ibidem, 250.
[26]   See Krąpiec, *Teoria analogii bytu*, 25-37.
[27]   Krąpiec, *Język i świat realny*, 172.

on account of the health of a living creature – is healthy), to many causes constituting beings internally or externally – the analogy of proper proportionality: general, as far as the relation in the categorial dimension of being is considered (e.g., the way the human being is related to his or her soul, so is an animal related to its soul) and transcendental, in the case of relations concerning every being (e.g., the way John is related to his existence, so is animal "x" related to its existence).[28] Because of apprehending and expressing relational states of affairs, strictly metaphysical terms are not abstract concepts, but they have a judgmental nature thanks to which they adapt better to the real existence of entities. Hence, the result of the proportions perceived in the first example is the concept of "living creature" and in the second one "being". Both concepts without reference to concrete beings do not have any sense because there exists no "living creature" in itself, no "being" as such outside of the realm of real living creatures and of beings that are always individual and occur in the form of specific ontic categories.

The apprehended relations are uniquely realized in every case of being, but in spite of this, they allow to highlight their aspectual unity in the form of an analogical "concept" which does not have an abstract character, for it is every time "filled in" by another, although analogically common, content.[29] The necessity of constant relating to existing entities and the dependence of the "content" of these concepts on those entities make analogical concepts more reminiscent of judgments than universals. What is more, they encompass not only the qualitative-quantitative properties of being but also its existence, what has a fundamental significance for grounding language in the real world. These "concepts" are not simple intellectual images of things, but they have a complex structure which expresses in a propositional way (affirmative or assertive) specific ontic structures (attributive, proportionality-related, transcendental). For this reason more complex cognitive forms based on analogical concepts and expressed in judgments-sentences are not exclusively a juxtaposition of concepts, but they serve the cognitive agreeing between the cognizing subject and the cognized states of affairs.

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[28]　Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Język," *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 5, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: PTTA, 2004), 341.

[29]　Kamiński claims: "An analogous concept must contain the necessary relational unity of that what is common and basic for all designates (*analogon*) and of that which is realized specifically in particular designates (*analogates*) is supposed to take place." Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," 237.

We encounter analogical terms, mainly proportional ones, at various levels of metaphysical cognition. The most basic terms refer to all beings, and they grasp them through the prism of analogous necessary relations. Nevertheless, also categorial expressions maintain analogousness, but in such cases they are not treated as universals when one solicits, among others, for their univocity, as it happens in strictly scientific cognition. According to Kamiński, designates of metaphysical concepts can be ultimately brought down to three domains: infra-ontic elements of being, particular beings, and relations; however, analogous terms refer to beings thanks to relations between infra-ontic elements, and they refer to the relations on the basis of apprehensions of beings and infra-ontic elements.[30]

A distinct sort of analogy is the so-called heuristics of thought, i.e. reasoning by analogy which consists in transferring structures apprehended within the cognized domain of being to other, unknown domains.[31] Consequently, the properties of the latter are unveiled through the formulation of the adequate concepts. The heuristics of thought is used mainly in scientific cognition.

## 4. Cognitive relevance

Based on that what was said above, one can point to the epistemological relevance of the language of metaphysics. Among its most important qualities Kamiński considers semantic completeness, realness, and properly precise transferability.[32] Semantic completeness or else the adequacy of the language of the theory of being is firstly expressed in the apprehension of a being under the aspects of existence and content, so the aspects which concern the necessary relations of intra- and inter-being causal dependencies that determine the transcendental properties of a being and ground its cognizability. Later it manifests itself in the sufficient number of ontic categories, required to express numerous modes of being. Another manifestation of the semantic completeness is the functional binding of the formulation of the conceptual apparatus with the intuitive apprehension of particular

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[30] Ibidem.
[31] Krąpiec, *Teoria analogii bytu*, 241-248.
[32] Kamiński, "On the Language of the Theory of Being," 127.

aspects of being, the reflection on this process, and with setting the rules of expressions acceptance. This way there occur mutual determination of the linguistic description of reality, of the formal object of the theory of being, and of cognitive apprehensions specific for this domain. This provides metaphysical assertions with specific analyticity grounded not in linguistic rules, but at the same time in the object (in necessary structures of being), in the disposition of cognitive faculty (intuitive grasp of such structures), and in the conceptual apparatus (the analyticity of the language of the theory of being).[33]

The realness of the language of metaphysics is ensured above all by grounding human cognition in the transcendental properties of the being which encompass not only the essential but also the existential aspect of the cognized beings. This is possible because – as it was already stated – transcendentals have a judgment-based and not a conceptual-abstract structure. They refer the mind to the cognized entities, the existence of which actualizes cognitive faculties. That is why, according to Krąpiec, only existential judgments can guarantee the realism of cognition. Already at their stage the agreeing of the intellect with the cognized being occurs, albeit in a pre-reflective manner. The senses play an important part in this process because with their aid the perception of material properties occurs, revealing thereby the content aspect of being from the phenomenal side. Thanks to the analysis of the content and the existential judgment, the role of existence in the structure of being and human cognition is uncovered. It is existence that grants "the concept" of being its realness because it lies at the foundation of all being. In spite of the fact that in language existence can be treated as an *accidens praedicabile* (accident in predication), it is not an accident in being but a reason for all the perfections of being (*actualitas omnium actuum*).[34] Nevertheless, the complete and self-aware cognition of entities occurs only in subject-predicate judgments in which the intellect cognizes the relation of the array of concepts to an entity, ascertaining their truthfulness or falsity.[35] In these latter judgments the grounding of the concepts in beings is confirmed, although genetically they are formulated on the basis of existential judgments.

An important element of the realness of the language of the theory of being is its empirical verifiability. It takes place on the grounds of experi-

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[33]    Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," 214ff.

[34]    Krąpiec, *Teoria analogii bytu*, 59-61.

[35]    Krąpiec and Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, 61.

ence understood as a mode of direct cognitive contact with the concretely and objectively existing being, what occurs in existential judgments. According to Kamiński, it is unjustified to search for empirical verification of the transcendentals, for by apprehending the real existence, they constitute aspects of the primal experience of the being. On account of that, it is the transcendentals that condition empirical verifiability and not the other way round. Although metaphysical assertions always refer to a particular being, they are not deduced from observational statements.[36] Grounding metaphysical cognition in existential judgments makes verification occur in every cognitive apprehension. And empirical verification is indispensable in the case of general concepts and predicative judgments, but that requires, however, grounding in a specific concept of experience and cognition.

The precision of communicating information in the language of the theory of being requires adequate rules which allow us to settle the meaning of expressions. It is not about the rules that are to lead to the unquestionable recognition of the meaning of expressions, as it is the case with formal languages. Since the language of the theory of being is constructed on the basis of colloquial language, these are empirical rules that play the main role in determining the meaning of expressions, and deductive rules play such a role to a lesser degree. Kamiński includes among these rules procedures of gaining insight, by which it is showed "which experience is to be realized and what reasoning needs to be done in order to notice the necessity of a thesis with intellectual obviousness."[37] Another method is an indirect acceptance of theses, what is done on the basis of the analysis of how particular concepts were formed. That process can be repeated and verified. Both, the empirical decidability of theses of the theory of being and the verifiability of the process of forming terms constituting these kind of theses, lead to certain difficulties that result from multi-directional content-related interconnections [of those theses], various degrees of the

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[36] See Kamiński,"On the Language of the Theory of Being," 130-132. The belief that metaphysical assertions are not verifiable, as the neo-positivists claimed, is a misunderstanding. According to Kamiński, "The theses of the theory of being are neither a generalization of observational clauses, nor do they perform directly a prognostic function for future observations. The basic statements of the general theory of being either make explicit the content of the transcendentals, or indicate the only ontic reason for an existential state given in experience and apprehended in an analytically-intuitively manner." Kamiński, "On the Language of the Theory of Being," 131-132.

[37] Ibidem, 133.

theoreticity of the terms and, finally, from the specificity of construing concepts within the theory of being. On account of that, Krąpiec claimed that transcendental concepts cannot be "quantified and univocally communicated to someone else. They must instead be conveyed in a 'lively' fashion through a certain 'agitation,' creating in the mind of the recipient a variety of images and associations in which he must himself perceive the cognitive content conveyed to him."[38]

## Conclusion

The language of the theory of being devised in the Lublin Philosophical School is first of all a system of natural signs which refer the cognizing subject to the cognized reality. Because of that, in this language a great importance is attached to existential expressions. It is, therefore, a language of first degree which describes and explains the real world and does not serve only conceptual analyses. Many basic terms are taken from colloquial language, but in the process of formulating the theory of being one gives them a strictly theoretical meaning, often very rich semantically and functionally. A fundamental role in it is played by terms expressing transcendental properties of beings which are the basis for construing the other concepts. The language of the theory of being is analogical, and analogousness belongs not only to purely transcendental expressions but also to categorial ones, what means that in the case of the latter one can speak of a double theoretical meaning – analogous in metaphysics and univocal in science. These properties give the language of the theory of being peculiar epistemic relevance. This finds its expression in communication, for it must include references to objects, and that constitutes the indispensable moment of transferring information. The concepts formulated in the theory of being are not only an intellectual image of the cognized entity, but they provide the cognizing intellect also insight into the entity itself. Existence and content of an entity is that what fills intellectual apprehensions. This allows us to justify the ontic grounding of instrumental signs of the natu-

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[38]    Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Metaphysics: An Outline of the Theory of Being*, trans. Theresa Sandok (New York et al.: Peter Lang 1991), 114.

ral language, thanks to which one can indicate that also universal concepts have a basis in reality.

The language of the theory of being so understood is the expression of the peculiarity and at the same time of the autonomy of metaphysical cognition. When one uses such a language, cognition retains transcendentalness, adherence to principles, analogousness, and ultimateness as well as an object-related and causal character. This language enables an adequate description of ontic facts, within the framework of which, by the intuitive insight, there are ascertained necessary states of being which require existential decontradictification. In this language the cognitive procedures peculiar to metaphysics – such as explanation and justification – are carried out, and they do not amount to demonstrating relations between concepts but refer to relations within real beings, especially to reasons (causes) of being which decontradictify the existence of a particular state of being. Thanks to this, the general theory of being works out basic expressions for other philosophical disciplines and, not infrequently, also for various domains of the arts and sciences as well.

Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik
Tomasz Duma

# Via ad Veritatem: On the Methods of Developing Philosophy in the Lublin Philosophical School

Stanisław Kamiński in his program article "Method in classical philosophy"[1] describes five differentiating features of the epistemological and methodological specificity of classical philosophy. Namely: (1) it is irreducible to scientific, ordinary, and theological cognition – it retains autonomy in relation to these types of cognition; (2) it plays a profound role in human life, but it lacks universally accepted principles for verifying its theses; (3) it has been developed for thousands of years, but its unity and overall progress are disputable; (4) it should respond to universal and eternal intellectual interests, but its responses are dependent on the mentality of the times, the "Zeitgeist," and even on personalities of philosophizing individuals; (5) it is expected to provide irrefutable theses, but at the same time the understanding of philosophy itself is problematic. Kamiński then claimed that "On all accounts, it seems right to take an interest in philosophical method"[2]. He means here this type of philosophy which is called classical in a strict sense and which is practiced in the Lublin Philosophical School.

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[1]    Stanisław Kamiński, "Method in Classical Philosophy," in Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2019), 37-67.
[2]    Kamiński, "Method in Classical Philosophy," 38.

## 1. The Method and its determinants

Andrzej Bronk, in the spirit of the methodological tradition aligned with the Lublin School, suggests the following definition of the method:

> Method (Gr. *methodos*, originally pursuit, a following after, from *meta* and *hodos*) in a broad sense means a manner (way) of doing something, consisting of steps (stages) which one must perform in a specific sequence in order to achieve a particular objective (to accomplish an assumed task); understood narrowly (in science) it means a manner of resolving theoretical or practical problems. Seen from an action point of view, the method is a configuration (sequence) of more or less ordered activities (i.e. occurring in a specific order) which serve to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of a particular activity; prescriptively the method (without a specific description) is a set of more or less homogenous provisions (rules, directives, hints, maxims) which delineate the course of a certain action, serving an effective and more efficient implementation of a specific task.[3]

Let us apply this understanding of the method to classical philosophy. Bronk's definition demonstrates that the choice of a method depends on the accepted goal of philosophizing. The representatives of the Lublin School, especially Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, stressed that philosophy has theoretical and practical objectives (purposes). The theoretical purpose is the deepest, ultimate, and irrefutable explanation of reality, or more precisely: the indication of the ultimate and irrefutable causes of the cognized ontic order. Philosophy is satisfied neither with some critical analysis of knowledge nor with a reflection on the content of consciousness, nor with an interpretation of signs, nor with discussing problems significant in life. Classical philosophy professes gnoseological maximalism and is an object-oriented type of cognition. The practical purposes are: providing rational bases for construing worldviews, providing foundations for scientific cognition, integrating science, and shaping culture. This last function has a profound social dimension. Kamiński wrote:

> The most profound and substantively accurate cognition of the world and the hierarchy of values is indispensable for a proper, human, culture-forming activity. Philosophy should serve as a guide in this en-

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[3]    Andrzej Bronk, "Metoda naukowa," *Nauka* 1 (2006): 48.

deavor, as it indicates and ultimately justifies, in the ontic order, why one should prefer certain value-forming behaviors, and uniformly solves issues outside the scope of particular domains of culture (…). Finally, it also provides means of understanding the transformations of culture, together with the criteria of evaluation of cultural achievements. Philosophy is therefore self-consciousness, as it were, of culture itself. It permeates culture, but is not reducible to any of its domains, merging them – through theory – in ways which enable human beings to perfect themselves in a harmonious and complete manner.[4]

Kamiński stresses that such specific theoretical and practical objectives are in harmony with questions posed by life itself:

It is in the decisive moments of life that the human being searches for indubitable reasons, which would be ontically as deep as possible, and the sense all that which exists, with special consideration for the existential position of the human being in the world. In such a situation, one is satisfied neither with critical investigations on knowledge nor commonly accepted hypotheses about life, nor with scientifically established laws describing the course of various kinds of phenomena are sufficient. Time and again the human beings asks i.e. why does anything exists, since nothing need exists; are there any necessities in the frame of that which really exists; what ultimately makes reality exist the way it does and present itself as such; on what account does good and evil exist at all; what is the ultimate end-purpose of human existence; what is the ultimate sense of all the suffering cast upon human beings by fate.[5]

The philosophical tradition takes note of the profoundness of these questions and serious attempts to solve them: "All attempts to flee from these issues were short-lived."[6]

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4    Stanisław Kamiński, "On the Nature of Philosophy," in Kamiński, *On the Metaphysical Cognition,* trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2020), 205.
5    Kamiński, "Method in Classical Philosophy," 50.
6    Ibid., 51. Kamiński's view gains confirmation in the dynamical development of so-called philosophical counseling. See Helena Kistelska, "Filozofia jako narzędzie osobistego rozwoju i droga do szczęścia? Kilka uwag o metodach doradztwa filozoficznego [Philosophy as an Instrument of Personal Development and a Path to Happiness]," *Kultura i Wychowanie*, 8(2) (2014): 59-68; Helena Kistelska, "Doradzamy, filozofujemy czy prowadzimy terapię? Doradztwo filozoficzne a psychoterapia [Do We Counsel, Philosophize, or Provide Therapy? Philosophical Counseling and Psychotherapy]," in *Filozofia wychowania w Europie Środkowej w kontekście uwarunkowań historycz-*

The second determinant of the method is the object, in reference to which we perform the activities indicated by the method. Kamiński discerns the object of cognition at the point of departure, i.e. a delineated area of reality and its aspects to be investigated as well as the object at the point of arrival, that is everything which is denoted by constants and represented by variables that occur in the theses of a theory developed on the basis of research.[7] The object of philosophy at the point of departure is any being accessible to primal experience. As Kamiński claims: "the theory of being is to be an objective and purely realistic philosophy, and therefore, in its starting point it has to get in contact with the existing, concrete reality."[8] This formulation points to two crucial assumptions for philosophizing in the Lublin School. Firstly, one assumes the intelligibility of the world and the possibility of cognitive access to it which enables the objective apprehension of at least some of its aspects. Classical philosophy is not then a form of cognition radically assumptionless. However, this is not an objection, for the possibility of building a philosophy without prior assumptions is itself a meta-philosophical assumption. At the same time, the aspectual apprehension of the entity, from a certain perspective, is a construction of the object of cognition. This construction occurs within us spontaneously, but only in hindsight and after reflection we become aware that what was grasped by our cognitive apparatus (of one type or another) was apprehended in certain aspects. From the fact that we do such a "construction of the object" one must not infer that we impose some cognitive content upon a particular object; on the contrary, that content entirely stems from reality. Philosophy is here no exception – it also must begin from distinguishing-construing its proper object. Kamiński points to the following conditions for the proper construction of the object of philosophy: (1) the proper object of philosophical cognition is to concern the real world (reality); (2) the proper object should include the whole of reality, i.e. philosophizing should concern everything that exists; (3) the proper object should be neutral, i.e. it should not imply solutions to problems *a priori*, but by enabling our constant contact with the object, it should allow for an objective philosophical interpretation.

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*nych, społecznych, politycznych i filozoficznych*, ed. Sławomir Sztobryn, Krzysztof Kamiński, and Marcin Wasilewski (Łódź: WN TPF "Chowanna," 2015), 235-251.

[7]   Stanisław Kamiński, *Nauka i metoda. Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1992), 187ff.

[8]   Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics," in Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, 290.

The two initial conditions bind the proper object of philosophy with the real world in the aspect of realness and wholeness, and the third condition is to secure the objectivity of cognition.[9]

The above analysis demonstrates the specificity of philosophy – its self-reflectivity. The indication of purposes, the proper object, and the assumptions of philosophizing takes place with philosophy itself. Kamiński then concludes: "one cannot discuss methods of philosophizing in a justifiable manner without philosophizing in one way or another."[10] In the further paragraphs the method of classical philosophy shall be presented by discussing: primal experience and the method of developing the concept of being as the adequate object of philosophizing, the method of explanation (which leads onto the problem of the possibility of general necessary truths), types of reasoning applied in classical philosophy, understanding hypotheses, and historicism. One should assume that ultimately we are discussing the method of the theory of being as a primal discipline in classical philosophy.

Kamiński used to stress that "philosophy is most of all the method."[11] He imposes then three conditions on philosophizing: (1) the method of philosophy should not be only one of the pure forms of the scientific method, presented usually in methodology of science; (2) there is no disjunctive alternative: either exact scientific cognition or irrational spiritual activity (a sort of lived through experience); (3) the method of philosophy seems to be a specific method of rational cognition, harmoniously making use of all valuable sources of cognition (it does not exclude lived through experience).

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[9]   See Stanisław Kamiński, "The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition," in Kamiński, *On the Metaphysical Cognition,* 9-94. See also Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School* (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2010), 89-102.

[10]  Kamiński, "Method in Classical Philosophy," 46-47.

[11]  Stanisław Kamiński, "O niejednostronną metodykę metafizyki," *Znak* 12, no. 77 (1960): 1423.

## 2. Separation: method of Determining the Proper object of the theory of being

As Kamiński notices, the theory of being does not deal with the formal, qualitative or quantitative aspect of being but with the existential-qualitative aspect. The object of the theory of being, he stresses, is reality as actually existing (it is not then the theory of existence as such). He writes: "one needs to come into cognitive contact with reality in such a way as to simultaneously intellectually apprehend both its facticity and its concrete content."[12] Abstraction is not sufficient in this case because it allows to apprehend conceptually only quantitative or qualitative aspects. In order to formulate the concept of the being as an existing entity, one needs another method, called separation.

The inquiries on the separation method had been systematically conducted from the beginning of the twentieth century. One of the first authors, who noticed the need to reflect on the issue, were Francis Albert Blanche and Louis-Marie Régis. The first broader work on the separation method was prepared by Louis-Bertrand Geiger,[13] and large contributions were made by: Jean-Dominique Robert, Armand Augustine Maurer, George Peter Klubertanz, Henri Renard, Robert William Schmidt, Jacques Maritain, and Étienne Gilson. A holistic concept of the separation method was formulated by M. A. Krąpiec.[14] Apart from him, this topic was investigated by S. Kamiński[15], Zofia J. Zdybicka[16], Antoni B. Stępień,[17] and

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[12]   Kamiński, "Method in Classical Philosophy," 59.

[13]   Louis-Bertrand Geiger, *La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1942), 318-321; Louis-Bertrand Geiger, "Abstraction et separation d'après S. Thomas," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques* 31 (1947): 3-40.

[14]   Krąpiec presented his concept of the separation method, among others, in: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Metaphysics*, trans. Theresa Sandok (New York et al.: Peter Lang, 1991), 86-100; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Teoria analogii bytu* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1993), 140-145; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Byt i istota* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1994),143-149. See also Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *Metoda metafizyki realistycznej* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2005).

[15]   Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics," in Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, 69-304.

[16]   Zofia J. Zdybicka, *Partycypacja bytu. Próba wyjaśnienia relacji między światem a Bogiem* (Lublin: PTTA, 2017), 135-141.

[17]   Antoni B. Stępień, *Wprowadzenie do metafizyki* (Kraków: Znak, 1964), 51-58.

Andrzej Maryniarczyk.[18] Those thinkers clarified Krąpiec's theory and demonstrated its applications in philosophy.

Essentially, all authors agree on the sources of the separation method: it is Thomas Aquinas's philosophy. Aquinas in *On Boethius's 'De Trinitate'* enumerates three types of distinctions specific for the human intellect which are connected with basic methods of the main types of the sciences – physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. Insofar as in the first two cases abstraction is used for differentiation (for physics: the general from the particular, for mathematics: form from matter), in the case of metaphysics one uses combination and division. Aquinas calls this procedure "separation."[19] The proper method is to allow metaphysics to apprehend the being as being, and therefore it cannot be a sequence of abstraction operations because this activity is about extracting from particular cases general properties. However, these general features do not constitute the reason of existence of concrete entities. On account of that, Aquinas saw the need to search for such a method for metaphysics which would enable to separate in the real being that what provides the basis for its existence, without eliding its individuality and concreteness. Krąpiec took up that intent. He demonstrated that this method reaches the very foundations of human cognition, which means that acts that are proper for the separation method occur in fundamental acts of human cognition, often described as primary cognitive experience or metaphysical experience.[20] That is why Krąpiec strictly links the separation method, and in consequence all of metaphysical cognition, with so-called spontaneous cognition which does not require prior knowledge

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[18]   Apart from the aforementioned book *Metoda metafizyki realistycznej*, Andrzej Maryniarczyk discussed the topic of the separation method also in: "Podstawy rozumienia i interpretacji separacji metafizycznej," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 24, no. 2 (1988): 139-160; Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Proces wyodrębniania przedmiotu metafizyki," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 26, no. 2 (1990): 55-87; Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *Realistyczna interpretacja rzeczywistości* (Lublin: PTTA, 2005), 121-137; Andrzej Maryniarczyk and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Metafizyka," *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 7, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2006), 109-112; Krąpiec and Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, 103-116.

[19]   "Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio invenitur. Una secundum operationem intellectus componentis et dividentis, quae separatio dicitur proprie; et haec competit scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae." S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate*, cura et studio Bruno Decker (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), q. 3, a. 3, resp.

[20]   See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Doświadczenie i metafizyka," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24, no. 1 (1976): 5-16.

and is pre-reflective. He treats this type of cognition as the natural manner of the human being's cognitive approach to reality.[21] Separation is the pure cognitive contact of the cognizing subject with the cognized reality. Here there is revealed exclusively the receptivity of the cognitive powers of the cognizing subject and the impact of objects present in the field of cognition on these powers, the real existence of which actualizes these powers.

Krąpiec distinguished three basic stages of the separation method. The first one is formulating existential judgments. The above-mentioned cognitive contact is revealed not in the form of so-called *simplex aprehensio*, that is a simple conceptual apprehension, but in an existential judgment: "a exists." In its basic form that judgment comes down to the affirmation of the cognized being, which assumes, according to S. Kamiński, a form of an intellectual intuition.[22] So here we deal with cognitive acts which are prior to the process of conceptualization. The act of passing an existential judgment is the basis for metaphysical cognition and the separation method, which is proper for this type of cognition and which allows to form the proper object of metaphysics. The existential judgment is a cognitive act which directly apprehends the existence of a concrete being and is verbalized in the statement "x exists." Hence, the term "existential judgment" encompasses both a cognitive action and its effect.[23] The core of this type of cognitive apprehension is the affirmation of the being's existence which in a primal sense has an immediate and spontaneous character. That is why, in A. Maryniarczyk's view, one must not yet take into consideration the intentional reference to the object.[24] The decisive moment is the direct contact of the cognizing subject with the concrete being, what decides about the uniqueness of this sort of judgments. Krąpiec describes this mo-

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[21]    Krąpiec, *Metaphysics*, 87.

[22]    See Stanisław Kamiński, "Explanation in Metaphysics," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2018), 192-195.

[23]    Krąpiec presented his concept of existential judgments, among others, in: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "O realizm metafizyki," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 12, no. 4 (1969): 9-20; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Doświadczenie i metafizyka," 5-16; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Pojęcie-słowo," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 26, no. 1 (1978): 83-112. For more on Krąpiec's concept of existential judgments see Wojciech Chudy, "Poznanie istnienia (bytu) w ujęciu tomistów egzystencjalnych (dokończenie)," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 18, no. 2 (1982): 41-69; Aleksandra Gondek, s.v "Egzystencjalny sąd," *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 3, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2002), 45-52.

[24]    Maryniarczyk, "Podstawy rozumienia i interpretacji separacji metafizycznej," 148.

ment as the "contact" of two existences or else two acts and considers it as the most primal and authentic cognitive experience of the subject. Indeed, we are also dealing with an existential judgment in the inner experience of the existence of the subject's own "I," yet despite their epistemological equivalence, they are temporarily and methodologically secondary.[25] The existential judgment is a cognitive "response" of the subject to the existing reality which actualizes the human being as a cognizing being (the existence of a being actualizes the intellect's potency to cognize[26]). However, at the same time a holistic apprehension of the substantive side of the subject as "something that exists" occurs. For this reason Krąpiec and Kamiński speak about the "pincer" apprehension of the being in the aspect of existence and essence.[27] Existential judgments are direct, i.e. they exclude any intermediaries (existence is not apprehended with the aid of notions), they are pre-reflective, i.e. they are entirely filled with the presence of the object without the creative effect of the subject, and they are supra-veridical, i.e. they exclude the possibility of a cognitive fallacy occurring. The supra-veracity of the existential judgment is the condition for the truth expressed in predicative judgments because ascertaining the compliance of the intellect with the entity presupposes the necessity of cognizing the existence of an entity. Existential judgments have a completely different structure than predicative ones: their only content is the apprehension of the existence of an object without assigning it any properties, as is the case with predicative judgments.

On the second stage of the separation method, analysis of the contents of the existential judgments takes place. This happens through the formulation of negative judgments: S is not P. The purpose is not to discover that what constitutes the being of "this here being" (John, an oak, a triangle), but that what in a necessary way is ascribed to every being without which the being would not exist. This occurs through comparing the existence affirmed in existential judgments with the concrete content of this here particular being. As Krąpiec notices, we "cognitively separate that which in reality cannot be identified."[28] The existence affirmed in an existential judgment cannot be regarded as identical with the concrete content (e.g.

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25    Chudy, "Poznanie istnienia (bytu)," 65.
26    Cf. Krąpiec, *Metaphysics*, 99.
27    Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, 225.
28    Krąpiec, *Metaphysics*, 91.

with John, an oak). For in such a case everything that exists would have to be that concrete content – and this would be evident absurd. Procedures which demonstrate the non-identicality of the existence and essence of being, grasped in existential judgments lead simultaneously to ascertaining the exact mutual ordering of existence and essence in a concrete being. According to Krąpiec, "the existences of particular beings […] are always proportional to the concrete contents they realize."[29] The result of this stage are two conclusions: existence is not exhausted in any being, but it manifests itself as a transcendental factor, without which no being would be real (realized) and cognizable; the essence of being is realized by the act of existence, and thanks to that it constitutes the content of the really existing being, and this, in turn, determines existence, making it – in relation to the essence – the existence of this here concrete entity and not general or undefined existence. Thus, by means of the separation method, one determines the basic content of the cognized being which comprises that what the existential judgment expresses, that is "the existence of beings as concrete contents, determinate in themselves."[30]

The objective of the third stage of the separation method is the formation of a concept of being as being, which is the proper object of metaphysical cognition. This occurs through transferring the analysis of the contents of the being apprehended in the existential judgment from the categorial aspect, under which always a concrete being is realized, to a transcendental plane which comprises every ontic case. This way the being in its most universal sense becomes understood as "any determinate content whatsoever and its proportional concrete existence"[31]; in other words: to be a being as being means to "exist concretely in a determinate content."[32] The basis for the apprehension of existence and essence, realizing themselves proportionally with regard to each other in every concrete ontic case as the transcendental aspects occurring in every being, is the analogy of being, thanks to which it is discovered that in order for a being to be a being, both having an existence and having a determinate essence is necessary. For this reason, the basic concept of being formulated in metaphysics has simultaneously a transcendental and analogical character.[33] The thus un-

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[29]    Ibidem, 92.
[30]    Ibidem, 91.
[31]    Ibidem, 93.
[32]    Ibidem, 93-94.
[33]    See Ibidem, 93.

derstood being constitutes the proper object of metaphysical cognition, described in traditional metaphysics as "being as being." This concept maybe predicated of all beings, albeit always in a vague and undifferentiated way, for it does not express any individual, specie-specific or generic properties of beings but exclusively its most common determinants, describing what means to be "being as being". That is why, according to Krąpiec, it is not in fact a notion but "a judgment of relative identity," in which the subject and the predicate is, indeed, "being", but due to the doubling in the form of the essence and existence, the subject and the predicate signify, respectively, the essential and existential aspect of the being.[34] Hence Kamiński concludes: "The concept of being thus produced denotes, in a properly proportional manner, all types of real beings, and so 'being' is an analogically common name (*ens commune*) for every real being."[35] What is more, it is a notion neutralizing the limitation of existence through essence – we do not make any assumptions with regard to that what exists and the modes of existence.

## 3. The Clarification of the concept of being and decontradictifying explanation

In the light of the concept of being as being, one can carry out so-called explanatory argumentation, or simply explanation, as a reply to the question: why? The term "explanation" may mean: (1) a knowledge-formative operation; (2) the result of that operation expressed in statements, and (3) a relation between that what explains and that what is explained. It was mentioned above that the purpose of philosophy (metaphysics) is to indicate the ultimate ontic reasons of the being in a way that allows for intersubjective communication and control of theses. These theses should have a necessary and irrefutable character. Kamiński stresses that explanation in classical metaphysics does not have an aporetic character, i.e. its aim is

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[34] Ibidem, 96ff. Kamiński had a similar claim: "The thesis 'the being is a being' expresses here that the being apprehended essentially is identical with itself apprehended existentially. Therefore, the unity in the notion of being is the unity of the relation (proportion) between inner elements constituting the real being." Stanisław Kamiński, "Czym są w filozofii i w logice tzw. pierwsze zasady?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 11, no. 1 (1963): 7.

[35] Kamiński, "Method in Classical Philosophy," 64.

to resolve problems and not to describe a subject matter in an ever deeper and more precise way.[36] There are various types of explanation, although the most typical for metaphysics is theoretical one. The explanation operations are the pursuit for answers to the question "why?"; they are acts of intellectual move from so-called data to scientific claims (in the general sense of the term "science"). Theoretical explanation consists in connecting data with other facts. It may be indicating the "principles" of a fact in the thing itself or else pointing to some external connections (e.g. causal or functional relations).

How does the explanation process in classical philosophy proceed? The data for explanation are gathered by relatively simple cognitive operations, both in general metaphysics (there are entities and they exist in various ways) and in particular metaphysics (without any doubts, examples of a particular types of being exist). Since it deals with a different aspect (it has a different formal object), metaphysics cannot utilize facts established by other sciences because – as modern methodology emphasizes – there are no "bare facts" and so-called scientific facts are already certain types of constructs. In other words, the object of any explanatory theory in metaphysics is different from the object of the explanatory theory in the particular sciences – in the two cases we are dealing with various cognitive operations determining the object of the explanatory theory. The separation method, which allows to form the object of inquiry for classical philosophy, was indicated above: the object of metaphysics is being as being, and the aspect of existence is here crucial. Existence includes more than what is experienced because the question is not: thanks to what does this here entity exist?, but: thanks to what does anything exist in the first place? Hence, the aim of explanation in metaphysics is to achieve the thing-related cognition which is indubitable, for it concerns the necessary intra-ontic relations (which occur between elementary factors that constitute the being as a being) or else ultimately reducible to them.[37] Intellectual intuition plays a significant role in the pursuit of these relations, and this fact indicates that we are dealing here with an analytical method of explanation. Without going into details, one can say that the aim is to focus on the facts apprehended in a particular aspect in order to decipher from them the necessary truth – substantial content, i.e. essential qualities, the most elementary relations between properties,

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[36]    See Stanisław Kamiński, "Explanation in Metaphysics," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics,* 135-203.
[37]    See Ibidem, 196ff.

also between entities. This way, Kamiński adds, the primary thing-related definitions and baseline theses are obtained.[38] Thanks to them, one can receive assumptions to construe a categorial-deductive system of metaphysics. The analytical method of explanation generates various objections. One can mention at least two: the insufficiently precise character of intellectual intuition and its role in attaining general, thing-related, and necessary assertions; a lack of a clear criterion of deciding when we are in fact dealing with an irrefutable claim. Kamiński presumes that sometimes we are dealing with such claims, but they concern very basic aspects or relations in reality, especially in general metaphysics. In his view, it is a problem which cannot be overcome. Analytical explanation does not allow to transgress the domain of analyzed objects in the direction of a transcendental apprehension of existence; moreover, existence is non-conceptualizable. For this reason, limiting oneself in metaphysics to analytical explanation easily leads to essentialism. Reflective-phenomenological and constructive explanations confront the problem of assimilating the results of metaphysical experience: "something exists." All of these types of explanation play a certain role in the explanation characteristic for classical philosophy, but the last one cannot be subsumed to any of these types.

Explanation in philosophy has an intuitive-reductive character. The intellectual intuition apprehends states of being in the general-existential aspect. "Theory-making part – Kamiński claims – on the other hand is characterized by reductive thinking. It consists in finding out and accepting the ultimate – and, if feasible, the only – ontic reasons on the basis of ontic consequences (effective states)."[39] The set of data to be explained, as it was mentioned before, is provided by the separation method because we explain the being as an existing entity – the being as a being.

The next stage is the clarification of the content-endowment of the concept of being as being. Through clarifying this concept in the semiotic aspect, we ascertain that the concept of being is analogical and transcendental. Through clarifying them from the thing-related side, we arrive at the so-called transcendentals, that is the universal and trans-categorial properties of beings: thing, oneness, separateness, the truth, the good, the beauty. Within them the cognition of concrete entities and the existing reality takes place, and linguistically they are treated as abbreviations of existential judgments. At this stage of explanation, we ascertain that everything that exists

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[38]   Ibidem, 182, footnote 34.
[39]   Ibidem, 191.

(being) has the following properties: 1) it possesses a determinate content (thing); 2) it is internally non-contradictory (the one); 3) it is sovereign and individual in its existence (separateness); 4) it is cognizable (the truth); 5) it is amiable (the good); 6) it is perfect (the beauty).[40] Further clarification allows to formulate the so-called first principles of being. Usually the following principles are enumerated: identity, (non-)contradiction, and excluded middle; sometimes the principle of sufficient reason is added.[41]

The clarification thus achieved allows to construe a conceptual apparatus rich enough to formulate an explanation as the answer to the following question: what makes a being, which does not have to exist, exist in the first place? The explanation has a theoretical character – it points to the structure of the being, i.e. the system of necessary relationships between the elementary factors constituting the being as being as well as relations between beings. Kamiński wrote:

> Metaphysical explanation now takes the form of an inquiry into the ultimate ontic reasons by means of the theory of the inner structure being, i.e. a theory concerned with necessary arrays of elementary factors that constitute a being. It begins on the negative and existential side, as it points out the only decontradictifying and elementary factors of a particular way in which a thing exists, and not on the positive-essential side, showing what the thing is.[42]

Such an explanation is based on the reductive sort of reasoning – assigning reasons to consequences. Ultimately, reasons are sought for in the inner structure of the being, namely, one searches for such a cause which would explain completely and infallibly a particular ontic state "treated as the ontic consequence of the inner ontic composition of reality in this particular state."[43]

From the point of view of logic – which sees reductive reasoning as fallible – the fundamental problem is the non-infallibility of reductive reasoning as well as the finality and irrefutability of some results of reductive reasoning in classical philosophy. The difference lies in the basis of

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[40]  See Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "On the Transcendental Properties of Real Beings," *Studia Gilsoniana* 5, no. 2 (April-June 2016): 429–444.

[41]  These principles occur in at least three domains: the theory of being, epistemology, and logic. The sense of these principles in the three domains should not be equated. See Kamiński, "Czym są w filozofii i w logice tzw. pierwsze zasady?," 93-115.

[42]  Kamiński, "Explanation in Metaphysics," 197-198.

[43]  Ibidem, 198.

reasoning. Reasoning in logic occurs by virtue of the form of relations between propositions; in classical philosophy it is based on causal relationships and may be infallible if one points to the one and only reason for an univocally defined state of a being. Rejecting that reason would entail rejecting the ontic state grasped in experience. This is why the operation is called decontradictifying. In other words, the infallibility of explanation is based on the necessary character of ontic relationships (and on them also relationships between beings are founded, "inheriting" in a certain aspect the necessary character) as well as on a high degree of the analyticity of the language of the theory of being. However, this does not mean that there are no hypotheses in classical philosophy. In the subsequent points of the article we shall consider in detail the possibility of the thing-related and general necessary truths, the understanding of analyticity, and the existence of hypotheses.

## 4. The possibility of substantial general necessary truths

Krąpiec and Kamiński in unison recognize the aspectual character of the distinction analytical–synthetic, and therefore they rejected the dichotomy of analyticity and syntheticity. Kamiński claims, when commenting the methodological peculiarity of the theory of being, that:

> the theses of the theory of being essentially have the character of both analytic and objective clauses at the same time. This analytic character is not rooted exclusively in the rules of language, nor only in the unusual abilities of some cognitive faculty or *a priori* forms of mind, but also, and at the same time, in the object (the clauses concern the necessary structures of reality), in the disposition of cognitive faculty (intellectual intuition allows us to grasp such structures with objective obviousness), and in the conceptual apparatus (the analytic method of constructing the concepts makes the language of the theory of being highly theoretical – i.e. analytic).[44]

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[44]    Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," 214-215.

