



Marek Wódka<sup>1</sup>

## Anthony D. Smith's idea of the nation. Controversy around definitions

### Abstract

This paper focuses on the category of the nation introduced by Anthony David Smith. The author attempts to answer the following questions: what does actually constitute a nation, what is the origin of a nation, and how does a nation exist. The main point of this paper is the evolution of the Smith's definition of the nation, which has already been debated. The analysis presented here aims to show that the changes introduced by Smith to the definition of the nation actually helped clarify this definition, while the basic definition of the nation remained a consistent and interesting concept for different theories of the nation, and in particular those coming from political sciences. In addition, this paper presents some major ideas of that British scientist and the main research schools studying the subject.

This paper mainly focuses on the analysis of the changes introduced by Montserrat Guibernau, a sociologist from the University of Cambridge, and attempts to explain motivations which drove Smith to introduce changes to his definition.

So far, none of the scientists exploring the British scientific thought has attempted to show how Smith's idea of the nation could be useful for Christian social teaching. Therefore, this paper includes some recommendations, which may be helpful for researchers interested in the field of the theory of nation. The ethnosymbolic concept of the nation, as defined by Smith, seems to correspond also with the concept of the nation that is characteristic of the Polish school of humanism. But while it is briefly mentioned in this paper, this problem is not explored in depth, as a possible subject of future research.

**Key words:** Anthony D. Smith, nation, ethnic, culture

### Introduction

In recent years there has been a lively debate on the nation as a sociological category. One of the many reasons for social scientists' interest

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<sup>1</sup> Dr Marek Wódka OFMConv, Wydział Nauk Społecznych, Instytut Nauk Socjologicznych, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II, Al. Raclawickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, e-mail: marek.wodka@kul.pl, nr ORCID: 0000-0002-0452-5440.

in this phenomenon is perhaps the crisis that can be observed at many levels within the European Union as an international community, as well as the issues raised by Brexit, and the problems of refugees and economic migrants. In different parts of Europe voices have asked to return to national states, as specific models of communities that are relatively closed in cultural, religious, political, and economic terms. Whatever the reasons for this, the category of the nation is again at issue, and not only among scholars. This observation has encouraged me to address this question, and this debate on these contemporary problems will rely on an in-depth analysis of the concept of the nation and approaches to its definition.

One of the sociologists who have explored the issue of the nation and nationalism is Anthony David Smith (1939–2016), a British scholar. Of Smith's many scientific achievements, it is his in-depth exploration of the cultural foundations of the nation that is perhaps the greatest. This British sociologist educated at Oxford focused virtually all his scientific efforts on the analysis of the cultural foundations of the nation across various historical periods, confining his attention to the underlying social and symbolic processes, and cultural resources. What must have proved useful in those scientific endeavours was his education in the humanities, and especially the history and philosophy degree courses he completed at the University of Oxford, and his sociological studies at the London School of Economics. Clearly interested in such areas as the nation, nationalism and ethnicity, he was appointed the first president of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) and continued to serve this role for more than twenty years.

Without a doubt, it was his all-round education that led Smith to approach his research interests in an interdisciplinary fashion. He investigated the nation from historical and sociological perspectives, i.e., within the domain of historical sociology. This paradigm of his studies would later become relevant, as discussed later in this paper.

This analysis focuses on the category of the nation, as originally defined by A.D. Smith. At the centre of attention here are such problems as what actually constitutes a nation, when does a nation exist, and, most importantly, under what circumstances is a nation born. In order to address these questions, Smith had, for many years, painstakingly examined various cultural traditions which lead to the development of the crucial conditions underlying the nation. Answers to those questions are not simple and scholars disagree on the specific times at which nations have emerged and the circumstances in which that happened. In light of this, it seems all the more appropriate to consider the approach proposed by Smith.

The bulk of this paper is a discussion on the evolution of the definition of the nation, as put forward by Smith, followed by an attempt to explain his intentions behind the changes he had made. Finally, what seems to me to be the most valuable about this article is that it sets out to demonstrate how useful his idea of the nation might be for Catholic social teaching, since there have been no previous studies on the sociological thought of this British scholar that seek to explore this area.

