

Denmark in European Union – Danish Attitudes towards European Cooperation

1. Introduction

Among the countries which are members of the European Union, Denmark occupies a special position. The status of the constitutional monarchy as an expression of a rather specific approach to integration is the subject of many disputes and discussions. Since the time when this small country, its population having an insignificant influence, expressed its readiness to join the European structures in the early 60's, its route towards integration has been characterised by a dynamic and changeable course. This study deals with the issue of the „Danish-specific” understanding of integration, as well as with the scope of transformations within Danish policy concerning the European Communities. The aim of the authors of this study has been to show the complexity of the issue of a conservative policy in relation to the European Union as an integrative group, which, especially in the context of the recent events, can prove useful for Poland. Therefore, the issue/chronological method has been applied.

The study includes a description of the actual state of the last half-century, starting from the application by the Danish for the membership of the EEC in 1961, to changes in Danish foreign policy, being a simple consequence of voting decisions of its society. The present analysis consists of several parts incorporated in the main course of considerations. Thus, the study presents the factors which influence the specificity and the essence of the Danish approach to European issues, after which the difficulties are briefly characterised, followed by the main Danish stages of towards the united Europe. After that, attempts to overcome the difficulties are described, together with the main elements of this integration model, which was especially influenced by the Danish Presidency in 2002. The analysis closes with considerations of the possibility of acquiring new settlements by Denmark in the form of the Treaty of Lisbon.

The present study is de facto of a pioneer nature, and the issue has not been duly recognised in the area of Polish knowledge. Therefore the preparation of

the study was based on the available literature, especially the monumental work entitled „Community Law and European Integration” by professor Ziemowit Jacek Pietraś, as well as „The European Parliament” by Piotr Tosiek, addressing the important issue of the dynamic growth of this body in relation to other institutions of the European Union. The study was also based on a few monographic studies by Joanna Berlińska and Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak concerning the integration of Denmark with European structures. The publications by Marian Grzybowski devoted to the legal systems of the Scandinavian countries, and handbooks by Rafał Matera, as well as the lexicon of European integration edited by Janusz Ruskowski were also helpful, inter alia, for the purpose of clarifying terminological ambiguities.

2. First Steps towards the EEC

The love of their country goes back to the ancient times. When deciding to join Europe, neither the Danes themselves nor Europe itself probably realised how tough and challenging Denmark's way to the European Community would be, and how difficult it would come to maintain this 'marriage'. Denmark filed its application for membership of the EEC in 1961, together with Great Britain, Ireland and Norway¹. A specific understanding of the relationship of Denmark with the politics of Great Britain was possible to notice back then. These connections were reflected in nearly every issue concerning affiliation to European economic structures – for example Denmark made its accession dependent on the membership of Great Britain in Europe². The hardening Denmark's position even at that stage seemed surprising to observers – its parliament passed a resolution declaring that Denmark would not join EEC without Great Britain³. The negotiations concerning the potential membership of Denmark in European structures were led simultaneously with the negotiations of Great Britain and Ireland.

The rejection of Great Britain's candidacy in 1963 blocked the Danish application as well. Another attempt by Denmark to join the Community in 1967 ended in fiasco, and only the negotiations for Denmark's accession to the EEC started during the rule of the liberal Hilmar Baunsgaard (1968-71) were successful. This was possible due to the change in the position of France, as well as the forming of

1 E. Maziarz, *Kontynent potęgi. Powstanie i rozwój Unii Europejskiej na tle globalnej równowagi sił*, Warszawa 1999, p. 23; J. D. Medrano, *Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom*, Princeton 2003.

2 J. Sevaldsen, *British images on Denmark*, „Angle” 1993, No. 3, pp. 25-46.; J. Sevaldsen, *The anglicizing of the North: the case of Denmark*, „History of European” 1995, No. 1-3, pp. 431-437.

3 A. Czubiński, *Historia powszechna XX wieku*, Poznań 2003, p. 628.

a coalition of radicals with liberals in Denmark itself – unusual for those times⁴. Previous social democratic governments were not willing to cooperate with the countries of the six, as they saw in them a threat to the idea of a „country of prosperity”. Paradoxically, it was the social democrats sceptical about the integration process who persuaded its society to join the EEC. In the referendum of 1972, 63.0% of citizens voted for accession to the European Community⁵.