The analyticity of metaphysical theses guarantees their necessity. It was, however, erroneously believed that infallible decidability with regard to logical values of propositions is possible only through intellectual operations, without referring to experience. In Kamiński's view, in turn, one must introduce "a distinction between the analyticity of theses apprehended from the linguistic (semiotic) perspective, cognitive (epistemological) perspective, and thing-related (ontological) one. Therefore, the irrefutable decidability of analytic propositions occurs in the domains of: linguistic rules, cognitive principles, and ontic relations."[45] This allows to draw the following conclusion:

> The dichotomy of broadly understood analytic and synthetic propositions is not absolutely universal and absolute, but it occurs on various levels (aspects). Hence, determining the analyticity of a statement in one respect does not entail its analyticity from another point of view.[46]

This means that there are possible statements which have the quality of necessity (e.g. analytic propositions in a Kantian sense), and at the same time they are general and thing-related (e.g. synthetic propositions in a Kantian sense). At least some of the metaphysical theses (in metaphysics there are also hypotheses, see par. 7) have such a character – they are necessary and irrefutable, and, at the same time, they concern the real world. Nonetheless, Kamiński warns us not to equate the necessity in the being with the necessity (apodicticness) and certainty of cognition.[47] Necessity as an aspect of being is that, the negation of which is at the same time the negation of the being in a given aspect. The apodicticness of cognition consists in that one is not able to negate an accepted statement without falling into contradiction. Certainty is, in turn, a state of mind recognizing the truth without the fear of committing a mistake, and it is not just a subjective feeling but a state objectively justified.[48] The distinction indicated may be

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[45] Stanisław Kamiński, "Koncepcja analityczności a konieczność tez metafizyki," *Logika – filozofia – człowiek*, ed. Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik and Konrad Zaborowski (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL 2017), 188.

[46] Ibidem.

[47] Stanisław Kamiński, "Możliwość prawd koniecznych [The Possibility of Necessary Truths]," in Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?* (Lublin: TN KUL 1989), 106ff.

[48] Only then, Kamiński notes, one can assume that expressions such as "certain truth," "indubitable truth," "necessary truth," and "irrefutable truth" have the same scope. More cautiously, this relation is seen as subordination: a proposition which is necessarily true is certain but not vice versa. See ibidem, 107.

hard to implement in practice, but this fact does not prevent answering the question of whether there are such assertions, the veracity of which one can settle indubitably and irrefutably, and which are assertions about the world (thing-related). Of course, we are speaking of necessary truths in an absolute, and not a relative, sense, i.e. when we assume truths as necessarily true on account of their derivation (i.e. by way of deductive inference) from earlier accepted truths. Ultimately, the question is: "is it possible for concrete theses to settle in an intersubjectively controllable manner and with absolute cognitive certainty whether they are materially true?"[49]. The response to this question requires the aforementioned multi-aspectual approach to the problem: "one must inquire whether the ontic, cognitive, and linguistic conditions jointly taken may sometimes lead to a necessary truth and in what way may one ascertain that."[50] When searching for an answer, one must not omit any of the domain, and one should consider them in the right order. Moreover, one must eliminate certain "idols": one must not autonomize language because it emerges from the cognitive contact with reality and it "adapts" to describe it adequately. Hence, Kamiński claimed that the ontic domain is primary, whereas the cognitive and linguistic ones – secondary: "searching for the reason for the necessity of general statements only in the realm of language is surely a misunderstanding, for this reverts the natural order of things."[51] One must not introduce dichotomies of cognitive operations done by the senses (external and internal) and the discursive intellect and reason as well as the dichotomies of their results – nothing in those operations excludes the possibility of mixed operations, e.g. a direct intellectual grasp combined with a sensual observation: "Sensual and intellectual acts as well as their products constitute an organic unity in the most typical and natural cognitive acts."[52] One must not narrow down the scope of the term "experience" to sensual experience nor omit the participation of experience in forming other statements than observational ones, such as "no red thing is green" or "the color orange is located between yellow

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[49] Ibidem, 109. In his article Kamiński poses the question in the context of the history of that problem, in accordance with the principle of historicism which functions in the Lublin School; see par. 7 in this article.

[50] Ibidem, p. 117.

[51] Stanisław Kamiński, "Czy możliwe są ogólne i konieczne twierdzenia rzeczowe?," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1994), 308.

[52] Kamiński, "Możliwość prawd koniecznych," 120.

and red."[53] Kamiński comments: "Therefore, moderate apriorism is right. According to it, there are necessary statements that not only highlight the meaning of the terms which they contain, but they are also assertions about the world."[54] The basis for such assertions that are thing-related and apodictically true are necessary states of being. The object of necessary truths may be mental structures as well as reality existing independently of cognition. Metaphysics is about reality. It is pointed out that infallible cognition requires a special sort of intuition which combines intellectual evidence and an empirically obvious contact with reality (external or internal). The occurrence of such an intellectual intuition should be controlled: "Through intuition errors are not eliminated in advance, but they can be eliminated after an adequate preparation of the act of intuition and controlling it."[55] The objective criterion is given by necessary states of being, but one must demonstrate – by means of analytic-definitional cognition – that something cannot be otherwise. The issue is not simply cognizing something which without contradiction could not exist or could exist otherwise. This has yet to be shown to enable a control of correctness. It is here where one takes into account the linguistic side. Kamiński claims:

> Only then there can manifest itself the evident contradiction due to combining inconsistent contents or the lack of a content necessarily supplementing. Only then one can also demonstrate irrefutably the sole reason for a particular fact. Therefore, intuition on its own does not yet provide means to recognize the apodicticness of a given judgment, i.e. that it is such a judgment, the negation of which would entail contradiction. Only jointly and as part of analytical-definitional cognition one notices whether a negation contains a contradiction. Only then one does not need decisive verification. The grasped content of experience is sufficient, for that content, due to the necessary state of affairs and the cognitive apparatus formed on empiria, provides, as it were, an analytic definition of that state in that language.[56]

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[53]    It is about statements which are true about the world. They are sometimes called – in the Kantian spirit – synthetic *a priori* propositions. See Wojciech Żełaniec, *The Recalcitrant Synthetic A Priori* (Lublin: ARTOM, 1996).

[54]    Kamiński, "Czy możliwe są ogólne i konieczne twierdzenia rzeczowe?," 309.

[55]    Kamiński, "Możliwość prawd koniecznych," 122.

[56]    Ibidem, 123.

Thus, the mind cannot discursively move from singular statements to general ones, but it can accomplish that non-discursively. The control of that move occurs on three inter-connected levels: linguistic (analyticity), cognitive (intellectual evidence), and ontic (ontic necessity). A general statement is not a sum of observational statements but an intellectual grasp of a general element during the contact with individual, concrete real beings. This combination of the *a priori* and empirical elements makes general metaphysical statements simultaneously necessary and world-related.

A good example of the analyticity (necessity), thing-relatedness, and generalness of assertions is the so-called causative predication.[57] If I, e.g. want to point to a formal cause of the being, I predicate a definition (or its part) about it. Statements formed by way of such a predication are analytic statements – if one predicates about something's *definiens*, then the entire expression will be a case of the law of identity.[58]

## 5. Types of Negative justification

In the paragraph 3 we analyzed the method of explanation called decontradictification: the indication of the sole and necessary ontic reasons, the negation of which would simultaneously be the negation of the fact to be explained. A parallel cognitive operation is justification (called sometimes argumentation in a broad sense). There is no difference in the logical structure of explanation and justification, but there is a difference of questions. When we are looking for an explanation, we know a fact, but we want to find out why a given fact is the way it is. When we are searching for a justification, we want to know why should one consider a given statement true (or else probable). As it was noted above, in metaphysics we start with statements that are justified directly in experience, whereas the acceptance of explanations depends on whether or not we are able to prove that a giv-

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[57]   See Krąpiec and Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, 221-224. Krąpiec refers here Witold Marciszewski's dissertation *Zdania konieczne u św. Tomasza i w filozofii analitycznej* (Catholic University of Lublin Archive).

[58]   The understanding of the generalness and analyticity of assertions becomes complicated due to the analogical character of the language of metaphysics and in the situation when we are dealing with transcendental concepts. See Tomasz Duma, "The Specificity of the Language of the Theory of Being," in this volume.

en explanation is necessary and the only. Rejecting the necessary and sole explanation would be a resignation from a rational, cognitive character of the theory of being.

The construction of the proper object of philosophy and clarification of its content by way of formulating the first principles of being are first cognitive operations which allow to build the system of metaphysics (language as well as theses and relations between them). This enables so-called negative argumentation. Krąpiec enumerates three such operations. The first one is called *probatio per absurdum*: the veracity of a philosophical thesis is justified by demonstrating that the thesis which is contradictory to it is obviously false. However, this is not a formal contradiction but a contradiction in an ontic sense: the being simultaneously would have to be and not be, be a concrete something and not be that something. Such a contradiction can be demonstrated only within a system. The second operation consists in showing that the negation of a philosophical thesis is incompatible with the observed facts, i.e. that this negation cannot be considered as a true and adequate description of reality. Krąpiec notices here a certain difficulty. In philosophy of science it is commonly believed that there are no "bare facts" – so-called facts are cognitive constructs, already interpreted, consciously or not, within a framework of specific assumptions or theories. Hence, the incompatibility of a philosophical thesis with "facts" is actually apparent because statements about facts are already elements of a system. Krąpiec's response to this difficulty is the following: the interpretation of a fact in the philosophy of being is neutral, i.e. [in the theory of being] there is no as yet interpretation what and how a fact exists, but it recognizes the fact's existence, what is "something most primal in the mental-cognitive life of the human being."[59] The intuition of a concrete being in the light of the concept of being as being and of the ontic principles "tests" the value of the claimed metaphysical thesis. So, also in this case, testing has a systemic character. The third operation is called *reductio ad absurdum* – proving a statement by deriving the contradiction from the negation of that statement and possibly other statements. Also in this case the argumentation is systemic because we implicitly acknowledge that it cannot occur that a being is contradictory within itself.

Following Aristotle, Krąpiec accepts additionally elenctic argumentation as a significant way for justifying primary principles. An elenctic argument

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[59]    Krąpiec and Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, 51.

is about the inability to negate a certain principle without simultaneously employing this principle in the process of negating. Krąpiec claims that one does not have to have a real interlocutor in a discussion, but one may treat various philosophical systems as "adversaries" and attempt to formulate theses within them which entail conclusions that would be rejected within a given system. This will allow for the elenctic argumentation for the veracity of a discussed thesis and for the sharpening or clarification of a thesis recognized by oneself.

Once more one has to stress that justification (argumentation) is an intra-systemic issue, and it does not have the character of deduction in a logical sense because the last instance for accepting a thesis are real states and not formal relations between propositions.

## 6. Hypotheses in the philosophy of being

The main representatives of the Lublin Philosophical School agree that in philosophy, along with irrefutable explanations, there occur explanations that have the status of hypotheses, especially in particular metaphysics. This refers to such theses which are justified through the appeal to the coherence of a system. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk claim:

> By a metaphysical hypothesis we understand a proposition with some philosophical content that at least in itself is free of contradiction, that explains facts not yet explained by philosophical theories, and that is in agreement with the general proper object of a philosophical system and its theses.[60]

A crucial issue here is the understanding of a system. This does not refer to a deductive system as a set of axioms and rules, and theses infallibly derived from axioms by means of those rules. A system is understood as

> an ordered arrangement of theses and relations that is the result of substantive cognition of reality and that is grounded in the internal structure of being. The organization of these theses is not the result of the

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[60] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School," http://www.ptta.pl/lsf/metaphysics.pdf, 160 [accessed 12.08.2020].

consequences of logical implication but of whether these theses refer to constitutive or accidental, categorical or transcendental elements.[61]

The above understanding indicates conditions imposed on assertions which may obtain the status of hypotheses. These assertions: (1) must be internally non-contradictory; (2) must not be in contradiction with the logical consequences of any necessary statements accepted in that theory – accepting a certain thesis in the system of metaphysics as necessary excludes accepting in that system any assertion or consequence of that assertion which contradicts that necessary thesis. However, due to the analogical character of metaphysical statements, logical consistency does not constitute a sufficient condition to grant a particular statement the status of a hypothesis; (3) should explain specific ontic states. For not every statement correctly built in the language of a metaphysical theory and consistent with the theses accepted within that theory can become a hypothesis. A hypothesis might be only such a statement which answers a certain question legitimate in the system of metaphysics (i.e. which has sufficient reasons for being posed) and therefore is capable of filling a genuine gap in the system; the gap occurs when a system of theses does not explain at all or does not explain sufficiently well a certain fragment or aspect of its object; (4) is congruent with the concept of the proper object of philosophy: "only the congruence with the proper object of the system makes philosophical hypotheses a component of a philosophical theory."[62] Józef Herbut rightly therefore emphasizes: „A comprehensive analysis of the concept of a philosophical hypothesis can only be conducted in the context of the entire philosophy of being: its concepts and assumptions, the rules of explanation being in force in it, criteria of acceptance as well as of their ordering."[63]

As an example of a metaphysical hypothesis, Krąpiec presents his own theorem that any existential judgment is a function of the so-called particular intellect in which the synthesis of sensual (apprehension of a specific essence) and intellectual (ascertaining existence) cognition occurs. The assertion fills the "gap" in the systemic explanation of human cognition – up until then there was no response to the question of whether and in what way is the existence of concrete entities cognized. The hypothesis does not

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[61]    Ibidem, 159.
[62]    Krąpiec and Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, 254.
[63]    Józef Herbut, "Pojęcie hipotezy w filozofii bytu," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 10, no. 1 (1974): 58.

explain the state of being in a necessary way, i.e. "the negation of such a hypothesis entails neither a contradiction [with theses of the system] nor contradiction with facts, nor does it lead to the negation of the principle of contradiction through the negation of the principle of the reason of being."[64] No statement functioning in metaphysics as a hypothesis can be logically derived from a set of the already accepted necessary assertions, for deductively obtained theses "inherit" necessity. Thus, metaphysical theses constitute for hypotheses only a "negative norm," i.e. they exclude certain statements, but they do not positively indicate which ones to accept. The quality of necessity allows to distinguish in the system that what is indicated as the only reason explaining a given state of being and hypothetical objects. The statement "God exists" is not a hypothesis because without accepting the existence of such a being, we will not explain ultimately and irrefutably the existence of contingent beings. Krąpiec calls such claims indirect existential judgments. The negation "of the existence of the subject of that existential judgment would at the same time be the negation of the principle of sufficient reason for being and therefore also that of non-contradiction, and this would lead to the negation of existential judgments such as 'John exists,' 'I exist,' etc."[65] The claim: "the particular intellect cognizes the act of existence" is not necessary because negating it does not lead to the negation of facts.

The development of hypotheses as explanations which do not have the quality of necessity is a way to remove gaps in the philosophical theory and thus increase its adequacy in relation to its object. Metaphysical hypotheses have a varying level of probability, i.e. the probability of their veracity can be justified to various degrees. Krąpiec claims that semantically valid are such metaphysical hypotheses which are in itself non-contradictory, explain hitherto unexplained real facts, do not contradict with other metaphysical statements, and close a gap within the system. However, it is not required that a hypothesis fulfills all of the conditions mentioned. Only the first condition is necessary – by virtue of the principle of non-contradiction of being one must reject all statements which negate this principle. Yet, non-contradiction itself does not guarantee that a statement is true, and it does not make a statement a philosophical one which is suitable to be included into the system. The most probable hypotheses, in Krąpiec's view, are those which fulfill all conditions, less so – those which do not fill

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[64]  Krąpiec and Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, 254.
[65]  Ibidem, 274.

a gap in the system, although adding them to the system does not lead to contradiction, and even less probable are those which do not fulfill the last but one condition, i.e. non-contradiction with other metaphysical theses.

Krąpiec himself does not delve into this issue, but this last assertion has far-reaching consequences for philosophizing. The condition of non-contradicting other theses should be well understood. As it was said above, a reasonable metaphysical hypothesis cannot be in contradiction with the theses of the system that have the character of necessary truths. So, a situation of not fulfilling the condition of non-contradiction and remaining a semantically reasonable metaphysical hypothesis may concern exclusively relations to other hypotheses of the system. This means that there may occur a case where in other "versions" of classical metaphysics a hypothesis will be accepted which is contradictory to a hypothesis earlier accepted in the system. By virtue of the conditions formulated by Krąpiec, it is less probable, but it is not semantically nonsensical. There are also interesting consequences of the differentiating the condition for the philosophical explanation of real and not yet explained facts from the condition of closing a gap in the system. There may be no noticeable gaps in the system, but new facts may arise. This means that classical metaphysics is capable of "absorbing" new facts and formulating explanations for them – both necessary and hypothetical. Therefore, the system of classical metaphysics is not a closed system. What is more, in Krąpiec's view, at times a hypothesis of the system may become a thesis of that system if one is able to justify it by referring to necessary states of being. Krąpiec concludes: "The existence of philosophical hypotheses enables the constant development of the system, thanks to which it ever more completely and coherently explains reality."[66]

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[66]     Ibidem, 254.

# 7. Historicism

Historicism is an inherent element of the way of philosophizing at the Lublin School. Only in the nineteenth century did scholars in fact start to realize the influence of historical circumstances on the understanding of the investigated reality. Initially, historicism assumed a radical form, according to which every scientific explanation depended on its historical context. The thinkers who assumed the non-relative character of reality developed moderate historicism which does not exclude, as Stefan Swieżawski pointed out, "the absolute character of the world of natures and values, the manifestation of which in human conduct and action investigated in the study of history undoubtedly is dependent on a vast array of constantly changing factors."[67] According to Swieżawski, a well understood and skillfully applied moderate historicism "deepens and refines our historical knowledge, protects us from the boastfulness of 'ultimate perspectives' and from the bending of historical reality to the contents to fit in the tight, temporally and spatially limited world of our own."[68] It allows to avoid both naive absolutism and total relativism, the skepticism of which leads to nihilism. Étienne Gilson contributed to the development of moderate historicism. He distinguished two phases in the practice of the history of philosophy. In the first one, one should meticulously investigate the views which occurred throughout the history of philosophy, doing so in a way adjusted to each of them for the sake of acquiring an interpretation. In the second phase, one is dealing with the proper history of philosophy, the task of which is "the study of the history of 'pure and bare' concepts and their mutual connections," leading to the discovery of the history of "one universal philosophy," deeply differing from the history "of an entire multitude of philosophical views and modes of philosophizing."[69]

The Lublin Philosophical School follows Gilson's approach. The idea is to include in philosophical inquiries the history of problems considered, mainly with regard to the context of their emergence and development. This allows to discover within particular philosophical systems, despite conceptual differentiation, permanent aspects of problems as well as the influ-

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[67]  Stefan Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii*, ed. Jacek J. Jadacki and Mikołaj Olszewski (Warszawa: Semper, 2005), 162-163.
[68]  Ibidem.
[69]  Ibidem, 207.

ence which on their interpretation is executed by accepted assumptions, methods of inquiry as well as manners of explaining and of justifying formulated theses. Thus, the history of philosophy was treated as an essential instrument in conducting systematic philosophical inquiries. Krąpiec wrote: "All philosophical problems, even if they were formulated abstractly, are manifestations of concrete human life and as connected with this life they explain something, rationally justify something, or express protest against the way things are. Philosophy cannot be divorced from the context of life."[70] Examining various philosophical systems allows us to discover that we are dealing with the same problems but under different names and analyzed from different perspectives and in different aspects. The need for such research most of all was an effect of the realism of the philosophy developed at the Lublin School. This is clearly emphasized by Swieżawski:

> [i]t is all the easier to assume an ahistorical stance, the more one treats the world of our intentional creations as the proper object of philosophy, and so the more one is close to philosophy of the idealistic orientation and further away from philosophy of the realistic orientation. Only in philosophies of a realistic type is the relationship of philosophy with its history seen as indispensable for any sort of philosophy which deals with the world and reality existing independently from us.[71]

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[70]    Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School," *Studia Gilsoniana* 5, no. 2 (April–June 2016): 416.

[71]    Stefan Swieżawski, "Rola historii filozofii w formacji umysłowej," in *Z zagadnień kultury chrześcijańskiej*, ed. Karol Wojtyła et al. (Lublin: TN KUL, 1973), 266. It was Swieżawski who began to practice the history of philosophy in this spirit, and under his influence also Marian Kurdziałek, Stanisław Wielgus, Kazimierz Wójcik, Edward I. Zieliński, Jan Czerkawski, Marian Ciszewski, Agnieszka Kijewska, Stanisław Janeczek, Piotr Gutowski. Those thinkers – especially the scholars of the medieval studies – enriched also their research methodology by employing the accomplishments of German (Martin Grabmann and Bernhard Geyer) and Polish (Konstanty Michalski and Aleksander Birkenmajer) historians. Historicism was broadly applied in systematic inquiries by: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, sister Zofia J. Zdybicka, Andrzej Wawrzyniak, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Piotr Jaroszyński, Piotr Moskal – in metaphysics; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stanisław Kowalczyk, Romuald J. Weksler-Waszkinel – in anthropology; Antoni B. Stępień, Henryk Kiereś, Stanisław Judycki – in epistemology; Karol Wojtyła, Tadeusz Styczeń, Andrzej Szostek – in ethics; Stanisław Kamiński, Stanisław Majdański, Andrzej Bronk, Stanisław Kiczuk, Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik – in methodology of science and in logic. This manner of developing the history of philosophy and applying the method of historicism in particular domains of philosophy are continued by a subsequent generation of the philosophical community at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.

The method of historicism includes some concrete operations. The first one is reaching source texts, what sometimes requires cooperation with philologists in order to prepare their appropriate translation. Thanks to that, it is possible to engage into a dialogue with the investigated philosopher – alien views will not then be imposed on her/him, but one will listen to his/her words, extracting what is crucial in texts.[72] The next stage is the explanation and interpretation of the examined issues. The aim of these two operations is to extract the proper meaning of a particular work, and the difference between them, as Swieżawski indicates, concerns mainly the context: in the case of explanation the context is narrower (e.g. other texts by the same author) than it is in the case of interpretation (everything which influences discovering the work's meaning). The interpretation is to a much larger degree than explanation conditioned by the scholar's mentality. This, nevertheless, does not have to mean that an interpretation is subjective or relative, although it is a fact that it is always aspectual and partial.[73] The next stage is the pursuit of the main assumptions underlying the philosophical topics presented in the investigated texts. For ultimately these are those assumptions which decide about the validity of the explanations proposed within particular theories or philosophical systems. In result, it becomes possible to determine a "type" of philosophy which underlies the analyzed issues.[74] Another important operation is the discovery of the consequences to which the accepted assumptions lead. According to Swieżawski, one can find out personally or even "laboratorily" when the consequences of the assumptions turn out to be absurd, discordant with evidence or common sense.[75] One should also take into account the consequences which follow specific types of philosophizing, with respect to the development or the termination of the latter.[76] The cognitive operations and their results are then subjected to evaluation, but the difference between historical and philosophical evaluation should be observed.[77] The first one is about construing some sort of "scale of values," according to which one evaluates the understanding, explanation, and interpretation of philosophical views, followed by the extraction of that what influences distinguishing the most

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[72]    Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii*, 212.
[73]    Ibidem, 534-540.
[74]    Ibidem, 471.
[75]    Ibidem, 399.
[76]    Ibidem, 448.
[77]    Ibidem, 543ff.

important types of philosophy. The philosophical evaluation focuses on particular philosophical theses and visions of reality which underlie them. The question is: to what degree do these theses facilitate the cognition of the truth about the explained facts? The value of the theses is established by means of decontradictification, reduction *ad absurdum*, or the coherence of the system.[78] Krąpiec claims that according to such a perspective "the history of philosophy is not a graveyard of human thought, but it is its vivid and developing form. For one then receives from history some additional confirmation for the rightness or incorrectness of philosophical theses."[79] Getting to know the origins and development of a given problem allows one to sharpen one's own perspective and to avoid at least some of the errors and inconsistencies as well as to identify pseudo-problems or solely verbal disputes. Taking into consideration the context of the formulation as well as the historical development of the investigations of a given problem plays a significant role in discussing the correctness of the proposed explanations and interpretations. This way one can confirm, to what extent are philosophical theses formulated in an appropriate way, and in particular – whether they are adequately justified. It allows, among other things, to select an adequate research method adjusted to a research object and compliant with the specificity of philosophical inquiries. Thanks to this sort of instruments, it is possible to accomplish progress in the domain of philosophical investigations, manifested, among other things, in the deepening of solutions suggested by those who came before. The method of historicism allows to analyze formulated philosophical theses under the aspect of aporeticity, in order, for example, to reveal contradictions, inconsistencies, or ambiguities they carry with themselves.[80] This way it functions as an instrument for verifying provided explanations and interpretation. The consistent application of historicism allows to avoid many mistakes committed throughout the history of philosophy.[81] An example of applying historicism

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[78]    Krąpiec and Maryniarczyk, *Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School*, 418-422.

[79]    Krąpiec and Kamiński, *Z teorii i metedologii metafizyki*, 246.

[80]    Barbara Wiśniewska-Paź and Bogusław Paź, s.v. "Historyzm," *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 4, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2003), 509ff.

[81]    See Krąpiec and Maryniarczyk, "Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School," 117.

is a so-called metaphysical web prepared by M. A. Krąpiec[82] which contains problems concerning the philosophy of being. Admittedly, it was created on the basis of Aquinas's philosophy, but it may serve to investigate any other philosophical system.[83]

These considerations on methods emphasize to an even greater extent the methodological peculiarity of classical philosophy or more precisely that of the theory of being seen as the first and basic discipline. They clearly indicate that classical philosophy is an empirical sort of cognition, and its starting point is the cognitive contact with reality. It is also a methodical type of cognition: the first step is elaborating the concept of being as being, followed by the clarification of that concept's content through discerning the transcendentals which turn out to be analogical. In this analogical language, and thus already within the system, we search for an explanation of why the being exists and why the being is the way it is. The being is explained by indicating such inner and/or external factors without which the being would not exist and it would not be what it in fact is. Explanatory reasoning resembles reductive inference, but since it is based on the grasp of necessary ontic relations, it becomes an infallible type of reasoning. Metaphysical theses are necessary in a threefold way. The thing-related necessity means that they grasp ontic necessity; the epistemic necessity – that they are apodictic; and the linguistic necessity – that they are analytical in a peculiar way. Justification has a negative character, necessary assertions are supplemented with hypotheses, and the entirety of considerations – with a historical analysis of the origins and development of a particular problem. *Mutatis mutandis* such a procedure is also applied in particular metaphysics which analyzes various categories of beings. And because in a system of metaphysics there are hypotheses and, moreover, one can always find in experience new categories of beings, the system of metaphysics has a dynamic and open character. Such a methodological characteristic demonstrates that classical philosophy is an autonomous and rational cognition in which knowledge-creating procedures are applied. Thus, denying philosophy the status of science (of course, not in the sense of the English term *science* but in that of Latin term *scientia*) is a methodological error.

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[82]  See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "'Siatka metafizyczna' w studium historii filozofii," *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 25, no. 1 (1997), 63-65.

[83]  Stanisław Janeczek, "Metodologia historii filozofii w ujęciu Stefana Swieżawskiego," in *Filozofia i historia filozofii*, ed. Tadeusz Klimski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UKSW, 2008), 48ff.

It is worth emphasizing one more time that practical fruits of philosophy are appreciated, most of all those related to wisdom and worldview. Kamiński claimed that "philosophy provides us with rational basis for the construction of a worldview and facilitates the perfection of one's personality. Also philosophy usually performs a generative, integrative, and regulative function in sciences, and its active, intervening presence in meta-scientific findings – regardless if one is aware of it or is not – is irremovable."[84] It also plays a regulative and evaluative role, for it constitutes, as was cited above, "self-consciousness, as it were, of culture itself."[85] And surely because of that, classical philosophy cultivated in the Lublin School should indeed be *philo-sophia* – the love of wisdom.

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[84]    Kamiński, "Method in Classical Philosophy," 49.
[85]    Kamiński, "On the Nature of Philosophy," 205.

Bożena Czernecka-Rej

# Non-Classical Logics in the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy

Gottlob Frege's invention of the classical logical calculus at the end of the 19th century was a groundbreaking event in the history of logic. Scholars hoped that it would quickly become the only real and fully appropriate logic. Starting with the 1920s, it had occurred that these hopes were exaggerated because that calculus has numerous limitations. Various non-classical logics began to be devised at the time. Their authors expressed the conviction that the standard logical apparatus was inadequate in an obvious way when dealing with various nonformal forms of reasoning. The first half of the twentieth century brought an ongoing multiplication of diverse calculi, aspiring to be considered logical calculi. Also Polish logicians actively participated in the formulation of new calculi. Were scholars from the Catholic University of Lublin among them? What were their achievements? Have they made a significant contribution to the development and search for the application of non-classical logical calculi?

The subject matter of non-classical logics relatively quickly entered into the canon of research topics undertaken by scholars at the Catholic University of Lublin. The monograph *Les judgments modaux chez Aristote et les scolastiques* published in Belgium (Louvain 1923) by the university's first lecturer in logic, Stanisław Dominczak, though not directly dedicated to modal syllogistic, anticipated many analyses and distinctions of modality (e.g. *de dicto – de re*) present in the modern modal propositional calculi.

It became one of the sources of inspiration and point of reference for Zygmunt Zawirski's investigations on the nature of modality.[1]

Systematic inquiries into modern logic have been conducted at the Catholic University of Lublin since 1946, when the Department of Logic was founded. A pioneering academic and organizational role was played by the first Chair of the Department, Antoni Korcik.[2] His disciple and subsequent Chair, Stanisław Kamiński,[3] after undertaking a meticulous study of Frege's logical system in his doctoral dissertation (1949), turned his research interests to methodology of science, focusing on the issue of the formalization of classical philosophy.

In 1951 Jerzy Kalinowski's post-doctoral dissertation (*habilitacja*) within the methodology of practical sciences was completed at the Department of Logic on the basis of his study entitled *Logika zdań praktycznych: Z badań nad podstawami logicznymi poznania praktycznego* [The Logic of Practical Propositions: Inquiries into the Foundations of Practical Cognition]. He presented in it the first ever logic of norms.[4] After emigrating to France (in 1958), he continued to work in the field of broadly understood legal logic, since 1961 at the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique within the group forming the Centre de Philosophie du Droit.[5] This research is currently continued by his disciples and successors. Also scholars at the Catholic University of Lublin are developing Kalinowski's logic of norms,

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[1]    Zygmunt Zawirski, review of: S. Dominczak, *Les judgments modaux chez Aristote et les scholastiques* (Louvain 1923), *Ruch Filozoficzny* 10 (1926-1927): 92-93. Zawirski claimed, in opposition to Dominczak, that modal judgments which express a certain objective state of affairs correspond to relations occurring between entities in the real world.

[2]    Antoni Korcik (1892-1969) before World War II studied, among other places, in Lublin, but he worked at the University of Warsaw and the University of Vilnius. He was the disciple of Stanisław Kobyłecki and Jan Łukasiewicz (he prepared his doctoral dissertation under Łukasiewicz's supervision in 1930). In 1948 Korcik received his post-doctoral degree at the Jagiellonian University. His focus was on the history of logic practiced – in the spirit of Łukasiewicz – from the perspective of contemporary logic. See Stanisław Majdański and Czesław Wojtkiewicz, "Logika na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim (Z okazji 50-lecia Uczelni)," Roczniki Filozoficzne 17, no. 1 (1969): 123-170.

[3]    Stanisław Kamiński was Chair of the Department of Logic between 1963 and 1975.

[4]    In the same year, independently from Kalinowski, the Finnish logician Georg Henrik von Wright presented a system of deontic logic. He based it on the analogy between alethic modal statements and deontic modal statements.

[5]    In the yearbook *Archives de philosophie du droit* published by the Centre de Philosophie du Droit he supervised the "Logic of norms" and "Legal logic" sections.

treating them as a point of departure for construing more abundant logical systems that constitute the basis for so-called formal ethics (connected, for instance, with the development of state-of-the-art technologies).[6]

The meta-philosophical seminar initiated by Kalinowski[7] was a place where not infrequently heated discussions were conducted on the shape of philosophy practiced at the Catholic University of Lublin and, in particular, on the possibility of its logicization. Kalinowski together with his disciples were heading towards a "logistic defense of metaphysics," that is its clarification and at least partial formalization with the help of the tools provided by contemporary logic.[8] Later on, mainly because of Kamiński who tried to combine the approach of the Lvov-Warsaw School with existential Thomism as well as his fruitful cooperation with Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, such an ambitiously outlined program was abandoned.

Since the beginning of the 1960s, a dispute was going on between Kamiński and a representative of the Cracow Circle, Jan F. Drewnowski,[9] who was a strong supporter of applying formal logic to classical Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. The main question was whether laws of logic encompassed all important types of reasoning formulated in the terms of nonformalized language and, thus, whether all the reasoning conducted beyond the realm of logic and mathematics may be treated as particular cases of schemas of logical reasoning. Both sides admitted that classical extensional logic was insufficient and cannot constitute the sole basis for the infallible justification of theorems. Just as the multiplication table is insufficient in mathematics, classical logic in metaphysics is insufficient for validating all operations of proving. It was hoped that in the future this gap should be filled by some non-classical intensional logic.[10] It was a powerful incentive to address these issues.

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[6] One of such formal ethics is being created for the purpose of autonomous vehicles.

[7] Its participants included, among others, Antoni B. Stępień, Stanisław Majdański, Leon Koj, Tadeusz Kwiatkowski, Witold Marciszewski, and later Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński.

[8] Stanisław Kiczuk, "Spór o stosowalność logiki formalnej do filozofii w szkole lubelskiej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 44, no. 1 (1996): 5-18.

[9] It was conducted by way of letter exchanges and publications, its main result being an article by Kamiński "Logika współczesna a filozofia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 9, no. 1 (1961): 49-84. In the background of the dispute there were controversies connected with the prewar accomplishment of the Cracow Circle, namely Jan Salamucha's formalization of Aristotle's proof *ex motu*.

[10] For a broader description of the topic see Michał Adamczyk, *Wiedza – wiara – racjonalność. Jana Franciszka Drewnowskiego program logizującej modernizacji myśli filozoficzno-teologicznej* (Lublin: TN KUL, 2015).

In 1975 the Chair of the Department of Logic at the Catholic University of Lublin was taken by Ludwik Borkowski, the disciple and colleague of Jerzy Słupecki, the co-creator of presuppositional propositional calculus, and this was a significant event for the Lublin academic community. In his Lublin period Borkowski wrote his crucial works concerning the foundations of many-valued logics, in particular the interpretation of logical values in truth-tables of these logics as well as works on the formal apprehension of the classical definition of truth. A significant role regarding the scope of the works on non-classical logics there played the construction of a four-valued system of logic, by way of modifying Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic. Nuel Belnap in his concept of logic for computers referred to the idea of crossing two classical matrices which lies at the foundations of this construction.

After Borkowski, the Department of Logic at the Catholic University of Lublin was headed by Stanisław Kiczuk (1985-2010), who investigated the boundaries of formal logic and physics. Kiczuk's main works belong to the domain of logic of change and logic of causality. He also initiated at the University philosophical and logical inquiries on the seminal and currently vividly discussed topic of the plurality of logics. These efforts are continued by his disciples.

This chapter shall review the accomplishments of three representatives of the scholarly community at the Catholic University of Lublin in the field of non-classical logics: Jerzy Kalinowski, Ludwik Borkowski, and Stanisław Kiczuk. They are not, obviously, the only logicians and philosophers who dealt with this matter; nonetheless, one should consider them as its major representatives.

## 1. Jerzy Kalinowski's logic of norms

Jerzy Kalinowski was active at the Catholic University of Lublin between 1934 and 1938 and 1947 and 1957, first as a law student and then as a scholar and teacher. Influenced by Czesław Martyniak, a lecturer on the theory and philosophy of law, he became interested in the philosophy of law practiced in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. He spent most of World War II abroad, mainly in France. In 1947 he returned to the Catholic University of Lublin, where he received his PhD in law and was hired at the Faculty of

Law and Economics. In 1952 he was moved to the Faculty of Philosophy and appointed as Dean of that faculty. He held that post until 1957.

Kalinowski got interested in logic under the influence of a lecture transcript written by Zygmunt Zawirski. It quickly became one of the main areas of his scholarly activity. Its first significant effect was his post-doctoral dissertation *Logika zdań praktycznych* [Logic of Practical Propositions] (1951, reviewers: Tadeusz Kotarbiński and Jerzy Słupecki). Thanks to it, Kalinowski became, next to Georg H. von Wright, the precursor of a new branch of logic called the logic of norms (or deontic logic). In 1951 independently from each other, they developed the first logical calculi which formalized normative reasoning. Kalinowski, however, published his findings two years later in the journal *Studia Logica*, in the article entitled *Teoria zdań normatywnych* [Theory of Normative Statements].[11]

Kalinowski's scholarly interests, on the one hand, focused on formal logic, and, on the other hand, they were the natural continuation of his university education in the field of law and interest in the philosophy of law. The combination of these two domains resulted in the elaboration of two complementary systems of logic of norms: $K_1$ and $K_2$.[12] These systems – as Kalinowski emphasizes – are a discovery (and not construction[13]) of the logical foundations of normative (legal, ethical) reasoning made by a philosopher of law who investigated the genuine procedures of deducing legal and moral norms. Kalinowski noticed that norms tend to be mixed with other practical statements which include, apart from normative statements, evaluative and imperative ones. However, axiological logic and imperative logic were barely outlined at the time.

Kalinowski's logic of norms is supported by a profound philosophical reflection on the nature and qualities of norms and normative statements. A norm, in his view, is a certain type of (normative) judgment signified by a specific grammatical structure called a normative sentence. In other words, a norm is a connotation of a normative statement, i.e. it is that what a normative sentence signifies.

The norm ascertains the existence of a normative relation, i.e. a relation between the subject of an act (set of subjects) and the act (set of acts). Syn-

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[11] Jerzy Kalinowski, "Teoria zdań normatywnych," *Studia Logica* 1 (1953): 113-184.
[12] Kalinowski writes: "I thought of the logic of norms when giving lectures to law students on contemporary logic." Jerzy Kalinowski, *Poszerzone serca. Wspomnienia* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1997), 161.
[13] In contrast to von Wright's deontic logic.

tactically, a normative relation consists of three elements: a) an individual name (e.g. "this here human") or general name (e.g. "judge") of an acting subject; b) the individual name ("this here act") or general name ("issuing a verdict") of an act as well as c) the normative propositional functor.