## Main research streams

While there have been many definitions of the nation, this paper focuses on the definition proposed by Smith. The problem addressed here seems interesting in so far as Smith's approach to the nation is the result of his scientific polemical engagement with two streams of scientific discourse on the importance of the nation as a sociologically observable phenomenon. The scholars who represent the first stream are known as modernists. They argue that nations emerged during the Enlightenment, as the modern State developed. This categorical approach is not commonly accepted in its extreme form, which is why a second group of scholars, especially British, was formed. Smith describes these as neo-perennialists. What is characteristic about them is that they challenge the majority of the claims made by modernists. Generally, the neo-perennialists contest the theory that nations, and nationalism, for that matter, are modern products: in their opinion, these have much earlier origins. As a seasoned scholar, Smith recognises the advantages and disadvantages of both these streams. But he does not identify himself directly with either of them. He respects the advances made by the representatives of both streams but argues that their research approaches are methodologically and substantively incomplete.

It is important to note here, that there is a third group of scholars identified by Smith. As those scholars all advocate primordiality, in the literature on the subject that stream is known as primordialism. It builds on the belief that modernists and neo-perennialists restrict themselves to historical and sociological arguments. Its advocates believe such 'methodological restraint' to be insufficient. Smith argues that it is also important to consider primordial ties, a sociological term proposed by Edward Shils, who identified several types of ties, including personal, sacred, civil, and primordial. This notion was then adopted by Clifford Geertz (Smith 2008: 9).

Smith argues that, while being unable to explain the origins or cultural development of nations, primordialists still make a significant con-

tribution that both modernists and neo-perennialists fail to make. They accentuate two elements, kinship and territory. So Smith asks why many people, even today, are ready to make sacrifices for the nation, as they used to make for faith in the past? The answer to this question is offered by Steven Grosby, who argues that ethnic groups and nations exist because there are traditional beliefs and activities related to primordial objects, such as biological properties and territorial location. Family, one's 'own' people, and milieu embody, carry, transmit and guard life. Therefore, people attribute sacredness to primordial objects and, just as in the past, today, too, they are ready to sacrifice their life for their family or nation (Grosby 1995; Smith 2008). Smith believes the argumentation based on primordial links plays an important role in the theory of the nation.

### Smith's definition of nation

Smith proposes the following definition of the nation as an ideal type: “a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or ‘homelands,’ create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws” (Smith 2008: 19). He understands national identity along similar lines – as the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identification of individuals with that heritage and its cultural elements (Smith 2008: 19).

The two above-mentioned categories (nation and national identity) give rise to a third important category explored by Smith, namely nationalism. Smith concludes that while the ideas of identity, whether individual, ethnic or national, have been criticised and misused not that long ago, they need to be defined clearly and their use limited to academic discourse. In other words, these are ideas which should not be abandoned in scientific research. He notices that the sense of national identity has become for many men and women (rather than only for politicians and academics) a kind of a public good, a state that needs to be found and cultivated, retained and transmitted among the members of the national community. The sense of national identity as such is closely connected with popular beliefs about the ideals of national autonomy and unity. Therefore, it seems reasonable to define nationalism as an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and

identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation' (Smith 2011: 231).

## Controversies around Smith's definition of the nation

Smith is not perfectly consistent in his approach to the nation, at least when it comes to its definition. The study of his earlier publications shows that he focuses on the permanent components of the nation, but also takes different positions in his attempts to define it. In his book *National Identity* (1991), Smith formulates his classical definition of the nation as "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith 1991: 14). And in his article 'When is a Nation?' (2002), Smith tries to define the 'ideal type,' a term he will regularly use in his subsequent publications. He defines the nation as "a named community possessing an historic territory, shared myths and memories, a common public culture and common laws and customs" (Smith 2002: 15). The 2008 definition builds on the one Smith provided and discussed in his paper entitled *When is a Nation?* The differences between those definitions can hardly be considered significant. In my opinion, Smith had retained the essence of the definition of the nation by eliminating, through the evolution of its concept, some of its less important elements. In other words, in the later definition, he retained the key elements that constituted the nation, although this does not mean that those are the only constituents of the nation.

Shortly after the publication of *When is a Nation?*, Montserrat Guibernau, a sociologist from the University of Cambridge, analysed the changes that could be observed in Smith's definitions of the nation, identifying three: (1) the 'mass' character of public culture has been eliminated; (2) reference to 'common economy' has also been removed; and (3) 'common legal rights and duties for all members' have been replaced with 'common laws and customs' (Guibernau 2004: 127).