3. Scepticism and Conservatism towards Integration Process

Danish scepticism and conservatism towards integration processes could be explained by the use of the theory of small countries in international relations. According to this theory, small countries are those which do not have the necessary potential, and are dependent on the said international structures, and have a limited possibility to influence their structure⁶. At present, in the European Union, the following countries can be classified according to this model of integration: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia. In the literature on this subject several concepts governing the policy of a country are mentioned, e.g. the policy of isolation, the policy of reluctant integration, of balanced and optimal integration, of dominating integration and alternative integration. Depending on the approach taken by decision-makers, the approach of a country to integration issues may vary. Taking into consideration patriotism, which is strongly established in Denmark, in radical cases taking the form of nationalism, respect for its history and language⁷, as well as the common sense of superiority over other nations, it can be assumed that the basis of the Danish policy in relation to integration processes is reluctant integration, comprising conditional accession into an integrated group, with simultaneous avoidance of unfavourable settlements, as well as the policy of balanced and optimal integration, i.e. of minimising unfavourable settlements and simulta-

4 S. Stefański, *Polityka zagraniczna Danii w latach 1945–1978*, Warszawa 1979, pp. 74–81.

5 A. Czekaj-Dancewicz, *Relacje duńskiego parlamentu z rządem w sprawach europejskich*, „Przegląd Sejmowy” 2006, No. 3 (74), p. 60.

6 M. Kelstrup, *Small States and European Political Integration* [in:] *The Nordic Countries and the European Community*, ed. by T. Tiilikainen, I.D. Petersen, Copenhagen 1993, p. 153; M. Paul, *Negotiating in the European Union: Comparing perceptions of EU Negotiators in small member states*, „Group Decision and Negotiation” 1997, No. 5, p. 468.

7 K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, *Państwa nordyckie a Unia Europejska*, Warszawa 2007, pp. 10–11; M. Horspool, *Over the rainbow: Languages and law in the future of the European Union*, „Futures” 2006, No. 38, p. 160; J. Blom-Hansen, *Organized interests and the state: A disintegrating relationship? Evidence from Denmark*, „European Journal of Political Research” 2001, No. 39, p. 392.

neously attempting to influence the formation of the Community's policies⁸. In radical cases the Danish decision-makers also presented the policy of alternative integration, i.e. heading towards membership in an alternative group or system. In Danish political thought and in the decision-maker's practice the hard approach dominates, which, depending on one's point of view, can be assessed as realistic or nationalistic.

4. Foreign Policy and Sovereignty Issues

The principal reason for countries such as Denmark being reluctant to broad cooperation in the area of foreign policy is the fear of losing sovereignty, which here is defined rather as the sole concept of the country's sovereignty. In the case of such a small country the issue of the loss of sovereignty is a matter of utmost importance as it is almost a hereditary trait of its society. Denmark was always a country with decentralised power, and some of its regions, such as Greenland or the Faroe Islands, enjoyed a great deal of autonomy⁹. However, sovereignty in the internal sense means that only the state authorities have the power to make laws, as the supreme body, superior to other bodies functioning in society. In the case of any integrating structure such as the European Union, one can hardly speak of this kind of sovereignty¹⁰. Member states do not enjoy unrestricted discretionary legislative powers, as is significantly reflected in how the internal affairs are regulated. This arises from the decisions of the European Court of Justice, which stipulate the precedence of Community law over the national law, also at the constitutional level. The decision-making process in the Community raises serious objections within Danish society. In the opinion of Danes, the EU-specific decision-making pattern is not transparent enough. They also disapprove of talks conducted behind closed doors, though they concern all Europeans¹¹. Therefore, looking at sovereignty from the perspective of complete independence and autonomous development of law and policies has become obsolete, and contemporary sovereignty stands for the right vested in a given country to decide about its own future.

A similar viewpoint is taken by Danes as regards the most recent integration processes, especially their attitude towards evolution of the role played by the European Parliament, in which Denmark has fourteen representatives¹².