Kalinowski took a firm position in the dispute on the logical value of norms. He assumed that there is no difference between theoretical judgments and norms: just as theoretical judgments ascertain the existence of entities and their properties, norms ascertain the existence of normative relations, i.e. obligations or possibilities of doing or not doing something.[14] He, therefore, opposed von Wright, according to whom norms (especially legal norms) are neither true nor false because they are a result of an agreement between people in a given community (e.g. a country) as far as the procedures of constituting them are concerned, or they are arbitrarily imposed by the authorities (e.g., an absolute monarch or a totalitarian regime). According to Kalinowski, a normative relation is always indicated by the nature of things and ultimately by the Creator. For this reason, the norm which ascertains a normative relation that occurs objectively (naturally) is true, and that which ascertains a normative relation that does not occur is false. For instance, the norm "every working Polish citizen should pay taxes" is true only in the case when there is a normative relation, defined by the nature of things, between (every) working citizen of Poland and the act of paying taxes or if there is a properly constituted (i.e., by competent authorities or according to an accepted legislative path) legal regulation which directly states that "every working Polish citizen ought to pay taxes." Thus, the veracity of a norm should be understood as its compliance with the normative relation (just like the one described above) or with a legal act (or some other body of regulations).

The problem of the logical value of norms lies at the roots of the distinction between "logic of norms" and "deontic logic." Kalinowski, who ascribed truth and falsity to the types of norms formalized by him, developed logic of norms, whereas von Wright (and others, e.g. in Poland – Zygmunt Ziembiński and Zdzisław Ziemba), who denied the values of truth and falsity to norms, developed deontic logic. The logic of norms is described as logic in which statements concern the relations between norms; it aims at formu-

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[14]  Jerzy Kalinowski, *Logika norm* (Lublin: Instytut Wydawniczy, 1993), 11-33; Jerzy Kalinowski, *Le problème de la vérité en morale et en droit* (Lyon: E. Vitte, 1967). See also Robert Trypuz, "Spór o wartość logiczną norm: Logika norm a logika deontyczna," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 52, no. 1 (2005): 293-316.

lating logical laws which are the basis of the (deductive) rules of normative inferences and organizing these laws in an axiomatized and formalized deductive system. Deontic logic can be understood in a narrow sense (*sensu stricto*) as a logic of statements about norms or, in a broad sense, as both the logic of statements about norms and logic of norms.[15]

The source of inspiration for calculus $K_1$ and $K_2$ was the idea of analogy between normative and modal statements. These systems are based on a two-valued or three-valued propositional calculus, Łukasiewicz's modal logic and Aristotle's *de inesse* and *de modo* propositional syllogistic. Content-wise they refer to traditional logic, and due to their form they belong to contemporary logic and thus perform, within a specific domain, a sort of *nova et vetera synthesis*.[16]

The logic of normative sentences $K_1$ (from 1951) includes the functor of negation $N$ and five norm-forming functors:

a) "$x$ should do $z$" – in short: $xSz$,
b) "$x$ should not do $z$" – $xLz$,
c) "$x$ has the right to (can) do $z$" – $xPz$,
d) „$x$ has the right (can) not do $z$" – $xWz$,
e) "$x$ may do (implicitly: "and does not have to do") $z$" – $xMz$.

Later (under the influence of Robert Blanché) a sixth relation was added which corresponds with the expression:

f) "$x$ should or should not do $z$" – $xVz$.

$S$, $L$, $P$, $W$, $M$, $V$ are respectively the functors of: the obligation to act, the obligation not to act (prohibition), unilateral permission to act, unilateral permission not to act, bilateral permission, necessity to act or not to act.

The $K_1$ system has two variants: matricial and axiomatic.

The $N$ functor is characterized by the matrix (analogically to the matrix of three-valued propositional negation):

| α | Nα |
|---|---|
| 1* | 0* |
| 1/2* | 1/2* |
| 0* | 1* |

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[15]   Kalinowski emphasized that the term "deontic" was spreaded, and it practically eliminated the term "normative." See Kalinowski, *Logika norm*, 15-16.
[16]   Ibidem, 122.

"1*" signifies the value of an essentially good act transformed by the negation $N$ into the value of an essentially evil act; "0*" signifies the value of an essentially evil act transformed by the negation $N$ into the value of an essentially good act; "1/2*" signifies the value of an act which is not essentially good or evil; therefore, the value of such an act has the same value as the negated act.

The matrix which characterizes norm-creating functors is the following:

| α | $xL\alpha$ | $xM\alpha$ | $xP\alpha$ | $xS\alpha$ | $xV\alpha$ | $xW\alpha$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1* | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| 1/2* | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 0* | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |

The matrix contains two classes of values. The first one {1*,1/2*,0*} is attributed to acts. These values should be understood respectively as the qualification of an act as good (essentially), evil (essentially) as well as neither essentially good, nor essentially evil (neutral).

Elements of the second class: {1,0} are attributed to normative propositions (statements) and should be understood as "true" and "false" Respectively. Therefore, the matrix of the system is non-homogenic. It characterizes the logical value of normative sentences depending on the value of an action.

The axiomatic variant is based on one axiom:

$\sim(xPNz) \rightarrow xPz$ which should be read: If it is not so that $x$ has the right to act not-z, then $x$ has the right to act $z$.

Definitions (which permit to replace any norm-creative functor with a functor of permission) are:

D1.   $xWz = xPNz$            x has the right not to do z = x has the right to do not-z,

D2.   $xSz = \sim(xPNz)$        x ought to do z = it is not so that x has the right to do not-z,

D3.   $xLz = \sim(xPz)$         x ought not to do z = it is not so that x has the right to do z,

D4.   $xMz = xPz \wedge xPNz$     x may do and may not do z = x has the right to do z and x has the right to do not-z,

D5.   $xVz = \sim(xPNz) \vee \sim(xPz)$   x ought to do or ought not to do z = it is not that x has the right to do not-z, or it is not so that x has the right to act z.

The rules of inference are: substitution, derivation (*modus ponens*), and replacement by definition.

The K1 system assumes the classical propositional logic. According to Kalinowski, classical two-valued logic provides a completely sufficient basis to normative reasoning. This remark was made in the context of the attempts to base deontic logic on intuitionistic logic (e.g. by Lothar Philipps).[17] The K2 system is an extension of K1 built upon the first-order logic. It is practically useful because its theses are the basis for normative rules of syllogistic inferences that occur in legal practice.

Kalinowski's systems became an inspiration for other originators of deontic logics. Among them are scholars from the Catholic University of Lublin: Piotr Kulicki and Robert Trypuz. They reconstructed Kalinowski's logical theory on the basis of a set-theorertical model and proved K1's completeness in relation to that model. Apart from that, they devised a new SK system which is an expansion of Krister Segerberg's B.O.D. system; with a richer language than K1, a full formalized rendition of Kalinowski's ideas on norms and acts became possible.[18]

## 2. Ludwik Borkowski's logical and philosophical analysis of many-valued logics

Ludwik Borkowski joined the academic community of the Catholic University of Lublin in 1975 when he was appointed as the Chair of the Department of Logic at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy. He came from the University of Wrocław, already as an established academic, soon after receiving the title of an associate professor of mathematical sciences in 1973. There, at the Faculty of Mathematics, Physics and Chemistry, he passed all the stages of his university career: a teaching assistant (since 1948), assistant professor (since 1951), lecturer (since 1961), and then associate professor.

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[17] Ibidem, 186-196.

[18] Robert Trypuz and Piotr Kulicki, "Jerzy Kalinowski's Logic of Normative Sentences Revisited," *Studia Logica* 103 (2015): 389-412. In the SK system they tried to explain the sense of a principle which states that (every) not doing a good act is evil. For this purpose they introduced the concept of moral indistinguishability of acts, filtrating all individual acts into two classes: good and evil.

The cooperation of the renowned logician, as was Borkowski in the 1970s, with the prominent philosophers from the so-called Lublin School resulted in numerous bilateral benefits. Borkowski contributed to it with his rich and multilaterally focused scientific achievements, rich pedagogical experience as well as the tradition of the School which taught him great care for a high logical culture. He took over from the philosophers of the Lublin milieu their style of philosophical discussions conducted with broad historical erudition and a great methodological awareness of one's own endeavors. He became involved in the vivid discussion which had been going on for over a decade on the shape of the philosophy practiced, especially on the possibility of its logicization. On the one hand, Borkowski did spread awareness of limitations of formal methods, derived, among other things, from Gödel's theorem[19], but on the other hand, he saw in those methods a powerful instrument for clarifying and communicating acquired knowledge.

The Lublin period, though it concluded Borkowski's scientific and didactic activities, simultaneously turned them into a slightly different direction. Joining the thriving community of philosophers encouraged him to take on more philosophically engaged topics. One of them was the issue of truth. The description of the classical concept of truth with the help of the terminology of modern logic was his original accomplishment.[20]

His interest in non-classical logics, called at a certain time philosophical logics, was particularly innovatory. In the mid-twentieth century the issue of the philosophical context of these logics was not yet sufficiently vivid, or in any case it did not belong to the predominant themes taken on by scholars. The efforts of logicians were directed rather at the construction of new calculi. Some of them shared Jan Łukasiewicz's hopes to construe a logical system more perfect than the classical propositional logic which would be adequate for all sorts of sciences and potential fields of discourse. Łukasiewicz linked this enthusiasm with the discovery of many-valued logics.

Borkowski's best known accomplishments in the field of non-classical logics concern many-valued, modal, and intuitionist logics. His contribution

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[19]   Ludwik Borkowski, "O twierdzeniu Gödla", *Filozofia* (journal of the Philosophy Students' Circle at the Catholic University of Lublin) 7 (1981): 5-10.

[20]   More on this topic see: Andrzej Biłat and Urszula Żegleń, "Ludwik Stefan Borkowski: w poszukiwaniu prawdy w logice," *Ruch Filozoficzny* 51(1994): 111-124.

consists not only in achieving significant formal results but, most of all, in drawing attention to their deep philosophical context.[21]

From a philosophical point of view, Borkowski's in-depth investigations on the intuitive interpretation of Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic and a specific four-valued matrix for modal functors turned out to be particularly important. Constructive results acquired in this field contributed to a better understanding of the cognitive status of many-valued and modal logics.

Valuable analyses are included in Borkowski's article "W sprawie intuicyjnej interpretacji logiki trójwartościowej Łukasiewicza [On the Intuitive Interpretation of Łukasiewicz's Three-valued Logic]" (1977). The point of departure was Jerzy Słupecki's study[22] and his attempt to systematize the assumptions of the interpretation proposed by Łukasiewicz on the subject of the logical value of statements concerning future events. Borkowski pointed to errors in the formalization proposed by Słupecki, namely, assumption 8 which was supposed to express the necessity of causal relation in the following way:

$(f_1 \Rightarrow f) \to (f_1 \times f_2 \Rightarrow f)$, where variables $f$, $f_1$, $f_2$ range over the set of all events, the expression $f_1 \Rightarrow f$ states that event $f_1$ is the cause of event $f$, while the sign $\times$ is the intersection of events,

leads to the conclusion that an impossible event is the cause for any given event which has some cause (if event $f_2$ is the complement of event $f_1$). Borkowski formalized the theorem that an effect necessarily follows a cause in the following way:

$(p_1 * f_1) \wedge (p * f) \to ((f_1 \Rightarrow f) \to (p_1 \to p))$, where the expression '$p * f$' ascertains that the statement '$p$' describes event $f$,

that he read as: if $f_1$ is the cause of $f$, then if $f_1$ exists, then $f$ *exists*.[23]

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[21]  Philosophy initiated and concluded Borkowski's period of abundant scholarly activity: starting with studying philosophy at the John Casimir University in Lvov and after World War II – at the Jagiellonian University, finishing off with the broadly understood philosophy of logic in the last Lublin period.

[22]  Jerzy Słupecki, "Próba intuicyjnej interpretacji logiki trójwartościowej Łukasiewicza," in *Rozprawy logiczne. Księga pamiątkowa ku czci K. Ajdukiewicza*, ed. Tadeusz Kotarbiński (Warszawa: PWN, 1964), 185-191.

[23]  Marek Lechniak demonstrated that the following formula is inferred from it:
$(p_1 * f_1) \wedge (p_2 * f_2) \wedge (p * f) \to ((f_1 \Rightarrow f) \to (p_1 \wedge p_2 \to p))$,

Assumption 8 serves to proof an expression of the following form:

$\exists\ g\ (g \Rightarrow f \times f_1) \equiv \exists\ g\ (g \Rightarrow f) \wedge \exists g\ (g \Rightarrow f_1)$, where variable $g$ ranges over the set of all past or present events and '$\equiv$' is the sign of the functor of equivalence,

which does not raise intuitive objections, and that is why Borkowski suggested to accept it as one of the assumptions. Słupecki from the accepted assumptions and the definition of a determined event: $D(f) \equiv \exists g\ (g \Rightarrow f)$[24] derived the formulas that give the values for three-valued conjunction, alternative and negation. However, in order to define the functor of implication, he needed to extend the intuitive base of the system by adding assumptions concerning the modal functors of necessity and possibility.[25]

According to Borkowski, some of the consequences of the accepted assumptions are unacceptable, namely, that the conjunction of two propositions with a third logical value has the third value also in the case when one is the negation of the other. If the proposition: "Tomorrow there will be a sea battle" has the third logical value, then its negation will also have the third value, and therefore their conjunction would have a third value too. It seems to be against the intuition that the conjunction "Tomorrow there will be a sea battle" and "Tomorrow there will be no sea battle" is simply false. Similarly, the alternative of two propositions with a third value, one of which is the negation of the other, should be true and should not have a third value.[26]

For this reason Borkowski suggested reformalizing the intuitions lying at the foundations of three-valued logic. In order to reach the conclusion that conjunction $p \wedge \sim p$ has the value 0, and the alternative $p \vee \sim p$ has the value 1 also when their elements do not have the value 1 or 0, one has to modify the definition of a determined event to the following formula:

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and it seems to be incompatible with Borkowski's intentions because by substituting the negation of $p_2$ for $p_2$, we receive a formula $p_1 \wedge \sim p_1 \rightarrow p$ which is a thesis, and therefore the value of $f_1 \Rightarrow f$ is irrelevant. Marek Lechniak, "O próbach intuicyjnej interpretacji logiki trójwartościowej J. Łukasiewicza," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 44 (1996): 161-176.

[24]    Event $f$ is determined when there is a past fact, or from the present moment, which is its cause.

[25]    $(p * f) \rightarrow [1(Lp) \equiv D(f)]$, where $L$ is the functor of necessity; $(p * f) \rightarrow [0(Lp) \equiv \sim D(f)]$; $(p * f) \rightarrow [1(Mp) \equiv \sim D(f')]$, where $M$ is the functor of possibility, and $f'$ is an event opposite to event $f$; $(p * f) \rightarrow [0(Mp) \equiv D(f')]$.

[26]    Ludwik Borkowski, "W sprawie intuicyjnej interpretacji logiki trójwartościowej Łukasiewicza," in Borkowski *Studia logiczne. Wybór* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1990), 428-429.

D($f$) ≡ ∃ $f$ ($f$ = $f_1$ + $f_1'$) ∨ ∃ $g$ ($g$ ⇒ $f$), i.e. the event is determined when it is an event certain to occur or when it has a cause.

As a result, statements describing undetermined events which do not have either value 1 or 0 may be divided into two disjunctive classes of propositions. Hence, one has to assume that there are at least two values different than 1 and 0. The four-valued matrix for the functors of implication and negation overlaps with the matrix of Łukasiewicz's Ł-modal system, but it differs from it as far as modal functor tables are considered. It turns out that this matrix for the functors ∼, ∧, ∨, → can be attained by multiplying two bivalent matrices. It, therefore, validates all (and only) theses of classical propositional calculus expressed be means of these functors. Thus, it is a system which is substantially different than Łukasiewicz's three-valued system.

As it was mentioned before, Łukasiewicz had high hopes connected with many-valued logics. He believed that they could influence the history of logic in a similar way as the emergence of non-Euclidean geometry influenced the history of mathematics. He postulated reconstruing the logical system, arithmetic, and set theory on the basis of logic which does not submit to the principle of bivalence. Borkowski doubted the correctness of that view due to the results he achieved, namely that one can introduce definitions of classical functors within some many-valued systems as well as due to the fact that modal systems, the characteristic matrices of which are many-valued, contain the classical logical calculus as their proper part.

Borkowski specifically referred to this issue in his article "Kilka uwag o zasadzie dwuwartościowości i logikach wielowartościowych" [Several remarks on the Principle of Bivalence and Many-valued Logics] (1981).[27] He specifically considered the question of whether many-valued logic rejects the principle of bivalence and, thus, whether many-valued logics replace classical logic. Borkowski stated:

> Łukasiewicz, when construing the three-valued propositional calculus with the matrix method, assumed that apart from truth and falsity there is a third logical value and declared his position as a rejection of the principle of bivalence; he also generalized the concept of the truth-func-

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[27]  Ludwik Borkowski, "Kilka uwag o zasadzie dwuwartościowości i logikach wielowartościowych," in Borkowski, *Studia logiczne*, 469-475.

tional functor to cover functors characterized by three-valued tables in which logical values are interpreted semantically.[28]

However, later in finitely and infinitely many-valued logical systems he no longer interpreted semantically logical values. Borkowski explained that the matrix characteristic of the system is an algebraic characteristic, in the case of which the values of the matrix do not have to be interpreted semantically. In other words, he believed that the notions of a matrix, of satisfying expressions in the matrix, and of the tautology of a matrix are syntactical. Matrix characteristics can be treated purely formally, that is syntactically, and the values of the matrix do not have to have any interpretation, in particular they do not have to have any semantic interpretation.[29]

Borkowski indicated this way that constructing a system, the adequate matrix of which has more than two values, does not have to be connected with the rejection of bivalency and the acceptance of the assumption that the division of propositions into true and false is not complete. He demonstrated at the same time what Łukasiewicz's actual reasoning while construing of three-valued propositional calculus consisted in. Namely, Łukasiewicz did not demonstrate that apart from truth and falsity (in a classical sense) there is a third logical value, but he introduced a new division of propositions: apart from those being true and those being false, he divided them into determined (true today, false today) and undetermined (neither true, nor false today). As a result of crossing these two binary divisions (true-false and determined-undetermined), Borkowski obtained a four-valued system which, according to him, has a better grasp at certain intuitions concerning truth and the possibility of cognizing it than a three-valued system has.

Kamiński wrote about the aforementioned works by Borkowski that they are "a terrific result because they undermine the philosophical foundations of the enormous formal edifice of Łukasiewicz's many-valued logic. Probably the intuitions lying at the roots of these logics do not lead to systems which enrich the instrumentarium of philosophical knowledge."[30] Borkowski demonstrated that logical values differing from the classical ones do not require the assumption of intuitions varying from the two-valued ones, and therefore one must abstain from a competitive character of

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[28]  Ibidem, 470.
[29]  Ibidem, 471-472.
[30]  Stanisław Kamiński, "Ludwik Borkowski jako kontynuator logiczno-metodologicznych prac szkoły lwowsko-warszawskiej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 32, no 1 (1984): 14.

many-valued logics. This way he indicated that Łukasiewicz's expectations with regard to these logics could not be fulfilled. Indeed, many-valued logics cannot be applied in mathematics which is practiced in the spirit of classical logic. Their significance comes down to enriching the repertoire of investigations on logical systems, e.g. many-valued matrices are used in the proofs of the independence of a set of axioms.

Borkowski also obtained many interesting results with regard to modality and intuitionism. An analysis of certain notions inspired him to construe new logical calculi. Based on the definition of modal terms:[31]

a)  the state of affairs is necessary if and only if the logical form of the proposition ascertaining this state of affairs is true for all values of variables, therefore, if it is an analytical proposition;

b)  the state of affairs is possible if and only if the logical form of the proposition ascertaining this particular state of affairs can be validated for certain values of variables, that is if that proposition is non-contradictory.

Borkowski introduced axioms and rules from Lewis's S5 modal system. He also presented presuppositional systems of modal logic equivalent to the S5, S4 and S1 systems. He constructed a truth-table method of validating propositional formulas with modal functions based on analogies between quantifiers and modal functions.[32] Together with Słupecki, he devised a presuppositional variation of the intuitionist propositional calculus.

Borkowski considered the usefulness of the system of strict implication for the formalization of deductive inferences.[33] He analyzed the issue of how to formalize infallible inferences conducted in the sciences. He believed that it is not correct to treat material implication as equivalent to the colloquial understanding of conditionals in contemporary logic. He posed a clear objective for philosophically inclined logicians: the researching of various systems of strict implication from the point of view of their usefulness for the formalization of different types of deductive inference.

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[31]  Ludwik Borkowski, "O terminach modalnych," in Borkowski, *Studia logiczne*, 143-144.

[32]  This analogy was used by Saul Kripke in the 1960s to construct relational semantics of modal logics. Perhaps that is why Kazimierz Pasenkiewicz described Borkowski's work as one of the most important ones in the field of modal logics among those published after World War II. See Kazimierz Pasenkiewicz, *Ocena dorobku naukowego doc. dr. Ludwika Borkowskiego* (1969), Catholic University of Lublin Archive.

[33]  Ludwik Borkowski, "Uwagi o okresie warunkowym oraz implikacji materialnej i ścisłej," in Borkowski, *Studia logiczne*, 333-345.

He believed that this could generate great benefits when applying logic to the empirical sciences.

Inquiries concerning many-valued, intuitionistic, and modal logics are continued at the Catholic University of Lublin. Marek Lechniak took on the philosophical and logical issue of the interpretation of values in the matrices of many-valued logics. He reached the conclusion that the values of the matrices in the case of Zawirski's probability logic, Dana Scott's logic of error, Leonard S. Rogowski's directional logic as well as N. Belnap's logic for computer are connected with the states of knowledge of the cognizing subject.[34] Bożena Czernecka-Rej gathered and analyzed the peculiar features of intuitionistic logic which were mentioned by its creator Arend Heyting. These specific features were revealed both on the formal and the philosophical level.[35] Publications concerning modality are more dispersed, rather in the form of minor contributions by authors who are current or former scholars from the Department of Logic at the Catholic University of Lublin.[36]

## 3. Stanisław Kiczuk's logics for the natural sciences

The scholarly interests of Stanisław Kiczuk, the head of the Department of Logic in the years 1985-2010, focused at the verge of logic, philosophy, and the natural sciences. Kiczuk's MA thesis entitled *Zygmunta Zawirskiego koncepcja stosowalności logiki współczesnej w przyrodoznawstwie*

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[34]   Marek Lechniak, *Interpretacje wartości matryc logik wielowartościowych* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1999).

[35]   Bożena Czernecka-Rej, *Osobliwość logiki intuicjonistycznej* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2014).

[36]   Marcin Tkaczyk, "On Axiomatization of Łukasiewicz's Four-Valued Modal Logic," *Logic and Logical Philosophy* 20 (2011): 215-232. This article deserves particular attention due to its profound formal effect, namely the axiomatics of the titular logic based on the classical propositional calculus and one distinct axiom: $Lp \wedge q \to p \wedge Lq$, called the axiom of jumping necessity. The articles which also made an impact on the logical community were: Zdzisław Dywan, "The Connective of Necessity of Modal Logic S5 is Metalogical," *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 24 (1983): 410-414; Zdzisław Dywan, "On Lemmon's Interpretations of the Connective of Necessity," *Logique et Analyse* 28 (1985): 369-374.

[Zygmunt Zawirski's Concept of the Applicability of Modern Logic in the Natural Sciences] written under Kamiński's supervision and defended in 1972, defined the main scope of his research. In this work he took on the problem of the adequacy of Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic in reference to Niels Bohr's complementarity principle in quantum mechanics. As a result of this analysis, he challenged Zawirski's claim that three-valued logic could be applied in the domain of microphysics. However, this did not preclude the possibility of applying it in another physical theory or in a field of knowledge of another type. As it was mentioned before, many-valued logics generated high hopes at the time, and their role was compared to the role of non-Euclidean geometries.

In subsequent years the significance of broadly understood modal logics increased, especially that of relational semantics, i.e. mathematical creations which serve the investigation of formal properties of calculi. Kiczuk's attention shifted from many-valued logics to calculi that broaden classical logic by adding non-extensional functors. In particular, he worked intensively on logic coupled with the natural concept of change and causation. An analysis of the foundations of causal logic lead him to the conviction that the condition for the adequate formalization of causation in physics was to have an efficient system of logic of change, and that, in turn, should include temporal dependencies. Yet, the then existing logics of change were not connected with the physical model of change but mainly with the logic of action and logic of norms.

Kiczuk devoted his doctoral and post-doctoral dissertations to the criteria for the possibility of application non-classical logics in physics and in the philosophy of the natural sciences. In his doctoral thesis, entitled *Zagadnienie adekwatności niektórych systemów logicznych do przedstawienia przyczynowości w fizyce* [The Problem of the Adequacy of some Logical Systems to Represent Causation in Physics] (1976), he claimed that an adequate logic of physical causation must include the moment of a change which occurs over time. In his post-doctoral dissertation *Problematyka wartości poznawczej systemów logiki zmiany* [On the Cognitive Value of Systems of the Logic of Change] (1984), he took on the task of construing a proper logic of change, becoming one of the pioneers in that branch of logic. His pursuit of a logic which would be adequate for the natural sciences was concluded with a monograph entitled *Związek przyczynowy a logika przyczynowości* [The Causal Relation and Causal Logic] (1995), in which – in agreement with the sequence of construing non-classical logics cognitively valuable for physics which he postulated himself –

he construed a causal logic based on the logic of change. The latter was
built upon temporal logic which is based on classical logic.

Prior to the construction of a system of non-classical logic for phys-
ics, Kiczuk devised some syntactic and semantic criteria of adequacy. The
first criterion is typical for deductive sciences, namely, a constructed log-
ical system cannot lead to contradictions on the grounds of the language
of physics. However, it is the semantic criterion which is proper for the
empirical sciences. According to Kiczuk, only the veracity of all the theses
of a logical system in an adequate model or comprehension of reality can
decide about the choice of that system. In particular, logic is cognitively
valuable for physics if all of its axioms are true in a physical interpretation.

Kiczuk's important accomplishment is the argumentation for the claim
that every non-classical logic used in the natural sciences has to be an
extension of classical logic. It is formulated by way of introducing new
symbols into the vocabulary of classical logic, in particular certain non-ex-
tensional constants. Kiczuk presented two complementary arguments to
support the claim about the validity of classical logic.[37] The first one refers
to Werner Heisenberg's distinction of two languages of modern physics
(quantum mechanics): the mathematical and the conceptual language. With
the aid of the mathematical language, one can describe – in the form of
equations – interrelations occurring between natural events. This language
is insufficient for conceptualizing the quantum world – in particular two
interconnected instances: wave-particle duality and the uncertainty prin-
ciple.[38] Physics needs, therefore, another, richer language based on the
natural language and similar to it, referring also to the elements of some
philosophical theories. Kiczuk notices that non-classical logics may play the
role of a conceptual language of modern physics. However, only such sys-

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[37] Marcin Tkaczyk, "Stanisława Kiczuka logika świata realnego," *Roczniki Filozoficzne*
56, no. 1 (2008): 19.

[38] The point is that in some experiments a light ray behaves like a wave (it is subject
to diffraction, refraction, and interference), and in others like a particle (it has mo-
mentum and energy). There are not experiments where it displays both qualities at
the same time. Moreover, Schrödinger's equation describes the behavior of a particle
of matter as a distortion of a wave of matter bound with that particle, i.e. a wave
function. When investigating the flow of this function, we receive information about
the probability of finding the particle in a specific location. These results of quan-
tum mechanics inspired the idea to revise classical logic and build so-called quantum
logic. See Stanisław Kiczuk, "Język fizyki współczesnej i problem logiki mechaniki
kwantowej w ujęciu Wernera Heisenberga," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 36, no 1 (1988):
57-75.

tems of non-classical logic are taken into consideration that are built upon classical logic through the addition of adequate non-extensional functors. Since the mathematical schema is a proper part of a conceptual language, any candidate for the logic of a conceptual language must include all assertions possible to be expressed in a mathematical schema. In turn, the type of mathematics which constitutes the basis for quantum mechanics is solely classical mathematics based on classical logic. Therefore, all systems incompatible with classical logic are irrelevant. None of them can become the logic of the conceptual language of modern physics. Moreover, Kiczuk indicates that the nature of physics is a decisive factor in choosing classical logic because it is a science – similarly to classical logic – concerning the ontological way of grasping reality. It grew out of the Aristotelian physics as a result of limiting the field of inquiries.[39]

Kiczuk's final argument refers to the assumptions of realistic ontology. Apart from that, he justifies the claim that the mathematical scheme of physics is based on classical logic in a substantial way and not only accidentally (as e.g. historical coincidence). Within realistic ontology certain principles were formulated already in antiquity. Their content is the precization of primary data referring to the being (e.g. that every being is a determined existing essence; that there are at least two different beings; that there is at least one being which is changing; that every being has a reason for its existence in itself or outside of itself). These principles are of: identity, non-contradiction, determination (excluded middle), double negation, sufficient reason. Within the general theory of being they are unprovable, and they are called the first principles of being.[40]

The ontological principles of non-contradiction and of excluded middle distinguished by Aristotle were formalized in various ways – non-contradiction principle: "the being is not a non-being," "it is impossible for something to be and not be at the same time," "it is not so that some being is what it is and is not what it is," "it is not so that the being simultaneously exists and does not exist," "it is not true that some being in the same respect has a quality $C$ and at the same time does not have it;" the principle of ex-

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[39]    Stanisław Kiczuk, *Problematyka wartości poznawczej systemów logiki zmiany* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1984), 131.

[40]    The lack of a proof does not mean the lack of justification. The justification of these principles takes the form of intellectual analysis in the continuous contact with reality. Stanisław Kiczuk, "Zagadnienie obowiązywalności klasycznego rachunku zdań," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 36, no. 1 (1988): 51.

cluded middle: "every being exists or does not exist," "every being is a determined existing substance or it is not a determined existing substance." Kiczuk noticed that these expressions show that ontological principles reflect truth-functional relations of non-co-occurring and non-non-co-occurring of two contradictory states. These and other philosophical principles (e.g. the principle of identity and of double negation) remain in adequate relations with connections between facts stated by means of truth functors of classical logic.[41] The principles of excluded middle and of non-contradiction, although they seem to be most characteristic for classical propositional logic and aspire to being its first principles, are not axioms of that logic due to their weak deductibility.

On multiple occasions Kiczuk emphasized that the first philosophical principles and the related laws of logic state the same, most general, objective relations between the corresponding facts (states of affairs) which constitute the "logical structure of the world, the logic of things."[42] Reality is such that it, as-if, imposes classical logic. The power of logic flows from reality, i.e. the laws of classical logic state the most general relations which occur in reality. At the same time it is obvious that classical logic alone is insufficient, it is only a "minimal theory of the structure of reality."[43]

Taking into consideration the assumptions described above, Kiczuk construed two logical systems: ZI and ZII based on the classical propositional logic and von Wright's *And Then* temporal logic. The vocabulary of the ZI system consists of: a) propositional variables: $p$, $q$, $r$, …, representing statements on physical events; b) truth functors; c) two non-classical functors: functor $T$ of temporal conjunction, governed by the axioms of the *And Then* system as well as the peculiar functor of change $Zm$. The set of well-formed formulas of the classical propositional calculus becomes extended by formulas like $(\phi T\psi)$ and $(Zm\phi)$, insofar as $\phi$ and $\psi$ are well-formed formulas. The first one is read as ($\phi$ and then $\psi$), whereas the second as (it *changes that* $\phi$). The $Zm$ functor is a one-argument functor of change which belongs to the syntactic category $z/z$. In earlier logics there were

[41]    Stanisław Kiczuk, "O niektórych prawach logiki i zasadach ogólnej teorii bytu," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 60, no. 2 (2012): 175.

[42]    Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, *Zarys logiki* (Warszawa: PZWS, 1960), 5-6.

[43]    Stanisław Kiczuk, "Skąd logika czerpie swoją moc?" in *Gaudium in litteris: Księga jubileuszowa ku czci Księdza Arcybiskupa Profesora Stanisława Wielgusa*, eds. Stanisław Janeczek, Wanda Bajor, and Michał M. Maciołek (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2009), 648, 653.

solely two-argument functors of change which allowed creating expressions such as "that $\phi$ changes into $\psi$".

The axiomatics of the ZI system contains:

$A_0$     set of axioms of the classical propositional calculus,

$A_T$     set of axioms of the *And Then* calculus,

$A_1$     $Zm\ p \rightarrow p$ (i.e.: only the event that actually occurs is changing),

$A_2$     $(p\ T \sim p) \rightarrow Zm\ p$,

$A_3$     $Zm\ (p \wedge q) \rightarrow Zm\ p \vee Zm\ q$ (if the conjunction of two events changes, at least one of its elements changes),

$A_4$     $(Zm\ p) \wedge q \rightarrow Zm\ (p \wedge q)$ (if some event changes, the conjunction consisting of that event and of any actually occurring event changes),

$A_5$     $Zm\ (p \vee q) \rightarrow Zm\ p \vee Zm\ q$ (if the alternative of two events changes, then at least one of its elements changes),

$A_6$     $Zm\ p \rightarrow Zm\ (p \vee q)$ (if an element of the alternative of two events changes, then that alternative changes).[44]

In the ZI system there are two rules of substitution, the rule of derivation, and the rule extensionality. The first rule of substitution allows us to take as a thesis of the system any correct substitution of a variable by any thesis of the classical propositional calculus and that of the *And Then* system. The second rule of substitution allows us to recognize as a thesis of ZI any expression which is a proper substitution of a thesis in which the *Zm* functor appears. An argument of such a functor can only be one propositional variable or expression built of such variables by means of the functors of conjunction and of alternative, or a phrase which is logically equivalent to that expression on the grounds of classical logic. The rule of derivation allows to consider as a thesis of ZI the consequent of an implication which is a thesis of the system insofar as the antecedent of that implication is also a thesis. The rule of extensionality states that if the equivalence constituted by two expressions is a thesis, then the elements of that equivalence can adequately substitute each other within the theses of the system.

The second system of logic of change ZII construed by Kiczuk is stronger than ZI. It includes, apart from the one-argument functor *Zm*, another peculiar functor, namely, a conjunction which takes into account the moment of changeability. Kiczuk introduced both of these functors of change as secondary terms to the *And Then* system based on the classical propo-

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[44]    Kiczuk, *Problematyka wartości poznawczej systemów logiki zmiany*, 230-233.

sitional calculus with quantifiers binding propositional variables. He adds
two definitions to that:

$D_1$    $p\ Z\ q \equiv (p\ T\ q) \wedge (q \rightarrow \sim p)$

$D_2$    $Zm\ p \equiv \exists q\ (p\ Z\ q)$

The first one states that (*p changes and as a result q*) is equivalent to
(*p and then q*) and (if *q*, then it is not so that *p*). The second one allows us
to define a one-argument functor of change which is a primary functor
for ZI by means of a two-argument functor of change.[45]

Kiczuk in his monograph *Związek przyczynowy a logika przy-
czynowości*[46][The Causal Relation and Causal Logic] construed a system
of causal logic CI which he earlier postulated. This system is based on his
ZI system of logic of change. He presents the laws governing the functor
of causal implication, called also relativistic implication: $\phi \Rightarrow \psi$ (read: if $\phi$,
then because of that cause $\psi$). These laws are supposed to correspond to
that how physics understands the causal relation. The arguments of the new
functor can be two different propositional variables or two expressions, non-
equivalent on the grounds of classical logic, constructed from propositional
variables by means of the functor of conjunction or that of alternative, or
equivalent expressions on the grounds of classical logic.

The axiomatics of the CI system is created by way of extending the set
of axioms of the classical propositional calculus and the *And Then* system
to the expressions of the CI system as well as by adding the peculiar axi-
oms of ZI and that of CI. The latter correspond with the properties of the
causal relation as understood in physics established during philosophical
analyses. Those are the following:

$A_7$    $(p \Rightarrow q) \wedge (q \Rightarrow r) \rightarrow (p \Rightarrow r)$,

$A_8$    $(p \Rightarrow q) \rightarrow \sim(q \Rightarrow p)$,

$A_9$    $(p \Rightarrow q) \rightarrow (Zm\ p \rightarrow (Zm\ p\ T\ Zm\ q))$,

$A_{10}$    $(p \Rightarrow q) \rightarrow (p\ T\ q)$,

$A_{11}$    $(p \Rightarrow q) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow q \wedge \sim(t\ T \sim q))$, where *t* represents any given thesis
        of the classical propositional logic,

$A_{12}$    $(p \Rightarrow q) \rightarrow (p \rightarrow q)$,

$A_{13}$    $(p \Rightarrow q) \wedge (p \Rightarrow r) \equiv (p \Rightarrow (q \wedge r))$.

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[45]    Ibidem, 234-235. Trypuz construed adequate semantics for Kiczuk's system in the
        article "A Completeness Proof of Kiczuk's Logic of Physical Change," *Studia Logica*
        95 (2010): 139-159. He also proved the completeness of the ZI system.

[46]    Stanisław Kiczuk, *Związek przyczynowy a logika przyczynowości* (Lublin: RW KUL,
        1995).

These axioms express the basic sense of the causal relation as understood in physics (e.g. transitivity, asymmetry of the causal relation, the temporal succession of effects after the cause). The cause is treated as an energetic type of event which affects something by transferring energy.[47]

The primary rules of ZI apply to all CI expressions, and apart from that, a third rule of substitution is added. It allows us to recognize as a thesis of the system an expression which is a correct substitution of axioms where a two-argument functor of causal implication is present.

Kiczuk also considered philosophical and logical issues connected with non-classical logical calculi. He believed that more important than the construction and inquiries into the formal properties of new calculi are: the analysis of the assumptions on which they are based; the evaluation of their adequacy; indicating the field for applying them. Non-classical logics are supposed to serve "the expression of thoughts on some topic with greater precision than it is performed by ordinary language" as well as to provide "an inferential apparatus, precise tools for controlling the correctness of respective inferences."[48]

Research on a logic appropriate for physical theories has been continued by Marcin Tkaczyk (Chair of the Department of Logic since 2010). He suggested a resolution of the problem of the relation occurring between temporal logic and the theory of relativity. He argues that within tense logic (developed by Arthur N. Prior, Nino B.Cocchiarella, von Wright, or Belnap) one cannot construe a substantively cogent relativistic temporal logic. The source of the incompatibility of temporal logic with the theory of relativity lies in the assumptions of this logic which are located in the meta-language – namely, there are expressions in it which do not have a physical sense. In order to obtain a formally correct and substantively adequate logic of relativistic time, one must, already at the stage of constructing a calculus, use in the meta-language only such expressions which in the light of the theory of relativity have a physical sense. Tkaczyk construed calculi that constitute the foundation for a future complex logic of relativistic time. He investigated the formal properties of these calculi and demonstrated that they are free of the difficulties which appeared on the verge of typical temporal logics and physics.[49] He deals with the topic of temporal logic in

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[47]    Ibidem, 149-153.
[48]    Ibidem, 156-157.
[49]    Marcin Tkaczyk, *Logika czasu empirycznego: Funktor realizacji czasowej w językach teorii fizykalnych* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2009).

the context of future contingent events in his monograph *Futura contingentia.*[50]

## Conclusion

The situation with non-classical logics has radically changed throughout the last century. During the 1920s the first non-classical logical calculi began to be created. One hundred years down the road, we are dealing with a seemingly infinite family of infinite sets of systems that are created on account of their formally interesting properties, and they do not always (so far) find practical application. This undoubtable success of contemporary logic, the source of its significance and claim to merit, turned out at the same time to be its weakness. In a certain sense this "curse of abundance" in logic generates numerous questions of a philosophical and logical nature. In particular, these are the following questions: What is the cognitive value of each particular system of logic? What does the adequacy of logic consist in? Can one speak of any substantive adequacy or only of formal one? What scope does logic have? These questions were taken on by the three scholars mentioned above and currently they are researched by their successors employed at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.