Guibernau argues that these changes in Smith's definition of the nation reveal a certain cognitively important reality. The first adjustment, in which, as shown above, the 'mass' character of public culture was eliminated, might be the consequence of a scholarly debate on that issue. Guibernau assumes that Smith did that as a result of a debate with Walker Connor, who in his 1990 essay having, by the way, the same title as Smith's (*When is a Nation?*), emphasised that nationalism was a mass rather than an élite phenomenon. Moreover, Guibernau addressed two

questions to Smith – one about the timeline of nation creation, and the other about its mass character as a sociological category. In relation to the former, arguing, I suppose, that the mass character of culture is a modern phenomenon, Guibernau challenges Smith's argument for the pre-modern existence of nations. She asks how Smith could continue to claim that the nation requires 'mass' public culture while at the same time arguing that there are examples of social structures in pre-modern times, even in antiquity, that had national character? In addition, she asks how 'mass' should be defined: whether by 'the majority' of people? And if so, what kind of 'majority' are we talking about here? Simply a large part of the population? More than 51 percent? (Guibernau 2004: 128).

To address those reservations by Guibernau, and to defend Smith's position, let me refer to the example of ancient Israel. The Jewish nation was constituted on the basis of a covenant and mass culture. That culture permeated the lives of individuals, families, the nation, and the State. Indeed, that example is referred to by Smith himself on multiple occasions. Notice how important for that nation is the significance of the sacred texts and the laws, rituals, ceremonies, and offices described in them. In Smith's terms, these are 'cultural resources,' which, after all, were mass in nature already back in antiquity, and the practice of those could be used to identify members of that nation and the nation itself among other communities living in the land of Canaan. Such cultural resources, Smith would argue, include also customs and mores, symbols, languages and scripts, artifacts (obelisks and temples), banners and insignia, etc. He recognises that such resources could also be used by communities other than nations, but the point is that those cultural resources were readily available, and some of them were directly associated with communities, which – Smith believes – appeared, at a distance, to resemble the later aspirant nations of Europe and could act as models for them (Smith 2008: 23).

The second change in Smith's definition, as identified by Guibernau, is removing references to 'common economy'. She also asks whether 'common economy' refers to business activity limited to the territorial boundaries of the nation. Or should it be understood as a common economy cutting across national boundaries, an economy over which the nation has little or no control? Besides, if the nation is, as Smith insists, 'a kind(s) of collective cultural identity' (Smith 2002: 15), why should it include a 'common economy' as a key feature? (Guibernau 2004). Having read Smith's book *The Cultural Foundations of Nations*, I can conclude that, indeed, Smith stopped emphasising the importance of a common economy for national identity. But he did not abandon this idea

completely. A common economy is in the State's best interest. Therefore, if the nation is, as Max Weber argues, a community of sentiments, which would adequately manifest itself in a State of its own, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a State of its own (Weber 1948: 176). In my opinion, while Smith eliminated it from the definition of the nation, he did not abandon the 'common economy' element in his concept of the nation. There are two reasons for this, I believe. Firstly, the 2002 definition is very general and refers to the ideal-type nation. It was probably created by Smith for the purposes of his study of the cultural foundations of nations, and refers primarily to pre-modern nations. This seems reasonable if we take into account the extensive study of ancient nations carried out by Smith. This does not mean that he overlooks the historical nations which had more economic autonomy. Such nations are perceived by Smith as forms of human community characterised by collective cultural and/or political identity. To confirm this, let me cite what Smith wrote in 2008 – "...while some nations can be regarded as predominantly forms of political community, aspiring to or conjoined with sovereign States, others are best seen as forms of cultural and territorial community without such political partnership or aspirations, in the specific sense of claims to sovereign statehood. Their drive for internal autonomy tends to focus on social, economic, and cultural goals and aspires to their control within a given territory, without recourse to outright independence and sovereignty" (Smith 2008: 27). Therefore, a common economy can be a specific aspiration of a nation, especially when this contributes to its sense of sovereignty.