8 J. Berlińska, *Ile Danii w Europie*, Toruń 2004, pp. 11-13.

9 See also: R. Matera, *Stopień integracji Danii z Unią Europejską*, Warszawa 2002, pp. 3-5.

10 See also: T. Stawewski, P. Winczorek, *Wstęp do prawoznawstwa*, Warszawa 1993, p. 29.

11 J. Berlińska, pp. 13-14.

12 A. Antoszewski, R. Herbut, *Systemy polityczne współczesnej Europy*, Warszawa 2006, p. 325.

Two standpoints have emerged in the western debates concerning accelerated integration. These represent two distinct approaches to this issue, namely the constructivist approach, which highlights the active role of units and groups participating in social dialogue, and the essentialist approach endorsed by the Danes¹³. If we assume that the Danish democratic system functions well, questioning the whole idea of putting it in jeopardy in the hope of achieving something which contradicts the country's tradition seems justified. It seems clear to those who adhere to the essentialist theory that the existence of two parliaments does not mean two times more democracy but may only impair and undermine the current system, forcing the necessity to strictly comply with the internal EU regulations¹⁴. A certain anxiety was observed among Danes, especially after the European Court of Justice had passed the ruling on *International Handelsgesellschaft*, finding that the Community law prevailed also over such legal norms as the primary laws or structural principles stipulated in the constitution.

Contrary to other Scandinavian countries, Denmark was never deeply committed to the idea of the political union of Europe¹⁵. Despite its membership of such organisations as EFTA and OEEC, it was basically oriented towards cooperating with Great Britain and Nordic countries. To manifest its support for the idea of such cooperation, Denmark broke off intensive talks with Sweden and Norway, focusing on the prospects of establishing the Nordic Economic Council. For this country, European integration revolves mainly around the issue of the economy, which is to promote international trade. The Danish politicians used to consistently steer clear of institutional integration, especially in the field of common foreign and security policies. Support for these concepts could not be found among the residents of the kingdom-dependent territories, i.e. the Faroe Islands and Greenland, whose policy after achieving autonomy was becoming more independent of Denmark¹⁶. The result of the Greenland referendum in 1982 concerning the membership of these territories of the European Communities turned out to be a peculiar precedent which obliged Denmark to apply for the exclusion of Greenland from this organisation¹⁷.

13 Ibidem, pp. 28–30; J. Blom-Hansen, *Avoiding the 'joint-decision trap: Lessons from intergovernmental relations in Scandinavia*, „European Journal of Political Research” 1999, No. 35, pp. 37, 45–46.

14 See also: K. Klaus, „Pojęcie i źródła deficytu demokracji w Unii Europejskiej”, „Studia Europejskie” 2004, No. 2, pp. 53–55; M. Ahl, *Prawo europejskie*, Warszawa 1998, p. 31.

15 See also: U. Burda, J. Gajewski, K. Szczepanie, *Vademecum organizacji europejskich*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 241–261; Z. M. Klepacki, *Zachodnioeuropejskie organizacje międzyrządowe*, Warszawa 1969, p. 320.

16 See also: Z. J. Pietraś, *Prawo wspólnotowe i integracja europejska*, Lublin 2005, p. 84.

17 See also: M. Grzybowski, *Systemy konstytucyjne państw skandynawskich*, Warszawa 1998, pp. 12, 34–35; S. Rudolf, *The European Constitution after the Failure of the Constitutional Treaty*, „Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht” 2008, No. 2 (63), p. 180.

Greenland was assigned the status of an overseas country, previously assigned also to the Falkland Islands and to New Caledonia, and retained the right of duty-free sales of its goods on the ECC markets, as well as the right to apply for financial aid from Brussels. The exclusion of Greenland from the structures of the EU has not brought any significant detriment to the Community, despite the considerable territorial loss.

5. Security Issues

Denmark based its security policy on its membership of NATO and on its close relationship with the United States¹⁸. As a result of the political expansion of the USSR, influenced especially by the events taking place in Czechoslovakia in 1948, Denmark had already joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation by 1949. The subsequent ruling party consistently granted precedence to NATO. According to many politicians, the time when Europe shaped its own history had passed forever, hence we should seek relations with the United States. This viewpoint was also supported by politicians after the crash of the eastern alliance. This thesis has remained to this day, especially in the light of efforts undertaken with a view to establishing the European Security and Defence Identity, to which Denmark is opposed¹⁹. Although the security of Denmark has always depended on its allies, it has conducted a firm policy against the alliance, in which it even managed to win a special status²⁰. Denmark objected to the installation of nuclear weapons and Euro rockets, and also refused to make contributions to the rocket infrastructure programme. Furthermore, it has never even sent a NATO contingent of its armed forces in the time of peace. Therefore, one can hardly expect that it will consent, similar to several other member states, including Poland, to far-reaching cooperation within the common security policy as exemplified by the arrangements made in Edinburgh in December 1992, under which the EU Council agreed upon extraordinary privileges of retaining autonomy, inter alia, in the field of defence policy, as well in as judicial and police cooperation. Additionally, Danish euro-sceptics voice certain doubts as to whether the united Europe will have sufficient powers to eliminate the risk of new conflicts arising, which was the initial intent of the founders of the ECSC. As emphasised by Danish analysts, in 1999 the Kingdom was engaged in war for the first time since 1964, taking an active part in

18 See also: S. Stefański, pp. 29, 34-47; K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, p. 10.

19 See also: R. Zięba, *Europejska Tożsamość Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony*, Warszawa 2000, p. 38.