The motives for constructing new systems are most frequently based on the necessity to solve some local problems arising in the particular sciences as well as local philosophical problems. Kalinowski's K1 and K2 systems are strictly connected with the notion of norm taken from the language of law and ethics. Their purpose was to provide a tool for controlling reasoning containing normative statements. Borkowski's calculus resulted from the reinterpretation of the intuitive assumptions of Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic. Borkowski construed a new system by removing from the axiomatics of Słupecki's three-valued logic that axiom, the consequence of which is the assertion that an impossible event is the cause for any event which has some sort of a cause. He obtained four-valued matrices as a result of crossing two binary divisions of statements: true/false and determined/un-

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50    Marcin Tkaczyk, *Futura contingentia* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2015).

determined, but the multivalence in them has a formal character. All the theses of the classical propositional calculus are satisfied by these matrices. Kiczuk's objective was to construe a system of logic adequate for the natural sciences. He designed systems which constituted extensions of classical logic by certain non-extensional functors connected with natural sciences' concept of change and causal relation.

Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik

# Amicus Plato, sed Magis Amica Veritas… On Philosophical Disputes within the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy

The term "Lublin Philosophical School" has become well established in the history of philosophy.[1] It is used to describe a mode of doing philosophy as well as a didactic curriculum elaborated in the 1950s. The term "school of philosophy" itself is difficult to interpret. Stanisław Janeczek claims that a school of philosophy is formed around the personality of a master (a school in a narrow sense), or it is a group of people, cooperating in a particular place and time, who formulate at least a partially unified program and/or methods (a school in a broader sense).[2] Antoni B. Stępień specifies:

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[1]   For more on the history of this term and the history of this School see e.g.: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Filozoficzna szkoła lubelska," in Krąpiec *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet*, ed. Andrzej Wawrzyniak (Lublin: RW KUL, 1982), 275-309. The title of the article comes from the editor of the volume and the term itself appeared in the title of the conversation conducted by Władysław Stróżewski: "O filozoficznej 'szkole lubelskiej'," *Tygodnik Powszechny* 22, no. 42 (1968): 1 and 6; Jan Czerkawski, "Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna na tle sytuacji filozofii w powojennej Polsce," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45, no. 2 (1997): 166-190; Andrzej Maryniarczyk and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Lubelska szkoła filozoficzna," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al., vol. 6 (Lublin: PTTA, 2005), 532-550; Stanisław Janeczek, "Lubelska szkoła filozofii klasycznej," *Idea: Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych* 18 (2006): 143-159. In the two latter works there is a large bibliography on the Lublin Philosophical School.

[2]   Janeczek, "Lubelska szkoła filozofii klasycznej," 143.

In a narrower (precise) sense, a philosophical school, I believe, is a basic unit (center, factor) in the social and historical development of philosophy that crystallizes around the personality of a master who provides it its substantive and formal direction; at the same time there is an awareness of belonging to a particular school.[3]

According to Stępień, in the case of the Lublin School of Philosophy one should rather speak of a school in a broader sense.[4]

A basic agreement as to a program and methodology does not exclude disputes within a school or even the creation of "schools within the school." As I shall demonstrate below, in the Lublin School disputes were one of the ways of developing reliable philosophy. Stępień mentions six disputes that were from the 1960s carried on within the School. They referred to: (1) the relation between metaphysics and epistemology; (2) the understanding of the purely intentional being; (3) the understanding of experience at the point of departure of metaphysics; (4) the usefulness of phenomenological methods in developing classical philosophy; (5) the applicability of formal logic in developing or refining philosophy; and (6) the foundations of ethics.[5] These are not all disputes that took place within the Lublin School over the years. In this article I provide a methodological reconstruction of several disputes which found their expression in a written form and then discuss briefly a few others. I shall not take a position in those disputes because the purpose of analysis is not to propose solutions but present the dispute as a permanent component of philosophizing in the Lublin School.

## 1. THE DISPUTE ON THE USE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODS

The turning point for the dispute on the applicability of phenomenological methods to metaphysics and anthropology was the arrival of Karol Wojtyła to the Catholic University of Lublin, especially his book *Osoba*

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[3]    Antoni B. Stępień, "Rola ks. prof. Stanisława Kamińskiego w rozwoju środowiska filozoficznego KUL," in Stępień *Studia i szkice filozoficzne,* vol. 2 (Lublin: RW KUL, 2001), 188.

[4]    Antoni B. Stępień, "Kilka uwag uzupełniających do dyskusji," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45, no. 1 (1997): 193-194.

[5]    Ibidem: 188-189.

*i czyn* [The Acting Person][6] on which a debate was organized, and its results were published later in a volume of *Analecta Cracoviensia*.[7] Wojtyła in his introductory statement recollects that he was arriving at his conclusions while preparing various lectures (as he says – on the boundaries of classical philosophy and phenomenology) as well as during philosophical disputes in which Stefan Swieżawski, Jerzy Kalinowski, Rev. Stanisław Kamiński, and Fr Mieczysław Krąpiec participated. Let us take a look at the opinions of a few Lublin philosophers on that book.

Krąpiec claims that, indeed, "The human person's being a subject, i.e. – in a primary understanding – the mode in which human being exists, can be most suitably and completely affirmed in the act and through the act. For it is here where the person manifests herself as a being that causes in herself and for herself new beings – "radiating" them from her own being – that hitherto did not exist."[8] The question, however, is: will such an analysis enable building a theory of the human being, that is philosophical anthropology? According to Krąpiec, if by a theory we mean presenting reasons which decontradictify the human being in the context of essential human actions, then the answer is negative, for in Wojtyła's work there is no analysis of the ontic structure of the human being. Krąpiec poses the following hypothesis: perhaps, the premise of this work is the postulate to reduce the philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of being. Such a "reduction" could take place either through treating data available to the consciousness as aspectual "reflections" of reality or through considering acts themselves as "radiated" from a person-being. The point of the latter analysis would be to grasp and through the reference to the ontic structure of the human being to explain the way in which an object is apprehended in a spiritual act. Only this would enable us to build full anthropology.

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[6] Karol Wojtyła, *Osoba i czyn* (Kraków: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, 1969. Two other editions in Polish were published, and there are substantial differences between the texts. As yet, there is no critical edition.

[7] The proceedings were published in *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5-6 (1973-1974): 49-263. The discussion itself took place at the Catholic University of Lublin on December 16, 1970, during the convention of the philosophical section of professors working in Catholic institutions of higher education; the volume of *Analecta* contains the papers (usually after revisions) of the participants as well as of people who were additionally invited.

[8] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec (in the publication the name Albert Mieczysław Krąpiec was used), "Książka Kardynała Karola Wojtyły monografią osoby jako podmiotu moralności," *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5-6 (1973-1974), 58.

Jerzy Kalinowski[9], while accepting the personalist concept of the human being presented by Wojtyła, points to two difficulties. The first one is summarized in the question of whether the fact of "the person and act" is actually intuitively grasped in experience. According to Kalinowski, the claim that the human being is a person requires a metaphysical justification, and the interpretation of an act automatically assumes that it is a person who acts – hence the doubt, whether this insight can be taken as a point of departure for phenomenological analysis. The second difficulty boils down to the question concerning the role of metaphysics of the person. Kalinowski claims that phenomenological analyses of data of insight confront metaphysical assumptions with experience; yet, the metaphysics of the person is bracketed. Without such metaphysics, Wojtyła's attempts to merge the philosophy of being and the philosophy of consciousness will not be successful.

Stanisław Kamiński considers the adequacy of the method proposed by Wojtyła for construing a philosophy of the human being. He calls this method the insight into the person through the act. An "acting self" given in an insight becomes objectivized into the fact of an "acting human being" which is understood objectively as the person's act – a relational whole "person–act." A description of human acts, given mainly in our consciousness, should reach the ultimate ontic "personhood foundation" of the human being. This, in a way, is to overcome subjectivism while preserving the perspective of oneself from within as well as to maintain the empirical character of knowledge on the human being, at the same time giving it a character of a theory. Kamiński raises two objections to such a method of building anthropology. First, the scope of the term "experience" is widened, and the emphasis is moved from explaining to analytic describing. Explaining is a discursive operation, experience in turn – a direct cognitive grasp. On this account, according to Kamiński, the insight into the person through the act is, indeed, an insight, and not a theory, explaining the person. The second objection relates to the usefulness of phenomenological analysis for building a holistic theory of the person. Kamiński analyzes the procedure proposed by Wojtyła and shows its purpose: merging – and thereby unifying – introspection and extraspection, and setting a discursive formulation of an explanatory theory in an insight into the "kernel of things." According to Kamiński, this is impossible because without the loss of essential features one cannot combine two modes of justifying a hypothe-

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9      Jerzy Kalinowski, "Metafizyka i fenomenologia osoby ludzkiej," *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5-6 (1973-1974): 63–71.

sis: demonstrating (analytical-ostensive showing) and explanatory-conclusive reasoning (connecting a hypothesis by logical relations with theoretical and observational propositions). In classical philosophy, which requires for facts to be explained conclusively and irrefutably, one cannot stop at "demonstrating" as the key method of justifying one's claims. "Demonstrating" is a valuable, perhaps even indispensable, procedure, but it is not sufficient – analytical-ostensive procedures neither lead to a philosophical theory with an adequate level of theoreticality nor do they justify it.

Also Tadeusz Styczeń discusses the method used by Wojtyła, but – in contrast to Krąpiec and Kamiński – he believes that it enables realistic and necessary as well as explanatory cognition. An analysis of the act enables grasping the human being in its entirety; and the act is the way in which the person manifests herself so that its realness raises no objections and that resists a freedom of interpretations. It is factually a given and experienced as well as "publicly" accessible and controllable point of departure. The analysis of facts that are mutually non-reducible to one another and empirically directly given leads to the principle of the unity of action, the essence and properties of which can be described on the basis of the content of analyzed dynamisms. Any rejection of this principle would amount to the claim that one does not experience what one experiences. This principle, nonetheless, is not hypothetical but necessary because it constitutes the only reason which decontradictifies that a given fact occurs, that it has its own particular essence, and that it is experienced in its own particular way. Wojtyła's theses, which express reasons that decontradictify dynamisms asserted at the point of departure, when considered from the point of view of their content turn out to be theses on the human being. As Styczeń claims:

> Anthropological claims of this sort are, therefore, really objective and experientially justified. For in their content, they express that what is in a necessary connection with the content of the facts grasped at the point of departure by descriptive claims. As a result of the demonstrated feedback between the point of departure: a description of facts and the final point: claims expressing the only reasons which decontradictify facts, claims about facts are "necessified". Things must be the way they are, and the way they manifest themselves in experience. Claims on reasons, on the other hand, become factual and empirical – the necessary reason for something that is real cannot itself be non-real.[10]

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[10]  Tadeusz Styczeń, "Metoda antropologii filozoficznej w *Osobie i Czynie* kardynała Karola Wojtyły," *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5-6 (1973-1974), 112. At the end Styczeń

Wojtyła himself in the concluding remarks in the volume[11] stresses that the main problem boils down to the issue of the role of experience as the source for the philosophical cognition of the person: "if, nonetheless, the cognition of the human being has no basis in experience, no point of departure in the insight, then one might think that the philosophical concept of the person is derived from elsewhere and by 'strenuous analyses' becomes imposed onto experience"[12]; what is more, "no discursive operation can be severed from that source if it is supposed to maintain contact with reality that we want to comprehend and explain."[13] He also does not agree that only a general theory of being can constitute the basis for a theory of person, for that theory is also rooted in experience and "one cannot see any other way of applying a general theory of being to a theory of person as only on the basis of specific experience of the human being."[14] From this very experience "philosophical anthropology treads its own way, wherein it treads […] 'in the perspective of the philosophy of being.'"[15] The insight into the person in the act is not a reduction of reality to the subject-consciousness and its content, for the reflection on data of consciousness may point to a reality transcendent in relation to it as well as to a specific, really existing subject.

Antoni B. Stępień,[16] Zofia J. Zdybicka, and Jerzy Gałkowski claim in their papers that Wojtyła's work is an attempt to merge the philosophy of being and the philosophy of consciousness. Stępień even calls Wojtyła's approach a Thomistic phenomenology: "it is a phenomenology which approximates a distinct type of metaphysics."[17] Essentially, we are dealing with a description of that what is directly given, but in certain parts the

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indicates the concurrence of Wojtyła's statements with those of Roman Ingarden from *Książeczka o człowieku* [Little Book on Man], and more specifically, from his discourse on responsibility. He claims that this concurrence is a result of the unity of the method: "The methodological program of the unity of anthropology which Ingarden carries out is a program of a philosophy of the human being in the classical understanding of this discipline, the program is in its essence identical with the methodological model of *The Acting Person*." Ibidem: 115.

[11]   Karol Wojtyła, "Słowo końcowe," *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5-6 (1973-1974): 244-263.

[12]   Ibidem: 247.

[13]   Ibidem.

[14]   Ibidem.

[15]   Ibidem: 247-248.

[16]   Antoni B. Stępień, "Fenomenologia tomizująca w książce *Osoba i czyn*," *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5-6 (1973-1974): 153-157.

[17]   Ibidem: 153.

description is supplemented by a theory taken from elsewhere (sometimes conceptual frameworks originating from Thomistic metaphysics are employed). Zdybicka believes that Wojtyła really achieved a connection of phenomenology and Thomism, and thanks to that "Thomism was enriched with the freshness of experience and phenomenology went beyond the circle of eidetic approaches."[18] Wojtyła, in turn, perceives his project in the following way: Thomism accepts the concept of the person as a substance (a specific rational nature of a human being), whereas in phenomenology it is understood as a specific center of the human being; one must unveil one concept using the other because "in our philosophical reflection on the human being we do not find ourselves in the situation of an irreversible split: one can go further ahead, trying to combine together a multitude of paths."[19] The discussion summarized above characterizes the dispute on the scope of applicability and role of phenomenological methods in philosophy. Neither classical philosophers nor phenomenologists deny the role of experience as a starting point of philosophizing. The problem is whether any description of what is given and how it is given in consciousness guarantees realism and generality of cognition, and whether such a description makes it possible to explain the given ultimately and irrefutably. This is why Gałkowski believes that the issue of how phenomenological analyses may constitute a justification for claims concerning the ontic structure of the human being is still an unresolved research question.[20]

## 2. A Dispute on the status of the theory of cognition

The dispute on the status of the theory of cognition was conducted predominantly by Fr Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Antoni B. Stępień, with some productive contributions from Rev. Stanisław Kamiński. They all agreed on the way one should characterize science and the autonomy of philosophy

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[18] Zofia J. Zdybicka, "Praktyczne aspekty dociekań przedstawionych w dziele *Osoba i czyn*," *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5-6 (1973-1974): 201-205.

[19] Ibidem: 262.

[20] See Jerzy Gałkowski, "Natura, osoba, wolność," *Analecta Cracoviensia*, 5-6 (1973-1974): 177-182.

in relation to the exact sciences. The dispute itself concerned the object, goal, and the autonomy of the theory of cognition in relation to other philosophical disciplines.

What is the subject-matter of the theory of cognition? Cognition, no doubt, but in what aspect? Krąpiec claims that the material object of that discipline is a certain kind of being, namely human cognition[21] which can be distinguished as a "fact"; its goal is the ultimate explanation of that "fact" with the aid of the method of decontradictification. The basis for distinguishing the theory of cognition from other philosophical disciplines is, therefore, neither a different method of philosophizing nor the formal object of philosophy but only the material object[22]. Spontaneous cognition "connects" us with beings, enabling us to grasp – in a necessary way – some constitutive properties of entities. Cognitive errors which occur at times are corrected in spontaneous judgmental cognition "because it corrects the spontaneity of primary apprehensions, and it is saturated with an initial kind of reflection, called 'concomitant reflection'"[23]. I can make cognitive acts the object of cognition. Nevertheless, objectified cognition is not the primary object of philosophical inquiry because it assumes something prior to that: spontaneous cognition – and that is why the theory of cognition cannot be the "first philosophy." According to Krąpiec, the question on the value of cognition has risen in those philosophies which take the human type of cognition as cognition itself. Moreover, posing the question on the value of cognition and resolving it through reflection on cognition leads to a paradox: we question the value of our cognition and after that, through the cognition of our cognition, we want to resolve whether cognition has value. Why should I trust the second cognitive act if we questioned the first one? And if we can trust the second act, why did we doubt the first one? "If I really wanted to justify the value of my cognition," Krąpiec concludes, "I would fall into a vicious circle because I would learn about the act of

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[21]  See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *O rozumienie filozofii* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1991), 125.

[22]  See ibidem. The disputes uses here Thomas Aquinas's distinction between the material object (*res accepta secundum suam entitatem)* and the formal object (*res accepta secundum illum aspectum sub quo a scientia consideratur*) of science. The former is a part of reality delineated for research, and the latter – the material object considered under a certain aspect. This distinction allows to show that there are scholarly disciplines that have the same material object but a different formal object.

[23]  Ibidem, 108.

cognition through the act of cognition the value of which I questioned."[24] In the light of data on cognition, the problem of the value of cognition does not arise at all. If my cognition has no value, then I cannot become aware of it, for becoming aware would be the cognition of cognition; and if I am aware of a cognitive error, I affirm the value of cognition, since being aware of one's error is the cognition of one's non-cognition. To summarize: one must acknowledge that the theory of cognition is a philosophical cognition of the being which is called human cognition; its goal is to describe and explain the nature of the cognitive function of the human being as well as the ontic nature of cognition. Treating the theory of cognition as a condition for philosophizing results from posing the problem of the value of cognition – and this problem does not exist.

Krąpiec's view is shared by Rev. Stanisław Kamiński. A theory of being is the "first philosophy," and "all other theoretical disciplines in the aspect of the determination of the formal object and the type of method come down to the theory of being."[25] And although he accepts Stępień's view that the theory of being examines the value of cognition, the reduction applies also to it:

> The theory of cognition – being a meta-science that investigates human cognition in a non-dogmatic way as a reliable informant and searches for the ultimate (in the ontic order) reasons for its value – in its final stage becomes the cognition that is typical of the theory of being. In other words, pointing out the ultimate ontic reasons for the value of cognition recourses to the theory of being with regard to the method and the formal object.[26]

The fact that the theory of cognition has a character of meta-science is not an obstacle for the ultimate explanation to appeal to the ontic status of being as a reason which decontradictifies the fact of cognition because "its meta-language contains within itself the object-language [...] and because theses concerning cognition do not exclude their validation in theses concerning the cognizing and the cognized."[27] Kamiński claims that acknowl-

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[24] Ibidem, 127.

[25] Stanisław Kamiński, "The Theory of Being and its Domains," in Kamiński, *On the Metaphysical Cognition,* trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2020), 81.

[26] Ibidem, 82-83.

[27] Ibidem, 84. I decided to replace the term "objective language" used in the original translation with the term object-language which seems to capture better the meaning

edging the absolute independence of the theory of cognition from meta-physics cannot be justified in classical philosophy, for one would then have to assume that the philosophy of reality is possible only when the existence of valuable cognition is proven – and this leads to idealism. One can, how-ever, grant the theory of cognition partial autonomy, for there is a sufficiently abundant array of facts to examine. The theory of cognition has at the starting point its own material objects and set of problems: cognition as a reliable informant – and the analysis of the reliability of cognition is not an analysis of being under an existential aspect. Contrary to Krąpiec, Kamiński considers the issue of the value of cognition to be a real problem, but he wants to solve it not by an immanent analysis of cognition but by searching for the reason of the value of cognition in the ontic structure of the cognizing and the cognized. This should be so, for in classical philosophy "each particular type of reality is ultimately explained also in the same way as being in general, that is by the inner structure of being."[28] The theory of cognition, although it has a character of meta-science, is no exception.

Antoni B. Stępień agrees with Krąpiec and Kamiński that the theory of cognition is autonomous in an objective sense, i.e. it has its own research object and experience data. However, he agrees neither with Krąpiec that the value of cognition is a superficial problem nor with Kamiński that at the final stage of explanation the theory of cognition must become a theory of being. He then postulates that there are two "first philosophies." Each one may be developed separately, and therefore it is not so that one has to solve the problem of the reliability of cognition before one starts to develop meta-physics. Stępień claims that there are two understandings of cognition and they cannot be reduced to each other. According to the first one, cognition is a component of reality entangled in relations (for example causal ones) with other entities. The properties and value of thus understood cognition are analyzed from the perspective of those objective entanglements and circumstances. Such a theory of cognition is reliant on a general theory of being. According to the second – meta-level – understanding, "cognition is a datum which appears in the realm of our consciousness as some sensible whole that fulfills a role (or aspires to fulfill) of an informant about something."[29] Only in the second case we can achieve the self-awareness of

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of the Polish term "język przedmiotowy" and is parallel to the term "meta-language."

[28]    Ibidem, 39-40.

[29]    Antoni B. Stępień, "Relacja czynność–wytwór a przedmiot teorii poznania," in Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne,* ed. Arkadiusz Gut, vol. 1 (Lublin: RW KUL, 1999), 105.

the character and value of cognition in a non-dogmatic manner and with-out committing the mistake of *petitio principii.* When discussing Krąpiec's book *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* [The Realism of Human Cognition],[30] Stępień rejects Krąpiec's charge that the problem of the value of cognition, cognitive errors, and sources of cognition has a non-realistic origin. In his opinion, it is difficult to align such a view with Krąpiec's claim that the main task of philosophy is to justify cognitive realism. For in metaphysics one can only demonstrate the existence of an entity, but any justification of the reliability of that "demonstration of existence" is not a part of the analysis of being. He also rejects Krąpiec's objection that reflection on cognition leads to a vicious circle. In Stępień's view, Krąpiec did not discern two ques-tions: (a) does human cognition have any value at all?; (b) does a particular cognition *p* have value? In the light of Krąpiec's argument, the first ques-tion indeed turns out to be groundless; but the second one remains valid. Stępień claims that "[p]roblems concerning the value of particular types of cognition cannot be solved by means of the research apparatus of the metaphysics of cognition. If the theory of cognition were to be a fragment of metaphysics, it could analyze our cognition only in the aspect of its be-ingness."[31] Hence, the metaphysics of cognition cannot replace the theory of cognition, and the meta-objectal conception of a theory of cognition does not lead to treating the subject [of cognition] and the object of cognition as something 'unreal'.[32] Stępień declares:

> Thus, we want to understand the theory of cognition as a philosophical discipline which analyzes cognition in the aspect of its truthfulness (i.e. as an informant that provides knowledge about something) in order to reach the ultimate rationale for qualifying its cognitive value as well as to obtain the basis (criteria) for evaluating results of human cognition actually achieved.[33]

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Stępień's polemical articles and articles elaborating his own concept of the theory of being have been appearing since the 1970s. They were collected in two volumes titled *Studia i szkice filozoficzne* [Philosophical Studies and Drafts], and in what fol-lows I take quotations from this edition.

[30]    Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* (Poznań: Pallottinum, 1959).

[31]    Antoni B. Stępień, "W związku z teorią poznania tomizmu egzystencjalnego," in Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne*, vol. 1, 98.

[32]    See Antoni B. Stępień, "Filozofia poznania a filozofia Boga," in Stępień, *Studia i szki-ce filozoficzne*, vol. 1, 119.

[33]    Ibidem, 118.

A piece of cognition taken as an informant is related to other pieces of cognition not by causal connections but by relations of other types – contradiction, subordination, being a justification, etc. And the internal and external conditions of cognition are revealed only due to cognition and through cognition. Thus, in order to understand cognition as an informant, there is no need to analyze anything else than cognitive activities and their results. "When one holds onto such an aspect," Stępień concludes, "the theory of cognition does not have to – and does not need to – appeal to other scholarly disciplines or become dependent from any type of cognition other than the one it achieves on its own."[34] Does the theory of cognition thus understood deal with truth? If one understands the truth as the relation of a conformity (intentional identity) of the propositional content with the object to which it refers, or more generally: the conformity of apprehensions (such as perception) with their objects, then in order to determine whether such a relation of conformity obtains, one would need to grasp as given both elements simultaneously in such a way that the cognizing consciousness is beyond them; and yet, the consciousness cannot go outside of itself. According to Stępień, the above difficulty can be removed, for the difference between cognitive and noncognitive experience is primal and fundamental, and respecting it is a condition of the meaningfulness of all cognitive procedures. Following Stępień's, we should, therefore, assume that we discern when we "connect" with a real object and when we construct an object with our thoughts (e.g. we distinguish between observing and imagining). In fact, this is analogous to Krąpiec's claim about "concomitant reflection": I perceive and I am aware that I perceive without making my act of perceiving an object of my reflection.

According to Stępień, building a theory of cognition has to start from reconstructing the initial situation which to an optimal degree fulfills the postulates of assumptionlessness and of non-dogmatism. The procedures employed in such a reconstruction are: phenomenological analysis, that is the insight into what is directly given; a description by means of terms that are not entangled in presuppositions and that acquire meaning in the presence of directly given objects; and – derivatively – linguistic-logical analysis of results of cognitive acts. What role does the theory of cognition thus comprehended play? Stępień replies:

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34    Ibidem.

The theory of cognition will not deliver premises to other sciences, it will not directly improve the methods of those sciences; it shall only provide the basis for the rational analysis of cognitive procedures; it shall explain the human cognition's claim to informing [about something] and the reason for doubting in results of human cognition. The theory of cognition – strictly speaking – neither replaces nor modifies our cognition; it only furnishes the cognitive subject with additional cognitive self-awareness.[35]

In order to explain the relation between the theory of being, metaphysics of cognition, and the theory of cognition, Stępień postulates distinguishing five types of dependencies between sciences. The sciences are thus dependent: (1) genetically – when one is the reason for the other's occurrence; (2) heuristically – when one supplies the other with ideas and problems to consider; (3) structurally – when one constitutes the research object of the other; (4) methodologically – when one gives assumptions (premises, definitions, rules) to the other or provides a cognitive apparatus to its theories; (5) epistemically – when one evaluates the truth of results of the other or else gives reasons for such an evaluation. Stępień claims that in the light of these distinctions treating any sort of discipline as "first philosophy" is relative. In his view, the theory of cognition is completely methodologically and epistemically independent from any other discipline – be it philosophical or non-philosophical, i.e. it does not take any assumptions from any other science, nor does any other science deliver the criteria to assess its results. This is what makes it primal. Metaphysics (together with the metaphysics of cognition) is methodologically independent from the theory of cognition because it does not take any premises or definitions from that theory – and this is what makes it primal. But it is dependent on the theory of cognition epistemically because the theory of cognition delivers reasons for the evaluation of the truth of metaphysics's results; without that metaphysics is prone to dogmatism, i.e. accepting assumptions without justifying them.[36]

The types of relationships between sciences proposed by Stępień as well as the relation between the theory of cognition and metaphysics which follow the former finding constitute a response to the resolutions suggested by Kamiński who slightly differently determines the relationships between the sciences. Kamiński discerns a psychological (motivational) relationship (when one science becomes an inspiration for someone to cultivate another

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[35]  Ibidem, 122.
[36]  See ibidem, 125.

science), and objective relationships. Among the latter he distinguishes:[37] (1) genetical – when one science is a source of another science or when itself constitutes an early stage with regard to its subject-matter (it indicates facts to be explained and problems to be solved), its methods (it provides preliminary concepts and modes of justification), and theses (it suggests some ideas); (2) structural which falls under three different types: (a) when one science is the research object of another; (b) when one science is built on the foundation of another, as its branch, particularization, analogical transformation or interpretation, i.e when one science constitutes an inner basis of another: one science borrows assumptions from another science (although it also has its own assumptions), or it employs another science's theses to explain its own data, or else another science gives it a form (a logical-mathematical structure) which is subject to interpretation; (c) when one science is assumed by another as its outer basis; (3) functional – when one science facilitates cultivating another (e.g. by providing concepts for formulating the conceptual apparatus of a discipline or models enabling it to solve problems with greater ease). Based on that considerations, Kamiński draws the following conclusion: "The theory of cognition depends on the theory of being primarily structurally because in its explanations […] it refers to the theory of being. On the other hand, the dependence of the theory of being from the theory of cognition, understood as meta-cognition, would be possible only if cognition itself fell under question."[38] It should be stressed that what Kamiński sees as a "structural dependence," Stępień considers to be a methodological dependence. Kamiński, on the other hand, introduces the methodological understanding of the autonomy of science.[39] We can speak of methodological autonomy in the objective and structural sense. A science is objectively independent when it has a "separate type of experience data, i.e. its own facts that it explains,"[40] whereas it is independent structurally when it does not enter structural dependencies. For Kamiński the theory of cognition is methodologically independent in the objective sense but methodologically dependent in the structural sense. Stępień, in turn, postulates the methodological independence of the theory

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[37]    See Stanisław Kamiński, "The theory of being and other philosophical disciplines," in Kamiński, *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, 15-47.

[38]    Ibidem, 45.

[39]    See Stanisław Kamiński, "O metodologicznej autonomii etyki," in Kamiński, *Jak filozofować?*, ed. Tadeusz Szubka (Lublin: TN KUL, 1989), 323-324.

[40]    Ibidem, 324.

of cognition in both of these meanings. In his view, the difference between the objective-metaphysical and the meta-objectal-epistemological perspective is a radical one: "We are dealing with two complementary, mutually independent, and irreducible manners of perceiving that which may be the object of considerations and cognition."[41] Considered from a metaphysical perspective, cognition is taken to be a distinct kind of being, and one searches for its ultimate ontic reasons, whereas from an epistemological perspective, cognition is a sensible whole which aspires to playing the function of an informant: "within that perspective the question of the ontic reasons of cognition and its results does not even appear and cannot be here situated."[42] According to Stępień, these perspectives may be superimposed on each other, one of them may be ignored, but they cannot be reduced to each other. Moreover, any theory which is dependent on any other sciences is not suitable for achieving the goal of the theory of cognition because that theory itself would fall into dogmatism, taking assumptions from other sciences (e.g., metaphysics) which are not justified within it. Cognition so understood, on account of its properties, does not enclose us in its immanence and, therefore, all the objections towards it – as long as they have a cognitive function – are situated within its limits. Stępień concludes: "This mode of [understanding] cognition does not contradict that – from another point of view – cognition is a specific sort of being. There is therefore no disjunction: being or cognition! There are only various aspects and various problems to be solved."[43] This dispute is well summarized by Jan Krokos who claims that positions on the issue of first philosophy are dependent on a preferable research aspect:

> [T]he primacy of philosophy of being is dependent on [taking] the general existential aspect as [an object] of the inquiry in classical metaphysics, whereas the primacy of the theory of cognition – on grasping cognition under the aspect of its being true. It seems, therefore, that the problem of first philosophy comes down to resolving whether the primal experience informs us justifiably only about one aspect of reality or about many different aspects that are mutually irreducible to one another.[44]

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[41]  Antoni B. Stępień, "Kilka uwag o 'filozofii klasycznej' i relacji: metafizyka – teoria poznania," in Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne*, vol. 2, 414.

[42]  Ibidem.

[43]  Antoni B. Stępień, "W sprawie stosunku między teorią bytu a teorią poznania," in Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne*, vol. 2, 417.

[44]  Jan Krokos, "Uwagi o filozofii pierwszej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45, no. 1 (1997): 214.

## 3. Dispute on the foundations of ethics

An intensive debate on the methodological status of ethics, including its research object, point of departure, and ways of justification, broke out at the wake of Karol Wojtyła's arrival at the Catholic University of Lublin (in 1954).[45] Wojciech Chudy suggests a periodization of the dispute into three phases: the first one took place in 1981 and was materialized in the articles published in number 2 of *Roczniki Filozoficzne* [Annals of Philosophy] from that year in the section entitled *Dyskusja w sprawie nowej propozycji etyki ks. Stycznia* [Discussion on Rev. Styczeń's New Proposal of Ethics]; the second phase of the dispute – entitled *Dyskusja na temat istoty bytu moralnego* [Discussion on the Essence of the Moral Being] – found its expression in the same journal (number 2) from the year 1983; the third one was entitled *W sprawie przedmiotu etyki* [On the Research Object of Ethics] and was conducted in the *Annals of Philosophy* (volume 2) from the year 1984. These phases are documented in the series of articles, but the debate itself was conducted much earlier. After publishing Tadeusz Styczeń's habilitation work *Problem możliwości etyki jako empirycznie uprawomocnionej i ogólnie ważnej teorii moralności* [The Problem of Ethics as an Empirically Justified and Generally Valid Theory of Morality],[46] Jerzy Kalinowski – who was already in France at the time – commented on that work[47]; Jerzy Gałkowski in 1972 wrote an article *Spór o powinność moralną* [The Debate on Moral Oughtness];[48] Krąpiec, in turn, commented on the theses included in Kamiński's and Styczeń's article *Doświadczalny punkt*

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[45]   Wojciech Chudy, "Spór w szkole lubelskiej o podstawy i punkt wyjścia etyki," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45, no. 1 (1997): 200-210. In this article Chudy distinguished three positions present in the Lublin Philosophical School: (1) traditionalism (Jacek Woroniecki, Feliks Bednarski, Jerzy Kalinowski, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Piotr Jaroszyński); (2) personalism (Karol Wojtyła, Tadeusz Styczeń, Andrzej Szostek, Adam Rodziński, Jerzy Gałkowski); (3) intermediary position, "leaning towards metaphysics" (Antoni B. Stępień, Andrzej Wawrzyniak, Stanisław Kamiński). The terms "traditional" and "personalist" are unfortunate, for the representatives of the traditionalist position also proclaim a personalistic understanding of the human being.

[46]   Tadeusz Styczeń, *Problem możliwości etyki jako empirycznie uprawomocnionej i ogólnie ważnej teorii moralności* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1972).

[47]   Jerzy Kalinowski, "A propos de la meta-ethique: Discussion avec Tadeusz Styczen," *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 65 (1973): 794-806.

[48]   Jerzy W. Gałkowski, "Spór o powinność moralną," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 20, no. 2 (1972): 5-39.

*wyjścia etyki* [The Empirical Point of Departure for Ethics][49] in his pivotal work entitled *Ja – człowiek* [I – Man], published in 1974.[50] One should, therefore, consider the phases indicated by Chudy as a summary of the debates and the crystallization of views.

The first contentious issue was the research object of ethics. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec's position is clear: the research object of ethics is a decision, for the decision is a being of which we may predicate moral adjectives, as any decision is a truly human act – "it is a peculiar integration, a synthesis of the act of will and that of intellect. And this is for us graspable in our concomitant reflection."[51] The climax of this decision process is a practical-practical judgment ("do this") which is chosen by me voluntarily and which determines me to act. This moment of self-determination creates the sphere of morality. We can predicate of decisions the moral predicates: good/bad, for decisions result from the human being's faculties (they are not, for instance, the result of instincts or stimuli) and constitute the human being as an efficient cause. A decision can lead to two sorts of effects: transitive which occur in the external world when a person executes a decision and non-transitive which shape the moral face of a human being – "we are such as we have decided to 'be' through our decisions."[52] Thus, in order to understand morality, one must build ethics as a philosophical theory of decision. One should, then, ultimately and irrefutably explain the decision on canvas of the structure of being, that is point to such decontradictifying factors, the rejection of which would be equivalent to denying of the fact of the decision's existence. The term "fact" is crucial here, for it is about explaining decisions as concrete existing beings. In order to explain them, Krąpiec refers to the being-good which – when it is cognized and chosen – becomes a goal-motivation and reason to act. We act in one way or another, and this is conditioned by the making out of the good-goal. I make it out by formulating the "truth about the good" and it is "my truth" (cognition is aspectual and characterized by personal moment) about this one specific good. "The moment of the decision," Krąpiec writes, "is in the most precise

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[49]   Stanisław Kamiński and Tadeusz Styczeń, "Doświadczalny punkt wyjścia etyki," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 4, no. 2 (1968): 21-73.

[50]   Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Ja – człowiek*, (Lublin: TN KUL, 1974). An English edition: *I-man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, trans. M. Lescoe, A. Woznicki, Th. Sadok et al. (New Britain, CT: Mariel Publications, 1983).

[51]   Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Decyzja – bytem moralnym," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 31, no. 2 (1983): 51.

[52]   Ibidem: 61.

meaning of that word, the creation of a new moral being, for in the moment of taking a decision an efficient cause is constituted, together with its necessarily inseparable relation to the rules of acting."[53] Any decision is, therefore, a being which is subjected to the norm of honest and fair[54] behavior of a human being, "and that norm is, simply put, a structure of being that I 'read out' as 'my truth' about the good which is an object of our action."[55]

Tadeusz Styczeń responds to the question on the research object of ethics differently: ethics is the theory of moral obligation. Ethics is interested in decisions but as the material object. The formal object of ethics is a decision comprehended as morally good or morally bad; yet, one must explain why a particular decision is good or bad. Decisions cannot then constitute the realm of morality, and there must be something more fundamental. An empirical point of departure for building ethics is moral obligation, accessible to the subject in direct experience. According to Styczeń, the decision, from the perspective of that experience, is not the main aspect. The main aspect is the obligation to perform this or that act grasped here as obligatory, regardless of whether it was already performed or shall be performed in the future. Experiencing obligation is the cognitive grasp of the real, individual, and concrete fact of obligation. Kamiński and Styczeń argue:

> Both the content of the act and the act itself stand before me as an uncompromising task to perform; not as something optional, to be accepted under certain condition. In a directly given moral situation, I find myself placed in the position of an uncompromising call to perform an unambiguously determined act, i.e., a call to perform a particular act.[56]

Let me add: in these specific circumstances we are speaking of an act towards a particular receiver. What I *must* choose and what I *should* choose does not depend on me; but what I do actually choose depends on me – and that is what freedom is about. In order to build a theory, one must present an ultimate and irrefutable multi-dimensional explanation (a decontradictifying reason) of the fact that a human being *should* do something,

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[53]   Ibidem.