Let me now move on to another argument associated with the concept of nationalism. It seems that Smith usually refers to the issue of economic life when he discusses nationalism. This seems reasonable even today, when communities such as the European Union can be observed to exhibit economic patriotism. To recapitulate, as argued by Weber, a nation is a community which usually seeks to create a State of its own, and economic business is generally the domain of the State, hence economic community is secondary to national community, which is established on the basis of culture in its broad sense. But on the other hand, it is important to bear in mind that economy itself also has cultural origins and that elements of broadly-defined culture constitute its primary roots.

Researchers like Charles Hampden-Turner and Alfons Trompenaars argue that by exploring and taking advantage of what various cultures have to offer, nations can reap considerable economic benefits. Commonly accepted and interiorized value systems, habits and culture patterns constitute vital components in social development. They are also –

as the above-mentioned researchers claim – important factors in economic success ( Trompenaars, Hampden-Turner 2012).

Finally, the third step taken by Smith in the evolution of his definition was to replace ‘common legal rights and duties for all members’ of the nation with ‘common laws and customs.’ Guibernau seems to support this change, when she comments that, in her view, common legal rights and duties for all members, as found in the first definition, is not what one should expect from a cultural community, such as the nation. Rather, this is a function of the State, the political institution that regulates the lives of people within its territory. In modern societies, only the State has constitutions and written laws, and embodies sufficient power to define citizenship rights and duties within its territory. So she argues that, by suggesting that the members of the nation ought to share ‘common legal rights and duties’, Smith was simply attributing to the nation one of the fundamental characteristics of the State. She is not, however, happy with the change made in 2002, as she believes that the introduced expression ‘common laws and customs’ is a much more vague and open requirement (Guibernau 2004: 128–129).

The analysis of Smith’s subsequent texts shows that he was far from abandoning the idea of common rights and duties for all members of the nation. He directly suggests the standardisation of laws to be an important stage in the development of the nation. The processes of dissemination of customs and standardisation of laws and law-making have been crucial elements in the formation of nations. Such laws governed internal and external interactions of nation’s members. In fact, Smith believes that nations could in part be characterised as communities of law and custom, in which there is a strong sense of the common good and a set of rights and duties members share in relation to one another. In historical terms, that process is not the domain of modern States. Smith argues that this is clearly illustrated by the centrality accorded to the Mosaic Law by the Jews for the definition of Jewishness in the Second Temple period (Smith 2008: 38–39).

Moving on to the core argument, let me quote Smith who explicitly states that the process by which ethnic communities come to be governed by increasingly standardised law codes and uniform legal institutions is crucial for the formation of nations, for it provides a ‘roof’ of unity and a sense of social solidarity through shared norms and the recognition of common rights and duties for the members of the community. Smith recognises that for the most part that process took place under the aegis of a State, however rudimentary, usually that of an ethnic kingdom or principality (Smith 2008: 39). Therefore, it seems reasonable to separate

the processes of law-making and shared customs from the purely political dimension, and to consider that process in relation to a much earlier timeframe than modern States. Again, ancient Israel may serve as an example of a nation, which was certainly a community of one faith and one culture, but also a political community, based on centuries-old tradition of Mosaic Law.

## Nation-building processes

Let us, however, come back to the nation itself as a central category in this analysis. The nation, as argued by A.D. Smith, is primarily a social and cultural resource. While Smith is careful not to make any categorical claims that ancient empires, which operated as peculiar cultural resources and role models, should be designated as national communities, he notices that much later nations looked back to those examples as models of nationhood and drew from them certain resources – ideals, beliefs, and attachments, as well as of social and cultural organisation (Smith 2008: 22).

We return to Weber's formulation: a nation is a community of sentiments. A question that recurs in Smith's work is why so many people are ready to make enormous sacrifices for their nations? Would such heroism even be possible if nations were considered not as relatively homogeneous communities, but rather as some practical categories imposed by States? Indeed, a similar conundrum was recognised by Piotr Sztompka, a Polish sociologist, as he analysed national identity. This question is difficult to answer on the basis of the modernist concept of the nation. Smith, just like Sztompka, follows his academic intuition towards certain fixed values on which nations have been built. Members of such nations, as 'felt communities', are under the influence of a power and force that has such a strong control over their minds and hearts that many of them are ready to make sacrifices for their nation, even in the form of their lives (Sztompka 1993: 187).