20 See also: L. Orchowicz, *Dunia we współpracy nordyckiej*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 1986, No. 3, p. 86.

armed operations against Serbia, but it was not preceded by a comprehensive political debate in the country. Actually, Danes are not inclined to believe that Europe has any common tradition of peace²¹. They advocate that only certain countries can be considered peaceful, rather than Europe as a whole, since only in the 20th Century did it „serve” its citizens with two world wars, as well as with Marxism, Nazism, and concentration camps. The sceptical Danish society just does not believe that things can be different now.

6. Economic Issues

A similar standpoint was expressed by Denmark as regards the Single European Act, agreed upon on 16 December 1983, preceded by long negotiations. At that time, power in Denmark was exercised by Liberals and Conservatives, led by the Prime Minister, Paul Schluter (1982-93) from the Conservative People's Party. The coalition lasted ten years, mainly due to the participation of the Democrats. Public acceptance for the Single European Act was one of the main challenges to be faced by the new coalition government, as on 17 February 1983 Denmark refused to sign this document²². Brussels' uncertainty was intensified by the gradually dropping support of Danes for earlier ECC policy, while the socio-democrats postulated the rejection of the document, thereby blocking its acceptance by parliament. The decision by the Folketing (the Danish Parliament) would have serious consequences for both the common market and Denmark. For the ECC it would have a paralysing effect, destroying all previous achievements, whereas for Denmark, in the nightmare scenario, it could even mean the necessity to resign from the Group²³. Given the decision passed by parliament, the conservative government reacted immediately, undertaking a diplomatic action aimed at obtaining a special status for Denmark, granted by the ECC member states. The government simultaneously decided to hold a referendum on this matter²⁴. Eventually, support among the Danish society for the Single European Act exceeded 56.2%, and on 1 July 1987 it came into effect.

The success of the new government achieved in relation to EU issues persuaded Schluter to undertake more firm actions - for example, to oppose European tendencies. The Kingdom was suffering from recession, and Danes expected it to be quickly brought under control²⁵. Cuts in social expenditures

21 See also: L. Bill, *Denmark*, „European Journal of Political Research” 2000, no. 38, p. 371; J. Berlińska, pp. 15-16.

22 See also: Z. J. Pietraś, p. 63.

23 See also: J. Berlińska, pp. 43-44.

24 See also: A. Czekaj-Dancewicz, p. 65.

25 See also: R. Matera, pp. 5-7; L. Bill, *Denmark*, „European Journal of Political Research” 2002, No. 40, p. 286.

was put through in the Folketing, which promoted the concept of the so called, „cheap state”. Conservatives did not want to agree to the proposal by the Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet – F), which strove for tax reduction, and at the same time they lost the necessary social support. Under those circumstances, new problems appeared, also relating to EU issues. Although in May 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was approved by the Danish Parliament, in June the Danes rejected its adoption by a majority of 50.7%.

7. The Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Amsterdam

The referendum results evoked confusion both in Brussels and Copenhagen. Social Democrats were held responsible for the rejection of the Treaty, though as a matter of fact they supported the document in the Folketing, but were sceptical towards the idea of integration²⁶. In December 1992, Schluter's government negotiated special clauses in the Treaty, which were finally adopted on 11-12 December 1992 during a special session of the European Council in Edinburgh. As a part of so-called derogations, Denmark was exempted from the obligation to replace the krone by the euro²⁷. It was also partially excluded from the defence, safety and judiciary policy, and from the introduction of European citizenship within Denmark. It is worth mentioning that the Edinburgh compromise did not introduce any new provisions into the Treaty and all its regulations were based mainly on interpretation of the Treaty resolutions²⁸.