[54]   These terms are to translate the Polish term *godziwy*. The term refers to actions which are morally good in the sense that an acting person has morally good intentions and that an act is morally effective in the sense that it brings morally good effects.

[55]   Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "O rozumienie bytu moralnego: W odpowiedzi na krytykę mego artykułu 'Decyzja bytem moralnym' kolegom Tadeuszowi Styczniowi i Andrzejowi Szostkowi," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 31, no. 2 (1983): 92.

[56]   Kamiński and Styczeń, "Doświadczalny punkt wyjścia etyki," 48.

*what* he or she should do and *why*. The obligation cannot be reduced to anything; one should not, therefore, contrast or oppose it to the decision to act in a certain way because the decision constitutes (or not) the fulfillment of that obligation.

With regard to the above view Krąpiec formulates the following objection: one must differentiate the decision as the self-determination to act in a certain way from the feeling of obligation to perform that action. The awareness and feeling of obligation to take such and such a decision is not an act about which we predicate moral adjectives but only a necessary condition for deciding to act in a certain way. This is one step too many: the authors "in such a supposition would not start from the 'existential fact' in the analysis of the moral act but solely from the consciousness of the obligation to accomplish such a fact. Consequently, they would remain only in the sphere of consciousness and of the conscious manifestation of that which occurs 'within me.' In this condition they would remain in the field of phenomenology and not in that of explanatory philosophy."[57] Moreover, a human being does not always know what to do – situations with an easily recognizable obligation how to act are rather infrequent. And yet, a person always knows what decision she has made and that is why "the analysis of the already existing and accomplished decision, and not the consciousness of an obligation to take it, can become the foundation and also the 'object' of philosophical, classical and explanatory treatment leading, on this background of the philosophical analysis of moral act, to the construction of ethics as the theory of that act."[58] Krąpiec claims that moral obligation characterizes the interpersonal relation which constitutes the law understood as *ius.* Taking obligation as the research object of ethics would reduce ethics to the philosophy of law and the sphere of morality – to the sphere of justice.[59] Experiencing obligation is a fact, but it is a result of human contingency: the feeling of moral bond and the necessity to align our decisions, i.e. our practical judgments, with theoretical judgments about reality reveals this contingency.

The second contentious issue concerned the content of moral norms. The question was: On what basis do we assess the moral value of any human act? According to Krąpiec, the decision, understood as a judgment 'I shall/shall not do this,' is in a necessary relation to the rule for conduct

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[57]    Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *I-man*, footnote 7, 403.
[58]    Ibidem, 404.
[59]    Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "O rozumienie bytu moralnego": 96ff.

and "this rule for human conduct – the nearest moral norm – is nothing else than the content of the last practical judgment that determined me to act."[60] As it was mentioned earlier, the decision should conform to the norm of honest, fair action, and the norm is given by the real nature of being, grasped by the intellect who formulates the theoretical judgment about an entity. "The rationally 'read out' nature of being – Krąpiec claims – binds me in action; I have to take into consideration the 'truth' of being and voluntarily choose such a practical judgment which is to determine me to act that reckons (through my theoretical judgment) with the 'truth' of being."[61] "My truth about the being" is a theoretical judgment with which I must/should align my practical judgment, or putting it in yet another way, I must/should voluntarily choose a practical judgment which takes into account the "truth of being." My practical judgment has a content which "is by its nature either compatible or incompatible with the structure of being itself, 'deciphered' by my theoretical judgment. It is, therefore, not obligation but the alignment of the practical judgment with my theoretical judgment in the decision that already makes me morally good, whereas the incompatibility – noticed by me myself – between that judgments makes me morally bad."[62] From such a perspective "there are no morally neutral decisions!", what Styczeń allows.[63] The crucial phrase here is "the incompatibility noticed by me," as it makes it possible to differentiate a moral fault from a mistake – for it may happen that I align my practical judgment with a false theoretical judgment. But if I reject to align the two judgments and choose a practical judgment against the theoretical judgment, I am morally to blame. It is worth keeping in mind that we always deal with an individual decision of a subject in relation to individual concrete objects. As Krąpiec stresses, the activity of the human subject is not a replication of functions of a certain species called "humankind," but it is an individual unique performance, actualization of potentialities which constitute, only analogously and not univocally, every human complex individual beingness.[64]

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[60]    Krąpiec, "Decyzja – bytem moralnym": 61.
[61]    Krąpiec, "O rozumienie bytu moralnego": 92.
[62]    Ibidem: 93.
[63]    See Tadeusz Styczeń and Jarosław Merecki, *ABC etyki* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 1996), 27.
[64]    Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Odzyskać świat realny* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1993), 611-612.

These additional remarks enable us to see the role of the terms: "good" and "the good." Any human action is contingent, existentially unnecessary. In order for it to come into being, there has to be something that knocks the human being out of passivity – and this is the role of the being-good which is perceived as the goal of rational pursuit and is 'deciphered' in its individual structure. The response to the question of why I should do exactly that to that particular being-good is: because it is good and one should do good. And why is that actually good? "The choice of precisely this act and not another" – Krąpiec explains – "was considered as consent to the best, *hic et nun*, means leading to the final end of human life."[65] The threat of subjectivism does not arise here because the ultimate end is inscribed into the structure of the human being. I become morally good when my decision respects both my own nature (including the ultimate end inscribed in it) and that of concrete beings that are objects of my action. A specific equivalence occurs here: if the act is good, it must be a means to an ultimate end of human life, and if it is not – then it cannot be good. The relation has a necessary character – it is not about the feeling of happiness or about personal satisfaction, but it is about the fact of achieving a state of fulfilling the objective end inscribed into our human nature. If we consider this desire for good to be love – *bonum amabile* will turn out to be *bonum affirmabile*: the desired good is a being capable of being loved, and loving belongs to affirmation.

Tadeusz Styczeń and Andrzej Szostek have two objections to the view formulated in this way. First, according to Styczeń, "different base experiences occur at the point of departure for analyzing a decision as a decision, whereas different ones at the final point of analyzing the moral good and evil of a decision."[66] While building a theory of decision, we shall notice the fact that decisions are subject to moral qualification, and therefore one must systemically formulate a norm that will allow us to judge whether a decision is morally good or morally evil. On the other hand, while building ethics, we begin from experience which one can express with phrases like "I may, but I do not have to," and "I should." The experience "I should" resists any attempts to reduce it to "I want." Ethics must answer the question of what makes the act (also a decision) morally good or bad. Thus – Szostek adds – "the dispute, in fact, refers to the norm for morality, and not to the

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65    Krąpiec, *I-man*, 209.
66    Tadeusz Styczeń, "Spór z eudajmonizmem czy o eudajmonizm w etyce?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 31, no. 2 (1983): 69.

manner in which the subject performs the act which is compatible or not with that norm."[67] The experience of the obligation's resistance to reducing it to "I want" prohibits answering that a decision is morally good because it is an act which is a means to achieving a desired good – even if that good would be happiness understood as the unification with the Ultimate Good or the achievement of the ultimate end of the human life.[68] In the "logic of desire" there is no place for another motive than "my good," whereas according to our experience, referring to the fact that a person's given act is a means to an end, at the very least, casts a shadow on the acting person. "*Bonum est faciendum*," Szostek concludes, "can, indeed, play the role of a basic ethical principle only when that *bonum* includes a good which is grasped as obliging."[69] This commitment is given through experience and in a judgment of the conscience: through my acts I should affirm persons – myself and the others. This judgment, as Styczeń claims, reveals obligation as independent from the condition of achieving one's own happiness – it is the recognition and acknowledgment of the truth about reality.[70] Thus, *persona est affirmanda*, as a norm for morality, is an empirical and necessary judgment which can be qualified as true. Obligation is given in experience, but it is not only an experience. Styczeń indirectly responds also to Krąpiec's objection that the experience of obligation to affirm the person is a distinct case of recognizing and affirming the good, and that, therefore, there is no special ethical experience which is supposed to lead to replacing the norm *bonum est faciendum* by *persona est affirmanda*. According to Styczeń, any moral obligation is given in the judgment of the conscience "I should perform such an act towards this being," and the basis for this obligation is the recognized value of the addressee. However, in the case of a personal addressee we are dealing with a distinct value. Styczeń writes:

> The value itself of every addressee of action, a person or thing, generates obligations. But the value of person generates obligation in a particular way because the intrinsic value of any non-personal addressee does not exclude moral permissibility or even the obligation to treat it instru-

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[67]    Andrzej Szostek, "Jeszcze o specyfice wartości moralnej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 31, no. 2 (1983): 85.

[68]    This is why Styczeń considers Krąpiec's concept as an example of perfectionist eudemonism.

[69]    Andrzej Szostek, "Wokół afirmacji osoby: Próby uściśleń inspirowane dyskusją nad koncepcją etyki ks. Tadeusza Stycznia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 32, no. 2 (1984): 159.

[70]    See Tadeusz Styczeń, "Etyka czy etyki?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 29, no. 2 (1981): 102.

mentally due to the affirmation of persons (...), whereas the personal dignity of the addressee of an act excludes the moral permissibility of treating instrumentally some persons "for the good" of other persons.[71]

In order to explain the fact of obligation, it is not enough to refer to the urge to actualize potentiality which is inherent in human nature. Szostek comments:

> [A]ssigning "the-adequate-good" to a given person cannot be interpreted only in terms of the dynamism that characterizes every being (and such an interpretation is suggested by the logic of Krąpiec's reasoning), but [it must – A.L.-K.] take into consideration that a person cognized as a good [...] demands to be respected as an end, on account of the good which the person is.[72]

In the experience of moral obligation, the conscience reveals the person's dignity or the intrinsic value of the entity as a source and basis of the subjective moral obligation (*why* I should do something). This is the experiential-empirical point of departure and basis for forming the general ethical principle. Hence, ethics is a discipline which is epistemologically and methodologically independent from other disciplines. However, as far as the correct recognition of the objective structure of the person is concerned, ethics depends on various sorts of anthropology which provide knowledge about how the person might be properly affirmed.

Styczeń's and Szostek's concept was challenged with several questions. If one assumes that obligations have an uncompromising and necessary character, Bogusław Inlender asks, then how should one consider actions which manifest themselves to the consciousness as compatible with moral obligation, though not obliging?[73] A similar problem is suggested by Jerzy Gałkowski: "it is hard to agree with a claim that everything which is not an obligation does not belong to the domain of authentic morality."[74] Andrzej Wawrzyniak claims in turn that the plane for Krąpiec's ethical considerations is metaphysical-anthropological. The purely ethical plane, as assumed

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[71]  Ibidem: 103.
[72]  Andrzej Szostek, "Spór o przedmiot etyki," in Szostek, *Wokół godności, prawdy i miłości: Rozważania etyczne* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1995), 80.
[73]  See Bogusław Inlender, "Etyka jako teoria powinności moralnej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 29 no. 2 (1981): 118-123.
[74]  Jerzy Gałkowski, "Spór o powinność moralną," 20.

by Styczeń – when ethics is understood as the theory of obligation – is derivative, for it is about the specification of the content of this "truth about the good" in the form of the particularized content of the primary ethical principle *persona est affirmanda*. "The truth about the good" encompasses *bonum honestum, bonum delectabile*, and *bonum utile*, while the personalist ethics of obligation relates only to the first of these goods. This is why one should not interpret Krąpiec's position as an attack on the personalist norm. Stępień's conclusions take in a similar direction. He considers ethics to be the philosophy of morality which searches for the ultimate reason of morality and its primary norms. Morality is the relational property of every conscious and voluntary (human) act as well as of every person who performed that act. The act is either congruent with the nature of the doer and it leads to her ultimate end – then it is morally good; or it is discordant with the doer's nature and hinders or prevents the achievement of her ultimate end, and therefore it is morally bad. When the act is not incompatible with the nature of the agent but does not hinder or prevent the fulfillment of her ultimate purpose, then the act is morally neutral. Thus, Stępień stresses: "determining the essence of morality does not in itself provide a criterion of morality. The latter is linked with cognizing the nature and ultimate end of the agent."[75] The experience of morality is but a secondary, theoretically determined, experience.[76]

Chudy, who wrote about this dispute twenty years ago, considered both positions to be complementary and offering a full – as far as the philosophical scope is considered – description and explanation of the fact of morality. Yet, complementarity is a cognitive problem rather than a solution, and it would be necessary to build a unifying theory. Inlender rightly claims that "it is necessary to coordinate the ethics of human end and that of obligation."[77] Edward Kaczyński's view that Styczeń and Krąpiec come close to each other in their ideas when referring to love in analyses of the human being does not find confirmation either.[78] As an argument Kaczyński indicates the papers published by the two authors: "Problem człowieka problemem miłości" [The Problem of the Human Being as a Problem of Love] (T. Styczeń) and

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[75]   Antoni B. Stępień, *Wstęp do filozofii,* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1995), 104.
[76]   Ibidem.
[77]   Bogusław Inlender, "Etyka jako teoria powinności moralnej," 121.
[78]   See Edward W. Kaczyński, "Etyka powinności czy etyka decyzji? Spór Tadeusza Stycznia z Albertem Krąpcem: próba zrozumienia," *Studia Theologica Varsaviensia* 29, no. 2 (1991): 61-77.

"'Cywilizacja miłości' spełnieniem osoby" [The Civilization of Love as the Fulfillment of the Person] (M. A. Krąpiec).[79] However, in these texts – although the same terminology is used – the authors adhere to the previously presented ideas. The dispute, which was fiercely conducted from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, died down, but it did not find a solution. The parties adhered to their positions, which is easy to see when one takes a look at the entries in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii* [Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy]: "Decyzja" [Decision] by Krąpiec[80] and *Etyka* [Ethics] by Styczeń.[81] The dispute on ethics gained a great deal of critical literature over time.[82] Meanwhile Andrzej Szostek, Wojciech Chudy, and Edward Kaczyński, who wrote about that dispute in the 1990s, agreed upon the need to continue it. Their postulate has not lost its relevance.

## 4. The dispute on the object and purpose of metaphysics

The debates presented above do not exhaust the list of methodological disputes carried out in the Lublin School. One of the most important discussions concerned the object and purpose of metaphysics. It was conducted in the articles published in the journal *Znak* in 1963 and 1966, and later recurred in the subsequent works of its participants.[83] In the two stages of

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[79] Tadeusz Styczeń, "Problem człowieka problemem miłości," in *Człowiek w poszukiwaniu zagubionej tożsamości: Gdzie jesteś Adamie?* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1987), 64-84; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "'Cywilizacja miłości' spełnieniem osoby," in ibidem, 224-244.

[80] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Decyzja," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 2, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: PTTA, 2001), 444-445.

[81] Tadeusz Styczeń, s.v. "Etyka," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 3, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin: PTTA, 2002), 269.

[82] See e.g. Edward Kaczyński, "Etyka powinności czy etyka decyzji?," 61-77; Andrzej Szostek, *Spór o przedmiot etyki*, 64-82; Tadeusz Biesaga SDB, *Spór o normę moralności* (Kraków: WN PAT, 1998); Tadeusz Biesaga, "*Bonum est faciendum* czy *persona est affirmanda?*," *Rocznik Wydziału Filozoficznego Wyższej Szkoły Filozoficzno-Pedagogicznej Ignatianum w Krakowie* 10 (2002-2003), 130-137.

[83] See Jerzy Kalinowski, "Ontologia czy aitiologia? Uwagi o naturze metafizyki z powodu książek Mariana Jaworskiego i Stefana Swieżawskiego *Byt* oraz Stanisława Kamińskiego i Mieczysława A. Krąpca *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*," *Znak* 111 (1963): 1069-1076; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "O rozumienie metafizyki," *Znak* 111 (1963): 1077-1082; Jerzy Kalinowski, "W związku z tzw. metafizyką egzystencjalną,"

the debate there participated Jerzy Kalinowski, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Antoni B. Stępień, and Stanisław Grygiel (the latter from outside of the Lublin School) as well as indirectly Sister Zofia Zdybicka by presenting her view on the foundations of the affirmation of God's existence. Kalinowski claims that within metaphysics one must discern aitiology (searching for the ultimate reasons of being) and ontology (analyzing the structure of being). In the light of this distinction, he criticized Krąpiec's concept for taking being as being to be the object of metaphysics and separation as a method of determining the notion of being. Separation requires negative judgments, for instance, that being is not necessarily material or that it is not necessarily contingent. However, in order to prove such assertions, one has to prove the existence of an immaterial being or noncontingent being (God). Krąpiec and Swieżawski – Kalinowski continues – seem to send the problem of God to natural theology and the question of the soul – to philosophical psychology, accepting the division of metaphysics into general and particular. This division originates from Christian Wolff's philosophy and not from Thomas Aquinas, to whom these authors refer to, and it is incompatible with realism. Also Kalinowski holds the position of realism: "metaphysics should be realistic and existential. If it is not, this is a misunderstanding."[84] He claims, however, that one cannot reach the concept of being as being or the theory of transcendentals before proving the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. So, one needs to accept that the object of metaphysics is contingent being and not being as an existing entity (God is also an existing entity!), and that its purpose is to explain the contingent being through discovering its ultimate causes. If the object of metaphysics were being as an existing entity, God would be included into its research object and, therefore, the aim of metaphysics would be the search for the reason of His existence. One should assume, in such a case, that God is the reason for His existence. Using in the definition of metaphysics the phrase "being as being" to designate its object "not only generates the illusion of accepting the concept of God – *causa sui*, but simultaneously shifts in a substantial

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*Znak* 142 (1966): 452-467; Antoni B. Stępień, "Kilka uwag w sprawie metafizyki," *Znak* 142 (1966): 478-481; Jerzy Kalinowski, "W związku z podziałem metafizyki na ogólną i szczegółową," in *Studia z filozofii Boga*, vol. 3, ed. Bohdan Bejze (Warszawa: ATK, 1977), 70-78; Antoni B. Stępień, "O metafizyce ogólnej – parę uwag z powodu dyskusji," ibidem, 102-102; Jerzy Kalinowski, "Metametafizyka: Przyczynek do rozważań nad koncepcjami metafizyki," in *Studia metafilozoficzne*, vol. 2, ed. Antoni B. Stępień and Jacek Wojtysiak (Lublin: TN KUL, 2002), 7-18.

84    Kalinowski, "W związku z tzw. metafizyką egzystencjalną": 454.

way, incompatible with the requirements of realism, the center of gravity of metaphysics from the aitiological perspective (the search for the ultimate causes of contingent beings) to the ontological one (the analysis of being as being, its components as well as its universal and necessary properties).”[85] The result of this shift – according to Kalinowski – is the essentialization of deliberations: “even the most existentially practiced metaphysical ontology ultimately hovers more in the realm of essence than in that of existence.”[86] This does not mean, he concludes, that one must remove the ontological component from metaphysics; only that it is a mistake to avoid aitiological problems or to solve them in inappropriate places. In short, in Kalinowski’s view, without a priori proving the existence of God, one cannot perform separation and, thus, neither elaborate a theory of transcendentals nor a theory on the real difference between essence and existence. If one were able to make a division of metaphysics into general and particular – what Kalinowski basically does not accept – then particular metaphysics would have to be preceded by general metaphysics. Kalinowski considers his own conception of metaphysics to be the genuine continuation of Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysics: he expressed this already in his article “O istocie i jedności filozofii” [On the Essence and Unity of Philosophy] and developed it in subsequent texts.[87] He agrees with Krąpiec’s assertion that only through faith one can know that beings are contingent.[88] However, one cannot treat this as an objection to aitiologically oriented metaphysics because one must differentiate the beginning of philosophy (asserting the existence of something) from the metaphilosophical analysis of metaphysics where we ask about the subject-matter of that discipline.[89]

Responding to Kalinowski, Krąpiec formulates several points.[90] Above all, beginning from the contingent being would be a non-neutral point of departure – one spontaneously knows that a being exists, whereas “the very

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[85] Ibidem: 457.

[86] Ibidem.

[87] Jerzy Kalinowski, “O istocie i jedności filozofii,” *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 6 (1958): 5-17; Jerzy Kalinowski, “Esquisse de l’évolution d’une conception de la metaphysique,” *Recherches de philosophie* 6 (1963): 97-133; Jerzy Kalinowski, *L’impossible métaphysique* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1981).

[88] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1962), footnote 128, 195.

[89] See Kalinowski, “W związku z tzw. metafizyką egzystencjalną.”

[90] They were directly formulated in Krąpiec, “O rozumienie metafizyki” [For The Understanding of Metaphysics].

concept of the contingency of being is already a result of systemic thinking."[91] In order to formulate what the object of metaphysics is, it is enough to state the existence of many beings – one does not have to prove that beings are material and immaterial, that the human soul is immortal, etc. Contingent beingness is a correlate of necessary beingness. If at the point of departure the contingent being and the necessary being were distinguished, the existence of God would be assumed *a priori*. Distinguishing contingent beings would be already an interpretation of the reality given in experience, and taking an interpretation as a point of departure for metaphysics would be a resignation from cognitive objectivity. From where would we know about the existence of God if we did not uncover Him in metaphysical cognition? If I, nonetheless, not assume but discover God's existence in metaphysical cognition, then it cannot be groundless. Thus, the object of metaphysics must be something else than the contingent being. In order, however, to discern forms of existence, including contingent one, decontradictifying factors of existence (causes) must be examined; and this is what "aitiology" proposed by Kalinowski is about. There is no reason to call the analysis of internal causes (material and formal) "ontology" and the analysis of external causes (efficient and final) "aitiology." If we point to God as the factor decontradictifying the existence of beings given in experience, it does not mean that we seek the causes for God. The decontradictifying factor of God's existence is the nature of His existence as a simple (non-composed) being. In metaphysics "the existence of God emerges as the decontradictifying reason for the existence of the world and not as a task intended *a priori*."[92]

Krąpiec's response is supplemented and clarified by Stępień.[93] Kalinowski's objection that the concept of metaphysics as a field of inquiry on being as being leads to the recognition of the existence of a being which is

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[91]    Krąpiec and Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki,* footnote 128, 195.
[92]    Krąpiec, "O rozumienie metafizyki", 1082.
[93]    This fact does not mean that Stępień have no objections to Krąpiec's conception. See his reviews of Krąpiec's works. Antoni B. Stepień, review of *Metafizyka* by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 10, no. 4 (1967): 82-86; Antoni B. Stepień, review of *Struktura bytu* by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 14, no. 1 (1966), 158-161; Antoni B. Stepień and Stanisław Majdański, review of *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 14, no. 1 (1966): 154-158. See also Stanisław Majdański, "Między 'ontologią', 'metafizyką' i 'realizmem': Szkic metafilozoficzny," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 50, no. 1 (2000): 383-401.

its own cause would be legitimate only when the narrow understanding of the term "cause" is accepted – as something external to being. But the term relates to reasons for existence, and the question about the reasons for existence leads to questions about the being which is the reason for its own existence. "If God were not to be a being which is the reason for its own existence, in metaphysics there would be no ground to acknowledge His existence!"[94] Moreover, the qualification of something as a contingent being is the qualification of something as a being, i.e. as an existing essence, because contingency is a mode of existence. Kalinowski's objection that such a metaphysics develops ontology and, therefore, essentializes deliberations is based on a misunderstanding: The Absolute being, as the reason for His own existence, is at the same time the reason for the essence of anything. What is more, aitiology – to use Kalinowski's terminology – assumes ontology because "one cannot look for the causes of being, not knowing what the being is."[95] Moreover, in this conception the question of the ultimate causes for the existence of beings given in our experience is included – "what matters is what is the appropriate method to acquire the answer to this question."[96]

## 5. Several Other Meta-Level Disputes

There was also a dispute on the status of the philosophy of nature. Three positions on the topic emerged. Mieczysław Krąpiec, and even more clearly Stanisław Kamiński, treated the philosophy of nature as a particular metaphysics. It has its own material object but the same purpose and formal object as any type of metaphysics: it is supposed to explain ultimately the material universe and its basic properties, pointing to the decontradictifying reasons in the structure of the analyzed being. Stanisław Mazierski, although he initially held Krąpiec's position,[97] later claimed that it was an

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[94] Stępień, "Kilka uwag w sprawie metafizyki," 479.
[95] Stępień, "O metafizyce ogólnej," 101.
[96] Stępień, "Kilka uwag w sprawie metafizyki," 481.
[97] See Kazimierz Kłósak, *Z teorii i metodologii filozofii przyrody* (Poznań: Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, 1980), 73; see also Paweł Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej* (Lublin: PTTA and Wydawnictwo KUL, 2015), 232ff.

autonomous philosophical discipline because it has a separate object: that is, the material world as a whole (the universe) and the essential properties of material beings as well as its own method – physical abstraction.[98] Philosophy of nature, he stated, is a cognition that is separate from the natural sciences as well as from general metaphysics and particular metaphysics, although it shares their terminology and premises.[99] Kazimierz Kłósak, following Jacques Maritain, believed that when pursuing philosophy of nature one had to include "facts of 'scientific' experience transformed into 'philosophical' facts."[100] He believed that accepting the thesis of the Lublin School on the unity of philosophy with respect to its purpose and formal object would lead to the "elimination of the epistemological and methodological autonomy of the philosophy of nature,"[101] and the method of physical abstraction proposed by Mazierski would not make it possible to develop an epistemologically homogenous philosophy of nature. He proposed a method of distinguishing reductive ontological implications of the most general statements on nature, what would enable ultimately explaining them as far as their most basic structure is concerned.[102]

The dispute on the understanding of classical philosophy constitutes an integral element of the disputes described above.[103] Practically, all representatives of the Lublin School accept autonomy (the independence from the particular scholarly domains and from theology) and empiricism (experience as the point of departure of philosophy) as the characteristic features of classical philosophy. There are, nonetheless, differences as far as the scope and purpose of philosophizing is considered. Krąpiec and Kamiński consider metaphysics and its subdisciplines to be classical when at their initial stage they have their own data to be explained, but at the stage

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[98] Stanisław Mazierski, *Prolegomena do filozofii przyrody inspiracji arystotelesowsko-tomistycznej* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1969), 112.

[99] See ibidem, 194.

[100] Kazimierz Kłósak, *Z teorii i metodologii filozofii przyrody*, 142.

[101] Ibidem, 57. The critique developed by Kłósak refers both to the view of the philosophy of nature as a particular metaphysics and to the view that the philosophy of nature is the so-called applied metaphysics. See ibidem, 76ff.

[102] See ibidem, 150ff. Critical trains see: Stanisław Kamiński, "Prelekcja stanowiąca zagajenie do dyskusji nad odczytem Kazimierza Kłósaka," in Kamiński, *Światopogląd – religia – teologia,* ed. Andrzej Bronk and Monika Walczak (Lublin: TN KUL, 1998).

[103] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Czym jest filozofia klasyczna," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 45, no. 1 (1997): 156-165; Andrzej Bronk and Stanisław Majdański, "Klasyczność filozofii klasycznej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 39, no. 1 (1991-1992): 367-391.

of explaining they refer to the theses taken from the theory of being. Kalinowski, on the other hand, claims:

> Philosophy is the study of real being (and not the "mental" one) which exists the way it is (object: *ens ut ens*), pursuing the cognition of the ultimate causes for its existence and essence (purpose: *per altissimas causas*) and employing for this end specific analogous notions, primary judgments (*prima principia*) and reasonings (method). (…) Philosophy is the appropriate name for only one, afore described, domain of human knowledge.[104]

Differentiating the broad and narrow understanding of classical philosophy, Kamiński adds:

> [C]lassical philosophy is above all a theory of the being that really exists. This means that the theory of being exhausts the whole range of fundamental issues of classical (in the strict sense of the term) philosophy: it is the philosophy that carries out its ultimate explanation in the same way in all of its disciplines, while starting from various kinds of experiential data.[105]

Thus, Kamiński claims that classical philosophy is objective and that epistemological and semiotic reflection belong to meta-philosophy. Stępień considers this approach to be an unjustified narrowing down of the scope of classical philosophy. He claims that if we called "classical philosophy" the one that reduces all branches of philosophy to the thomistically understood metaphysics, we would have no name for a conception that accepts the methodological features of the classical philosophy but differs from other visions of what philosophy is.[106] Therefore, Stępień continues, there is no reason to deny his conception of the theory of cognition as a meta-level discipline – with the view of cognition as an informant – that it is affiliated

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[104]  Jerzy Kalinowski, "O istocie i jedności filozofii," in *Logika – filozofia – człowiek: Wybór tekstów Stanisława Kamińskiego i Jerzego Kalinowskiego,* ed. Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik and Konrad Zaborowski (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2017), 169-170. As noted earlier, the paper was first published in *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 6, no. 1 (1958): 5-17.

[105]  Stanisław Kamiński, "Method in Classical Philosophy," in Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics,* trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin and Roma: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu and Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, 2019), 57.

[106]  See Stępień, "Kilka uwag o filozofii klasycznej."

to classical philosophy, despite the fact that such a theory does not appeal to the ontic reasons.[107]

The debate on the applicability of formal logic to classical philosophy outbroke when the Cracow Circle – Rev. Jan Salamucha, Father Innocenty M. Bocheński, and Jan F. Drewnowski – formulated a postulate to renew and scientify Thomistic philosophy with the tools taken from contemporary logic. Drewnowski claimed that reasoning which was incompatible with the laws of logic could not be recognized as scholarly. The representatives of the Lublin School do not reject this assertion, but, in their opinion, from this thesis it does not follow that logical calculi are tools for solving all philosophical problems. Perhaps the closest to applying logic to philosophy was Kamiński who proposed the formalization of fragments of metaphysics. However, since the world does not constitute a model for any logical calculus, and existence – the key term for metaphysics – can only be expressed by means of a formal operator and intensional predicate, these difficulties do not generate a prospect for the formalization of classical metaphysics.[108] Krąpiec was skeptical about even a limited formalization of classical metaphysics because such metaphysics uses transcendental notions (the equivalence of the scopes does not mean the equivalence of the meanings) as well as analogous ones; and existence as such cannot at all be treated as a predicate in the sense of a logical calculus.[109] Both thinkers agreed on the differences between the metaphysical and the logical status of the principles of non-contradiction, identity, and excluded middle.[110] This debate became an inspiration for developing nonclassical calculi in the Lublin School.[111] Kalinowski, on the other hand, being inspired by the ideas of logic and metalogic, postulated building meta-metaphysics in a strict sense

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[107] Stępień believes that Kamiński through limiting the applicability of the term "classical philosophy" gives up the autonomy of the theory of cognition. See ibidem. Cf. Andrzej Bronk and Stanisław Majdański, "Klasyczność filozofii (W rozumieniu szkoły lubelskiej)," *Ethos* 9, no. 3-4(35-36) (1996): 129-144.

[108] Stanisław Kamiński, "The feasibility of the axiomatization of classical general metaphysics," in Kamiński, *On the Methods of Contemporary Metaphysics*, 305-345.

[109] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Istnienie," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al., vol. 5 (Lublin: PTTA, 2004), 44-58, and 68-69.

[110] For more on this topic see for example Stanisław Kamiński, "Czym są w filozofii i w logice tzw. pierwsze zasady?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 11, no. 1 (1963): 5-23; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, "Specyficzność poznania metafizycznego," *Znak* 13 (1961): 602-637.

[111] For more on the topic see Bożena Czernecka-Rej, "Non-Classical Logics in the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy" in this volume.

as a set of rules governing the formulation of a language of metaphysics and rules for accepting primary and derivative statements.[112]

We should also mention the discussion of the School's representatives with Mieczysław Gogacz. He was developing so-called "consistent Thomism." Contrary to Krąpiec, he believed that the cognition of existence is not accomplished directly. The encounter with a being starts with experiencing an essence, and it ends with grasping the act of existence. The object of metaphysics are the ontic principles that constitute being, and the human being can grasp them in experience.[113]

It is also worth noting the dispute on the existence of Christian philosophy which was initiated in France.[114] Étienne Gilson, and later Jacques Maritain, defended its existence. Although the Lublin School took its shape under the influence of Gilson's philosophy, its main representatives did not accept this particular view. Theological statements or articles of faith, according to Krąpiec, cannot be formally in contradiction to any philosophical system and no one, not even the Church, can order or prohibit accepting assertions within a system.[115] Zofia J. Zdybicka and Edward I. Zieliński conclude: "The most justified view seems to be the one that from the point of view of methodology, philosophy is a field of knowledge autonomous in relation to the Christian religion and faith; it is neither Christian nor non-Christian."[116]

[112] Kalinowski presented meta-metaphysics for his own system in the book *L'impossible métaphysique.* See also Jerzy Kalinowski "Metametafizyka: Przyczynek do rozważań nad koncepcjami metafizyki," in *Studia metafilozoficzne,* vol. 2, 7-18.

[113] For the details of the discussion, see Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej,* 37 ff. One can also find there a bibliography of the significant works by Gogacz.

[114] The discussion was published in the *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie,* Paris 1931, 37-85. Its participants were M. Xavier Léon, M. Bréhier, J. Maritain, M.L. Brunschvicg, M. Édouard Le Roy as well as M. Raymond Lenoir. *Bulletin* included also a letter by Maurice Blondel. See also Richard J. Fafara, "Spór o rozumienie 'filozofii chrześcijańskiej' między É. Gilsonem a H. Gouhierem," *Człowiek w Kulturze* 19 (2007): 331-355.

[115] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Wiara a nauka," in Krąpiec, *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet,* red. Andrzej Wawrzyniak (Lublin: RW KUL, 1982), 199-200.

[116] Zofia J. Zdybicka and Edward I. Zieliński, s.v. "Chrześcijańska filozofia," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii,* vol. 2, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al. (Lublin PTTA, 2001), 170.

## 6. Some Object-level Disputes

Within the Lublin School also disputes on the object-level were conducted. Three of them – fundamental for philosophical settlements – will be presented here in more detail.

On account of the postulate of the empirical character of classical philosophy, the fact that a dispute on direct experience and its role in the foundation of metaphysics broke out is not surprising.[117] Stępień claims that directness "is the lack of a *medium quod* and also the lack of the alterations of time-space parameters of the cognized object as well as the lack of dependence of acquiring information on the acceptance of some sort of judgments."[118] The types of direct cognition for Stępień are: lived experience, internal and external sensual perception, perception of the other's psyche, recollection. These types of cognition constitute experience *sensu stricto,* and together with aesthetic perception they constitute experience *sensu largo.* Purely intellectual perception is also a direct form of cognition. Krąpiec also claims that cognition can be direct and indirect, but only the first type "is the ultimate epistemic reason for the truthfulness of further cognitive grasps."[119] According to him, Stępień is using a broader understanding of direct experience because directness excludes any types of intermediaries. The occurrence of an intermediary (even a transparent one) introduces the possibility of an error, even on account of choosing a medium inadequate for the cognitive purposes by the cognizing subject. Krąpiec, thus, postulates the radicalization of the concept of direct experience, connecting it exclusively with cognition that excludes all intermediaries and, therefore, excludes the possibility of cognition with errors as well as the possibility

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[117] See Antoni B. Stępień, "Rodzaje bezpośredniego poznania," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 19, no. 1 (1971): 95-126; Antoni B. Stępień, "Rola doświadczenia w punkcie wyjścia metafizyki," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 17, no. 4 (1974): 29-37; Antoni B. Stępień "O doświadczeniu – ponownie," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24, no. 1 (1976): 143-147; Antoni B. Stępień "O doświadczeniu – tylko nieporozumienia?," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 26, no. 1 (1978): 255-258. All the articles were reprinted in the volumes *Studia i szkice filozoficzne* and that is where the citations come from. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Doświadczenie i metafizyka," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24 no. 1 (1976): 5-16; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Uwagi o 'O doświadczeniu – ponownie'," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 24 no. 1 (1976): 147-148.

[118] Antoni B. Stępień, "Rodzaje bezpośredniego poznania," in Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne*, vol. 1, 156.

[119] Krąpiec, "Doświadczenie i metafizyka," 11.

of true cognition. Direct cognition is "over-truthful." Krąpiec enumerates two types of direct cognition: the affirmation of reality which is expressed in existential judgments and the affirmation of the "I" in "my" acts. This is what constitutes the basis of human cognition: all subsequent types of cognition make use of intermediaries.

Responding to Krąpiec, Stępień claims that we do not have intermediaries only in lived experience which is a non-act form of cognition. Transparent intermediaries, in turn, do not threaten the directness of cognition. He concludes:

> If the assertion of something's existence (that something exists) is not supposed to be an experience of the presence of something or of something present, then either it occurs within a particular sort of act in which some *medium quo* participates, some view on something, or it is a theoretically abstracted component of such acts. Therefore, there is no reason here to speak of an entirely direct cognition of existence (of something).[120]

Meanwhile, in the intuition of lived experience through the sole fact of the activity taking place, we cognize that this activity occurs and that it is "my" activity, wherein

> the "I" here is given only in certain existential limits (as currently existing, co-present in the act), formal ones (as a subject, a performer of the currently occurring phase of the stream of consciousness), with the primal sense of its numeric individuality (unitary, unchanging). Everything else is already the understanding of the "I" or "grasp of it" which reaches beyond that what is given a particular experienced activity.[121]

On account of that, Stępień criticizes Krąpiec for separating too forcefully the cognition of the existential and the essential side of the being.

According to Krąpiec, Stępień's recognition of the existence of "harmless" intermediaries of the *quo* type is a theoretical conception, not data given in experience. He also claims that the theory of the cognitive act presented by Stępień concerns the contents of the act and not the actual reality – and this leads to idealism. Stępień firmly retorts this objection: acknowledging the presence of intermediaries in cognition does not exclude realism. One should not stop at the – otherwise correct – assertion that

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[120] Stępień, "O doświadczeniu – ponownie," 146.
[121] Ibidem.

reality is given to me in its factuality, but one must analyze in what way we find out that something exists and how it exists: we perceive some objects as real and currently present, others as given in the past, and yet others as imaginary. Existence occurs in our perception in conjunction with a system of stimuli or with a way of grasping these stimuli – "and this has nothing to do with idealism."[122]

The polemic on the directness of cognition is linked with the dispute on existential judgments. Krąpiec discusses the theory of these judgments in numerous publications.[123] He calls the existential judgment a primal cognitive act which directly grasps the existence of an individual entity: the judgment "a exists." These judgments are not subject-predicate judgments because they do not ascribe a certain property to a cognized object; in this sense existence is not conceptualizable, and in the existential judgment no sign of existence appears even if our perception has a sign character: "in the direct cognition through existential judgments we encounter the existence of the being and the existence of the being does not generate any – even transparent – image which would be the natural sign of an entity."[124] And yet, existential judgments constitute the necessary condition for any further realistic cognition. They are spontaneous and objective as a "response" of the mind towards reality which strikes us with "the blade of existence," and "the content presented in cognition is simultaneously grasped by the intellect as existing here and now."[125] Hence, Krąpiec describes the existential judgment as "obvious," "indubitable", or "infallible." As direct cognition, it is "supra-truthful" because it cannot be false. I can err with respect to what is that something existing, and I can err as far as the mode of existence goes, but I cannot err that I perceive an existing essence or an "essentialized" existence.