The nation is the product of certain social and symbolic processes. It seems possible to identify the principal processes in the formation of nations. Smith identified five of these, namely self-definition, the cultivation of symbolic elements, territorialisation, the rise of a distinctive public culture, and the standardisation of laws and customs. Smith largely builds here on a study by Walker Connor, who back in 1994 made a claim about the central importance of myths of origin (Connor 1994, Chapter 8). According to Smith, the process of self-definition can be

negative, as the community comes to know who and what they are *not* in opposition to others near and far, from whom the community differentiates itself. The community feels that they differ from other communities. As part of such self-definition, as described by Smith, the community is given a distinct name, by which it is known and identified by itself and others (Smith 2008: 54).

Nation-building is also about the cultivation of symbolic elements, such as memories, symbols, values, traditions, and myths. What plays a special role in this process, Smith argues, is the cultivation of the myth of origin. It is important to note that a community distinguishes its own cultural heritage from that of its neighbours.

Another element of that process is the territorialisation of memories. This is not a static, one-off event in the history of a nation, but a more dynamic process. It is particularly important for ethnicity. Historical evidence of these processes is found by Smith long before modern times. While there are many examples of territorialisation in ancient and medieval communities, this process became more conscious during the Romantic era. Poetry from that period expressed an emotional link between the members of a nation and their land and landscape. In Polish literature, suffice it to mention Adam Mickiewicz and his famous invocation in "Pan Tadeusz."

The relative nature of territorialisation can be seen in the experience of the Jewish nation that has been able to sustain, cultivate, and develop its national identity for centuries in the diaspora. This fact does not, however, undermine the belief in the significant role of the Promised Land for Jews, or the importance of Jerusalem, the sacred city, for their culture and religiosity. Another example can be the Polish nation, which, deprived of its statehood for more than the one hundred and twenty years it was partitioned, and often dispersed throughout the East (Siberia) and the West (United States, France), not only did not lose its national identity, but even strengthened it during the times of oppression and persecution.

Another element of the cultural foundation of the nation is the development of a distinctive public culture, specific to a given community. What Smith understands by this is, on the one hand, the creation of a system of public rites, symbols, and ceremonies, and on the other hand the development of nation-specific public codes and literature. This process is associated with the last stage, as identified by Smith, namely the standardisation of laws and customs. He argues that most *ethnies* and nations, once their members had acquired a written vernacular, boasted various compilations of customs, rituals, traditions, and laws, and these increasingly governed their relationships, both among themselves and

with outsiders. Consequently, Smith believes that nations could in part be characterised as communities of law and custom, in which there is a strong sense of the common good (Smith 2008: 38–39).

These nation-building processes, as briefly discussed above, are only the preconditions for the development of nations. But this does not mean that this list is exhaustive. Still, the above discussion shows that the State, as a political structure, can be considered secondary to the nation.

Smith's exploration of the cultural foundations of nations has provided cognitively interesting material on the long-standing dispute among sociologists over the origins and character of the nation. Let us but briefly touch upon this topic, as a short detour from our main discussion here. In the sociological literature there are two major concepts of the nation, a political-science one, and a cultural one. The former, based on political science, is quite widespread. It assumes the existence of a link between the State and the nation, so the primary criterion that underlies the nation is legal and political in nature, and the State and its institutions are in charge of it. And the cultural concept, on the other hand, stipulates that it is distinctive culture that is primarily constitutive of the nation.

The latter concept is advocated by Jan Turowski, a famous Polish sociologist, and many of his adherents. Take, for instance, a claim proposed by Janusz Mariański along the same lines as that made by Turowski, where he argues that the nation exists and operates through cultural institutions, such as schools, universities, associations of folk artists, libraries, publishing houses, theatres, museums, etc., i.e., through the institutions that create works of symbolic and material culture, and the institutions that disseminate these values among the members of that nation. What seems important here is that, in terms of their organisational form and financing, such institutions can be State or local-government institutions, but in terms of what they do, they are always institutions of the nation as a cultural community (Mariański 2018: 104–105).