The amended version of the Maastricht Treaty was presented to the Danish public. Fortunately for developing European Union Danes approved the proposal on 18 May 1993. A second registered veto would have threatened plans for the fast accession of the remaining Nordic countries. It can be regarded as a crucial factor in the change in Danish attitudes before the second referendum on the matter²⁹. 43% of society voted against the Treaty – this significant sector part responded to the referendum results with obvious discontent, which was proved by stormy demonstrations on the night after the results were announced. It was the first time in the history of Denmark that live ammunition was

26 Ibidem; J. Zielonka, *Europa jako imperium. Nowe spojrzenie na Unię Europejską*. Warszawa 2007, p. 170; Z. J. Pietraś, p. 65; D. C. Mueller, *Federalism and the European Union: A constitutional perspective*, „Public Choice” 1997, No. 90, p. 272.

27 See also: K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, p. 17; art. 2-5 of The Protocol on the position of Denmark (Official Journal of the European Union from 16.12.2004, C 310/356); N. Petersen, *The Danish Referendum on the Treaty of Amsterdam Europas?*, Bonn 1998, p. 35; H. J. Nielsen, *EF pa valg*, Copenhagen, 1993, p. 44.

28 See also: E. Synowiec, *Dziśka Biała Księga w sprawie Traktatu z Maastricht*, „Wspólnoty Europejskie. Biuletyn Informacyjny” 1992, No. 10, p. 14.

29 J. Berlińska, pp. 80-82.

used against protesters. As a result over 50 people were injured. On behalf of Queen Margrethe the Treaty was formally signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and the Minister of Economy and future Prime Minister, Aders Fogh Rasmussen³⁰.

In January 1993, for the first time in eleven years, Social Democrats formed a majority government under the leadership of the „specialist” in economic affairs, that is, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen (1993-2001)³¹. Social Democrats faced a challenge of preparation and ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam. However difficulties in approval for the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and sharp statements concerning the Treaty made by Steen Gadea from the Social-Democratic party itself persuaded the Prime Minister to announce early elections, which he justified for economic reasons. This announcement turned out to be a surprise for the opposition and for electors. In March 1998 the party already in power won the elections³². In April 1998 proceedings against Prime Minister P. N. Rasmussen accusing him of violation of constitution were closed. The ruling favourable to the Prime Minister muted the campaign against the referendum, as a result of which in May 1998 Danes gave their consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam³³.

8. The Danish Presidency

In the elections which took place in November 2001 the Danish social democrats were defeated, losing the so-far leading position in the parliament, which they had held continuously since 1920³⁴. A coalition government was created by Liberals and Conservatists, securing their majority in the Folketing. The new Prime Minister, the Liberal Anders Fogh Rasmussen, focused on lowering taxes, which, despite the recommendations of the European Commission, remain one of the highest in the world. It was because of him, known as he was for his fervent support for expanding the European Union, that Denmark, was the first to ratify the Treaty of Nice.

In the 2nd half of 2002 Denmark, in spite of its known Euro-scepticism, held the presidency of the European Union, which was assessed as very success-

30 See also: K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, p. 18.

31 See also: Ibidem, pp. 8-10; J. Volz, *Denmark: An Exemplary Economic Policy?*, „Economic Bulletin” 2004, No. 4, pp. 59-64.

32 L. Bill, *Denmark*, „European Journal of Political Research” 1999, No. 36, p. 375.

33 See also: A. Czekaj-Dancewicz, p. 64; K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, pp. 18-19.

34 See also: W. Czapliński, K. Górski, *Historia Danii*, Warszawa 1965, p. 348.

ful³⁵. On 13 December 2002, at the summit in Copenhagen, accession negotiations with ten countries were concluded. The governing Liberals attributed this success to Prime Minister Rasmussen's personal skills. However, not all Danes believed in the diplomatic sense of the Prime Minister. Anders Fogh Rasmussen encouraged people to remember that „solutions in the constitution must be balanced between what Europe wants and what the citizens of the Kingdom can accept. Eventually, they make decisions in the referendum³⁶”. The words of the Prime Minister, together with his other warnings, were ignored by many.

During the Danish presidency, many countries outside the European Union asked the Danish the question why Denmark had decided to join EEC and the EU at all. There is no simple answer why this country could not be able to accept the rules of unconditional membership since the issue of Denmark is a of many factors and it constitutes an important problem. Denmark's accession to the EEC was purely an economic decision and hardly anyone thought of its political implications. The Danish began to perceive a united Europe in their own way, from the perspective of a small country, and at some point they wanted to generalise this idea into a more universal model, consisting of some kind of alternative membership in the European Union. Such a postulate was put forward by the Danish nationalists on the occasion of the invitation to the European Council in Edinburgh, and this same concept was supposed to pertain to the new members, especially the Nordic countries³⁷. This concept, due to its strong nationalistic character, and since the Treaty of Maastricht, has not appeared again.