Stępień develops a critique of this approach.[126] In his view, it is perception that is a direct (without a *medium quod*, though with a *medium quo*)

[122]   Antoni B. Stępień, "O doświadczeniu – tylko nieporozumienia?," 58. See also Stępień, "Bezpośredniość poznania i sposoby istnienia: Dwie polemiki," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 48. no. 1 (2000): 247-250.

[123]   See e.g. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* (Poznań: Pallottinum, 1959); Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1962); the cited edition is from 1994.

[124]   Mieczysław A. Krąpiec "Doświadczenie i metafizyka," 15.

[125]   Krąpiec and Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1994), 60.

[126]   See Antoni B. Stępień, "[Review.]: Zofia Józefa Zdybicka: "Partycypacja bytu: Próba wyjaśnienia relacji między światem a Bogiem," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 21, no. 1 (1973):

and evident grasp of a concrete entity. An act of perception is a certain whole in which the grasp of the content of a perceived being is organically combined, the grasp of its ontic status as an entity existing here and now. We are not dealing here with two acts: perception and judgment. If – following Krąpiec's conception – the existential judgment were the passive experiencing of something, then we would not yet deal here with cognition, and the term "judgment" would thereby acquire a nonstandard meaning. This is why, according to Stępień, it is epistemologically risky to claim that existential judgments are the absolutely primary conscious encounter of the human being with the world, and that, therefore, they constitute the point of departure for a philosophical system. They would rather be a cognitively significant primary feeling or experience, but "can something like that be the beginning of a philosophical system?"[127] If an existential judgment is supposed to grasp existence, then one should consider it to be an element of perception. The importance of the issue of existential judgments and their role in metaphysics is signified by the discussion which took place among Polish Thomists in the journal *Studia Philosophiae Christianae*[128] in the 1970s and 1980s as well as in articles by disciples of Krąpiec, Kamiński, and Stępień.[129]

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84-87; Antoni B. Stępień "Istnienie (czegoś) a pojęcie i sąd," in Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne*, vol. 1, 178-196. The text was first published in *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 9, no. 1 (1973): 235-261.

[127]  Antoni B. Stępień, "Nowy podręcznik metafizyki," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 10, no. 4 (1967): 85.

[128]  Except for the Stępień's article "Istnienie (czegoś) a pojęcie i sąd" [The existence (of something) and the notion and the judgment] that was mentioned above, one should list: Bogdan Bakies "Sądy egzystencjalne a punkt wyjścia metafizyki," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 14, no. 1 (1978): 5-24; Bogdan Bakies "Przedmiot afirmacji sądu egzystencjalnego," ibidem, 25-29; Marek Kur, "W poszukiwaniu tomistycznej teorii sądów egzystencjalnych," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 16, no. 1 (1980): 101-136; Bogdan Bakies "O właściwą koncepcję poznawalności istnienia," ibidem, 178-185; Wojciech Chudy "Zagadnienie tomistycznej teorii sądów egzystencjalnych (artykuł polemiczno-wyjaśniający)," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 17, no. 1 (1981): 185-200; Wojciech Chudy "Poznanie istnienia (bytu) w ujęciu tomistów egzystencjalnych (część pierwsza)," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 17, no. 2 (1981): 19-40; Wojciech Chudy "Poznanie istnienia (bytu) w ujęciu tomistów egzystencjalnych (dokończenie)," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 18, no. 2 (1982): 41-70.

[129]  E.g. Arkadiusz Gut "Sąd egzystencjalny i poznanie istnienia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 44, no. 1 (1996): 61-78; Arkadiusz Gut "O sądzie egzystencjalnym", in *Studia metafilozoficzne*, vol. 2, 295-353; Arkadiusz Gut "O sądzie egzystencjalnym – trzy tradycje," in *Stefan Swieżawski: Osoba i dzieło,* ed. Jan Czerkawski and Przemysław Gut (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2006), 130-141; Jacek Wojtysiak, "Próba reinterpretacji

Another dispute concerned the existence and nature of intentional beings and, consequently, also of works of culture.[130] Neither Krąpiec nor Stępień changed their views in result of these discussions, but Krąpiec elaborated his concept in subsequent publications.[131] According to him, the intentional content does not exist per se; it "hangs" on the act of the existing cognizing subject. Cognitive acts originate from the existing human being but their content is "not mine" because it comes from an object affecting the cognizing subject. The object of the cognitive act and the content of that act are aspectually – but not ontically – the same; through subsequent acts I may supplement this content by grasping other aspects of the object. This is why the cognitive content exists intentionally, "on the way to," constantly in relation to the object which is cognitively grasped; and the cognizing subject "is not responsible for the content which is grasped, although he is responsible for the manner of grasping that content."[132] Works of culture existing outside of the consciousness are intentional beings because they are "realized content." Stępień sees Krąpiec's conception as a form of psychologism, dictated not by data of experience but by some earlier theoretic ascertainments. He also claims that Krąpiec's view ignores the distinction, given in experience, between real beings and, e.g. beings presented in novels or mathematical beings. They are not ele-

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130   (neo)tomistycznej koncepcji sądu egzystencjalnego," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 46-47, no. 1 (1998-1999): 221–231; Tomasz Duma, "The Role of Existential Judgments in Knowing the Existence of Beings," (Barcelona) *Espíritu* 63 (2014): 317-331. See also Aleksandra Gondek, s.v. "Egzystencjalny sąd," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii,* vol. 3, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk al. (Lublin: PTTA, 2002), 45-52; Paweł Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej,* 149ff.

130   The positions were formulated in the following publications: Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Próba ustalenia struktury bytu intencjonalnego (egzystencjalno-ontyczna interpretacja aktu poznania)," *Collectanea Theologica* 28, no. 2 (1957): 303-381 (reprint in Krąpiec *Realizm ludzkiego poznania)*; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec "Intencjonalny charakter kultury," in *Logos i ethos: Rozprawy filozoficzne,* ed. Kazimierz Kłósak (Kraków: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, 1971), 203-218; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec "Kilka uwag tytułem bardziej wyczerpującej dyskusji," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 21, no. 1 (1973): 72; Antoni B. Stępień, "W związku z teorią poznania tomizmu egzystencjalnego," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 8, no. 1 (1960): 173-184 (reprint in Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne,* vol. 1, 95-104); Antoni B. Stępień, "O sposobie istnienia dzieła sztuki", *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 6, no. 3 (1963): 55-64 (reprint in Stępień, *Studia i szkice filozoficzne,* vol. 2, 84-94).

131   Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Byt," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk et al, vol. 1 (Lublin: PTTA, 2000), 746-785.

132   Ibidem.

ments of the real world (they do not even have to be an image of real beings), nor are they the immanent content of my consciousness either. As Stępień puts it:

> If I treat these objects as non-existent (because they do not exist in reality!), I will complicate my language, create several paradoxes, and I will not change anything in the actual situation: I shall still have to acknowledge that apart from real beings there are also unreal beings; they exist – this means that they have specified properties, a specific structure, they are cognizable, they remain in certain relation to other objects (including real ones).[133]

On these grounds, one should assume ontic pluralism: apart from real beings, there are also intentional ones.

## 6. debates as an important element of A Philosophizing style in the Lublin Philosophical school

The methodological and object-level disputes presented so far do not exhaust the list of debated issues. Debates were a persistent element of philosophizing in the Lublin School. Stępień claims that "every entry into a discussion in philosophy is, nonetheless, a form of cooperation."[134] This refers to debates both within the School and with other schools and traditions. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński in the preface to their joint publication confirm the importance of debates: "the frequent disputes which we conducted together on topics pertaining to the theory and methodology of metaphysics influenced not only the sharpening of the issues but also the formulation of general solutions or at least their direction."[135] Andrzej Szostek says even more forcefully: "There is no other way to explain and verify mutually opposing positions than through confronting them

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[133]   Antoni B. Stępień, "O intencjonalnym sposobie istnienia – ponownie," 71.
[134]   Antoni B. Stępień, "O dorobku badawczym Wydziału Filozofii," in Stępień *Studia i szkice filozoficzne*, vol. 2, 197.
[135]   Krąpiec and Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*, 14.

with each other."[136] Tadeusz Styczeń adds that for a scholar there is nothing more unpleasant than "a finding that as a result of one's discoveries, one has against oneself those whom one would want to have on his side, that one even has to – in order to be faithful towards 'things' – question the views of a famous and renowned author."[137] These quotes demonstrate what is the purpose of any discussion: solving a problem. If one were to ask what does the resolution of a problem consists in, at a certain preliminary level one would need to reply: to determine how things really are. It is, therefore, no accident that the Festschrift in honor of Krąpiec is entitled *Wierność rzeczywistości* [Faithfulness to Reality].[138] Styczeń declares "faithfulness to being" to be a condition for the reliability of analyses; and Kalinowski claims that carrying on controversies is the imperative of the "philosophical conscience."[139] Szostek states:

> A discussion between philosophers is not a boxing match, and it is not supposed to result in designating as a winner the one who dealt more accurate blows. It is rather climbing together a peak desired by all of its participants. The adversaries are thus particularly valuable allies for each other because they can "pull" each other to their own "positions" and bring them closer to their desired goal: the full truth.[140]

Krąpiec writes: "If anybody asks what philosophy is for, then the only final answer is: it is the attempt to understand ultimately reality."[141] The dispute is an efficient tool to fulfill this purpose. This is why historicism is a methodological requirement in the Lublin School. Kamiński claims that

> one needs to study the formulations and justifications of philosophical issues in the widest possible variety of systems and directions of philosophical thinking. (…) If a single issue (even though it was formulated in various ways) was studied by many great minds over many centuries, the results amassed so far must be learnt as this will improve our

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[136] Andrzej Szostek, "Jeszcze o specyfice wartości moralnej," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 31, no. 2 (1983): 89.

[137] Styczeń, "Spór z eudajmonizmem czy o eudajmonizm w etyce?," 72.

[138] *Wierność rzeczywistości: Księga pamiątkowa z okazji jubileuszu 50-lecia pracy naukowej na KUL o. prof. Mieczysława A. Krąpca*, ed. Zofia J. Zdybicka et al. (Lublin: PTTA, 2001).

[139] Kalinowski, "A propos de la méta-ethique: Discussion avec Tadeusz Styczen."

[140] Andrzej Szostek, "Wokół afirmacji osoby: Próby uściśleń inspirowane dyskusją nad koncepcją etyki ks. Tadeusza Stycznia," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 32, no. 2 (1984): 149.

[141] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *O rozumienie filozofii*, 308.

personal perception, and our formulations and justifications would be undoubtedly deepened with the help of our predecessors.[142]

Karol Wojtyła comments in a similar spirit:

> Human cognition, scientific cognition, is creative because it is a search. And since it is a search, it is also the readiness to take on problems anew. […]. The problems once addressed can be analyzed again if they are seen afresh.[143]

The purpose of the dispute – establishing how things are – designates the ethos of debates. Let us recall Wojtyła's statement formulated at the beginning of the discussion on his book *The Acting Person:*

> The fact that this discussion takes place in the presence of the author probably will not stop anybody from expressing one's own opinion because what matters here is not a person but a book, and via this book the fundamental purpose of scientific inquiry – finding the truth about the human being: the person and the act.[144]

When discussing the object of metaphysics with Krąpiec, Stępień, and Stanisław Grygiel, Kalinowski wrote: "If I shall be, nonetheless, 'bothering' them with my remarks, it is only because in this case it impossible to express in any other way both my love of the friends and my love of the truth."[145]

The above citations demonstrate how seriously disputes were treated in the Lublin Philosophical School. They were not only mutual critique (to what discussions today are often reduced), but the engaged parties held their own positions, and the dispute was treated as an opportunity to clarify and crystallize one's views. Disputes were intense and "merciless", for they concerned something crucial for philosophy: the truth. The study of the polemical articles shows that the resolution of problems really concerned the participants of the dispute personally. These articles were often published in the form of polemic blocs, also in journals published by the

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[142]  Stanisław Kamiński, "The Specificity of Metaphysical Cognition," in Kamiński, *On the Metaphysical Cognition,* 48.

[143]  Karol Wojtyła, "Wypowiedź wstępna w czasie dyskusji nad 'Osobą i czynem' w KUL 16.12.1970r." [The introductory talk during the discussion on "The Acting Person" at KUL on December 16, 1970], *Analecta Cracoviensia* 5-6 (1973-1974), 55.

[144]  Ibidem.

[145]  Kalinowski, "W związku z tzw. metafizyką egzystencjalną," 453.

Catholic University of Lublin, because at that time nobody was worried yet about the loss of prestige of the journal due to the "local character" of the authors – what mattered was only the problem and the quality of the argumentation. The sides of the dispute were shaped depending on the problem: adversaries in one case would become allies in another.

The key terms for these disputes have not yet been sufficiently clarified, nor have satisfactory solutions been elaborated. Meanwhile the disputes have essentially faded out. Paweł Gondek is, therefore, right when he claims that the realistic philosophy of the Lublin School is still a work in progress.[146] Joining into the dispute on existential judgments, Bogdan Bakies wrote:

> [O]nly an exchange of ideas enables delving deeper into problems. Even the most profound among them die a natural death if the discussion on them fades out. One should never stop at the hitherto findings and accomplishments because none of them are, for they cannot be, final.[147]

This statement, I believe, summarizes the methodological *credo* and tasks ahead of the next generations of the Lublin Philosophical School.

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[146]   Paweł Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej.*
[147]   Bogdan Bakies, "O właściwą koncepcję poznawalności istnienia," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 17(1981), no. 1, 177.

Stanisław Majdański

# A Phenomenon within Polish Philosophy: The Lublin School. Fragments of a Testimony and Reflection

*"Stanisław, the only really interesting journeys are the metaphysical ones."*

*Mieczysław A. Krąpiec*
*(after returning from a trip to the USA*
*while being the rector of the Catholic University of Lublin)*

It is extremely difficult, even in the most abrupt form, to respond to the trust and request which has been bestowed upon the author of these words. The fact that one belonged to the "school," what grants an undeserved honor to the person writing this text, and also the fact that one looked at it from, as-if, an external perspective, having therefore not only participant observations (this may be an adequate term), do not make the task any easier. I admit that at times there come to me many reflections based on my memory of the School, that is of this peculiar university entity; and not only that, for it is a more general cultural fact. So far it was never the right time and occasion to properly reveal these soliloquies to the public – at one time it was too early, at another time too late; for one reason or another the endeavor never reached the realization phase, although recently I decided to write something in collaboration with Andrzej Bronk.[1]

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[1]   Andrzej Bronk and Stanisław Majdański, "Metodologiczno-epistemologiczne inspir-acje i aspiracje Lubelskiej Szkoły Filozofii Klasycznej," in Jacek Wojtysiak, Zbigniew

As a preparation for the proper topic, to that which shall occur in my reminiscences and reflections, I should give these introductory words a certain personal, autobiographical touch. This is a certain subjective background for that which is notoriously called "the Lublin School" or more precisely "the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy" (LSCF), as I have been calling it for years, and what – to a certain degree irrespectively of me – has been commonly accepted.

My difficulty in gazing at the School consists also in the fact that I hesitate when looking from afar and grasping it as a whole: on the one hand, I can see the necessity of an emphatic, synthetic recapitulation and "summary," and on the other hand – I am tempted to get into certain details, perhaps unknown to a broader public, for they are absent in published testimonials. Indeed, it is difficult to harmonize and balance adequately this and that, and still other things. Perhaps it is easier to do for those who remember less and repeat certain common truths and clichés, although such simplifications are, admittedly, also necessary. Thus, to close the issue: the author of these words has reservations of one sort or another.

As far as simplification is considered, as the defiant Andrzej Grzegorczyk once explained to me, it is a form of abstraction or idealization which is constitutive for science. He then referred to Galileo's famous discussions with Scholastic scholars who perfidiously accused him of disrespecting various elements of empiry which he omitted in his famous "tower" experiments, but, admittedly, this is why he obtained his famous law of free fall.

I observed the very beginnings of the School, of that which – it seems – is called indisputably and routinely the Lublin School, when I started my studies at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin. The Faculty, by a paradox of history, was founded in 1946 in the capital of "Lublin Poland," governed by Bolesław Bierut.[2] The Faculty was developing, also its section dedicated to practical philosophy, in a way at the expense of the structures of the Faculty of Law and Social-Economic Sciences which were being liquidated. I enrolled in the section of practi-

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Wróblewski, and Arkadiusz Gut (eds.), *Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna w porównaniach* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2019). Editor's note.

[2]    The author refers here to the fact that in 1944, immediately after the Soviet army entered that part of Poland, in Lublin the communist government of Bolesław Bierut was established, with a program of nationalization of industry, agriculture, education, and culture as well as of atheization of society to build the Polish Socialist Soviet Republic. Editor's note.

cal philosophy in 1952, therefore, formally in the beginnings of post-war communist Poland.

The Faculty of Philosophy was founded and first headed by Rev. Józef Pastuszka, philosopher and psychologist, who not much later (still in 1952) was exiled from the Catholic University of Lublin and the city itself by the Communist authorities, and indeed not only him. During my interview to enter the university, he asked me, among other things, what I think that I would be doing after graduation. I answered, with some youthful idealism, that I even might work with a shovel – but with a degree in philosophy. Incidentally, my slightly older colleague, Jan Bardan, in a way fulfilled this vision, for after defending his doctoral dissertation under Karol Wojtyła's supervision, he engaged in sheep farming in the Bieszczady mountains, then became a lumberjack therein, and ultimately – a locksmith in the US. I described this story briefly some time ago.

I was accepted at the Catholic University of Lublin after graduating a high school in Warsaw, although in the school (*liceum*) I declared the wish to apply to study architecture at the university of technology in order to receive a referral to university – a document necessary at the time (the classified opinion from a high school was sent to a university chosen by a prospect student). Even if I possessed certain skills in this field, I had no chance to get accepted to those studies. My father, Walenty, due to his activity, was negatively perceived by the authorities,[3] my mother was in a Soviet prison and then in exile, I and my brother barely got back from there at the time. Most of my friends went to the university of technology; at that time it was the trend which was, anyway, supported by the authorities: practical studies for the "politechnization of the country," in the spirit of the implanted Leninist slogan that "communism is Soviet power plus electrification." This corresponded to the philosophical principle that the criterion of truth is praxis and "philosophy is a party science." All of that occurred within the plans of rebuilding and developing the country. How this endeavor looks in practice, I experienced myself prior to that, in Siberian exile.

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[3]   Walenty Majdański (1899-1972) - educator, writer and Catholic activist, expert in family, ethical and demographic issues, defender of the life of the unborn, closely cooperating with the Church. He was persecuted by the authorities of communist Poland, and there was a ban on publishing his works and storing them in libraries. On his life and work see *Jubileusz Giganta. Księga Pamiątkowa 50-lecia pracy publicystycznej Walentego Majdańskiego* (typescript, 1970) and the volume of *Studia nad Rodziną UKSW* 8, no. 2(15) (2004). Editor's note.

At the Catholic University of Lublin, it was hard but friendly. Lublin was "the first capital of the People's Republic of Poland." The region had the scent of partisan warfare in the air, and the Catholic University of Lublin – that of already liquidated "Bratniak," a selfhelp student organization. The former rector, Rev. Antoni Słomkowski, who fervently defended the Catholic University, was imprisoned, alongside many others who were imprisoned or persecuted. The new dean of the Faculty, who came after the relegated Rev. J. Pastuszka (who was very popular among the students), was Jerzy Kalinowski; he soon changed its name to the Philosophical Faculty (what is still another issue). Kalinowski, who after the adventures of the war came from France, was a young, multi-talented person, great organizer, educated to be a lawyer, and logician by vocation. Rev. Józef Iwanicki became then the rector of the Catholic University of Lublin; he was a philosopher and logician who came from Warsaw but belonged to the same, Włocławek, diocese as Rev. Idzi Radziszewski, the founder of the University, just like many other KUL's professors.

The section of practical philosophy, which I chose, consisted of five departments, with that of Ethics and its Chair, Fr Feliks Wojciech Bednarski OP, being the leading one. I clung onto him and his classes at once, due to my interests in ethics which I brought out of the home. Such interests are anyways characteristic of the Polish philosophical tradition which was, generally speaking, "practical" (it was no accident that Polish philosophy contributed to the emergence of praxeology). Soon I realized that I could fill the gaps in my formation by joining the section of theoretical philosophy, where, at the time, a pro-logical atmosphere reigned supreme – impersonated by young Rev. Stanisław Kamiński, who later hired me, Rev. Józef Iwanicki, Jerzy Kalinowski, and Rev. Antoni Korcik. One could learn a lot here about the history of philosophy, psychology, and philosophy of nature with its auxiliary courses in some particular sciences.

Incidentally, this two-section structure of the Faculty corresponded with the division – still Aristotelian – of philosophy into theoretical and practical. Kalinowski administered the practical section, as a philosopher of law and ethicist who also had other interests, mainly in logic (his habilitation was on logic, called – following Georg Henrik von Wright - deontic) and in metaphysics. It was he, along with Kamiński, who influenced my decision to transfer from practical to theoretical philosophy. Years after that I returned to ethical issues due to Rev. Tadeusz Styczeń, the disciple and successor of Rev. Karola Wojtyła (who directed the Department of Ethics after Feliks W. Bednarski). Let us add something about the dichotomic di-

vision of philosophy: this division was in a sense paralleled with the Marxist division into dialectical materialism, the so-called diamat, and historical materialism. In 1952 a Faculty of Philosophy was founded in Warsaw and it was practically entirely dedicated to Marxism. I remember that we discussed with them at the time on the philosophical concept of matter and the social role of philosophy.

I wish to state here, a bit ahead of what follows, that the Lublin School is a unique phenomenon that overlaps a certain dominant of Polish civilization and culture. Simplifying, what is, nonetheless, necessary, we call it the (old-)Polish Sarmatian tradition. Whatever that was, in particular and historically, in its development it shimmered with different shades. This dominant overlapped still with the Piast[4] heritage and appeared already in the renaissance (the Golden Age of our statehood and culture). It decisively culminated in the period of baroque that was long with us, and – we may say – underwent later romantic modification, extending itself until the "Young Poland." A breach in this cultural line was made by the Enlightenment and positivism, foreign to Sarmatianism – we shall not delve into details in this reflection. Following this course, including the tragedy of the partitions, insurrections, attempts at organic work, and hence the revival of the nation, we reached the threshold of independence. And here we encounter something for the Polish tradition quite exceptional, in particular when we take into account the features of Sarmatianism (omitting perhaps the cultural heights of the Golden Age and certain intentions of the Polish Enlightenment), namely, the uniqueness of what is nowadays almost routinely called "the Lvov-Warsaw School."

In Polish intellectual Catholicism (it should be: "rational," for when the origin is taken into account, "intellectual" is "intuitive"; in early modernity, as it was stressed in the Lublin School, the meanings of these two terms were reverted) this resulted with a programmatic debate at the National Catholic Institute (NIK), founded by Rev. Konstanty Michalski. That debate was initiated on the occasion of the Philosophical Congress held in Cracow in 1936. The conclusions from this meeting were published in a book with a symptomatic title *Myśl katolicka wobec logiki współczesnej* [Catholic Thought in the Face of Modern Logic] (Poznań, 1937). Jan Łukasiewicz, a leading representative of the Lvov-Warsaw School who openly confessed

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[4]    Dynasty which ruled on the territory of what is now Poland between c. 960-1370. The first king of Poland Bolesław the Brave (crowned in 1025) came from that dynasty. Editor's note.

to Catholicism, was present there and among the polemicists were, among others, Rev. J. Pastuszka. Program manifestos, if I may express myself this way, were presented by Rev. Jan Salamucha, Jan Franciszek Drewnowski, and Fr Innocenty Maria Bocheński (he later used his baptismal name – Józef). The Cracow Circle was then constituted.

The Lvov-Warsaw School, and its catholic echo in the form of the Cracow Circle, was a true explosion of rationalism, of logicalness, exceptional up to the dream of logicism, as we would say today, having in mind later achievements in meta-logic (the inter limitations of formalisms – as it was deftly expressed by Jean Ladrière from the Francophonic Louvain whom I remember well). An explosion of rationality – as we sometimes speak of the explosion of Polish independence in 1918. Is not that a paradoxical concurrence? In the same year our University of the Sacred Heart of Jesus came into existence, founded as the University of Lublin by Rev. Idzi Radziszewski, the last rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy for clergy, where the idea of a university emerged. He was an alumni of Card. Desiré Joseph Mercier at the University of Louvain and a philosopher. What is interesting is that he did not found a philosophical faculty – leaving that for posterity – there was only a philosophy group (later – section) at the Faculty of Humanities.

This was happening in the background of the tragic of culture, of the existential experiences of the Great War, as World War I used to be called, and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia (as well as the Polish-Bolshevik War which broke out later on). The continuation, as one nowadays says, happened later: World War II was started by an attack on Poland and it was another existential experience – for Poland, indeed, a tragic one; after the German occupation, an invasion of Sovietization occurred, on account of which Marxism was politically imposed as the ruling communist ideology, engaging local conformist and not selfless collaborators.

In this cultural and ideological context, especially the attack on the Church, on who/what She serves as an *instrumentum redemptionis* (this term was emphasized by Drewnowski) as well as in the scholarly context, including philosophy and theology, and against the background of the aforementioned Sarmatianism with its links to Polish "folkness" and inclination to emotional tenderness, one must situate another Polish phenomenon, namely, the one called the Lublin Philosophical School.

In its self-description, it is standardly repeated, following Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, that the School has three dimensions in its innovative core. Most of all, it is metaphysics-centeredness (whatever that may mean). For

metaphysics is, in a way, the substantial mainstay of the School due to the settling role of Krąpiec. It was he who mainly set the tone for the School. The School is most often perceived through him and his intellectual disciples (Andrzej Maryniarczyk as well as Piotr Jaroszyński, Henryk Kiereś, and the representatives of the youngest generation are the continuers or heirs of the idea of the School).

The second dimension of the School is its emphasis on methodology – methodologism. It assumes the use of broadly understood logic in philosophy, however, without logicist hopes, "excesses" or delusions (Étienne Gilson described this as "logism"). In the process of the School's maturation, a certain, we would say, noble moderation with respect to the formal requirements for philosophical cognition was formed. This was linked to the conviction that in the case of philosophy – as Krąpiec, in particular, stressed – intuition has a decisive role at its metaphysical foundations (existential judgments and principles as well as transcendentals connected to them). Methodologism during Rev. Iwanicki's rector tenure was not limited only to the Faculty of Philosophy where he lectured on the methodology of philosophy, and Jerzy Kalinowski conducted his memorable meta-philosophical seminar in the 1950s. Rev. Iwanicki founded the Department of Methodology of Sciences and hold the chair. Soon he passed it on to Kamiński who became the main methodologist of the Lublin School and over time also of the entire University (one ought to mention here his activity as an adviser in the field of science studies at the University Library and cooperation with Czesław Zgorzelski within a distinct sort of seminar which I called meta-humanistic). Rev. Rector Iwanicki simply hunted at a University scale for methodological deficiencies, arousing fear in many, similarly as Kamiński did later for many years. He believed that care for methodological standards in didactics and research conditions high quality of philosophy and the university as a whole as well as defends it formally and indisputably from attacks of Marxism which attempted at the time to penetrate the University and stigmatize it as a mainstay of "Catholic backwardness" (at that time communist youth organizations – Związek Młodzieży Polskiej [Union of Polish Youth] and Zrzeszenie Studentów Polskich [Polish Students' Association] – were present at the Catholic University of Lublin, a few students were party members, what shows what times it was. The former rector, Rev. Antoni Słomkowski, the unyielding defender of the University, called its "second founder", suffered in prison at the time). Iwanicki's role as rector is underappreciated. He made a colossal effort with his diplomacy to assure the University's survival in those times of ideological

attacks against it. Very few could have known about his constant contact with the primate, Stefan Wyszyński, on matters concerning the University.

The third dimension, the component of the School's self-description, is its "historicism." I am still referring, in a slightly interpretative way, to a certain common understanding promoted by Krąpiec. This dimension was revealed at the earliest stage, constituting an as-if foundation for the remaining dimensions of the School, penetrating them in one way or another. This was contributed by Stefan Swieżawski. He was an alumnus of the John Casimir University in Lvov. Educated in Kazimierz Twardowski's school, he knew well the Lvov model of philosophizing; he transposed to the Lublin academic community his "didactic regime" and partially his research approach. Twardowski got his students interested also in scholasticism – and that interest he adopted from his master, Franz Brentano. However, the young Swieżawski, neither due to his character nor his passion, was imbued by the analytical approach or certain philosophical minimalism of the Lvov School, not to mention an interest in the applications of logic (formal one in particular) to philosophy which was the driving idea of some of Twardowski's disciples. He instead reoriented his interests, with all the enthusiasm, towards Thomism which in Europe for years had been undergoing a process of revival. One may therefore say that Swieżawski was in a way a natural link between the Lublin School which he co-founded, and the Lvov-Warsaw School from whence he originated. He also brought with him to Lublin the many results of his inquiries in medieval philosophy, including Thomism and in particular – Gilson; he then inspired the others (especially Rev. Marian Kurdziałek). He defended his habilitation during World War II and then again after the war. And when he consulted Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz on employment perspectives, he received the following piece of advice: "Stefan, your place is at the Catholic University of Lublin." Swieżawski once confessed that at first that perspective sickened him. He later acknowledged that his fate turned out to be for the good, especially that he cooperated with Rev. Karol Wojtyła who arrived not long after that from Cracow. Swieżawski also, as it is known, anticipated Wojtyła's papacy.

In these three mentioned dimensions of the Lublin School one should see its distinct novel character, or as we here stress: being a phenomenon – a supplement to its Polish heritage and at the same time in a certain contrast to this heritage. One may add also a fourth dimension, within which the School marked itself also, but this time with reference to that which was already present in the Polish tradition, hence continuing it and developing it – namely, the ethical dimension. This was connected firstly with the

aforementioned F. W. Bednarski, and later, for a long while, with Karol Wojtyła and his school (it was a school within a school), although ethics was a topic of consideration for various representatives of the Lublin School.

The Lublin School, as we can particularly see it today from the perspective of science studies, practically did not have its own institutional and organizational structure. In its beginnings, but also later, it constituted a certain milieu of friends. We call them nowadays the Founding Fathers of the School. It was based on the community of professed ideas which they shared with respect to philosophy in general and its role in culture, and though they differed with regard to their main interests, these, in turn, were mutually complementary. Everything took place at the Faculty of Philosophy which constituted the framework for what, in time, was called the School. It did not have any special formal expression. It took on a shape at the Faculty which was its "vehicle" and in which at a certain period the School dominated.

In other words, the School was based around individualities who gathered disciples around themselves, and that assured its intergenerational continuation. This counteracts the aforementioned organizational imperfections which concerned not only the School but also the Faculty, its structural "vehicle." The philosophical community here described did not have its own journal which would expose and transpose externally its accomplishments, stimulating at the same time its progress. The *Annals of Philosophy* published at the Catholic University of Lublin could not be its sufficient expression because a journal counts when it is at least a quarterly. In those days, obviously, there were no proper external conditions to found such a journal. Some expressed this need particularly fervently, yet ineffectively. In later times this gap was partially filled by *Ethos*, the journal founded thanks to the efforts of Tadeusz Styczeń, the founder of the John Paul II Institute. He wished to celebrate this way his master, who became pope, and to promote his ideas.

As far as the Faculty of Philosophy is considered, one can say that its organizational dendrite was devised well from the start (according to a Louvain scheme?) – sections, then specializations, departments, divisions (consisting of few departments), and workshops which were usually to facilitate the teaching of auxiliary sciences. All of this supported the didactic and library function; the research-scholarly functions awaited to be fulfilled. The Faculty expanded organizationally over time. Three specializations emerged from the section of theoretical philosophy: philosophical-theoretical (mostly philosophical), philosophical-psychological (*de facto* psychological), and

philosophical-natural (*de facto* philosophy of nature with elements of natural sciences). The section of practical philosophy was called the philosophical-social specialization. This philosophicity in the names of the elements of the department's structure suited the Ministry of Higher Education which did not want to allow for four formal divisions (divisions were assigned separate didactic quotas, whereas specializations – were not), suspecting, rightly so, that "divisional" names without the term "philosophy" support "separatist" tendencies of their corresponding structures into new, non-philosophical faculties. *De facto* this was a big branched faculty of philosophical sciences: philosophy proper and sciences historically connected with philosophy that emerged from it as particular sciences. As Kamiński would say – philosophy was supposed to play an integrational, keystone role in it. Unfortunately, this concept was not implemented. The particular disciplines considered here, apart from philosophy, "liberated themselves," founding a new faculty, when only the external conditions enabled such a move. Nevertheless, the concept itself was interesting and is connected with Kamiński's concept of so-called general disciplines: formally or in their content; on a meta-object level or on an object-level. Let us not get into details here. He sketched out this concept while working in the commission – which he headed – dedicated to systematizing the catalog of the University Library. The commission worked during the tenure of the Library's legendary director, Fr Romuald Gustaw, who proposed that task to Kamiński as a part of his effort to modernize the library. General disciplines constitute a natural basis for interdisciplinary research and for the integration of the sciences which are nowadays so greatly differentiating.

On account of that, one should note that the representatives of the School treated philosophy as a discipline that is epistemologically and methodologically autonomous. Thus, one referred thereby to the specificity (or peculiarity, as Kamiński would say) of philosophical cognition as well as to the distinctiveness of its object, for "the object determines the method" is one of the mottos characteristic of the Lublin School (though not every method leads to the intended object of philosophical cognition). Let us add that the dependence of all of the (particular) sciences from philosophy was stressed but not the contrary – in this case, a heuristic dependence was noted. Anyhow, it is a different conception that the one called "philosophizing in the context of the sciences."

I would like to emphasize at this point that what is mentioned in this draft concerns the earlier phase of the development of the Lublin School, when it was starting to gain momentum, so to speak, demonstrating a sort

of enthusiasm which was shared by us, the students. For it was a "spoken" school – some of the communications from lectures, discussions, and conversations resound in my ears till this day. There were not too many possibilities to publish at the time and our masters were still very young (Swieżawski was the eldest). And even later, when publications were growing in numbers, spoken philosophy maintained its significance. Spoken statements were, by default, more spontaneous and daring, more stern, less polished; yet, they expressed the intentions and spirit of the School more sharply and emphatically. Of course, that depended on the personality. It was one case with Swieżawski, Krąpiec, and Kamiński, and another case with the more measured persons: Kalinowski and Wojtyła. By the way, all of them had a terrific sense of humor, demonstrated not only during the "Eutrapelia" shows organized by the students.

Let us return to the Lublin School apprehended in itself. Its manifesto, or rather quasi-manifesto is contained in a collaborative publication of Krąpiec and Kamiński *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics], published by the Learned Society of the Catholic University of Lublin in 1962. The first part of the book was written by Krąpiec (theory), the second by Kamiński (methodology). The whole book was authorized as a collaborative work. It is the basic source material for anyone interested in the Lublin School, also for younger successors of its ideas who inevitably have not witnessed this (meta)philosophical story. It is a manifesto comparable with the aforementioned manifesto of the Cracow Circle.

I used above a fuller description: "The Lublin School of Classical Philosophy," and I used it predominantly in reference to the main figures of this school, its founders, though not only, distinguishing the role of two co-founders of the School who cooperated in the creation of the aforementioned manifesto: Krąpiec and Kamiński. By agreement, I stipulate that a bit.

As far as the "Lublinness" is concerned, I shall not focus on that too much, for there is something which is called *genius loci.* That was the choice of Idzi Radziszewski, who most probably took into consideration the Zamoyski Academy which used to be located nearby. Lublin within the limits of the country borders outlined in 1918 was not, relatively speaking, situated so far to the east. Krąpiec, who came from Podolia, joked that eastern Poland, apart from Lvov, did not have, essentially, any institution of higher education, and it needed such an institution on these vast areas filled with small towns and villages, with magnate estates placed here and

there. Historically Lublin belonged to Lesser Poland, ecclesiastically it was connected to Cracow, as part of the Cracow Archdiocese. It was a city of cloisters. It had some sort of an intellectual tradition. One used to say "Lublin School," but it did spread all over the country (and even beyond), becoming *de facto* a Polish School of Classical Philosophy (this is also stressed by sister Zofia J. Zdybicka).

Its "classicality" still requires a separate reflection. There are adequate publications of the School on this topic. In short, it refers to the ancient Greek *episteme* and its subsequent equivalents, which boils down to philosophy understood maximalistically, as it was described by Władysław Tatarkiewicz, though not only by him. One can speak of various indicators of classicality, but it is pointless to delve into them too much. Among these indicators, one should indicate its certive ("certiveness") and at the same time veridical character, whereas the classical ethics and anthropology are marked by personalism because the notion of a person is fundamental for them. The notions mentioned here are constitutive for the Lublin School which was initiated by a group of friends and at the same time friends of truth. We have a distinct, although at first glance paradoxical connection between respective notions. Yet another issue is how this sentence which flows through the ages, referring to Aristotle's classic *Nicomachean Ethics*: *"Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas*[5]*,"* relates to it. Why is therefore supposed to be some *disiunctim* between the categories of "person" and "truth" (and with a seeming preference for the truth), and not a *iunctim*?

Being aware of the necessity to make certain choices in the course of our deliberations, in which we are forced to omit a lot of things, let us ponder over the input of the distinguished representatives of the School: Krąpiec and Kamiński. They formed a specific tandem, although they differed with regard to the topics on which they focused, the way they comprehended them, not to mention characterological differences. It is indeed hard to discern at times what comes from one thinker and what from the other. They cooperated, but the role of each of them in the School was different. This cooperation, as I mentioned already, had a friendly, barely formalized and institutional character. With all due respect to them (I owe them quite a lot), let us refer to one telling example: they decided that they shall cooperate within the seminars conducted by both of them (as well as the corresponding sections and departments) for the sake of systematical-

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[5]    Plato is my friend, but the truth is a better friend.

ly continuing scholarly activities (connected to didactics, as it tends to be at universities). In short, this was a proposal to continue together with their disciples the program earlier demonstrated in their joint publication *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* mentioned above. I remember a joint meeting dedicated to it which took place in the Division of Logic and Epistemology in the room of the Department of Methodology of Sciences where Rev. Prof. Kamiński's seminars took place on a weekly basis. Unfortunately, this was the first and last meeting. The cooperation continued, yet privately and within two separate seminars.