Therefore, the nation is best conceived as a community of culture that emerges over time as individual communities develop and “create their distinctive culture, and nation members participate in that national culture, which includes a common language, customs, art, science, business activity, tradition, and other forms of activity” (Turowski 1999: 145). These claims have been analysed by another Polish sociologist, Stanisław Fel, who demonstrated that, in addition to that measurable aspect of the development of national culture, as referred to above, an important role in its constitution, identity, and development, is played by ideals, or goals, which are pursued by that national community. Both

those scholars, Turowski and Fel, agree that social subsystems overlap, meaning that they believe in the integrity of the four subsystems – social, political, economic, and cultural – and only consider them separately for analytical purposes. Moreover, it is culture, its type, shape and advancement level, as developed within a community that significantly affects the quality of social, political, and economic life. At this point, it only seems reasonable to do what Smith did in his definition of the nation when he eliminated the concept of a ‘common economy’ in favour of attaching more importance to culture as the key determinant of the development of the nation.

## Conclusions

This analysis of the evolution of Anthony D. Smith’s ideas about the nation and its cultural foundation leads to two conclusions: 1. Smith does not change his general position as he updates his definition of the nation. In other words, in order to reliably and fairly examine his position, one must not limit oneself to the analysis of definitions themselves and the specific changes that can be identified in these between the consecutive publications. One must make a comprehensive study of his theories. So it is insufficient to read just the definitions, one must read the whole book in which each definition is provided. 2. The changes proposed by Smith in his second definition meet the needs of his studies, which explore the ancient roots of the nation – religious, ethnic, and cultural.

Moreover, the cultural concept of the nation, which Smith advocated, similarly to such major representatives of humanistic sociology in Poland as Florian Znaniecki, Józef Chałasiński, Stanisław Ossowski, and Jan Turowski, or, more recently, Janusz Mariański and Stanisław Fel, provides some valuable insights for those currents in social philosophy which emphasise the subjectivity of the person across all four social subsystems. Moreover, Smith’s concept of the nation might serve as a very useful conceptual tool for many theories involving the cultural foundations of the nation, including theories advocated within the circles of Christian thinkers. This analogy is recognised by Fel, as he accentuates the subjectivity of the person across all social subsystems (Fel 2018: 13). This calls for further reception and careful study of Smith’s sociological ideas in many interdisciplinary fields of research, including Catholic theology and Christian social philosophy.

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## Koncepcja narodu Anthony'ego D. Smitha. Kontrowersje wokół definicji

### Streszczenie

Treść artykułu skupia się na kategorii narodu zdefiniowanej przez brytyjskiego socjologa Anthony'ego Davida Smitha. Autor podejmuje próbę odpowiedzi na pytania: w jaki sposób konstrytuuje się naród, gdzie ma swoje początki i w jaki sposób egzystuje. Głównym problemem analizy jest jednak ewolucja Smitha definicji narodu, która była już przedmiotem debaty. Zaprezentowana w niniejszym studium analiza ma na celu wykazanie, że wprowadzone przez Smitha zmiany definiujące naród są w rzeczywistości próbą wyjaśnienia samej koncepcji narodu, przy czym podstawowa teoria Smitha pozostała spójną i interesującą alternatywą dla innych teorii narodu, szczególnie tych z nurtu politologicznego. W artykule zarysowany też został kontekst naukowy prowadzonych przez brytyjskiego socjologa badań oraz główne szkoły myśli socjologicznej zajmujące się niniejszą problematyką.

Autor artykułu poświęca najwięcej miejsca analizie zmian zdefiniowanych przez Montserrat Guibernau, socjolog z Uniwersytetu w Cambridge, i podejmuje próbę wyjaśnienia intencji, jakimi kierował się Smith, wprowadzając zmiany w swojej definicji.

Jak dotąd nikt z badaczy myśli socjologicznej brytyjskiego uczonego nie podjął się próby wykazania przydatności jego koncepcji narodu dla chrześcijańskiej myśli społecznej, stąd artykuł zawiera rekomendacje, które w przyszłości mogą pogłębić badania nad kategorią narodu wśród reprezentantów tego nurtu badań naukowych. Etnosymboliczna koncepcja narodu w ujęciu Smitha zdaje się korespondować także z ujęciem narodu charakterystycznym dla dyskursu polskiej socjologii humanistycznej. Autor artykułu wzmiankuje o tym, pozostawiając jednak ten problem na etapie przesłanki do dalszych badań.

**Słowa kluczowe:** Anthony D. Smith, naród, etniczność, kultura