9. „Constitution for Europe” and the Treaty of Lisbon

When it comes to support for the project entitled „Constitution for Europe”, which finally fell, and which for the Danish was an explicit sign of the federalisation of Europe, or the European federation of countries, public opinion was traditionally sceptical³⁸. Since the very beginning of their cooperation within the European Union, the Danish have taken the Gaullist position, claiming that „you can't make an omelette without breaking a few eggs”. This point of view was also expressed in surveys by the European Commission concerning the necessity to introduce the Treaty of Lisbon. Although the majority of member states generally agreed that the treaty regulations are necessary, the per-

35 See also: K. Dośpiał-Borysiak, p. 69-72; H. Larsen, *Denmark. A committed Member with Opt-Outs!* [in:] *National and European Foreign Policy*, ed. by R. Wong, C. Hill, New York 2011.

36 J. Berlińska, pp. 163-166; D. Čosić, *Szczęściarz z Kopenhagi*, „Wprost” 2009, No. 16 (1371).

37 See also: R. Matera, pp. 5-7.

38 See also: S. Rudolf, p. 184.

centage of proponents of such a solution has been the lowest – ever, and of opponents nearly the highest³⁹. Also due to this fact the government decided not to carry out a referendum, referring to the legal opinion that it is acceptable to leave the question of ratification to Parliament, which Folketing in fact did on 25 April 2008. However, under the pressure of public opinion, the government will be obliged to carry out such a referendum in the future. Although Anders Fogh Rasmussen mentioned the possibility of Denmark's resigning from opt-out clauses by way of a referendum⁴⁰, his successor, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, has already announced the date of the referendum concerning the potential inclusion of Denmark into the euro zone, which will take place in 2011. It should be noted that in the light of the survey carried out in May 2009, Danish society is to large extent (45.2%) against this proposition. However, it should be emphasised that despite the presence of strong anti-European opposition and despite the constant calling for greater democratisation of the Union, Denmark is one of the leading countries in terms of the level of democracy in the EU⁴¹. The December of 2010 marked the end of a transition the Lisbon Treaty. Danish government fully supported the new institutional balance and was working towards mobilizing all member states enhancing European economic policy cooperation and projecting EU's influence more effectively across the globe⁴².

In the first half of 2012, Denmark held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. It was the seventh time Denmark holds the EU Presidency since joining the European Community in 1973.

10. Conclusions

The decision of Denmark concerning membership of the EEC and, subsequently, in the European Union, was not univocal. A *consensus* on this matter has never been achieved. The creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 negatively affected Danish exports by discriminating against the country's products, which in a way forced Denmark to join the group. The problems connected with the Treaty of Maastricht, in turn, resulted from the

39 See also: J. Berlińska, pp. 163-166.

40 See also: A. Czekaj-Dancewicz, p. 66; U. Federspiel, *The international situation and Danish foreign policy in 2008* [in:] *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2009*, ed. by N. Havdtt, H. Mouritzen, Copenhagen 2010 p. 29.

41 R. Grzeszczak, *Problem deficytu demokratycznego w strukturach wspólnotowych*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 2002, No. 3, pp. 5-9; R. Biering, *The application of EU law in Denmark: 1986 to 2000*, „Common Market Law Review”, Haga 2000, No. 37, p. 959; R. Adler-Nissen, T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, *Straitjacket or sovereignty shield? The Danish opt-out on justice and home affairs and prospects after the Treaty of Lisbon* [in:] *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2010*, ed. by N. Havdtt, H. Mouritzen, Copenhagen 2011, pp. 137-160.

42 N. Havdtt, H. Mouritzen, *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2011*, Copenhagen 2012, pp. 24-25.

fear of losing identity and national values so important to the Danish.

Despite the final agreement on joining the EEC and the ratification of the Treaty on the European Union, Denmark's road towards Europe has never been easy. Starting from the issue of the common market within the EEC, in Denmark there has always been an opposition between two positions concerning integration, two visions of Denmark in Europe, and separate concepts represented by the country's two biggest parties. Therefore, as has already been rightly pointed out, the answer to the question whether there is a Danish approach towards integration or whether there are specific conditions in which this process takes place should be positive.