Undoubtedly, the main personality within the aforementioned tandem, within the entire Lublin School, the Faculty of Philosophy and, indeed, the entire University, was Krąpiec; and the entire School is perceived through the lens of his output. Without aspiring to characterize his accomplishments in their entirety, let us draw attention to certain distinct features. Krąpiec was a passionate metaphysician, and in this role he was as-if a characteristic actor, both in what he claimed and in his personality – there was a certain unity in that. He affected people with his personal charm, even the Podolian accent, he was something of a Sarmatian, one could say – a metaphysical Sarmatian. No wonder that Kamiński, who initially differed in his views from Krąpiec, quickly "converted" to Krąpiec and his metaphysics. He agreed to play a secondary and instrumental with regard to metaphysics role in this tandem, as it would befit a methodologist. Krąpiec cherished ingenuity, and he was creative himself, full of intellectual verve, as if originating from the *Kresy*,[6] which he manifested – whether he liked it or not – when sharing his metaphysical intuitions. And this is how he was perceived. I remember our conversation during a stroll, where I was mainly the listener because in such circumstances he usually spoke in the most interesting, as if in a passing, relaxed manner. "Mister Stanley, I know that I write sketchbooks, but that is the way I am. We have many planishers and carvers among those who call themselves philosophers. Let them handle that someday." The same tone from another memory of mine sounds in the motto placed at the beginning of this article. At the same time, we find in his statements genuine pearls, though not always in writing, because he expressed himself best in front of an auditorium and a supportive one (he rather was not able to debate *ad hoc* with a harsh opponent).

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[6]   The term describes historical eastern borderlands of Poland before World War II, encompassing parts of contemporary Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania. Editor's note.

In his classes, the master's personality was inseparably connected with what he professed. Undoubtedly, he was an authority, despite declaring an anti-authoritarian stance and objectivism by design (in relation to the so-called neutralized point of departure in philosophizing). The stylistic garments of his utterances were far from literary beauty, they were slightly rough. This in a way was supposed to mean that the purpose was not the verbalization but the thing itself. He shared with his listeners the care for the realism of metaphysical cognition. He suggested the proximity of the being itself, and even residing jointly in the being, almost mystical, at limits identifying with it, "co-being" together with the listeners – indeed rather with listeners, less so with readers. In short, together they had to reach for the "existential core of being." Practicing metaphysics in this way had both an individual (personal) and social character. This was cognition with a guide, under a master's supervision. This was constant watching not to abandon the path of realism. While following this path, he was always concerned that the auditorium adequately resonated with the effect of a cognitive tuning-fork and respond with an accordant echo. In other words, his listeners accompanied him on a basis of analogy and transcending, if I may refer to these otherwise profound notions, constitutive for Krąpiec's philosophy. It was characteristic of him that he was able to focus on a selected fragment, term, claim, or a small discursive text and develop it, as he said, into an "entire philosophy-metaphysics"; he knew also how to derive it from those items, of course, not in some standard logical, deductive, or argumentative way, but by appealing to some common intuition to which he directed his listeners. In that he was, one could say, a true (pro)metaphysical positivist. In turn, those who historically were called positivists and had an anti-metaphysical program were, from that point of view, philosophical negativists indeed. For they were incapable of cognizing with reference to metaphysical principles and to operate within the realm of transcendentalizing cognition and transcendentals, that is "ceiling concepts," as Wiktor Wąsik used to say (who characterized the typical approach of Poles as "attached to the soil," empirical, practical, as if eternally positivist; indeed, there was some truth in this idea, also – let us say – due to the Sarmatian heritage's not too high thresholds). By the way, transcendentals are *przewyszniki*, as they were called by Rev. Piotr Semenenko, the most philosophical of the resurrectionist friars.[7]

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[7] See Stanisław Wielgus, "Znaczenie pism księdza Semenenki dla filozofii polskiej," in *Zmartwychwstańcy w dziejach Kościoła i narodu,* ed. Zygmunt Zieliński (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Unia, 1990), 185.

Kamiński was a completely different personality, and his primary interests were also different. One must remember that logic was his point of departure (initially – formal logic). His lectures on logic for the division of practical logic were terrific. I participated in them as a student, and I remember them well. There was even a very good academic script at the time, from 1952, based on them, entitled *Elementy logiki* [Elements of Logic]. Balanced in his character, Kamiński was distinguished by the versatility of his approach in every field ("approach" was one of his favorite terms). He loved teaching and examining. He was fond of being the dean. Everyone was scared of him, but in fact, he was gentle and likable. When he got older, there was an unwritten contract: he tried to be scary, and everyone else pretended that they were terrified – this game played out quite well.[8]

Getting back to Krąpiec and his metaphysics, the mark of which was borne by the entire Lublin Philosophical School in all its dimensions, it is worth mentioning names he employed when characterizing at various moments the philosophy which he preferred. One could then hear at his lectures the term "existential Thomism" or else "Thomistic existentialism" (with the proviso that it does not have much to do with modern existentialism); he sometimes spoke of the philosophy of being as the main philosophical discipline, as the reference point for all the others, and sometimes he

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[8] Stanisław Kamiński is presented in a highly incomplete way in this draft, it does not render the entirety of the role which he played in the "School," also with regards to his external impact. The variety of his interests is amazing. He, essentially, considered himself to be a methodologist of science in general and of philosophy in particular (he took on methodology inspired by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz – Antoni B. Stępień reminded me of that recently). Apart from that, he was a scholar of a science of sciences. Let us recall here that in the methodological "subcommunity" of the Faculty a project of a separate course in science studies emerged and was certified during the tenure of dean Rev. Stanisław Janeczek (with the intent to do research). This idea inspired Paweł Kawalec, but unfortunately, its implementation did not occur. Kawalec organized a special post-graduate course within the Lublin Business School and took on this topic at the Committee of Science Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, cooperating with Urszula Żegleń who originated from the Lublin School. For more on this project as well as on the concept of science studies (with reference to the Polish traditions) see Stanisław Majdański, "Nota o potrzebie uniwersyteckiego naukoznawstwa i nie tylko (z refleksji naukoznawczych)," *Summarium* 36 (2007): 203-210; Stanisław Majdański, "O potrzebie naukoznawstwa – z myślą o rozwoju badań i studiów (w nawiązaniu do polskiej tradycji)," in *Skrypt dla uczestników studiów podyplomowych „Zarządzanie badaniami naukowymi i pracami rozwojowymi w jednostkach naukowych"*, vol. 1, ed. Paweł Kawalec and Stanisław Majdański (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskiej Szkoły Biznesu, 2008), 7-21.

treated it – slightly misleadingly – as a current, a sort of an "-ism" (which bewildered some of the logically inclined students). I myself, slightly later, preferred the name "(general) theory of being," which in a way was accepted in the School over time, instead of "metaphysics" and the aforementioned "philosophy of being."

These were the fifties, the times before the Lublin School took shape in the proper sense of this name, at its foyer, when the fate of the question of how to modernly and at the same time traditionally understand Christian philosophy was at stake (Krąpiec himself avoided that adjective, stating that there are Christian philosophers or philosophy practiced by Christians but not Christian philosophy; he differed from Gilson at that point). There were basically two styles of philosophizing between which to choose: logicizing Thomism, relating to the Cracow Circle (Rev. Salamucha indeed uses the term "new style of Christian philosophy" in this case), the young Kamiński was the proponent of this variation (also Iwanicki and Kalinowski – and they persisted with this approach in a way), and existential Thomism, practiced by Swieżawski and Krąpiec, in the version referring to Gilson and Jacques Maritain.

Ultimately the latter style took hold in the Lublin School, with a certain inclusion, though rather debatable, of the former. In relation to that School, one could also say with slightly greater ease that it constituted a certain "philosophical current," or even an "aspiration" (a term taken from Roman Ingarden's article *Dążenia fenomenologów* [Aspirations of Phenomenologists]). Let us omit other terms and thus characteristics referred to the School's philosophy with the exception of but one, used in the self-description of his philosophy by the postwar Krąpiec (which refers to the main assumptions of the School), namely – "precising Thomism" (he used it during the lecture and seminars in which I participated). This term perhaps sounds misleading because the keynote to give philosophy precision was referred to as the "logicization of philosophy," following the Lvov-Warsaw School and the Cracow Circle. Abroad, this referred, most of all, to the neo-positivist logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and analytical philosophy, especially in the version of the Cambridge School. We symbolically mention only two names: Jan Łukasiewicz and Heinrich Scholz. Another version of the idea of making philosophy precise was linked to phenomenology. Krąpiec's intention was to make Thomism – which had been undergoing a revival – be as close to what Thomas Aquinas claimed as possible, to express his philosophy clearly and precisely, to clean it off the accretions of his commentaries, presenting the authentic original. Krąpiec criticized e.g. Giles of

Rome for "warping and disfiguring Aquinas's thought and transforming the integral parts of the being into separate entities" (so he said). He expressed a similar view with regard to many other commentators. He positively distinguished only a few, e.g. Sylvester from Ferrara. In fact, Krąpiec did not tolerate entirely the term "Thomism," not to mention "neo-Thomism" or "neo-scholasticism." He used to claim, in the spirit of realism and existentialism linked with it, that what metaphysics is about is essentially a cognition of a veridical type (in contrast with the sciences which have a probabilistic-hypothetical character), necessary, real, and at the same time general, in short – about assertions that are grounded in adequate intuitions and certain, about the *episteme*. It is about "deciphering the being itself," as he used to profess with conviction and zest. And Thomas Aquinas? It was he who deciphered the being appropriately – this has to be stressed – and that is why we cherish him so much, following him as our guide. Let us add that this does not mean that there are no initial discernments or hypotheses in metaphysics. Indeed, there are – Krąpiec gave the example of a hypothesis of the particular intellect (*ratio particularis*). Within the Lublin School this topic was considered by Józef Herbut.

As far as the essence of metaphysics is concerned, following Krąpiec's view, one must emphasize that it consists of transcending, or else transcendentalizing, cognition, as he most often formulated that idea; and let us add: referring to the principles. Putting the issue in such a way, one reaches the very core of metaphysics. It seems that this term, used by Andronicus of Rhodes who – as we know – assembled the writings of Aristotle, has not only an editorial-ordering character but also a deep substantial sense. Therefore, one should understand the term "metaphysics" literally because it contains exactly what it is about. It is exactly what the Greek *meta* and Latin *trans* express, hence "metaphysicing" is transcending. Of course, in this case the relation of that *meta-trans* to *physis (*nature) requires a separate reflection. In this matter Immanuel Kant had a kind of proper intuition, repeating that "metaphysics transgresses the boundaries of all possible experience," only that he approached the issue "critically," overly focused on David Hume's skepticism and patterns for the natural sciences. This transgression suggests two things which can generate misunderstandings: the first one, that it purportedly has something to do with transgression in a pejorative sense, that it is a mistake – which would be justified if one considered philosophy according to the same standards as the particular sciences, without indeed transcending them, in fact then remaining in the realm of the sciences; the second one – that it is here, so to say, decided

that it is about "steps", therefore about procedures, discourse, "reason-providing" cognition, reasoning – whereas in metaphysics, at its foundations one prefers "intellectual intuition" (though discoursivizations of intuition and intuitionizations of discourse are possible).

Metaphysics expresses itself – if we still follow Krąpiec's view, though in an interpretative manner – most of all in existential judgments-propositions which, in a way, render the essential-existential structure of the being itself. The being is in fact contingent and unnecessary because in the case of a Divine being "equating of the essence and existence occurs," which is a claim of Thomistic metaphysics. As Krąpiec claims, there is a distinctive connection, on the one hand, between existential judgements-propositions and metaphysical principles, and on the other hand, between those judgements-propositions and the so-called transcendentals. Thus, there is a connection between the transcendentals and principles. There are Krąpiec's representative deliberations on this topic, referring anyway to Jean-Hervé Nicolas. I dealt with these issues when analyzing Krąpiec's claim about the propositional-judgmental character of the transcendentals that are "as-if abbreviations" of corresponding principles.[9] On the other hand, it is also said that they have the status of peculiar notions and that is what generates the problem. It is linked with the impossibility of conceptualizing existence which is "a matter of judgements" that express a specific – metaphysics-creating – intuition of existence.

In Krąpiec's metaphysics, there are certain conceptual clusters (as Antoni B. Stępień would say) as well as some distinctive phrasemes, to which it would be worth drawing attention. It is hard to "unpack" them (as Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik would say), express them analytically. For metaphysics is rather an issue of synthesis, to the point of holism, and because of that, it is highly, even utmostly, contextual. Let us start from such phrases: "metaphysics is the act of thinking with necessary states of being," "metaphysics is constituted by decontradictifying thinking." One could say shortly: decontradictification (culminating in the theodical parts of metaphysics). It is an interesting notion, but it generates a certain question, even in the context

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9     See Stanisław Majdański, *Problemy asercji zdaniowej. Szkice pragmatyczne* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1972), 248; Stanisław Majdański, "O naturze logicznej transcendentaliów w aspekcie pryncypiów ogólnej teorii bytu," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 10, no. 1 (1962): 41-85; Stanisław Majdáńki, "Metafizyka klasyczna: transcendentalia, konwertybilia i reduplikatywy (refleksje meta-metafizyczne)," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 38, no. 2 (2000): 157-180; it would be worth getting back to that problem.

of Krąpiec's other symptomatic assertions. Namely: how is it connected with his critical remarks on essentializing and simultaneously ontologizing philosophies that differ from his metaphysics as a philosophy which has as its object the being in the aspect of its existence and not – essence? He especially condemned in this context idealizing thinkers who, in his view, somehow saw existence in non-contradiction. Yet, non-contradiction included in metaphysical decontradictification would be existentially decisive! Therefore, we would have two types of non-contradiction. Would one of them, as, let us say, a maximized to the limits and metaphysically desired non-contradiction in a way enforce existence? Let us add to that another phrase: "our thinking has a subject-predicative character." One must state here straight away that a philosopher should try to liberate oneself from this inclination, since, according to Krąpiec, existential judgments-propositions insurmountably have a subject-verb structure in their purely metaphysical meaning. Thus, they irreducibly have a *de secundo adiacente* structure, according to the terminology of "traditional logic" (it was not appreciated in the time of emerging modern symbolical logic which enthusiastically gazed at mathematics) and not a *de tertio adiacente* one. Krąpiec in this case referred to Gilson's inquiries, making use also of some linguistic works, although he was far from semioticizing philosophical thinking, that is developing it in the context of language. I tried to draw attention, not always fully aware of that, to this aspect, recalling the "etno-," "etymo-," and "metaphoro-thinking" used by philosophers.

Let us stress here that Krąpiec was not attached to the term "thinking." On the contrary – according to him, one should use the term "cognition." In his view employing this very term-concept in a way brings in a natural manner the philosophizing subject close to the object, in the name of the fundamental indicator of the classicality of philosophy practiced at the School, that is realism constantly emphasized by Krąpiec. Such a tendency was indeed visible in his case, but he was not always consistent with respect to the terminology used unless one takes into account meticulously the context of his deliberations, which at various times placed emphasis on various things. That was the case with other terms, e.g. "rational" and "intellectual," or "intellectuality" and "rationality." Indeed, Krąpiec was at times "sketchbooky," or maybe put in a different way: highly contextual in his metaphysical statements. For instance, he referred to the classical maxim *ens est intelligibile* as the principle of ontic rationality, though otherwise, he demonstrated a radical preference for taking intellectualism as intuition-

ism (cognition as cognition is in its essence source-wise direct – hence, he stated, the "contact" concept of cognition).

In the margin of the above one has to stress that we are observing here – and elsewhere in philosophy – certain perverseness of philosophical concepts (also judgments and discursive arguments) which is not always controllable sufficiently easy. As "perverseness" I understand the phenomenon of the mutability of the meanings of philosophical terms "to the point of contradiction," i.e. a term at a given historical stage has a specific meaning, and then it begins to be used with a meaning entirely or partially opposing to the initial meaning. This refers to the aforementioned opposition and to many others. This concerns also revered "classics of classical philosophy," even Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas (the aforementioned distinction also relates to him).

Let us recall – still from tradition – those characteristic epistemological concepts to which Krąpiec refers in his theory of, not only metaphysical, cognition, namely, *species intelligibilis impressa* and *species intelligibilis expressa*, which he translates respectively as: "cognitive form impressed" and "cognitive form expressed" (cf. *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* [Realism of Human Cognition]). This is an interesting translation, for the Latin word *species* is translated into the word "form" taken without alternation from Latin into Polish, although the two terms have a different etymology, wherein *species* suggests a visual concept of cognition and belongs to the sphere of "*speculabilia.*" This is also important for those who philosophize using the aforementioned "ethno-", "etymo-" and "metaphoro-thinking." Anyway, also the term "cognition" preferred by Krąpiec has this sort of reference, namely, to the "sign" and "meaning"; this is so in all languages, especially Indo-European, as far as the linguistic-philosophical purport is considered. In order to notice that, one does not have to be a relativist or a scientific determinist in the sort of Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, and earlier Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg who referred Aristotelian philosophical categories to the structure of the Greek language. It gives food for thought if philosophizing is the constant return to the "world of primordial meanings," as it was claimed by Martin Heidegger who stressed – as it is known – the philosophical prominence of the Greek and German languages.

When characterizing the Lublin School through the prism of Krąpiec's theses, one should note some of his remarks which did not directly concern metaphysics but rather a theory of culture. He distinguished as the basic realms of culture (and it was generally accepted at the Lublin School): religion, science (including philosophy, though Krąpiec separately discerns it),

morality, and art. This corresponds to four values (although M. A. Krąpiec did not like this term; he preferred the term "good" classically understood and considered the theory of values as an idealistic exanthema), respectively: sanctity, truth, moral good (*bonum honestum*), and beauty. The last value is connected to a corresponding realm of culture called art or is even simply identified with it. We are dealing here with beauty objectively comprehended and taken resultatively, described as *splendor ordinis*. John Paul II transposed this to the order of knowledge (with philosophy and theology): that, indeed, is his *veritatis splendor*. With that in mind, there opens a broader perspective which may be considered as a generalized variant of the classical one. It is thus a certain supplement of that what is claimed about culture, also in the Lublin School. This effect of splendor-radiance, which the values of beauty and truth brings through relevant orders, is manifested also in the other values: good (moral, as *bonum honestum*, and the order coupled with it) and, obviously, sanctity through its corresponding order; in this way it is also about the sphere of morality and religion as the realms of culture. In a way, each of these realms could be considered fundamental and from its perspective one can comprehend the other ones, for instance, the three ones may be grasped from the aspect of science.

Along with culture understood in an objectivized way and as results, we have parallelly culture as activity. For culture means transcending nature, its rationalization-intellectualization, that is perfecting nature, also further perfecting of already existing culture. Therefore, we are here dealing with something of a notion, which we sketched above, constitutive of metaphysics. Religion, as Krąpiec comprehends it, is in the set of these cultural realms treated as the most fundamental part, culminating the others, integrating them, and in a certain way – transcending. Krąpiec considers religion from the perspective of religious cognition which he calls "personal cognition." It is juxtaposed to the "factual cognition" of the sciences (including philosophy and theology). The verbalization of this cognition is quite distinct. Krąpiec claims that religion approaches the sphere of Mystery, and therefore it is essentially forced to use metaphorical language. However, he considers metaphors to be a sort of analogy (metaphysical cognition and its verbalization are also analogical, provided by another type of analogy, namely, by the analogy of proper proportionality, so transcendental, exactly metaphysical). On account of that, there is a need for a clarifying, explaining, and resolving authority and, ultimately, the Authority. Hence the irremovable role of the papacy in the Catholic Church. This concept of authority, ultimately the Divine Authority in its Trinitary dimension, distin-

guishing Christ as the God-man and Redeemer, refers to Peter and every one of his successors who functions in the Church by way of delegation. The thoughts expressed in this paragraph relate to Krąpiec's very interesting, though short, publication entitled *Filozofia w teologii. Czytając encyklikę "Fides et ratio"* [Philosophy in Theology: Reading the Encyclical "Fides et Ratio"] (Lublin: Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 1999).

By the way, "delegated authority" was a term-concept elaborated by Bocheński. Yet, in his thought being an authority is something too close to being an expert, and it does not show a closer connection with the phenomenon of transcending, "transgressing orders" which is distinctive for authorities in, if I may say so, the spirit of scholasticism. Also, his distinction between an epistemic and a deontic authority seems to be too divisive. As if it did not take into consideration the motto of mature scholasticism: *distinguere sed non separare.* This *opposita* constitute rather theoretical *extrema*, beyond the set of "mediate" cases coming here into play, the cases which make some form of a "mixed" authority, what I already suggested earlier. Let us add also that the thing we call a "personal authority" is the first and distinguished argument for an authority conceived as a relation, and that, be it comprehended in one way or another, an authority is an undoubtedly important phenomenon, especially from a practical perspective. The sphere of *praxis* openly demands authorities because of the need for efficient and swift resolutions in action, therefore certain skills of simplification are required, ultimately in terms of binary solutions (I spoke of this once and I was recorded by A. Lekka-Kowalik).

So much of this digression on authority. Also Kamiński, the second of the authorities decisive as far as the profile of the Lublin School is concerned, dealt with the notion of religion (as well as that of morality; in this case he cooperated with Tadeusz Styczeń). He discussed theology also from an epistemological and methodological perspective, and he introduced the concept of religiological studies which was accepted among theologians. Kamiński discerned theology as the "revelationization" of the results of natural (philosophical or scientific) cognition – he spoke of their saturation with data taken from Revelation and theology understood as the "scientization" (mainly "philosophization") of data given in Revelation. The two approaches in a way supplement each other and in practice were known for many centuries. It is worth noting that Kamiński, such a specialist in differentiation and unification of scientific knowledge, did not design, even as a postulate, a theology of science, which would be something imposing itself, but he introduced a theology of religion. This gap was only recently filled in by

Michał Heller, an alumnus of philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin but belonging to the so-called Cracow school of philosophizing (including theological and religious reflection) in the context of the particular sciences, mainly the mathematised natural sciences. Of course, in Kamiński's version as well as that of the Lublin Philosophical School, the notion of a theology of science would have a completely different character.

Kamiński was a versatile thinker – he had many fields of interest which it is impossible to present here. He worked, among others, didactically and scholarly as a historian of logic and in the field of modernizing traditional logic that was sometimes flippantly called philosophical by mathematical logicians, those from the early phase of the enthusiastic development of that discipline (nowadays the situation is slightly different). He concerned himself seriously – still as a young scholar and probably as the first one in Poland – with the logical works of Gottlob Frege. Kamiński's view on the role of symbolic letters and corresponding propositional schemas of traditional logic, starting with Aristotle, was particularly interesting. In general publications and presentations as well as during course lectures he routinely repeated Jan Łukasiewicz's view that these letters constituted a certain novelty, introduced by Aristotle as variables, and that it was his, Aristotle's himself, invention that was in turn uncovered by Łukasiewicz. However, during monograph lectures or high-level presentations (e.g. during those memorable annual conferences on the history of logic which took place in Cracow, organized by Tadeusz Czeżowski, with whom Kamiński cooperated; he cooperated also with Izydora Dąmbska) he assumed a different, more critical, position, expressing various reservations.

These fragmentary recollections and reflections are but shards of soliloquies – unfinished, requiring some sort of supplementation and continuation. Let this be treated as a contribution to the understanding of the phenomenon of the Lublin School, a homage paid to it and an expression of gratitude, especially to its Masters.

It is impossible not to touch – even as a certain *post dictum* – and relate to two issues in order to – figuratively speaking – close with a big arch these deliberations, referring to some trains occurring in them.

First thing – the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy can be understood in a more narrow sense, in its core, in its source, though growing leaven, or else in a broader sense, variously, in reference to its influence and scope. Today we prefer this second view. In a broad sense – many people belonged to the School. These who clearly marked their presence are known and renowned on a national and international scale – one should

list many names that were not even mentioned in this short essay. Some of them went later their own ways, functioning in various milieus, and shaping them. Others, who seemingly have been forgotten, did not make a great career. They usually worked in other fields, sometimes fulfilling their passions in the form of "philosophical volunteering." Yet, they carried on further the concepts of the Lublin School, at times retaining contact with it. Among them, I reminisce about Jan Bardan whose interesting and difficult story I described at length,[10] Rev. Ryszard Śliwiński whose uneasy life story and activity is waiting for its biographer (both of them acquired their PhD in philosophy). An important figure for the milieu of the School was Rev. Andrzej Wawrzyniak who unfortunately did not get to do his PhD,[11] at last Wacław Muzyczka, brought up by the Franciscans, who worked in the health service, a "merciful Samaritan" – did not even graduate philosophical studies, but he was a philosopher by vocation and by passion, who so effectively and creatively participated in discussions that he was taken for a professor.[12] All of them passed away, though I remember them as friends with gratitude.

The second issue concerns one of the two topics touched upon in this article – namely, this rationality which was discussed in particular with reference to the Lvov-Warsaw School and the Cracow Circle, and against the background of that what we described as the Sarmatian tradition of Polish culture. Also in this aspect, the Lublin School made its presence, though perhaps less "logically." Krąpiec, who ultimately determined the intellectual direction that the School assumed, perceived rationality most of all in the being itself; thus, the issue was the rationality of the being itself. Kamiński, however, saw rationality in a specific relation with logic which he called the general formal theory of the rationality of cognition. He claimed that there are three such forms: logical form in its proper sense which is investigated by logic, the method as the object of interests of the methodology of sciences, and language as the research object for semiotics; he added

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[10]   See Stanisław Majdański, "Okolicznościom się nie kłaniał: Jan Bardan (1933-2015) – etyk, uczeń Feliksa W. Bednarskiego i Karola J. Wojtyły," *Summarium* 44 (2015): 27-38.

[11]   See Zofia J. Zdybicka, "Przyjaciel mądrości prawdziwy. Ksiądz infułat Andrzej Wawrzyniak," *Summarium* 42 (2013): 143-150.

[12]   I wrote about him a few words together with Józef Zon, see Stanisław Majdański "Rozmiłowany w mądrości i prawdzie współczesny samarytanin: Wacław Muzyczka (1946-2017)," *Summarium* 46 (2017): 86-95.

sometimes that scientific organizations and institutions constitute the object of practical interests of the science of sciences.

The founder of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy, Rev. J. Pastuszka, during the aforementioned meeting at the Cracow National Catholic Institute, put forward some reservations about the program of logicizing philosophy and theology there promoted. He spoke, among other things, about emotional-intuitive and emotional-affective thinking, which sounded paradoxically, especially for the representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School. This position was criticized – as I remember – by Kamiński who as a logician simply considered it to be inconsistent (lack of respect for the distinction, "a conceptual blunder"). Pastuszka, on the other hand, being a psychologist, considered it as interesting, so to speak, mixed, mental, human activity. He would add in a paper: "Reality is richer than its rational, logistic formalization."[13] This article reports on that meeting on the 26th of September 1936 at the Cracow National Catholic Institute, referring to the materials published after it in the volume *Myśli katolickiej wobec logiki współczesnej* [Catholic Thought in the Face of Modern Logic].

Years went by. And so Krąpiec, who defended in his own way rationality in philosophizing, and not only there, formulated a claim that what is symptomatic for Polish culture (with its Sarmatian traditions, as we can presume) is emotional rationality. The paradox of the phrase is similar to the one in Pastuszka's formulation – after all, he indeed was in dialogue with the Lublin School and, thus, with Kamiński and Krąpiec. This concurrence, noticed years later, is something to think about. Although at a certain time the ideas of the School dominated the Faculty of Philosophy, they were never shared by all and therefore provoked internal disputes which echoed broadly.

We have not mentioned so far that the ideas of the Lublin Philosophical School were part of a greater endeavor. Over time Krąpiec, during his tenure as dean of the Faculty of Philosophy and then the Rector at the Catholic University of Lublin for 13 years (1970-1983), turned more and more towards practical philosophy, towards ethics which was – and in a way still is – a Polish specialty (in this context I think that it was not an accident that John Paul II was also an ethicist!), but also towards the philosophy of law and philosophically inclined political science – at the same time metaphysically deepening it. He was always deeply religiously and patriotically

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[13]    See Józef Pastuszka, "Logistyka a filozofia katolicka," *Prąd* 35 (1938): 274.

engaged. In this respect, he was the intellectual heir of the Dominican Jacek Woroniecki, who was the rector of the Catholic University of Lublin (after Idzi Radziszewski). Both of them represented – succinctly put – a Catholic-national orientation. He was also active in this direction. He gave a famous speech on the independence of Poland in connection to the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of "limited independence" in the presence of Mikhail Gorbachev at the Royal Castle in Warsaw. He always defended his country how he could best, and he preferred to defend Poland mainly through culture, especially moral culture. This is why ethics coupled with an adequate philosophical anthropology is so significant. This is the purpose that the philosophy developed in the spirit of the Lublin School was supposed to serve and indeed did serve; theoretical, but also practical, submerged in an adequate theory (because "the most practical thing is a good theory," as it was said in the Lvov-Warsaw School).

He wished to save in this manner his Fatherland from the growing wave of communization, Sovietization, and philosophy – from Marxism. When one observed his efforts, one could notice a certain continuation and reference to the spirit and exertions of grand Poland from times of yore, still before the 18th century partitions as well as to that from the times of the partition in its struggle to regain its sovereignty, in its aiming at that with one way or another. His choice of weapon was: philosophy.

On this I shall finish my fragmentary outline of the portrait of the Lublin Philosophical School. May these elements of testimony and reflection revive, perhaps slightly subjectively, but with a certain degree of authenticity, the memory of this indeed remarkable phenomenon of philosophical thought in Polish culture.

Mieczysław A. Krąpiec

# What Is Classical Philosophy?*

C lassical Philosophy may be understood: (1) in a historical sense as a philosophy of Greek and Roman antiquity; (2) in an object-related sense as a philosophy determined by both its subject-matter and methods of explanation used; (3) under the aspect of crucial problems-questions-aporias formulated with regard to the surrounding reality, [as a philosophy] which requires from the human being more or less justified answers, intersubjectively sensible and controllable.

1. Philosophy of classical antiquity includes philosophers and thinkers of ancient Greece and Rome from the 6th century before Christ until the 6th century after Christ (the year 529 – closing down Plato's Academy by Justinian the Great). In that period there appeared various systems that attempted to explain reality understood ultimately either monistically or pluralistically, depending on the employed ways of cognizing seen as an *a priori* condition of understanding reality.

And thus, employing a naïve empiricism and making too hasty a generalization on the basis of a real element perceived in reality (Water, Air, Fire, Earth), the Ionian hylozoists – reducing reality to one basic element (Water, Air, Fire, Earth) – reached a monist conception of reality. More-

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over, in generalized elements they noticed indications of religious-mythical events or figures impersonating nature. Radical aprioristic intellectualism of Parmenides and the Eleats as well as of Heraclitus and phronetic intuitionism were at the roots of Parmenides's static monism and Heraclitus's monistic mobilism.

The pluralism of "paths of cognition" saved Plato from a monistic vision of reality, for as a result of accepting noetic, dianoetic, and doxal cognition, he discerned a necessary, general, and immutable sphere of pure ideas, a pluralistic sphere of mathematical beings, and a sphere of individual-material beings that undergo changes. A pluralistic vision of the world (without *a priori* thoughts) allowed Aristotle to overcome the apriorism of his predecessors, to consolidate the realism of conceptual cognition, and to build a rational system of philosophical explanation of the pluralist reality. For the being given in cognition – as plural – can be rationally systematized in ontic categories and can ultimately be explained within a rational conception of scholarly cognition by revealing those elements that constitute reasons for the ontic states in question.

In antiquity, Aristotle's conception of philosophy did not prevail in philosophical cognition because Stoicism and Neoplatonism caused the return to monistic and aprioristic intellectual stances. Christian thinkers of the Greek and Roman antiquity, in turn, chose Platonic threads for demonstrating the rationality of revealed faith. For it seemed that Platonic and Neoplatonic cognitive measures which in explanation start from "top" ontic states resemble more the Revelation which shows that reality comes from God. That is why reading the Holy Bible in the context of Plato's and Plotinus's thoughts (those authors were universally acknowledged) seemed to make the Revelation itself more clear for an educated Christian: a Jew, a Greek, or a Roman. A classical thought of Aristotle was mainly used by logic and by "physical sciences," i.e. that what constituted a philosophy of nature. Metaphysics and natural theology acquired Platonic and Neoplatonic understanding. It manifested itself in [writings] of the Fathers of the Church of the East (especially the School of Alexandria) as well as that of the West (mainly St Augustine).

2. Aristotle's classical philosophy was characterized – and it is still a factor determining the crucial understanding of philosophy – by taking real non-psychic objects for research and by the decontradictifying method of explaining. The object of philosophical explanations in a pluralistic real world – things and persons – is called being. Certainly, in the history of

philosophy there were different understandings of being, for it is not easy to notice something that is common to all entities in the real world. All that is real is being. However, there arises a difficulty in giving an answer to the question: "thanks to what" is something a being? Aristotle correctly claimed that the being is conceived in many ways (*to on pollachos legetai*), but it is a being because of its autonomous, subject-like way of existence in itself, called *ousia* – substance. The autonomous, subject-like way of existence – substance – is a chief category of being, for all what we call a being is either a substance, its coming-into-being or its perishing, its property (accident), or, finally, relations of thought to ways of existing. Thus, for Aristotle and his followers, substance is a fundamental object of metaphysics.

And yet, how should one understand substance? Aristotle distinguished the following understandings of substance: a) a being in itself as an autonomously existing concrete entity *(ousia kyrios – tode ti)*; b) a general concept of substance (to *kathólou*); c) properties constituting a substance itself as an object of cognition through definition (*to ti en éinai*). He also drew attention to substance as a subject (*to hypokéimenon*), and in this sense the matter and the form itself can be called substance.

In the Middle Ages and later periods, Aristotle's distinctions became a specific agent in [creation] of various understandings of metaphysics. A special role was played by Avicenna who, while considering the understanding of the object of Aristotle's metaphysics, noticed that it could be substance-nature. But which understanding of substance-nature can be accepted? Certainly, it cannot be "second" substance-nature (i.e. the universal), for it is only a mental being, not a real one. Neither can the object of metaphysics be "first" substance-nature, i.e. a concrete individual being, as this would wreck any object-related necessary cognition. Thus, the object of metaphysics can only be "the third nature," i.e. such a nature that is just a set of constitutive properties of a given being. For only the nature thus understood is necessary, immutable, and eternal. One cannot reasonably add to it any feature-element, as it would make this absurd. Thus, for a horse (*equus*) the third nature is "horseness" (*equinitas*), on which one cannot say anything more than express it in identity terms: "horseness is just horseness." The "third natures" thus understood constitute objects of the Divine cognition, for they are eternal by themselves. However, when God gives them existence stemming from Him, they become real existing beings. The existence thus understood given to third natures is for those natures a certain accident, not necessarily connected to them. This unnecessary connection of the existence with the third nature determines the so-called being's

contingency. Avicenna's interpretative view was accentuated by two great thinkers of the Middle Ages: Saint Thomas Aquinas and Blessed Duns Scotus. Both featured, although to an uneven degree, Aristotle's metaphysics. The general conception of philosophy as well as that of scholarly cognition became foundations for even more precise philosophical approaches that gave rise to distinct ways of philosophizing of the two thinkers. The philosophical understanding of reality-being specified by St Thomas Aquinas brought a cardinal revolution in the decontradictifying explanation of being as being, i.e. being as really existing. For he made a fundamental shift from the Platonic-Aristotelian understanding of being as a set of constitutive elements (form) to understanding reality as actually existing beings. The being is something concretely determined in itself (thanks to a form) and actually existing. Such a being – as existing – appears to us in philosophical cognition as: a) existing through itself – God; b) existing in itself as if in a subject – substance; c) existing in a certain subject – accident; d) existing in relation to something else – relation. The key to understanding being is the relationship between essence and existence. St Thomas, after William of Auvergne and Albert the Great, rethought the relationship of essence to existence, earlier expressed as the relationship of "the third nature" to existence. St Thomas made a cognitive revolution in philosophy by noticing that the real being is a concrete (not abstract and differently apprehended) content-essence that exists. In a concrete being the existence is the factor – act – thanks to which that being is real, for "being real" means "to exist actually." In any actually existing being there are various ontic potentialities that can be realized in proper existential contexts. The research object of metaphysics is any being as existing, for the task [of metaphysics] is to provide the necessary and ultimate explanation of reality, and not to speculate on non-contradictory configurations of possibilities. Individually existing concrete beings, because of their relational structure (the relation of essence to existence), are analogously one, which excludes any forms of monism and ontic univocity. At the same time, because of the transcendental relations inherent to being, those beings are necessarily connected to the First Being, pure existence, God, who is the chief and primary reality, that is the origin, exemplar, and goal of any really existing being. St Thomas, generally accepting Aristotle's metaphysics, gave it a new sense, thoroughly realistic, deeply rational, and controllable through reference to actually existing beings – reality.

Among philosophically explained real entities, the human as a substantial being is especially difficult to explain. In a Platonic tradition, the human

being appeared as a spiritual substance eternally living, as intellect – *nous* –
after the fall for punishment incarnated into a human body which obstructs
the spirit's life. In an Aristotelian tradition, the human being was seen as
a peculiar animal, capable of rational thinking – *zoon logikon*. St Thomas,
knowing the two traditions very well, made a historically fundamental turn
in the understanding of the human being, correcting essentially the two
hitherto present conceptions. He referred to inner cognitive experience,
lived through by an acting human being, and as the only one in the history
of human thought pointed out that the human being exists through its own
soul which, while existing in itself (being a subject of its existence), gives
[existence] as life to matter that is organized (being formed) to be a human
body. The human soul neither occurs in result of transformations of matter
as Aristotle supposed, nor exists eternally as Plato thought, but it is directly
created by God. For no powers of nature are commensurate for creation
of the soul that transcends the entirety of reality in acts of cognition and
love and that expresses itself humanly in free acts of decision, determining
thereby its own unrepeatable personal face. The human being experiences
oneself as a subject with identity, acting in a biological and psycho-sensual
order as well as in a psycho-spiritual one. The human body, which the hu-
man soul constantly organizes (and disorganizes) for itself, is a necessary
condition for performing any human action. For [the soul] as a substantial
form, although it exists in itself, acts only through the matter of its body,
constantly being formed by it. That is why – despite non-material structures
of cognition and will revealed in personal life – the fact of acting and the
process of acting are accomplished only through one's own body.

The human being itself in its ontic structure as well as various forms
of human actions – as real beings – undergo philosophical interpretation
and decontradictifying explanation which consists in indicating a factor, the
negation of which would be at the same time the negation of an explained
fact. Such a method of philosophical explanation is employed both in [gen-
eral] metaphysics itself and in all its particularized domains, especially those
dedicated to various forms of human activities. In St Thomas's [conception]
one sees the objectively real entity (being as existing) and the clearly de-
termined method as indicating a necessary factor, the negation of which
is a negation of the ontic fact itself cognized in the process of explaining.

The second stream of philosophical explanation of the encountered
reality appears in Blessed Duns Scotus, who, starting from Avicenna's dis-
tinctions of natures, understood differently and controversially – in relation
to St Thomas – the object of metaphysical cognition itself. He claimed that

the so-called third nature distinguished by Avicenna constitutes a proper object of philosophical explanations. However, those natures should be ordered (what Avicenna did not accomplish), for they constitute ontic strata of concrete beings. First, each nature has a mode (*modus*) of existence proper to it. But natures themselves, making up concrete entities, are arranged hierarchically – from a concrete most narrow nature, *haecceitas* of concrete John to the broadest and all-embracing "nature of being." For example, in concrete John (*haecceitas* is an individual nature) we notice more and more general natures: the nature of humanness, the nature of animality, the nature of vegetative life, the nature of bodiness-corpuscularness, the nature of substantiality, and then the final broadest nature of being. The nature of being is initially reached by a single act of our intellect, and at the same time, it is the reason for all cognition, for ultimately everything is founded on the nature of being. The cognitive grasp of the nature of being is done through the simplest univocal concept of being. The concept of being thus understood expresses the inner non-contradiction of being, which is a structure that excludes contradiction from itself. Thus, everything that appears as non-contradictory is a being of some kind. Metaphysical considerations and analyses come down to reducing the analyzed states to the basic concept of being, i.e. non-contradiction. The concept of being thus understood, expressing the nature of being, may be predicated of anything and is common to everything. Being as nature is common both to God and to creatures, with the proviso that the Divine Being is infinite, and the created being – finite.

This possession of the common nature-being is a foundation of human cognition, and especially of metaphysics as the only discipline that has being as its object. In the light of that concept of being everything is cognizable, for everything may be "reduced" to being.

Being as the broadest non-contradictory structure takes into itself natures that determine it: substance, corporeity, vegetativity, animality, humanity, and finally the nature of a human concrete "John" – *haecceitas*. Each of these natures "exists" in a specific way, for its existence is with regard to a nature a mode (*modus*) proportional to it, and there could not be such a nature that would not have its own mode of existence, as [that mode] is contained in a given nature. These ontic natures are the object of cognition and not their existence as a mode of being of those natures. The whole cognitive weight is put on grasping an essence determining the nature of being itself. And this is why it is especially important to apprehend cognitively various classes of the universals that express proper na-

tures determining the nature of being. This is where we might search for origins of the controversy over the universals as cognitive apprehensions of the natures themselves in the being. In nominalism that dispute caused the transformation of metaphysics into epistemology.

It was William Ockham who – in his dispute with the view of Duns Scotus – accentuated only an individual mode of being as real and removed general natures – as *flatus vocis* – from the program of cognition in accordance with the so-called Ockham's razor: "Non sunt multiplicanda entia praeter necessitatem." He understood the generality itself not as an ontic state but as a way of general predication, i.e. applying a sign-name to many objects. With this, he stressed a pragmatic side of language which has expressed itself clearly in analytic philosophy.

Cognitive nominalism became a crucial object of controversy in the late Middle Ages and the scholasticism of the Spanish Renaissance. Emphasizing individuality together with negating any cognition of necessary natures seemed to stress the value of an individual and to indicate the impotency of intellect. That was conducive to accepting theological theses of Protestantism and largely bound nominalism to the Protestant movement.

In the Spanish scholasticism, headed by an outstanding Jesuit philosopher, Francis Suarez, who was in favor of moderate realism in conceptual cognition, one considered Thomism "*ad mentem Suarezii*" (as interpreted by Suarez) obligatory in widely spread Jesuit schools. Yet, this stream deviated substantially from the thought of St Thomas, and it was rather a continuation of John Duns Scotus's solutions. For the real non-identity of essence and existence in the being was not recognized, and as the object of metaphysical research there were taken the necessary natures i.e. ontic natures (Avicenna's "third natures") the existence of which amounts to some ontic modification that in abstract cognition appears differently than in individual-concrete cognition. The epistemological controversy over the universals acquired a metaphysical character: understanding of the structure of being in which an essence necessary in itself (able to exist) became an object of metaphysics. This state of affairs was largely renewed by J. Kleutgen (one of the animators of Vatican Council I), and as "neoscholasticism" it was taught in Church institutions (of course in such "scholasticism" there were various kinds of Thomism).

The cognition of general natures, together with its distinction between "objective concept" (essence as cognized) and "subjective concepts" (a conceptual sign created by intellect) became for Descartes, a clever pupil of the Jesuit college of La Flèche, a good occasion to reject (in accordance

with the "Ockham's razor") useless "doubling" of concepts and to accept only the subjective concept as a "clear and distinct" idea which since then was to become the only object of cognition. Later, in the school of analytic [philosophy], those ideas, as natural signs, were replaced by conventional signs of language itself, subordinated to rules of language games.

It is not then surprising that the philosophical movement after Descartes (G. W. Leibniz, Ch. Wolff, I. Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, Neokantianism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and existentialism) switched to subjective stances that analyze not the really existing world, but only data of consciousness. It was not classical philosophy, as it abandoned the object [of metaphysics] and method of decontradictifying explanation.

Threads of classical philosophy did not disappear, but they survived and were developed in specialized institutions, especially Church ones, where clergy and lay people were able to develop and clarify eternal classical *problématique.*

3. The classical stream of philosophy is characterized by many questions-problems-aporias that force us to [have] answers proportionally justified, intersubjectively reasonable, throughout history made constantly more precise, and objectively – by appealing to reality – verified. Aristotle in Book B of *Metaphysics* pointed out to such aporias-problems which acquire their legitimacy either from the very arrangement of things or from a historical cognitive context. Posing a question-aporia is transformed into diaporesis, i.e. the process of searching for an answer by indicating reasons for and against, and one comes to an "euporia" i.e. finding an answer; this usually gives rise to a new "aporia" (question) originating from that answer. A "diaporetic" system of cognition is a characteristic feature of philosophy that explains – in a justified manner – an objectively existing state of affairs.

Each human being poses questions with some significant philosophical content as soon as one starts manifesting "the use of intellect." This is the period of childhood when we see the occurrence of questions that often get provisional, sometimes flippant answers. However, those questions determine a sequence of intellectual cognition for the whole life. And old, even not precise answers, are already the seed of philosophical explanation, for they make it possible to understand things through noticing justifying reasons. It is an interesting issue that children's questions constitute what Aristotle called aporias.

The question of "what it is" is a question about being, about the reality that appears pluralistic. Such a question implies the pluralistic reality itself

as well as probes into what in that reality distinguishes one being from another and "thanks to what" – why – such a being exists and is separated from other beings, and is something existing in itself. The meaning of that question may be of course elaborated by investigating "in that what is" (being) its elements and "essential" factors, necessary for that being. And [one may do it] under different aspects: holistic (species), partial – potential (genus), or actual (specific difference); one may search for more or less random factors, accidental properties, or features. Thus, the question of "what it is?" may then be broken up – as it has already happened – in accordance with logical suggestions of Porphyry who distinguished categories of linguistic predicabilia (*species*, *genus*, *differentia specifica*, *proprium*, *accidens*). And even if we give a child superfluous answers, they already constitute an instillation of some understanding of being as yet unintelligible for [the child]. The same is the case with other basic questions (also posed by a child who starts using intellect): What is it for? What is it made of? Where did it come from? Who made it? Questions of that sort concern reality that surrounds us, not inner psychic states. It may be easily seen that the listed questions (What is it? Where did it come from? What is it made of? What is it for?) express what Aristotle such a long time ago called four causes: formal, material, efficient, and final. A child, pressured by the states of a cognized thing, asks about being, and does this not accidentally but is directed by the being itself.

The most general questions on being become more and more inquiring and detailed on closer contact with the thing. One poses then questions on properties of a being, its working, or circumstances of existing. We namely ask: "How" a given thing is?; "What" is it like?; "How much" is of it? "With whom, with what" is it?; "Where" and "when" is it?; "Does it act?;" "Does it affect" anything?; "Whose" is it?...

If we look closely at the content of those questions and answers given to them, we easily notice that these questions indeed refer to particular ontic categories of which Aristotle wrote. Chief questions concern the understanding of being itself, mainly substantial one, and particularizing questions – respective ontic categories. Namely, the question of "how" refers to the quality of being; the question of "how much" – to its quantity; the question of "with whom, with what" – to relations; that of "where, when" – place and time; the categories of action and passion are connected with such questions as: is it acting (working)? does it affect anything?; [the question of] "how is it?" is connected to the category of situation (*situs*), and that of "whose?" indicates the category of possession (*habere*).

Those questions, formulated spontaneously by human beings when they begin to use their reason in the search for the understanding of a thing itself and its structure as well as its existential context, constitute the canvas of "perennial philosophy," that is the philosophy in its classical sense. For all questions grow out of the perception of reality which "awakes" questions because a being is not simple but diversely "composed" and requires cognizing relations binding a composed being into a whole really existing. For there is a certain real "reason" that a being exists as one but composed of many elements. This requires cognizing a reason, "why" it is so. Indicating that reason means indicating correlates which remain in relations variously binding, according to a discovered relationship binding "into one".

The question "why" is the essence of "questionness" itself. This is how Aristotle understood it, seeing the knowledge-creative role of the question: *dia ti?* (why so?). An answer is an attempt at revealing such an ontic factor which understandingly justifies and cognitively relieves (by separating being from non-being) the anxiety born from incomprehension of a cognized object-being.

Metaphysics initiated by Aristotle constitutes not only the formulation and justification of questions-aporia, but it is also a foundation of a system of justified answers that have been developed and deepened throughout the ages. Already a child that starts using reason poses important questions about reality – being really existing – and probably each human being constantly repeats these questions, for the desire to cognize being (reality) is still alive and unexpired. That is why in its cognitive origin each human being is a philosopher who tries to understand a "perceived" real thing. And yet, the understanding of a thing might be different: a philosophical one that is ultimate (fundamental), and a proximate one which directly takes into account methods of a certain science. Today the main thing is to understand quantitative relationships, although they concern structures quantitatively measured, that is the category of quantity, the function of which is the rational organization of matter by putting its parts that are mutually outside of one another into an ontic sequence. Thus, posing various questions and searching for rational and justified answers of an ultimate (cardinal) character decide about the classicality of philosophy, its proper understanding, its inextinguishable continuity, and juvenility, just as forever alife is the rational cognition of the world of things and persons.

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Stanisław Kamiński

# On the Nature of Philosophy[*]

The diversity of concepts of philosophy demonstrates how difficult it is to produce a single and adequate definition of philosophy that really corresponds to its content. For its object, its end-purpose, and its method were defined in various ways, not to mention the fact that the very concept of philosophy constitutes an object of philosophical cognition that escapes the ground of a philosophically neutral definition. Most generally speaking, philosophy (*philein*=to love, and *sophia*=wisdom, the love of wisdom) is a domain of investigations into the most profound reasons, structure, and sense of reality, as well as the ultimate conditions of valuable cognition and the basic principles of conduct. A meaningful characterization of philosophy can be therefore obtained not by averaging multiple approaches to it but through elucidation of the positions taken with regard to the relationship between philosophy and other types of knowledge, the diversity and unity of philosophy, and its role in culture.

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# 1. Philosophy and other types of knowledge

Usually, philosophy is compared to common-sense, scientific, and sapiential knowledge. Patterns of their similarities and differences vary, as they depend not only on the type of knowledge taken into consideration but also on the adopted variety of the concept of philosophy.

Most of the time, philosophy is clearly distinguished from common-sense (colloquial) knowledge because 1) it is specialized (having a defined point of view of its object) and *not* applicable to just anything in any respect whatsoever (a multifaceted cognition), 2) it is utterly systematic and explanatory in its character, as opposed to a knowledge that is spontaneous and contains casual information for practical purposes, 3) it is universal in a justified manner and able to problematize itself, as opposed to a knowledge that is hastily generalized and dogmatically incontestable. In some instances, indeed, the term "simpleton philosopher" is applicable, and a few academic varieties of philosophy wish to be methodologically ameliorated continuations of common-sense knowledge (*vide* some classical approaches) or they wish to have it, in the last resort, as their basis (Thomas Reid). More often, however, they break with common sense completely, immersing themselves in idealism or irrationalism.

What is characteristic of philosophy seems to be its principal independence from the sciences, formal and empirical ones alike. In the first case, it is so because philosophy explains not only structures of thought but also that which is deemed truly real. In the second case, it is because philosophy posits far more fundamental and radical questions (it even critically reflects upon its own foundations and all knowledge that there is) and points out the most profound reasons and meaning of all that exists, regardless of the mode of that existence. Science, on the other hand, is unable to determine the existential position of the human being in the universe (Albert Einstein). The range of issues that is most characteristic to philosophy stems predominantly from such an all-encompassing and general-existential approach to the object of inquiries (qualitative and quantitative approaches are but secondary). Philosophy asks, for instance, why does anything exist, if nothing need exist; are there any necessary relations present within all that exists, and if so, what are they; what is the ultimate sense (meaning) of human life; how can one justify in an ultimate manner (i.e., in the ontic order) a hierarchy of basic values. The methodological autonomy of philosophy from the particular sciences does not exclude mutual relation-

ship and influences, both genetic and functional. Philosophy is implied in the foundations (in the so-called "outer basis") of the sciences, and during breakthrough periods it performs heuristic tasks as a proto-science and a source of substantive inspiration [for them]. It can also play the role of a regulative knowledge, one that ultimately underpins the manner in which the cognitive and trans-cognitive value of the sciences is kept in check. The achievements of the sciences, on the other hand, provide philosophy with precious material for the *problématique* of different types of reality to be developed upon. Those links between science and philosophy endured (late Antiquity excluded) until the 18th century, and they were the reason why, back then, philosophy was called the queen of sciences. Later on, science began to influence the very nature of philosophical cognition (it was often believed that it was only through science that one could arrive at [any meaningful] philosophy). Finally, in the scientistic conceptions of philosophy, its dependence on the particular sciences was inflated to such an extent that it was turned into a meta-science, a synthesis or a generalization (or a lexicon) of their developments (they even say that [such a] philosophy turns into scientifically corroborated case for giving up on philosophy). In this approach, the philosophical issues brought about by life itself remain, of course, unsolved. More moderate positions are: 1) to treat philosophy as a critical analysis in which one investigates the epistemological/ontological implications and consequences of generally accepted, scientific facts, and 2) to treat philosophy dialectically—as a kind of knowledge that, on the one hand, provides the sciences with their foundations in terms of worldview, epistemology, and general methodology, while, on the other hand, it is in and of itself a generalization of the results obtained by those very sciences (Marxism).

The relationship between philosophy and wisdom is most simply expressed by the etymology of its name (philosophy as the love of wisdom). In practice, however, both types of cognition were often blended on equal terms, as each of them sought the most profound understanding and justification of the reasons (causes) and the end-purpose of the world, as well as the ultimate, within our human capacity, criteria of valuation (Alexander of Hales maintained that philosophy is *sapientia ut scientia*). From the 17th century onwards, philosophy was separated from wisdom due to the emphasis put on the more theoretical character of the former and the practical (involved) nature of the latter, in accordance with the adage that *sapientia est ordinare*. At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, philosophy sometimes took back the form of sapiential knowledge, whenever it was

identified with worldview or turned into a philosophy of life. Most of the time, however, the relationship between philosophy and wisdom is presented thus: the fullness of metaphysical cognition is the key building-block of the edifice of wisdom, which, in turn, is supposed to be a model and the end-purpose of philosophizing.

## 2. Plurality and unity of philosophy

The plurality of philosophy is made manifest mainly in its diversity with regard to the concepts of philosophy and its particular disciplines. The unity of philosophy, on the other hand, shows through in continuous inquiries (including self-knowledge) into the ultimate principles in a field that is essential for determining and explaining the position of the human being in the world.

The variety of approaches to philosophy as such can be most informatively characterized and arranged in an orderly way when their adopted methods are considered. For the way in which one philosophizes is the [aggregate] function of the end-purpose of this activity, its object, and the sources of cognition one accepts as his or her home base. Apart from the concepts of philosophy having the character of a personal expression, or of an exercise in arranging self-consciousness and self-inducing one's reassurance regarding one's own existence (e.g. Karl Jaspers), instead of being a purely cognitive behavior, the methods are twofold: those that essentially do not depart from scientific methods and those that are peculiar to philosophical cognition.

The first kind can be I. syntheses that are object-oriented (directly concerned with the extra-subjective reality) and either 1) deductive (whether as constructed ontological systems of e.g. Baruch Spinoza, Thomas Hobbes, and Gottfried W. Leibniz, or as logical reconstructions of philosophical theories—e.g. those of Bertrand Russell and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, or as ontological interpretations of certain formalized systems—e.g. those of Heinrich Scholz and Benedict Bornstein) or 2) inductive (whether as universalizations of the data of common experience—e.g. first philosophers, or as extrapolated generalizations of the key scientific theses – e.g. late positivists, Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt, and, partially, Marxists, or as elaborations of the scientific output, aimed at arranging and harmonizing it—e.g. the Encyclopedists),

or II. meta-objective (i.e. focused on cognition) critical analyses that are either 1) epistemological (seeking conditions of valuable cognition) – e.g. John Locke, David Hume, Schlick, and the initial stages of René Descartes' and Immanuel Kant's contributions, or 2) logical-methodological (concerned with language and method of science)—e.g. Condillac, Mill, and Carnap, or 3) semiological (concerned with how expressions work)—e.g. analytical philosophers, philosophers of language, and the structuralists, or, finally, 4) aporetic (concerned with philosophical *problématique* as such)—e.g. the initial stage of philosophizing of Aristotle and the Scholastics, and the main phases of philosophizing of Hartmann and Martin.

Methods that are peculiar to philosophy may allow I. exclusively rational sources and objects of cognition, and then they could be either 1) *aprioric* and speculative, as, e.g., dialectically developed systems of Plato and Georg W. Hegel, or 2) *aposterioric* but then, they could be either (a) object-oriented syntheses (whether as an inductive-deductive procedure—e.g. Aristotle, Christian Wolff, and some Scholastics, or as an inductive-reductive procedure—e.g. Thomas Aquinas, Étienne Gilson, and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec), or b) meta-objective analyses (concerned predominantly with the data of consciousness, experiencing, and expressing oneself with signs—e.g. phenomenological and existentialist-hermeneutic methods, or concerned with the *a priori* conditions for the facts to appear in consciousness—e.g. transcendental methods, or, finally, concerned with the knowledge already established—e.g. Hellenistic interpretations of philosophical systems or interpretations inquiring into the ontological foundations and consequences of generally accepted, scientific facts—e.g. Isaac Newton, Alfred N. Whitehead, some neo-Scholastics and the Frankfurt School), or II. also allow trans-rational sources and objects of cognition, whenever they 1) make significant use of supernatural illumination (e.g. Augustine), extra-intellectual intuition (e.g. Blaise Pascal and Henri Bergson), or religious faith (e.g. fideists), or 2) assume the absurdity of reality (e.g. Jean-Paul Sartre), or, finally, 3) employ the praxist criterion of accepting truths (e.g. Kant as a postulativist and, partially, Marxists).

The diversity of philosophical disciplines was initiated by Aristotle, and gradually increased ever since with their specialization and the emergence of more multi-faceted approaches to the issues incorporated into philosophy. But the diversity of ways in which philosophical disciplines were systematically arranged depended just on preference given to this or that particular discipline or method. Thus, with some simplification, it can be presented as follows.

Almost from the outset, philosophy was divided—as far as the end-purpose of inquiries was concerned—into theoretical (cognition for the sake of cognition) and practical (cognition for practical purposes). According to Aristotle—who left out logic as a mere tool of philosophizing, and took into consideration mainly the level of abstraction of the object of investigations—the first one included the so-called first philosophy (the theory of being in general, and therefore a theory based on the $3^{rd}$ level of abstraction) and natural philosophy (the theory of reality approached at the $1^{st}$ level of abstraction). The second one included ethics (the theory of conduct) and *poietic* knowledge (the theory of producing things). In the Platonic-Stoic tradition, this division was simplified down to a triple set: logic (the inquiry into the ultimate criterion of truth), physics (the inquiry into the ultimate cause of phenomena), and ethics (the inquiry into the ultimate source of happiness). In the $12^{th}$ and $13^{th}$ centuries, the division of philosophy proposed by the Stagirite was universally reinstated (with a few minor modifications) but later on, the theory of being (metaphysics) stopped being distinguished as the fundamental one, while the theory of cognition and language, as well as ethics, were attracting the most attention. In the Renaissance period, the main emphasis was put on ethics, and only then on natural philosophy and epistemology. In the $17^{th}$ century, the role of metaphysics in philosophy was revived, but the character of philosophy changed. The most important modification of the division of theoretical philosophy was introduced by Descartes, who had metaphysical issues preceded by his solution of the problem of valuable cognition. Apart from that, nobody came up with a new design for the arrangement of philosophical disciplines, as the theoretical ones were not being developed. Among continuators of Aristotelianism, the typology proposed by Christian Wolff was given an exceptional and sustained support. In the theoretical group, bearing in mind the methodological affinity of principles, he distinguished rational and real philosophy (metaphysics). The first consisted of formal and applied logic; the other was divided into general (i.e. ontology) and particular (natural theology, psychology, and cosmology). Practical philosophy, according to him, comprised of ethics, politics, and economics (with the courses in natural law split between these three). In the $19^{th}$ century, metaphysics was usually discarded, while the range of particular philosophical issues was substantially expanded and new, specialized philosophical disciplines began to form under the influence of progress made in the broadly conceived humanities. This period marked the emergence of the modern history of philosophy and the philosophy of history, as well as the gradual

rise of axiology, aesthetics, philosophy of culture, social philosophy, political philosophy, the philosophy of law and state, the philosophy of economics, and the philosophy of technology. Not every discipline was approached and emphasized equally, and their order depended on the methodological concept and scope assigned to philosophy. Philosophical disciplines, when apprehended in full and in line with tradition, are usually grouped in three divisions: the theory of cognition (and epistemology), the theory of being, and the theory of value of actions and products. The history of philosophy is usually placed in meta-philosophy. The most commonly held opinion, however, is that disintegration of philosophy goes against its very nature, and thus, when striving for unity, one or two of these divisions are being given preference, and what is left of the philosophical *problématique* is reduced to them. On this ground, we are able to discern *types* of philosophy. They are epistemological and metaphysical (ontological) or epistemological-ontological and epistemological-axiological. On top of that, the semiological type is sometimes distinguished.

The order of philosophical disciplines that is closest to classical philosophy—and at the same time possesses the best unifying qualities—appears to be the one belonging to the metaphysical type [of philosophizing]. If philosophy is to be an autonomous (and specialized), rational cognition of the real world, explaining it in an ultimate manner in the aspect of existence, the entire *problématique* which is, by tradition, bound with philosophy, can be distributed, as a consequence, between: 1) meta-philosophical disciplines (the history of philosophy, the theory of philosophical cognition, the methodology of philosophy, philosophical didactics, etc.) and 2) the theory of being, divided into a) general metaphysics (encompassing the inquiries into all being and indicating the ultimate reason of being—the Absolute/God) and b) particular metaphysics, inquiring into the ultimate principles of the main types of beings, that is, the natural world and the human being, as well as the actions and products of the latter. General metaphysics and the philosophy of nature (philosophical cosmology) constitute as it were an indispensable introduction to the philosophy of human being (philosophical anthropology), which, in turn, should be necessarily completed by the philosophy of conduct, which is ethics, social philosophy (with its extensions: the philosophy of politics, the philosophy of law and state, the philosophy of economics), the philosophy of culture (religion, art, science, language, technology), and the philosophy of history. The unity of philosophical cognition is ultimately reassured by the ontic structure of the human being and its existential position within the universum of [really existing] beings.

Currently, not every one of the above-mentioned disciplines is equally developed. The reasons for it are not only various preferences with regard to the tradition of philosophizing but also diverse intellectual fashions followed by particular philosophical milieus. However, certain disciplines, traditionally elevated to the status of fundamental ones, have not been given a prominent place. The theory of cognition was splintered, in spite of many authors upholding it as the starting point of philosophical reasoning, in which a fully non-dogmatic knowledge of the value of human cognition can be gained. The opponents of this position, referring to the testimony given by the history of philosophy, call this critical stance an ostensible one, as it provides only slim chances for the successful completion of a fully non-dogmatic theory of cognition that would, in addition, get rid of the *petitio principii* fallacy in justifying the realism of cognition. Conscious awareness of being is no more basic and reliable than being itself. In order to assure that criticism is upheld, it suffices to examine thoroughly the validity of philosophical cognition at the meta-philosophical level (just like scientific cognition is scrutinized in meta-science), and then, demonstrate the ultimate principles of valuable cognition in the philosophy of human actions and products. In this approach, axiology, so fashionable these days, is not distinguished as a separate discipline, for the general theory of absolute values is contained within the boundaries of general metaphysics. And it is so, because value is but a relative quality of being (relative, as it relates to personal acts). The issues of particular types of values, in turn, can be resolved in the disciplines of particular metaphysics. As is apparent from the above, this order of disciplines covers uniformly the entire philosophical *problématique*. The unifying factor is the way of explaining (*obiectum formale quo*) which is accomplished in its final stage by indicating the principles of being as being ("[...] sine [principiis metaphysicae][1] completa cognitio de his, quae sunt propria alicui generi vel speciei, haberi non possit"). The differentiating principle of philosophical disciplines, on the other hand, consists in different types of data to be explained, given at

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[1] The quote is not literal. Kamiński substituted "principiis metaphysicae" for the Latin pronoun *his*. Thomas says (when discussing briefly metaphysics and its principles in the Prologue): "sine his" ("without them"). Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, trans. by John P. Rowan (Chicago: Regnery, 1961), proemium. Stable URL: http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/metaphysics/liber1, accessed 6/1, 2019. Translator's remark.

the point of departure ("secundum diversa rerum genera diversae partes philosophiae inveniuntur[2]").

The issue of the unity of philosophy manifests itself not only because of the variety of philosophical disciplines (the horizontal aspect), but even more in relation to the diversity of concepts of philosophy that accumulated throughout history (the vertical aspect). For it is hard to see, when the mosaic of various currents, schools, and systems that mutually invalidate themselves is beheld, a clear picture of philosophy (*perennis quaedam philosophie*—Leibniz). Someone said that philosophical systems are born with time, and, with time, are gone because time itself is the mode of existence of a philosophical system. Still, however, attempts were made to point out some unifying *moments* of this diversity. First of all, the constancy of the fundamental range of issues is emphasized. They are being reformulated ever anew, and the answers to them change as in a kaleidoscope, but analogically, the fundamental questions regarding the ultimate reasons/ causes of reality, especially the human being and its actions, remain the same. This is because philosophical issues arise from human life (from intellectual life and life's crucial moments in particular) and from the history of philosophy (from the unity of philosophical experience, as Gilson used to say), and it is only their precise formulation that occurs within a particular philosophical theory or cultural setting. The unchangeable character of human nature and its cognitive goals (seeking the most profound and most certain, objective truth) guarantees therefore the "perennial" nature of basic philosophical issues, albeit it allows for a variety of philosophical doctrines due to the changing circumstances of life. The same can also be expressed by stating that the unity of philosophy dwells upon the enduring quality of that which is worth giving a thought, regardless of what particular way of thinking it might be. This unity is also felt in the identity of basic terms, regardless of their changing meanings.

So, how is the progress of philosophical cognition possible? Above all, it must not be overlooked that standards (criteria) of progress in philosophy are different from those in the particular sciences. The latter are being developed, excluding a few revolutions, in a more continuous, linear, and cumulative way, especially with regard to the content of the acquired knowledge. In philosophy, on the other hand, progress lies not in consecutive elimination of problems/issues but rather in discovering and refining

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[2]    S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Summa contra gentiles*, cura et studio Ceslai Pera (Taurini: Marietti, 1961), lib. II, cap. 4.

the adequate approaches to (or aspects of) reality (i.e. approaches that are relevant for solving basic questions), as well as in an increasingly strong awareness of the presuppositions, conditions, and consequences of adopting certain positions. Also, philosophy undergoes a growth whenever it posits and solves its issues in a methodologically improved manner, especially with regard to the lines of argumentation. This, however, does not mean that philosophy should limit itself to meta-philosophical investigations only, and for their own sake. Occasionally, it is said that philosophical progress is a spiral movement, as essentially the same issues appear in ever new light due to the growing amount of the initial information concerning the world, and the improvement of methods and investigative skills. Without denying this view, one should adopt a more relevant test for progress in philosophy. It consists in assessing whether a new stage of development comes closer to the cognitive intentions of a wisdom-seeker (and thus, closer to the end-purpose of philosophizing) or not.

## 3. The role of philosophy in culture

This role is mainly visible in the cognitive plane. The most profound and substantively accurate cognition of the world and the hierarchy of values is indispensible for a proper, human, culture-forming activity. Philosophy should serve as a guide in this endeavor, as it indicates and ultimately justifies, in the ontic order, why one should prefer certain value-forming behaviors, and uniformly solves issues outside the scope of particular domains of culture (religion, morality, science, and art). Finally, it also provides the means of understanding the transformations of culture, together with the criteria of evaluation of cultural achievements. Philosophy is therefore self-consciousness, as it were, of culture itself. It permeates culture but is not reducible to any of its domains, merging them—through theory—in ways which enable human beings to perfect themselves in a harmonious and complete manner. Human beings are creators of culture but they themselves are also being formed by it. And for this reason, philosophy should contribute to the personalistic character of culture, that is, demonstrate in which way culture can be worthy of human beings and serve their development the best. Such auxiliary [serving, or ministerial] functions of philosophy with regard to culture are nothing else but service to humanity

(philosophy satisfies the most profound intellectual aspirations of human beings). And this is exactly why cultural crises are so closely connected with crises of philosophy and the deterioration of respect for human dignity.

Therefore, in order for philosophy to be able to perform the aforementioned functions, and perform them adequately to the personal dignity [value] of human beings and their development needs (that is, shortly, to give culture its deepest and the most firmly justified cognitive foundations that would be, and at the same time, substantively accurate), it needs to show suitable hallmarks. They are summarized in the following list of what philosophical cognition should be like: 1) It should be autonomous, that is, methodologically independent from other types of knowledge, and having a separate object, end-purpose, and, as a consequence, a separate method (that does not have to be different in its elements from the scientific one). The point here is not the state of an absolute lack of presuppositions, but a critical approach and lack of prejudice towards the initial amount of knowledge (e.g. the intelligibility of reality is among the assumptions made). 2) It should be realistic, that is, concerned with reality that exists independently from cognition. For this reason, the object-oriented point of departure is adopted, as opposed to initiating philosophy from reflection upon the content of consciousness or dynamic cognitive acts, or from the analysis and interpretation of language. 3) It should be specialized but universally valid, that is, concerned with all that really exists (transcending categorial limits) but, ultimately, valid solely in a certain aspect—that of the ontic structure ("being as being"). And for this reason, the analogical-transcendental language is used. 4) It should be rational, that is, accepting statements based exclusively on inter-subjectively checkable experience or intellectual obviousness, and obtained as a result of applying (to this type of data) methodological principles in such an extent as it is feasible. [In order to accomplish this,] genetic empiricism, gnosiological intellectualism, and methodological rationalism are adopted. 5) It should be both theoretical and sapiential, that is, explaining reality in light of the ultimate (in the order of existence) reasons and [personally] engaging (having learned what is right and precious, the cognizing one should not evade the resulting obligations). 6) It should be necessary in its character, i.e. providing necessary truths in essential matters. This is founded on facts that a) at the starting point the so-called particular intellect apprehends, in an indubitable manner (because it does so without the agency of any signs), a concrete, existing content, while intellectual intuition apprehends with objective obviousness the necessary, basic relations in states of things, allowing these apprehensions to be con-

trolled on their language-side as analytical judgments, and b) the applied reasoning procedures are reliable (deduction or—in the case of pointing out the only reason that renders (in the ontic order) some state of things contradiction-free—reduction).

Content-wise, such a philosophy features ontological pluralism (owing to the doctrine that contingent beings are composed of matter and form), substantiality and dynamism of reality (owing to the composition of contingent beings out of potency and act), and also theism (either internally justified by the composition of being out of essence and existence—two factors that are different from each other in real terms—or based upon the consistent explanation of contingent being by means of the metaphysical principle of causality).

*Translated by Maciej B. Stępień*

# Preface
# to the Bibliography

As we have emphasized in the "Preface," this book is supposed to serve as a source for research on the Lublin Philosophical School. Hence, we have prepared the following arrangement of the bibliography: part 1 lists to publications which were referred to by the authors of the articles included in this volume. If the authors referred to various editions of the same work, then they were included into one point in order not to create a separate bibliographical position for each of the edition. The decision to prepare one bibliography, instead of adding one after every article, was dictated by the fact that the authors often referred to the same publications in their works. Such an arrangement has yet another advantage: it allows the reader – as-if at a glance – to see what literature those writing about the Lublin School of Philosophy refer to. In the English version of the book, when available, the editors adjusted references by using English translations of quoted works, and those translated works are listed in the bibliography. This especially concerns works of Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Karol Wojtyła, and Stanisław Kamiński. Three two-language volumes of the latter thinker's works were recently published by the Polish Society of Thomas Aquinas. They are listed as separate item in part 1.

Part 2 supplements the literature used in the texts and enumerates the selected works on the Lublin Philosophical School and its representatives, in order for those who are interested to have a starting point for further research. In the case of Karol Wojtyła, due to the multitude of texts, the

works enumerated – apart from a few exceptions – were written by the representatives of the Lublin School before cardinal Wojtyła was appointed as the Bishop of Rome. The collected literature is supposed to show that philosophers from the Lublin School reviewed and commented each other's works – and this is carried on by subsequent generations of the School – as well as that their views were discussed in Poland and abroad. The Bibliography is appended by part 3: a list of websites dedicated to the Lublin School, on some of them one can find the biographical notes of the representatives of the School, the complete bibliographies of their works as well as conferences dedicated to them or the School as a whole.

*Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik and Paweł Gondek*

Tomasz Łach

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## Part 3: Websites about The Lublin Philosophical School:

http://www.philosophy.kul.pl/
> The website in english dedicated to current events and projects conducted by employees of the Faculty of Philosophy of KUL. It contains information on the studies, history and tradition of the faculty, information on current research and contact information.

http://sapientia.kul.pl/
> The website was realized as part of the project "Pomniki polskiej myśli filozoficznej, teologicznej i społecznej XX i XXI wieku," the aim of which is to develop and share the achievements of the most outstanding representatives of the Lublin philosophical school and those researchers who were associated in various ways in the post-war period (from 1946 ) with the Faculty of Philosophy at KUL.

http://dlibra.kul.pl/dlibra
> Digital library of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. It contains digitized publications of representatives of the Lublin Philosophical School. Most are available in the public domain.

https://www.kul.pl/lubelska–szkola–filozofii–klasycznej,13032.html
> The website of the Faculty of Philosophy of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin with the Fr. Professor Janeczek's text about the Lublin Philosophical School.

http://sapiencjokracja.pl
> The website contains information on the Lublin Philosophical School, selected articles, and texts of the next generation of school members.

https://www.kul.pl/ks–prof–dr–hab–stanislaw–kaminski,14285.html
> Website dedicated to Fr. Professor Stanisław Kaminski. It contains biographical information and a bibliography of his works.

http://www.ptta.pl/krapiec/

Website dedicated to Fr. Prof. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec. It contains biographical information, a bibliography of his works, lecture records, selected texts, studies, memories and a photo gallery. Also available in English.

https://www.kul.pl/karol–wojtyla–sw–jan–pawel–ii,16065.html

Website devoted to Karol Wojtyla / John Paul II, founded by the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. It contains a complete set of biographical and bibliographic information, photo galleries, a calendar, a list of theses.

http://www.bu.kul.pl/stefan–swiezawski–1907–2004–sylwetka,art_11226.html

Website dedicated to Prof. S. Swieżawski. Realized in the website of the KUL University Library, it contains biographical information and a short presentation of selected publications.

https://www.kul.pl/in–memoriam,13829.html

Website of the Faculty of Philosophy of KUL. It contains biographical information, a list of publications, photo galleries and other information about the deceased authors, co-authors and students of the Lublin Philosophical School, as well as about selected people associated with the Faculty of Philosophy of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.

https://www.kul.pl/nasi–mistrzowie,15588.html

Website of the Faculty of Philosophy of KUL. It contains biographical information, a list of publications, photo galleries and other information about students of the Lublin Philosophical School as well as about retired employees of the Faculty of Philosophy of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.

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# The Lublin Philosophical School in Photos

Employees of the Faculty of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin (1950). Seated from the left: Rev. S. Adamczyk, T. Rylska, Rev. M. Żywczyńska, C. Strzeszewski (Vice Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin), Rev. A. Słomkowski (Rector of the Catholic University of Lublin), Rev. T. Wilczyński, Fr F. Bednarski OP. Standing from the left: S. Kunowski, S. Swieżawski, Z. Plewicka, Rev. S. Kamiński, Rev. A. Korcik, J. Kalinowski



Employees of the Theoretical Philosophy Specialization (1968). Seated from the left: Rev. F. Tokarz, Rev. A. Korcik, Rev. S. Kamiński, Fr M.A. Krąpiec OP, Sister Z.J. Zdybicka, Rev. M. Kurdziałek. Standing from the left: Rev. A. Wawrzyniak, S. Majdański, J. Czerkawski., Rev. C. Wojtkiewicz, E. Wolicka, A.B. Stępień, K. Wójcik, M. Gogacz

Jubilee commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin. Granting the honorary doctorate to Prof. W. Tatarkiewicz (March 7, 1976)



Staff discussions at the Theoretical Philosophy Specialization: From the left: Rev. C. Wojt-kiewicz, K. Wójcik, Sister Z. Zdybicka, A.B. Stępień, S. Majdański (standing), Rev. F. Tokarz, M. Gogacz (standing), Rev. S. Kamiński, J. Czerkawski (standing), A. Wawrzyniak, E. Wolicka, Fr M.A. Krąpiec OP

Employees and students of the Faculty of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin (1970s)



In a corridor at the Catholic University of Lublin (1974). From the left: Fr M.A. Krąpiec, Rev. Abp. Karol Wojtyła, Rev. S. Kamiński

Employees and students of the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin (1968)

In the courtyard at the Catholic University of Lublin (1974). From the left: Fr M.A. Krąpiec OP, S. Majdański, Rev. Abp. Karol Wojtyła, J. Gałkowski



Editors and contributors to the Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii [Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy] (2006)